INSTITUTO TECNOLGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE MONTERREY

EGAP GOBIERNO Y POLTICA PBLICA

PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN MEXICO: RISKS TO

SOVEREIGNTY BY 2020

TESINA

PRESENTADA COMO REQUISITO PARCIAL PARA OBTENER EL GRADO

ACADMICO DE:

MAESTRA EN PROSPECTIVA ESTRATGICA

POR:

JUAN RAMIRO GARZA QUINTANILLA

MONTERREY, N.L. MAYO DE 2014

 INSTITUTO TECNOLGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE
MONTERREY

EGAP GOBIERNO Y POLTICA PBLICA

Los miembros del comit de tesina recomendamos que el presente proyecto de tesina
presentado por el Lic. Juan Ramiro Garza Quintanilla sea aceptado como requisito parcial
para obtener el grado acadmico de:

Maestro en Prospectiva Estratgica

Comit de Tesina:

Dr. Zidane Zeraoui

Asesor

Dr. Pedro Torres Estrada Dr. Gerry A. Andrianopoulos

Sinodal Sinodal

2
AGRADECIMIENTOS

A mi familia, por su incondicional apoyo. A mi padre, por compartir siempre su experiencia

y sabidura. A mi madre, por su total confianza en m.

A mis compaeros y profesores de EGAP, por compartir sus conocimientos y siempre

estar abiertos a nuevas ideas. Al Dr. Zidane Zeraoui, que siempre estuvo atento a las
necesidades de sus alumnos y al Dr. Pedro Torres quien me abri las puertas para
involucrarme en el Legado de Seguridad Pblica y a quien le debo incontables favores.
Especialmente al Dr. Gerry A. Andrianopoulos, su entusiasmo y motivacin durante este
proceso fue un gran apoyo. Sin sus indicaciones, este trabajo no hubiera tenido la misma
calidad.

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter I: Concepts defined ........................................................................................... 8
1. International Relations and Mexican sovereignty .................................................. 8
2. National Security redefined for Mexico ................................................................ 12
3. What is a Private Military and Security Company? .............................................. 15
4. A prospective study: The Delphi method ............................................................. 18
Chapter II: The international context ............................................................................ 22
1. Development of Private Military and Security Companies ................................... 22
2. International law and PMSCs .............................................................................. 28
Chapter III: The Mexican context .................................................................................. 33
1. A need for security reconstruction ....................................................................... 33
2. Cooperation with the United States: the Merida Initiative .................................... 37
3. Private Military and Security Companies activity in Mexico ................................ 47
4. Mexican legislation on the matter ........................................................................ 56
Chapter IV: Delphi method and prospective analysis ................................................. 61
1. Delphi methodology ............................................................................................ 61
2. Cross-impact analysis and scenario building....................................................... 64
Final considerations ...................................................................................................... 74

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 75

Annexes.......................................................................................................................... 81

4
INTRODUCTION

Mexico has been transitioning to a model of economic and political openness since

the last three decades. The states motivation to do this is related with the conception that

a greater integration with international markets and direct foreign investment will result in

economic growth and development. Market integration, consumerism, multinational

corporations, and organized crime are just a handful of phenomena derived from the

political organization of the economic system in the global stage. The effects of these

processes have brought a higher participation of private companies in the world affairs

turning them into power entities beyond the state and beyond borders. These entities are

participating in the global agenda with a greater frequency in the last decades to such an

extent that their influence has a significant role in the decision making process and help

shape public policies both domestically and internationally.

The aspects that surpass borders not only include political and economic events

but cultural and social features as well. Social networking, popular global events, sports,

religion and migration, all of them adapting to the new financial and commercial protocols

have opened the banking networks and consumerism redefining global society. Alongside

this redefinition, the sovereign state has also been transforming. The state is no longer the

most important entity in political, economic and institutional existence on every issue. The

redefinition of the role of the state is not only in relation to its power but also with its limits

and its freedoms. It is in these limits, created with the objective of guaranteeing a pacific

existence for its population, that its position as the central entity is being displaced. More

importantly, the influence of private corporations in state matters has been shaping the

policies designed to control the global economic organization.

In the case of Mexico, adapting to this new shift required a response to specific

internal and external forces. During the 1980s, the Mexican state made several changes
5
in its relation with other countries adopting new policies towards the international market

and domestically, diminishing its intervention in economic activity. The policies followed

were similar to those in other countries, showing a willingness to work through

interdependence and adapt to the new global principles. However, the protection of the

consumer and the market prevented the development of the productive forces and

competitive quality in accordance to international standards which can result from adapting

domestic prices to international levels.

The economic system to which Mexico turned had the objectives of economic

openness, deregulation, promotion of foreign investment and the privatization of

decentralized public entities. These objectives brought a greater influence from

multinational corporations in state policies alongside an influence of organized crime

founded on violence. As Patio states, violence and the appearance of influence groups

within a closed territory are some of the effects that underdeveloped countries suffer due

to the change of state-wise policies that have privileged an irrational globalization in

contempt of the citizens interests and a distancing of the practices of the Welfare State

(Patio, 2010).

Transnationalization and global capitalism have privileged market supremacy

giving a higher participation of the enterprises controlling it. This has displaced the social

policies of the sovereign state. This reconfiguration of states purpose must be done wary

of any threats. The more functions it displaces, the more vulnerable it can become to non-

public actors. This worldwide phenomenon of private actors taking roles that are normally

attributed to the state has been present in Mexico since the 1980s.

Since 2007, Mexico has seen an increase of private security companies entering

national territory, mostly through the Merida Initiative. Most of the private companies

working in Mexico are hired by the United States. To a lesser extent, Mexican institutions
6
hire private security companies directly but this is done mostly for operative police

preparation. In accordance to Mexican legislation, these companies can only offer training

and consulting services to public security forces, however the evolution of their

participation in state-attributed functions has yet to be defined.

As the roles of the state reconfigure, it is of great importance for sovereignty to

distinguish the privatization of security functions from other privatization markets. The

objective of this document is to assess the potential long-term risks to sovereignty and

national security of outsourcing security functions to foreign private companies in Mexico.

This will be done through a prospective analysis using the Delphi method. It is imperative

to know the limitations a state must address to outsourcing traditionally public functions.

For this, an evaluation of international legislation will be analyzed alongside the internal

legislation in Mexico related to this issue.

A prospective study involving the Delphi method will be presented in order to give

an expert approach of the delegation of security functions by the state and is future

implications to sovereignty and national security in Mexico.

7
 CHAPTER I: CONCEPTS DEFINED

1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND MEXICAN SOVEREIGNTY

For a detailed analysis of the subject of study, the main concepts will be outlined in

this section to give a particular path to the investigation at hand. The first concept has to

do with sovereignty and the elements that allow a state to practice this concept within its

borders.

Max Weber gives a definition of sovereignty that is helpful to contextualize in the

subject of force as a state-only attribution. He determines that the state is such, and

therefore sovereign, only insofar as it is the supreme and legitimate controller of physical

force within the territorial boundaries (Weber & Whimster, 2004). For Weber, the use of

force is deemed as a task to be performed only by the state.

In international relations theory, sovereignty has a direct link to national security. In

classical theories, in an anarchic international system, power is the axis of operation for

international actors since this allows a state to conserve its position within the system and

consequentially preserve their national interest (Orozco, 2006). It is then of the utmost

importance for a state to maintain its monopoly of force in its order to uphold its

sovereignty.

The historic debate in international relations theorists resides between the points of

view of realists and idealists. Their definition of sovereignty differs in concept. For liberal

interdependence theorists sovereignty is defined in terms of the states ability to control

actors and activities within and across its borders. For realists, the essence of sovereignty

is the states ability to make authoritative decisions (Thomson, 1995).

8
 The extent of any states sovereignty has an internal and an external dimension.

Internal sovereignty defines the ultimate or highest authority within a state. [It] implies a

hierarchic relationship between the sovereign and subordinates, whoever they may be.

Internal sovereignty requires effective control over the territory claimed by the state (Lake,

2003). This has also been called domestic sovereignty.

On the other hand, external sovereignty entails the recognition by other similarly

recognized states that this entity is one of them and thus, is an inherently social concept.

Sovereignty implies a relationship of formal equality. As Kenneth Waltz describes it,

between sovereign states none is entitled to command; none is required to obey (Lake,

2003). This comprises the concept of anarchy within the international arena, where no

actor possesses any authority over another.

Westphalian sovereignty is defined as an institutional arrangement for organizing

political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors

from domestic authority structures (Krasner, 1999). In this sense, any states sovereignty

is its own ability to decide for itself the course of action to take regarding any matter within

its territory.

Sovereignty within international relations theory has a basic and direct input. To

define it under this scope, Janice Thomsons work State Sovereignty in International

Relations is deemed useful. In her work, the concept is defined as the recognition by

internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene

coercively in activities within its territory (Thomson, 1995). To outline the elements that

derive from this definition, Thomsons work mark the guideline by pointing out the concepts

of recognition, state, authority, coercion and territory.

9
 Although it is unclear on who must make the recognition of a state, it is convened

that it must emanate from a majority of states, the great powers, all states, a core of elites,

a hegemonic power or something else. What a state must to do to achieve recognition is to

demonstrate its capabilities to defend its authority against domestic and international

challengers. Even though not every state has these capabilities, there are cases when

they do exist alongside a lack of recognition. Such was the case of the Soviet Union, which

lacked recognition of the great powers but still maintained authority within its territory.

The state is another element to be mentioned in order to achieve a complete

definition of sovereignty. In international relations theory, sovereignty resides with the

state. Under realist theories, the state comprises territory, government, people and society.

In liberal theories, under the paradigm of interdependence, the distinctions between

country and state are more sensitive. Thomson mentions that the state-building process

and state-society relations were permeated with outside influences in the sense that war,

competition and cooperation gave form to the modern state. The state is the central

bureaucratic apparatus claiming a monopoly on organized coercive forces (Thomson,

1995).

The next element is authority. A sovereign state has the recognition of having the

authority to define what is subject to state coercion. This means that the state has the

ability to decide what is delegated to other entities in the country beyond political, that can

be private, social, economic, religious, cultural, etc. Authority concerns rule-making and

control, rule-enforcement (Thomson, 1995).

Thomson explains that the states function is policing. They all have a common

interest in monopolizing coercion. States can and do cooperate between them against

societal actors who challenge this monopoly.

10
 Finally, territoriality has a link with political authority under the concept of

sovereignty. Under the geographical boundaries of a country, the state exercises its

authority. To finish with Thomsons ideas to define sovereignty, we must return to the first

element of recognition. Most states are sovereign because other states recognize them as

such (Thomson, 1995).

To have an even more contextualized concept of sovereignty we must analyze the

definition given by authors that have a direct relationship with the state that is the object of

this study, the Mexican state. Joel Guerrero Gonzlez says that the European doctrine

accepts the state as the subject of sovereignty and that power must be exercised by the

organs that form it. However, he claims that this doctrine has failed and that the American

doctrine differs by substituting the state and recognizing sovereignty as the will of the

people, externalized in the Constitution. (Guerrero, 1988)

This can be related with Jean Jacques Rousseaus idea that the social contract

originates the concept of sovereignty of the people. Within the state, every individual

possesses an equal and inalienable part of sovereignty. In contrast, Thomas Hobbes

stated that men decide to form a power, absolute and perpetual giving up their self-

defense and submitting to their lord which is delegated with their natural rights. Jean Bodin

affirmed that power of the state resided in sovereignty. That sovereignty is a characteristic

of the power of the state and consists of giving definite orders; by making itself obeyed in

the internal order of the state and affirm its independence in relation to other states.

(Guerrero, 1988)

In Mexican history, the evolution of the Constitution has had different definitions of

the concept of sovereignty. In the first document from 1814, Sentimientos de la Nacin,

Jos Mara Morelos takes Rousseaus point of view and determines that sovereignty is

derived immediately from the people, which deposit it in their representatives dividing the
11
powers in Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. The following versions also have an

influence from American and French ideas and the last Constitution of 1917 continues with

this tradition and establishes that sovereignty resides, by essence, in its origin and

principle, in the Mexican people, not in the individuals or persons, but in the nation, the

people (Guerrero, 1988).

To conclude, sovereignty as understood by the Mexican Constitution is the

sovereignty of the people. It is unique because it is indivisible, inalienable, non-

transferable, supreme and submitted to law (Guerrero, 1988).

2. NATIONAL SECURITY REDEFINED BY MEXICO

The second concept that will be analyzed, National Security, has numerous

definitions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as the safety of a nation and its

people, institutions, etc., from a military threat or from espionage, terrorism, etc. (National

Security, 2013). This concept has been evolving and new dimensions may be added or

subtracted from it.

For Martha Brcena, the term security refers to being free of concerns, to feel safe

of any harm that may be inflicted by others. It is a subjective concept that is determined by

perceptions and not necessarily by objective situations (Brcena, 1999). She states also

that due to the transnational characteristic of many problems, the bond between national

and international security is constantly becoming stronger. For the objective of this thesis,

the Mexican redefined concept for national security will be used. Several scholars

addressing national security from a Mexican perspective will be consulted on their

conceptions to the conclusion of this effect.

12
 The concept of national security is defined by Luis Herrera-Lasso as a condition

that must prevail in order for everything else to work and is translated into stability, social

peace, Rule of Law and institutional permanence (Herrera-Lasso, 2010). For Jos Luis

Pieyro, national security is defined as a situation where the majority of the sectors and

social classes of the nation have their cultural and vital material needs guaranteed trough

the decisions of the national government, the actions of the state institutions, or, where

there exists a relative security against potential domestic risks or real external threats, that

violate the reproduction of the nation or the state (Pieyro, 2010).

The definitions given respond to a general overview of the concept, however, every

administration defines national security according to its own beliefs and views. For Tello,

the concept is historically configured to encompass those aspects which put at risk the

conditions and basis of existence, functioning and continuity in a nation. He adds that the

construction of the concept is different for every state and that it evolves in function of time

and its internal and external conditions (Tello, 2006). For this study, the focus will be on

the definition and use of the concept by presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Caldern. This

responds to the years from 2000 to 2012, a period that comprises an increase in the

severity of the threats perceived by Mexico as well as its cooperation with the United

States under the Merida Initiative.

In 2005, under the administration of Vicente Fox, a new National Security Law was

passed that redefined the PRI conception of national security. Under the PRI, the national

security of Mexico was equated with the survival of the PRI in power. The new definition

focuses on maintaining the integrity, stability, and permanence of the Mexican state-

namely:

I. Protection of the Mexican nation against threats and risks faced by our country;

13
 II. The preservation of sovereignty and national independence and defense of the

territory;

III. Maintenance of constitutional order and strengthening of democratic institutions of

the government;

IV. The maintenance of the unity of the parts of the Federation signaled in the article

43 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States;

V. The legitimate defense of the Mexican State in respect to other States or subjects

of international law, and

VI. The preservation of democracy, founded in the economic, political and social

development of the country and its inhabitants (Cmara de Diputados del H.

Congreso de la Unin, 2005).

Under Calderns administration the same legislation remained in effect, he

continued Foxs strategy to strengthen public security institutions and adopted a broad

concept of national security. The main difference was the use of the military to address

national security threats, mainly the drug trafficking organizations.

Dr. Gerry Andrianopoulos gives a redefinition of the national security term using

Mexico as an example in his paper National Security Redefined: Calderons War on

Drugs. He states that today it is politically convenient to use national security loosely to

describe both internal and external threats to national territory, population, and

government (Andrianopoulos, 2010). In Mexico, drug trafficking organizations were

considered by Fox and Calderon a national security threat. This definition opened the path

to strengthen cooperation in security with the United States.

In Mexico [t]he absence of external military threats and the institutional weakness

of the Mexican public security agencies have substantially expanded the militarys role on

domestic non-military areas, such as counternarcotics, civil protection and disaster relief.
14
As Andrianopoulos explains [b]oth concepts see the threats to Mexican national interests

coming primarily from domestic factors rather than international actors and developments

()This view was not accepted by the US until 2003 (Andrianopoulos, 2010). In short, in

Mexico since 2005, the redefined concept of national security merged the concepts of

national security and public security.

It is in these terms that national security in Mexico is defined. As we can see, the

potential risks and threats that could destabilize the state are considered of supreme

importance for the development of a national security strategy. On the matter of what

concepts should be considered as a national security threat, many countries and

representatives can differ but once it has been identified as such, measures to defend

stability may involve coercion or the use of force. In the particular case of Mexico, the

elements that define national security combine traditional and new concepts of national

security.

3. WHAT IS A PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANY?

The last concept is Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). These

companies provide a diverse array of services which range from military operations to

training for local security institutions. For the clarification of the concept, a distinction must

be made with the term mercenaries that was first established in the Protocol Additional to

the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of

International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. In Article 47, a mercenary is

defined as one that meets the following conditions:

As being recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.

He does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities.

15
 He is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private

gain and, in fact, is promised material compensation substantially in excess of that

promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.

He is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory

controlled by a party to the conflict.

He is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict.

He has not been sent by a state which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty

as a member of its armed forces.

This concept of a mercenary was the first introduction of private services to deliver

security activities normally during the development of a domestic or an international

conflict. However, this definition has shifted to adapt to the evolution of PMSCs. Since the

end of the Cold War, their participation in armed conflicts and world affairs has been

increasing alongside the consternation by the international community to clarify the role

these actors play in international conflicts.

As Peter Singer explains, these companies compete in the open global market.

They are legal entities that can be contracted by anyone willing to do so. This puts them in

a spot where international law clarification needs to be well-defined.

The definition given in the Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight

and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies, issued by the United Nations

Working Group on Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating and Impending the

Exercise of Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination goes as follows: a PMSC is a

corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services,

including investigation services by physical services and/or legal entities (Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009).

16
 The Montreux Document, issued in Switzerland by 17 representatives of different

states, seeks to provide guidance on a number of thorny legal and practical points, on the

basis of existing international law. It does so without taking a stance on the much broader

question of the legitimacy and advisability of using PMSCs in armed conflicts (International

Committee of the Red Cross, 2008).

The Montreux Document, issued in 2008, defines PMSCs as private business

entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe

themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and

protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places;

maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or

training of local forces and security personnel (General Assembly Security Council, 2008).

The existence and contracting of PMSCs is within the boundaries of international

law and the Montreux Document is only determined to address states on the good

practices of PMSCs. However it is still useful for other international entities that decide to

contract these companies. The concern of issuing this document relies on the possibility

that a state might use these private entities to commit international humanitarian law

offences. With guidelines on the usage of the PMSCs this possibility is reduced.

Another definition of PMSCs is given by Peter Singer in his book Corporate

Warriors. In it he explains that these organizations are corporate bodies that specialize in

the provision of military skills including tactical combat operations, strategic planning,

intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training, and military

technical assistance (Singer, 2002). Singer calls these organizations Privatized Military

Firms to give a broader understanding of the concept, as he says, drawing from the

business economics theory of the firm literature. However, for the purposes of this study,

the term Private Military and Security Companies will be used.

17
 Singer distinguishes three different types of firms that offer different services. The

type 1 firms are military provider firms who offer implementation and command services.

Types 2 are military consulting firms, offering advice and training. And lastly, types 3 firms

which offer military support such as supplementary services (Singer, 2002).These

concepts open the path to the analysis of these contractors being involved in Mexico and

the challenge this could pertain for its sovereignty and national security. In the next

chapters, a historic point of view will be provided and a prospective methodology will be

used to build scenarios for a long-term period.

4. A PROSPECTIVE STUDY: THE DELPHI METHOD

One of the most well-known methods for prospective studies is the Delphi method.

Developed in the Research Centre of the RAND Corporation by Olaf Helmer and

Theodore J. Gordon, this instrument is used to broaden the knowledge about the future of

a certain topic. It is a method that gives structure to a group process dealing with a

complex problem. The Delphi method selects a group of experts whose opinion will be

asked concerning a specific topic referring to its future.

The process involves successive questionnaires that will eventually reveal potential

convergences and the consensus between the experts selected. Typically, the inquiry is

made anonymously with the objective of avoiding possible reservations due to the

influences some personalities or ranks may exert. However, there are many different

versions of Delphi and anonymity is debatable in some modalities.

Questions refer to the probability of realization of a certain hypothesis or events in

the future. The quality of the prospective study depends on the depth and clarity of the

questions asked alongside a thorough and precise selection of the experts. These

18
characteristics are the difference between an incomplete study and an inclusive

examination of the probable future events. The ultimate objective of the Delphi method is

to foresee the most important transformations that may be produced in the future.

In this study, the steps dictated in Astigarras document, The Delphi Method, by the

University of Deusto, will be followed. Its process consists of four phases for a successful

Delphi application. The first phase is the formulation of the problem. This phase is

essential as it will lay off the delimitation of the topic studied and experts should share

knowledge about the topic to be studied. The questionnaire must be designed at this step

with precise, quantifiable questions that are independent from each other.

The second phase is the selection of experts. Their selection must be determined

by their knowledge of the topic to be studied and their capacity to predict the future. A

thorough analysis of their professional experience must be made in order to define the

fields of expertise needed for a complete prospective analysis.

The third phase is about the formulation of the questionnaire. Answers will

preferably be quantifiable by level of occurrence and of importance. They need to include

information on the environment, information available, evolution of the systems and the

necessity of change in a determined area. Answers can be categorized in order to apply

percentages and separate them in majority and minority.

Finally, the fourth phase is about the practical development and exploitation of

results. The questions must be followed by a presentation note to explain the objectives

and practical conditions of the Delphi study. The successive questions are made to

diminish the dispersion in the opinions. If an answer is divergent in relation to the group, a

justification must be made in order to achieve a definitive answer which is an opinion made

by consensus.

19
 The utility of the method rests in the idea that subjectivity can be objectified trough

the agreement of several experts opinions. Some of the advantages of the method are

that the shared cosmogony of the participants will give certainty to the factors that

surround the topic studied. The method is a great tool to bring light to probable events,

tendencies, probable evolutions of any given problem and with abundant information.

The limitations of the method have to do with the duration, sometimes costly

process. It is considered to be intuitive more than rational by some critics. If the experts

have high positions in companies or in other institutions, their time is probably very

valuable and a complete dedication to the method may be unimportant for them, rushing

into their answers and giving an incomplete notion of their knowledge. Another

disadvantage is the lack of analysis in the interaction of the variables derived from the

study; this has been countered by using other prospective methods such as the cross-

impact analysis.

The cross-impact analysis has the goal of creating scenarios that will give a precise

narration of possible situations derived from the variables obtained in the Delphi analysis.

Theodore Gordon defines a scenario as an affluent and detailed portrait of a possible

future. It is sufficiently vivid so that a strategist can perceive and comprehend the

problems, changes and challenges that exist in a determined context. He states that a

scenario is not a prediction by itself but more of a plausible description of what might

happen in the future (Gordon, 1994).

Michel Godet, an economist and prospective studies academic, defines a scenario

as an integration formed by the description of a future situation and of the path of events

that allow passing from an origin situation to a future one. He stresses that a scenario is

not a future reality, but a means to represent it with the goal of having a wider vision when

20
taking decisions in the present (Godet, La prospective en quete de rigueur: porte et

limites des methodes formalises, 2000).

The cross-impact analysis helps with the creation of future scenarios. It is a refined

version of the model designed by Theodore Gordon and Olaf Helmer in 1966. It sustains in

the perceptions of how future events may interact and how the occurrence or non-

occurrence of an event may influence another event.

21
 CHAPTER II: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

1. DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

Since the end of the Cold War, private contractors of security services have been

spreading worldwide. The propagation of these private entities responds to the

technological advancements in warfare and the general shift towards privatization in the

global stage. Their operations are not exclusive of a certain type of country since they

have been acting in a range of different entities with diverse political, social and economic

situations. They are present in the United States as well as in Haiti or African countries.

Their services provide security or military skills; these can be tactical combat operations,

strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training,

and military technical assistance (Singer, 2002).

The United States involvement in global post-Cold War conflicts has in all cases

included support by PMSCs. The reliance on PMSCs by countries, corporations,

international organizations and other actors has become a constant in the last decades.

This calls for a better understanding of the implications that the presence of these

companies can have for international security.

The use of PMSCs is not a recent occurrence as it goes back to Ancient Egypt. Its

evolution, however, responds to systemic transitions in the international order. Trading

entities such as the Dutch and English East Indies Companies operated as near-sovereign

powers, commanding armies and navies larger than those in Europe, negotiating their own

treaties, governing their own territory, and even minting their own money (Singer, 2002).

The influence of neoliberalism in western societies and the constant search for

cost-efficiency in every economic endeavor has also affected the security dimension by

22
turning it into a business. Laurence Juma makes a prudent assertion when he says that

PMSCs are no accident; they are a product of the privatization and maximization of profit

ideology which drives processes to reorganize the security infrastructure as well as of the

concomitant growth of political awareness that inform political choices in the developed

world. (Juma, 2011). Today, these groups operate as corporations. This gives them a

wider flexibility in the offering of their services and allows them to increase the variety of

deals and contracts. The array of services they can provide can be training, logistics,

support, operational support and post-conflict resolution (Singer, 2002).

The reasons states contract this kind of corporations varies depending on the

necessities of each state. The wealthy ones such as the United States and the United

Kingdom contract them to focus on communications and logistics as a matter of cutting the

costs of their operations. Other smaller states such as Croatia have used them to upgrade

their weak armies and thus receiving an enhancement of their military capabilities.

The increase in this market is due to several factors. Once the Cold War ended, a

new international order emerged and alongside it, new security threats. These threats

range from international criminals, organized crime, terrorism and other non-state actors.

The new characteristics of international conflicts provided a perfect breeding ground for

PMSCs since conflicts between states was diminished. In addition to this, the end of the

Cold War period brought with it an enormous downsizing in military expenditures and

resources. Many military and security-oriented professionals were out of a job in the

public sector and they turned to the private one to continue their activities.

These conditions proved perfect to develop a sustainable international market

presenting supply and demand for security services worldwide. Another important factor to

point out is the ever growing necessity for high technology weaponry and technical

23
instruments. It is said that the U.S. Army of the future will be unable to perform without the

logistic and technical support of PMSCs (Adams, 1999).

The reliance on PMSCs by states is increasing due to their well trained staff and

their ability to perform quick deployments of military and security services, and their

technical support overall. The efficiency showed by PMSCs is professionalizing their

involvement to the point that states now consider them an indispensable instrument for

their operations and policies.

This shows a delegation of the states monopoly in the use of force. Another aspect

to consider on the use of PMSCs by states is their long-term plans. Sometimes private

contractors are used to take care of small, endless wars in order to prepare the military

forces for big scale operations without interruptions. This gives an advantage to strong

states when facing global war challenges.

These are indications of a market that is not going away; on the contrary, its

influence is growing rapidly. A study by the Freedonia Group establishes that the U.S.

demand for private contracted security services will rise 5.4 percent annually to $64.5

billion in 2016. (Freedonia Group, 2012) The growth in this market can be explained by the

recovering economy of the United States. This country is of particular importance to the

sector due to its heavy involvement in international conflicts worldwide.

The increase in the demand for private security services have brought along

several effects in the national military institutions as well. The market growth has given

these firms the ability to lure high skilled military personnel into their organization since the

salaries exceed by much the ones offered by military institutions. PMSCs employees earn

$500 to $1,500 US dollars per day while infantry soldiers get only $70 per day (Mini,

24
2010). The increasing skills and capabilities of private security firms are making the

governments dependent on their services.

Francioni states that [a]t a political level, the reliance on private contractors rather

than on soldiers diminishes the effectiveness of domestic mechanisms of democratic

control over armed forces, as required in all constitutional democracies. It offers the

possibility of circumventing the requirement of parliamentary authorization for specific

missions and services, or of going beyond limits on the number of troops to be deployed

abroad or allowed to serve in a theatre of military operations. (Francioni, 2008)

As stated before, Singer pinpointed three types of PMSCs that differ in dimension.

The type 1 firms focus their services on the tactical environment. They can participate in

the battlefield be it by fighting or commanding field units. The clients of these firms are

usually states with low military capabilities in need of addressing urgent threatening

situations. The type 2 firms are mostly consulting firms. They offer strategic, operational

and organizational analysis for armed forces and they can be contracted for a boost of

capabilities in any military or security organization; their services tend to be longer than

type 1 firms. The type 3 firms offer supplementary services such as logistics, technical

support and transportation. Some type 3 firms were not initially in the security market but

have turned due to its latest growth providing assistance on various services and products

(Singer, 2002).

In An Analysis of Private Military and Security Companies, issued by the Academy

of European War and written by Ltg. Fabio Mini, shows the extent to which PMSCs

activities are depicted popularly and contrasted to their real implications. Mini explains that

PMSCs are normally known for having high professional skills; however the personnel at

private companies are usually ex-military that have been discharged or retired from

service. This makes PMSCs comparable to national armies in terms of skills.

25
 The insinuation that PMSCs offer cheaper services is overturned by Mini as he

explains in four points: 1) the expenses for training, social security and operational

expertise have been already provided by public institutions and taxpayers, 2) most

companies achieve tax evasion by incorporating in tax havens, 3) there is a hidden cost of

the consequences related to mistakes, misbehavior and malpractice, and 4) the political

cost of state credibility and reputation (Mini, 2010).

Another assumption made is that private companies have a better ability to cope

with the Fourth Generation War. The truth, he explains, is that the new methods of war, in

asymmetrical settings and in non-linear battlefields, lead to a path to abuses due to

unclear legislation on the issue and lack of accountability for perpetrators.

There is also the postulation that PMSCs provide services that used to be of a

military nature in the past. Mini explains that most of the services provided should be

delivered by state institutions and many cases of PMSCs utilization are illegal. He

considers a tragedy that the public sector now has to pay for services that used to be their

patrimony.

It is said that PMSCs hire personnel under strict ethical standards. However, there

are cases of severe psychological instability in their personnel as well as inexperience.

When there are true cases of exceptional individuals as members of a private company,

then Mini considers this a loss to the community as they should serve strictly in a public

organization. This issue takes more importance when you look at the difference in

earnings between a public soldier and a private one.

Lastly, Mini states that the conception exist that PMSCs perform defensive roles

and the public military the offensive ones. In reality, these companies are providing

services like interrogation, strategic intelligence in warfare aspects and sometimes they

26
handle drones which are offensive by nature. However, as much as the market has grown

for these companies, the implications they have for international security are wide and

affect several dimensions. The contracts that are signed between the PMSCs and the

governments complicate the environment of war. The interests of the private groups

should keep in line with those of the client in such a manner that control is never lost by

the state. A full monitoring of the private actor must be made by the state in order to keep

in line the activities of the PMSC which are autonomous by nature. It is important to note

that these companies goals are of a lucrative nature; this may propel them to act without

the carefulness of governmental and diplomatic protocols. The increase of PMSCs activity

in conflicts is making some of their clients highly dependent on their services. This can

pose a threat to the contractors objectives since the private company can abandon its

duties if it feels threatened by a certain situation, exacerbating the dependency of the

client. Another risk is an evolution where the PMSC begins gaining dominance over its

client.

The international legislation to punish private companies if they fail to fulfill their

objectives is not clear and cannot be considered reliable. A military commander can

operationally have a single chain of command to report through, but he is subject to a

variety of legal obligations stemming from international law, national law, host country law,

international agreements like SOFA, code of military conduct, rules of engagements,

national caveats, etc. (...) With regard to the civilian contractors, the military commanders

simply do not have command authority to exercise over contractors and cannot order them

to do anything (Mini, 2010).

To PMSCs is only their reputation at stake. However, there are several methods to

avoid accusation for violations by changing their corporate names or promptly justifying

their in-field decisions.

27
 Nowadays, in the United States, the functions of weapon maintenance and supply

are completely privatized. If the personnel of the PMSC leave their post, this would have a

great impact on military machinery and would put a dent to the military ability to perform in

full capacity.

The risk posed by PMSCs does not only affect strong states, in weaker ones and in

the hypothesis of dissatisfaction with their contract, payment or other issues, a hostile

takeover by the PMSCs may occur. If a state does not hold the power of force by its own

means, this can be usurped provoking a coup dtat or simply favoring other forces within

the country. Some weaker countries have chosen methods of payment that delegate

sovereignty by paying private companies with concessions of natural resources such as

mining companies. Through means of privatization, countries have sometimes utilized

public assets as a means of payment to private security companies.

This can also bring differences in objectives between the clients and the

companies. If a company is bound to secure its new acquisitions, the clients objectives

may become secondary. Private companies objectives pledge allegiance to its core

values and these are not always in alignment with those of the client.

2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PMSCs

The analysis of the international legislation is necessary to understand the degree

of awareness of the international society towards this phenomenon. Many states are

currently benefiting from PMSCs services but not all have deeply explored the

consequences that their use can bring to other factors. As noted earlier, the Geneva

Convention addresses their nature in order for them to be accounted whenever a morally

questionable action is committed. This takes particular importance in Human Rights

28
legislation where several controversies have emerged due to the lack of clarity in the laws

when addressing PMSCs.

Olivier De Schutter explains in Public Order: The outsourcing of Public Services

and Its Limits that PMSCs can be registered in one state and provide services to another

state. For example, by assisting the armed forces of that other state in the performance of

their duties, whether it is on the territory of that state or on the territory of a third state.

Alternatively, PMSCs may be providing services to the armed forces of the state in which

they are incorporated, whether at home or abroad. They may also be recruited by private

actors, particularly corporations in need of better security than that which can be provided

by the state on the territory of which they operate (Schutter, 2009).

This brings dissimilar situations in which the participation of PMSCs in conflicts can

be assessed legally. There are several situations where the legal dimension of a conflict

regulates PMSCs. Whether employees of PMSCs are considered as independent militia or

with a complete dependence on a state, the effects of these entities in state sovereignty

extend beyond legislation. In Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,

issued by the International Law Commission, several articles intend to expose the

instances on which a private actor can be deemed as a state responsibility.

To have a broad vision of the impact of these companies in international conflicts, it

is essential to review the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). PMSCs have been

extensively criticized because of their violations of this law and Human Rights. Emanuela

Gillard points out in her analysis, The Position Under Humanitarian Law, that the main

issues to consider is the status of the staff working in PMSCs under IHL and the

responsibilities of states that hire these companies.

29
 In the field, the staff of PMSCs can be considered combatants or civilians. If

civilians however take direct part in the hostilities they lose the protection under IHL. In the

article IV of the 3rd Geneva Convention there is a category referred as civilians

accompanying the armed forces, however the list is not exhaustive enough to have a

clear idea of the role under international law of private security staff. Another point

discussed by Gillard relates to the argument that PMSCs provide defensive services only,

it is explained that this does not work from the point of view of IHL as it does not draw a

distinction between offensive or defensive operations (Gillard, 2007).

The other aspect relates to states responsibilities. Even if a state hires a private

company, it has to ensure that the standards of the 3rd Geneva Convention are met with

respect to the IHL. If a violation of the IHL is committed, states that hired the PMSC have

the obligation of prosecuting the perpetrators they hired. This raises particular issues since

some crimes have been committed in states that are under occupation amidst an

international conflict and have no strong legal foundations, this obliges a third state to

intervene and this brings practical challenges.

In the Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring

of Private Military and Security Companies, issued by the United Nations Working Group

on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating and Impending the Exercise of Rights

of Peoples to Self-Determination, it is stated in Article 5 that State Parties shall ensure

that private military and security companies, including their personnel, and all

governmental and non-governmental employees, structures and bodies related in any

way to their activities, should perform their respective functions under officially

enacted laws which are uniformly and independently enforced and which are

consistent with international humanitarian law and international human rights norms,

30
standards and principles (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights, 2009).

In regard to state sovereignty, the document expresses that state parties shall carry

their obligations with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states

and the obligation of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. In

consequential articles, directives on Human Rights are expressed and the prohibition of

certain activities regarding PMSCs. These prohibitions regard intrinsically governmental

functions such as waging war, combat operations, taking prisoners, espionage,

intelligence and police powers including interrogation of detainees.

The draft intends to reaffirm and strengthen the principle of state responsibility for

the use of force and to identify the functions inherently governmental that cannot be

outsourced regarding the activities of PMSCs. It is intended to address any challenges to

Human Rights obligations by monitoring the activities of PMSCs.

However, some countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom have

raised questions about the validity of this agreement. According to Laurence Juma, these

countries do not consider multilateral agreements on this matter necessary at this point.

He explains their five arguments to explain this disagreement. The first is that the existing

legislation such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for

Private Security Providers is sufficient and its effectiveness has not been tested yet.

Second, they also point out that there is a lack of agreement on how inherently

governmental functions is defined for each state. Their third argument is that the Working

Group developing the draft is overstepping its mandate by bringing legislation to Human

Rights issues. Finally, they also state that the licensing process would be costly to some

states and that an international treaty on this matter requires further consultation.

31
 The Montreux Document was the result of a process initiated by the Government of

Switzerland alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross. It involves 17 other

states and its objective is to identify the rules and good practices in relation to the

contracting of private military and security companies during a conflict. This initiative is a

direct respond to the criticism directed to PMSCs after the alleged violations of

international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Due to the demand for clarification of international law, the Montreux document

was issued in an attempt to fill this vacuum. The first part outlines the legal obligations of

pertinence to states and PMSCs. The second part gives precise practices to promote the

compliance with international law. In Statement 2 of the document, it declares that

international law requires states to carry out activities by their own, thus limiting the

contracting of PMSCs. This is to ensure state responsibility in situations of international

conflict. It is important to note that this document is not binding for states as it is not an

international treaty. It is merely a reminder of the rules and principles already established

that have pertinence on PMSC activity.

32
 CHAPTER III: THE MEXICAN CONTEXT

1. A NEED FOR SECURITY RECONSTRUCTION

In the last decade Mexico went through a transformation that begun in 2000. This

year marked the end of the 70-year ruling party in the Executive position, PRI and for the

first time in history, Mexico was under the rule of the former opposition, PAN, under the

leadership of Vicente Fox. This brought considerable changes in the nations politics.

Some of these changes were clearly visible from the security dimension which seemed to

come into deep reorganization. In the first days in office, Fox created the Ministry of Public

Security (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica), which separated the duties of public security

from the Ministry of the Interior (Secretara de Gobernacin).

Ral Bentez Manaut mentions in his work La seguridad nacional en la indefinida

transicin: Mitos y realidades del sexenio de Fox that the Ministry of the Interior reform

was weakened by stripping it of intelligence duties and maintaining the separation of the

Ministry of National Defense (Secretara de la Defensa Nacional) and the Ministry of the

Navy (Secretara de Marina). Some of the changes that begun in the last administration

were never carried forward as it were intended and in consequence, the security and

defense dimensions old status quo prevailed. In 2005, the National Security Law comes

into effect which redefined national security and regulates the activities of CISEN, the

Mexican intelligence agency. This law defines the intelligence agenda of the country, and

establishes national security priorities. This law was a step forward in tightening the

cooperation with the United States later on.

There were three main security issues in 2005, the conflict in Chiapas which was

an indigenous uprising in southern Mexico, drug trafficking and the growing public

insecurity. However there was a problem defining national security in Mexico at the time as

33
it was seen as a broad concept that included many dimensions as potential threats to

security.

It was during the administration of Vicente Fox that the sense of insecurity by the

population began to rise towards the appalling problem that affected the country in the

Caldern administration of 2006-2012. One of the causes of insecurity was the lack of

public trust in the police institutions. To resolve this problem, the Federal Preventive Police

(Polica Federal Preventiva or PFP) was created in 1998 and its manpower came primarily

from the military.

The other actions taken in this period regarding security were the creation of the

Federal Agency of Investigation (Agencia Federal de Investigacin or AFI) in 2001 with the

objective of professionalizing criminal investigation and the 2005 approval of Congress of

the National Security Law that allowed telephonic intervention. Other reforms were

proposed by Fox such as the reform on Public Security and Criminal Justice, which was

aimed to carry on a deep reform of the system of justice promotion and administration.

This reform was never approved by the Congress due to the polarization that existed in the

political environment at the time (Chabat, 2010).

A persistent problem in Mexican institutions has always been corruption, and in the

first years of Foxs administration, the number of judicial policemen with criminal

proceedings increased. The lack of confidence in police institutions was general.

According to a Citizens Institute on Insecurity Studies (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios

sobre la Inseguridad or ICESI) report, 7 out of 10 citizens said to feel insecurity in 2005.

The official data on homicides and kidnappings was not trusted due to the high figures of

unreported crimes which are thought to be elevated.

34
 In Mexico, the use of military forces to tackle crime was becoming more frequent.

To combat organized crime, this strategy was understood; although many criticized this

approach in relation to regular crimes due to its implications such as human rights

violations. The critics vowed for community involvement, professionalism and honesty in

the police departments. However, the decision to allow military forces to tackle problems

pertaining public security dates from 1996 when the Secretariat of the Supreme Court

declared that ...it is constitutionally possible that the Army, Air Force and the Navy may

[...] act in support of civil authorities in diverse tasks of public security (Aguinaco, 1996).

The other great challenge for national security in Mexico is related to drug

trafficking and the powerful organizations that controls it. In 2006, the Minister of Public

Security, Medina Mora said there is no region in Mexico free of organized crime. He said

that it is a national security problem and that is threatening the security structures of the

state (Todo en Mxico es territorio narco, Diagnstico del secretario de Seguridad Pblica,

2006).

To face the organized crime challenge, six government offices were participating to

stop their proliferation, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Navy, the

Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry

of Internal Affairs through its intelligence agency, CISEN. The redistribution of the cartels

that were present in 2006 were the Tijuana Cartel which supplied the market in California,

the Gulf Cartel which controlled drug traffic to Texas and a Federation of Cartels present in

Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Durango, Nayarit and Quintana Roo. Other states

were disputed territory for the cartels and that caused an increased violence in these

regions.

During Foxs administration 60,000 persons were arrested on crimes against health

but only 15 were considered leaders of cartels, 50 members of the financial structures and
35
71 assassins. The rest represented a number of persons involved in retail and considered

lower in the chain of the cartels power. In 2005, one of the actions taken by president Fox

against organized crime was operation Mxico Seguro. It removed 700 policemen

accused of collaborating with drug cartels (Bentez Manaut, 2008) and took control of eight

cities in the states of Tamaulipas, Sinaloa and Baja California by the Mexican Army and

the Federal Preventive Police (Chabat, 2010).

The Caldern administration came into power in 2006 determined to control the

organized crime threat to national security. When he started his presidency, Calderns

choices were limited since the control of Mexican territory by drug cartels was challenging

the authorities. As Chabat mentions in his study, Combatting Drugs in Mexico under

Calderon: The Inevitable War, Caldern developed three pillars to combat organized

crime, the intervention of military in police affairs, legal and institutional reforms, and

international collaboration.

Caldern professionalized the PFP and created a robust system of information

called Plataforma Mxico, a platform with the objective of connecting networks of

institutions of public security in order to facilitate the exchange of information. He also

proposed several reforms for processing crimes related to drug trafficking, life sentence for

kidnappers, among others. In the judicial system, the former president proposed an

intense reform to conduct oral trials and break with old rooted practices in this sector.

The penetration of the political process by organized crime in Mexico was

becoming a matter of national security and Calderns war against it contemplated a long-

term strategy to fragment and weaken the criminal organizations. The use of force was

criticized heavily since human rights violations by the Army and drug-related violence

became well-known in the media. The number of deaths in 2007, 2008 and 2009

36
increased to levels never before seen in Mexico. The next graph shows the number of

drug-war related murders from 2006 to 2011.

Graph 1 Drug-War Related Murders in Mexico

Calderons strategy combined the long-term strengthening of Mexican institutions

with the immediate use of force to control organized crime. The use of force was the result

of the perception that the cartels were an immediate national security threat to Mexicos

survival.

2. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE MERIDA INITIATIVE

The change in global security after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001

affected Mexico due to its geopolitical position. The United States, Canada and Mexico

signed the Smart Border Agreement which had the objective of securing the borders

without affecting commerce. This agreement was signed with Mexico in 2002 and it covers

three main sections, security and infrastructure, security in the movement of persons and

security in the movement of products.

37
 It is important to note that the United States has three priority areas concerning

security in Mexico, organized crime, which includes drug and arms trafficking, illegal

immigration and human trafficking, and lastly, terrorism and rebel insurgencies. The United

States was concerned with the increasing violence of organized crime into its territory, and

the drug trafficking, since the United States is the main consumer of illegal drugs. Human

trafficking is a threat for national security as terrorists could use these networks to enter

the United States through the Mexican border (Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009). In fact,

the United States was very deeply concerned with the deteriorating situation in Mexico in

2009. In a National Drug Intelligence Center official webpage it is stated that Mexican

DTOs (drug-trafficking organizations) represent the greatest organized crime threat to the

United States. The influence of DTOs over domestic drug trafficking is unrivaled (National

Drug Intelligence Center, 2008).

Mexicos elite has been divided into two groups regarding the debate about national

security--the nationalists and the globalists. PRD and PRI are in the nationalist side and

PAN in the globalist side. Nationalists advocate a higher degree of independence from the

United States and the globalists tend to support international cooperation initiatives such

as sending armed forces in cooperative actions of hemispheric security.

The United States support to Mexico was almost $400 million dollars in the period

from 2000 to 2006. The U.S. governments Law Enforcement Professionalization and

Training Project provided 275 training courses to 6,269 Mexican law enforcement agency

personnel. The U.S. government has also provided training to new SSP polygraph

operators. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard provided several training courses for the

Mexican navy in 2007, including seven maritime law enforcement courses focused on

maritime boarding tactics and procedures for more than 250 Mexican navy personnel

(Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009). The RAND analysis authored by Schaefer explains the

38
level of aid that the United States gave to Mexico in this period which preceded the Merida

Initiative. It explains that the United States focused on four trends to aid Mexico, each with

a different level of intensity. The trends are counterterrorism and counternarcotics, federal-

to-federal cooperation, technological aid, and institution building.

The primary focus of US aid has been in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Since

Fox, Mexico increased the extradition of criminals to the United States and the control of

narcotics used in the production in methamphetamines. In the federal-to-federal

cooperation, the focus has been in vetting the federal police units, leaving aside the state

and local police, considered by many as the root of corruption.

During this period the United States also provided technological aid to Mexico.

Mexico received fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The U.S. Department of Homeland

Security and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol loaned intrusive inspection equipment to

Mexican customs. The third type of aid came in a lesser intensity and respond to institution

building, rule of law, anticorruption and financial transparency initiatives. One of the

reasons this kind of aid remained as a secondary focus is the respect of sovereignty since

the Mexican government has always been wary of U.S. involvement in Mexican Internal

Affairs (Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009).

Caldern increased cooperation with the United States through the Merida

Initiative, which had the objective of collaborating in the fight against drug trafficking. The

Merida Initiative was signed on June 30, 2008 as a regional security cooperation

agreement and provided Mexico with $1.5 billion dollars for the period of 2008-2010.

In a compendium issued in 2008 by the Service of Research and Analysis in the

Chamber of Deputies, Alma Armbula states that the idea of this Initiative came from

Mexico, specifically from the Centro de Informacin y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN), the

39
Mexican intelligence agency. It contemplated probable obstacles present in the North

American Congress and Mexican political sector (Armbula, 2008). Although it began with

the Human Rights issues as the centre of the collaboration, the funding on this subject was

diminished to focus on technological aid as the first stage of funding. This aid came as the

following:

Helicopters and surveillance aircraft

Nonintrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine units for customs

Technologies and secure communication systems to improve data collection and

storage

Technical advice and training to strengthen institutions of justice and improve

vetting for the new Mexican police force

However, at this point, the Merida Initiative remained at the Federal level and did

not contemplate assistance to the local police forces to address everyday security issues

since drugs is a federal matter for the US and Mexico (Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009).

As Clare Ribando Seelke explains in her document U.S. - Mexican Security

Cooperation: The Mrida Initiative and Beyond, U.S. assistance initially focused on

training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on

addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the

drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mrida strategy focused on (1) disrupting organized

criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and

(4) building strong and resilient communities (Ribando Seelke & Finklea, 2013). These

four approaches constitute the four pillars that give form to the Merida Initiative.

The new administration, led by Enrique Pea Nieto has vowed to continue with the

cooperation with its particular adjustments. Some of the requests of the Mexican

40
government are in judicial reforms and prevention efforts, and limits to U.S. involvement in

some law enforcement and intelligence operations.

In the CRS Report for Congress, written by Seelke, it is stated that [f]rom FY2008

to FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Merida assistance for Mexico, roughly

$1.2 billion of which has been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama administration asked

for $234.0 million for Merida programs in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its

FY2014 request (Ribando Seelke & Finklea, 2013).

There are several sections by which the support of the Unites States is given. For

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Departments

request for the FY2015, the Economic Support Fund for Mexico is of $35 million. In the

Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related

Programs document for the FY2015, it is stated that [t]he FY 2015 request will support the

United States continued partnership with Mexico and expand mutual cooperation under

the Merida Initiative to address security risks from drug trafficking, violent crime, and rule

of law capacity in Mexico. Specifically, the ESF funding will focus on strengthening and

building reforms to improve the rule of law and respect for human rights and building

strong and resilient communities able to prevent and reduce crime and violence. A more

stable Mexico will increase the U.S. national security, enhance economic growth potential,

and protect U.S. citizens along our shared border (Congressional Budget Justification

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 2014).

In USAID and the State Departments budget request for 2015, for the International

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement section, $80 million are destined to Mexico to

institutionalize the rule of law, disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations, creating

21st century border, and building strong and resilient communities through the Merida

Initiative.
41
 In Development Assistance, the FY2015 request is $12.5 million, is International

Military Education and Training, $1.5 million, and $5 million in Foreign Military Financing

(FMF). The FMF will support Mexicos efforts to control national territory and enhance

cooperation with the United States. The total amount requested reaches $134 million in aid

to Mexico for the FY2105. It is important to note that, as mentioned, these figures only

account for the request made by USAID and the State Department.

In the U.S. Department of State webpage, there is a section that pertains to the

Merida Initiative which lists the main programs and activities realized under the Initiative.

The webpage states the following:

The U.S. Congress has appropriated $1.9 billion since the Merida Initiative began

in Fiscal Year 2008. Under the partnership:

The United States is supporting Mexicos implementation of comprehensive

justice sector reforms through the training of justice sector personnel

including police, prosecutors, and defenders, correction systems

development, judicial exchanges, and partnerships between Mexican and

U.S. law schools.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is partnering with

the Government of Mexico and civil society to promote the rule of law and

build strong and resilient communities by supporting the implementation of

Mexicos new justice system; increasing knowledge of, and respect for,

human rights; strengthening social networks and community cohesion;

addressing the needs of vulnerable populations (youth and victims of crime);

and increasing community and government cooperation.

Air mobility has been increased through the delivery of eight Bell helicopters

to the Mexican Army/Air Force, three UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to the

42
 Federal Police, and three UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to the Mexican

Navy to provide for rapid transport of personnel for counternarcotics and

other security operations.

The U.S. government has provided scanners, X-ray machines, and other

non-intrusive inspection equipment to enhance Mexican authorities ability to

detect illicit goods at key checkpoints of land and air ports of entry.

The Mexican government has established a corrections academy to train

Mexican federal correctional staff at Xalapa in Mexicos Veracruz state

(Merida Initiative).

In the document U.S. - Mexico Security Cooperation: An overview of the Merida

Initiative 2008-Present, the cooperation program is considered a success. Our assistance

has provided crucial support to the Mexican government in building the capacity of its rule

of law institutions and advancing justice sector reforms, while enhancing the bilateral

relationship and extent of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican governments

through provisions of equipment, technical assistance and training. A variety of U.S.

federal agencies - including the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Homeland

Security, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense - are working with the

Mexican government to implement Merida projects (Feeley, 2013).

The document, issued by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere continues

by saying in the statement prepared by Ambassador William Brownfield, Our partnership

with Mexico has demonstrated results. With our assistance, the Government of Mexico

has: Built a stronger legal framework through the training of over 8,500 federal justice

sector personnel; augmented the professionalization of police units by providing training to

more than 19,000 federal and state police officers, 4,000 of which are federal

investigators; expanded secure incarceration at the federal level from five facilities with a

43
capacity of 3,500 to 14 facilities with a capacity of 20,000; improved the detection of

narcotics, arms, and money, reaching almost $3 billion in illicit goods seized; and provided

civic education and ethics training to more than 700,000 Mexican students. Since 2009,

Mexico has apprehended more than 50 senior and mid-level drug trafficking organization

(DTO) leaders, significantly disrupting all major Mexican DTOs (Brownfield, 2013).

The Department of Defense (DOD) has several organizations working to

accomplish the objectives of the Initiative. Apart from the Mrida Initiative, DOD has its

own legislative authorities to provide certain counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in

Mexico are overseen by the U.S. Northern Command, which is located at Peterson Air

Force Base in Colorado (Ribando Seelke & Finklea, 2013). The U.S. Northern Command

(NORTHCOM), established in 2002 as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, has

the mission to partner to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security

cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests (U.S. Northern

Command). The scope of this organization extends through Canada, Mexico and the

Caribbean. Some of the support given by the U.S. Northern Command includes counter-

drug operations, which specifically pertains to Mexico.

NORTHCOM was not seen positively by Mexico at first, and its cooperation level

has not been considerable (Bentez Manaut, 2008). The creation of this organization

raised concerns in Mexico, as Deare states: The fact that the U.S. Government created

USNORTHCOM without consulting as meaningfully and collaboratively with its neighbors

as they would have liked troubled both Mexican and Canadian leaders. This displeasure

manifested itself in large part in the Mexican press, which published articles raising

concerns of being assigned to USNORTHCOM and of falling within USNORTHCOMs

area of responsibility (Deare, 2009).

44
 However, the cooperation began evolving. In an institutional news article from the

American Forces Press Service in 2013, Donna Miles cites Maj. Gen. Francis Mahon,

director for strategy, plans and policy at NORTHCOM, and gives his point of view of the

relationship between NORTHCOM and the Mexican authorities. ... [T]he Mexican army

and Mexican navy have taken on a larger role beyond internal security issues, our

relationship with them has really grown and expanded through security cooperation... They

have opened up to us and said, Lets start working closer and closer together (Miles,

2013).

In this interview, Mahon talked about the strategic importance for both nations of

partnering and envisioned a deeper relationship for the future. About the activities being

carried out by NORTHCOM in Mexico, Mahon said that [t]he scope and breadth of things

we are doing with our Mexican partners is very wide. Its everything from techniques to

planning skills to support for disaster operations. About the future, Mahon stated that Its

all about getting comfortable with each other and hopefully, advancing in the relationship, it

would be wonderful, someday, to take a Mexican company to the National Training Center

to train with an American battalion or brigade. That sounds visionary, but we regularly

conduct combined training with other allies and partners. There is no reason we cant get it

going with our Mexican partners. I think our vision, working with Mexico, is that they

become more of a regional strategic partner and more of an outward-looking military. I

think theyre moving in that direction (Miles, 2013).

This interview provides the perfect example of the new convergence of the Mexican

and U.S. views of national security. The Mexican redefinition of national security explained

before acted as the catalyst to increase cooperation on this matter.

In another news article by Associated Press, Kimberly Dozier writes about the

assistance provided by NORTHCOM. She states that NORTHCOM will build on a

45
commando program that has brought Mexican military, intelligence and law enforcement

officials to study U.S. counterterrorist operations, to show them how special operations

troops built an interagency network to target al-Qaida mastermind Osama bin Laden and

his followers (Dozier, 2013).

NORTHCOMs current special operations training missions are an outgrowth of the Merida

Initiative that was signed in 2008, to provide extensive military assistance to Mexico. The

extra special-operations staff, including both troops and civilians, will help coordinate more

missions as Mexico requests them, current and former officials said (Dozier, 2013).

Although there might be several questions regarding Mexican sovereignty, the

United States does not accept such allegations, as they point out in the State

Departments website where it is stated that [t]he Merida Initiative is a partnership, and

the United States respects its individual partners sovereign decisions and their different

legal authorities. Close collaboration with Merida counterparts has been a hallmark of all

issues concerning support, training, technical advice, and funding. The Merida Initiative

supports efforts partner nations themselves have initiated to combat their common enemy-

-transnational criminal organizations (U.S. Department of State, 2009).

Mexico has always been cautious when the United States approaches its internal

affairs, in this sense, a respect for sovereignty must be clearly defined in future endeavors

of cooperation. During the Merida Initiative debate the U.S. Congress, Caldern stated that

My government will defend at all times its national sovereignty and the interests of

Mexicans and we will act strictly in accordance with the Constitution, and, of course, we

will not accept conditions that simply are unacceptable (Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009).

The pertinence of this concern responds to the history between the two nations. As

Craig Deare mentions virtually every Mexican schoolchild is taught the events of 1836,

46
18461847, 1914, and 1917, the key dates of U.S. interventions against Mexican

sovereigntythe reverse is not true in the United States. Only a small percentage of U.S.

citizens are aware of what actions the U.S. Army and Navy performed in those years. And

while the following events are ancient history for a U.S. audience, they formed a deep scar

on the Mexican national psyche (Deare, 2009).

3. PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES ACTIVITY IN MEXICO

In 2009, a PMSC called Jax Desmond Worldwide (JDW) in a press release offered

its services of risk management that provides antiterrorist and counterinsurgency support

to the Mexican government in order to completely destroy the criminal group known as Los

Zetas in under 120 days. It claims to have a military capacity unreachable to Los Zetas

and the most powerful arsenal in the world. The offer was snubbed by the Mexican

government but the press release showed the extent of which PMSCs will go to try to

influence governmental decisions and society.

Most of the activities of the United States regarding the Merida Initiative are under

the services of private contractors, many of which are PMSCs. The fact that these

companies are entering Mexico is of special concern due to their nature and the sensibility

of Mexico towards sovereignty. An effective control of these companies by the Mexican

government is still in question. However, their incursion into Mexico has been significantly

growing under the Initiative.

In a document presented to the United States House of Representatives, an

overview of the security cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. was addressed. The

document presents the speeches of several officials. Elizabeth Hogan, the Senior Deputy

Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in USAID

47
stated that [w]e are also partnering more and more with the private sector to raise

additional resources for prevention, as well as to make our efforts more sustainable. For

instance, we are working with Intel and Prudential in the cities of Monterrey and Tijuana to

train at-risk youth from tough neighborhoods for productive employment in the technology

and construction fields (Hogan, 2013).

The collaboration of Private Security Companies with Mexico is not restricted to

military matters, since the fourth pillar of the Merida Initiative is about building strong and

resilient communities. Some of the activities carried under NORTHCOM and USAID

address the topics of human rights by bringing Mexican officers to the United States for

specialized training on human rights and use staff Judge Advocates to teach classes in

Mexico on human rights and the Law of Armed Conflict (Feeley, 2013). There is also a

distance-education Masters degree in Human Rights and Security supported by USAID in

partnership with the Mexican Federal Police. Other activities include crime and prevention

strategies in target areas. As Hogan points out, [t]he crime and violence prevention

component, Pillar IV, of the Merida Initiative is at the heart of USAIDs work in Mexico.

A United States Government Accountability Office report mentions that [i]n

addition, to help remedy staffing issues, USAID is hiring a personal services contractor in

Washington to assist in the management of CARSI and Mrida (Engel, Mack, & Grassley,

2010). Many of the offerings of the United States to private contractors are posted in the

Official Federal Business Opportunities website. The extent of the services required is

mostly related to security and vary in nature.

In a news report in the Mexican newspaper Milenio, Victor Hugo Michel covers the

collaboration of Mexico and the U.S. and the involvement of private companies. He cites a

solicitation for a Personal Services Contractor published in the Federal Business

Opportunities official website where a Corrections Reform Program Coordinator (CRPC-M)

48
is solicited to assist the Government of Mexico reach its stated Goals and Objectives in

reforming the corrections/prisons system in Mexico. The CRPC-M offers assistance in a

variety of areas, to include technical assistance, contingency planning and development,

training and equipment needs. He also states that [a]s of now, the DynCorp company

has contracted three employees to administer its participation in the Merida Initiative, one

of whom will be in Mexico City and will help the Narcotics Affairs Office in the Embassy to

"maintain good contact with Mexican security agencies" (Michel, 2009).

To outline other examples, here is a list of positions mentioned in the Milenio article by

Victor Hugo Michel for private contractors to work in Mexican institutions. The list,

presented in Table 1, was corroborated by reviewing the Federal Business Opportunities

website in the address: https://www.fbo.gov. This is presented to demonstrate directly the

kind of activities required for private contractors in Mexico.

49
 Table 1 Job openings in the Federal Business Opportunities website
Contract Position Area Activities

Corrections Reform Technical assistance, contingency planning and

PSC-09-018 Penitentiary
Program Coordinator development, training and equipment needs

Help in the implementation of projects to

improve the Mexican government's interdiction
operations and serve as a link between federal,
NAS Drug Interdiction
PSC-09-011-INL Narcotics state, and municipal authorities to counsel
Advisor
activities that encourage drug interdiction,
institution-building, better training, and support
to special programs
Work with Cisen [the Mexican intelligence
agency], Immigration, the Attorney General's
Deputy Program
Border Office, Hacienda [the tax office], the Public
PSC-09-021-INL Coordinator for
Security Security Ministry, Foreign Relations, and the
Border/POE Security
Navy in projects that will improve border
security.

Deputy Program Develop a short, medium and long-term training

Coordinator for Law strategy for the Mexican law enforcement and
PSC-09-019-INL Training
Enforcement and Training judicial sectors, specifically police recruits,
Operations investigators, prosecutors, and judges

Source: https://www.fbo.gov

According to a Reuters article in 2009, a U.S. Embassy official who remained

anonymous said that the budget for the Merida Initiative is being released bit by bit and will

be doled out to 30 or 40 U.S. contractors. He said that these companies are lining up for

Merida contracts and that the Mexican government is being picky by checking their

reputations. Other concerns were raised by U.S. Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, who

said monitoring their activities could be difficult. When they wear the badge of the United

States there is a very clear chain of command and very clear rules. These contractors tend

to be very much independent operators. (Rosenberg, 2009).

50
 Another article by the BBC Mundo, Mxico, in 2011, quotes Jos Luis Gmez del

Prado, president of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, and he

says that the millions of dollars the U.S. gives in order to combat drug trafficking are not

awarded to local governments but come in the form of war technology that is in hands of

private contractors. He also said that the Working Group he presides has asked the

Mexican authorities to allow a visit and has not received an answer. They have been

observing several countries in Latin America on the matter, but neither Mexico nor

Colombia have answered. This has been confirmed in the Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights website where Mexico appears under the label

Requested visits and not on the Completed visits (Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights). One of his concerns is the possibility of the participation of private security

companies giving training in torture practices to Mexican Federal police personnel in

Guanajuato. In the same article, Benitez Manaut is quoted by saying that government

agents are bound since they are watched by the U.S. Congress but private contractors are

free since no one watches over them in any country in the world (de los Reyes, 2011).

In the U.S. official report Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce

Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008, Title III, Administrative Provisions, places

several conditions on provision of assistance to recipient countries, caps the number of

contractors present in each recipient country, and prohibits cash payments. Under Section

302 of this Title, Limitations on Provision of Assistance it is stated that the activities

undertaken by Title I, Assistance to Mexico, should be performed by employees and

officers of the recipient country, not by U.S. citizens or foreign nationals retained as

contractors in a recipient country (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2008).

Other subsections caps at 50 the total number of foreign nationals retained as

contractors for Mexico and expect that the assistance provided under this Act will be in

51
the form of equipment or training; no cash shall be offered to bolster a recipient country's

counternarcotics efforts. The purpose of this limitation is to ensure that the assistance

addresses those concerns identified by Mexico, Central America and the United States,

and that the United States maintains visibility over assistance provided (Committee on

Foreign Affairs, 2008).

Since the United States is the official contractor of private security services, the

accountability they give on the matter is essential to assess a potential impact to Mexicos

sovereignty. The United States, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years

2010 and 2011, issued by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of

Representatives, mentioned in section 903, Merida Initiative Monitoring and Evaluation

Mechanism, in part H, that a report will be required with a detailed description of contracts

awarded to private companies to carry out provisions of the Merida Initiative, including

(i) a description of the number of United States and foreign national civilian

contractors awarded contracts;

(ii) a list of the total dollar value of the contracts; and

(iii) the purposes of the contracts.

However, a detailed breakdown of the funding or the names of the private

companies is not reported. This lack of transparency made Senator Claire McCaskill,

chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, complain in

her opening statement on May, 2009. She said that there is almost no transparency into

what these contractors are doing or how much were paying them. And it appears there

has been insufficient oversight of these types of contracts. She also said that the

Subcommittee began an investigation to know What are we spending on contracts? What

are contractors doing? And are the taxpayers getting what they paid for? She added, We

52
asked this information from the State Department and the Defense Department more than

three months ago. Despite our repeated requests, neither Department has been able to

answer our questions yet (Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 2009). She

denounces contracts made by the Department of Defense to companies that delivered

their services with low quality and underreported contracts made by the State Department

to the Subcommittee by hundreds of millions of dollars for Colombia.

In May 26, 2011, Jess T. Ford, Director for International Affairs and Trade,

responded to Senator McCaskill in an official report identified as GAO-11-564. He said that

the State measures its performance based on information provided by the Narcotic Affairs

Sections at overseas posts. He also mentions that contract data are disaggregated

between the Narcotics Affairs Sections and the Federal Procurement Data System

(FPDS). The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs are also in the process

of developing its own database of counternarcotics contracts since they do not have a

comprehensive inventory of counternarcotics contracts and all the data on contracts

comes from the FPDS and posts (Ford, Department of States Counternarcotics

Performance Management System, 2011).

In another report in 2009 by Jess Ford, a status of the funds of the Merida Initiative

is provided. It mentions that the programs are derived from three appropriations, the

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, the Economic Support

Fund, and the Foreign Military Financing account. However there is no breakdown of

private contractors for each activity in this document. The document does state that

Merida assistance () is difficult to track because each of the three State bureaus has a

different method for tracking Merida funds. () State could not provide us with a

comprehensive document that contained an accurate status of Mrida funds across all

53
accounts. Rather, we received separate spreadsheets and reconciled each to determine

the status of Mrida funds overall (Ford, Status of Funds for the Mrida Initiative, 2009).

In a Report for Congressional Requesters, dated from 2010 and titled Mrida

Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but

Needs Better Performance, with the identification GAO-10-837, it is said that the States

strategic documents lack certain key elements that would facilitate accountability and

management. It also states that they do not include performance measures that indicate

progress toward achieving the four strategic goals or timelines for all future deliveries and

completion of Mrida programs (Engel, Mack, & Grassley, 2010).

In relation to this, a report in 2011 by the United States Senate Subcommittee on

Contracting Oversight titled New Information about Counternarcotics Contractors in Latin

America contains analysis that covers information on private contractors activity in eight

countries of Latin America, hired by the State Department and the DOD. The document

states that [t]he White House Office of National Drug Control Policy is charged with

overseeing the overall strategy of the nations drug control mission, but three government

agencies are primarily used to fund counternarcotics assistance programs in Latin

America: the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) (Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 2011).

This report shows a chart divided by country on where the allocations of resources

are headed. In Latin America, Colombia is by far the country with more PMSC activity

derived from U.S. assistance with 80.1% of the spending. Mexico comes in second place

with 7.3% of the total spending on private contractors by the U.S. The report also mentions

that the counternarcotics contracts in Mexico reached its peak in 2008, with 64.4 million in

spending.

54
 The companies involved in Latin American contracts are mainly five, DynCorp,

Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, ITT, and ARINC. They represent over 57% of the total

counternarcotics contracts from 2005 to 2009. The main spending was done in aircraft-

related services, equipment and training. Other areas include Base Operations Support,

Equipment and Supplies, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

The report points out problems due to lack of transparency and oversight of these

companies by the U.S. government. This can turn into a major concern for Mexico if they

cannot keep up with the activities performed in Mexican territory. Neither the Defense

Department nor the State Department has a centralized database or system with the

capacity to track counternarcotics contracts () the volume of procurement actions

overwhelms staff capacity in some instances, and found that many of the acquisition steps

are manual processes that are both time-consuming and error prone (Subcommittee on

Contracting Oversight, 2011).

A particular example of the lack of depth in oversight is mentioned in the document

where it states that $54.4 million dollars were spent on contracts identified solely by

miscellaneous foreign contractors of which 6.8 million were miscellaneous commodities,

supplies, and/or services. The report concludes that the federal governments annual

spending on counternarcotics contracts in Latin America rose by 32%, from $482 million in

2005 to $635.8 million in 2009 and that the State Department and the Defense Department

do not adequately monitor counternarcotics contracts and have failed to implement

centralized databases or systems to track counternarcotics contract spending

(Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 2011).

In an interview with Los Angeles Times, Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas

program for the Center for International Policy, said that

55
 Congress has stipulated that Mexico receives no cash payments or budget

support under the plan. All the resources will be given in kind, through

military and hi-tech equipment and training programs.

This means that most of the money will remain in the United States with

defense contractors, information technology firms and private security firms.

This raises ethical issues of what constitutes foreign aid, and the impunity

that these private security firms enjoy on foreign soil, where they have

allegedly been involved in the murder of civilians and other human rights

violations. The degree of unprecedented U.S. government involvement in

Mexicos intelligence and national security apparatus has also raised valid

concerns over sovereignty within Mexico that could end up increasing friction

between the two nations (La Plaza: News from Latin America and the

Caribbean, 2008).

Although the problem of accountability by some private contractors is a

responsibility of the government of the United States, Mexico has to push for better

performance measures or begin controlling the private security firms that are entering the

country. In Mexico, existing national laws are evaded by PMSCs, increasing the lack of

oversight on them. As mentioned before, U.S. interventions in Mexican affairs have always

been seen with concern. The failure in the control and oversight of private contractors

could be perilous for sovereignty in the future.

4. MEXICAN LEGISLATION ON THE MATTER

In 2012, an article in The Washington Post noted that the number of private

security firms in Mexico is rapidly expanding and that contractors are seeing Mexico as a

business opportunity. However, their article mentions the limitations for PMSCs that the

56
country has. They quote Michael Braun, a former DEA operations chief, now working with

Spectre Group International LLC, a private security firm, saying that [t]he Mexican

government is not going to allow U.S. contractors to be armed in Mexico, and I can tell you

that alone will cause many companies large and small to not even consider performing

work there. () The Mexican government and the Mexican people are extremely sensitive

when it comes to these questions of sovereignty, and we need to respect that (Miroff &

Booth, 2012)

Although there are events in the relations between Mexico and the United States

that might raise questions about the control over sovereignty, the Mexican legislation is

wary of any external threat. Article 27 of the Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives (Ley

Federal de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos) states: Foreigners will only have the

authorization to possess arms when (...) they accredit their status of inmigrados, except in

the case of a temporary license for tourists with sporting purposes (Cmara de Diputados

del Honorable Congreso de la Unin, 2004).

Mexico has a strict usage of weaponry. The only official and legal way of obtaining

a gun is through the Directorate of Arms and Munitions Sales. As the Washington Post

published in 2010, [t]o go shopping for a gun in Mexico, customers must come to Mexico

City. (...) To gain entry to the store, which is on a secure military base, customers must

present valid identification, pass through a metal detector, yield to the security wand and

surrender cell phones and cameras. To buy a gun, clients must submit references and

prove that their income is honestly earned, that their record is free of criminal charges and

that their military obligations, if any, have been fulfilled with honor. They are fingerprinted

and photographed. Finally, if judged worthy of owning a small-caliber weapon to protect

home and hearth, they are allowed to buy just one. And a box of bullets (Booth, 2010).

57
 These strict requirements apply only to national citizens that comply with several

other requirements. Non-citizens are not allowed to work as armed security guards or to

carry weapons for self-defense. For many private contractors this has been a deterrent to

work in Mexico, others have just adapted to what the legislation approves or omits;

besides, the application of the law has not proved effective.

Many of the functions of PMSCs remain unregulated because of the inability of

Mexican authorities to apply the law. As Perret mentions in his paper Privatization without

Regulation: the Human Rights Risks of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)

in Mexico, Mexican law on private security requires, among other provisions, that security

companies officially register both their entities and employees and that non-Mexican

citizens are prohibited from bearing arms. In reality, however, neither domestic nor

multinational companies respect this law (Perret, 2013).

On weapon availability, it is relevant to mention that most of the weapons in the

country come from illegal sources. Andrea Amaya mentions that 70% of the seized

weapons come from the United States. Another document issued by the General

Attorneys Office identifies four routes of arm trafficking in Mexico. The volume of the arms

entering the country illegally is not known.

In the Mexican Constitution, Article 21 states that public security is a function of the

Federation, the Federal District, the states, and the municipalities. However, the General

Law of the National Public Security System contemplates the existence of private security

services in Articles 150, 151, and 152.

It is important to note the last amendment to Article 150 made in July 2012. In the

Statement of Motives for the amendment, issued in the Gaceta Parlamentaria with number

3347-IV, it is stated that the original article has a clause of foreign exclusion for private

58
security providers. This, is claimed, violates the ability of the Federation to legislate about

foreign investment. By referencing the Foreign Investment Law (Ley de Inversin

Extranjera), and international treaties subscribed by Mexico, it is stated that there is no

disposition that limits or restricts the contracting of private security services to national-

exclusive economic activity (Ovando, Acosta, Caro, Aguirre, & Herrera, 2012).

This amendment can be seen as a disposition of the Mexican government to have

laws that are consistent with the Federal government actions, such as the utilization of

PMSCs. On this matter, La Jornada, a Mexican newspaper, quoted Arturo Santana, a

PRD congressman, who said that the prohibition to allow foreigners to participate on

security matters must be maintained as well as the strict controls required in the

legislation. According to La Jornada, despite his declarations, Santana voted in favor of

the reform. Congressman Jaime Crdenas was also quoted and said that this kind of

clauses generate a possible interposition of constitutional controversies before the

Supreme Court (Mndez, 2012).

As explained above, most PMSCs contracted under the scope of the Merida

Initiative work for the U.S. government, this gives them immunity from prosecution by the

Mexican government since they are considered part of the US mission in Mexico and

benefit from the same treatment as other US government employees (Perret, 2013).

PMSCs contracted directly by the Mexican government have a much more limited scope of

action and work for the Ministry of Public Security (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica). Their

activities consist of giving training to Mexican Federal police agents.

The Federal Law on Private Security (Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada)

prohibited foreigners of owning or operating a PMSC in Mexico. However this was evaded

by establishing bases in neighboring countries and working remotely or travelling for short

59
periods of time, which is possible due to the nature of the contracts with Mexico in which

main activities focus on prevention and intelligence (Perret, 2013).

60
 CHAPTER IV: DELPHI METHOD AND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

1. DELPHI METHODOLOGY

For the development of the Delphi methodology, several questions where

formulated in order to present them to experts in the topics of sovereignty, PMSCs, or

public security. The questions were developed with the intention of obtaining a future view

of how PMSCs in Mexico will affect sovereignty by 2020.

The experts interviewed where seven and came from different backgrounds. Their

professional background was the following:

1. Former Mexican Military and former owner of a PMSC.

2. Public Security academic, PhD in Law.

3. National Security academic.

4. Program developer of USAID projects in Nuevo Len, Mxico.

5. Former Mexican Federal Police, collaborator of USAID projects.

6. Director of a local security public institution regarding coordination and control.

7. Employee of a PMSC working in Mexico.

The questions were the following:

1. What services offered by Private Security Companies will have a tendency to grow

in the Mexican market towards 2020?

2. What is the relation between institutional weaknesses in Mexico with the private

security market?

3. What other factors promote the increase in the demand of private security services

in Mexico?

61
 4. Are Private Security Companies a trustable way to contribute to the institutional

development of Mexico?

5. In terms of public security what level (local, state or federal) is the most vulnerable

to a loss of sovereignty because of the inclusion of private security providers?

6. What limitations and institutional framework is needed to guarantee the

safeguarding of national security in the long-term?

7. How could public security institutions in Mexico benefit from the collaboration with

Private Security Companies towards 2020? In a scale from 1 to 10, how much

benefit do you consider? How much risk do they represent?

According to the experts opinions the services most needed in Mexico are the

ones in Table 2. This was evident after examining the weakness of the security institutions

in Mexico and the new advancements that are being used worldwide.

Table 2 PMSCs services to grow in Mexico

PMSCs services with a tendency to grow in Mexico

Technology
Surveillance strategies and operative capacity
Intelligence
Information Technologies
Unmanned aerial vehicles
Trust and control testing
Infrastructure protection

On the question regarding the potential risks or benefits that the inclusion of

PMSCs represents for the sovereignty of Mexico, at any level, being federal, state, or

local, an average of the ratings provided by the experts was graphed. As we can see in

Graph 2, most agree that the benefits will be greater. This is understandable given the

weakness of Mexican institutions. The support that a professional contractor can give to

contribute to the development of institutions is seen as greater than the risks these

62
companies may pose to sovereignty. Most of the interviewees had knowledge of the

Mexican legislation and the concern of Mexican officials to subcontract security services.

Graph 2 Expert grading of risk vs. benefit of PMSC inclusion in Mexico

Once the questionnaires where completed, there was a thorough analysis of their

answers in order to find common factors divided in four specific topics. These factors were

later converted into variables that would be used for the next stage of the prospective

study. The four topics where the following:

1. Mexican institutions

2. Private Military and Security Companies

3. Control and legislation

4. Sovereignty and National Security

The purpose of dividing the variables obtained into four different topics was useful

in order to complete the next step of the prospective analysis represented by a Cross-

Impact analysis using a matrix of the final version of the variables. This matrix was

answered by three of the experts consulted and then submitted into software created by

Lipsor that graphs the results.

63
 These results offer a probability of occurrence of multiple scenarios that take into

account the variables derived from the Delphi study. A further explanation of the Cross-

Impact analysis will be discussed in the next section.

2. CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS AND SCENARIO BUILDING

As previously mentioned, Cross-Impact analysis is sustained in actual perceptions

of the manner in which events in the future may interact. It takes into account the

occurrence or non-occurrence of an event and how these can influence on other events.

The first step is to generate the events to consider for the analysis.

Four events were designed taking into account the Delphi method results. The

events are shown in Table 3. Then, a description of each event is presented in order to

have a complete understanding of each event designed.

Table 3 Event description

Event Description
E1 Institutional development is an integral part of policies
E2 Private Security Companies continue their growth in Mexico
E3 PSCs are controlled through a strong legal framework
E4 The government is prone to delegate responsibilities to external actors

Institutional development is an integral part of policies

Mexican institutions are starting to gain strength through internal development and, to a

lesser extent, through private external aid. Police and security institutions are shifting from

a reactive nature to a strategic one. The lack of personnel for public security functions is a

problem that is being addressed through higher incomes and a career model for

professional development. Alongside this, we find government programs to tackle

corruption, a problem with deep roots throughout Mexican history. Numerous training
64
programs have been developed with domestic and international resources to achieve a

more professional police. In financial matters, a great number of resources have been

allocated to develop the public security dimension in Mexico since this is considered a

priority. The population and private sectors confidence in public security is rising. The

Mexican institutions have begun to develop their own technologies and implementing a

long-term vision.

Private Security Companies continue their growth in Mexico

The Private Security Companies participating in Mexico are strongly coordinated with

public institutions. They share knowledge and function as a compliment for public security.

Their professionalism is significant and they focus their human resources to provide their

services for public or private actors. Although they are helping the institutions in Mexico to

gain access to new technologies and modern programs, their contribution to institutional

development is minimal, as many of their services are contracted to fill gaps in Mexican

needs and do not give a strong foundation for long-term development. Their services are

well appreciated since they help protect strategic installations, gather intelligence, and run

prison systems.

PMSCs are controlled through a strong legal framework

Private Security Companies are thoroughly reviewed, the number and competences of

each one of them is clearly defined in legal documents. Everything that comes through

international aid is fully in control of the state and belongs to it. The monitoring and

oversight of PMSCs is extended and helps the delineation of policies. External aid to

official institutions responds to Mexican needs and is seen as suggestions for decision-

making, with complete independence for the state to follow it or not. There is a clear legal

65
framework that limits the activities of foreign participants in internal affairs such as gun

control and depth of participation.

The government is prone to delegate responsibilities to external actors

Although there is resistance in some local governments to work with external actors, there

is no real threat to Mexicos sovereignty. The vulnerability in the local sector has been

diminished through a strong legislation and clear premises. Everything done between

Private Security Companies and local governments need to pass through a confidentiality

agreement so that this collaboration results in no leaks of information. Sovereignty is well-

guarded and collaboration with other countries falls under international law parameters.

Mexico may develop dependence on some foreign services since it is not building new

technology.

Once the events are properly defined, a question is formulated for each of the

event in order to assess the probability of occurrence of each. This probability is given by

the experts selected and was given independently from one another. The average simple

probability by each expert for each event is presented in Table 5; it is showed in a range

from 0 to 1, with 0 being Almost impossible and 1, Highly probable.

Event 1: How probable is that the institutional development in Mexico becomes an integral

part of public policies by 2020 deeply affecting reactive practices in security areas,

corruption and short-term vision?

Event 2: What is the probability that PSCs continue their involvement in Mexico by 2020

through international cooperation with other countries, especially the United States and

continue complementing public security functions?

66
Event 3: What is the probability that the legislation in Mexico will be adjusted in order to

better administer private security companies and secure the states responsibility of

decision making by 2020?

Event 4: How probable is that the Mexican government will continue accepting external

actors and delegate responsibilities pertaining to public security by buying their services to

acquire technology as opposed to sustainable development by 2020?

Table 4 Simple probability grading

Simple
Event Description
probability
E1 Institutional development is an integral part of policies 0.7
E2 Private Security Companies continue their growth in Mexico 0.7
E3 PSCs are controlled through a strong legal framework 0.5
E4 The government is prone to delegate responsibilities to external actors 0.4

The simple probability gives a general overview of the occurrence of each event.

However, the extent of this method goes beyond these numbers and includes the

interaction between the events. The Cross-Impact analysis considers positive and

negative conditional probabilities. Positive conditional probabilities are obtained by asking:

How probable is that Event X will happen given the occurrence of Event Y? This is asked

several times in order to include every combination of events possible.

The negative conditional probabilities follow the inverse relation. To determine the

probability, the question asked is: How probable is that Event X will happen given the non-

occurrence of Y? And so forth for every possible combination of events.

The average of the positive conditional probabilities is shown in Table 5. This

shows the matrix of the probability of the occurrence of an event (X) given the occurrence

of another (Y).

67
 Table 5 Positive conditional probabilities

Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4

Event 1 0 0.7 0.6 0.7
Event 2 0.3 0 0.4 0.7
Event 3 0.2 0.8 0 0.9
Event 4 0.2 0.7 0.8 0

The negative conditional probabilities follow the same pattern with the only

difference being that the matrix now takes into account the probability of the occurrence of

an event (X) given the non-occurrence of another (Y).

Table 6 Negative conditional probabilities

Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4

Event 1 0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Event 2 0.8 0 0.8 0.4
Event 3 0.6 0.2 0 0.3
Event 4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0

Once the conditional probabilities are seen, we can move forward to the probability

of occurrence of the scenarios, which is the objective of using the Cross-Impact analysis.

Scenarios are generated by the number of events created and the overall probability of

occurrence of each. The overall probability includes conditional and simple probabilities.

As the description of the events show, they are determined for the 2020 horizon. Every

scenario is composed of four events that may or may not happen.

The realization of an event is marked with a 0 if the event is not to happen and with

a 1 if the event will happen. To give an example, the number 0001 says that event 1, 2,

and 3 will not happen, but event 4 will happen. Because the number of events is 4, the

total possible scenarios are 16, the probability of occurrence of each is determined with

the SMIC-PROB-EXPERT software created by Lipsor.

68
 Table 7 Probability of each scenario and accumulated value

Scenario Probability Accumulated

08 - 1000 0.219 0.219
09 - 0111 0.172 0.391
04 - 1100 0.138 0.529
01 - 1111 0.102 0.631
16 - 0000 0.078 0.709
02 - 1110 0.064 0.773
06 - 1010 0.054 0.827
03 - 1101 0.042 0.869
05 - 1011 0.038 0.907
12 - 0100 0.029 0.936
11 - 0101 0.028 0.964
10 - 0110 0.018 0.982
07 - 1001 0.009 0.991
13 - 0011 0.008 0.999
14 - 0010 0 0.999
15 - 0001 0 0.999

Chart 1 Probability of scenarios

The probability of occurrence of the first scenario reaches 22% and is defined by

(1000), which states that the first event will occur and none else will happen. This is the

tendency scenario. The second scenario in probability has 17% probability of occurrence

69
and is defined by (0111). The first six scenarios represent 77% probability of occurrence,

according to Godet, its necessary to consider the scenarios around 80% of probability, so

these six scenarios will be the basis to form the final four scenarios for the potential threat

to sovereignty that PMSCs represent in Mexico.

Scenario 1 (1000) A strong state has strong institutions

The first scenario shows the most probable tendency and is seen as an attempt by the

Mexican government to strengthen its institutions over any other effort. This talks of a

government that has established as its priority to have a strong state. If this is on its way in

2020, an increased confidence of the citizenship will be seen. The public institutions will be

more trusted and the law will be complied with a PMSC or any other external actor

cooperation. However, the use of PMSCs will decline, as well as cooperative attempts

from other countries to contribute to the development of Mexico.

In this scenario, the reach of the Merida Initiative will be waning since the strengthening of

Mexican institutions will suffice to achieve an effective, independent state. In terms of

legislation, little change will be seen since there is no apparent gap in any law that might

challenge sovereignty, the difference will be that the law will be complied and thus, a

greater sense of security.

Nevertheless, the attempt of the Mexican government to strengthen its institutions by its

own is not a fact and many problems will have to be addressed from the inside such as

corruption and lawlessness. To do this a more strategic approach has to be given when

planning for the future of security organizations in the country.

70
Scenario 2 (0111) Help wanted

The second most probable scenario gives another perspective of the institutional

development of Mexico. The country is aware of the need to restructure internally in order

to have a stronger state; however the ability to do this by its own is weak. In this scenario,

the Mexican government will continue to accept external aid from the U.S. and PMSCs.

More and more companies will see Mexico as an ideal country to do business.

Mexico will accept the entrance of private companies to help its endeavor of strengthening

institutions and will adapt the legislation to have a broader control of the activities these

organizations have in the country. Every offer of international cooperation will be seen with

good eyes by the Mexican government, slightly shifting their historical position on external

influence within its borders.

However this shift will not be abrupt since the need for a better, more controlling legislation

is well in sight of the authorities and every action to accomplish this will be taken in such a

way that sovereignty is not at risk. Some laws will have to be more lax, in order to permit a

more effective approach to external aid, while some laws will have to be strengthened to

accomplish an armored legislative framework.

Scenario 3 (1100) What we have is enough

This scenario, third in probability, can be seen as the status quo scenario. While there is

an effort of the government to build stronger public organizations, expertise, technology,

and other services that Mexican institutions lack will be imported from PMSCs. This means

an increase in PMSC activity in the country, which results from the continuation of the

Merida Initiative.

71
The need for changes in the legislation is not a concern, as Mexico has a good legislative

framework. However, the struggle to make the law be carried out is still an issue and there

have not been enough projects to address the lack of oversight and monitoring of PMSCs

in the country. Although this can turn into a problem for sovereignty, the Mexican

government is still wary of any external aid. Even if the Merida Initiative has brought

advancements and progress, the difficultness to control the nature of private companies

has made the government wary of any other external aid.

Scenario 4 (1110) Doing things the right way

This is the sixth most probable scenario to occur and represents a plausible and desirable

scenario for Mexico. This scenario was chosen as it is seen as a desirable scenario. It

depicts an effort of the Mexican government to build strong institutions as well as obtaining

any expertise and technological advancements from PMSCs. It reckons a strong oversight

and monitoring of their activities with foundations in the legislation. We can see in this

example that Mexico understands the position of PMSCs in Latin America, and is now

dictating the way they should interact with governments in the region.

Mexico continues to be cautious of external involvement in national affairs. The

involvement that exists is well controlled and fluctuates in a manner that benefits the

strategic needs of the country. There is a master plan of the government to develop its

institutions that include PMSCs in such a way that they are under jurisdiction of Mexican

laws. The government takes a careful approach when dealing with them and does not

allow any violations of human rights or sovereignty risks thanks to a strong legislation.

Regarding other external involvement, the Mexican government is still concerned about

the sovereignty of the nation and does not allow any involvement that has the potential of

72
going beyond governmental control. When cooperating with other countries, Mexico has a

clear stand on its position and only allows foreign involvement when it is beneficial for the

Mexican society and no threat is posed to sovereignty.

73
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The goal of this document was to assess the potential risks posed by PMSCs to

Mexican sovereignty. As we saw, there are serious concerns on thinking of the plausible

threat the incursion of these multinationals can bring to Mexico. However, after discussing

the rigidness of the Mexican law, we observe control mechanisms to secure sovereignty.

Nevertheless, these mechanisms are not applied as they should and this could exacerbate

our original concerns for sovereignty.

Alongside this, a clear notion of the involvement of the United States in this matter

was elucidated. One of the main issues presented was the lack of oversight and

monitoring at high levels in the U.S. government. Even though this makes the United

States concerned because of the allocation of funding, it should be of special attention for

Mexico, as these companies are entering many governmental institutions and their

worldwide reputation is not the best in the international community.

A complete list of the companies working in Mexico is not available but some of the

companies known to have established in Mexico are DynCorp, Lockheed Martin, ARINC,

ITT, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman. Most of them have been cited by the United

Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as having legally doubtful practices.

The scenarios formulated are a valuable asset to portrait the future and make

decisions accordingly since the main concern of politicians is the threat to sovereignty.

While it is true that Mexico has always been concerned regarding its sovereignty, it also

has a recent history of economic opening and hunger for foreign investment. While there

are supporters and detractors of these kinds of policies, when addressing PMSCs the

circumstances have to be handled with extreme caution, an advice that seems to be

needed by the Mexican authorities under the circumstances.

74
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, J. (1999). The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons and the Front Line is
Everywhere. Simon & Schuster.

Aguinaco, J. (1996). Informe del Presidente de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacin

y del Consejo de la Judicatura Federal. Mxico.

Amaya, A. (2012, Mayo 31). El trfico de armas de Estados Unidos a Mxico: un problema
sin pronta solucin. Observatorio de Drogas Ilcitas y Armas Universidad del Rosario .

Andrianopoulos, G. (2010, February 17-20). National Security Redefined: Calderon's War

on Drugs. ISA 51st. Annual Convention , 45.

Armbula, A. (2008). Iniciativa Mrida Compendio. Mxico D.F.: Centro de

Documentacin, Informacin y Anlisis.

Astigarraga, E. El Mtodo Delphi. Donostia - San Sebastin, Espaa: Universidad de

Deusto.

Brcena, M. (1999). La reconceptualizacin de la seguridad: el debate contempraneo.

Revista Mexicana de Poltica Exterior (59), 9-30.

Bentez Manaut, R. (2008). La seguridad nacional en la indefinida transicin: Mitos y

realidades del sexenio de Vicente Fox. Foro Internacional , XLVIII (1-2), 184-208.

Booth, W. (2010, December 29). The Washington Post. Retrieved April 15, 2014, from In
Mexico, only one gun store but no dearth of violence: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/28/AR2010122803644.html

Brownfield, W. (2013). U. S. - Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida

Initiative, 2008-Present. U. S. - Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida
Initiative, 2008-Present (pp. 1-6). Washington: United States Department of State Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

Cmara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unin. (2005). Ley de Seguridad Nacional.

Secretara de Servicios Paralamentarios. Mxico D.F.: Diario Oficial de la Federacin.

Cmara de Diputados del Honorable Congreso de la Unin. (2004). Ley Federal de Armas
de Fuego y Explosivos. Diario Oficial de la Federacin (p. 6). Mxico D.F.: Secretara de
Servicios Parlamentarios.

Chabat, J. (2010). Combatting Drugs in Mexico under Calderon: The Inevitable War.
Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE (205), 24.

Chesterman, S., & Fisher, A. (2009). Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and
Its Limits. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

75
Committee on Foreign Affairs. (2008, May 22). Federation of American Scientists.
Retrieved April 15, 2014, from Library of Congress:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/externalresources/2008/HR6028rpt.htm

(2014). Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and

Related Programs. Washington: U.S. Congress.

de los Reyes, I. (2011, August 10). BBC Mundo. Retrieved April 15, 2014, from BBC
Mundo - El polmico negocio de los contratistas de EE.UU. en Mxico:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/08/110808_mexico_contratistas_narco_irm.sht
ml

Deare, C. (2009). U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface. Strategic

Forum (243), 1-13.

Dozier, K. (2013, January 17). Associated Press News. Retrieved April 13, 2014, from US
Commandos boost numbers to train Mexican forces: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-
commandos-boost-numbers-train-mexican-forces

Engel, E., Mack, C., & Grassley, C. (2010). Merida Initiative: The United States Has
Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support But Needs Better Performance
Measures. United States: United States Government Accountability Office.

Feeley, J. (2013). U.S. - Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative
2008-Present. In C. o. United States House of Representatives (Ed.). Washington:
Homeland Security Digital Library.

Ford, J. (2011). Department of States Counternarcotics Performance Management

System. United States Government Accountability Office.

Ford, J. (2009). Status of Funds for the Mrida Initiative. Washington: United States
Government Accountability Office.

Francioni, F. (2008). Private Military Contractors and International Law: An Introduction.

The European Journal of International Law , 961-964.

Freedonia Group. (2012, October). Freedonia Group - Private Security Services to 2016 -
Industry Market Research, Market Share, Market Size, Sales, Demand Forecast, Market
Leaders, Company Profiles, Industry Trends. Retrieved Febrero 17, 2014, from
http://www.freedoniagroup.com/Private-Security-Services.html

General Assembly Security Council. (2008). Informal Sumary of the Montreux Document
by Switzerland. Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
relating to the protection of victims in armed conflicts (pp. 1-26). Montreux: United Nations.

Gillard, E. (2007). The Position Under International Humanitarian Law. In M. Vuijlsteke, &
P. (. Stroobarts, Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Private Military/Security

76
Companies Operating in Situations of Armed Conflict (pp. 26-32). Bruges: Collegium No
36.

Godet, M. (2000). La prospective en quete de rigueur: porte et limites des methodes

formalises. Futuribles (249).

Godet, M. (2007). Prospectiva Estratgica: problemas y mtodos. Paris: Laboratoire

d'Investigation Prospective et Stratgique.

Gordon, T. (1994). Cross-Impact Method. Futures Research Methodology .

Guerrero, J. (1988). El Concepto de Soberana en Nuestra Historia Constitucional. In B.

Bernal, & R. M. Romero (Ed.), Memoria del IV Congreso de Historia del Derecho
Mexicano (Vol. I, pp. 501-516). Mxico D.F.: UNAM.

Herrera-Lasso, L. (2010). Inteligencia y Seguridad Nacional: Apuntes y Reflexiones. In A.

Alvarado, & M. Serrano, Los Grandes Problemas de Mxico: Seguridad Nacional y
Seguridad Interior (Vol. XV, pp. 191-226). Mxico D.F.: El Colegio de Mxico A.C.

Hogan, E. (2013). U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative

2008 - Present. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative
2008 - Present (pp. 17-21). Washington: Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2008). The Montreux Document: On pertinent
international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operationd of private
military and security companies during armed conflict. Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs. Geneva: Directorate of International Law.

Juma, L. (2011). Privatisation, human rights and security: Reflections on the Draft
International Convention on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and
Security Companies. Law, Democracy and Development , 182 - 214.

Krasner, S. (1999). Sovereignty: Orgnanized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

La Plaza: News from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2008, July 8). Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved April 13, 2014, from Mexico: The Merida Initiative discussed latimes.com:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2008/07/draft-merida.html

Lake, D. (2003). The New Sovereignty in International Relations. International Studies

Review (5), 303-323.

Liivoja, R. (2012). Regulating the Private Military and Security Industry: A Quest to
Mantain State Control and Preserve Public Values. Leiden Journal of International Law ,
1019-1028.

77
Mndez, E. (2012, April 11). La Jornada. Retrieved April 15, 2014, from La Jornada:
Extranjeros podrn participar en las empresas de seguridad privada:
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/04/11/politica/003n2pol

Merida Initiative. (n.d.). Retrieved Abril 4, 2014, from U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy
in Action: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/

Michel, V. H. (2009, April 16). Merida Initiative: the United States' Bureaucratic Invasion.
Milenio .

Miles, D. (2013, January 22). United States of America Department of Defense. Retrieved
April 13, 2014, from Defense.gov News Article: Northcom Pursues Closer Engagement
With Mexico: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119074

Mini, L. F. (2010). An Analysis of Private Military and Security Companies. EUI Working
Papers (p. 21). Florence: European University Institute.

Miroff, N., & Booth, W. (2012, January 26). The Washington Post. Retrieved April 15,
2014, from Security contractors see opportunities, and limits, in Mexico - The Washington
Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/security-contractors-see-new-
opportunities-in-
mexico/2012/01/03/gIQAUj3wSQ_story.html?wprss=rss_linkset&utm_medium=twitter&utm
_source=twitterfeed

National Drug Intelligence Center. (2008, December). Retrieved Marzo 8, 2014, from
National Drug Threat Assesment 2009:
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs31/31379/summary.htm

National Security. (2013, Diciembre 1). Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved Diciembre 1,
2013, from Oxford English Dictionary: http://www.oed.com/

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). United Nations Human Rights.
Retrieved April 15, 2014, from Country visits:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2009). Draft
International Convention on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and
Security Companies. (p. 39). United Nations.

Orozco, G. (2006). El concepto de seguridad en la Teora de las Relaciones

Internacionales. CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, no. 72 , 161-180.

Ovando, J., Acosta, M., Caro, S., Aguirre, M. d., & Herrera, B. (2012). Iniciativa que
Reforma el Artculo 150 de la Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica, a
cargo de la Diputada Mara de Jess Aguirre Maldonado, del Grupo Parlamentario del
PRI. Mxico D.F.: Gaceta Parlamentaria, Nmero 3347-IV.

78
Patio, R. (2010). El Estado Soberano y la Globalidad. In H. Fix-Zamudio, & D. Valads,
Formacin y Perspectivas del Estado en Mxico (pp. 301-318). Mxico D.F.: Instituto de
Investigaciones Jurdicas, UNAM.

Perret, A. (2013). Privatization without Regulation: The Human Rights Risks of Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in Mexico. Mexican Law Review , 163-175.

Pieyro, J. (2010). Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas en la Seguridad Pblica y la

Seguridad Nacional. In A. Alvarado, & M. Serrano, Los Grandes Problemas de Mxico:
Seguridad Nacional y Seguridad Interior (Vol. XV, pp. 155-190). Mxico D.F.: El Colegio
de Mxico A.C.

Ribando Seelke, C., & Finklea, K. (2013). U.S.- Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mrida
Initiative and Beyond. Congressional Research Service.

Rosenberg, M. (2009, July 16). U.S. security firms vie for Mexican drug war work. Reuters
.

Schaefer, A., Bahney, B., & Riley, J. (2009). Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S.
Policy Options. RAND Corporation Monograph series , 108.

Schutter, O. D. (2009). The responsibility of states. In S. Chesterton, Public Order: The

Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (pp. 25-45). New York: Oxford University
Press.

Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and
Implications. Chicago Journals , 193-245.

Singer, P. (2002). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its
Ramifications for International Security. International Security , 26 (3), 186-220.

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight. (2009). Hearing on Counternarcotic Contracts in

Latin America, Opening Statement by Claire McCaskill. Washington: U.S. Senate.

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight. (2011). New Information about Counternarcotics

Contracts in Latin America. Washington: United States Senate.

Tello, J. (2006). Seguridad Nacional y Poltica Exterior: Espacios para la Accin. In L.

Herrera-Lasso, Mxico ante el mundo: tiempo de definiciones (pp. 363-401). Mxico D.F.:
Fondo de Cultura Econmica.

Thomson, J. (1995). State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap

between Theory and Empirical Research. International Studies Quarterly , 39, 213-233.

Todo en Mxico es territorio narco, Diagnstico del secretario de Seguridad Pblica.

(2006). Emeequis (36), 27.

79
U.S. Department of State. (2009, June 23). U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action.
Retrieved April 13, 2014, from Merida Initiative: Myth vs. Fact:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/122395.htm

U.S. Northern Command. (n.d.). United States Northern Command. Retrieved April 13,
2014, from About USNORTHCOM: http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx

Weber, M., & Whimster, S. (2004). The Essential Weber: A Reader. London.

80
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRES

Expert 1

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

La seguridad siempre ha sido vista de forma reactiva. Desde la perspectiva de la

poblacin y la de las empresas. La seguridad no puede ser vista en un espacio delimitado,
por ejemplo en una colonia privada pues al salir de sta, la inseguridad es la misma. Es
necesario tener una conexin entre el sector pblico y el sector privado. En las sesiones
con el secretario de seguridad, tambin se encuentran empresas privadas como Oxxo,
Seven, etc. Pero no hay una interaccin productiva, slo se buscan respuestas para hacer
ms eficiente la seguridad.

Las empresas privadas de seguridad tampoco estn completamente coordinadas con la

seguridad pblica. En algunos casos a las instituciones de seguridad pbica no les agrada
la idea de contratar servicios privados para entrenamientos u otros servicios de este tipo.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

La cercana con los habitantes. Hay mucho dficit por las depuraciones policiacas. En
Monterrey se quedaron con pocos policas, el contralmirante tena 800 policas y se qued
con 200. Este dficit est siendo compensado por elementos de seguridad privada. Las
grandes empresas contratan sus servicios pues no estn dispuestas a esperar a que las
autoridades hagan su trabajo.

Hay mucha resistencia del sector privado con el acercamiento municipal, no hay mucha
filosofa de colaboracin, ni credibilidad. Tenemos un eje de asociaciones pblico-
privadas y no ha podido salir. Al municipio s le parece traer recursos pero en el lado
privado no, ya que: nos han dejado colgados en el cambio de administraciones, no nos
cumplen los convenios que ejercimos, no nos dan lo que al principio haban ofrecido. Hay
mucha resistencia del sector privado al sector pblico pues no confan en ste.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

La corrupcin. No hay entrenamiento ni capacitacin efectiva. La delincuencia en ciertos

polgonos hace que empresas como Oxxo promueva medidas de prevencin situacional
que confronten la situacin con prevencin de delito a travs de desarrollo urbano,
prevencin comunitaria para que la gente sea ms activa y colabore.

81
Quisieron hacer un convenio de colaboracin con el municipio de Monterrey con el
esquema de polica de barrio. Sin embargo este esquema es para clase media, media-alta
con la facilidad de colaborar para un vehculo y adems el convenio con seguridad pblica
asigne a policas. Sin embargo esto lo pag Oxxo y el modelo no funcion. Haba
corrupcin, no se rehabilit la estacin de polica, a pesar del convenio. Entonces Oxxo
contrat su propio sistema de seguridad privada. Han gastado muchos millones de pesos
en seguridad privada pues no confan en el municipio.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

En primera instancia s. Si las empresas de seguridad privadas tienen la capacidad de

compartir, colaborar. Normalmente estas tienen una visin de negocios imperturbable. No
siempre estn dispuestos a compartir su experiencia, sus modelos. Si lo hicieran, sera
una mstica muy interesante pero no deja ser una empresa, un modelo de negocio.

Las ventajas competitivas de las empresas privadas no se comparten pues es su modelo

de negocio.

Se comparten proyectos con la Universidad de Ciencias de la Seguridad para el modelo

de polica de proximidad.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

El municipal es el ms vulnerable. Hay mucho desorden desde el nivel federal. Sin

embargo el trabajo se hace a nivel municipal, a este le cae toda la desorganizacin. Piden
ayuda y no siempre la reciben.

6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se

resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

Debe haber un padrn. Hay empresas de seguridad privada formales e informales. Yo he

estado en contacto con empresas pequeas de seguridad que no estn constituidas y por
lo tanto no son tan confiables. No pagan impuestos, no generan facturas. No estn
registradas ante el IMPI, ni Hacienda. Es importante estar registrada, tener las
certificaciones, etc. De esta forma se puede contar con la certeza de que no hay
infiltraciones.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

La parte de tecnologa, de infraestructura llama la atencin al sector pblico, sin embargo

esto puede ser contraproducente pues algunas no han terminado su depuracin y hay

82
personas dentro de la institucin en las que no se confa totalmente como para estar
compartiendo este tipo de servicios.

El secretario de seguridad del Estado cerr las puertas por considerar que empresas de
otros pases vengan a trabajar. Porqu los gringos me van a venir a decir qu es lo que
tengo qu hacer? Aunque su equipo operativo piense que es benfico el modelo de
policia de proximidad. Aunque el general no est de acuerdo por lo que no se puede
hacer nada. En Guadalupe la situacin es diferente pues si estn abiertos y hemos
llevado consultores y han resultado beneficiados del apoyo de USAID. En Monterrey, para
poder trabajar el proyecto piloto de polica de proximidad, el anterior contralmirante y el
actual tuvieron que ir a hablar con el Gral. Flores, secretario de seguridad el Estado para
que les diera oportunidad de llevar este programa piloto de USAID y al final s concedi el
permiso. Pero si hay resistencia en Fuerza Civil por cuestiones polticas con el consulado.

Es difcil convencer al sector pblico de colaborar con USAID sin embargo poco a poco se
han ido abriendo.

El beneficio puede ser grande ya que las empresas privadas traen cuestiones de
capacitacin, mejora continua, calidad, estn en boga estos conceptos.

Beneficio: 8

Cuando se present la propuesta de polica comunitaria lleg el Gral. de Galeana,

secretario de seguridad pblica con muchas preguntas sobre el financiamiento, USAID,
las colaboraciones. Al da siguiente sali en las noticias sobre una investigacin por sus
nexos al crimen organizado. Entonces existen riesgos con las infiltraciones en los cuerpos
de seguridad pblica.

Sin embargo, hay mucha resistencia por la parte gubernamental de dejar entrar a actores
internacionales. Adems, los productos que se entregan de parte de USAID son
propiedad del gobierno mexicano.

Riesgo: 8

Expert 2

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

Seguridad para las empresas privadas. En instituciones pblicas, controles de acceso,

cmaras de vigilancia. La tecnologa tambin definitivamente crecer. La capacitacin, la
parte tcnica y operativa tambin. Estrategias de vigilancia.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

83
Falta de personal policiaco. A nivel estatal y municipal carecen de personal. Hay muchas
empresas que contratan personal de seguridad privado esto a raza de la ltima crisis de
inseguridad. La comunicacin entre instituciones es muy limitada. El mayor apoyo que las
instituciones reciben es en la parte de la infraestructura tecnolgica.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

La falta de vigilancia, crecimiento de los delitos del fuero comn, la falta de equipo tctico
para cumplir con tareas de vigilancia.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

La realidad es que al entrar una empresa extranjera que invierta de forma mayscula,
est comprometida a cumplir con las expectativas y de forma responsable. Si ayudan y si
son confiables. Tienen mejores recursos econmicos, estn mejor preparadas y tienen
ms compromiso para realizar su trabajo.

Hay que revisar si la legislacin al da de hoy es la adecuada para que se lleven a cabo
las labores de vigilancia.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

El municipal. Es el que menos se preocupa por prepararse. El polica del nivel federal
tiene que pasar por un perodo de escolaridad, quiz pueda contribuir alguna empresa
privada pero el municipio es ms vulnerable pues tambin depende de recursos, los
cuales son menores en este nivel y esto hace ms propenso la contratacin de servicios
de seguridad privada.

6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se

resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

Es necesario tener fortalecidas las instituciones para que no se vean transgredidos por
personas civiles. Tambin se debe estar sujeto a las leyes y reglamentos emanados de la
Constitucin. Las empresas privadas pueden entrar como asesores pero deben tener sus
limitaciones. Se deben de escuchar a los asesores pero siempre en base a lo que la
legislacin dicta. El caso del Gral. Naranjo con Pea Nieto quien es un consultor privado e
influy en las decisiones del pas. Las instituciones deben estar asistidas por el congreso
quien es la representacin social.

Hay que tener en cuenta que cada estado tiene una legislacin diferente.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

84
Las empresas que vienen sugieren en base a sus experiencias. Hasta cierto punto es
aceptable pero siempre habr alguien que ponga un lmite en base a sus necesidades. La
idea es que sirvan como complemento.

Al final es ms beneficio que riesgo. Al estar dentro de una institucin se les comparten
los conocimientos de las empresas privadas, cualquier iniciativa tiene que llegar al
congreso por lo que tiene que pasar muchos controles y por lo tanto no genera tanto
riesgo. No hay mucho riesgo, se debe estar sujeto a las disposiciones del pas.

Lo bueno de traer empresas privadas es que traen otras visiones.

Beneficio: 8

Riesgo: 3

Expert 3

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020.

RESPUESTA: Todos los servicios contemplados en la Ley (seguridad, proteccin,

vigilancia o custodia de personas, lugares o establecimientos, de bienes o valores,
incluido su traslado y monitoreo electrnico) debern, en mi opinin, crecer ya que los
prestadores de estos servicios, en su carcter de auxiliares de la funcin de seguridad
pblica, se vern con demandas de servicio cada vez mayores, sobre todo si
atendemos a las expectativas de mayor crecimiento de nuestra economa y a la
dificultad de que esos servicios sean prestados directamente por los entes pblicos.

Ahora bien, el crecimiento en lo particular entre los tipos de servicio tendr

seguramente variaciones diferentes, pienso por ejemplo que en el caso de traslado y
monitoreo de valores ser menor, mientras que en custodia de lugares y
establecimientos podr ser mayor, igual que en el caso de los servicios generales de
seguridad.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

RESPUESTA: En general la falta de recursos humanos, materiales y financieros

de las diferentes corporaciones de seguridad. Por ejemplo se sabe de las dificultades
para el reclutamiento de policas (casos Fuerza Civil y municipios rurales en Nuevo
Len). Tambin los rezagos en infraestructura y tecnologa y la imposibilidad de
hacer frente a los pasivos por nminas o a las inversiones requeridas ante la escasez
de recursos y el alto endeudamiento de federacin, estados y municipios. Lo que hace
imposible proteger la integridad de todas las personas y sus bienes, requiriendo,
entonces, el concurso de la iniciativa privada para cierto tipo de servicios.

85
 Por otro lado, tambin hay que considerar que las inversiones privadas en
seguridad tienen la posibilidad de hacer que las instituciones adquieran la tecnologa
de punta de muchas de sus acciones, mientras que a las instituciones pblicas se les
dificulta tal adquisicin por las limitaciones presupuestales.

En este rubro tambin hay que considerar que, en opinin de muchos, la

salvaguarda de personas y bienes privados en muchos casos no corresponde a los
rganos pblicos (como la proteccin de directivos, el cuidado de las instalaciones de
las empresas o los bancos). Es decir, realizan funciones que no estn en el mbito de
competencias del sector pblico.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

RESPUESTA: Adems de la correcta identificacin de los mbitos competenciales

del aparato pblico, habra que agregar el crecimiento de la actividad de los grupos de
la delincuencia organizada (por ejemplo secuestros, extorsiones, robo a tiendas de
conveniencia y robo a casa habitacin, robo a trileres, etc.), la presencia de
grupos de narcotraficantes que violenta cuya conflictividad pone en riesgo a la
poblacin en general y en general la impunidad, la corrupcin, la falta de apego a la
cultura de la legalidad y al Estado de Derecho que nos caracteriza como poblacin.

Tambin el alto valor de bienes e instalaciones o el perfil de remuneracin de

ciertos ejecutivos funcionan como factores que fomentan el crecimiento de los
servicios de seguridad privada.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

RESPUESTA: Si, como lo hace cualquier sector productivo cuando en el ejercicio

de los asuntos de su responsabilidad su actuacin es apegada a Derecho, contribuyendo
entonces al crecimiento de la economa general del pas, creando empleo y
fungiendo como rganos que hacen posible la vida armnica en la comunidad,
contribuyen , sin duda, al desarrollo nacional.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

RESPUESTA: Me parece que habra que dividir la respuesta atendiendo a dos

situaciones.

Primero: si los servicios de esas empresas se brindan a organizaciones igualmente

privadas no habra ningn supuesto de cesin de soberana.

Segundo: si los servicios de seguridad privada se brindan a instituciones pblicas,

habr que considerar si esas instituciones estn ligadas o no a temas de seguridad

86
nacional. Si no lo estn, pienso que en ningn momento estamos frente a la
posibilidad de vulnerar la soberana nacional. Si estn ligadas depender de la
utilizacin de candados y clusulas de confidencialidad la disminucin del riesgo que
podra presentarse de filtrar o poner en riesgo informacin que pudiera considerarse
estratgica o clasificada como confidencial en trminos de la propia informacin,
bases de datos, caractersticas de los equipos o sistemas que la contengan.

Como sea, en mi opinin, y hablando en trminos de soberana entendida como la

capacidad de autodeterminacin de una sociedad, no considero que la
actuacin o actividad de las instituciones de servicios de seguridad privada ponga en
riesgo la soberana nacional, mxime que entiendo que esas empresas slo
participan en parte, mnima dira yo, de temas de seguridad nacional, generalmente
proveen herramientas tecnolgicas, equipos, instrumentos o diseos de procesos
pero la soberana nacional como algo trascendente y cuya titularidad la detenta la
poblacin no se vera comprometida.

6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se

resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

RESPUESTA: Desde la perspectiva de candados ya he comentado la importancia

de incluir en los contratos correspondientes clusulas de confidencialidad y candados
que restrinjan severamente la utilizacin indebida de la informacin clasificada como
estratgica o confidencial. Adems pienso que hay que incluir clusulas penales en esos
contratos cuyos montos elevados funcionen como mecanismos disuasorios ante la
posible utilizacin indebida de la informacin. Por lo que hace a las empresas
prestadoras de servicios de seguridad tambin es conveniente extender la prctica de
que sus empleados y directivos otorguen fianza de su funcionamiento en la
institucin.

Por otra parte, convendra analizar la tipificacin de delitos y las sanciones que la
propia Ley General del Sistema prev para los casos de divulgacin indebida o ilcita de
informacin. En mi opinin pudieran hacerse ms severos.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

RESPUESTA: Me parece que, como en muchos otros temas, la aportacin de las

empresas privadas de seguridad puede ser de gran envergadura, proveyendo
tecnologa, equipos, sistemas, procesos de ltima generacin que impactara muy
positivamente a las instituciones pblicas. En ese sentido pienso que la escala es
cercana a 10 y, como he comentado, en mi opinin, manejada su contratacin
correctamente, con apego a la ley y la definicin puntual de los candados
correspondientes el posible riesgo es bastante menos, sobre todo si consideramos
que en el padrn de proveedores de este tipo de servicios, la experiencia probada, la

87
seriedad de las instituciones y su solvencia moral, econmica y tecnolgica debe quedar
debidamente acreditada.

Expert 4

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

La prevencin. Los de seguridad y custodia y proteccin de instalaciones. Proteccin de

instalaciones estratgicas como estaciones petroleras, de comisin de electricidad,
instalaciones penitenciarias. En temas de vigilancia presencial con elementos operativos.
Estos elementos son contratados por los sistemas de seguridad privada para vender sus
servicios a gobierno y a particulares. Con la reforma energtica habr refineras que se
conviertan en instalaciones estratgicas y el gobierno no tendr que protegerlas, sern los
particulares quienes se encarguen de garantizar la seguridad de las instalaciones y esto
har que las Empresas de Seguridad Privada expandan su mercado. Estos elementos
pueden ser de cualquier origen. Las leyes mexicanas no establecen restricciones,
simplemente dan limites en cuestiones de en qu casos pueden estar armados. La ley
mexicana para la portacin de armas de fuegos establece que solo los mexicanos pueden
estar armados en territorio nacional por lo que no hay extranjeros que puedan estar
armados. Ni siquiera personal de otras corporaciones extranjeras en Mxico.

Por ejemplo los guardias del embajador son oficiales de seguridad mexicanos.
Contratados por la embajada y adscritos a ella pero mexicanos.

Hay muchas empresas, no necesariamente extranjeras. En Mxico hay 5 o 6 empresas

extranjeras que brindan servicios de capacitacin, asesora, etc. Pero no las brindan
directamente al gobierno, se hace a travs de agencias de Estados Unidos que trabajan
en colaboracin con el gobierno por medio de los recursos del Plan Mrida.

USAID es una agencia del gobierno con fines de desarrollo humano, desarrollo
institucional. Las agencias de seguridad del gobierno de Estados Unidos son la Agencia
Antinarcticos, el INL International Affairs Narcotic Section, la DEA, el FBI, la CIA,
instituciones de gobierno. Estas a su vez tienen subcontratistas como MSI y estos
subcontratistas ofrecen servicios al gobierno mexicano pero regulado por los lineamientos
del gobierno mexicano como el de los Estados Unidos.

En el tema de tecnologa, no hay proveedores nacionales, la mayor parte de la tecnologa

que se adquiere es a travs de la Marina, la Secretaria de Defensa y la Polica Federal.
Siempre es a travs de contratistas nacionales que compran productos en el extranjero.
Mxico no produce tecnologa para defensa ni para seguridad pblica.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

88
La falta de personal es la principal. En Mxico los recursos asignados a la seguridad no
son pocos. En el sexenio de Caldern se asignaron 18 millones de pesos a la seguridad,
muchos de estos recursos no pudieron ser ejercidos por la falta de capacidad de las
instituciones para ejercerlos, derivado de la falta de personal.

Faltan manuales, procesos, reglamentacin, todo el contexto institucional. Pero esto no

est siendo compensado por las empresas privadas. Slo suplen la falta de personal.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

La inseguridad pblica. La necesidad de la poblacin de sentirse protegida. Aunque

realmente los guardias de seguridad privada no proveen una seguridad real, si no que
slo hacen acto de presencia.

La industria privada busca reas de oportunidad y lo principal es la sensacin de

inseguridad en el pas.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

No. Al hablar de desarrollo institucional se habla de fortalecer a las instituciones. Las

empresas de seguridad privadas suplen carencias pero no son empresas que ayuden a
que las policas se vuelvan mejores o mejoren sus sistemas o que aporten a mejorar las
instituciones.

Las empresas no trabajan directamente con el gobierno mexicano sino que lo hace a
travs de una organizacin del gobierno americano en base a tratados y convenios
internacionales celebrados entre los dos pases para colaborar de cierta forma. MSI
trabaja aqu pero la cara visible de este programa es USAID. El contratista o la compaa
no aparecen en ningn lado, por lo que no se puede decir que la compaa contribuye al
desarrollo cuando es otra persona o institucin la que se lleva el crdito.

Los gobiernos de Mxico no contratan a empresas privadas de seguridad directamente.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

Los servicios de seguridad privada estn muy focalizados y regulados por la ley a temas
que por la naturaleza de la seguridad pblica no pueden ejercer, es decir que solamente
le dan a las empresas actividades que no pueden atender, es muy poco probable que se
ponga en riesgo la soberana en cualquier nivel de gobierno. No hablamos de empresas
de seguridad privada haciendo tareas de seguridad pblica. Ni tampoco hay posibilidad
porque la Constitucin lo prohbe que la seguridad pblica en algn momento sea
concesionada a empresas privadas.

89
SI hubiera un reforma constitucional para permitir esto entonces si hubiera un riesgo a la
soberana. Pero mientras eso no ocurra, se ve difcil que la soberana se vea a afectada.
Es tan sencillo porque a cada nivel existe un organismo especializado en las secretarias
encargado del control de la seguridad privada. Es el gobierno quien pone los candados.

Las sugerencias que alguien de una empresa privada hace en las reuniones de gobierno
son slo eso, sugerencias. Se puede considerar o no. Sera un riesgo mayor para
empresas que se renen con el Senado de la Repblica, con los senadores, con
organizaciones de la sociedad civil y hacemos propuesta de mejoras y hacen eco y se
convierten en iniciativas. La iniciativa del Cdigo Nacional, la Iniciativa de la reforma
constitucional en materia penal sali de propuestas de MSI, ah s puede haber riesgo.
Aunque no son a ttulo de la empresa. No es de inters de la empresa. Es el inters del
gobierno mexicano, expresado a travs de la Iniciativa Mrida y materializado a travs de
los recursos que da el gobierno de Estados Unidos. MSI como operadores solamente
seguimos los objetivos y lineamientos que se construyeron entre el gobierno mexicano y
el de Estados Unidos. No es una propuesta de empresa.

Estados Unidos tiene los mismos intereses, por esto la firma de la Iniciativa Mrida.

No se pierde la soberana porque tenemos un marco jurdico que regula la participacin

de estas empresas. Todas las actividades que tienen que ver con seguridad pblica estn
controladas por las mismas instituciones de seguridad pblica, igual con las privadas. Ese
es un panorama que no se ve que vaya a cambiar. Para el 2020 faltan seis aos, no
habr cambios tan radicales como para que las compaas de seguridad privada le quiten
el monopolio de la fuerza a las instituciones de seguridad pblica.

En el tema de seguridad privada, hay un contrapeso muy importante. La Secretara de la

Defensa Nacional. Esta otorga todos los permisos de portacin de armas de fuego.
Ninguna compaa de seguridad privada va a estar por encima del ejrcito.

El riesgo es mnimo pues habra que modificar la Constitucin, despus modificar las
leyes en materia de seguridad pblica, las estatales, las leyes de armas de fuego y
explosivos y todo un marco legislativo que tendra que cambiara nada ms para permitirle
a los extranjeros portar armas en el territorio nacional. De ah a monopolizar el uso de la
fuerza, falta todava ms.

Aunque la debilidad institucional de Mxico en el tema de seguridad pblica est a nivel

municipal. Cuando hablamos del Estado, esta debilidad se reduce drsticamente. No en
balde, los modelos de polica acreditable le han dado mayor confiabilidad a los policas
estatales. La debilidad institucional se representa en ciertos estados.

Aunque tambin depende de en qu estados, el de B.C. tienen municipios con los

mejores policas del pas.

Inclusive la polica federal ofrece servicios de seguridad privada a particulares. Ellos

venden seguridad a empresas de gobierno que no son consideradas estratgicas.

90
 6. Qu candados y estructura orgnica institucional es necesaria para garantizar
que se resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

Lo que blinda es el marco jurdico. El marco jurdico es slido. Garantiza el que vengan
empresas como Blackwater u otras empresas privadas y nos invada a travs de un
convenio. No veo necesidad de mejora al marco jurdico.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

Si las empresas fueran competitivas y de primer nivel, sobre todo las que operan en
Mxico podran beneficiarse de copiar sistemas de trabajo de seguridad pblica o privada
pero como no lo son, no hay mucho beneficio. Al no superar las instituciones de seguridad
pblica las capacidades de las empresas privadas no representan un riesgo para las
instituciones.

Se pueden beneficiar de compaas extranjeras que trabajaran en el pas, de ah se

pueden obtener beneficios, pero gracias al marco regulatorio slo obtienen los beneficios
ms nunca los riesgos. Por ms que contrates a una EPMS para capacitar, para lo que
sea, nunca va a poder salir del marco legal que existe.

Tampoco hay dependencia. El gobierno va a depender de compaas privadas de

seguridad mientras tenga dinero para hacerlo, no hay ninguna compaa en el mundo
cuyo fin sea apoderarse del pas, slo quieren hacer negocio.

En Mxico si hay firmeza institucional suficiente para que no sea un riesgo. Mxico no ha
desarrollado su propia tecnologa pero porque no le interesa hacerlo. La tecnologa en
seguridad pblica no es tan novedosa, es tecnologa de otras reas adaptadas a la
seguridad pblica.

Beneficio: 4

Riesgo: 0

Expert 5

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

Tecnologa de inteligencia, sistemas informticos para el procesamiento y anlisis de

datos. Capacitacin en la temtica de intervenciones y tecnologa para el combate a la
delincuencia. Las licitaciones directas en seguridad revelan informacin sensible. Se
considera que es de seguridad nacional en el momento en que se abren las licitaciones.
El nuevo sistema de servicio penal hay muchas empresas que son subcontratados para
estos efectos. Pero el crecimiento es primordialmente en servicios de tecnologas, aviones

91
no tripulados, etc. Si hay en capacitacin de personal y en anlisis de informacin pero no
en trminos operativos.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

La constante rotacin. No hay un servicio civil de carrera y cada sexenio rota la gente.
Esto hace que los servicios no se especialicen. Es muy comn que en reas sensibles,
cada gobierno lleva su propia gente. No hay continuidad en los servicios civiles. En
Mxico no se ha invertido mucho, o no es un referente en tecnologa de punta en el
mbito de seguridad.

Como hay urgencia, al momento de subcontratar, no es de operacin, es ms de asesora

y capacitacin. Aunque si existe la tentacin de los gobiernos por disfrazar clusulas
donde se piden otras cosas donde incluye la anexin de personal privado.

Las empresas que a veces son de origen internacional pero operadas por mexicanos
terminan haciendo trabajo que no estaba inicialmente planeado.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

El aumento de la inseguridad. Esto hizo que se destinaran fondos nacionales y

extranjeros a este tema. Hasta hace poco no haba empresas privadas que ofrecieran
servicios y tuvieron que traer empresas de otros lugares principalmente el gobierno
federal.

La inseguridad se tradujo en mayores presupuestos y trajo empresas de otros pases.

Formalmente nunca se ver a estos servicios en la parte operativa pero si existe la
tentacin. Poltica y jurdicamente es muy difcil que se acepte la intervencin a nivel
operativa. Materialmente si se est dando ante la falta de fortaleza de las instituciones
mexicanas.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

No, a menos que sean de manera subsidiaria y controlada. Al da de hoy no existen

controles claros ante este boom. Lo ptimo sera que no existieran, tener un estado slido
que no las necesitara. Deben estar reguladas y controladas, desde las armas, los
controles de confianza, etc.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

Lo local, el mayor nmero de elementos de la seguridad privada est haciendo

actividades que le corresponde al municipio, en escuelas, etc. En lo estatal no se
identifica con claridad la funcin de policas de agentes privados si se nota en reas de

92
aeropuertos, de algunas reas donde la funcin es un rea federal donde ceden esa
proteccin a un cuerpo privado. La responsabilidad primaria la tienen las privadas aunque
tambin hay control de elementos federales.

Sin embargo, en el nivel municipal es en donde ms se han necesitado elementos de

seguridad privada. Incluso en los altos niveles se toma informacin de empresas privadas.
El problema es que no estn controladas como en otros estados de la repblica, donde la
lnea es muy delgada.

Los contratos en el nivel federal con empresas privadas son muchos, se llenan de
asesores. Tambin est la forma de participaciones o convenios con otros gobiernos. Por
ejemplo los colombianos han apoyado a los mexicanos en la profesionalizacin de polica,
esto se da a nivel institucional. Muchas empresas privadas han filtrado informacin a sus
gobiernos de origen y esto puede convertirse en un riesgo. Al final, un Estado es celoso
de su autonoma pero cuando no se tiene la fortaleza institucional se llega a estos
contratos.

Un ejemplo, la venta de microscopios para balstica al gobierno tambin necesitan

mantenimiento por lo que se depende de instancias privadas para que se asegure un
contrato a largo plazo.

6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se

resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

La transferencia de tecnologa debe quedar en manos del gobierno mexicano. Vigilancias

y controles por parte de rganos externos a la instancia que contrata los servicios
privados. Cuidado de la Auditoria superior, secretaria de funcin pblica para cuidar no
solo el aspecto formal sino tambin el material de los contratos. Que haya una instancia
externa a la institucin donde se de el servicio que este monitoreando el cumplimento,
limites y alcance del convenio.

Crear tecnologa propia, invertir en estos temas. Si la SSP y PF tuviera un rea de

creacin de tecnologa. Muchas veces se necesita subcontratar aunque en la medida de
lo posible sera contratar empresas privadas mexicanas. Reforzar el aparato del estado
con reas propias de investigacin y tener mucho control en los convenios y contratos de
prestacin de servicios.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

Si hay un beneficio importante de la transferencia de tecnologas, no obstante el tema es

ver la forma en que este conocimiento se multiplique. El riesgo se transfiere y la rotacin
hace que no se alcance a crear una situacin de xito ni que alcance a permear.

Otro de los elementos es capacitar a formadores que despus vayan a transferir el

conocimiento y sean los guardianes de las tecnologas en las instituciones y que tengan

93
clusulas especiales en sus convenios laborales con la institucin para que sea difcil
moverlos de sus puestos.

Hay un riesgo a considerar. La gente que capacitas, luego a dnde se van? Como el
caso de los Zetas. Muchas personas que han trabajado en anlisis de informacin, luego
terminan trabajando en empresas privadas pero tambin es posible de que crucen al
crimen organizado.

Debe haber controles para que la gente que vaya a recibir el conocimiento, no utilice de
mala manera sus conocimientos. Lo normal es que se aporte a las instituciones.

Existe un riesgo potencial. Se puede correr el riesgo de que si no hay una poltica de crear
y mantener la solidez tecnolgica de las instituciones, depender de las empresas
privadas. Esto sera efecto de la carencia y falta de visin de polticas pblicas
institucionales que solidifiquen el tejido. Esta falta de visin es una variable muy
importante a tomar en cuenta para el riesgo a futuro.

Beneficio: 8

Riesgo: 7

El beneficio es indiscutible, las ultimas aprehensiones es con tecnologa prestada pero

este es tambin es riesgo pues no es tecnologa propia.

Expert 6

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

Los exmenes de control de confianza pues son un requisito indispensable a nivel estatal
federal y municipal. En trminos del mercado mexicano en general, todos los involucrados
en la seguridad debern tener al da estas pruebas. En ciertas tecnologas tambin. La
video vigilancia, cmaras fijas o mviles o ahora los drones que son algo novedoso y
verstil y pueden abonar a los aparatos del Estado. Las consultoras tambin. Las
instituciones de seguridad adolecen del talento humano para ciertos tipos de trabajos y
requieren ayuda de terceros para procesos o anlisis de protocolos. En capacitacin
tambin. Mxico es dependiente en tecnologa de seguridad. Para temas de investigacin,
software de anlisis, mtodos de intervencin, tecnologas de posicionamiento global y
todos los campos donde se involucra la radiocomunicacin.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad?

El Estado no puede invertir muchas veces en su propia tecnologa y acuden a empresas

privadas para estos servicios. A veces no tienen la capacidad de dar programas de
desarrollo.

94
 3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de
seguridad privada en Mxico?

La especializacin. Hay empresas privadas especializadas exclusivamente en temas de

vigilancia y hay algunas que te dan instrumentos especializados y lo ms novedoso en el
mercado. Hay otras enfocadas al despacho de emergencias. Hay una necesidad del
Estado por tener estos servicios que por s mismo no podra tener.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

La unidad especializada antisecuestros del Estado ha recibido un gran apoyo del gobierno
estatal. Le han invertido y han dado apoyo institucional a la unidad antisecuestros. Un
pilar para que esto funcionara fueron instancias privadas como empresas de consultora
que se dedican a asesorar con programas y objetivos a la unidad y fungir como puente
con la iniciativa privada para dar capacitacin, equipo, uniformes. De alguna manera se
estn fortaleciendo las instituciones. Son las empresas privadas quienes tienen el peso de
la capacitacin. Como ejemplo EGAP y los policas de San Pedro Garza Garca.

El esfuerzo es local pero ha habido participacin de proveedores internacionales que

apoyan este esfuerzo.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

A nivel federal los mercenarios en el ejrcito podran convertirse en un problema a largo

plazo, aunque esto no pasa hoy. El tema de la seguridad carcelaria, el Estado si est
cediendo terreno a la soberana privada en un elemento crucial de seguridad pblica
como lo es el sistema penitenciario. Debe haber un entramado legal bien definido para
que no exista ningn problema. Si se lanza este tema para, por poner un ejemplo, dar
resguardo a instituciones bancarias o de gobierno hay que tener en cuenta que la lgica
del Estado no es la misma que la de las empresas privadas. El estado ve por el bien
pblico, une empresa privada tienen una lgica de maximizar utilidades en vez de
condiciones sociales o polticas.

Si de aqu al 2020 los servicios de seguridad pblico son insuficientes para la demanda
social de seguridad y esa demanda hace que los gobiernos se vean forzados a contratar
servicios de forma privada, de forma generalizada o masiva se corre el riesgo de que el
esto pierda su soberana.

En Nuevo Len hubo una tentacin en 2008, 2009, donde la inseguridad era muy fuerte y
la sociedad deca que el gobierno est rebasado, las instituciones de seguridad estn
coludidas o son omisas. Si esto se generaliza y una empresa llega y te ofrece la mejor
tecnologa, los elementos ms capacitados para esta situacin entonces este escenario
se podra dar si se estuviera en un estado de crisis.

95
 6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se
resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

El tema legal, jurdico es muy importante. El tema de inversin en capital humano es muy
importante. Y el tema de la planeacin a largo plazo, de planeacin estratgica. Estos tres
pilares son los bsicos. Claridad en la ley, redignificar al elemento humano que se dedica
a la seguridad pblica y la planeacin se asegurar la seguridad nacional.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

Pueden beneficiar como complementariedad, si es ms caro hacerlo por mi mismo que

con alguien especializado, por economa y por eficiencia contrato a alguien para que lo
haga, y considerando que este bien reglamentado el proceso, y con los candados
adecuados, de forma que la empresa est vigilada y normada por el estado, en ese
aspecto sera un asunto muy til. Aunque si se vuelve a ver la corrupcin pues esto no
sera as. En opinin personal, sera un 7, si hay un avance institucional, todava falta
mucho por hacer pero se ha ido avanzando en el tema. El riesgo sera un 3. En trminos
polticos al Estado no le conviene ceder un elemento como la fuerza pblica a la iniciativa
privada. Es un parte que los ciudadanos tambin evalan.

Beneficio: 7

Riesgo: 3

Expert 7

1. Qu servicios ofrecidos por las empresas privadas de seguridad tendern a

crecer en el mercado mexicano hacia el 2020?

Los servicios crecern de manera positiva. Su crecimiento va en proporcin a la

poblacin. De la misma manera que crece la poblacin, crece el nmero de policas y por
lo tanto la necesidad de las policas privadas. No debe contradecir la legislacin. Las
personas de clase alta son el principal demandante. La seguridad es un problema de
todos y debe ser visto desde todos los puntos de vista.

2. Cules son las carencias de las instituciones de seguridad que estn

compensando las empresas privadas de seguridad

Hay una actitud estpida en las instituciones pblicas y son nefitos en el tema de la
seguridad. Esto sucede en todo el pas. A diferencia de otros estados, en Nuevo Len hay
cierta organizacin en trminos de seguridad privada.

3. Qu otros factores fomentan el incremento en la demanda de servicios de

seguridad privada en Mxico?

96
Hay factores econmicos tambin. El incremento en el trfico de drogas, aunque tambin
otros delitos que fueron apareciendo a la par. Uno de los ms terribles es el secuestro ya
que afecta a todo el mundo. Las drogas son una decisin de cada quien, pero el
secuestro afecta a toda la poblacin.

4. Son las empresas privadas de seguridad una forma confiable de contribuir al

desarrollo institucional de Mxico?

Las instituciones de seguridad deben pasar por un examen integral para identificar el
problema desde la raz. La institucin es un conjunto de relaciones de igual naturaleza. Se
necesita la accin del ciudadano organizado y del Estado. Es vlido e indispensable
tambin apoyarse en las empresas de seguridad privada con estos fines. Las instituciones
acadmicas tambin pueden aportar al desarrollo institucional a travs de la seguridad.
Un ejemplo es la UANL, en su divisin de criminologa.

Se debe analizar de dnde provienen las empresas y los resultados que produzcan. Sin
embargo no hay mucho riesgo, al contrario, contratar estos servicios ayuda a garantizar la
democracia en la que vivimos. No existe ningn riesgo, la legislacin es muy clara en ese
sentido y la soberana no se ver amenazada. El derecho mercantil tambin debe ser muy
claro para la inclusin de empresas privadas extranjeras en Mxico. Hay que distinguir
entre recursos formales y recursos materiales.

5. En trminos de seguridad pblica, qu nivel (federal, estatal o municipal) es ms

vulnerable a la cesin de soberana por la inclusin de servicios de seguridad
privada?

No hay ninguna vulnerabilidad. El mayor riesgo es a nivel federal ya que se encuentra en

las fronteras.

6. Qu candados e infraestructura institucional es necesaria para garantizar que se

resguarde la seguridad nacional en el largo plazo?

No violar el contenido de la ley. Que no se violen los principios orgnicos o

constitucionales vigentes. Si se va a contratar una empresa privada, debe seguir
parmetros dentro de la legislacin nacional. Los legisladores tambin deben estar muy
atentos pues a veces toman decisiones importantes sin reflexionar en su totalidad.

7. Cmo podran resultar beneficiadas las instituciones pblicas de seguridad en el

pas al colaborar con empresas privadas de seguridad al 2020? En una escala del
1 al 10, qu tan beneficiosas resultarn? qu tanto riesgo presuponen?

Hay academias de formacin, de capacitacin, especializacin y adiestramiento y se debe

ser muy cuidadoso en no confundir lo que le corresponde a cada quien. Si existen
profesores y estudiantes extranjeros en los colegios militares pero esto es de carcter
acadmico por lo que no hay riesgo para la soberana. Adems hay que tener en cuenta
que estos contratos son de carcter privado por lo que se arreglan entre las partes si es
que llega a haber un desacuerdo. Beneficio: 10 Riesgo: 0

97
ANNEX 2: DELPHI VARIABLES

Instituciones
1. Reactividad de la seguridad pblica Reactividad
2. Cantidad de personal en las instituciones policiacas Personal
3. Corrupcin en las institucionesCorrupcin
4. La capacitacin no es efectiva Capacitacin
5. Recursos financieros de las instituciones pblicasRecursos financieros
6. El sector privado no confa en el sector pblicoConfianza en el sector pblico
7. Mxico no produce su propia tecnologaCreacin de tecnologa
8. Falta visin para las polticas pblicas a largo plazoVisin a largo plazo

Empresas privadas de seguridad

1. Las EPS no se coordinan con el sector pblicoCoordinacin con sector pblico
2. Las EPS compensan el poco personal policiacoRecursos humanos
3. Las EPS no comparten todo su conocimientoCompartimentacin de conocimiento
4. Muchas EPS no son profesionalesProfesionalismo
5. Las EPS tienen mayores recursosRecursos financieros
6. Las EPS suplen carencias pero no funcionan para el desarrollo institucionalSolucin
reactiva

Legislacin y control

1. No existe un control efectivo de las EPSControl en censo

2. Los productos de USAID son propiedad del gobierno mexicanoProductos de cooperacin
internacional
3. Las EPS pueden dar asesora pero slo como sugerenciaApoyo no vinculatorio
4. Los operativos privados extranjeros no pueden ir armadosControl de armas
5. La Secretara de Defensa otorga los permisos de portacin de armas
6. El marco jurdico blinda la seguridad nacionalMarco jurdico

Soberana y seguridad nacional

1. Los municipios son ms vulnerables a perder soberanaVulnerabilidad municipal

2. Existe resistencia por parte del sector pblico de dejar entrar EPSResistencia en el
sector pblico
3. Las clusulas de confidencialidad son necesarias para evitar riesgos a la seguridad
nacionalConfidencialidad
4. La legislacin actual no permite ceder soberanaSoberana
5. Las EPS extranjeras brindan sus servicios a travs de E.U.A. Injerencia de otros pases
6. La dinmica de los negocios en seguridad pueden hacer dependiente al
EstadoDependencia

98
ANNEX 3: TOOL FOR CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX

Matriz de Impactos Cruzados

Objetivo: Identificar la probabilidad de que ocurran los eventos enlistados al 2020.

Institutional development is an integral part of policies

Mexican institutions are starting to gain strength through internal development and, in a

lesser extent, through private external aid. Police and security institutions are shifting from

a reactive nature to a strategic one. The lack of personnel for public security functions is a

problem that is being addressed through higher incomes and a career model for

professional development. Alongside this, we find governments programs to tackle

corruption, a problem with deep roots throughout Mexican history. Numerous training

programs have been developed with domestic and international resources to achieve a

more professional police. In financial matters, a great number of resources have been

allocated to develop the public security dimension in Mexico since this is considered a

priority. The population and private sectors confidence in public security is rising. The

Mexican institutions have begun to develop their own technologies and implementing a

long-term vision.

Private Security Companies continue their growth in Mexico

The Private Security Companies with participation in Mexico are strongly coordinated with

public institutions. They share knowledge and function as a compliment for public security.

Their professionalism is significant and they focus their human resources to provide their

services for public or private actors. Although they are helping the institutions in Mexico to

gain access to new technologies and modern programs, their contribution to institutional

development is minimal, as many of their services are contracted to fill gaps in Mexican

needs and do not give a strong foundation for long-term development. Their services are

99
well appreciated since they help protect strategic installations, gather intelligence, and run

prison systems.

PSCs are controlled through a strong legal framework

Private Security Companies are thoroughly revised, the number and competences of each

one of them is clearly defined in legal documents. Everything that comes through

international aid is fully in control of the state and belongs to it. External aid to official

institutions responds to Mexican needs and is seen as suggestions for decision-making,

with complete independence from the state to follow it or not. There is a clear legal

framework that limits the activities of foreign participants in internal affairs such as gun

control and depth of participation.

The government is prone to delegate responsibilities to external actors

Although there is resilience in some local governments of working with external actors,

there is no real threat to sovereignty of national security. The vulnerability in the local

sector has been diminished through a strong legislation and clear premises. Everything

done between Private Security Companies and local governments need to pass through a

confidentiality agreement so that this collaboration results in no leaks of information.

Sovereignty is well-guarded and collaboration with other countries falls under international

law parameters. Mexico may develop dependence on some foreign services since it is not

building new technology.

Matriz de probabilidad simple:

Instrucciones: Utilizando la escala de valor abajo proporcionada, indique de acuerdo a su
opinin, el grado de probabilidad de que cada evento se realice tomando en cuenta que el
horizonte temporal es al ao 2020.

La escala de probabilidad es del 1 al 5 donde:

100
1 = casi imposible 2 = poco probable 3 = Evento medianamente probable
4 = Evento probable 5 = Evento muy probable

Probabilidad
Evento Descripcin simple
El desarrollo institucional es una parte integral de las polticas
E1 pblicas
Las empresas privadas de seguridad continan creciendo en
E2 Mxico
Las empresas privadas de seguridad son controladas por un
E3 fuerte marco legal
El gobierno de Mxico es proclive a delegar responsabilidades
E4 a actores externos

Event 1: How probable is that the institutional development in Mexico becomes an integral

part of public policies towards 2020 deeply affecting reactive practices in security areas,

corruption and short-term vision?

Event 2: What is the probability of PSCs continue their entrance to Mexico towards 2020

through international cooperation with other countries, especially the United States and

continue complementing public security functions?

Event 3: What is the probability that the legislation in Mexico will be adjusted in order to

better administer private security companies and secure the states responsibility of

decision making in 2020?

Event 4: How probable is that the Mexican government will continue accepting external

actors to delegate responsibilities pertaining public security buy their services to acquire

technology without developing in a sustainable manner towards 2020?

Matriz de probabilidad condicional positiva:

101
Instrucciones: De acuerdo a su opinin, valorar la probabilidad de que un Evento (1,2... ocurra si
el Evento (2,3.) sucede.

La escala de valores a utilizar ser en forma de porcentaje, con un rango del 1% al 100%.

Nota: En caso de considerar que los eventos son independientes, (no tienen relacin de
dependencia) se debe indicar un valor de 6 en la casilla.

Ejemplo:
Cul es la probabilidad de que el Evento 1 ocurra, si el Evento 2, sucede?
Cul es la probabilidad de que el Evento 4 ocurra, si el Evento 3, sucede?

E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 X
E2 X
E3 X
E4 X

Matriz de probabilidad condicional negativa:

Instrucciones: De acuerdo a su opinin, valorar la probabilidad que un Evento (1,2... ocurra si el
Evento (2,3.) sucede.

La escala de valores a utilizar ser en forma de porcentaje, con un rango del 1% al 100%

Nota: En caso de considerar que los eventos son independientes, (no tienen relacin de
dependencia) se debe indicar un valor de 6 en la casilla.

Ejemplo:
Cul es la probabilidad de que el Evento 1 ocurra, si el Evento 2, no sucede?
Cul es la probabilidad de que el Evento 4 ocurra, si el Evento 3, no sucede?

E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 X
E2 X
E3 X
E4 X

102