Grid Code Regulation Operationalization-3

OPERATIONALIZATION OF GRID CODE
REGULATION, 2008
DEVELOPED BY:
THE OFFICE OF SYSTEM COORDINATOR/NLDC,
BHUTAN POWER CORPORATION LTD.
THIMPHU: BHUTAN
Reviewed By:
Protection Coordination Committee Members
Druk Green Power Corporation &
Bhutan Power Corporation Ltd.
May 25, 2012

OPERATIONALIZATIONOFGRIDCODEREGULATION,2008
Sl. No. Table of Contents Page No.
1.0 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE...........................................................................5

1.1 PURPOSE..............................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES....................................................................................................................5
1.2.1 System Operators...............................................................................................................................................5
1.2.2 Field Operators.................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 DESCRIPTION AND INTENT OF THE NLDC...................................................................................................5
1.3.1 System Monitoring.............................................................................................................................................5
1.3.2 Devise Switching and Isolation.........................................................................................................................6
1.3.3 Operational Switching.......................................................................................................................................6
1.3.4 Switching of Devices to Achieve De-energization and Isolation.......................................................................6
1.3.5 Operation of Isolators.......................................................................................................................................6
1.4 NLDC AND RTU SITE INTERACTIVE LOGIC.................................................................................................6
1.4.1 Remote/NLDC and Local/RTU Site Logic.........................................................................................................6
1.4.2 Circuit Breaker Logic........................................................................................................................................7
1.5 MAINTENANCE..................................................................................................................................................9
1.6 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES............................................................9
1.6.1 Authorizing Maintenance.................................................................................................................................10
1.6.2 Establishing Guaranteed Protection...............................................................................................................11
1.6.3 Returning Maintained Equipment to Service...................................................................................................11
1.6.4 Procedure for Maintenance of International Power Lines..............................................................................12
2.0 BLACKSTART CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEM RESTORATION...........................................................15

2.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................................................15
2.2 FULL AND PARTIAL RESTORATION............................................................................................................15
2.2.1 Eastern Region (Full restoration)....................................................................................................................15
2.2.2 Western Region (Partial restoration or full restoration).................................................................................16
2.3 BLACK START CAPABILITIES.......................................................................................................................16
2.3.1 Black Start Facilities.......................................................................................................................................16
2.3.2 Startup Power Requirements...........................................................................................................................17
2.3.3 Synchronizing facilities....................................................................................................................................17
2.3.4 Containing Over Voltage.................................................................................................................................18
2.4 GRID RESTORATION POSSIBILITIES............................................................................................................19
2.5 SYSTEM RESTORATION APPROACH...........................................................................................................20
2.5.1 General Guideline:..........................................................................................................................................20
2.5.2 Initial Course of Action...................................................................................................................................21
2.5.3 Important considerations during restoration...................................................................................................22
2.5.4 Special consideration in extending/providing start up power.........................................................................22
2.5.5 Donts..............................................................................................................................................................23
2.6 RESTORATION SCENARIOS...........................................................................................................................23
2.6.1 Failure of 220 kV Rurichhu- Semtokha transmission line (Taken from Section 4.0 of Contingency Plan).....23
2.6.2 Failure of 220kV Semtokha-Chhukha transmission line AND the failure of the 66kV Rurichhu-Semtokha line
(taken from Section 5.0 of the Contingency Plan)........................................................................................................24
2.6.3 Failure of 220kV Rurichhu - Semtokha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV Chhukha - Semtokha
line (taken from Section 3.0 of the Contingency Plan).................................................................................................25
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2.6.4 Failure of 220kV Rurichhu - Semtokha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV Chhukha - Semtokha
line AND failure of the 66kV Rurichhu - Semtokha line via 66kV Lobeysa substation (taken from Section 3.1 of the
Contingency Plan)........................................................................................................................................................26
2.6.5 Procedure to be followed for restoration from Isolated Mode operation at Basochhu (taken from Annexure
05 of the Basochhu Operation and Maintenance Manual 2011)..................................................................................27
2.6.6 Procedure to be followed for restoration from Isolated Mode operation at Basochhu while momentarily
blacking out Thimphu...................................................................................................................................................29
2.6.7 Procedure to be followed for restoration from complete blackout of 220kV Malbase substation (taken from
Section 6.0 of the Contingency Plan)............................................................................................................................32
3.0 CONTROL OF VOLTAGE AND REACTIVE POWER.............................................................................35
3.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................................................35
3.2 TRANSMISSION ELEMENTS AFFECTING REACTIVE POWER BALANCE AT A BUS...........................35
3.3 BACKBONE OF THE BPC WESTERN SYSTEM.............................................................................................36
3.4 TRRANSFORMERS ON THE BPC SYSTEM...................................................................................................37
3.4.1 Listing of Tap Changing Transformers...........................................................................................................37
3.4.2 Tap Changing Equation...................................................................................................................................41
3.5 SWITCHED INDUCTORS AND CAPACITORS ON THE BPC SYSTEM.......................................................41
3.6 MVAR PRODUCTION BY HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION LINES........................................................41
3.6.1 MVAR net production by high voltage lines....................................................................................................41
3.6.2 MVAR Net production at generator buses due to high voltage lines...............................................................42
3.5 GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVES............................................................................................................43
3.5.1 Chhukha Generator Capability Curves...........................................................................................................43
3.5.2 Basochhu Upper Generator Capability Curves...............................................................................................44
3.5.3 Basochhu Lower Generator Capability Curves...............................................................................................46
3.5.4 Tala Generator Capability Curves..................................................................................................................46
3.5.5 Kurichhu Generator Capability Curves..........................................................................................................47
3.6 VOLTAGE CONTROL RESOURCE ANALYSIS.............................................................................................48
3.6.1 Generators.......................................................................................................................................................48
3.6.2 Switched Inductor............................................................................................................................................49
3.6.3 Tap Changing Transformers in Radial Configuration....................................................................................49
3.6.4 Tap Changing Transformers in Transmission Loops......................................................................................49
3.7 VOLTAGE CONTROL STRATEGY IN THE NORMAL CONFIGURATION.................................................50
3.7.1 Transmission System voltage...........................................................................................................................50
3.7.2 Radial Line and Radial Load Voltage Control................................................................................................51
3.8 VOLTAGE CONTROL STRATEDY IN CONTINGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.............................................51
4.0 INTERCHANGE SCHEDULING...............................................................................................................52

5.0 COMMUNICATIONS.................................................................................................................................52
6.0 OPERATIONAL LIAISON.........................................................................................................................52

7.0 DEMAND ESTIMATION............................................................................................................................52
8.0 OUTAGE PLANNING.................................................................................................................................52
10.0 PERIODIC REPORTS................................................................................................................................53

11.0 GENERATOR CONNECTION AGREEMENT..........................................................................................53

12.0 SYSTEM SECURITY..................................................................................................................................53
List of Figures:
FIG:1.4.11 REMOTE/NLDCANDLOCAL/RTUSITELOGIC...................................................................................................7
FIG:1.4.21 CIRCUITBREAKEROPERATIONLOGIC.................................................................................................................8
FIG:2.6.11 WESTERNGRIDWITH220KVRURICHHUSEMTOKHALINEOPEN.....................................................................24
FIG:2.6.21 WESTERNGIRDWITH220KVSEMTOKHACHPLINEAND66KVLOBEYSARURICHHULINEOPEN.....................25
FIG:2.6.31 WESTERNGRIDWITH220KVRURICHHUSEMTOKHAAND220KVSEMTOKHACHHUKHALINEOPEN...............26
FIG:2.6.41 WESTERNGRIDWITH220KVRURICHHUSEMTOKHA,220KVSEMTOKHACHHUKHAAND66KVRURICHHU
SEMTOKHALINEOPEN......................................................................................................................................................27
FIG:2.6.51 WESTERNGRIDWITH220KVSEMTOKHACHHUKHAAND66KVCHHUKHACHUMDOLINEOPEN......................28
FIG:2.6.61 WESTERNGRIDWITHISOLATEDMODEOFOPERATIONATBASOCHHUHYDROPOWERPLANT..................................29
FIG:2.6.62 WESTERNGRIDRESTORATIONPROCESSWITH220KVSEMTOKHARURICHHUAND66KVLOBEYSARURICHHU
LINEOPEN. 30
FIG:2.6.63 WESTERNGRIDRESTORATIONPROCESSWITH220KVSEMTOKHARURICHHUAND66KVLOBEYSARURICHHU
LINEOPEN. 31
FIG:2.6.64 WESTERNGRIDRESTORATIONPROCESSWITH66KVLOBEYSARURICHHULINECLOSED.....................................32
FIG:2.6.71 WESTERNGRIDWITHMALBASESUBSTATIONBLACKOUT...................................................................................33
FIG:2.6.72 WESTERNGRIDWITHMALBASESUBSTATIONBLACKOUTBUTWITH220KVSEMTOKHACHHUKHALINECLOSED..34
FIG:3.31 WESTERNGRIDNETWORK...................................................................................................................................37
FIG:3.5.11 CAPABILITYCURVEOFCHUKHAGENERATOR.....................................................................................................44
3.5.31 CAPABILITYCURVEOFBASOCHHULOWERGENERATOR..............................................................................................46
FIG:3.5.41 CAPABILITYCURVEOFTALAGENERATOR.........................................................................................................47
FIG:3.5.51 CAPABILITYCURVEOFKURICHHUGENERATOR..................................................................................................48
List of Tables:
TABLE:2.3.11 BLACKSTARTFACILITIES...................................................................................................................................16
TABLE:2.3.31 SYNCHRONIZINGFACILITIES...............................................................................................................................17
TABLE:2.3.41 REACTORSINBHUTANPOWERSYSTEM...............................................................................................................18
TABLE:2.41 PROBABILITIESINGRIDRESTORATIONPOSSIBILITIES...............................................................................................19
TABLE:3.21 TRANSMISSIONELEMENTAFFECTINGREACTIVEPOWERBALANCE..............................................................................35
TABLE:3.4.11 LISTOFTAPCHANGINGTRANSFORMERS..............................................................................................................37
TABLE:3.51 LISTOFSHUTREACTORANDINDUCTOR...............................................................................................................41
TABLE:3.6.11 MVARNETPRODUCTIONBYHIGHVOLTAGELINES.................................................................................................41
TABLE:3.6.21 MVARPRODUCTIONATGENERATORBUSESDUETOHIGHVOLTAGELINES.................................................................42

CHAPTER- 1
1.0 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE
This is incompliance to Grid Code Regulation Clause No. 6.13.4.1 and 6.13.4.2 regarding the
safety co-ordination, where System Operator should establish procedure for establishing and
maintaining the necessary isolation and earthing when work and /or test are carried out.
1.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process for:

a. Authorizing and controlling the configuration of equipment or system to allow for
maintenance, and then return to service.
b. Providing protection for personnel performing maintenance work.
1.2 DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
1.2.1 System Operators
The System Operator has responsibility for receiving any shutdown requests for maintenance,
and for initiating & approving the shutdown.
All steps, process and activities of the Field Operators shall be reviewed by the System
Operator.
1.2.2 Field Operators
The Filed Operators have responsibility for switching out of equipment to be maintained,
isolation of that equipment, completing the maintenance work, and returning the equipment to
service. Before taking any shutdown, switching off clearance should be sought from System
Operator.
1.3 DESCRIPTION AND INTENT OF THE NLDC
1.3.1 System Monitoring
NLDC has installed number of Remote Terminal Units (RTU) at various Generating stations
and substations to collect data. It will collect date from approximately 800 points. This data is
necessary for the safe and reliable operation of the Bhutan power system.

1.3.2 Devise Switching and Isolation
The NLDC has circuit switching capabilities to open and close circuit breakers on the BPC
transmission system as follows:
a) Down to the 33kV and 11kV voltage levels at all terminals and substation fed by
transmission lines at 66kV and above.
b) No switching capabilities at terminals and substations fed by 33kV transmission lines,
with the following exceptions.
Switching capabilities down to 33kV and 11kV voltage levels at terminals and
substations fed by 33kV lines in the Thimphu area as follows:
1) 33/11kV Chubachu
2) 33/11kV Mothithang
3) 33/11kV RICB
4) 33/11kV DPH (Diesel Power House)
5) 33/11kV Thimphu Mini Hydal
6) 33/11kV Gidakom (Khatsadraphu)
1.3.3 Operational Switching
The NLDC shall carry out operational switching from time to time as may be necessary for
operation of the Bhutan power system to achieve steady state, which includes voltage control,
switching of overloaded transmission lines and other like operational requirements.
1.3.4 Switching of Devices to Achieve De-energization and Isolation
In the absence of a System Operator, Field Operators at generating stations, terminals and
substations have a long history of the switching of devices for maintenance purposes. That is,
each localized area has switched devices in its area to achieve de-energization and isolation of
components on which maintenance is to be carried out.
It is the intention of the System Operator to continue this procedure. However, the
authorization for maintenance, and the coordination of the work, will be done under guidelines
established by the System Operator and under the control of the System Operator.
1.3.5 Operation of Isolators
At present motor operated isolators cannot be opened or closed by the NLDC. It has to be done
at the site of the terminal or substation. However, NLDC will receive an indication of the
status of all isolators.
1.4 NLDC AND RTU SITE INTERACTIVE LOGIC
1.4.1 Remote/NLDC and Local/RTU Site Logic

OPERATION
NALIZATIONOFGRIDCOD
DEREGULATIION,2008
Eacch circuit brreaker under the control of an RTU hash an L/R switch
s in thee Trip Coil path.
p L or
Local means th he site of thee RTU. R orr Remote meeans the NL LDC. This L//R switch is in series
witth a contact closed by thhe digital Ouutput (DO) unit
u of the RT TU on comm mand from NLDC,
N as
shoown in the diiagram below w.
a) When the t L/R switch is in the Local
L positioon (open), thhis opens thee series pathh. In such
case, an
ny signal froom the NLD DC to the RTTU to trip thee circuit breaker will be ignored.
The Local, or RTU site, has conntrol of the circuit
c breakker.
b) When the
t L/R swittch is in the Remote
R position (closedd), this comppletes the serries path,
and the NLDC is noow able to trrip the circuiit breaker.
c) The diagram below w has beenn drawn forr energizatioon of the Trip T Coil. A similar
configu
uration and loogic will exiist for energization of thhe Close Coill.
Fig:1.4.11 Remote
e/NLDCand
dLocal/RTU
Usitelogic
1.4.2 Cirrcuit Break

ker Logic
The NLDC/Reemote selecttion logic is only one path for enerrgization of the Trip Cooil of the
circcuit breakerr. To be prrepared to authorize
a annd monitor maintenancce and testiing, it is
neccessary to unnderstand alll paths for energizationn of the Tripp Coil in ordder to trip thhe circuit
breeaker. The diiagram is shown now, annd the explannation follow ws the diagraam.
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Fig:1.4.21 CircuitBreakeroperationlogic
a) With the Test-Operate switch in the Test position, pressing the Test Push Button (PB)
will immediately trip the circuit breaker (with no conditions).
b) With the Test-Operate switch in the Operate position, we now reach a second switch
called the Local-Remote switch. This is a second, lower level of Local and Remote (the
RTU/Local and the NLDC/Remote being the first level).
c) With the Local-Remote switch in the Local position, an Operator at the site of the
circuit breaker has a push button or like mechanism to trip the circuit breaker.
d) With the Local Remote switch in the Remote position, an Operator in the terminal
Control Building now has three options as described in the next three items.
e) The Operator can press a Push Button (or turn a handle) on the switchgear panel to trip
the circuit breaker.
f) The Operator can use the site SCADA to trip the circuit breaker.
g) The Operator can select L on the L/R switch, and prevent the NLDC from taking any
control action.
h) The 52 a contact is in series with all the trip paths. It is a contact off the actual 52
circuit breaker and it is closed when the circuit breaker is closed. This means that a
Trip Signal can only be sent to a closed breaker. It is not logical to send a Trip Signal
to an open breaker because, should it be allowed, seeing no response the Operator may
continue to press the trip push button and burn out the Trip Coil.

i) The 52 CC b contact is in series with all the trip paths. It is a contact associated with
the Close Coil and is open when the Close Coil is energized. This means that the Trip
Coil and the Close Coil cannot be energized at the same time. This prevents rapid
open-close cycling of the circuit breaker.
j) Our diagram shows only System Operator, or Field Operator, initiated tripping of the
circuit breaker. There could be upward of 6-8protective relay-activated contacts in
parallel with all the other parallel paths, and all relays (over current, over voltage,
under voltage, phase imbalance, etc) can trip the circuit breaker. This is called a
protective trip, as opposed to an operator-initiated trip.
Summary:
a) When the L/R switch is set at Local, circuit breaker control is under the exclusive
control of the Field Operator.
b) When the L/R switch is set at Remote, circuit breaker control can be carried out by
either the System Operator or the Field Operator.
c) The Field Operator at the site of the RTU controls the L/R switch. Therefore that Field
Operator, either on her/his own initiative or at the direction of the System Operator,
establishes who the control authority will be.
1.5 MAINTENANCE
There are three classifications of maintenance. These are:

a) Planned maintenance
The planned shutdowns are the ones which have been proposed by the individual
agency in advance and has been discussed, and in principle approved by the System
Operator after the Annual Maintenance Plan (AMP) with the process followed as per
the Grid Code Clause No. 6.11.
b) Emergency maintenance
The emergency shutdowns are required to be taken by the agency immediately as a
result of the failure of equipment or components which otherwise could have a
catastrophic effect.
c) Ad hoc maintenance
The ad-hoc shutdowns are the ones which are requested by the agencies to the SCO
during the course of the year (not envisaged during the AMP meetings) as felt
necessary so that regular or preventive maintenance of the system can be done.
1.6 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
Prior to authorizing maintenance activities, there are five reference Appendices with which the
System Operator should be familiar. These are:
a) Appendix- A: Approved Protective Devices

b) Appendix- B: Tagging Equipment

c) Appendix- C: Maintenance Jobs Not Requiring Approval.
d) Appendix- D: Planned maintenance form, Shut down request form and Flow chart for
different maintenance.
e) Appendix- E: Definitions
1.6.1 Authorizing Maintenance
The following procedures shall be followed:

a) DGPC, BPC and private firms (bulk power consumer/generating plants), shall provide
the System Operator with a schedule of planned maintenance activities for next
operational year by 1st of December of the current year.
b) The proposed outage plans shall contain identification of each generating

unit/line/inter-connecting transformers (ICTs), the preferred date for each outage and
its duration, the earliest start date and latest finishing date. The format for the
submission of planned maintenance is given in Appendix: D-I.
c) The System Operator shall carry out necessary system studies and, if necessary, the
maintenance plans of the respective agencies shall be rescheduled. The finalized
maintenance plan will be communicated to the respective agencies latest by 31st of
December prior to the beginning of the Operational year.
d) Field Operators before taking any kind of maintenance (Planned, Ad-hoc and
Emergency) needs to follow the procedure approved during 19th SCC meeting held on
January 15, 2010 at CHP. They have to fill up the Shutdown Request Form (given in
Appendix: D-III) and submit it to the System Operator. Shutdown Request form will be
available at NLDC web site.
e) The System Operator will initiate the authorization process for all the planned
maintenance activities. This includes completion of a Work Authorization Form
covering the intent, duration, and target completion date for the maintenance activity.
The More details can be extracted from the flow chart given in Appendix: D-II.
f) The plant or substation Field Operators shall not undertake any emergency
maintenance without informing the System Operator. It is the responsibility of the
Field Operators to make the initial contact with the System Operator for dealing with
emergency maintenance. (Refer the flow chart given in Appendix: D-II).

g) The System Operator will complete a Work Authorization Form covering the intent,
duration and target completion date for the maintenance activity.
h) A similar step will be required for ad-hoc maintenance (Refer the flow chart given in
Appendix: D-II).
The approval form and approved annual maintenance plan shall be available on NLDC web
site.
i) The System Operator shall instruct the Operator at the designated RTU site to switch
the appropriate L/R switch to Local.
1.6.2 Establishing Guaranteed Protection
The following procedure will be followed:

a) The Field Operator shall isolate the equipment on which maintenance is to be carried
out.
b) The System Operator should observe this network change at the NLDC.
c) The Field Operator will place a cautionary sign Equipment under shutdown on the
control panels/equipments and wherever necessary.
d) The Field Operator shall isolate the device or component on which maintenance is to
be carried out as per the Bhutan Electricity Authority safety codes.
e) After the isolation of the equipment for maintenance work, the Field Operator shall
physically verify the same.
f) The Field Operator shall ground the device or component on which maintenance is to
be carried out using an appropriate grounding device.
g) The System Operator shall contact Field Operator to list the network changes that have
been made, and to confirm the status on the network model at NLDC.
h) Only permanently configured Ground Switches will appear in the network model.
Temporary grounding devices such as those used for grounding rackable circuit
breakers and grounding Motor Control Centre bus bars will not appear in the network
model.
1.6.3 Returning Maintained Equipment to Service
The Field Operator will inform the System Operator that the maintenance is complete and that
the maintained device or component is ready to be returned to service by following procedure:
a) The Field Operator shall open the earth switch and remove the temporary grounding
for the maintained device.
b) The Field Operator shall close the isolators.

c) The Field Operator will inform the System Operator that the L/R switches are put back
to Remote.
d) The Field Operator shall fax the approved shutdown form, duly signed to the System
Operator for charging.
e) The System Operator shall then give the clearance for charging.
1.6.4 Procedure for Maintenance of International Power Lines
The international power lines begin in one country and end in a second country. Circumstance
requiring maintenance may be as easy to spot as a tower falling over, or as difficult to spot as a
cracked insulator which will result in a line-to ground fault tripping the transmission line.
A request for maintenance can be initiated in either Bhutan or India.
A. If the site to be maintained is in Bhutan:
a) The NLDC will initiate the authorization approval process.

b) The System Operator will complete a Work Authorization Form covering the intent,
duration and target completion date for the maintenance activity.
c) The System Operator will inform the appropriate Field Operators in Bhutan that an
authorization form has been initiated on-line.
d) The System Operator will continue to communicate and coordinate with the
appropriate responsible body in India.
e) After all the required similar steps have been taken in both countries, the System
Operator will release the on-line authorization form.
f) Upon on-line release of the authorization form, the Field Operators in Bhutan at site
will switch the L/R switch to Local and will proceed to open the circuit breakers and
the isolators (BUT NOT COMPLETE THE GROUNDING) on the transmission line
on which maintenance is to be carried out.
g) The System Operator will observe at NLDC the circuit breaker and isolator operation
being carried out in Bhutan.
h) The System Operator will be able to see and can confirm with ERLD, India over voice
communication.
i) Upon confirmation from India, and from the Bhutan Field Operators, that isolation of
the line has been carried out, the System Operator will authorize the Field Operators to
apply the ground switches to all three phase of the transmission line.
j) The appropriate body in India will inform the System Operator when the grounding of
the transmission line in India has been carried out.

k) Upon confirmation from India, and from the Bhutan Field Operators, that grounding of
proceed with the approved maintenance work.
l) When the maintenance work is complete in Bhutan, the System Operator will inform
the appropriate body in India.
m) The System Operator will request the Bhutan Field Operators, and the appropriate body
in India, to open the grounding switches on all three phases.
n) Upon confirmation from both parties that the grounding switches have been removed,
the System Operator will request the Bhutan Field Operator, and the appropriate body
in India, to close the isolators.
o) The System Operator will request the appropriate body in India to close the
transmission line circuit breaker putting the line back into service at the India end.
p) The System Operator will ask the Field Operator to return the L/R switch to Remote.
q) The System Operator will close the transmission line circuit breaker.
B. If the site on the transmission line to be maintained is in India:
a) The NLDC will initiate the authorization approval process, which will cover only the
isolation and grounding of the transmission line at the Bhutan end.
b) The System Operator will complete a Work Authorization Form covering the intent,
duration and target completion date for the maintenance activity (as information for the
Field Operators).
c) The System Operator will inform the appropriate Field Operators in Bhutan that an
authorization form has been initiated on-line.
d) The System Operator will continue to communicate and coordinate with the
appropriate responsible body in India.
e) After all the required similar steps have been taken in both countries, the System
Operator will release the on-line authorization form.
f) Upon on-line release of the authorization form, the Field Operators in Bhutan at site
will switch the L/R switch to Local and will proceed to open the circuit breakers and
the isolators (BUT NOT COMPLETE THE GROUNDING) on the transmission line
on which maintenance is to be carried out.
g) The System Operator will observe at NLDC the circuit breaker and isolator operation
being carried out in Bhutan.
h) The System Operator will be able to see grid and can be confirm with ERLDC, India
over voice communication.
i) Upon confirmation from India, and from the Bhutan Field Operators, that isolation of
apply the ground switches to all three phases of the transmission line.
j) The System Operator will inform the appropriate body in India when grounding of the
transmission line has been completed in Bhutan.

k) Upon confirmation from India, and from the Bhutan Field Operators, that grounding of
proceed with the approved maintenance work.
l) When the maintenance work is complete in India, the System Operator will be
informed by the appropriate body in India.
m) The System Operator will request the Bhutan Field Operators to open the grounding
switches on all three phases.
n) Upon confirmation from India that the grounding switches have been opened, the
System Operator will request the Bhutan Field Operators close the isolators.
o) The System Operator will request the Field Operator to close the transmission line
circuit breaker energizing that line from the Bhutan end.
p) The System Operator will ask the Field Operator to return the L/R switch to Remote.
q) The NLDC will observe power flows as the transmission line circuit breaker is closed
at the India end.

CHAPTER- 2
2.0 BLACKSTART CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEM RESTORATION
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.6 and 6.12 regarding power
system security aspects and recovery procedures respectively.
2.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to:

a) Identify system components with black start capability
b) Identify different scenarios from which system restoration will have to take place
c) Provide operating procedures by which system restoration will be accomplished
2.2 FULL AND PARTIAL RESTORATION
The Bhutan power system has developed as the western region and the eastern region. Since
the beginning of the Bhutan power system in 1986 there has been no Bhutan interconnection
between them. That 132kV connection will not be made until 2012. Because of the
opportunity for the sale of power to India, both regions are normally interconnected through
India. When the India Grid is lost, the two systems operate as electrical islands. They face all
the operational problems associated with islanded systems.
2.2.1 Eastern Region (Full restoration)
The eastern region has only one generating station at Kurichhu. It is 4x15MW. There is a fairly
small residential load of about 7MW in the region, one 18 MW industrial load, and the balance
of the power is exported to India.
The summer generation at Kurichhu is 64MW, and the winter generation is 15 - 25MW. When
the India Grid is lost, the generating units output and load suffer a very large momentary
difference (60 minus 20 = 40MW) in the summer time and a smaller momentary difference (25
minus 20 = 5MW) in the winter time. This momentary difference causes the turbine-generators
to accelerate, which the governors do try to correct.
However hydro units have some delays which make control more difficult. These are the water
start time in the penstock and the fact that it takes the guide vanes (wicket gates) about ten
seconds to go from fully open to fully closed. Additionally two governor parameters called
temporary droop and temporary droop reset time are not set at the optimum values. With a
disturbance such as the loss of the India grid, the unit starts to oscillate and will trip off/shut

down either on over frequency (set at around 52.5Hz) or on under frequency (set at a close
tolerance of about 47.7Hz to prevent over fluxing or volts/Hz).
Therefore the restoration of the eastern system is from a black start. The eastern region has to
undergo a full restoration.
2.2.2 Western Region (Partial restoration or full restoration)
The western region has four generating stations at Chhukha, Basochhu Upper, Basochhu
Lower and Tala. These generators have a summer generation of 1556MW and a winter
generation of approximately 232MW. When the India Grid is lost, either summer or winter,
there is a very large momentary difference between total western plant generation and total
western region load. The generating units start to accelerate, which the governors should try to
correct.
Historically in sequence, the original Chhukha governors had control characteristics which
allowed the Chhukha turbine-generator to operate with isolated load supplying the western
region. The Tala plant was then installed and its digital governors do not have the control
characteristics to allow the Tala generators to supply an isolated load. The original governors
on the Chhukha units were then replaced with digital governors which, like Tala, do not have
the control characteristics to allow the Chhukha generators to supply an isolated load.
On the other hand, the Basochhu units do have digital governors which allow them to supply
an isolated load. Therefore the restoration of the western region often is from the small
electrical island formed by Basochhu Upper, Basochhu Lower, and the Thimphu load. The
western region would have to undergo a partial restoration from this state.
The restoration of the western region alternatively may be from a black start, should the
Basochhu units not have enough generation to supply the load and therefore run down (i.e. trip
off due to under frequency). The western region would have to undergo a full restoration.
2.3 BLACK START CAPABILITIES
2.3.1 Black Start Facilities
Table:2.3.11 BlackStartFacilities
Installed Batteries Black-
Type of
Station Capacity Start-up Facilities for Field start
Turbine
(MW) Flashing Facility

Capacity
Source
(kVA)
Basochu Pelton Diesel

2 x 12 130 Yes Yes
Upper Wheel Generator set
Basochu Pelton Diesel

2 x 20 150 Yes Yes
Lower Wheel Generator set
Pelton Diesel
Chhukha 4 x 84 2 x 500 Yes Yes
Wheel Generator set
Two 11 kV
feeders form
Pelton CHP.
Tala 6 x 170 2x1250 Yes Yes
Wheel DG Set if
those are not
available
Kaplan Diesel 1 x 500

Kurichu 4 x 15 Yes Yes
Turbine Generator set 1 x 320
2.3.2 Startup Power Requirements
The actual requirements depend on the plant type gas, hydro, thermal. The typical value
assumed for hydro stations is 1.0% of rated capacity.
2.3.3 Synchronizing facilities
Synchronizing facilities play a vital role in the building up of systems, and also for
interconnection of different sub-systems or different islands. A list of major sub-stations which
have synchronizing facilities is as discussed in Table: 2.3.3-1.
Table:2.3.31 SynchronizingFacilities
Substation/ Voltage Circuit
Point 1 Point 2 Remarks
Plant level (kV) Breaker
Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Birpara- I E-F1 Yes
Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Birpara- II E-F2 Yes
Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Malbase E_F3 Yes

Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Semtokha E_F4 Yes
Basochu
11 Basochu Semtokha/ Lobeysa E-F1 Yes
(LS)
Basochu
66 Basochu Semtokha/ Lobeysa C-F1 Yes
(US)
Kurichu 132 Kurichu Nangkhor D-F1 Yes
Kurichu 132 Kurichu Kilikhar D_F2
Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- I F_F1 Yes
Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- II F_F3 Yes
Tala 400 Tala Malbase- III F_F4 Yes
Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- IV F_F2 Yes
2.3.4 Containing Over Voltage
Containing over voltage during the restoration process is very much essential. During the early
restoration process, lines are generally lightly loaded due to the small level of load on the
system. The capacitive elements in the high voltage transmission lines dominate, and provide a
large amount of MVARs. Voltage starts rising on different buses as the system size grows.
Shunt reactors play a vital role in containing over voltage. A list of shunt reactors is as given
in Table: 2.3.4-1.
Table:2.3.41 ReactorsinBhutanpowersystem
Substation/ Rating
Voltage (kV) Switching Tap Remarks
Plant (MVAR)
Tala 400 1 x 63 On or off
Kurichhu 132 1x5 On or off
Punatsangchhu-
400 1 x 80 On or off
1 (Year 2015)
Mangdechu
400 1 x 890 On or off
(Year 2017)
Jigmeling
400 2 x 80 50% switching
(Year 2017)

2.4 GRID RESTORATION POSSIBILITIES
It is assumed that the east-west transmission line connection is in operation. Generally it is

assumed that the India Grid has been lost.
Table:2.41 ProbabilitiesinGridrestorationpossibilities
Probability
First condition Second condition Comment
(%)
East-west This is the most desirable condition for

All generating
connection either summer or winter load. All in-
plants stay 0
remains as one country load can be met. No part of the
connected
island country loses power.
These two plants do not have the

ability to supply the in-country load,
East-west but at least can supply part of it.
Kurichhu and
connection
Basochhu stay 20 System Operator has choice of
remains as one
connected plants/unit to use to nudge the system
island
voltage and frequency when again
synchronizing to the India Grid
Operators at Chhukha report that this

East-west has happened once with the western
Chhukha and island with the new digital governors at
connection
Basochhu stay 5 Chhukha (at least for a few minutes).
remains as one
connected
island Likely could meet both the summer
and winter in-country load.
Basochhu can only supply the

Thimphu load now. Asking it to supply
East-west the eastern load would only make
connection matters worse.
Basochhu stays 80
remains as one
island Likely would result in Basochhu
Upper-Basochhu Lower-Thimphu
island
Western region
Eastern region 0 Governors at Tala and Chhukha do not
island, with all
island with have the control capabilities to make
generators staying

connected Kurichhu connected this happen
Western region Eastern region

island with island with
0 Kurichhu will not stay connected now.
Basochhu staying Kurichhu staying
connected connected
Western region Eastern region Basochhu cannot supply western

island with island, with region load.
10
Basochhu staying Kurichhu not
connected staying connected Please see next item.
Basochhu Upper- Eastern region

Basochhu Lower- island, with
Thimphu local Kurichhu not
staying connected. 99 This is what happens now
island remains
within western Eastern island
region suffers blackout.
Based on all of these scenarios, the east-west connection provide no additional reliability for
the eastern customers, except if the India Grid remains connected to the western region while
the Gelephu-Salakati transmission line suffers major structural damage and is out of service
for an extended period of time.
2.5 SYSTEM RESTORATION APPROACH
The following specific points must be given due importance for system restoration.
2.5.1 General Guideline:
a) This document should be placed in the NLDC and available to the System Operator
and available to all Operators on duty.
b) The System Operator should be fully aware of changes/additions made to all
controllers, and all control parameters (gains and time constants) at all the generating
stations.
c) The black start and restoration procedures should be reviewed and updated annually.
d) NLDC will co-ordinate the entire restoration process.
e) During the restoration process, NLDC will be allowed to operate the BPC system with
reduced security standard for voltage and frequency in order to achieve the fastest
possible recovery as per Grid Code Clause No. 6.12.3.
f) All communication channels required for voice communication during restoration
process must be operational. At least one channel of voice communication should be
kept free for NLDC communication.

g) The health of the communication system and ancillaries at NLDC, WLDC (back up
NLDC), ELDC, power stations, terminals, and sub-stations should be checked at least
once every week to ensure availability of communication system during periods of
crisis.
h) A list of mobile and land line phone numbers of NLDC, power stations, terminals, and
important personals should be available and to be distributed to all concerned. Any
change or addition of above phone numbers should be incorporated time to time and to
be communicated to all concerned.
i) System Operators are expected to be thoroughly conversant with
1) Reactive Capability of Generators
2) Voltage Control through the following means
Charging the shorter lines first
Switching off capacitor bank if present on the system
Putting bus reactors into service
Operating generators at minimum voltage levels
Changing transformer taps
Energization of fewer high voltage lines
3) Network connectivity by heart.
j) Power stations which have black start capability should be tested at least once a month.
k) Synchronization facilities wherever available should be checked periodically and
should be in working condition. Periodic reports of nonfunctioning of any
synchroscope should be sent to NLDC.
l) All equipment such as Disturbance Recorders and Event Loggers shall be kept in
healthy condition, so that under no condition is any important data is lost. Periodic
reports of non-functioning of Disturbance Recorder/Sequential Event Records should
be sent to NLDC.
m) Priority wise loads are to be secured in steps during the restoration process. This is to
determined by NLDC, and documented to each user.
n) OLTC transformers should be tested at least once in a week. Periodic report of
nonfunctioning of OLTC transformer to be sent to NLDC.
2.5.2 Initial Course of Action
a) The initial steps are:

1) Assess extent of black out
2) Assess whether any sub-system or island is alive or not
3) Appraise the severity of disturbance to all concerned.
b) Open all circuit breakers at the power station and/or sub-stations that have blacked out,
to establish well defined starting points for restoration.
c) Note the relay indications and have plant personnel reset them, if operated.
d) Check whether any equipment or any element has suffered damage or developed a
technical malfunction.
e) Lay out the optimum path for restoration after checking the grid elements that were
under outage before the disturbance.
f) Defer all planned outages.

2.5.3 Important considerations during restoration
a) Generating stations which have black start facilities have to start up immediately.
b) Availability of generation capacity in each island/sub system should be ensured.
c) Availability of transmission lines serving as interconnections between
islands/subsystems should be ensured.
d) Load is to be added in small steps with smaller and radial loads added first. Larger load
may be connected after observing the system conditions.
e) For a developing island / sub system, special care should be taken to closely coordinate
the load pick-ups with the ramp rate of generation, and ensure that the frequency of the
island is maintained within sustainable limit (around 50Hz).
f) A reasonable active to reactive power ratio is to be maintained so that the generator can
be operated normally within their Generator Capability Curves.
g) Auxiliary power to be readily available so that machine can be operated normally.
h) Total auxiliary power drawn by the sub-system to be kept within 3% of the capacity of
the source.
i) Before synchronization between two islands there should be proper co-ordination for
frequency adjustment.
j) Risky synchronization should be avoided as small islands may not be able to survive
the significant synchronizing torque step/jerk.
k) While adding loads, it is to be ascertained whether machines can supply the power.
l) Tap position of transformers, bus voltage and frequency at generating stations and sub-
stations should be closely monitored to ensure that over fluxing does not occur.
m) Shift personnel should promptly formulate the strategy to be adopted for quick
restoration of the grid.
n) The work of restoration in the NLDC should be shared and coordinated among the shift
personnel for smooth and quick restoration.
o) Shift personnel should preferably be retained till restoration is over, before handing
over the change to the next shift.
2.5.4 Special consideration in extending/providing start up power
a) Power plant operators should be able to differentiate between the following:

1) Full auxiliary power needed to start all machines
2) Minimum auxiliary power needed to start a minimum number of machines.
b) For providing start up power to other plants, the following considerations should be
kept in mind:
1) Nearness to the source.
2) 132kV lines vis--vis 220 kV/ 400 kV lines.
3) Shorter route having a number of intermediate sub-stations vis-a-vis longer
route having very few/ no intermediate sub-stations.
c) For extending start up power from one sub-system to another sub-system or from one
utility to another utility, the following clear-cut information should be given to NLDC:
1) Line through which start up power is to be extended
2) Quantum of such start up power
3) Normal time period admissible

d) NLDC should also be empowered to resort to load shedding or bring up additional

generation wherever possible, to extend start up power to neighboring sub-
systems/utilities during the period of crisis.
2.5.5 Donts
a) Do not panic
b) Do not load any generator beyond 80% of its capacity
c) Do not load any transmission line/ICT beyond 80% of its capacity.
d) Do not hastily connect loads, and ensure that the island / sub-system frequency lies
within the sustainable range.
e) Once power extended to a power station/utility, it should not be withdrawn except in
case of extreme emergency as actions taken at power stations would have to be redone.
f) No communication disputes should be raised during the restoration period.
g) Until the restoration procedure is over, NLDC should not be disturbed in an
undesirable manner while discharging their duties, and they should not be expected to
function as a Management Information System.
2.6 RESTORATION SCENARIOS
2.6.1 Failure of 220 kV Rurichhu- Semtokha transmission line (Taken from Section 4.0 of
Contingency Plan)
The failure of the 44.9Km 220kV Rurichhu-Semtokha transmission line is shown on the
diagram Fig: 2.6.1-1.

Fig:2.6.11 Westerngridwith220kVRurichhuSemtokhalineopen.
The 66kV Rurichhu Lobeysa - Semtokha line remaining healthy, this line is limited by the
300A CTs on it. Therefore the MVA rating = (3x 66 000 x 300/10^6) = 34.3 MVA.
Assuming a line transmission power factor of 0.85 the line limit is 29.2MW.
The Thimphu load including Lobeysa substation load is about 31 MW. Not only will the BHP
generation have to back down from its summer flow level of 64 MW, it will also have to back
down below the Thimphu load level to a value of 29.2MW. However, Tsirang and Gewathang
load, CTs ratio of BHP (LS) end and Gewathang substation need to be taken in consideration
while backing down of BHP.
While in during lean season, Thimphu load can be still feed from Chhukha via 220kV and
66kV.
2.6.2 Failure of 220kV Semtokha-Chhukha transmission line AND the failure of the 66kV
Rurichhu-Semtokha line (taken from Section 5.0 of the Contingency Plan)
The failure of the 54.0Km 220kV Semtokha - Chhukha line AND the failure of the 66kV
Rurichhu - Semtokha line is shown on the diagram Fig: 2.6.2-1.

Fig:2.6.21 Westerngirdwith220kVSemtokhaCHPlineand66kVLobeysaRurichhuline
open.
During the summer, the BHP generation should be back down as per the carrying capacity of
66kV Olakha - Jemina after meeting the Thimphu, Lobeysa and Tsirang load. But during the
lean season, BHP generation would be around 15MW and to meet the Thimphu load, BHP
should increase generation to avoid the overloading of 66kV Chhukha Chumdo line.
Prolonged outage of these two lines will result in spillage and waste of water at BHP in
summer and load shedding in Thimphu during lean season.
2.6.3 Failure of 220kV Rurichhu - Semtokha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV
Chhukha - Semtokha line (taken from Section 3.0 of the Contingency Plan)
Failure of 220kV Rurichhu - Chhukha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV
Chhukha - Semtokha line is shown on the diagram Fig: 2.6.3-1.

Fig:2.6.31 Westerngridwith220kVRurichhuSemtokhaand220kVSemtokhaChhukha
lineopen
Thimphu can still be supplied from the 66kV ring. During the summer, the BHP generation
should be back down depending on the line carrying capacity of 66kV Rurichhu - Semtokha
and during the lean season the load of Thimphu should be shed depending on 33kV and 11kV
priority. The amount of load that needs to be shed depends on the line carrying capacity of
66kV Chhukha - Chumdo line.
2.6.4 Failure of 220kV Rurichhu - Semtokha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV
Chhukha - Semtokha line AND failure of the 66kV Rurichhu - Semtokha line via 66kV
Lobeysa substation (taken from Section 3.1 of the Contingency Plan)
Failure of 220kV Rurichhu Semtokha transmission line AND the failure of the 220kV
Chhukha - Semtokha line AND failure of the 66kV Rurichhu - Semtokha line via 66kV
Lobeysa substation is shown on the diagram Fig: 2.6.4-1.

Fig:2.6.41 Westerngridwith220kVRurichhuSemtokha,220kVSemtokhaChhukhaand
66kVRurichhuSemtokhalineopen.
During the above failure, if the 66kV Rurichhu Semtokha line via 66kV Lobeysa substation
also fails then the 66kV Chhukha Olakha line will also trip on overloading resulting blackout
in Thimphu. The shift in-charge of CHP or BHP should extent the power supply to Thimphu in
coordination with shift in-charge of 220kV Semtokha substation.
2.6.5 Procedure to be followed for restoration from Isolated Mode operation at Basochhu
(taken from Annexure 05 of the Basochhu Operation and Maintenance Manual 2011)
The procedure to be followed for restoration of the BPC system from Isolated Mode operation
at Basochhu is illustrated on the diagrams Fig: 2.6.5-1.

Fig:2.6.51 Westerngridwith220kVSemtokhaChhukhaand66kVChhukhaChumdoline
open.
In the event of tripping of 66kV and 220kV Chhukha-Semtokha transmission lines (shown as
OPEN on the diagram), the BHP units will attempt to supply the Thimphu load in Isolated
Mode.
a) The 220kV Chhukha - Semtokha line is ready to be charged and closed at Chhukha.
b) In order to avoid black out at Thimphu (please see next section), BHP units should be
resynchronized to the grid through the 220kV bus at Chhukha.
c) CHP has the synchronizing device for the 220 kV Chhukha - Semtokha line.
d) The CHP Operators see the India Grid voltage and frequency but the Basochhu
Operators do not.
e) However Basochhu Operators are the ones who can control the voltage and frequency
in order to synchronize.
f) Once the 220kV line is ready to attempt synchronizing, the Basochhu Operators should
call the Chhukha Control Room and get the values of voltage and frequency at their
end.
g) As per the instructions from the CHP Control Room, the Basochhu Operators should
control generator voltage and frequency so that it will match the India Grid.
h) Basochhu Operators, however, should keep in mind that they should not raise/lower
voltage or frequency beyond the maximum/minimum settings of the generator.

i) Once the parameters are matched, the CHP Operators will give the command and close
the (synchronizing) breaker at the Chhukha location.
j) Given the distance of the transmission lines, past experience has shown that it is
difficult to match the generator/line and India Grid parameters of voltage and
frequency.
k) Therefore it is difficult to synchronize the BHP units at CHP 220kV bus.
l) After repeated trials, synchronization fails and an alternative method is used.
The alternative method involves blacking out Thimphu for a short time. It is described in the
next section.
2.6.6 Procedure to be followed for restoration from Isolated Mode operation at Basochhu
while momentarily blacking out Thimphu
The procedure to be followed for restoration of the BPC system from Isolated Mode operation
at Basochhu is illustrated as below.
a) We start with Basochhu supplying an Isolated Load as before.
Fig:2.6.61 WesterngridwithisolatedmodeofoperationatBasochhuhydropowerplant.
b) Permission is requested from Semtokha Control Room to open the 220kV Rurichhu -
Semtokha line and the 66kV Rurichhu Lobeysa line at Rurichhu end.

Fig:2.6.62 Westerngridrestorationprocesswith220kVSemtokhaRurichhuand66kV
LobeysaRurichhulineopen.
c) These blacks out the Thimphu load served by the Olakha bus.
d) CHP closes the 220kV Chhukha - Semtokha line.
e) This resumes the supply to the Thimphu load.

Fig:2.6.63 Westerngridrestorationprocesswith220kVSemtokhaRurichhuand66kV
LobeysaRurichhulineopen.
f) BHP can now synchronize via the 220kV Rurichhu Semtokha line or 66kV Rurichhu
Lobeysa line depending on the line availability. This synchronizes with the India
Grid.

Fig:2.6.64 Westerngridrestorationprocesswith66kVLobeysaRurichhulineclosed.
2.6.7 Procedure to be followed for restoration from complete blackout of 220kV Malbase
substation (taken from Section 6.0 of the Contingency Plan)
The procedure to be followed for restoration of the BPC system is shown in the following
diagrams.
a) The System Operator shall call Shift-in-charge at CHP and BHP regarding the nature
of the problem.
b) The System Operator shall immediately open all the incoming feeder breakers
(i.e.220kV Chhukha-Semtokha, 220 kV Rurichhu-Semtokha).

Fig:2.6.71 WesterngridwithMalbasesubstationblackout
c) If there is no problem on the India Grid, and no problem at CHP, then the System
Operator will extend the grid supply to Semtokha.
d) Then the supply shall be extended to Rurichhu substation (the synchronizing circuit
breaker at Rurichhu end is still open)

Fig:2.6.72 WesterngridwithMalbasesubstationblackoutbutwith220kVSemtokha
Chhukhalineclosed.
e) The BHP Operator shall then synchronize with the grid.

f) In case of India Grid failure with tripping of both CHP and BHP, the System Operator
shall first try to get the supply back from the India Grid.
g) If the supply is available at Birpara, the System Operator shall extend it to the
Semtokha substation, and then try to resynchronize the generating stations.
h) If the India Grid supply is not available, then the System Operator shall ask BHP (or
possibly CHP) to normalize the supply system to Thimphu immediately in coordination
with the Shift-in-charge at the 220kV substations.
i) The System Operator through the Shift-in-charge at the 220kV substation shall ensure
(after complete supply blackout in general) that the load is gradually applied in
consultation with the Shift-in-charge at the source of supply (normally BHP).
j) After complete restoration of the Thimphu supply, the remaining units at BHP and the
CHP units c an synchronize their supplies at either end.
k) The India grid shall be synchronized at the Chhukha end (refer to Section 7.5 and
Section 7.6 above)

CHAPTER- 3
3.0 CONTROL OF VOLTAGE AND REACTIVE POWER
3.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to identify:
a) Identify voltage control devices on the Bhutan power system, including ratings, ranges,
and capability.
b) Identify normal, emergency and restorative scenarios which are likely to occur on the
power system.
c) Identify control strategies for use of switchable and continuously variable reactive
power sources, as well as direct voltage control sources (tap changing transformers),
for control of voltage on the BPC power system.
3.2 TRANSMISSION ELEMENTS AFFECTING REACTIVE POWER BALANCE AT A

BUS
Table:3.21 Transmissionelementaffectingreactivepowerbalance
Sources of Reactive Power VAR Neutral Devices Sinks of Reactive Power
Shunt capacitors Shunt inductors/reactors
Filter banks
Underground cables (per km
almost five times that of
similar voltage transmission
line)
Transmission lines loaded at
Lightly loaded transmission Surge Impedance Loading Heavily loaded transmission
lines (SIL) - a statistically random lines
event on a power system
Synchronous generators Synchronous generators
(over excited) (under excited)
Synchronous condensers Synchronous condensers

(over excited) (under excited)
Static VAR compensators Static VAR compensators

(SVC) (SVC)
Transformers

Induction motor loads,

especially those operating at
less than rated load
Induction heating
Inductive arc furnaces
An all-residential load on a
substation (almost at 1.0
power factor)
High Voltage Direct Current
systems (HVDC)
Induction generators (wind

farms)
3.3 BACKBONE OF THE BPC WESTERN SYSTEM
The backbone of the Bhutan western transmission system is a group of 220kV and 400kV
transmission lines. There is also a 66kV transmission system, which serves two functions.
a) It is an alternative transmission path at all times, and particularly when parts of the
220kV transmission system are out of service.
b) It is the supply for all of the customer distribution system.
These two sets of overlaid transmission paths are connected together at a series of points by
inter connecting Transformer (ICTs). These ICTs form a series of loops or meshes in the BPC
system. All of the ICTs are tap-changing under load transformers, and as a result have the
ability to cause MVARs to be wheeled as required within the various loops in the system.
This diagram serves as a reference point in describing voltage control devices and strategies
for the Bhutan power system.

Fig:3.31 Westerngridnetwork
3.4 TRRANSFORMERS ON THE BPC SYSTEM
3.4.1 Listing of Tap Changing Transformers
The transformers on the BPC system have been divided into two groups. These are:
a) Transformers in transmission loops. There are six sets of these, and they occur in sets
because load growth at various points has necessitated paralleling of the two or more at
some locations.
b) Transformers in radial configurations.
As control devices, it is necessary to know their ratings, whether or not they can tap change
under load, the tap range, and the winding of the transformer on which tap changing takes
place.
Table:3.4.11ListofTapchangingTransformers
Sl. From Rating Tap Tap Tap Set Tap
To (kV) Remarks
No. (kV) (MVA) Changing Range on side Position
Western Grid

1 400_MAL 220_MAL 200 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Malbase
2 220_MAL 66_MAL 50/63 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Malbase
7 66_GED 33_GED 8 OLTC 1 to 13 HV-Side Gedu
Gedu (Taken to
8 66_GED 33_GED 8
paro)
11 66_PLG 33_PLG 10 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Phuentsholing
12 66_PLG 11_PLG 10/12.5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Phuentsholing
15 66_GOM 33_GOM 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Gomtu
18 220_SGO 66_SGO 50 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Singhigaon
23 66_WAT 33_WAT 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Watsa
24 66_LSA 33_LSA 5 OLTC 1 to 13 HV-Side Lobeysa

27 66_JEM 33_JEM 10 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Jemina
28 33_JEM 11_JEM 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Jemina
29 66_DEN 33_DEN 10 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Dechencholing
30 66_DEN 33_DEN 10 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Dechencholing
31 33_DEN 11_DEN 2.5 Off load 1 to 5 HV-Side Dechencholing
32 33_DEN 11_DEN 2.5 Off load 1 to 5 HV-Side Dechencholing
33 66_HAA 11_HAA 5 OLTC 1 to 17 LV-Side Haa
34 66_HAA 11_HAA 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Haa
33_PRO
35 66_PRO 10 OLTC 1 to 17 HV-Side Paro
11_PRO
36 66_PRO 11_PRO 8 OLTC 1 to 13 HV-Side Paro
37 220_SEM 66_SEM 50 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Semtokha
Eastern Grid
41 132_KAN 33_KAN 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Kanglung
42 132_KAN 33_KAN 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Kanglung
43 33_KAN 11_KAN 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Kanglung
44 33_KAN 11_KAN 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Kanglung
45 132_KIL 33_KIL 5 OLTC 1 to 17 LV side Kilikhar
46 132_KIL 33_KIL 5 OLTC 1 to 17 LV side Kilikhar

47 33_KIL 11_KIL 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 LV side Kilikhar
48 33_KIL 11_KIL 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 LV side Kilikhar
49 33_TAN 11_TAN 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 LV side Tangmachu
50 33_TAN 11_TAN 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 LV side Tangmachu
51 132_GEL 66_GEL 25 OLTC 1 to 21 HV side Gelephu
55 132_NGA 33_NGA 3 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Nganglam
56 132_NGA 33_NGA 3 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Nganglam
57 33_NGA 11_NGA 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Nganglam
58 33_NGA 11_NGA 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Nganglam
59 132_TIN 33_TIN 3 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Tintibi
60 132_TIN 33_TIN 3 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Tintibi
61 33_TIN 11_TIN 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Tintibi
62 33_TIN 11_TIN 1.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Tintibi
63 132_DEO 33_DEO 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Deothang
64 132_DEO 33_DEO 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Deothang
65 33_DEO 11_DEO 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Deothang
66 33_DEO 11_DEO 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Deothang
67 132_NKO 33_NKO 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Nangkhor
68 132_NKO 33_NKO 5 OLTC 1 to 17 HV side Nangkhor
69 33_NKO 11_NKO 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Nangkhor
70 33_NKO 11_NKO 2.5 OLTC 1 to 5 HV side Nangkhor

3.4.2 Tap Changing Equation
As indicated in the table above, all BPC tap changing transformers taps on the high voltage
side.
The tap changing equation is:
V220/V66 = N220/N66
V66 = V220 .N66/N220

a) To increase V66, the number of turns on the 220 winding must be decreased.
b) To decrease V66, the number of turns on the 220 winding must be increased.
3.5 SWITCHED INDUCTORS AND CAPACITORS ON THE BPC SYSTEM
Table:3.51 ListofShutreactorandInductor
Device Bus Location Rating Switching Other
Inductor/ reactor Tala 400KV bus 63 MVAR 0 to 100%
2x5
Shunt reactor 132kV KHP Bus
MVAR
3.6 MVAR PRODUCTION BY HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION LINES
3.6.1 MVAR net production by high voltage lines
The MVARs produced in the naturally-occurring capacitance of a transmission line are

calculated as V2BC. Normally the voltage variations on the high voltage transmission lines are
not large. Consequently it is reasonable to calculate the MVARs produced at nominal voltage
and to use this value as representative.
The MVARs consumed in the naturally-occurring inductance of a transmission line are

calculated as I2XL. Therefore the MVAR consumption is load dependent. The Bhutan system
essentially has two representative patterns. One is high summer flows, high generation and low
summer load. The other is low winter flows, low generation and high winter load. Load flow
results are available for each of these respective patterns. These load flow results have been
used to calculate representative values for MVAR consumption.
Table:3.6.11MVARnetproductionbyhighvoltagelines
Charging Length MVAR MVAR Net MVAR
From To kV
MVAR (Km) Produced consumed Produced

per Km Summ Sum

Winter Winter
er mer
THP MAL 400 0.61 24 14.6 3.35 1.45
THP SIL- IV 400 0.61 146.1 89.1 18.73 2.00
THP SIL- I 400 0.61 140.3 85.6 19.49 2.09
THP SIL- II 400 0.61 140.3 85.6 19.49 2.09
MAL SIL 400 0.61 98.1 59.8 19.15 2.07
CHP BIR- I 400 0.14 70.3 9.8 9.42 0.16
CHP BIR- II 220 0.14 70.3 9.8 9.42 0.18
CHP MAL 220 0.14 32.3 4.5 10.19 0.93
CHP SEM 220 0.14 54 7.6 3.23 0.23
MAL BIR 220 0.14 41 5.7 1.58 0.71
MAL SGO- I 220 0.14 2.1 0.3 0.12 0.11
MAL SGO- II 220 0.14 2.1 0.3 0.12 0.11
SEM BHP 220 0.14 44.9 6.3 3.41 0.04
BHP TSI 220 0.14 47.6 6.7 1.11 15.77
TSI JIG 220 0.14 28.5 4 0.85 17.49
KAN KIL 220 0.05 10.1 0.5 2.23 0.01
KHP NKO 132 0.05 33.8 1.7 2.91 0.29
KIL KAN 132 0.05 29.7 1.5 0.01 0.01
NKO NGA 132 0.05 34.1 1.7 0.14 0.003
NGA TIN 132 0.05 83.4 4.2 0.39 0.005
TIN JIG 132 0.05 45.7 2.3 0.29 0.05
TIN YUR 132 0.05 32.6 1.6 -
JIG GEL 132 0.05 35.9 1.8 50.63 0.02
GEL SAL 132 0.05 50 2.5 14.16 0.14
NKO DEO 132 0.05 23.3 1.2 3.13 0.18
DEO MGA 132 0.05 10.5 0.5 1.381 0.07
MGA RGA 132 0.05 46.4 2.3 8.39 2.52
The above reference and calculation is taken from book Power System Stability and Control
by P. Kundur.
3.6.2 MVAR Net production at generator buses due to high voltage lines
Table:3.6.21MVARproductionatgeneratorbusesduetohighvoltagelines
Line Net MVAR
MVAR MVAR consumed
Generator Voltage From To produced
produced
(kV) Summer Winter Summer Winter
Chhukha 220 CHP BIR- I 9.8
220 CHP BIR- II 9.8

220 CHP MAL 4.5
220 CHP SEM 7.6
Total 31.7
Basochhu 220 BHP SEM 6.3
Tala 400 THP MAL 14.6
400 THP SIL- IV 89.1
400 THP SIL- I 85.6
400 THP SIL- II 85.6
Total 281.2
Kurichhu 132 KHP KIL 0.5
132 KHP NKO 1.7
Total 2.3
3.5 GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVES
3.5.1 Chhukha Generator Capability Curves
Refer to Operation and Maintenance manual of DGPC for the description of capability curve.

Fig:3.5.11 CapabilitycurveofChukhagenerator.
3.5.2 Basochhu Upper Generator Capability Curves

Fig:
3.5.21 CapabilitycurveofBasochhuuppergenerator

3.5.3 Basochhu Lower Generator Capability Curves
3.5.31 CapabilitycurveofBasochhuLowergenerator
3.5.4 Tala Generator Capability Curves

Fig:3.5.41 CapabilitycurveofTalagenerator
3.5.5 Kurichhu Generator Capability Curves

16.667 MVA, 15 MW, 11 kV, 0.9 PF,

3-phase, 50 Hz, 24 poles, 250
R.P.M Kurichu Generator
PRACTICAL
STABILITY LIMIT
WITH 10% MARGIN
POWER FACTOR
LEAD LAG
STATOR WINDING
1.10 V 1.00 V HEATING LIMIT AT
0.90 V RATED LOAD
1.00
STATOR END
PACKET
HEATING LIMIT
FOR 0.75
CONTINUOUS
0.80
OPERATION
0.70
0.90
0.60
0.80 FIELD
0.50 1.10 V
WINDING
0.50 0.70
1.10 V HEATING
0.60 LIMIT AT
0.90 V RATED
0.40 0.50 LOAD
0.25
0.40
1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
MINIMUM LEADING REACTIVE POWER IN PU LAGGING

EXCITATION LIMIT AT
15% F.L EXCITATION
Fig:3.5.51 CapabilitycurveofKurichhugenerator.
3.6 VOLTAGE CONTROL RESOURCE ANALYSIS
3.6.1 Generators
Generators are the first priority for control of the system voltage. They are important because
the AVR set points are continuously variable. They have three drawbacks.
a) There is always another control device between them and in-country load on the 66KV
system is very strong.
b) The 220kV and 400kV transmission system is very strong. In other words, the three
generating stations in the western region are very close together electrically. An
indication of this is the very small phase angles across the transmission lines (often in
the range of 2-8 degrees) evident in the load flows even under high flow, high

generating conditions. Consequently an attempt to raise the AVR set point at one
generating station may find a counter-acting effect at another generating station.
3.6.2 Switched Inductor
This 63MVAR reactor at Tala can only be switched at 0 or 100%, that is all or nothing. Its sole
purpose is to absorb some of MVARs produced by the four 400kV lines terminating at the bus.
Without the shunt reactor, it is likely that the Tala generators would have to move so far into
the under excited region that they would not stay with the P-Q Generator capability curves.
Another way of saying this is that the generators would move so far into the under excited
region that they would run up against the Under Exciter Limiters and voltage control at the
Tala bus would be lost.
Around nominal voltage is always present on the 400kV line, so the capacitive MVAR
production is always there. As expected, the 63MVAR shunt reactor is always switched in.
The 63MVAR reactors are intended solely as a local device, with no broad transmission
system implications.
3.6.3 Tap Changing Transformers in Radial Configuration
They can be summarized as follows:

a) They have well defined local effect.
b) The control is precise within the tap changing increment.
c) They have no impact, or interaction, at all on other transmission system voltage control
devices.
3.6.4 Tap Changing Transformers in Transmission Loops
These should be considered individually.

a) 220/66kV Rurichhu ICT.
One end of this ICT (220kV) is connected directly to Basochhu lower bus which is
controlled by its digital AVR. The other end (66kV) is connected through a very short
1.3 Km transmission line to the upper bus which is controlled by its digital AVR.
Any action by this ICT would simply be countered by the AVRs of the generating
stations, and it should not be tapped under the normal transmission configuration.
b) 220/66kV Semtokha ICT

The Semtokha 220kV bus should be an electrically strong bus. It should provide a
solidly held point for tap changing of this ICT to broadly control the voltage on the
66kV transmission line which is supplying power to a large segment of the Bhutan in-
country load (Olakha-Jemina-Chumdo to Haa or Paro, Dechencholing and Lobeysa)

c) 220/66kV Chukha ICT

The Chukha 220kV bus is held by the AVRs on the Chukha generating units. It will
provide a solidly held point for tap changing of this ICT to control the voltage on 66kV
transmission line which is feeding more of the Bhutan in-country load (Watsa, Gedu
and Phuentsholing).
d) 400/220kV Malbase and 220/66kV Singhigaon ICTs

There are parallel very short (1.7 Km), very electrically strong (220kV) transmission
lines connecting the Malbase 220kV and Singhigaon buses. Electrically they are
essentially the same point.
This effectively puts the two ICTs in a series configuration, which is highly unusual.
The Malbase 400kV bus should be electrically strong. The impedance of the Malbase
ICT is 11.78% which will cause some voltage drop on the 220kV bus as the
transformer is loaded up. Right now the Malbase is only 33% loaded. Based on the
result of the D2S1 load flow (Simulation case using MiPower), likely this ICT should
be tapped in the vicinity of 0.98.
The 220/66kV Singhigaon ICT could be used to control the voltage at the 80MW
industrial loads at Pasakha.
However some coordination may be required as noted in the next section.
e) 220/66kV Malbase ICT

The Malbase 66kV bus is only (3.5+1.5) Km away from the Singhigaon 66kV bus.
This effective creates a parallel combination of the 220/66kV Malbase ICT and the
220/66kV Singhigaon ICT.
When parallel tap-changing ICT gets out of step, the result is to create large circulating
MVARs between the two.
It would appear that either by themselves should not be used to control the voltage at
the 80MW industrial loads at Pasakha. In combination, the tap changing operation
would have to be coordinated.
3.7 VOLTAGE CONTROL STRATEGY IN THE NORMAL CONFIGURATION
3.7.1 Transmission System voltage
Voltage control on the transmission system should be carried out by tap changing selected
ICTs in this order

a) 220/66kV Semtokha ICTs

b) 220/66kV Chukha ICTs
c) Coordination tap changing of the 220/66kV Malbase ICT and the 220/66kV
Singhigaon ICTs
d) Voltage control through use of the generators AVRs should only be undertaken after
completing a system impact study using Mipower or other simulation load flow
software.
3.7.2 Radial Line and Radial Load Voltage Control
This should be done on an individual basis using normal tap changing transformers where they
are available.
3.8 VOLTAGE CONTROL STRATEDY IN CONTINGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
The operation group will have to identify the specific contingency.

CHAPTER- 4
4.0 INTERCHANGE SCHEDULING
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 7.5 regarding scheduling and
dispatch procedures.
CHAPTER- 5
5.0 COMMUNICATIONS
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 3.8 regarding communication
between System Operator and other Licenses/User.
CHAPTER- 6
6.0 OPERATIONAL LIAISON
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.13 regarding procedures
necessary to facilitate quick transfer of operational information to operation staff.
CHAPTER- 7
7.0 DEMAND ESTIMATION
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.8 regarding demand
estimations for operational purposes.
CHAPTER- 8
8.0 OUTAGE PLANNING
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.11 regarding outage
planning which has to be carryout annually.
CHAPTER- 9

9.0 POWER QUALITY
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.7 regarding operational
responsibilities for power qualities.
CHAPTER- 10
10.0 PERIODIC REPORTS
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.14 regarding periodic
reports.
CHAPTER- 11
11.0 GENERATOR CONNECTION AGREEMENT
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.13 regarding general
conditions for connection to the Transmission System.
CHAPTER- 12
12.0 SYSTEM SECURITY
This is in compliance to Grid Code Regulation, 2008 Clause No. 6.6 regarding system security
aspects.

APPENDIX- A
A.0 Approved Protection Devices
This appendix describes the approved protection devices and how these devices must be
operated to provide acceptable isolation and de-energization points for protection under a
Guaranteed Work Clearance Authorization.
A.1 General Guidelines for Electrical and Mechanical
The following are the general electrical and mechanical guidelines.
A.1.1 Electrical Guidelines
Open Contacts
Whenever possible, electrical isolating devices should meet the requirement that all phases of
the circuit be confirmed open by visual inspection of the contacts or conductors.
If this confirmation cannot be performed due to physical design of the device, perform the
required checks to verify the contacts open using an approved Electrical procedure and record
it on Work Clearance Document tagging list.
If this confirmation cannot be performed due to previous isolation requirements denying

access to contacts (example: MCC breaker door locked closed), reference the Work Clearance
Document that performed the check.
A potential check is not required for switchgear breakers (13.8kV, 4.16kV, 600V ac) as
protection is provided by ensuring physical separation of the breaker from the bus or
disconnected leads from such breakers.
Grounding:
No work must proceed on any apparatus with a voltage of 300V or above, unless all
conductors have been properly grounded. Certain apparatus, such as insulated cables,
generator windings, and motors may be exempted from these rules if it is not reasonably
possible to apply proper grounds.
Potential Checks
Before manually applying temporary grounds or before starting work on any electrical
apparatus, perform a potential check of all conductor phases to confirm isolation or de-
energization. Although this check is primarily the responsibility of the Work Clearance
Holder, personnel working under the Work Clearance Application must not take for granted
that this check has been performed.

Split Phase Circuits (common neutral)
Complete isolation of one phase in a two phase, common neutral circuit (that is, 347 V lighting
system) can only be provided by isolation of the power supply to all phases of the circuits.
When it is decided to take out of service only the circuit on which work is to be done, follow
an approved Procedure and provide Limited Protection by isolating only the power supply of
the circuit on which work is to be done. In this condition low voltages and currents will
probably be present in the common neutral. However, if the common neutral is broken, voltage
and available fault current from the common neutral to ground will be the full value of the
energized phase of the circuit.
Locking Devices
With the exception of specified devices (fuses, temporary grounds, cable or bus bar removal),
all electrical protection devices must be locked in position to provide guaranteed protection. A
device that cannot be locked is considered a Limited Protection device.
A.1.2 Mechanical Guidelines
Depressurizing or Draining
Systems or equipment must be drained and vented or depressurized to ensure that all sources
of energy or hazardous substances have been adequately removed. If this cannot be confirmed,
define a special procedure or enter appropriate statements of caution on the Work Clearance
Application.
Use caution when ensuring adequate isolation through the ability to depressurize or drain. A
false indication may occur if:
a) the drain or vent point is plugged

b) a device (example: check valve, control valve) located between the isolation and drain
or vent points was in a closed state (eventual opening can occur).
Locking Devices
All isolation devices are to be secured in the protecting position using approved securing
devices if practical (example: ice plugs and check valves without external swing arms are
isolation points that cannot be physically secured). Air operated valves that fail in the
protected state can be considered isolated if there is no built in manual operator and the air
supply is isolated disconnected and tagged.
Approved securing devices are:
a) locks with numbered keys

b) chains with a breaking strength greater than 49 pounds

c) tie wraps with a breaking strength greater than 49 pounds and other Operations stocked
safety lock out devices.
Double Isolation
When dealing with high pressure, high temperature, or toxic or corrosive substances, consider
providing double isolation (if available) whereby two valves in series are closed to provide
isolation.
A.2 Electrical Guaranteed protection devices
Guaranteed protection devices provide a protection guarantee because:
a) The physical characteristic of the device enables the device position to be verified and
ensures this protecting position will not change (example: metal clad rackable
switchgear).
b) Verification is through visual observation (example: electrical contacts open).
c) Verification is through or an approved indirect method (example: potential check of
electrical circuit).
A.2.1 Electrical guidelines by devices
Cables or bus bars
Sections of cables or bus bars may be removed to provide guaranteed protection (without the
need for locking).Connection points on the protected side must be tagged to identify them as
isolating points. When leads are disconnected, open the associated breaker and attach a
lamacoid to the door stating that the leads are disconnected. Remove the lamacoids when the
leads are reconnected. When performing maintenance on the MCC during a maintenance
outage and the tag is removed from the load leads, remove the lamacoids and reconnect the
leads as part of the return to service. The lamacoid does not provide protection and will be
recorded as a comment in the tagging or untangling list.
In the case of bus links, isolation can be provided if approved links are removed, the complete
separation of the bus observed, and the cover installed, locked or secured in place, and tagged.
Use caution to ensure possible live components are remote from the work location. Where this
is not practical, enter adequate cautionary notes on the associated Work Clearance Application.
Disconnected cables must have their bare leads taped.
Operated switches
Electrically operated or remote mechanically operated switches must be locked in the

guaranteed state or a portion of the mechanism must be removed to prevent accidental
operation. In the case of 345kV disconnect switches, block electrical operation by setting the

selector handle to Manual and locking it. Block mechanical operation by chain locking the
hand wheel.
Lockable circuit breakers
Lockable circuit breakers can be used as guaranteed protection devices as long as the device is
tagged and one of the following conditions exist:
a) contacts on all phases can be (and are) visually inspected for confirmation of the open
state
b) all phases have their contacts verified open using an approved Electrical procedure.
This check must be performed at the appropriate part of the circuit, by a qualified
person.
Fuses
Fuses can be used as guaranteed protection devices, without the need for locking, as long as
the device or open circuit is tagged and the circuit can be confirmed in the open state by visual
inspection. Removal or installation of PT fuses must be performed under a Work Clearance
Application. The fuse(s) must be removed from the circuit and, if applicable, removed from
the fuse holder (example: 120V ac, Class 2), and the protected side of the circuit tagged.
Removing the fuse from the holder is not necessary if the fuses can be locked in the retracted
position (example: 4.16kV and 13.8kV PT fuses).
Caution: The associated bus must be isolated before opening or closing the PT compartment
door. If unsure of the circuitry design such that the protected side is not obvious, the operator
must obtain qualified assistance in making this determination.
Temporary grounds
Temporary grounds (cables) are considered guaranteed protection devices without the need for
locking in place. These grounds must be properly applied by trained and qualified personnel. If
installed as part of the protection Work Clearance Document, the grounds must be tagged with
red Do Not Operate tags.
Tags must be attached at the point where the ground disconnected to the protected circuit or
bus and also at the point where the ground is connected to the station grounding network.
Note: Installation or removal of the grounds on the generator lighting arrestors or IPB must be
performed under a Work Clearance Application.
Grounding devices
A grounding device is available for installing in a 13.8kVor 4.16kV breaker cell if necessary.
The primary use of this device is to ground the electrical apparatus on which work is

performed. Installation of this device must be performed by an approved individual who has
received training in its use. It must be locked in place.
Note: Installation or removal of the grounding device in any cell that supplies power to the bus
must be performed under a Work Clearance Application.
The grounding device must be racked into the connected position, and have the racking lever
tagged, all three phases connected to the station ground, and each phase tagged and the racking
lever locked to be considered a protection point.
If the grounding device is used to provide protection to disconnect or reconnect a load and is
removed after the device is disconnected, the disconnected leads must be tagged in addition to
the supply device.
Metal clad circuit breakers
Draw-out types of metal clad circuit breakers provide satisfactory guaranteed protection
(without visual inspection of the contacts) when they are disconnected from the bus and either
the shutters are locked closed(example: 4.16-13.8 kV switchgear) or the breaker is locked in
the disconnected position (example: 600V switchgear).
Electrical de-energization devices
De-energization of electrical equipment (when necessary) is provided by the application of

grounds. These grounds may be temporary ground cables, integral grounding switches, or
installed grounding devices.
A.2.2 Electrical guaranteed protection devices by voltage level
Voltage Level Guaranteed Requirements for Approval

Protection Device
26 345 kV Isolator/disconnect Visually verified that all phases are physically open,
switch and the mechanism is locked in open state, and if
electrically operated then locked in Manual Mode
Cables and bus bars and tagged
Visually verified that all sections are physically

removed and connection points on the protected side
are identified as isolation points by tagging.
A Work Clearance Authorization is required to

26 kV PT fuses remove these fuses
4.16 13.8 kV Circuit breaker Racked out to test or disconnect position. Shutters

(switchgear) confirmed closed and locked and tagged.
Cables and bus bars As above (for 26-345 kV cables and bus bars).
Grounding Device Racked to the connect position in accordance with

approved procedures (by persons approved to
operate the device) to ground the equipment to be
isolated or de-energized, and locked in place and
tagged. Ground straps connected to ground and tags
Isolator/disconnect installed on ground strap connection to ground
switch
A Work Clearance Authorization ios required to
install or remove the grounding device in the bus
supply cell.
4.16-13.8 kV PT fuses
As above (for 26-345 kV isolators/disconnect
switch)
Open door on PT compartment of the switchgear.

This swings the PT fuses to the disconnect position
and is confirmed by observing the PT fuses move
from the horizontal to the vertical position.
A Work Clearance Authorization is required to

install or remove these fuses.
Caution: The associated bus must be isolated before

opening or closing the PT compartment door.
600 volt Circuit breaker Racked clear of bus to test or disconnect position,
(switchgear) locked in that position and tagged.
Cables and bus bars As above (for 26-345 kV cables and bus bars)
Circuit breaker (MCC) Selected to OFF and contacts confirmed open, either
visually or by an approved Electrical Measurement
procedure. Door closed, and breaker locked open
and tagged (handle tagged).
Note: Breaker must be in the cubicle.
Isolator/disconnect As above (for 26-345 kV isolators/disconnect

switch switches)
110 220 volt Circuit breaker Selected to OFF and all contacts open, either

48-250 volt visually or by an approved Electrical Measurement

procedure. Circuit breaker locked in the open
Fuses: 250 v dc, position and tagged.
120 v ac. Fuse and holder retracted, fuses removed from
Fuses: 48 v dc holder. Tags installed on protected side.
Supply side: Fuses and holders removed from (+)

and (-) circuits. Tags installed on protected side.
Isolator/disconnect
switch Distribution side: Fuses removed from (+) and (-)
circuits. Tags installed on protected side.
As above(for 26-345 kV isolators/disconnect

switches)

APPENDIX- B
B.0 TAGGING EQUIPMENT
B.1 Tagging hierarchy
Level 1:
Level 1 tags establish work protection. These are the red Do Not Operate tags. Normally
equipment with a red Do Not Operate tag is not permitted to operate.
There may be exceptions to this rule. For example, after maintaining an electric motor it may
be necessary to carry out a Bump Test, or Direction of Rotation Test. Operation of any device
covered by these tags must be performed in accordance with procedures established to control
these tags (examples: suspension for test, Work Permit Modification).
Level 1 tag includes:
Red Work Clearance Do Not Operate tags
Other types of tags include Temporarily Energized tags that provide information about
energized equipment and should not be removed without approval.
Level 2:
Level 2 tags provide information about a particular device. These are normally lined white tags
on which information can be written. (Example: while working on an SF6 circuit breaker, it is
necessary to remove the SF6 supply to the circuit breaker. As an isolation point, it could be
covered by a red Do Not Operate tag. Alternatively a white Information Tag could be placed
adjacent to the red Do Not Operate tag on the electrical supply to the circuit breaker.

APPENDIX- C
C.0 JOBS NOT REQUIRING WORK CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION (WCA)
Activity Exception or Condition Comments
Transporting material within Control Room Operator

the plant (CRO) to be notified before
transporting bulk hazardous
chemicals (for example, a
drum)
Unloading equipment at site Work Clearance required if

using Boom Trucks under
power lines.
Maintenance of on-site Maintenance must not impact Maintainer to coordinate with

Security Equipment ability to establish audio or Plant Security and the CRO.
video contact between Plant
Security and the Control
Room Operator.
Normal painting process for Maintainer to observe

equipment and floors restrictions and coordinate
with Plant Supervisor as
required.
Repair or replace site Work Clearance required for Maintainer performing task
fluorescent and incandescent areas under surveillance by responsible to ensure
bulbs. Security Cameras. exception is not compromised.
Reduced lighting does not

cause safety concerns for
maintenance or operations
activities.
Battery banks, non-intrusive The following activities are Maintainer responsible for
tests allowed: staying within the scope of the
work.
voltage checks
CRO to be informed before
internal resistance checks starting, and when work is
specific gravity checks. completed.

Removing rectifiers or battery

chargers from service is
intrusive and requires Work
Clearance
Non-intrusive clip-on in-rush Co-ordination with CRO to Maintainer responsible to co-

and running current place load in-service if ordinate with CRO.
measurements on motors, required.
transformers and other loads.
Exception: Work Clearance
required if un-insulated and
exposed cables or bus bars are
present and within 18 inches
of the work.
Routine vibration readings Not applicable
Thermovision checks Work Clearance is required

for opening of electrical or
mechanical equipment.
Equipment rebuild in other Work Clearance is required if Maintainer responsible for

than shop areas welding, grinding, burning or obtaining Work Clearance if
soldering is involved, welding, burning or soldering
is required, and for following
station procedures for such
activities.
Routine oil sampling Verbal approval from the

CRO required before starting.
Monthly crane or hoist The intent is that no isolations Maintainer performing

inspections. are required for these maintenance responsible for
inspections. ensuring isolations are not
required
Excavation activities. Consult all facility diagrams to

avoid buried cables.
Maintenance in parking lot

and other outside grounds.

Staging Staging within 20 feet of crane Maintainer responsible for

bus bars requires Work obtaining Work Clearance for
Clearance. work in this area.
Standard repairs on water No burning, welding or Maintainer to obtain Work

fountains, washroom sinks, soldering required. Clearance if burning, welding
toilets, and urinals. or soldering required

APPENDIX- D
I. Planned Maintenance Format
Equipment (Generating Unit/ Description of

Sl. No Agency Name Duration Start Time End Time
Line/Transformer) Work
II. FLOW CHART

III. SHUTDOWN REQUEST FORM
APPENDIX- E
E.0 DEFINITIONS
These definitions apply to both the System Operator and the Field Operators. There are four
pivotal terms.
a) Work Clearance Authorization (WCA) - which is the actual authorization to carry

out maintenance work.
b) Guaranteed Protection - which is the physical assurance that a worker authorized to
carry out the work, maintenance, or testing will be protected from all electrical hazards
and electrical injury while carrying out the assigned duties.
c) Isolated - refers to a state whereby equipment is physically disconnected or separated
from sources of dynamic energy by means of approved isolating devices. Isolated does
not infer de-energized. (Example: a capacitor bank may be completely isolated from
any electrical supplies. However it might still retain some residual charge or energy
until both ends of the capacitor are connected to ground, so it is not yet de-energized)
d) De-energized - refers to an isolated state of the system that is also:
1) in the electrical sense: at the potential of the earth or ground
2) in the mechanical sense: at rest, at atmospheric pressure; free from stored or
potential mechanical energy (example: spring loaded, or compressed air in an
Air Blast circuit breaker); free from chemical, poisonous, suffocating, or
explosive substances.
The supporting terms associated with these pivotal terms are described in the following list.
Configuration management
Configuration management is the integrated set of processes, programs and procedures

required to ensure that the physical plant is in accordance with the paper plant. That is, it is the
process which assures that there will be no surprise configurations encountered in the course of
planning and carrying out maintenance.
Confirmation
A confirmation is a record of the time spent and work performed by individuals while
performing work related to an Order.
De-energizing device
A de-energizing device is one that ensures that the de-energized state (mechanical or
electrical) is achieved and maintained.
Emergency

An emergency is an abnormal event that necessitates prompt actions in order to mitigate

adverse consequences. Emergencies include situations for which prompt action is warranted to
respond to a perceived hazard or threat.
Ground
A ground is a metallic plate or rod buried or driven into the earth, or an extended conducting
body connected to such a plate or rod, or to a buried metallic system. Temporary grounds must
be copper wire and installed with clamp-on or clip-on connectors. Grounding devices satisfy
these requirements.
Guaranteed Protection
A Guaranteed Protection Work Clearance Authorization provides protection from hazards by

guaranteeing both of the following:
a) The equipment on which work is authorized is isolated and, where possible, de-
energized (in the case of bus work, grounds will be applied) or instructions are
provided for safely de-energizing the equipment.
b) The devices used are approved as guaranteed protection devices and the protecting
position will not change while the Guaranteed Protection Work Clearance
Authorization is in effect (unless the Work Clearance Authorization is suspended for
testing or modifications in accordance with this document).
Isolating device
An isolating device is an approved device that provides a positive physical separation between
equipment on which work is authorized and any source or potential source of energy.
Job Safety Analysis
The Job Safety Analysis is a formal plan that complements the protection provided by the
Work Clearance Authorization by setting limits (example: on Oxygen requirements) or
providing detailed procedures. It is used to provide more guidance on conventional hazards
when the hazard is not covered by an approved issued procedure.
Limited protection device
A limited protection device is one that provides work protection, but cannot be positively
guaranteed to remain in the same state or the position cannot be clearly identified.
Limited Protection Work Clearance Application
a) A Limited Protection Work Clearance Application provides a degree of protection that

is limited because of one or more of the following:

b) Isolation from all hazards, sources, or potential sources, of energy cannot be

guaranteed for the equipment on which work is authorized.
c) One or more of the devices used to isolate or de-energize the equipment is a limited
protection device.
d) One or more of the devices used for isolation or de-energization has a Condition
Abnormal tag attached.
No Protection WCA
A No Protection WCA is a Work Clearance Authorization that is used when there is no hazard
from which the holder needs protection. They are used to keep the Control Room Operator and
Shift Supervisor aware of activities that may affect plant operations (examples: computer
software changes, painting in normal access areas).
Operations activities
Operations activities are activities related to testing, changing, and monitoring the status of
station structures, systems, or components (SSCs).
Plant status control
Plant status control refers to control of the configuration of systems to ensure the plant is
operable, safe, and kept within the established operating boundaries.
Protection Guarantee
Protection Guarantee is a protection boundary established using only protection guarantee

devices positioned and secured in accordance with the lists given in Appendix B: Approved
Protection Devices, and all energy sources have been isolated and, where possible, de-
energized.
Protection Points
Protection points are the points used to provide work protection and includes both isolation
and de-energization points.
Safe Deviation
Safe deviation is an approved departure from the normally prescribed process, ensuring safety
of personnel and plant equipment are not compromised. Approval is required for a safe
deviation.
Safety Work Plan or Hazard Plan

The Safety Work Plan, Hazard Plan or Job Safety Analysis is a formal plan that complements
the protection provided by the Work Clearance Authorization by setting limits (example: no
work at elevations without Fall Protection Equipment) or providing detailed procedures.
Self Protection Work Clearance Authorization
A Self Protection Work Clearance Application provides no guarantee of protection or

reduction of the hazards or risk associated with the work authorized. Protection will be
provided by the Work Clearance Holder through safe work practices and the use of green self
protection tags.
A Self Protection Work Clearance Application can be used when:
a) the system must remain energized due to the nature of the maintenance (examples:
troubleshooting 48 VDC logic circuits, obtaining vibration readings on operating
equipment)
b) it is not practical to provide protection due to the nature of the maintenance (examples:
removing a stab type breaker drawer from an energized MCC for breaker maintenance
or adjusting the packing on a valve)
c) it is not practical to provide a protection guarantee due to the nature of the maintenance
(examples: adjusting stop limits on cranes where the maintainer must alternate
between the isolated state to perform adjustments and the energized state to assess the
adjustments)
d) calibrating instrumentation
Verification
Verification is the act of reviewing, inspecting, testing, checking, or otherwise determining and
documenting whether items, processes, services, or documents conform to specified
requirements.
Work authorization
Work authorization is authorization to perform work on, or gain access to, structures, systems,
or components (SSCs).
Work Clearance Authorization
A formal approval to do the work becomes the Work Authorization. The Work Clearance
Authorization may contain instructions or restrictions for the Work Clearance Holder.
Work Clearance Document
A Work Clearance Document is the actual paper copy of a Work Clearance Authorization,
which provides additional details and controls for the work, specifically:

a) Applying and removing Work Clearance protection, including: a list of the equipment
to be operated, the desired state for the equipment, the sequence of operations, tag type
for devices
b) Aligning plant equipment to prevent process disturbances during maintenance and
returning to the desired configuration after maintenance
c) Performing authorized testing
d) Returning maintained equipment or systems to service, including: a list of the
equipment to be operated, the desired state for the equipment, the sequence of
operation.
e) Modifying protection points
f) Changing from red Do Not Operate tags to Conditions Abnormal tags.
g) A record of the preparation, checking, modification, and testing performed.
Work Clearance Package
The Work Clearance Package is a compilation of documents including the following:
a) Work Clearance Authorization

b) Work Clearance Document
c) Work Clearance Document Check Forms
d) Any attachments (examples: tagging and un-tagging lists, flow sheets, appropriate
system diagrams, Safety Work Plan).
The package provides authorization and procedures for performing and monitoring
maintenance.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF GRID CODE

May 25, 2012

Sl. No. Table of Contents Page No.

1.0 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE...........................................................................5

2.0 BLACKSTART CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEM RESTORATION...........................................................15

3.0 CONTROL OF VOLTAGE AND REACTIVE POWER.............................................................................35

4.0 INTERCHANGE SCHEDULING...............................................................................................................52

6.0 OPERATIONAL LIAISON.........................................................................................................................52

8.0 OUTAGE PLANNING.................................................................................................................................52

10.0 PERIODIC REPORTS................................................................................................................................53

12.0 SYSTEM SECURITY..................................................................................................................................53

1.0 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process for:

1.2 DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

1.2.1 System Operators

1.2.2 Field Operators

1.3 DESCRIPTION AND INTENT OF THE NLDC

1.3.1 System Monitoring

1.3.2 Devise Switching and Isolation

1.3.3 Operational Switching

1.3.4 Switching of Devices to Achieve De-energization and Isolation

1.3.5 Operation of Isolators

1.4 NLDC AND RTU SITE INTERACTIVE LOGIC

1.4.1 Remote/NLDC and Local/RTU Site Logic

1.4.2 Cirrcuit Break

There are three classifications of maintenance. These are:

1.6 AUTHORIZING AND MONITORING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

b) Appendix- B: Tagging Equipment

1.6.1 Authorizing Maintenance

The following procedures shall be followed:

b) The proposed outage plans shall contain identification of each generating

1.6.2 Establishing Guaranteed Protection

The following procedure will be followed:

1.6.3 Returning Maintained Equipment to Service

1.6.4 Procedure for Maintenance of International Power Lines

A request for maintenance can be initiated in either Bhutan or India.

A. If the site to be maintained is in Bhutan:

a) The NLDC will initiate the authorization approval process.

B. If the site on the transmission line to be maintained is in India:

2.0 BLACKSTART CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEM RESTORATION

The purpose of this document is to:

2.2 FULL AND PARTIAL RESTORATION

2.2.1 Eastern Region (Full restoration)

2.2.2 Western Region (Partial restoration or full restoration)

2.3 BLACK START CAPABILITIES

2.3.1 Black Start Facilities

Basochu Pelton Diesel

Basochu Pelton Diesel

Kaplan Diesel 1 x 500

2.3.2 Startup Power Requirements

2.3.3 Synchronizing facilities

Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Birpara- I E-F1 Yes

Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Birpara- II E-F2 Yes

Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Malbase E_F3 Yes

Chhukha 220 Chhukha Bus Semtokha E_F4 Yes

Kurichu 132 Kurichu Nangkhor D-F1 Yes

Kurichu 132 Kurichu Kilikhar D_F2

Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- I F_F1 Yes

Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- II F_F3 Yes

Tala 400 Tala Malbase- III F_F4 Yes

Tala 400 Tala Siliguri/Binaguri- IV F_F2 Yes

2.3.4 Containing Over Voltage

Tala 400 1 x 63 On or off

Kurichhu 132 1x5 On or off