FIRST DIVISION themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
An appropriate adversary
[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002.]
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her
minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON,
respondents.
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89 of Quezon
City, a petition for correction of some entries in the birth certificate of her son
Charles Christian namely: her son's surname "Borbon" be changed to "Eleosida";
the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and the informant's name
should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida" instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In
support thereof, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock,
therefore, the child is illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. After
the trial court issued a notice of hearing and another Order setting the date of
presentation of evidence, it motu propio dismissed the petition for lack of merit
on the ground that only clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature may
be the subject of a judicial order pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, the instant petition.
It is true that the changes sought to be made by petitioner were not, merely,
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of
the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. However, changes of such nature are now allowed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied
with. It was, therefore, an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her
petition and all other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose
the same. TcEaAS
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY; THE PROCEEDINGS MAY EITHER BE SUMMARY
OR ADVERSARY IN NATURE. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted
is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS.
The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus: "The pertinent sections of Rule 108
provide: SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5.
Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto. Thus, the persons who must be
made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an order fixing the time
and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: (l) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these procedural
requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.' . . ."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. It is true in the
case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of
the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed
under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided
that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records
show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing
setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the publication of said notice
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
1
and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the
petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other persons
having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any
reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena
Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all
furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the
petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the
petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997.
The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary
proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition
motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her
petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to
oppose the same.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma.
Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son,
Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows, among others, that the child's full
name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma.
Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also
indicates that the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas
City. 2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the
birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should
be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left
blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida,"
instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged
that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the
boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore
illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the
Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents. 3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos
Eleosida, praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth
of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be
changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON
be deleted and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA,
which is the surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry
"January 10, 1985 - Batangas City", be likewise deleted, since
the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the
time of the minor's birth were not legally married; and the
surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under
the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court
sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon
City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper =0njjnjof general
circulation and published in Metro Manila, to be selected by
raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at which date, time and
place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in
that all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon
shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the
petition shall not be granted.
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies
of the petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices
of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor
General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
within which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In the event
that the Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the
scheduled hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to appear for and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED." 4
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the
presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor
General as contained in the notice of hearing dated April 23,
1997 requiring that office to file their opposition, if any, to the
petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of
minor child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be
allowed to present compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and at the same time initially present evidence
on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A
HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name,
occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial
order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code),
authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the
CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner
will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN,
as she wants the Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of
2
 BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12,
respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the
ground that she was never married to respondent CARLOS
VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in ITEM 14,
respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E.
BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of
petitioner's intention and device to establish that CHARLES
CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial
order, which would authorize a change in the civil status of
CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action improper. The
matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by petitioner
cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the words
'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPRIO (sic)
dismissed." 6
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether
corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the
errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature. 7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG
submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected
provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks
the correction and eventual change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the
same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified and represented. 8 Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the
other hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite several notices
from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing of
respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition. 9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted
is adversary. 10 This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia 11 where we held that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court
further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are
(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of
the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2)
any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.' . . . "
12
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are
not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect
the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are
now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied
with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a
notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at
Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the
publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
3
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro
Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said
hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also
appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be granted.
Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a
second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on
July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an
adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the
petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to
support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the
matter to oppose the same.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997
of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside.
The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. IcHAaS
SO ORDERED.
(Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, G.R. No. 130277, [May 9, 2002],
|||
431 PHIL 612-621)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170340. June 29, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO I. KHO,
MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-
SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO
(Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision 1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which affirmed the
September 4, 2002 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City,
Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho,
Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of
entries in their birth certificates as well as those of Carlito's minor children Kevin
and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy
Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of
entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective
birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children,
Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese", as well as the deletion
of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because
his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlito's siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito's children, he prayed that the date
of his and his wife's marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21,
2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate. EHACcT
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition 3 in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlito's second name of "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito's father in his
(Carlito's) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and
"Filipino" to "Chinese", respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it
was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5
stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth
4
records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other
amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for
respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to
enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the
hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On September 14, 2001, 7 the OSG entered its
appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear
in the case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also
presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlito's children was requested to the effect that the first name of
their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel".
By Decision 8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar
of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1)
change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage
of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. CHDTIS
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the
minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel
Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
"Maribel" as "Marivel".
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections
ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito's father from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latter's citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese".
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA,
faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors'
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to
warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned "married" status of Carlito
and his siblings' parents, and the latter's citizenship. HAECID
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito
John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements
for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner's appeal
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the
proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was
observed in the case.
Regarding Carlito's minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that
the correction of their mother's first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was made
to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA
conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not affect
the minors' filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time
of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlito's first marriage
was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito's legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born,
their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on to
state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having
been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3 9 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with the
jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlito's birth
record, it noted, falls under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule
108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents' parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlito's name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito's prior three-year
bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state
Carlito's aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho". Petitioner concludes
that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlito's
father. DEIHAa
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlito's mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
"married" status of Carlito's parents in his and his siblings' respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 10
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito's mother as reflected in his
birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. 11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito's and his siblings' parents were
"married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate", with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.
5
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 12 explains the raison d etre:
. . . . The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If
the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through mere summary proceedings
and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of
which might be detrimental and far reaching. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia, 13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly
ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108. 14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative
relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres
to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. DTcHaA
xxx xxx xxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. . . . 15 (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil
status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing
of a petition under Rule 108. 16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito 17 observed that the obvious effect of
Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical
or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil
register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to
the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
TIDaCE
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial court's Order 19 setting the petition for hearing
and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose it was
posted 20 as well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings
were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the
local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which
the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-
examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito's
parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the
trial court's judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a
minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando
Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by
the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however,
sought to annul the trial court's decision, claiming that she should have been
made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the
RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barco's petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of
hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable
6
party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil
registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.
Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any
judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her ward's share in the estate of her father. . . . .
CDHacE
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance
with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by
publication . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently
left out. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing
and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds
not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or
respondents' parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding.
It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31,
2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not
raise any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito's parents as parties
to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her children's birth certificates, especially
since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence 23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein. 24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of
marriage 25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on
April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989"
was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time
his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. 26
Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at
all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlito's mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness
stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 27 Again, that
testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor. EADSIa
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito's and his siblings'
birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by
St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have
never contracted marriage legally. 28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents' Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania. 29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlito's birth certificate of his name from
"Carlito John" to "Carlito", the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction
of entries involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of the following
provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: 30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions
for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of
Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito's official transcript of record from the Urious College in
Butuan City, 31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, 32 and
voter registration record 33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first
7
name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second
name.
The correction of the mother's citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing
in Carlito's birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question
her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly
was not respondents' fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of
the proceedings. SEHTIc
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito's siblings uniformly
stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino". To disallow the correction in
Carlito's birth record of his mother's citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably
born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the
name of Carlito's wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel". The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding 34 considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate
of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel".
Apropos is Yu v. Republic 35 which held that changing the appellant's Christian
name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.
The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo
was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a
summary proceeding. 36 The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlito's marriage certificate of his father's name from "John Kho" to
"Juan Kho". Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, [June 29, 2007], 553 PHIL 161-177)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented
by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September
2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name
and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian
Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently
got married on September 22, 1998, . . . they executed a deed
of legitimation of their son so that the child's name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. . . .
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long
time because they will let him study there together with his
sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. . .
. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of
the mother are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against
because of his current registered name which carries a middle
name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they
are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they
pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian
Lin Wang. 1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial
court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition
that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in
8
Singapore because of his middle name did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person,
names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article
174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames
of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now
be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then
decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied
in a resolution dated 20 May 2004. 4 The trial court maintained that the
Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping
of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The
dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to
or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is
controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would
not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the
reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable. 5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) 6
arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore
determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a
minor child is contrary to Article 174 7 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme
Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his
new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into
consideration the "best interest of the child." 8 It is argued that convenience of
the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice
the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will
cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it
will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied
the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him
to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases 9 decided by this Court that
allowed a minor to petition for change of name. 10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition. The OSG filed its Comment 11 positing that the trial court correctly
denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of
the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their
father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of
dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the
dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner,
since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name
and/or cancellation of entry. 12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not
shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of
the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner's allegation that the continued use of
the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more
imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court
that the dropping of the child's middle name could only trigger much deeper
inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian
has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the
surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to
drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle
name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law. 13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied. acITSD
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and
that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. 14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and
reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid
are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest. 16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence
available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts. 17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not
simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but
9
instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this
jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for
change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for
change of the given name 18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of
the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his
registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant at this point.
We quote, thus:
. . . For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he
lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used
merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons;
they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the
identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held
that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of,
the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended
to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It
is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at
the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man,
and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter
vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. 19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not
mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names
serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as
he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. 20 The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's
surname. 22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies
him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or
private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. EHDCAI
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a
given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name
as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into
Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic 23 and Calderon v.
Republic, 24 which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena
Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name
from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition
based on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected
Philippine citizenship have been using their mother's surname; she was
embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the
Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of
name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public
interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of
her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mother's husband. The Court held that a
petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly
for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the
opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of
illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person
be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of
other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic, 25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the
Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father
10
and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family
name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the
legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her
name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in
the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voter's registration). The trial court
denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article
364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use
the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the
surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on
which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the
age of majority. 26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Julian Lin Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, [March 30, 2005],

there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion. 494 PHIL 149-163)
Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his name against
the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that
his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable
action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at
all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from
the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when
they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to
have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their
decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the
reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was
the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in
Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time
against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein
petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the
petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different
from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her
school records and voter's registration records; thus, denying the petition would
only result to confusion. SEcAIC
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a
mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to
buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to
petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in
granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the
best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make
his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.

11
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.]
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE
ANN T. BRAZA, petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN
TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR
and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad
Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married 1 on
January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina's co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2
and Janelle Ann 3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian
Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died 5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in
Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the
Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's
son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she
obtained Patrick's birth certificate 6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL
TITULAR
Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular
Father: Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997
Annotation: "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza
on January 13, 1997"
Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of
parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth,
the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 7 of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her
and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional
Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the
entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. DCHIAS
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in
Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of
the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of
Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration
of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial
court, by Order 9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without
prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the
validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct
entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario, 11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals 12 and Republic v. Kho, 13 they contend that even substantial
errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the
subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code 15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed. 16 ATICcS
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly
show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille
on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick's filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to
12
 a DNA test. those obtaining in the present case. HASTCa
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
the correction of Patrick's birth records 17 and that the rest of the prayers SO ORDERED.
are merely incidental thereto. ||| (Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, G.R. No. 181174, [December 4,

Petitioners' position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually 2009], 622 PHIL 654-660)
to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille's marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick's legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners' reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the
first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the
first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted
marriage with the husband while the latter's marriage to the first wife was
still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death
benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the
contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the
lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to
declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as
stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter's
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood
relation at all between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the
Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the
petitioners' mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is
their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the
petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought
the correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that
they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese,
because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that
the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous,
the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in
nature, upheld the lower court's grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from

13
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said.
She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open.
Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named
the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas
and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling
with regard to a person's sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone
the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People's Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. SCEHaD
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique
of a female. Petitioner's misfortune to be trapped in a man's
body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and
the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically
for petitioner's first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY
and petitioner's gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court's decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground
of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic's petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
14
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit. AEScHa
A PERSON'S FIRST NAME
CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for
the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, 16 form 17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. AcDaEH
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner's first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned. EACTSH
NO LAW ALLOWS THE
CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO
SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
15
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register. 23
Section 2 (c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. AIDcTE
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts
(such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and
judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These
acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the
legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership. 27 DHaEAS
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status . . . include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of
a person's legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn
child.
16
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f)
such other data as may be required in the regulations to be
issued. AScHCD
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable. 31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction between
male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and
male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35
Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed
to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36
Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
DCTHaS
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR
SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF
EQUITY
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause
no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioner's first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. 37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female. 38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner's petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The
Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
17
not by the courts. AaCTID SECOND DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. [G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]
Costs against petitioner. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B.
SO ORDERED. CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
||| (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, [October 19, 2007], 562 PHIL 953-974) DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female"
to "male".
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her
first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. cHaCAS
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation
for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by
the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued
a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH.
He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and

18
 she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition
is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of lack
of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to
her.
The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated
January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition.
It was medically proven that petitioner's body produces
male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is
a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and
identified as a male. DHSEcI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school
records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED. 3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108
OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108
DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE". 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff",
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. DHECac
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while
the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar. 5 The OSG further contends respondent's petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to
the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2 (b), Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court. 6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the
Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings, 8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex
or gender is allowed under Rule 108, 10 and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
11 ICTacD
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SEC. 1. Venue. A person desiring to change
his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of
Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for
change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to
the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed
is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of
19
 the order be published before the hearing at least once a
week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be
within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four
(4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear
on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in
open court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition. AcISTE
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or
orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith
enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name. TcHEaI
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and
any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto. AaHTIE
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in
which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his
record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule
108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can
be had. 12 Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules. 13 The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. 14
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, 15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of
the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth
20
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 16 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 17 in so far as clerical or typographical
errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register. 18 DAEIHT
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is
a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article
407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the
early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH. DcIHSa
CAH is one of many conditions 21 that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.
22 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose
sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role. 23 Since the rise of modern
medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals. 24 More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for
those individuals who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." 25
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender.
But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a
change in the subject's birth certificate entry is in order. IaSAHC
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically
male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
21
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has
not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with.
And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication, 26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
consequences that will follow. 28 The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of
a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence
that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. TcSHaD
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, [September 12, 2008], 586 PHIL

due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male 637-653)
characteristics. TCacIE
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate
on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses
of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" 27 and in
the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary
state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the

22
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198010. August 12, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DR. NORMA S.
LUGSANAY UY, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 Decision 2 dated February 18, 2011 and
Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed
decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and,
consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004
granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. She alleged
that she is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. 6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth 7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact
she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, 8 and passport 9 bear the
name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the
surname of her mother. 10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen
and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all
Filipinos. 11 SECcIH
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her
name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. 12 However, the National
Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition
before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 13 finding the petition to be sufficient
in form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the
said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition
be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor's
Office for their information and guidance. 14 Pursuant to the RTC Order,
respondent complied with the publication requirement. AHSEaD
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person
acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the
correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of petitioner's name and citizenship so that the entries
would be:
a) As to petitioner's name:
First Name:NORMA
Middle Name:SY
Last Name:LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner's nationality/citizenship:
FILIPINO
SO ORDERED. 15
The RTC concluded that respondent's petition would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay"
and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that
respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as
"Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to
avoid confusion. 16 acCITS
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondent's failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to
the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor's Office. 17 As to
whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondent's filiation, the CA ruled in
favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and
that her siblings' birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay
and their citizenship is Filipino. 18 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011. aETDIc
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for
failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court,to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
23
 children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name. aTCADc
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. IaEASH
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed
for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She
sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for
since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere
clerical as they touch on respondent's filiation and citizenship. In changing her
surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is
the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to
illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same
affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are
substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that
case is illuminating: EICSTa
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative
relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and
a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. . . .
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding. 22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court's conclusion in Republic
v. Kho, 23 Alba v. Court of Appeals, 24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals, 25 that the
failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In
Republic v. Kho, 26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the
petition for correction of entries despite respondents' failure to implead the
minor's mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly
apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable
that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her
children's birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the
trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27 DHAcET
In Alba v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court's
decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent
although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case,
petitioner's mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of
entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth
certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she
no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the
petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied.
Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the
Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is,
therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial
court's compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court addressed the question of whether the
court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to
the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said
case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the
24
failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which
requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the
petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the
parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It
emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the
provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was
considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties. EDaHAT
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was
impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC
granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which
decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in
this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v. Delantar, 32 and Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic. 33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 34 claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian
Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate
to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the
petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the
trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondent's
petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties;
correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry
"Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr."
in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on
respondent's birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent's
failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a
petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,assuming that
he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition
still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil
Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
THIcCA
In Ceruila v. Delantar, 35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and
annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same
was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore,
invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an
order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and
that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or
opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to
the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified respondent's birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the trial court's decision, hence, the latter was
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court
annulled the trial court's decision for failure to comply with the requirements of
Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth
certificate was nullified.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of
entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name
from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from
"married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to
"No marriage." The Court modified the trial court's decision by nullifying the
portion thereof which directs the change of petitioner's civil status as well as the
filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and
the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required
in cases where substantial alterations are sought. aIDHET
Respondent's birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a
Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the
petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her
status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to
"Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the
Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to
make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the
nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may
be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must, therefore, be
served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply
with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when
there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
25
parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left out. 43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.(petition was
granted by the SC and ruled in favor of the republic. Did not grant the
change of name for being a substantial alteration)
44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud
or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching. 45 SEHaTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27,
2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28,
2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No.
230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth
filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010, [August 12, 2013])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]
MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated
2 March 2011 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The
26
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where
he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. . . .
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5 (4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is
not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries
in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of
marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. CaAIES
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19
which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."
20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately
dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ." 23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) . . . as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court . . . which is Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The
Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages . . . ." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in
a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral
attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] . . . ." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
27
ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General andthe Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC . . . be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic 33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect
of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v.
Santo Tomas, 36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 While Corpuz
concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code.In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person's legal capacity and status . . . ." 38
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and
Nial v. Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other
hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would
like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if
the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
28
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office. 50 EaISTD
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons, 52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial,
54 the trial 55 and the judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Raada, 58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules
of evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his
or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." 67 AIaHES
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
29
 register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) 68 his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72
but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized
under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any
case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized
by law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife" 75 it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages
are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is
also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue
in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a
court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . . can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary(Tina D.-does not apply to cases where there is already a case decision by a
foreign court) to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, 84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.
86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other
30
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
In Republic v. Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot
try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending
in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is based on this Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo 90
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad
to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in
the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be
31
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and
94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." CcHDSA
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013])
[G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR,
respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Regional Trial Court 1 (RTC) Decision 2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order
3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted
respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's
marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the
Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. cIaHDA
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing
officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then
in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely
denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she
was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her
name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she
gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent. 7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8 TADCSE
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of
the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE
32
 portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED. 9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not
that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to
straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on
the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio. 11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise: aASEcH
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner's counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED. 12
Contrary to petitioner's stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding
required. Considering that respondent's identity was used by an unknown person
to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is
not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC
Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE
ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED
OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14
IHDCcT
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones
provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L.
Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter's personal circumstances. 15 In directing the
cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the
RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16 Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law
are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination
of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the issue raised by
petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry, to wit: TSEHcA
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto. TaSEHC
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of
33
 the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed
for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary
or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 19 in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding." 20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. 21 AEIDTc
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down
in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires
the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 22 HIAcCD
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims
that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted
marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no
such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to
obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain
Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate. HTCSDE
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements
set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General
was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the
alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified.
Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and
other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent's signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established
that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v.
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office
24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and
children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry. ScaEIT
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show
the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While
we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
34
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification
of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in
any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25,
2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. SaHcAC
||| (Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, [February 10, 2014], 726 PHIL 378-388)
Tina D.- legitimacy status is considered as a substantial alteration, hence, the appropriate
adversary proceeding under Rule 108 should be complied with and not the summary
proceeding under RA 9048
[G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014.]
FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS CITY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October 7,
2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Pias
City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by
petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition 2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth
before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Pias City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of
his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth
certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also
stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc
Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as
follows:
Entry From
1) Date and place of marriage of his Dece
parents Bico
2) First name of his mother Tely
3) His first name Fran
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction
of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that
the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in
nature and would affect petitioner's status as a legitimate child. It was further
held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for
this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner's parents were not married
on December 23, 1983. CHaDIT
35
Essentially, the petition raises four issues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that
the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that
correcting the entry on petitioner's birth certificate that his parents were married
on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no
proof that petitioner's parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial
correction of entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, 3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that
substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will
be presented during the trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of
entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC
correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the
first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative
proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner's
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
"not married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must
be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are
impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and
his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the
RTC's ruling on this point. 4 Indeed, under Section 1 5 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of
first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a
judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error
or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic, 6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, 7
we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical
errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without
the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus
petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mother's first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioner's birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring
adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In
Republic v. Uy, 8 we held that corrections of entries in the civil register including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceedings. 9 ScTIAH
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling
that the correction he sought on his and his mother's first name can be done by
the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his
prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC be reinstated
since the same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother's
first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC's dismissal is without prejudice. As we said,
petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mother's first name. He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the
alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City: 10
. . . This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established under
Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
36
 adversary proceeding. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner
are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones
as they would affect the status of the marriage between
petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their
son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature,
however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided
that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied
with. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil
register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil
registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but
also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida, 11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, 12 we have
similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother
as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last
issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents
were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the
purpose. ACTESI
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7,
2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pias City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional
Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, G.R. No. 197174
(Resolution), [September 10, 2014])
37