Can the Advaita Vedntin Provide a Meaningful Definition of Absolute Consciousness?

Author(s): William M. Indich

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), pp. 481-493
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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WilliamM. Indich Can the Advaita Vedantinprovidea meaningful
definitionof absoluteconsciousness?

This article addressesitself to the question:Can a meaningfuldefinitionof

absoluteconsciousness(cit sdksicaitanya)be offeredin AdvaitaVedanta?This
questionarisesfroman apparentcontradiction.On the one hand, Sankaraand
manyof his followershave criticizedall attemptsto providea definitionof the
ontologicalnatureof consciousnessin terms of the traditionalcategoriesof
Indian philosophicalthought. These criticismsare, of course, perfectlycom-
patible with the Advaitin's identificationof absolute consciousness with
ultimate(paramarthika) reality,higherknowledge(para vidya)and liberation
(moksa), as well as with the radicalontologicaldistinctionbetweenabsolute
and phenomenalor modified consciousness(citta, vrtticaitanya),which he
identifies with the world of appearance,lower knowledge, and bondage.
Moreover, these criticismscomplementthe well-knownUpanisadicvia ne-
gativa, reality of absolute consciousnessis "not this, not that" (neti, neti).'
From this point of view, absoluteconsciousness"has no distinguishingmark
such as name, or form, or action, or heterogeneity,or species,or qualities."2
On the other hand, however-and hereinlies the problem-Sanikaraand his
followershave arguedthat knowledgeof absoluteconsciousnessis directlyand
immediatelyrevealed3 to be the identity of existence (satya), knowledge
(jnana) and infinity(ananta).4And this certainlyappearsto be a definitionof
consciousness.
How, then, can the Advaitinreconcilehis claim that pure consciousnessis
beyond, indeed, is radicallydistinctfrom, the categoriesof thought with his
own apparentdefinitionof consciousness?That is, can a meaningfuldefinition
of consciousnessbe offeredby the Advaitin?Beforeattemptingto answerthese
questions, let us review in detail Safikara'scriticisms of his opponents'
definitionsof consciousnessas well as the argumentsby which he tries to
justifyhis own definition.

Safikara'scriticismsof alternativeIndian theories of consciousness,that is,

consciousnessas attributeor quality,as activityor mode, as an instantaneous
moment,or as a combinationof materialelements,are motivatedby his desire
to undermineany position which qualifies,or appearsto limit, the essentially
unqualified,homogeneous,and indeterminatenature of absolute conscious-
ness. Underlyingthesecriticisms,then, is the Advaiticclaimthat consciousness
is identicalwith the self (atman)and with reality(brahman)and is necessarily
presupposedby the very categoricalthinkingthat tries to relate,qualify,or in
any othermannerdefineit.
Safikara'sopposition to the theory that consciousnessis an attributeor
qualityof the self is madeclearin his criticismsof the Nyaya-Vaisesikaschool.

William M. Indich is an Assistant Professor of Philosophyat Towson State University,Maryland.

Philosophy East and West 30, no. 4 (October, 1980). ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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482 Indich

According to Vaisesika ontology, all objects of experience can be classified

either in terms of one of nine ultimately real substances (dravya) or in terms
of the various properties and relations which pertain to these substances.
According to this analysis the self (atman) is only one of these nine real
substances. But what really distinguishes this system, and makes it a par-
ticularly important object for Safikara's criticism, is its claim that knowledge
or consciousnes is properly categorized as an attribute (guna) which is
altogether distinct from each individual self yet which belongs to, or inheres in,
the self adventitiously. Using the dreamless sleep state as an example of a case
in which the self exists without being characterized by consciousness, the
Naiyayikas argue that consciousness must inhere in the self adventitiously and
must be a product or combination of the self with a number of other factors
which are nonfunctional in deep sleep, for example, the instrument of mental
attention (manas), the senses (indriya), and the body (visaya).5 How do we
know that consciousness inheres in the self rather than in any of these other
contributing causes? Two arguments are offered: first, because consciousness
cannot be discovered in any of these three causes alone6; and second, because
consciousness cannot subsist without a locus.7 In this sense, as an accidental
attribute of self, consciousness actually represents the limitation or qualifi-
cation of the self by the three contributing causes of consciousness.
While it is clear that Sankara would find most of the details of the Nyaya-
Vaisesika theory of consciousness unsatisfactory, we observe that the brunt of
his criticism is focused on the theory of ontological inherence (samavdya), in
terms of which Nyaya tries to explain the necessary and eternal relationship
between the substantial self and its distinct attribute, consciousness. The
problem facing the Nyaya pluralist is to explain how a permanent substance,
for example, the self, is related to an impermanent attribute, for example,
consciousness. Of a number of types of relationship posited in Nyaya philo-
sophy, the one that applies between substance and attribute is the relationship
of ontological inherence (samavdya),which is supposed to account both for the
production of an attribute, for example, consciousness, as well as for its
necessary, simultaneous relationship with its substance, for example, the self.
But Sankara objects that his ontological relationship, on the pluralist's
account, is itself a distinct entity. And because this relationship must be
different from both the substance and the attribute in question, it will require
an additional inherence relationship for it to inhere in both the self and
consciousness. This clearly leads to an infinite regress.8 Therefore, Sankara
argues, the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of inherence does not really explain how
the self, which is different from consciousness, can be its necessary, eternal
substance while not even being one of its contributing causes. Saikara
concludes that the position which treats consciousness as a limiting attribute
of the substantial self is false.
It would not be unreasonable to object that Sankara's criticism of the

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483

Nyaya ontological inherence relationship does not exhaust the possible ways
that a substance and its attribute can be related. For example, it does not take
into account the relation of logical entailment between substance and attribute
which was upheld by Descartes, among others. According to Descartes,
"Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of
which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property, quality, or
attribute, of which we have a real idea is called a Substance...." Further along
in the same paragraph, Descartes argues that this definition of substance is
justified precisely because we are certain, through the "natural light" of
reason, that "a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing."9 For
Descartes, then, it is logically self-evident that an attribute must be an
attribute of a substance. Applying this principle to self-conscious mental
activity, for example, he claims that the substance in which thought inheres is
called mind. Moreover, it is clear that Sankara himself is committed to just
such a logical entailment between an attribute and its underlying substance in
terms of what we will call his svabhava principle. In fact, as we will see in the
following section, Safikara's arguments for his definition of the essential
nature of consciousness are based primarily upon just this principle.
Another possible way in which the relationship between consciousness and
self can be expressed is in terms of a theory which argues for both the identity
and difference between substance and attribute at once. Just such a theory is,
in fact, put forth by Ramanuja when he argues that consciousness is both the
essence (svarupa) of the self as well as its quality (guna).10 Ramanuja is torn
between his desire to say, on the one hand, that consciousness is a quality of
the self which is actively intentional and always changing and, on the other
hand, to say that the self is eternally, and therefore essentially, conscious.
Ramanuja's theory of the relationship between consciousness and the self is
dismissed as contradictory from the Advaitic perspective since the Advaitin
assumes that a substance must either be completely identical with, or different
from, its attributes. We might note at this point that Sankara tries to account
for active, intentional consciousness while upholding the eternal and essential
identity of consciousness with dtman by introducing the conception of two
ontologically distinct levels of consciousness, that is, modified and absolute
consciousness. In this way a radical discontinuity is established by Advaitins
between all mental activity on the one hand and the eternally unchanging,
homogeneous, undifferentiated and pure nature of absolute consciousness on
the other.
The locus classicus in Indian thought of the theory that consciousness is an
activity (kriya) of the self is found in Purva Mimarhsa philosophy. This school
developed out of the exegetical analysis of pre-Upanisadic Vedic literature,
which was primarily concerned with the performance of ritual. Upholding the
position that "action is the sole end of sruti," 11 these thinkers focused their
attention on the study of injunctions to action and on the results accruing

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484 Indich

from prescribed conduct. Additionally, they moved beyond the basic position
that "no Vedic passage can ... be said to have any meaning unless it refers to
some action or to some means or fruit of action," 12 to the conclusion that the
significance and meaning in all discourse comes from prescriptions to action.
Thus it was not unnatural that the members of this school arrived at the
conclusion that activity itself was the essential nature of the entire universe.
Consistent with this vision of reality, the Mlmarhsakas maintained that
there was a plurality of active selves, each of which was eternal and perma-
nent while nevertheless continuously undergoing various changes of form
(pari.ndma).'3The Mimramsakastreated each of these selves as both the agent
(kartr) and the enjoyer (bhoktr) of the possible modes into which they could be
modified. And one of these internal modificants or modes of self was
knowledge, or consciousness. While consciousness was distinguished from the
self on this account, it was nevertheless treated as a real modification of the
self and was thus related to the self as an action is related to the agent who
performs it.14 In this sense the Mlmarhsakas stressed a certain intimacy
between consciousness and the self that was lacking in the Nyaya-Vaisesika
substance-attributemodel.
Clearly, this theory is completely unacceptable to Sankara, for whom the
radical distinction between absolute, eternal consciousness and the activity of
the empirical self is parallel to the distinction between transcendental reality
and the world of phenomenal illusion, both of which are lost on the Mimam-
saka account. He rejects the Mimarhsaka claim that the self must be active
since the sole purpose and validity of the revealed texts lie in their prescriptive
function.
It is not necessary ... that the soul must in its real nature be the doer of
actions in order to save the utility of Vidhi,astra [written by the Mimamsaka
Man.dana Misra]; it is sufficient even for this purpose if the soul has authorship
which is superimposed on it.15
In other words, Sankara argues that the self only appears to act because of
the superimposition of the qualities of the not-self on it: "the attributes of
enjoying are said to arise out of avidyd or ignorance, and have no existence
during the condition of knowledge." 16 Additionally, Safikara argues that
absolute consciousness would be imperfect if it were active, since all activity is
motivated by desire, that is, by the feeling of incompleteness. Lastly, Safikara
claims that it is a contradiction to maintain both that the self is active and that
it is eternal, since what is eternal is unchanging, while an activity changes the
agent of which it is a modification.17
Finally, Safikara rejects two theories which deny that there is a relationship
between consciousness and the self because they deny the existence of the self.
The first theory is that of the Vijfinanavadaschool of Buddhist thought, which
according to Sankara's interpretation undermines the existence of the continu-
ous, let alone eternal, self by reducing it to a series of discrete moments of

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485

consciousness. The second theory is the view of the materialist, CarvSka,

which reduces both the self and consciousness to matter.
The Vijiianavadin is a subjective idealist who believes that only discrete,
momentary ideas (vijndina)or cognitions are real and that there is no external
world. One argument offered by the Vijfinnavadin against the existence of the
external world maintains that because the cognition of an object occurs simul-
taneously with the act of cognition, the object is identical with the cognition
itself. Another of their arguments is based on the analogy of dreams and
illusions, wherein experience takes place without dependence on the external
world.18 Sankara makes short shrift of these arguments by countering that
common sense and conventional logic both presuppose the existence of the
subject and the external world, and that true spiritual experience involves the
transcendence of the empirical subject in addition to the cancellation of the
objective world.19
Granted that Vijiianavadin's arguments hardly seem strong enough to
support such a highly implausible position, it is nevertheless clear that these
philosophers are pointing to a very important phenomenological fact, that is,
to the primacy of the subject or consciousness in experience, and particularly
in the meditative states cultivated by the Vijiianavadins. This vision-
elaborated in the context of the Buddhist tradition and therefore having to
accommodate the Buddha's marks of existence, particularly impermanence
(anitya) and no-self (andtman)-resulted in the Vijiianavadin's denial of the
reality of mental substance or a continuous self. Instead, these thinkers posited
the existence of an infinite number of individual streams or series (samtdana)of
ideas.
An obvious problem arises at this point. How is it possible for a theory
which admits only the reality of momentary, subjective ideas to explain the
coherence of empirical experience (the possibility of correspondence between
our ideas and external objects having already been denied)? The Vijnanavadin
explains that our cognitions cohere because they are caused by impressions
(vasana) left behind from previous experience. Safikara objects to this theory
by claiming that it is circular, that is, cognitions are caused by impressions
which are themselves caused by cognitions, and that it leads to an infinite
regress.20 But the Vijianavadin replies that an infinite regress does not under-
mine his position since each series of cognitions, like sahmsra itself, is begin-
ningless. Sankara raises a more fundamental objection, however, when he asks
where this continuity of impressions resides. For he argues (by assuming the
validity of the svabhdva principle once again) that the experiences of personal
identity and memory presuppose a continuous principle of consciousness.21
And how can any kind of continuity, whether it be required to explain the
existence of a substratum of impressions or the experiences of personal
identity and memory, be incorporated into an analysis of consciousness based
on a doctrine of momentariness?22 This argument does seem to raise a

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486 Indich

conclusive objection against any theory which attempts to reduce the self to a
series of discrete conscious moments, although it must be pointed out that
Safikara's criticisms of the Vijnanavada school overlook the monistic or
absolutistic interpretation of its doctrine of the storehouse of consciousness
(alayavijnhna), which enables this school of Buddhist thought to have great
historical and philosophical influence in China, Japan, and Tibet.
While the Vijfianavadins tried to account for the existence of consciousness
through a theory of momentariness, the Carvakas, or Indian materialists,
identified consciousness with the self and maintained that both were merely the
product of a combination of the four material elements.23 Using the produc-
tion of the intoxicating quality of liquor from nonintoxicating ingredients as
an example, the Carvakas argue that consciousness is a quality of the body
which can have no existence apart from the living body itself. Where do the
qualities of consciousness reside, they ask, if not in the body itself? In this
sense the Carvakas propound a variety of epiphenomenalism not entirely
unlike the reductionism found in Hobbes and modern behaviorism.
Sankara tries to combat the force of the Carvaka's empirical claim that we
never perceive consciousness except in conjunction with bodily activity and
experience, by arguing that the qualities of the self are not perceptible to
others, since they are as different from the perceptible qualities of the body as
consciousness is different from matter.24 In this sense Safikara is claiming that
it is impossible to establish perceptually that consciousness exists, since it is
invalid to identify existence and knowability with, and thereby reduce them to,
the contents of empirical perception alone. In addition to this point, Safikara
objects that the Carvaka is unable to explain the relationship between the
material elements and their supposed product, consciousness. For if the
Carvaka tried to reduce consciousness to the faculty of perception arising from
the combination of the elements, then Safikara's criticism rests on the fact that
it would be impossible for perception to apprehend the elements whose
combination is presupposed by perception itself. On the other hand, if the
Carvaka treats consciousness as a property or quality of the combination of
the elements, that is, of a physical body, then Safikara wants to know why
other material objects, such as jars, do not share in the quality of intelligence.
Rather, Sankara argues that the self, being essentially intelligent, must be
different from, and independent of, the material elements and the human
body. In this sense Sankara is reasserting the central theme which runs
throughout his criticisms of all opposing theories of consciousness, and that is
the fact that self-revealing consciousness, beyond all qualifications and deter-
minations, is fully independent. That is, absolute consciousness is indefinable
precisely because its essential ontological nature is eternal self-autonomy. And
how can any definition, using concepts which are relative and therefore
dependent upon one another, grasp that which is radically discontinuous with
relativity itself?

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487

II

So much for Safikara's objections to some of the attempts of Indian philoso-

phers of his day to define the ontological nature of absolute consciousness. Let
us now turn our attention to the opposite pole of our apparent contradiction,
that is, to Safikara's claim that absolute consciousness is revealed to be the
identity of existence, knowledge, and infinity.
When Sanikaraidentifies consciousness with existence or being (sat), he is
indicating that consciousness is the ontological principle of unity in the uni-
verse. Consciousness is the permanent, immutable, unchanging, and uncaused
reality which is "undecaying, immortal, beyond fear, pure, homogeneous"25
and fully in and by itself. By claiming that absolute consciousness is pure
knowledge (jhnan), Advaitins wish to signify both that consciousness is
eternally self-luminous, that is, aware of its own essential existence and
perfection, and that it is the unmanifest (to thought), omnipotent witness of all
that is apprehended.26 Finally, by identifying consciousness with infinity
(ananta), that is, with an eternally existing intelligence beyond limitation,
determination, and imperfection, the Advaitin upholds the ultimately self-
satisfying or blissful (dnanda) nature of consciousness' self-revelation.
Clearly then, the Advaitin is claiming that the validity of the identity of
reality and consciousness rests on the existential realization of identity as
communicated to us by those who have had the experience. No argument can
be offered to prove the reality of this self-revealing experience itself. Rational
arguments, however, can be presented to support the claim that the nature of
absolute consciousness is eternal existence, self-luminosity, and perfection. Let
us now examine the arguments which Sankara does indeed offer.
To establish that the essential nature (svariipa) of absolute consciousness is
permanent and immutable existence, Sankara argues that reality would not
exist at all if it were not identical with its own unchanging and eternally
existing, original self-cause (svabhava). If reality "were to be only an effect,
then in the absence of an original cause, the effects will not be what they are,
and there will be nothing but the theory of void." 27 This argument is based on
applying the Advaitic analysis of the nature of phenomenal causality (satkar-
yavdda) to absolute consciousness. The phenomenal analysis offers a variety of
a substantialist causal model which maintains that an effect is nothing more
than, and is ontologically not different from, its material cause (upaddna-
kdrana).28 In other words, the Advaitic theory of causality presupposes that
there is some constant and therefore essential element in any causal situation
which is modified but not essentially changed in the course of the production
of its various effects, for example, a lump of clay remains essentially un-
changed whether it is molded into a pot or a vase. However, while the essential
nature of two phenomenal entities may be different, for example, clay from
gold, the validity of Sankara's transcendental argument rests on the qualifi-

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488 Indich

cation that the cause of the totality of phenomenal reality, which remains
constant throughout the creation and destruction of the universe, must neither
be limited by its opposite nor confronted with duality of any kind. In this
sense there can be nothing outside ultimate reality; even the nonexistence of
the phenomenal world is included in the existence which is the essential nature
of consciousness. Safikara modifies his svabhdvaprinciple so that it applies not
only to the ontological inherence of an effect in its cause, but also to the logical
inherence of any attribute or qualification in an underlying substance. Thus,
consciousness as transcendental reality is eternal existence, unchanging, un-
caused, and homogeneous.
A second argument offered by Advaitins for the existence of absolute con-
sciousness is similar to Descartes' cogito argument. According to Sankara,
"[n]one can doubt its existence; for it is involved even in doubting. Fire cannot
cancel its own heat; even so self-consciousness can never doubt itself." 29 It is
not clear, however, that an argument of this sort establishes the existence of
Descartes' substantial self, as many of his critics have pointed out. It is even
less clear that it establishes the existence of a transcendental and eternally
existing self, as Sankara would have us believe, for the self that doubts is the
phenomenal, and not the transcendental, self.
Safikara's arguments for the essentially intelligent nature of consciousness
are perhaps a bit more convincing, although for the most part these arguments
amount to no more than the application of the same svabhdva principle to
empirical knowledge and the various phenomenal states of consciousness. In
other words, the arguments amount to the claim that knowledge and intelli-
gent experience presuppose a transcendental intelligence or knowing principle.
In possibly the earliest of these arguments, we are led through a threefold
identification of internal experience, cognitive and volitional activity, and all
being in the universe with intelligence. The conclusion: "All this is guided by
intelligence, is based on intelligence. The world is guided by intelligence. The
basis is intelligence. Brahman is intelligence." 30 In a similar vein, we are told
that the perceptual, cognitive, and vital functions of all men share in the
essentially intelligent nature of consciousness: "there is nothing but Intelli-
gence at the time of the origin, continuance and dissolution of the universe." 31
And again, the analysis which distinguishes three states of experience in the
Mdn.dukyaUpanisad concludes that intelligence or knowledge is the essential
nature of the substance which persists through and witnesses these different
conditions. 32
Two further points are important in this context. First, Sankara argues that
existence and intelligence, as essences of absolute consciousness, are identical
not only with consciousness but with each other: "existence is intelligence and
intelligence is existence." 33 Second, knowledge as the essence of consciousness
is neither a product nor an activity.

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489

It denotesthe ontologicalperfection(bhavasadhand) (of knowing)and not the

fact of being a performerof acts of knowledge... for in accordancewith the
terms satyam and anantam ... true reality and infinity are incompatible with
the fact of beinga performerof acts of knowledge.34

In otherwords,absoluteconsciousnessis eternalself-revelation.
Finally,the Advaitinsoffertwo basic argumentsto establishthat the essence
of consciousnessis infinity,which is to say bliss. Infinity(ananta)and bliss
(ananda)are synonymousfor Advaitinsbecauseconsciousnessis revealedto
be full (purna),perfect,and beyond all determinationand qualification,and
because the realizationof perfectionis the source of ultimate value in the
universe."Thereis nothing else which could be desired in addition to the
absoluteunity of Brahman."35 Thus, the two argumentsfor the identityof
infinity and consciousness are based on the application of the svabhdva
principle to the basis of conventional human value, that is, pleasure, as
expressedin the experienceof love and sleep. The first argumentbeginsfrom
the premisethat all love is groundedsolely in, and is for the primarysake of,
one's own self.36The claim is that love is extendedto an objectbecauseof the
happinessor pleasurewhich love providesfor the lover himself.Since love is
basedon the happinessof the loving self, the "intensityof love that an object
meritsis dependenton its proximityto the self."37 Ultimately,of course, all
love for objectsis misplacedbecause"[t]hisSelf is dearerthan the son, dearer
than wealth, dearer than everythingelse, and is innermost."38Thus, the
argumentconcludesthat love of objectsreflectsonly a fragmentof the infinite
bliss, or transcendentalpleasure,which is the essentialnature of the trans-
cendentalself or absoluteconsciousness.
The second argumentis based on the absenceof miseryand pain in deep
sleep, as demonstratedby the sense of calm and well-being experienced
immediatelyupon waking.39From the fact that the cessationof the cognitive
activity which comprises the waking and dream states of experience is
accompaniedby a cessationof pain and by a positive state of happinessor
bliss, the Advaitin concludes that bliss must be the essence of absolute
consciousness.Further,essentialbliss must be identicalwith eternalexistence
and self-revealedknowledgebecauseit is experiencedin nonduality,beyond
the activityof cognition.40

III

Grantedthat the precedingargumentsfor the existent,intelligent,and infinite

nature of consciousnessare based primarilyupon the application of the
svabhdvaor logical inherenceprincipleto variousdimensionsof phenomenal
experience,how are we to reconcilethis apparentdefinitionwith Sanikara's
argumentsagainst the applicabilityof all traditional Indian philosophical

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490 Indich

categories to consciousness, that is, for the fundamentally unqualified and

unqualifiable nature of consciousness?
One way Advaitins have traditionally tried to resolve this problem has been
to distinguish two types of substance-attribute definition.41 In a conventional
substance-attribute definition, called "definition with reference to accidents"
(tatasthalaksana), the attribute or accident of a substance actually represents a
conceptual qualification or limitation of that substance. For example, we have
seen that the Naiyayika's definition of consciousness, as an attribute of the
substantial self, stands for a limitation of the self by the mind, sense organs,
and body. Advaitins insist, on the other hand, that their definition of
consciousness is a definition depicting the essential character (svarupalaksana)
of Brahman or reality. That is, existence, knowledge, and bliss do not refer to
parts, attributes, or accidents of reality, but to its essentially unitary, nondual
nature. In other words, "existence is consciousness, and consciousness is
bliss." 42 In this sense, the Advaitin argues that he does not commit the error
of trying to apprehend or limit reality conceptually when offering an essential
definition of consciousness. Rather, Safikara's definition is consistent with his
criticisms of alternative theories of consciousness to the extent that both
recognize that absolute consciousness is presupposed by, and radically distinct
from, the categories of thought.
A second solution to this apparent contradiction offered by Advaitins
consists in their claim that the essential definition of consciousness is, ulti-
mately, provisional. This solution complements the first: since thought cannot
apprehend reality but applies to the realm of phenomenal experience alone, all
conceptualization is sublated or cancelled along with the transcendence of the
phenomenal world. Thus, even the essential definition of absolute conscious-
ness becomes meaningless in the realization of Brahman. But why does the
Advaitin offer a definition if it is ultimately to be cancelled? In response to this
query, the Advaitin answers that the essential definition of Brahman is actually
a "concession" to ignorance (avidya), or to the modified consciousness
resulting from it. That is, one must not make the mistake of supposing that the
phenomenal world can be dismissed from within, or in terms of, itself. In other
words, one does not realize absolute consciousness by mistaking the via
negativa (neti, neti), instead of the conventional categories of thought, for
ultimate truth. The Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna, makes the same point
with respect to his via negativa (sunyatd) when he says:
Emptiness [sunyatd]is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all
viewpoints. But those who adhere to the concept of emptiness are called incur-
able [by the wise].43
That is, liberation is not realized by repressing the phenomenal world, but by
seeing through it. Thus, the essential definition of absolute consciousness is a
necessary concession to the efficacy of the phenomenal world and to the need
to speak meaningfully within the context of phenomenal experience. While

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491

concepts are ultimately illusory and inapplicableto reality, they have a

practicalefficacythat warrantsthis concession.Just as a dreamassailantcan
promptus to awaken,so, the Advaitinargues,illusoryexperienceprovidesthe
meansby whichto transcenditself.
Pursuingthis point further,we findthat the essentialdefinitionof conscious-
ness entails two distinct concessions to phenomenalexperience.First, by
provisionallydefining absolute consciousnessas existence, knowledge, and
infinity,the Advaitin acknowledgesthe need to awakenmodifiedconscious-
ness to discriminate(viveka)the possibility,and to desire the attainment,of
Brahmanrealization(mumuksutva).In this context, the essential definition
"direct[s]the mind towardsBrahmanby affirmingessentialqualitiesthat are
really only denials of their opposites."44Second, by offeringa phenomeno-
logical descriptionof the realizationof the unity of all distinctions(saguna
brahman),the Advaitinconfirmsthat althoughone-pointedconcentrationon
the Lord (Tivara)is the highest meditative experience,it is not the final
spiritual attainment. True liberation (nirguna brahman, nirvikalpa samddhi)
from the Advaiticperspectiveconsistsnot in the unificationof all distinctions
but in their transcendence.K. C. Bhattacharyyahas expressedthe difference
betweenthese two states by arguingthat the formeris the realizationof the
illusorynatureof duality throughunion with God, while the latter involves
completetranscendence,even of the realizationof unity itself.45Nevertheless,
the positivedescriptionof man's experienceof unity succeedsin affirmingthe
joyous and inherentlyvaluablenatureof man'sspiritualquest.
Thus, the Advaitin argues that he can offer an essential definition of
consciousnesswithoutcontradictinghimselffor two reasons:first,becausethe
essentialdefinitiondoes not attempt to limit or qualify reality;and second,
becausethe definitionis ultimatelyprovisionaland is thereforea concessionto
phenomenal experience. But is this answer satisfactory?One implication
entailed by the admission that this essential definition of consciousnessis
provisionalis that all languageis, ultimately,limitedto the phenomenalworld.
Does it reallymakesense,then, to talk of two levelsof consciousness,truth,or
reality,even if we interpretsuch talk as a concessionto ignorance?That is, if
all conceptsare limitedto conventionalapplication,then how is it possibleto
use concepts such as consciousness,truth, or realityto refer in any accurate
sense to the realizationof Brahman.The inconsistencyhere lies preciselyin
trying to provide an account of that which is beyond the reach of our
conceptualapparatus.Ultimately,of course, the Advaitinmaintainsthat the
certaintyand indubitabilityof the highest spiritualexperienceremainsradi-
cally distinctfrom, and unaffectedby, the relativesuccessof any attemptto
categorizethat realizationand its relationshipto all other humanexperience.
But this transcendental commitmentdoes not lead to antiintellectualism
on the
Advaitin'spart. Rather,he articulatesand defineshis nondualvision in spite
of the inconsistenciesconfrontedand the "concessions"he admitshaving to

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492 Indich

make in the courseof trying,paradoxicallyenough,to speakthe unspeakable

to one who cannot,as yet, hear.
Havingestablisheda radicaldistinctionbetweenrealityand appearance,the
one and the many, eternal and changing consciousness,the Advaitin's at-
tempts to define the former in terms of the latter may be systematicallyin-
structiveand spirituallyedifying,but they can, in the final analysis,be neither
logicallyconclusivenor meaningful.Of course, the Advaitin arguesthat the
inabilityto comprehendthe meaningof this radical discontinuityis only a
problemfor one who assumesthat the humanmind shouldbe the finalarbiter
of reality.And just such an assumptionhas characterizedthe mainstreamof
Westernphilosophicalthinking,at least since the time of Parmenides.We in
the Westhave long believed,and actedas if, we wererationalanimalscapable
of using intellectto unravelthe mysteriesof the universeand the meaningof
life. In this milieu,the Advaitin'sclaim of an ontologicaldistinctionbetween
reason and absolute consciousness must initially seem somewhat mind-
bogglingand, if taken seriously,demandsa reevaluationof the scope, limits,
and purposenot only of philosophybut of humanlife itself.

NOTES

1. BrhddcranyakaUpanisad 3.9.26; 4.2.4; 4.4.22.

2. Brhaddranyaka Upanisad Sankara Bhdsya (hereafter cited as Brhad. S.B.) 2.3.6, trans.
Swami Madhavananda, 5th ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1975), p. 239. I will use Swami
Madhavananda's translation throughout this article; and page numbers will refer to his trans-
lation of the text.
3. Sankara, Brahma-StutraSankara-Bhdsya(hereafter cited as B.S.S.B) 2.3.7.
4. TaittirTyaUpanisad 2.1.1. This definition was modified in later Upanisadic and Vedantic
thought into the more well-known "existence, knowledge, and bliss" (sacciddnanda).
5. Vatsyayana, Nyaya Bhdsya 3.2.18-41, Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra 1.1.6. Confer discussion in
S. K. Saksena, Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy (Benares: Nand Kishore, 1944),
pp. 50-51.
6. Jayanta Bhatta, Nydya Maijarl, p. 441, quoted in Saksena, Nature of Consciousness,p. 51.
7. Sridhara Bhatta, Nydya Kandall, p. 97, quoted in Saksena, Nature of Consciousness,p. 51.
8. B.S.S.B. 2.2.13.
9. E. S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross, trans. and ed., The Philosophical Works of Descartes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911-12), II. p. 53.
10. Ramanuja, Sr Bhdsya, 1.1.1.
11. Jaimini, MTmdrhsdSuitra1.2.1.
12. B.S.S.B. 1.1.4.
13. Kumarila Bhatta, Sloka Vdrttika(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p. 707.
14. Saksena, Nature of Consciousness,p. 62.
15. B.S.S.B. 2.3.40.
16. B.S.S.B. 2.4.40.
17. B.S.S.B. 1.1.4.
18. B.S.S.B. 2.2.28.
19. B.S.S.B. 2.2.28-31.
20. B.S.S.B. 2.2.30.

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493

21. B.S.S.B. 2.2.25., Brhad. S.B. 4.3.7.

22. B.S.S.B. 2.2.31.
23. B.S.S.B. 3.3.53. Since no original text of the Carvaka tradition is extant, all our information
about their thought is derived from the representation of their position by their critics. This fact
suggests that whatever subtlety and/or intricacy was entailed by the original position has been lost.
24. B.S.S.B. 3.3.54.
25. Brhad. S.B. 2.4.12, p. 256. Confer Brhad. S.B. 4.4.25, B.S.S.B. 3.2.21, Taittir[ya Upanisad
Sankara Bhdsya2.1.
26. B.S.S.B. 3.2.22 ff., Brhad. S.B. 4.3.15, Taittir[ya Upanisad Sankara Bhasya 2.1.
27. B.S.S.B. 2.3.7.
28. See Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Veddnta. A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu: The
University Press of Hawaii, 1973), pp. 35-37 for discussion of the Advaitic theory of causality and
for the arguments by which Sankara upholds this theory.
29. B.S.S.B. 2.3.7., confer Pancadafs 3.23-4.
30. Aitareya Upanisad, trans. Robert Ernest Hume, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1931) 3.5.3., p. 301. Confer Baldev Raj Sharma, The Concept of Atman in the Principal
Upanisads (New Delhi: Dinesh Pub., 1972), pp. 7-8 for a discussion of the debate regarding the
date of this Upanisad.
31. Brhad. S.B. 2.4.11, p. 254.
32. MdandukyaUpanisad with Gaudapdda'sKdrikdand Sankara's Commentary,trans. by Swami
Nikhilananda, 4th ed. (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955), 1.6.
33. B.S.S.B. 2.1.14.
34. Taittiriya Upanisad Sankara Bhdsya 2.1.1.
35. B.S.S.B. 2.1.14.
36. Pancada.si 12.11-20, 12.6, quoted in T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita
(Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1957), pp. 159-160.
37. Mahadevan, The Philosophyof Advaita, p. 166.
38. BrhaddrnyakaUpanisad 1.4.8, p. 97.
39. Confer ChdndogyaUpanisad 8.4.2, for example.
40. Brhad. S.B. 3.9.28.7.
41. Confer discussion in Deutsch, Advaita Veddnta,p. 9, n. 2.
42. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The PancadasT(Madras: University of Madras, 1969), pp. xxiv-xxv.
43. Nagarjuna, Milamddhyamikakdrikds 13.8.
44. Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta, p. 11. Confer Deutsch, pp. 9-14 for a more detailed discussion
of these points.
45. K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Veddntism(Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1909), pp. 28-
29.

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