Leticia Cruz

ED658
Court Case #1
July 27, 2010

ARK HARTMANN, a minor, by his parents and next friends, Roxanna

Hartmann and Joseph Hartmann; ROXANNA HARTMANN; JOSEPH HARTMANN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et., al.

I. Facts

Parents of an elementary student with autism believe that the school district is
not allowing their son to be included into the general education setting to the
maximum extent appropriate. School district feels otherwise because the student
is not showing signs of progress and has evaluated that the student needs to be
placed in a more restrictive environment. The parents transferred their son to
another school where he was educated in the general education classroom for
nearly the whole day. The IEP and administrator had undergone various trainings
and consultation and collaboration in the field of autism and found that the
student was still not making any educational progress and decided that he should
be placed at an elementary school that specializes in autism. However, parents
refused to do so. The courts agreed with the parents and felt that schools were
not consistent and trained in working with a student in this case. The school
board appealed but the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case.

II. Decision in administrative hearings and the lower courts

- Educators working with the student were qualified, but court felt otherwise.

- Behavior was not significant enough to be considered in the placement off the
student.

- The student should be able to receive education in the regular educational

classroom.

- School district was not giving the child education with non-disabled children
to the maximum extent appropriate, as stated in the law.
 - The need to place the student at a regular educational elementary school that
specialized program for students with autism.

III. Rationale

The district court found that some educators involved with the student were
under-qualified and not trained in the area. They also found that under IDEA, the
school district was not allowing the student be educated in the general education
setting to the maximum extent appropriate, which is for all classes. The supreme
court dismissed the case when the school board appealed the district court’s
decision because according to IDEA, federal courts are granted a license to
substitute their own notions of educational policy for those of local school
authorities.

IV. Holding

The district court ruled that the schools did not follow through on the IEP and
that the boy could be educated in the general education setting. The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal of the school court.

V. Scope of the holding

United States District Court 4th Circuit: Eastern District of Virginia

VI. Unresolved issues and further questions

The behavior concern of the general education teacher was not significant during
the case. The court feels that is has little to do with the placement of the child.
However, it is possible that the behavior may be one of the reasons the students
is not progressing in the general classroom.

The district court reversed the hearing officer’s decision. The court rejected the
administrative findings and concluded that Mark could receive significant educational benefit
in a regular classroom and that "the Board simply did not take enough appropriate steps to
try to include Mark in a regular class."

While the hearing officer had addressed Mark’s conduct in detail, the court stated that
"given the strong presumption for inclusion under the IDEA, disruptive behavior should not
be a significant factor in determining the appropriate educational placement for a disabled
child."

The district court found that Mark could receive substantial educational benefit in a regular
classroom, that his disruptive behavior was not sufficient to justify a more segregated
instructional setting, and that the Leesburg program would not have been an appropriate
placement.

Although section 1415(e)(2) provides district courts with authority to grant "appropriate"
relief based on a preponderance of the evidence, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), that section "is by
no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review."

Absent some statutory infraction, the task of education belongs to the educators who have
been charged by society with that critical task. Likewise, federal courts must accord "due
weight" to state administrative proceedings. Id. Administrative findings in an IDEA case "are
entitled to be considered prima facie correct," and "the district court, if it is not going to
follow them, is required to explain why it does not." Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953
F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).

IDEA’s recognition that federal courts cannot run local schools.

but the Act does not require "the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize
each handicapped child’s potential,"

The district court also gave little or no weight to the disruptive effects of Mark’s behavior in
the classroom, stating that "given the strong presumption for inclusion under the IDEA,
disruptive behavior should not be a significant factor in determining the appropriate
educational placement for a disabled child."