THIRD DIVISION piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the
said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated December 23,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the
records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property
and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and
acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of
the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies,
every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic)
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in
the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar
to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of
Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot
No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further
command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No.
1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and
my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs
violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell,
lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred
(100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to
plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to
the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
1988 -1989.
Belleza.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
complaint and disposing as follows:
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who
filed his Answer, accordingly.
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the
action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son- children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does
in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in- not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.
fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of
the following effect: Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim
under the Codicil.
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT
No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
wit: DISMISSED without prejudice.

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then SO ORDERED."[6]

existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y
Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered
the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years. "Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right
to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88,
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-
will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total
the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to
order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit: institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the
appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's
legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No.
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
1392 until she dies.

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
 Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his
way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis
of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance
with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole
issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner
maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and
the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And
since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and
such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that
the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as
"near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the
substitution should be deemed as not written.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is
not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the
of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute
against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress
him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with
over to the testatrix's near descendants.
law.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under
by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." [16] Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under
Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted
must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New
Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with
its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator,
it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with
his wishes.
from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent
has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted
heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or
mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.
[23]
Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is
thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable
law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in a conditional
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement
be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
and not the seizure of subject property.
the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.[21]
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the Will expresses
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the pronouncement as to costs
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
SO ORDERED.
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L.
CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES
JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and
HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real
property with damages is sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated
upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were
required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were
directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully
considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed
Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and
Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his
daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian,
Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in
Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano,
which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought
into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and
Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course
of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those
that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in
the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal
adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless,
they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their
respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian
relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his
will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both
sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her
lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's
estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items
mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital
at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco,
and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio
Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she
disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to
the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or
their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years
after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also
advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don
Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the
following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to
his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello 2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
favor Aurea Locsin,
Refinery were assigned to
Matilde L. Cordero
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
and Salvador Locsin
Cornelio

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045

Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and
favor Aurea Locsin,
others:
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin, 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
Matilde L. Cordero Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
and Salvador Locsin (6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco 24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -
Maquiniana
favor of Aurea B. Locsin

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -
favor of Ireneo Mamia
favor of Aurea B. Locsin

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
favor of Zenaida Buiza
Aurea Locsin

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
favor of Felisa Morjella
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
favor of Mariano Locsin

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
favor of Juan Saballa
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio 25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
Locsin of Rogelio Marticio

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the
transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After
the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for
probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them
by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or
estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces
who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties
which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were
inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those
who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against
the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo
Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in
equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral
heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian,
and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and
all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de
Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known properties
(Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all
certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this
case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new
ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and
possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments
of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes
received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from
the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be
effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same,
defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes
received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each
as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract
between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now
appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and
nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of
her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time
of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death,
and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or
conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her
death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in
her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were,
one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during
her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom
to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code
which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor
or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any
person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died
on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed
upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the
petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate.
The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already
begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don
Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano
Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land
to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a
5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin,
Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in
this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of
Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he
(Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which
she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent
when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the
fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously
disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente
Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three
years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other
persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes
Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions
was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's
niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that
conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer
her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a
"consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of
properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's
admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the
deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the
surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She
would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her
under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of
First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty.
Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been
prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died,
he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should
eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and
a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also
prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's nephews
and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece
and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio
and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to
annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it
would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that
Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the
petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh
impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her
to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter
of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio,
was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor
of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of
Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador
Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria
Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 26The sales which
she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and
Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but
free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not
dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced
decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's
death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of
Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights
of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the
registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents'
complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private
respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.