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Nicholas Harrigan
QOLS, Blackett Laboratory, Imperial College London,
Prince Consort Road, London SW7 2BW, United Kingdom
Robert W. Spekkens
Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 0WA, United Kingdom
(Dated: June 15, 2007)
Does the quantum state represent reality or our knowledge of reality? In making this distinction
precise, we are led to a novel classification of hidden variable models of quantum theory. Indeed,
arXiv:0706.2661v1 [quant-ph] 18 Jun 2007
representatives of each class can be found among existing constructions for two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces. Our approach also provides a fruitful new perspective on arguments for the nonlocality and
incompleteness of quantum theory. Specifically, we show that for models wherein the quantum state
has the status of something real, the failure of locality can be established through an argument
considerably more straightforward than Bells theorem. The historical significance of this result
becomes evident when one recognizes that the same reasoning is present in Einsteins preferred
argument for incompleteness, which dates back to 1935. This fact suggests that Einstein was
seeking not just any completion of quantum theory, but one wherein quantum states are solely
representative of our knowledge. Our hypothesis is supported by an analysis of Einsteins attempts
to clarify his views on quantum theory and the circumstance of his otherwise puzzling abandonment
of an even simpler argument for incompleteness from 1927.
provided yet another way to see that locality was ruled over, to the authors knowledge, whenever Einstein sum-
out for the -complete view3 [11, 12]. What is not typ- marizes his views on incompleteness in publications or in
ically recognized, and which we show explicitly here, is his correspondence after 1935, it is the argument appear-
that the latter argument was actually strong enough to ing in his correspondence with Schrodinger, rather than
also rule out locality for -ontic hidden variable theo- the EPR argument, to which he appeals.
ries. In other words, Einstein showed that not only is We suggest a different answer to the puzzle. Einstein
locality inconsistent with being a complete description consistently used his more complicated 1935 argument
of reality, it is also inconsistent with being ontic, that in favor of his simpler 1927 one because the extra com-
is, inconsistent with the notion that represents real- plication bought a stronger conclusion, namely, that the
ity even in an incomplete sense. Einstein thus provided quantum state is not just incomplete, but epistemic. We
an argument for the epistemic character of based on suggest that Einstein implicitly recognized this fact, even
locality. though he failed to emphasize it adequately.
Fuchs has previously argued in favor of this conclu- Finally, our results demonstrate that one doesnt need
sion. In his words, [Einstein] was the first person to say the big guns of Bells theorem [20] to rule out local-
in absolutely unambiguous terms why the quantum state ity for any theories in which is given ontic status;
should be viewed as information [...]. His argument was more straightforward arguments suffice. Bells argument
simply that a quantum-state assignment for a system can is only necessary to rule out locality for -epistemic hid-
be forced to go one way or the other by interacting with den variable theories. It is therefore surprising that the
a part of the world that should have no causal connection latter sort of hidden variable theory, despite being the
with the system of interest. [13]. One of the main goals most difficult to prove inconsistent with locality and de-
of the present article is to lend further support to this spite being the last, historically, to have been subject to
thesis by clarifying the relevant concepts and by under- such a proof, appears to have somehow attracted the least
taking a more detailed exploration of Einsteins writings. attention, with Einstein a notable but lonely exception
We also investigate the implications of our analysis for to the rule.
the history of incompleteness and nonlocality arguments
in quantum theory.
In particular, our analysis helps to shed light on an II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN -ONTIC
interesting puzzle regarding the evolution of Einsteins AND -EPISTEMIC ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
arguments for incompleteness.
The argument Einstein gave at the 1927 Solvay confer- A. What is an ontological model?
ence requires only a single measurement to be performed,
whereas from 1935 onwards he adopted an argument re- We begin by defining some critical notions. First is
quiring a measurement to be chosen from two possibili- that of an ontological model of a theory. Our definition
ties. Why did Einstein complicate the argument in this will require that the theory be formulated operationally,
way? Indeed, as has been noted by many authors, this which is to say that the primitives of description are sim-
complication was actually detrimental to the effective- ply preparation and measurement procedures lists of
ness of the argument, given that most of the criticisms instructions of what to do in the lab. The goal of an oper-
directed against the two-measurement form of the argu- ational formulation of a theory is simply to prescribe the
ment (Bohrs included) focus upon his use of counterfac- probabilities of the outcomes of different measurements
tual reasoning, an avenue that is not available in the 1927 given different preparation procedures, that is, the prob-
version [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. ability p(k|M, P ) of obtaining outcome k in measurement
The notion that Einstein introduced this two- M given preparation P. For instance, in an operational
measurement complication in order to simultaneously formulation of quantum theory, every preparation P is
beat the uncertainty principle, though plausible, is not associated with a density operator on Hilbert space,
supported by textual evidence. Although the Einstein- and every measurement M is associated with a positive
Podolsky Rosen (EPR) paper does take aim at the un- operator valued measure (POVM) {Ek }. (In special
certainty principle, it was written by Podolsky and, by cases, these may be associated with vectors in Hilbert
Einsteins own admission, did not provide an accurate space and Hermitian operators respectively.) The proba-
synopsis of his (Einsteins) views. This has been empha- bility of obtaining outcome k is given by the generalized
sized by Fine [12] and Howard [19]. In the versions of the Born rule, p(k|M, P ) = Tr(Ek ).
argument that were authored by Einstein, such as those In an ontological model of an operational theory, the
appearing in his correspondence with Schrodinger, the primitives of description are the properties of microscopic
uncertainty principle is explicitly de-emphasized. More- systems. A preparation procedure is assumed to prepare
a system with certain properties and a measurement pro-
cedure is assumed to reveal something about those prop-
erties. A complete specification of the properties of a
3 Borrowing a phrase from Asher Peres [10], these facts are well system is referred to as the ontic state of that system, and
known to those who know things well. is denoted by . The ontic state space is denoted by . It
3
cles. The ontic nature of in the deBroglie-Bohm inter- Definition 2 An ontological model is -complete if the
pretation is clear from the fact that it plays the role of a ontic state space is isomorphic to the projective Hilbert
pilot wave, so that distinct s describe physically distinct space PH (the space of rays of Hilbert space) and if every
universes. Bells beable interpretations [24] and modal preparation procedure P associated in quantum theory
interpretations of quantum mechanics [25, 26, 27, 28] also with a given ray is associated in the ontological model
take to be a sort of pilot wave and thus constitute - with a Dirac delta function centered at the ontic state
supplemented models 6 . As another example, Belifantes that is isomorphic to , p(|P ) = ( ).8
survey of hidden variable theories [29] considers only -
supplemented models. Hence, in such models, the only feature of the prepara-
There is a different way in which could be an incom- tion that is important is the pure quantum state to which
plete description of reality: it could represent a state of it is associated. Epistemic states for a pair of prepara-
incomplete knowledge about reality. In other words, it tions associated with distinct quantum states are illus-
could be that is not a variable in the ontic state space trated schematically in part (a) of Fig. 2.9
at all, but rather encodes a probability distribution over
the ontic state space. In this case also, specifying does Definition 3 If an ontological model is not -complete,
not completely specify the ontic state, and so it is apt to then it is said to be -incomplete.
say that provides an incomplete description. In such a
model, a variation of does not represent a variation in Identifying a model as -incomplete does not specify
any physical degrees of freedom, but instead a variation how such a failure is actually manifested. It might be
in the space of possible ways of knowing about some un- that is parameterized by and by supplementary vari-
derlying physical degrees of freedom. This is illustrated ables, or it could alternatively be that the quantum state
schematically in part (c) of Fig. 1. We refer to such mod- does not parameterize the ontic states of the model at
els as -epistemic.7 all. In order to be able to distinguish these two possi-
ble manifestations of -incompleteness, we introduce a
second dichotomic classification of ontological models.
-complete -incomplete
-epistemic -epistemic
D. Examples
mechanics associates with M . It follows that,
We now provide examples from the literature of models
Z
that fall into each class. Pr (k|M, ) = d p (k|M, ) p(|)
Z
= d tr (|ih|Ek ) ( ) (5)
1. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model
= tr (|ih|Ek ) , (6)
The model of Beltrametti and Bugajski [30] is essen-
tially a thorough rendering of what most would refer to and so the quantum statistics are trivially reproduced.
as an orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.12 If we restrict consideration to a system with a two di-
The ontic state space postulated by the model is precisely mensional Hilbert space then is isomorphic to the Bloch
the projective Hilbert space, = PH, so that a system sphere, so that the ontic states are parameterized by the
prepared in a quantum state is associated with a sharp Bloch vectors of unit length, which we denote by ~. The
probability distribution13 over , Bloch vector associated with the Hilbert space ray is
denoted ~ and is defined by |i h| = 1 I + 1 ~ where
2 2 ~
p (|) = ( ) , (3) ~ = (x , y , z ) denotes the vector of Pauli matrices and
I denotes the identity operator.
where we are using interchangeably to label the Hilbert If we furthermore consider M to be a projective
space vector and to denote the ray spanned by this vector measurement, then it is associated
with a projector-
The model posits that the different possible states of valued measure {|i h| , } or equivalently, an
reality are simply the different possible quantum states. orthonormal basis {|i , }. It is convenient to de-
It is therefore -complete by Definition 2. It remains note the probability of getting the outcome given ontic
only to demonstrate how it reproduces the quantum
state ~ simply by p(|~). Eq. (4) simplifies to,
statistics.
This is achieved by assuming that the probability of
p(|~) = | h|i |2 (7)
obtaining an outcome k of a measurement procedure M
depends indeterministically on the systems ontic state 1
~ ~ .
= 1+ (8)
as 2
p (k|M, ) = tr (|ih|Ek ) , (4) The epistemic states and indicator functions for this
case of the Beltrametti-Bugajski model are illustrated
where |i H denotes the quantum state associated with schematically in Fig. 4.
PH, and where {Ek } is the POVM that quantum
2. The Bell-Mermin model
12 Note, however, that there are several versions of orthodoxy We now present an ontological model for a two dimen-
that differ in their manner of treating measurements. The sional Hilbert space that is originally due to Bell [31] and
Beltrametti-Bugajski model is distinguished by the fact that it was later adapted into a more intuitive form by Mermin
fits within the framework for ontological models we have out-
lined. [32].
13 Preparations which correspond to mixed quantum states can be The model employs an ontic state space that is a
constructed as a convex sum of such sharp distributions Cartesian product of a pair of state spaces, = .
7
1
ZZ
p(|) = d d (~ ~ ) (~ (~ + ~ )) ~ ~).
p(|) = ( (15)
4
1
It can be checked that the overlaps of p(|) and p(|)
= 1 + ~ ~
2 then reproduce the required quantum statistics,
2
= |h|i| . (12)
1 ~ ~
Z
p(|) = d ( ~ ~)
)( ~ ~
We can see immediately that the Bell-Mermin model is
-incomplete because = 6= PH. Furthermore, 1
= (1 + ~ )
~
2
p(|)p(|) = p(~ , ~ |)p(~ , ~ |) 2
= |h|i| . (16)
1
= (~ )(
~ ~ ) ~
16 2 Referring to Definition 3 we see that this model is -
= 0 if 6= , (13) incomplete, since although is isomorphic to the sys-
tems projective Hilbert space, Eq. (14) implies that the
implying that the Bell-Mermin model is -ontic. Recall-
model associates non-sharp distributions with quantum
ing Definition 7 we conclude that this model falls into the
states. Furthermore,
class -supplemented.
Because the ontic state space of this model is four di- 1
mensional, it is difficult to illustrate it in a figure. We p(|)p(|) = ~ ~) (
( ~ ~)
~ ~
~ ~,
2
can present the distributions over ~ and ~ on separate
unit spheres, as in Fig. 5 , but the indicator functions is nonzero for nonorthogonal and , showing, via Def-
cannot be presented in this way. inition 5, that the Kochen-Specker model is -epistemic.
8
-complete = S = L. (19)
tum systems prepared in the maximally entangled state Eqs. (20) and (21) are justified by noting that the proba-
| + i = (|0i |1i + |1i |0i) / 2. If Alice chooses to im- bility one assigns to in the unconditioned case is simply
plement a measurement M01 associated with the basis the weighted sum of the probability one assigns in each
{|0i , |1i}, then depending on whether she obtains out- of the conditioned cases, where the weights are the prob-
come 0 or 1, she updates the quantum state of Bobs abilities for each condition to hold [1].
system to |0i or |1i respectively (these occur with equal The proof is by contradiction. The assumption of local
probability). On the other hand, if she implements a causality implies that the probabilities for Bobs system
measurement M associated with the basis {|+i, |i} , being in various ontic states are independent of the mea-
where |i = (|0i |1i)/ 2, then she updates the quan- surement that Alice performs. Consequently,17
tum state of Bobs system to |+i or |i depending on
her outcome. Although Alice cannot control which in- p(|P01 ) = p(|P ). (22)
dividual pure quantum state will describe Bobs system,
she can choose which of two disjoint sets, {|0i , |1i} or Multiplying together Eqs. (20) and (21) and making use
{|+i , |i}, it will belong to. Schrodinger described this of Eq. (22), we obtain,
effect as steering Bobs state [40].
This steering phenomenon allows us to prove the fol- 4 p (|P01 )2 = p (|P+ ) p (|P0 ) + p (|P+ ) p (|P1 )
lowing theorem15 . + p (|P ) p (|P0 ) + p (|P ) p (|P1 ) .
(23)
Theorem 11 Any -ontic ontological model that repro-
duces the quantum statistics (QSTAT) violates locality,16
Therefore, for any within the support of p (|P01 ) (a
-ontic QSTAT L. non-empty set), we must have,
where |A(B)i is the quantum state that leads to an elec- to a system. Bearing this in mind, his definition of
tron detection at A(B). Now suppose that one consid- completeness can be identified as precisely our notion
ers an ontological model of the scenario, employing ontic of -completeness given in Definition 2. Einstein then
states . Then the probability of obtaining a si- re-iterates to Schrodinger the beginning of the EPR ar-
multaneous detection at both sites A and B is given by gument, starting by considering a joint system (AB) to
p(1A 1B |) = p(1A |)p(1B |1A , ). Suppose furthermore be prepared in an entangled state by some collision be-
that the model describing these events is assumed to be tween the subsystems A and B. He then emphasizes
local, then we can write p(1B |1A , ) = p(1B |) and thus (what we would now call) the steering phenomenon by
p(1A 1B |) = p(1A |)p(1B |). If the model is taken to noting how a choice of measurement on A can result in
satisfy -completeness then = , and we infer that, the subsystem B being described by one of two quantum
states B or B .
p(1A 1B |) = p(1A |)p(1B |). (27) Einstein then uses this scenario to derive his preferred
proof of incompleteness,
Inserting the quantum mechanical predictions p(1A |) =
p(1B |) = 21 , we obtain p(1A 1B |) = 14 , which entails
a nonzero probability for simultaneous detections at both Now what is essential is exclusively that B
A and B, in stark contradiction with what is predicted and B are in general different from one an-
by quantum mechanics. other. I assert that this difference is incom-
Hence the logical structure of this rendition of Ein- patible with the hypothesis that the descrip-
steins 1927 argument is that LQSTAT-complete tion is correlated one-to-one with the phys-
contradiction, i.e., that, ical reality (the real state). After the colli-
sion, the real state of (AB) consists precisely
L QSTAT -incomplete. (28) of the real state of A and the real state of
B, which two states have nothing to do with
Note that, unlike the 1935 argument to which we shall one another. The real state of B thus can-
turn in the next section, the 1927 argument cannot be not depend upon the kind of measurement I
used to show locality to be at odds with more general - carry out on A. (Separation hypothesis from
ontic models because if is supplemented with a hidden above.) But then for the same state of B there
variable , then the complete description of the system are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally
is = (, ), and Eq. (27) is replaced by, justified B , which contradicts the hypothe-
sis of a one-to-one or complete description of
p(1A 1B |, ) = p(1A |, )p(1B |, ). (29) the real states.
Because there is no reason to assume that p(1A |, ) =
p(1A |) nor that p(1B |, ) = p(1B |) (conditioning on Einstein is clearly presuming separability with his as-
the hidden variable will in general change the probability sertion that the real state of (AB) consists precisely of
the real state of A and the real state of B. He further-
of detection), one can no longer infer a nonzero proba-
bility for simultaneous detections at both A and B, and more appeals to local causality when he asserts that The
real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of mea-
the contradiction is blocked.
surement I carry out on A, because he is ruling out the
possibility of events at A having causes in the space-like
C. Einsteins 1935 incompleteness argument separated region B.
Now, although Einsteins conclusion is nominally to
deny -completeness, he does so by showing that there
In his 1935 correspondence with Schrodinger, after not-
can be many quantum states associated with the same
ing that the EPR paper did not do justice to his views,
ontic state, for the same state of B there are two (in gen-
Einstein presents a different version of the argument for
eral arbitrarily many) equally justified B . The proof
incompleteness. The argument differs markedly from
need not have taken this form. An alternative approach
that of the EPR paper from the very outset by adopting
would have been to try to deny -completeness by show-
a different notion of completeness [44],
ing that there are many ontic states associated with the
[...] one would like to say the following: same quantum state. For our purposes, this distinction
is correlated one-to-one with the real state of is critical because what Einstein has shown through his
the real system. [...] If this works, then I argument is that a variation in need not correspond
speak of a complete description of reality by to a variation in the ontic state. Recalling Definition
the theory. But if such an interpretation is 4, we see that Einstein has established the failure of -
not feasible, I call the theoretical description onticness! His 1935 incompleteness argument rules out
incomplete. -onticness en route to ruling out -completeness.
The structure of his argument, in our terminology, is:
It is quite clear that by real state of the real sys-
tem, Einstein is referring to the ontic state pertaining L QSTAT (-ontic) -incomplete. (30)
13
But the second implication is actually a weakening of accurate assessment of what is going on in the EPR pa-
the conclusion, because among the -incomplete mod- per, it does not explain Einsteins post-1935 conversion
els are some which are -ontic (those we have called - to the two-measurement form of the argument. Indeed,
supplemented) and the argument is strong enough to rule Einstein explicitly de-emphasizes the uncertainty princi-
these out. ple in his own writings. For instance, in his 1935 letter to
Einstein would have done better, therefore, to charac- Schrodinger, he remarks: I couldnt care less19 whether
terize his argument as, B and B can be understood as eigenfunctions of ob-
servables B, B.[44]
L QSTAT (-ontic),
which is our Theorem 11.
Another explanation worth considering concerns the
experimental significance of the two gedankenexperi-
V. HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS ments. Although Einsteins incompleteness arguments
imply a dilemma between -completeness and locality, a
sceptic who conceded the validity of the argument could
A. A puzzle
still evade the dilemma by choosing to reject some part
of quantum mechanics, specifically, those aspects that
What can we gain from this retrospective assessment of were required to reach Einsteins conclusion. To elimi-
Einsteins incompleteness arguments? There is one long- nate this possibility, one would have to provide exper-
standing puzzle that it helps to solve: why did Einstein imental evidence in favor of these aspects. From this
ever switch from the simple 1927 argument, which in- perspective, there is a significant difference between the
volves only a single measurement, to the 1935 argument, 1927 and 1935 gedankenexperiments. In the case of
which involves two? the former, the measurement statistics to which Ein-
The move he made in 1935 to the two measurement stein appeals (perfect anti-correlation of measurements
argument described in Sec. IV C proved to be a perma- of local particle number) can also be obtained from the
nent one. He published the argument for the first time mixed state 12 (|AihA|+|BihB|) rather than the pure state
in 1936 [45] and from this point onwards, the 1935 ar-
(1/ 2)(|Ai+ |Bi). It follows that the sceptic could avoid
gument proved the mainstay of his assault on orthodox the dilemma by positing that such coherence was illusory.
quantum theory, appearing in various writings [47, 48], To convince the sceptic, further experimental data for
most notably his own autobiographical notes [49]. In instance, a demonstration of coherence via interference
fact, there is evidence to suggest that this argument was would be required. On the other hand, the measurement
still on Einsteins mind as late as 1954 [50]. statistics of the 1935 gedankenexperiment cannot, in gen-
Many commentators have noted that an EPR-style eral, be explained under the sceptics hypothesis (which
argument for incompleteness can be made even if one in this case amounts to positing a separable mixed state).
imagines that only a single measurement is performed Indeed, any hypothesis that takes system B to be in a
[14, 15, 16, 17]. The resulting argument is similar to mixture of pure quantum states (that are unaffected by
Einsteins 1927 argument, although it differs insofar as it events at A) can be ruled out by the 1935 set-up be-
appeals to a pair of systems rather than a single parti- cause the latter allows one to make predictions about
cle and makes use of the EPR criterion for reality rather the outcomes of incompatible measurements on B that
than the assumption of -completeness. Nonetheless, the are in violation of the uncertainty principle. This has
point being made by these authors is the same as the one been demonstrated by Reid in the context of the EPR
we have just noted: having multiple possible choices of scenario [52] and by Wiseman et al.[53] more generally.
measurement is not required to reach the conclusion of Although Wiseman has argued that this provides a rea-
incompleteness from the assumption of locality. Further- son for favoring the 1935 over the 1927 version of Ein-
more, the extra complication actually detracts from the steins incompleteness argument [54], he does not suggest
argument (whether it follows the reasoning of the EPR that it was Einsteins reason. Indeed, this is unlikely to
paper or Einsteins correspondence with Schrodinger), have been the case. Certainly, we are not aware of any-
because it introduces counterfactuals and modal logic thing in Einsteins writings that would suggest so.20
into the game, and this is precisely where most critics, in-
cluding Bohr [51], have focussed their attention. The sin-
gle measurement versions of the argument are, of course,
completely immune to such criticisms. 19 ist mir wurst (emphasis in original).
One explanation that has been offered for Einsteins 20 Although Schr odinger had some doubts about the validity of
move to two measurements is that one can thereby land quantum theory, these concerned whether experiments would
a harder blow on the proponent of the orthodox approach confirm the existence of the steering phenomenon (I am not
by also defeating the uncertainty principle in the course satisfied about there being enough experimental evidence for
that.[55]). This sentiment was a reaction to the 1935 form of
of the argument. Maudlin refers to this extra twist of Einsteins argument and so could not have motivated it. It is
the knife as an unnecessary bit of grandstanding (prob- unlikely that anyone would have been sceptical of the spatial
ably due to Podolsky)[17]. Although this may be an coherence assumed in Einsteins 1927 argument.
14
Therefore, in the 28 years between the publication such as teleportation, no-cloning, the impossibility of
of Einsteins 1935 incompleteness argument (in 1936) discriminating non-orthogonal states, the information-
and the publication of Bells theorem (in 1964), only - disturbance trade-off, aspects of entanglement theory,
epistemic ontological models were actually viable to those and many others, are found to be derivable within toy
who were daring enough to defy convention and seek an theories that presume hidden variables and wherein the
interpretation that preserves locality. Why is it then that analogue of is a state of incomplete knowledge. This
during the pre-Bell era, there was not a greater recogni- interpretation of is further supported by a great deal
tion among such researchers of the apparent promise of of foundational work that does not presuppose hidden
-epistemic approaches vis-a-vis locality? variables [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73]. -
It seems likely to us that the distinction between - epistemic ontological models are therefore deserving of
supplemented and -epistemic hidden variable models more attention than they have received to date.
was simply not sufficiently clear. One searches in vain However, it remains unclear to what extent a -
for any semblance of a distinction in Einsteins descrip- epistemic ontological model of quantum theory is even
tion of the alternative to the orthodox -complete view possible. Recall that the Kochen-Specker model dis-
during the general discussion at the 1927 Solvay confer- cussed in Sec. II D 3 secured such an interpretation
ence. But nothing in what we have said would lead one for pure states and projective measurements in a two-
to expect that Einstein had clearly understood the dis- dimensional Hilbert space. But can one be found in more
tinction as early as 1927. What is surprising is that, general cases? 21
after 1935, Einstein seems to voice his support for an We here need to dispense with a possible confusion
epistemic view of in his papers and correspondence, that might arise. In the same paper wherein they pre-
and yet never bothers to articulate, nor explicitly de- sented their 2d model, Kochen and Specker proceed to
nounce, the other way in which his bijective notion of prove a no-go theorem for certain kinds of ontological
completeness (-completeness) could fail, namely, by models seeking to reproduce the predictions of quantum
being ontic but supplemented with additional variables. mechanics in 3d Hilbert spaces. One might therefore be
By characterizing his 1935 argument as one that led to the impression that Kochen and Specker rule out
merely established the incompleteness of quantum the- -epistemic models for 3d Hilbert spaces. This is not
ory on the assumption of locality, Einstein did it a great the case, however, as we now clarify.
disservice. For in isolation, a call for the completion of
As soon as one moves to projective measurements in a
quantum theory would naturally have led many to pursue
Hilbert space of dimension greater than two, it is possible
hidden variable theories that interpreted the fundamen-
to define a distinction between contextual and noncon-
tal mathematical object of the theory, the wave function,
textual ontological models [1]. It was famously shown
in the same manner in which the fundamental object of
by Bell [31] and independently by Kochen and Specker
other physical theories were customarily treated as on-
[2] that noncontextual ontological models cannot repro-
tic. But such a strategy was known by Einstein to be
duce the predictions of quantum theory for Hilbert space
unable to preserve locality. Thus it is likely that the
dimension 3 or greater. Furthermore, the notion of non-
force of Einsteins 1935 argument from locality to the
contextuality can be extended from projective measure-
epistemic interpretation of was not felt simply because
ments to nonprojective measurements, preparations, and
the argument was not sufficiently well articulated.
transformations [1]. In all cases, one can demonstrate
A proper assessment of the plausibility of these histor-
a negative verdict for noncontextual models of quantum
ical possibilities would require a careful reexamination of theory [1]. Indeed, by moving beyond projective mea-
Einsteins papers and correspondence with the distinc-
surements, one finds that noncontextual models cannot
tion between -ontic and -epistemic ontological mod- even be constructed for a two-dimensional Hilbert space.
els in mind. We hope that such a reassessment might
yield further insight into the history of incompleteness But the dichotomy between contextual and noncon-
and nonlocality arguments. textual models is independent of the dichotomy between
-ontic and -epistemic models. So, whereas the Bell-
Kochen-Specker theorem and variants thereof show the
necessity of contextuality, these are silent on the issue of
VI. THE FUTURE OF -EPISTEMIC MODELS
whether one can find an ontological model that is also
-epistemic. The ontological models of quantum theory
Bells theorem shows that the preservation of local- that we do have, such as deBroglie-Bohm, are contextual
ity is not a motivation for a -epistemic ontological but -ontic. Bell [31] even provides a very ad hoc exam-
model, because it cannot be maintained. However, it ple of a contextual hidden variable model (an extension
does not provide any reason for preferring a -ontic ap- of the Bell-Mermin model of Sec. II D 2) to prove that
proach over one that is -epistemic; it is neutral on
this front. Moreover, there are many new motivations
(unrelated to locality) that can now be provided in fa-
vor of -epistemic models. For instance, it is shown 21 Hardy was perhaps the first to lay down this challenge explicitly
in Refs. [4, 5] that information-theoretic phenomena [74].
16
such a model is possible. It too is -ontic (although one such as the property that the classical fidelity between
must have recourse to the definition appealing to fideli- epistemic states associated with a given pair of quantum
ties provided in footnote 10 to properly assess this model) states is invariant under all unitary transformations of
[75]. the latter.23
Many features of deBroglie-Bohm theory have been Rudolph has devised a -epistemic contextual onto-
found to be generalizable to a broad class of ontolog- logical model that is quantitatively close to the predic-
ical models. Nonlocality, contextuality, and signalling tions of quantum theory for projective measurements in
outside of quantum equilibrium [76] are examples. In- three-dimensional Hilbert spaces and also has the desired
spired by this pattern, Valentini has wondered whether symmetry property [6]. This model does not, however,
the pilot-wave (and hence ontic) nature of the wave func- reproduce the quantum predictions exactly.
tion in the deBroglie-Bohm approach might be unavoid- It is possible that a -epistemic model with the de-
able [77]. On the other hand, it has been suggested by sired symmetry property does not exist. However, a no-
Wiseman that there exists an unconventional reading of go theorem always presumes some theoretical framework.
the deBroglie-Bohm approach which is not -ontic [78]. In Sec. II A of the present paper, we have cast ontolog-
A distinction is made between the quantum state of the ical models in an operational framework, wherein sys-
universe and the conditional quantum state of a subsys- tems are considered in isolation and the experimental
tem, defined in Ref. [79]. The latter is argued to be epis- procedures are treated as external interventions. Such
temic while the former is deemed to be nomic, that is, a framework may not be able to do justice to all inter-
law-like, following the lines of Ref. [80] (in which case it is pretations that have some claim to being judged realist.
presumably a category mistake to try to characterize the For instance, in deBroglie-Bohm, a system is not separa-
universal wave function as ontic or epistemic). We shall ble from the experimental apparatus and consequently it
not provide a detailed analysis of this claim here, but is unclear whether one misrepresents the interpretation
highlight it as an interesting possibility that is deserving by casting it in our current framework (an extension of
of further scrutiny. Nelsons approach to quantum the- the formalism used here is, however, to be developed in
ory [81] also purports to not assume the wave function Ref. [21]). Ontological models that are fundamentally re-
to be part of the ontology of the theory [82]. However, lational might also fail to be captured by the framework
as pointed out by Wallstrom [83], the theory does not described here. Nonetheless, something would undeni-
succeed in picking out all and only those solutions of ably be learned if one could prove the impossibility of a
Schrodingers equation22 . Consequently, it also fails to -epistemic model with the desired symmetry properties
provide a -epistemic model of quantum theory. within an operational framework of this sort.
Recently, Barrett [75] has constructed a model that
is -epistemic. Although it only works for a countable
set of bases of the Hilbert space, it seems likely that
this deficiency can be eliminated, in which case it would VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
be the first -epistemic model for a Hilbert space of ar-
bitrary dimension. Unfortunately, the model achieves We would like to acknowledge Jonathan Barrett,
the -epistemic property in a very ad hoc manner, by Travis Norsen, and Howard Wiseman for discussions and
singling out a pair of non-orthogonal quantum states, comments, and Don Howard and Arthur Fine for their
and demanding that the epistemic states associated with Einstein scholarship, without which the present work
these have non-zero overlap, while the quantum pre- would not have been possible. We are also grateful to
dictions are still reproduced. It consequently does not Terry Rudolph for numerous discussions on this work and
have the sorts of features, outlined in Refs. [4, 5], that for having supported the progressive rock movement by
make the -epistemic approach compelling. This sug- refusing to adopt a reasonable haircut. RWS acknowl-
gests that the interesting question is not simply whether edges support from the Royal Society. NH is supported
a -epistemic model can be constructed, but whether one by Imperial College London and the occasional air-guitar
can be constructed with certain additional properties, recital.
22 It is assumed that only continuous and single-valued wave func- ture.
tions are valid, a fact that is disputed by Smolin [84].
23 The Kochen-Specker model discussed in Sec. II D 3 has this fea-
J. Stachel (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). chanics (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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[82] G. Bacciagaluppi, in Endophysics, time, quantum and the ter der modernen Physik (Schwabe & Co., Basel and
subjective, edited by M. S. R. Buccheri and A. Elitzur Stuttgart, 1968).
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388. lishing Co., 1954).
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[84] L. Smolin, quant-ph/0609109 v1 (2006). Context (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[85] J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Me-