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FACTS:
Atty. Fe T. Tuanda the respondent was suspended for practicing her profession
until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa 22.
She was now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted
arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her
in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the
plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez) and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No, The Supreme Court ruled to deny the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order
of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension.
The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing
Section 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. the nature
of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.
DR. RAUL C. SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALUSTINO SOMOSO,
respondent.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Samoso giilty of misconduct, and
he is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and he
was warned that any further infarction by him shall be dealt with most severely. The
Court resolved that the respondents action of issuing his personal checks in payment
for his medical bills, knowing fully well that his account with the drawee bank has been
already closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic norm of integrity required of all
memebers of the legal profession. When respondent paid, with a personal check from a
bank account which he knew had already been closed, the person who attended to his
medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand,
respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has
taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less
than a severe disciplinary sanction.The law profession is a noble calling, and the
privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent and fit to
exercise it.
LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT,
respondent.
FACTS:
The initial case of estafa was filed and subsequently dropped upon payment of
the respondent of the amount allegedly owed to the complainant. However, the
administrative case was pursued by the complainant claiming gross misconduct on the
part of the respondent as to the delayed payment of debt even with repeated request in
addition to the asking of Php 2000 as bond in a case handled by him, which was not
even required.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled to DISBAR Atty. Francisco Ricafort in relation to his
palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 and Rules
16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by
a violation of Canon 11.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions;
but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules
of Court.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is
specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the
Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due the courts.
C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, Complainant,
FACTS:
Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that
"he is sincerely sorry for it and vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no
evidence in the record establishing the relationship of attorney and client between the
respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been
committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed
could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a
ground for disciplinary action.
ISSUE:
Wherher or not the acts committed by Atty. Abordo constitute a ground for
disciplinary action.
RULING:
Yes, the Court issued an Order that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year to begin on September 1,
1933. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the
profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification
for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to
engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine
Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of
his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of
the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics
which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been
brought to a successful culmination. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well
known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our
unqualified support.
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND
ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants, vs. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M.
GRECIA, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia on August 20,
1991by Doctors Fernandez, Dr. Ongtengco, Dr. Bartolome and St. Lukes Medical
Center. The respondent is charged with dishonestyband grave misconduct in
connection with the theft of some pages from medical chart which was material
evidence in a damage suit filed by his client (Atty. Damaso B. Aves) against the a
forenamed doctors and St. Lukes.
Atty. Grecia had a previous disbarment case filed on November 12, 1987, he was
disbarred for his immoral complicity or unholy alliance with a Judge in Quezon city.
After three years since the first disbarment case he was reinstated in the profession.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not
effectively reform him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges of a Member of the Bar.
RULING:
The Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense
against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more
the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is
hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has
demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness
to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his
membership in the BAR.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced
that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from
Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01,
canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which
provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
FACTS:
Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients the Furtunados to pay all
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the
value of the property in litigation.
Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land
involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143 covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he
acquired fifty percent interest thereof as attorneyss fees from the Furtunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June
30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Furtunados
contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a
lawyer may in good faith advance the expenses in litigation, the same should be subject
to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Furtunados, however
does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
clients rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreedto carry on the action at his own expense
in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of
these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for
which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar
examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on
Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the
newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.[1]Upon
hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief
Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that
a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.Acting on the report and
recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003,
nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in
that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the
earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous
petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the
examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On
the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to
allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other
bar examination subjects (Resolution datedOctober 7, 2003).
An Investigating Committee was formed and directed to determine and identify the
source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited
therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar
examinations.
It was found out from the investigation that the source of leakage came from the
computer of Atty. Balgos who was the author of the questions and it was Atty. De
Guzman had an access and admitted that he had copied the said questionnaire and
given it to other persons in the fraternity where he belongs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Danilo De Guzman be disbarred from the legal profession.
Whether or nor not Atty. Balgos committed his negligence and lack of due care in
preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law.
RULING:
Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit
to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity,
and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and
pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the
cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of
this institution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of interests with his
work as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
RULING:
The Court finds that there is no conflict of interest on the part of the respondent
when he handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal charges filed by the
Taggat Employees. The issue of the matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to
the withholding of the wages and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from
April 1, 1996 to July 15, 1997. Evidently, the respondent was no longer connected with
the Taggat Inc during such period since he is working as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
since 1992. Should there be apparent conflct of interest, it must be supported by
sufficient evidence that Taggat, respondents former client, used any confidential
information from his preceding employment with Complainant in resolving the filed
criminal complaint.
As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat together with
the case he handled as government prosecutor was labor-related case which fact is not
a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
FACTS:
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living
separately from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a
second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation
from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that
the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the
same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each members right against
the party marrying. The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the
document and declared that they were again single and as such could contract another
marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.
The respondent upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign
the deed of cancellation (EXHIBIT C) a month later but after the second marriage of
Baniquit.
ISSUE:
whether or not Atty. Roque Santiago committed malpractice in his acts regarding
the dispensation of such advice and preparation of document.
RULING:
Yes, for the first issue, the advice given by the respondent and his preparation
and acknowledgement by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies
disbarment from the practice of law.
No, for the second issue, marriage separation should be sanctioned in the proper
court and before the separation. Apart from this, the document subverts the vital
foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, moral and public policy.
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M.
MESINA, JR., respondent.
FACTS:
The complainants are lessee of the property of the respondent. There had been
an agreement between the parties that the complainant will obtain the Deed of Sale of
the property after helping them to settle the respondents obligation of the property
because it was mortgage in a loan incurred by the respondents mother(Mrs. Mesina).
The complainants were able to comply with the agreement.
ISSUE:
Wheteher or not Atty. Mesina can de disbarred from the legal profession by
falsification of documents.
RULING:
Yes, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct,
hereby DISBARRED. This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to
promote respect for law and legal processes,28 and not to abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law;29 That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private
party but the government is aggravating.30 Second, when respondent convinced
complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein
they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother,
he committed dishonesty.31 Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own
clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title
upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed
by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. That the
signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 document32 and that in the 1979
document33 are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979
or the 1985 document or even both
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989,
before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports
received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of
some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the
candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association,
namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision
over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect
and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec,"
headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged
by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon
himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP principal candidates violated Section 14 of the IBP By-
laws and made a traversy of the idea of a strict non-political Integrated Bar enshrined in
Section 4 of the By-laws
RULING:
Yes, The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and
to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for
law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers
bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of
the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR
D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Issue:WON Atty. Luison violated Canon 1.03 (Alawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest,encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any manscause.)
FACTS:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dismissing this
case, with costs against the petitioner, and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428, filed by Rufino Abuyen, on
June 18, 1956, for a disease allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as
foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and
docketed as WC Case No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958, by
Pompeyo V. Tan an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor
sentencing petitioner herein:
2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation of P17.40 from date hereof
until he is cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as certified by a competent
physician but the total compensation should not exceed P4,000.00; payment to be
made, thru the Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor;
3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund the amount of P26.00 as administrative
costs pursuant to Section of 55 of Act 3428, as amended.
ISSUE:
RULING:
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble costs, jointly and
severally, against the petitioner and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas and let
certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of the latter, as a
Member of the Bar. One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's
claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, through the present case, and Civil Case No.
42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila petitioner has succeeded in prolonging
the litigation, for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more,
petitioner's contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as
early as August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of Abuyen's disability had never
been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case,
like the previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted to" in the
language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party" in this case atuberculosis patient "and of compelling it to submit out
of sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible
with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or
defeat the same.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
No, the petition for certiorari was dismissed. The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of
an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for
the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility
as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a
member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,
when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
FACTS:
This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against
respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20,
1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation
his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for
them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been
reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a
result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. This
notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her
attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when
respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they as well as their co-
plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-/3% of whatever could
be recovered whether in land or damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Perpetua Coloma disbarred fro the legal profession.
RULING:
No, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine
Bar, is hereby dismissed.
The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of
bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who,
after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on
their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing
her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and
genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."12
He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial
cases could not be considered binding "it is safe to conclude, from a review of the
evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence before us in this
case, that respondent may be exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the
Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for
his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a
client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that
is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due.
Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and
every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned
honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
FACTS:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Appearing in his own behalf,
respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently,
thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional
misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published
only once in theTribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Estanislao Bayot committed malpractice in the legal
profession.
RULING:
Yes, Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be,
as he hereby is, reprimanded.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent. Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for
the Government.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Atty. Luis Tagorda constitutes malpractice and warrants
disciplinary action.
RULING
Yes, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is
hereby suspended from the practice as an attorneyat-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929,
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal
provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to
disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar
Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end
thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."