Economic history of Germany

Germany before 1800 was heavily rural, with some ur-
ban trade centers. In the 19th century it began a stage of
rapid economic growth and modernization, led by heavy
industry. By 1900 it had the largest economy in Europe, a
factor that played a major role in its entry into World War
I and World War II. Devastated by World War II, West
Germany became an economic miracle in the 1950s
and 1960s with the help of the Marshall Plan. Currently
it is the largest individual economy in the EU with GDP
of roughly 3 trillion USD.[1]
1 Middle Ages
to obtain control of the towns; a few were open to women.
Society was divided into sharply demarcated classes: the
clergy, physicians, merchants, various guilds of artisans;
full citizenship was not available to paupers. Political ten-
sions arose from issues of taxation, public spending, reg-
ulation of business, and market supervision, as well as
the limits of corporate autonomy.[5] Colognes central lo-
cation on the Rhine river placed it at the intersection of
the major trade routes between east and west and was the
basis of Colognes growth.[6] The economic structures of
medieval and early modern Cologne were characterized
by the citys status as a major harbor and transport hub
upon the Rhine. It was governed by its burghers.[7]

Medieval Germany, lying on the open Northern Euro-

pean Plain, was divided into hundreds of contending
kingdoms, principalities, dukedoms, bishoprics, and free
cities. Economic prosperity did not mean geographical
expansion; it required collaboration with some, compe-
tition with others, and an intimate understanding among
government, commerce, and production. A desire to save Cologne around 1411
was also born in the German experience of political, mil-
itary, and economic uncertainty.[2]
1.2 Hanseatic League
1.1 Towns and cities Long-distance trade in the Baltic intensied, as the ma-
jor trading towns came together in the Hanseatic League,
under the leadership of Lbeck.

Lbeck, 15th century

The German lands had a population of about 5 or 6

million. The great majority were farmers, typically
in a state of serfdom under the control of nobles and
monasteries.[3] A few towns were starting to emerge.
From 1100, new towns were founded around imperial
strongholds, castles, bishops palaces and monasteries.
The towns began to establish municipal rights and lib-
erties (see German town law). Several cities such as Main trading routes of the Hanseatic League
Cologne became Imperial Free Cities, which did not de-
pend on princes or bishops, but were immediately sub- It was a business alliance of trading cities and their guilds
ject to the Emperor.[4] The towns were ruled by patricians that dominated trade along the coast of Northern Europe
(merchants carrying on long-distance trade). The crafts- and ourished from the 1200 to 1500, and continued
men formed guilds, governed by strict rules, which sought with lesser importance after that. The chief cities were

1
2 3 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Cologne on the Rhine River, Hamburg and Bremen on services and holy days. In Prussia, the peasants drew lots
the North Sea, and Lbeck on the Baltic.[8] to choose conscripts required by the army. The noblemen
The Hanseatic cities each had its own legal system and a handled external relationships and politics for the villages
degree of political autonomy.[9] under their control, and were not typically involved in
daily activities or decisions.[14][15]
The emancipation of the serfs came in 1770-1830, begin-
2 Early modern era ning with then Danish Schleswig in 1780. Prussia abol-
ished serfdom with the October Edict of 1807, which
upgraded the personal legal status of the peasantry and
2.1 Thirty Years War gave them the chance to purchase for cash part of the
lands they were working. They could also sell the land
The Thirty Years War (16181648) was ruinous to the they already owned. The edict applied to all peasants
twenty million civilians and set back the economy for whose holdings were above a certain size, and included
generations, as marauding armies burned and destroyed both Crown lands and noble estates. The peasants were
what they could not seize. The ghting often was out freed from the obligation of personal services to the lord
of control, with marauding bands of hundreds or thou- and annual dues. A bank was set up so that landowner
sands of starving soldiers spreading plague, plunder, and could borrow government money to buy land from peas-
murder. The armies that were under control moved back ants (the peasants were not allowed to use it to borrow
and forth across the countryside year after year, levying money to buy land until 1850). The result was that the
heavy taxes on cities, and seizing the animals and food large landowners obtained larger estates, and many peas-
stocks of the peasants without payment. The enormous ant became landless tenants, or moved to the cities or to
social disruption over three decades caused a dramatic America. The other German states imitated Prussia after
decline in population because of killings, disease, crop 1815. In sharp contrast to the violence that characterized
failures, declining birth rates and random destruction, and land reform in the French Revolution, Germany handled
the out-migration of terried people. One estimate shows it peacefully. In Schleswig the peasants, who had been in-
a 38% drop from 16 million people in 1618 to 10 million uenced by the Enlightenment, played an active role; else-
by 1650, while another shows only a 20% drop from where they were largely passive. Indeed, for most peas-
20 million to 16 million. The Altmark and Wrttemberg ants, customs and traditions continued largely unchanged,
regions were especially hard hit. It took generations for including the old habits of deference to the nobles whose
Germany to fully recover.[10] legal authority remained quite strong over the villagers.
According to John Gagliardo, the recovery period lasted Although the peasants were no longer tied to the same
for about fty years until the end of the century and was land like serfs had been, the old paternalistic relationship
over by the 1700s. At that time, Germany probably had in East Prussia lasted into the 20th century.[16]
reached its pre-war population (though this is disputed).
Then, there was a period of steady though quite slow
growth to the 1740s. Afterward came a period of rapid
but not exceptional economic expansion, that mainly oc-
3 Industrial revolution
curred in the great states in the east (Austria, Saxony,
Prussia) rather than in the small states of central or south Before 1850 Germany lagged behind the leaders in indus-
Germany.[11] trial development, Britain, France and Belgium. How-
ever, the country had considerable assets : a highly skilled
labor force, a good educational system, a strong work
2.2 Peasants and rural life ethic, good standards of living and a sound protectionist
strategy based on the Zollverein. By midcentury, the Ger-
Peasants continued to center their lives in the village, man states were catching up, and by 1900 Germany was
where they were members of a corporate body and help a world leader in industrialization, along with Britain and
manage the community resources and monitor the com- the United States. In 1800, Germanys social structure
munity life. Across Germany and especially in the east, was poorly suited to any kind of social or industrial devel-
they were serfs who were bound permanently to parcels opment. Domination by modernizing France during the
of land.[12] In most of Germany, farming was handled era of the French Revolution (1790s to 1815) produced
by tenant farmers who paid rents and obligatory services important institutional reforms, including the abolition of
to the landlord, who was typically a nobleman.[13] Peas- feudal restrictions on the sale of large landed estates, the
ant leaders supervised the elds and ditches and grazing reduction of the power of the guilds in the cities, and
rights, maintained public order and morals, and supported the introduction of a new, more ecient commercial law.
a village court which handled minor oenses. Inside the Nevertheless, traditionalism remained strong in most of
family the patriarch made all the decisions, and tried to Germany. Until midcentury, the guilds, the landed aris-
arrange advantageous marriages for his children. Much tocracy, the churches, and the government bureaucracies
of the villages communal life centered around church had so many rules and restrictions that entrepreneurship
3.3 Banks and cartels 3

was held in low esteem, and given little opportunity to

develop.[17]
From the 1830s and 1840s, Prussia, Saxony, and other
states reorganized agriculture, introducing sugar beets,
turnips, and potatoes, yielding a higher level of food pro-
duction that enabled a surplus rural population to move
to industrial areas. The beginning of the industrial rev-
olution in Germany came in the textile industry, and
was facilitated by eliminating tari barriers through the
Zollverein, starting in 1834. The takeo stage of eco-
nomic development came with the railroad revolution in
the 1840s, which opened up new markets for local prod-
ucts, created a pool of middle managers, increased the
demand for engineers, architects and skilled machinists,
and stimulated investments in coal and iron.[18] The po-
litical decisions about the economy of Prussia (and after
1871 all Germany) were largely controlled by a coalition
of rye and iron, that is the Junker landowners of the east
and the heavy industry of the west.[19]
Historical coalelds of Western Germany, Belgium, The Nether-
lands and Northern France
3.1 Regions
The north German states were for the most part richer in zechen) became numerous after 1854; after 1900 they
natural resources than the southern states. They had vast became mixed rms called Konzern.
agricultural tracts from Schleswig-Holstein in the west The output of an average mine in 1850 was about 8,500
through Prussia in the east. They also had coal and iron in short tons; its employment about 64. By 1900, this output
the Ruhr Valley. Through the practice of primogeniture, had risen to 280,000 and employment to about 1,400.[20]
widely followed in northern Germany, large estates and Total Ruhr coal output rose from 2.0 million short tons
fortunes grew. So did close relations between the owners in 1850 to 22 in 1880, 60 in 1900, and 114 in 1913, on
and local as well as national governments. the verge of war. In 1932 output was down to 73 million
The south German states were relatively poor in natural short tons, growing to 130 in 1940. Output peaked in
resources and those Germans therefore engaged more of- 1957 (at 123 million), declining to 78 million short tons
ten in small economic enterprises. They also had no pri- in 1974.[21] End of 2010 ve coal mines were producing
mogeniture rule but subdivided the land among several in Germany.
ospring, leading those ospring to remain in their native The miners in the Ruhr region were divided by ethnic-
towns but not fully able to support themselves from their ity (Germans and Poles) and religion (Protestants and
small parcels of land. The south German states, there- Catholics). Mobility in and out of the mining camps to
fore, fostered cottage industries, crafts, and a more in- nearby industrial areas was high. The miners split into
dependent and self-reliant spirit less closely linked to the several unions, with an aliation to a political party.
government. As a result, the socialist union (aliated with the Social
Democratic Party) competed with Catholic and Commu-
nist unions until 1933, when the Nazis took over all of
3.2 Coal them. After 1945 the socialists came to the fore.[22]
The rst important mines appeared in the 1750s, in the
valleys of the rivers Ruhr, Inde and Wurm where coal
seams outcropped and horizontal adit mining was pos-
3.3 Banks and cartels
sible. In 1782 the Krupp family began operations near
Essen. After 1815 entrepreneurs in the Ruhr Area, which German banks played central roles in nancing German
then became part of Prussia, took advantage of the tar- industry. Dierent banks formed cartels in dierent in-
i zone (Zollverein) to open new mines and associated dustries. Cartel contracts were accepted as legal and
iron smelters. New railroads were built by British engi- binding by German courts although they were held to be
neers around 1850. Numerous small industrial centres illegal in Britain and the United States.
sprang up, focused on ironworks, using local coal. The The process of cartelization began slowly, but the cartel
iron and steel works typically bought mines and erected movement took hold after 1873 in the economic depres-
coking ovens to supply their own requirements in coke sion that followed the postunication speculative bubble.
and gas. These integrated coal-iron rms (Huetten- It began in heavy industry and spread throughout other
4 3 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
industries. By 1900 there were 275 cartels in operation;
by 1908, over 500. By some estimates, dierent cartel
arrangements may have numbered in the thousands at dif-
ferent times, but many German companies stayed outside
the cartels because they did not welcome the restrictions
that membership imposed.
The government played a powerful role in the industrial-
ization of the German Empire founded by Otto von Bis-
marck in 1871 during a period known as the Second In-
dustrial Revolution. It supported not only heavy industry
but also crafts and trades because it wanted to maintain
prosperity in all parts of the empire. Even where the na-
tional government did not act, the highly autonomous re-
gional and local governments supported their own indus-
tries. Each state tried to be as self-sucient as possible.
Despite the several ups and downs of prosperity and de-
pression that marked the rst decades of the German Em-
pire, the ultimate wealth of the empire proved immense.
German aristocrats, landowners, bankers, and produc-
ers created what might be termed the rst German eco-
nomic miracle, the turn-of-the-century surge in German
industry and commerce during which bankers, industrial-
ists, mercantilists, the military, and the monarchy joined
forces.
3.4 Class and the welfare state
Germanys middle class, based in the cities, grew expo-
nentially, but it never gained the political power it had
in France, Britain or the United States. The Associa-
tion of German Womens Organizations (BDF) was es-
tablished in 1894 to encompass the proliferating womens
organizations that had sprung up since the 1860s. From
the beginning the BDF was a bourgeois organization, its
members working toward equality with men in such areas
as education, nancial opportunities, and political life.
Working-class women were not welcome; they were or-
ganized by the Socialists.[23]
Bismarck built on a tradition of welfare programs in Prus-
sia and Saxony that began as early as in the 1840s. In
the 1880s he introduced old age pensions, accident in-
surance, medical care and unemployment insurance that
formed the basis of the modern European welfare state.
His paternalistic programs won the support of German
industry because its goals were to win the support of the
working classes for the Empire and reduce the outow
of immigrants to America, where wages were higher, but
welfare did not exist.[24] Bismarck further won the sup-
port of both industry and skilled workers by his high tari
policies, which protected prots and wages from Ameri-
can competition, although they alienated the liberal intel-
lectuals who wanted free trade.[25]
3.5 Railways
Main article: History of rail transport in Germany
Political disunity of three dozen states and a pervasive
conservatism made it dicult to build railways in the
1830s. However, by the 1840s, trunk lines did link the
major cities; each German state was responsible for the
lines within its own borders. Economist Friedrich List
summed up the advantages to be derived from the devel-
opment of the railway system in 1841:
as a means of national defence, it facilitates the con-
centration, distribution and direction of the army.
It is a means to the improvement of the culture of
the nation. It brings talent, knowledge and skill
of every kind readily to market.
It secures the community against dearth and famine,
and against excessive uctuation in the prices of the
necessaries of life.
It promotes the spirit of the nation, as it has a ten-
dency to destroy the Philistine spirit arising from
isolation and provincial prejudice and vanity. It
binds nations by ligaments, and promotes an in-
terchange of food and of commodities, thus mak-
ing it feel to be a unit. The iron rails become a
nerve system, which, on the one hand, strengthens
public opinion, and, on the other hand, strengthens
the power of the state for police and governmental
purposes.[26]
Lacking a technological base at rst, the Germans im-
ported their engineering and hardware from Britain, but
quickly learned the skills needed to operate and expand
the railways. In many cities, the new railway shops were
the centres of technological awareness and training, so
that by 1850, Germany was self-sucient in meeting the
demands of railroad construction, and the railways were
a major impetus for the growth of the new steel industry.
Observers found that even as late as 1890, their engineer-
ing was inferior to Britains. However, German unica-
tion in 1870 stimulated consolidation, nationalisation into
state-owned companies, and further rapid growth. Unlike
the situation in France, the goal was support of industrial-
isation, and so heavy lines crisscrossed the Ruhr and other
industrial districts, and provided good connections to the
major ports of Hamburg and Bremen. By 1880, Ger-
many had 9,400 locomotives pulling 43,000 passengers
and 30,000 tons of freight, and pulled ahead of France.[27]
3.6 Agriculture
Perkins (1981) argues that more important than Bis-
marcks new tari on imported grain was the introduc-
tion of the sugar beet as a primary crop. Farmers quickly
4.1 First World War
abandoned traditional, inecient practices for modern
new methods, including use of new fertilizers and new
tools. The knowledge and tools gained from the intensive
farming of sugar and other root crops made Germany the
most ecient agricultural producer in Europe by 1914.
Even so, farms were small in size, and women did much
of the eld work. An unintended consequence was the
increased dependence on migratory, especially foreign,
labor.[28]
3.7 Chemicals
The BASF-chemical factories in Ludwigshafen, Germany, 1881
The economy continued to industrialize and urbanize,
with heavy industry (coal and steel especially) becoming
important in the Ruhr, and manufacturing growing in the
cities, the Ruhr, and Silesia. Based on its leadership in
chemical research in the universities and industrial labo-
ratories, Germany became dominant in the worlds chem-
ical industry in the late 19th century. Big businesses such
as BASF and Bayer led the way in their production and
distribution of articial dyes and pharmaceuticals during
the Wilhelmine era, leading to the German monopolisa-
tion of the global chemicals market at 90 percent of the
entire share of international volumes of trade in chemical
products by 1914.[29]
3.8 Steel
Germany became Europes leading steel-producing na-
tions in the late 19th century, thanks in large part to
the protection from American and British competition
aorded by taris and cartels.[30] The leading rm was
Friedrich Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp run by the Krupp
family[31] The German Steel Federation was estab- In reality, the total German Reparation payments actually
lished in 1874.[32] made were far smaller than anyone expected. The total
came to 20 billion German gold marks, worth about $5
billion US dollars or 1 billion British pounds. German
4 20th century reparations payments ended in 1931.[40]
The merger of four major rms into the Vereinigte
Stahlwerke (United Steel Works) in 1926 was modeled
on the U.S. Steel corporation in the U.S. The goal was
to move beyond the limitations of the old cartel system
5
by incorporating advances simultaneously inside a single
corporation. The new company emphasized rationaliza-
tion of management structures and modernization of the
technology; it employed a multi-divisional structure and
used return on investment as its measure of success.[33]
By 1913 American and German exports dominated the
world steel market, as Britain slipped to third place.[34]
In machinery, iron and steel and other industries, German
rms avoided cut-throat competition and instead relied
on trade associations. Germany was a world leader be-
cause of its prevailing corporatist mentality, its strong
bureaucratic tradition, and the encouragement of the gov-
ernment. These associations regulated competition and
allowed small rms to function in the shadow of much
larger companies.[35]
4.1 First World War
Unexpectedly Germany plunged into World War I (1914
1918). It rapidly mobilized its civilian economy for the
war eort. The economy suered under the British
blockade, which cut o supplies.[36]
4.2 Weimar Republic
See also: Hyperination in the Weimar Republic
British economist John Maynard Keynes denounced the
1919 Treaty of Versailles as ruinous to German and
global prosperity. In his book The Economic Conse-
quences of the Peace.[37] Keynes said the Treaty was a
"Carthaginian peace", a misguided attempt to destroy
Germany on behalf of French revanchism, rather than
to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out
in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which
Germany had accepted at the armistice. Keynes argued
the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were
many times more than it was possible for Germany to
pay, and that these would produce drastic instability.[38]
French economist tienne Mantoux disputed that anal-
ysis in The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Conse-
quences of Mr. Keynes (1946). More recently economists
have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small
army in the 1920s saved it so much money it could aord
the reparations payments.[39]
The war and the treaty were followed by the Hyper-
ination of the early 1920s that wreaked havoc on Ger-
manys social structure and political stability. During
that ination, the value of the nations currency, the
Papiermark, collapsed from 8.9 per US$1 in 1918 to 4.2
6 6 POST-WORLD WAR II

trillion per US$1 by November 1923. Prosperity reigned During the Hitler era (193345), the economy developed
192329, supported by large bank loans from New York. a hothouse prosperity, supported with high government
The Great Depression struck Germany hard, starting in subsidies to those sectors that tended to give Germany
late 1929.[41] There were no new American loans. Un- military power and economic autarky, that is, economic
[45]
employment soared, especially in larger cities, fueling ex- independence from the global economy. During the
tremism and violence on the far right and far left, as the war itself the German economy was sustained by the ex-
centre of the political spectrum weakened. Germany had ploitation of conquered territories and people.
paid about one-eighth of its war reparations when they
were suspended in 1932 by the Lausanne Conference of
1932. The failure of major banks in Germany and Aus-
tria in 1931 worsened the worldwide banking crisis.[42]
So, as known, Germany was among the countries most
severely aected by the great depression because its re-
covery and rationalization of major industries was -
nanced by unsustainable foreign lending. And as men-
tioned, war reparation obligations reduced investment
propensity and, perhaps most importantly, the govern-
ment implemented a rigid austerity policy that resulted
in deation. [43]
As unemployment reached very high levels, the national
socialists accumulated government power and began to
pursue their inhuman policies against the Jewish minor- US Air Force photographs the destruction in central Berlin in July
ity, political leftists and many other groups. After being 1945
elected, the national socialists undertook a series of rapid
steps to abolish democracy. Their trade policy in Ger- Physical capital in the occupied territories was destroyed
many consisted of an autarkic policy regime that aimed by the war, insucient reinvestment and maintenance,
to cancel all imports, such as foodstus, that could be re- whereas the industrial capacity of Germany increased
placed with domestic substitutes or raw materials for the substantially until the end of the war despite heavy bomb-
consumer-oriented industries. Only imports of iron ore ing. (However, much of this capacity was useless after
and similar items were considered necessary because a the war because it specialized in armament production.)
[46]
main aim of the government was to strengthen the pro-
duction capacity of military products. Interestingly, both With the loss of the war, the country entered into the pe-
the persecuted and non-persecuted German groups suf- riod known as Stunde Null (Zero Hour), when Germany
fered from these autarkic and trade-restraining policies. lay in ruins and the society had to be rebuilt from scratch.
[44]

6 Post-World War II
5 Nazi economy
Further information: German reparations for World War
II

The rst several years after World War II were years of

IG Farben factory in Monowitz (near Auschwitz) 1941.
Main article: Economy of Nazi Germany
bitter penury for the Germans. Seven million forced la-
borers left for their own land, but about 14 million Ger-
mans came in from the East, living for years in dismal
camps. It took nearly a decade for all the German POWs
to return. In the West, farm production fell, food supplies
were cut o from eastern Germany (controlled by the So-
viets) and food shipments extorted from conquered lands
ended. The standard of living fell to levels not seen in a
century, and food was always in short supply. High ina-
tion made savings (and debts) lose 99% of their value,
while the black market distorted the economy. In the
East, the Soviets crushed dissent and imposed another
police state, often employing ex-Nazis in the dreaded
Stasi.[47] The Soviets extracted about 23% of the East
 7

German GNP for reparations, while in the West repara- socialist to distinguish their system from those in which
tions were a minor factor.[48] the state claimed the right to direct the economy or to in-
The man who took full advantage of Germanys postwar tervene in it.
opportunity was Ludwig Erhard, who was determined to Beyond these principles of the social market economy,
shape a new and dierent kind of German economy. He but linked to it, comes a more traditional German con-
was given his chance by United States ocials, who found cept, that of Ordnung, which can be directly translated
him working in Nuremberg and who saw that many of his to mean order but which really means an economy, so-
ideas coincided with their own. ciety, and policy that are structured but not dictatorial.
Erhard abolished the Reichsmark and then created a new The founders of the social market economy insisted that
currency, the Deutsche Mark, on 21 June 1948, with the Denken in Ordnungento think in terms of systems of
concurrence of the Western Allies but also taking advan- orderwas essential. They also spoke of Ordoliberalism
tage of the opportunity to abolish most Nazi and occupa- because the essence of the concept is that this must be a
tion rules and regulations. It established the foundations freely chosen order, not a command order.
of the West German economy and of the West German Over time, the term social in the social market economy
state. began to take on a life of its own. It moved the West Ger-
man economy toward an extensive social welfare system
that has become one of the most expensive in the world.
6.1 Productivity improves Moreover, the West German federal government and the
states (Lnder ; sing., Land ) began to compensate for ir-
After 1950, Germany overtook Britain in comparative regularities in economic cycles and for shifts in world pro-
productivity levels for the whole economy, primarily as duction by beginning to shelter and support some sectors
a result of trends in services rather than trends in indus- and industries. In an even greater departure from the Er-
try. The Marshall Plan was eagerly adopted in Germany hard tradition, the government became an instrument for
as a way to modernize business procedures and utilize the preservation of existing industries rather than a force
the best practices, while these changes were resisted in for renewal.[51] In the 1970s, the state assumed an ever
Britain.[49] Britains historic lead in productivity of its ser- more important role in the economy. During the 1980s,
vices sector was based on external economies of scale in Chancellor Helmut Kohl tried to reduce that state role,
a highly urbanized economy with an international orien- and he succeeded in part, but German unication again
tation. On the other hand, the low productivity in Ger- compelled the German government to assume a stronger
many was caused by the underdevelopment of services role in the economy. Thus, the contradiction between the
generally, especially in rural areas that comprised a much terms social and market has remained an element for
larger sector. As German farm employment declined debate in Germany.
sharply after 1950 thanks to mechanization, catching-up
Given the internal contradiction in its philosophy, the
occurred in services. This process was aided by a sharp
German economy is both conservative and dynamic. It
increase in human and physical capital accumulation, a
is conservative in the sense that it draws on the part of
pro-growth government policy, and the eective utiliza-
the German tradition that envisages some state role in
tion of the education sector to create a more productive
the economy and a cautious attitude toward investment
work force.[50]
and risk-taking.[52] It is dynamic in the sense that it is di-
rected toward growtheven if that growth may be slow
and steady rather than spectacular. It tries to combine
7 Social market economy the virtues of a market system with the virtues of a social
welfare system.
The Germans proudly label their economy a soziale
Marktwirtschaft, or "social market economy, to show
that the system as it has developed after World War II 8 Economic miracle and beyond
has both a material and a socialor humandimension.
They stress the importance of the term market be-
cause after the Nazi experience they wanted an econ- See also: Wirtschaftswunder (the economic miracle)
omy free of state intervention and domination. The only
state role in the new West German economy was to pro- The economic reforms and the new West German system
tect the competitive environment from monopolistic or received powerful support from a number of sources: in-
oligopolistic tendenciesincluding its own. The term vestment funds under the European Recovery Program,
social is stressed because West Germans wanted an more commonly known as the Marshall Plan; the stimu-
economy that would not only help the wealthy but also lus to German industry provided by the diversion of other
care for the workers and others who might not prove able Western resources for Korean War production; and the
to cope with the strenuous competitive demands of a mar- German readiness to work hard for low wages until pro-
ket economy. The term social was chosen rather than ductivity had risen. But the essential component of suc-
8 8 ECONOMIC MIRACLE AND BEYOND

cess was the revival of condence brought on by Erhards greater authority to guide economic policy. In 1967 the
reforms and by the new currency. Bundestag passed the Law for Promoting Stability and
The West German boom that began in 1950 was truly Growth, known as the Magna Carta of medium-term eco-
memorable. The growth rate of industrial production was nomic management. That law, which remains in eect al-
25.0 percent in 1950 and 18.1 percent in 1951. Growth though never again applied as energetically as in Schillers
continued at a high rate for most of the 1950s, despite oc- time, provided for coordination of federal, Land, and lo-
casional slowdowns. By 1960 industrial production had cal budget plans in order to give scal policy a stronger
risen to two-and-one-half times the level of 1950 and far impact. The law also set a number of optimistic targets
for the four basic standards by which West German eco-
beyond any that the Nazis had reached during the 1930s
in all of Germany. GDP rose by two-thirds during the nomic success was henceforth to be measured: currency
stability, economic growth, employment levels, and trade
same decade. The number of persons employed rose
from 13.8 million in 1950 to 19.8 million in 1960, and balance. Those standards became popularly known as the
magisches Viereck, the magic rectangle or the magic
the unemployment rate fell from 10.3 percent to 1.2 per-
cent. polygon.

Labor also beneted in due course from the boom. Al- Schiller followed a dierent concept from Erhards. He
though wage demands and pay increases had been modest was one of the rare German Keynesians, and he brought
at rst, wages and salaries rose over 80 percent between to his new tasks the unshakable conviction that govern-
1949 and 1955, catching up with growth. West German ment had both the obligation and the capacity to shape
social programs were given a considerable boost in 1957, economic trends and to smooth out and even eliminate
just before a national election, when the government de- the business cycle. Schillers chosen formula was Global-
cided to initiate a number of social programs and to ex- steuerung, or global guidance, a process by which govern-
pand others. ment would not intervene in the details of the economy
but would establish broad guidelines that would foster un-
In 1957 West Germany gained a new central bank, interrupted noninationary growth.
the Deutsche Bundesbank, generally called simply the
Bundesbank, which succeeded the Bank deutscher Ln- Schillers success in the Grand Coalition helped to give
the SPD an electoral victory in 1969 and a chance to form
der and was given much more authority over monetary
policy. That year also saw the establishment of the a new coalition government with the Free Democratic
Party (Freie Demokratische ParteiFDP) under Willy
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Oce), designed to
prevent the return of German monopolies and cartels. Six Brandt. The SPD-FDP coalition expanded the West Ger-
years later, in 1963, the Bundestag, the lower house of man social security system, substantially increasing the
Germanys parliament, at Erhards urging established the size and cost of the social budget. Social program costs
Council of Economic Experts to provide objective eval- grew by over 10 percent a year during much of the 1970s,
uations on which to base German economic policy. introducing into the budget an unalterable obligation that
reduced scal exibility (although Schiller and other Key-
The West German economy did not grow as fast or as nesians believed that it would have an anticyclical eect).
consistently in the 1960s as it had during the 1950s, in This came back to haunt Schiller as well as every German
part because such a torrid pace could not be sustained, in government since then. Schiller himself had to resign in
part because the supply of fresh labor from East Germany 1972 when the West German and global economies were
was cut o by the Berlin Wall, built in 1961, and in part in a downturn and when all his ideas did not seem able
because the Bundesbank became disturbed about poten- to revive West German prosperity. Willy Brandt himself
tial overheating and moved several times to slow the pace resigned two years later.
of growth. Erhard, who had succeeded Konrad Adenauer
as chancellor, was voted out of oce in December 1966, Helmut Schmidt, Brandts successor, was intensely inter-
largelyalthough not entirelybecause of the economic ested in economics but also faced great problems, includ-
problems of the Federal Republic. He was replaced by ing the dramatic upsurge in oil prices of 1973-74. West
Germanys GDP in 1975 fell by 1.4 percent (in constant
the Grand Coalition consisting of the Christian Demo-
cratic Union (Christlich Demokratische UnionCDU), prices), the rst time since the founding of the FRG that
it had fallen so sharply. The West German trade balance
its sister party the Christian Social Union (Christlich-
Soziale UnionCSU), and the Social Democratic Party also fell as global demand declined and as the terms of
trade deteriorated because of the rise in petroleum prices.
of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SPD) under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the By 1976 the worst was over. West German growth re-
CDU. sumed, and the ination rate began to decline. Although
Under the pressure of the slowdown, the new West Ger- neither reached the favorable levels that had come to be
man Grand Coalition government abandoned Erhards taken for granted during the 1950s and early 1960s, they
broad laissez-faire orientation. The new minister for were accepted as tolerable after the turbulence of the pre-
economics, Karl Schiller, argued strongly for legislation vious years. Schmidt began to be known as a Macher
that would give the federal government and his ministry (achiever), and the government won reelection in 1976.
 9

Schmidts success led him and his party to claim that they tion would not have brought the all-German share above
had built Modell Deutschland (the German model). 8.2 percent by 1989 and would leave all of Germany with
But the economy again turned down and, despite eorts barely a greater share of world production than West Ger-
to stimulate growth by government decits, failed to re- many alone had reached fteen years earlier.
vive quickly. It was only by mid-1978 that Schmidt and It was only in the late 1980s that West Germanys econ-
the Bundesbank were able to bring the economy into omy nally began to grow more rapidly. The growth rate
balance. After that, the economy continued expanding for West German GDP rose to 3.7 percent in 1988 and
through 1979 and much of 1980, helping Schmidt win re- 3.6 percent in 1989, the highest levels of the decade. The
election in 1980. But the upturn proved to be uneven and unemployment rate also fell to 7.6 percent in 1989, de-
unrewarding, as the problems of the mid-1970s rapidly spite an inux of workers from abroad. Thus, the results
returned. By early 1981, Schmidt faced the worst pos- of the late 1980s appeared to vindicate the West Ger-
sible situation: growth fell and unemployment rose, but man supply-side revolution. Tax rate reductions had led
ination did not abate. to greater vitality and revenues. Although the cumula-
By late 1982, Schmidts coalition government collapsed tive public-sector decit had gone above the DM1 trillion
as the FDP withdrew to join a coalition led by Helmut level, the public sector was growing more slowly than be-
Kohl, the leader of the CDU/CSU. He began to direct fore.
what was termed the Wende (West Germany) (turning or The year 1989 was the last year of the West German econ-
reversal). The government proceeded to implement new omy as a separate and separable institution. From 1990
policies to reduce the government role in the economy the positive and negative distortions generated by German
and within a year won a popular vote in support of the reunication set in, and the West German economy be-
new course. gan to reorient itself toward economic and political union
with what had been East Germany. The economy turned
Within its broad policy, the new government had sev-
eral main objectives: to reduce the federal decit by gradually and massively from its primarily West Euro-
pean and global orientation toward an increasingly intense
cutting expenditures as well as taxes, to reduce govern-
ment restrictions and regulations, and to improve the ex- concentration on the requirements and the opportunities
of unication.
ibility and performance of the labor market. The gov-
ernment also carried through a series of privatization
measures, selling almost DM10 billion (for value of the
deutsche marksee Glossary) in shares of such diverse
state-owned institutions as VEBA, VIAG, Volkswagen,
Lufthansa, and Salzgitter. Through all these steps, the
state role in the West German economy declined from 52 9 German reunication and its af-
percent to 46 percent of GDP between 1982 and 1990,
according to Bundesbank statistics.
termath
Although the policies of the Wende changed the mood of
the West German economy and reinstalled a measure of Main article: Economic history of the German reuni-
condence, progress came unevenly and haltingly. Dur- cation
ing most of the 1980s, the gures on growth and ination
improved but slowly, and the gures on unemployment
Germany invested over $2 trillion marks in the rehabili-
barely moved at all. There was little job growth until the
tation of the former East Germany helping it to transition
end of the decade. When the statistics did change, how-
to a market economy, and cleaning up the environmen-
ever, even modestly, it was at least in the right direction.
tal degradation. By 2011 the results were mixed, with
Nonetheless, it also remained true that West German slow economic development in the East, in sharp contrast
growth did not again reach the levels that it had attained in to the rapid economic growth in both west and southern
the early years of the Federal Republic. There had been Germany. Unemployment was much higher in the East,
a decline in the growth rate since the 1950s, an upturn in often over 15%. Economists Snower and Merkl (2006)
unemployment since the 1960s, and a gradual increase in suggests that the malaise was prolonged by all the social
ination except during or after a severe downturn. and economic help from the German government, point-
Global economic statistics also showed a decline in West ing especially to bargaining by proxy, high unemployment
German output and vitality. They showed that the West benets and welfare entitlements, and generous job secu-
German share of total world production had grown from rity provisions.[53]
6.6 percent in 1965 to 7.9 percent by 1975. Twelve The old industrial centers of the Rhineland and North
years later, in 1987, however, it had fallen to 7.4 per- Germany lagged as well, as the coal and steel industries
cent, largely because of the more rapid growth of Japan faded in importance. The economic policies were heavily
and other Asian states. Even adding the estimated GDP oriented toward the world market, and the export sector
of the former East Germany at its peak before unica- continued very strong.[54]
10
10 See also
History of Germany
11 Notes
[1] Germany. CIA World Factbook. Central Intelligence
Agency. Retrieved 6 October 2011.
[2] Horst Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1986)
[3] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages (1986) ch 1
[4] Alfred Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 1056-1273 (Ox-
ford University Press, 1988)
[5] David Nicholas, The Growth of the Medieval City: From
Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth Century (Longman,
1997) pp 69-72, 133-42, 202-20, 244-45, 300-307
[6] Paul Strait, Cologne in the Twelfth Century (1974)
[7] Joseph P. Human, Family, Commerce, and Religion in
London and Cologne (1998) covers from 1000 to 1300.
[8] James Westfall Thompson,Economic and Social History of
Europe in the Later Middle Ages (1300-1530) (1931) pp
146-79
[9] Clive Day (1914). A History of Commerce. p. 252.
[10] Georey Parker, The Thirty Years War (1997) p 178
has 15-20% decline; Tryntje Helerich, The Thirty Years
War: A Documentary History (2009) p. xix, estimates a
25% decline. Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Eu-
ropes Tragedy (2009) pp 780-95 reviews the estimates.
[11] Germany under the old regime, John Gagliardo
[12] Heide Wunder, Serfdom in later medieval and early mod-
ern Germany in T. H. Aston et al. eds., Social Relations
and Ideas: Essays in Honour of R. H. Hilton (Cambridge
UP, 1983), 249-72
[13] The monasteries of Bavaria, which controlled 56% of
the land, were broken up by the government, and sold
o around 1803. Thomas Nipperdey, Germany from
Napoleon to Bismarck: 1800-1866 (1996), p 59
[14] Sagarra, A Social History of Germany: 1648-1914 (1977)
pp. 140-54
[15] For details on the life of a representative peasant farmer,
who migrated in 1710 to Pennsylvania, see Bernd Kratz,
Jans Stauer: A Farmer in Germany before his Emigra-
tion to Pennsylvania, Genealogist, Fall 2008, Vol. 22 Is-
sue 2, pp 131-169
[16] Sagarra, A social history of Germany, pp 341-45
[17] Imanuel Geiss (2013). The Question of German Unica-
tion: 1806-1996. Routledge. pp. 3234.
11 NOTES
[18] Richard Tilly, Germany: 1815-1870 in Rondo
Cameron, ed. Banking in the Early Stages of Indus-
trialization: A Study in Comparative Economic History
(Oxford University Press, 1967), pages 151-182
[19] Cornelius Torp, The Coalition of 'Rye and Iron'" un-
der the Pressure of Globalization: A Reinterpretation of
Germanys Political Economy before 1914, Central Eu-
ropean History Sept 2010, Vol. 43 Issue 3, pp 401-427
[20] Grin, Emma. Why was Britain rst? The Industrial
revolution in global context. Short History of the British
Industrial Revolution. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
[21] Pounds (1952)
[22] Stefan Llafur Berger, Working-Class Culture and the
Labour Movement in the South Wales and the Ruhr Coal-
elds, 1850-2000: A Comparison, Journal of Welsh
Labour History/Cylchgrawn Hanes Llafur Cymru (2001)
8#2 pp 5-40.
[23] Eda Sagarra, A Social History of Germany 1648-1914
(2002)
[24] E. P. Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in Eng-
land and Germany, 18501914: Social Policies Compared
(2007); Hermann Beck, Origins of the Authoritarian Wel-
fare State in Prussia, 1815-1870 (1995)
[25] Elaine Glovka Spencer, Rules of the Ruhr: Leadership
and Authority in German Big Business Before 1914,
Business History Review, Spring 1979, Vol. 53 Issue 1,
pp 40-64; Ivo N. Lambi, The Protectionist Interests of
the German Iron and Steel Industry, 1873-1879, Journal
of Economic History, March 1962, Vol. 22 Issue 1, pp
59-70
[26] List quoted in John J. Lalor, ed. Cyclopdia of Political
Science (1881) 3:118 online; see Thomas Nipperdey, Ger-
many from Napoleon to Bismarck (1996) p 165
[27] Allan Mitchell, Great Train Race: Railways and the
Franco-German Rivalry, 1815-1914 (2000)
[28] J.A. Perkins, The Agricultural Revolution in Germany
18501914, Journal of European Economic History,
Spring 1981, Vol. 10 Issue 1, pp 71-119
[29] Cornelius Torp, The Great Transformation: German
Economy and Society 1850-1914, in Helmut Walser
Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern German
History (2011), pp. 347-8
[30] Steven B. Webb, Taris, Cartels, Technology, and
Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879 to 1914,
Journal of Economic History Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1980),
pp. 309-330 in JSTOR
[31] Harold James, Krupp: A History of the Legendary German
Firm (Princeton U.P. 2012)
[32] The German Steel Federation. WV Stahl. Archived
from the original on 2007-01-29. Retrieved 2007-04-26.
[33] Alfred Reckendrees, From Cartel Regulation to Monop-
olistic Control? The Founding of the German 'Steel Trust'
in 1926 and its Eect on Market Regulation, Business
History, (July 2003) 45#3 pp 22-51,

[34] Robert C. Allen, International Competition in Iron and
Steel, 1850-1913, Journal of Economic History, (Dec
1979) 39#4 pp 911-37 in JSTOR
[35] Gerald D. Feldman and Ulrich Nocken, Trade Associa-
tions and Economic Power: Interest Group Development
in the German Iron and Steel and Machine Building In-
dustries, 1900-1933 Business History Review, (Winter
1975), 49#4 pp 413-45 in JSTOR
[36] Feldman, Gerald D. The Political and Social Founda-
tions of Germanys Economic Mobilization, 1914-1916,
Armed Forces & Society (1976) 3#1 pp 121-145. online
[37] Antony. Lentin, Germany: a New Carthage?, History
Today (Jan. 2012) 62#1 pp 20-27
[38] Keynes (1919). The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
Ch VI.
[39] Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer, The imposed gift of Ver-
sailles: the scal eects of restricting the size of Ger-
manys armed forces, 1924-9, Economic History Review
(2010) 63#4 pp 849-864. online
[40] Sally. Marks, The Myths of Reparations, Central Euro-
pean History (1978) 11#3 pp 231-55 in JSTOR
[41] Harold James, State, Industry and Depression in Weimar
Germany, The Historical Journal, (1981) 24#1 pp. 231-
241 in JSTOR
[42] Christopher Kopper, New perspectives on the 1931
banking crisis in Germany and Central Europe, Business
History, (April 2011), 53#2 pp 216-229
[43] Baten, Jrg (2016). A History of the Global Economy.
From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press.
p. 61. ISBN 9781107507180.
[44] Baten, Jrg (2016). A History of the Global Economy.
From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press.
p. 62. ISBN 9781107507180.
[45] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and
Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2008)
[46] Baten, Jrg (2016). A History of the Global Economy.
From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press.
p. 63. ISBN 9781107507180.
[47] Deutsche Welle, Sta, Book Claims Stasi Employed
Nazis as Spies Deutsche Welle online Oct. 31, 2005
[48] Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of
Occupied Industrial Societies (1996) p 147
[49] The process had begun in the 1920s says Mary Nolan, Vi-
sions of Modernity: American Business and the Modern-
ization of Germany (1994)
[50] Stephen Broadberry, Explaining Anglo-German Produc-
tivity Dierences in Services since 1870, European Re-
view of Economic History, Dec 2004, Vol. 8 Issue 3, pp
229-262
[51] http://countrystudies.us/germany/136.htm
[52] http://countrystudies.us/germany/136.htm
11
[53] Dennis J. Snower, and Christian Merkl, The Caring Hand
that Cripples: The East German Labor Market after Re-
unication, American Economic Review, May 2006, Vol.
96 Issue 2, pp 375-382
[54] Christopher S. Allen, Ideas, Institutions and Organized
Capitalism: The German Model of Political Economy
Twenty Years after Unication, German Politics and So-
ciety, 6/30/2010, Vol. 28 Issue 2, pp 130-150
12 Further reading
Berghahn, Volker Rolf. Modern Germany: society,
economy, and politics in the twentieth century (1987)
ACLS E-book
Berghahn, Volker R. American Big Business in
Britain and Germany: A Comparative History of
Two Special Relationships in the Twentieth Century
(Princeton University Press, 2014) xii, 375 pp.
Bhme, Helmut. An Introduction to the Social
and Economic History of Germany: Politics and Eco-
nomic Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen-
turies(1978)
Buse, Dieter K. ed. Modern Germany: An Encyclo-
pedia of History, People, and Culture 1871-1990 (2
vol 1998)
Clapham, J. H. The Economic Development of
France and Germany 1815-1914 (1936)
Clark, Christopher. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and
Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (2006)
Detwiler, Donald S. Germany: A Short History (3rd
ed. 1999) 341pp; online edition
Fairbairn, Brett, Economic and Social Develop-
ments, in James Retallack, Imperial Germany
1871-1918 (2010)
Haber, Ludwig. The Chemical Industry During the
Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Economic Aspect
of Applied Chemistry in Europe and North America
(1958); The Chemical Industry: 1900-1930 : Inter-
national Growth and Technological Change (1971)
Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany (3
vol 1959-64); vol 1: The Reformation; vol 2: 1648-
1840; vol 3. 1840-1945
James, Harold. Krupp: A History of the Legendary
German Firm. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2012. ISBN 9780691153407.
Lee, W. R. (ed.), German Industry and German In-
dustrialisation (1991)
12 12 FURTHER READING

Meskill, David. Optimizing the German Workforce:

Labor Administration From Bismarck to the Eco-
nomic Miracle (Berghahn Books; 2010) 276 pages;
studies continuities in German governments eorts
to create a skilled labor force across the disparate
imperial, Weimar, Nazi, and postwar regimes.
Milward, Alan S. and S. B. Saul. The Development
of the Economies of Continental Europe: 1850-1914
(1977) pp 1770

Milward, Alan S. and S. B. Saul. The Economic De-

velopment of Continental Europe 1780-1870 (1973)

Overy, R. J. The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-

1938 (1996) excerpt and text search
Overy, R. J. War and Economy in the Third Reich
(1994)
Perkins, J. A. Dualism in German Agrarian Histo-
riography, Comparative Studies in Society & History,
Apr 1986, Vol. 28 Issue 2, pp 287330, compares
large landholdings in the territories east of the Elbe
river, and the West-Elbian small-scale agriculture.

Pierenkemper, T., and R. Tilly, The German Econ-

omy during the Nineteenth Century (2004)

Sagarra, Eda. A Social History of Germany: 1648-

1914 (1977)

Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismark, Bleichroder,

and the Building of the German Empire (1979) in-
depth scholarly study from viewpoint of Bismarcks
banker excerpt and text search

Tipton, Frank B. The National Consensus in Ger-

man Economic History, Central European History
(1974) 7#3 pp. 195224 in JSTOR
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Mak-
ing and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. London:
Allen Lane, 2006. ISBN 0-7139-9566-1.

This article incorporates public domain material

from the Library of Congress Country Studies web-
site http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/. Germany
 13

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