A.C. No.

10179 (Formerly CBD 112985), March 04, 2014

BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS

A lawyers issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey
the laws. To accord with the canon of professional responsibility that requires him to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law
and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for gross
misconduct.

Antecedents

In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty.

William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between them, Ong and Atty.
Delos Santos became friends. In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked
him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To
reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos
bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty.
Delos Santos financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29,
2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latters Metrobank Check No.
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008. However, the check was dishonored upon
presentment for the reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of
the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the
latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a
criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos
Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint
as CBD Case No. 112985.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP Bar Commissioner

In his Commissioners Report, IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated
that Ong had sufficiently established the existence of the dishonored check; and
that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite notice, and did not also
present contrary evidence. He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held liable
for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant, be meted
on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment case brought against him
(Lucman v. Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09253).

Resolution No. XX2013253

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX2013253
adopting and approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr., to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. William
F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years
and ORDERED to RETURN the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos to complainant with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Issue

By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty.

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to
maintain his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a
condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a
continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine
Bar. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable,
and reliable individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross
misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of
the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano
v. Martinez, is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
The Court has observed in Lozano v. Martinez:

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest. xxx

Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them,
for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyers Oath that enjoined him to support
the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03, viz:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan, required of him as a lawyer an
enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:
The aforecited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness
expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and
his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers
of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity,
if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.

That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer
invested him whether he was acting as such or in a nonprofessional capacity
with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with
others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his
professional capacity. His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a
person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings
with others.

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious
question not only his personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated
Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos request for
encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the
Legal Profession. The following excerpts from Ongs testimony bear this out, to wit:
COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you were issued a bounced check by
the respondent?

MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him money because actually he was
not even my friend. He was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to loan
him money was because the sheriff told me that abogado eto. It is his license that
would be at stake thats why I lent him the money.

xxxx

COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are saying is that you felt betrayed
when the lawyer issued a bounced check in your favor.

MR. ONG: Yes, Commissioner.

COMM. DELA RAMA: Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?

MR. ONG: They uphold the law, they know the law. He should not have issued the
check if you know it cannot be funded because actually I have many lawyer
friend[s] and I have always high regard for lawyers.

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be
circumspect in all his dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his
part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the
publics faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in
good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was
true manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in
exchange for his worthless postdated check. Such actuation did not speak well of
him as a member of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting

appropriate administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging
him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed, and that
he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of three
years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the practice of law to
six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Carandang.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS

GUILTY of violating the Lawyers Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM
NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Delos Santos personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
 A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,

SORSOGON CITY vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the
respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because
the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case.
Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then
pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by
complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from
entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and
the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge,
and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealcas motion to re-raffle through an order issued on
February 14, 2007, viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal
sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and
the other Courts in this province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a
Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases
against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for
utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so
as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for
inhibition. It is the lawyers duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to
appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the
first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby

DENIED. Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty.
Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being
violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip
William Arsenault is likewise DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealcas unethical practice of entering his appearance and
then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous
adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint,

and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.

In his comment-complaint, Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrids issuance of the
February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of
the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge
Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant
of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who
should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross
ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation, report and recommendation. Several months thereafter, the Court
also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ,
entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer Merlyn D.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v.
Judge Madrid).
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript
of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity
of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with
the following findings and recommendation:

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan
S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the
complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by
himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and
personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that
respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge
Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters,
who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out of the
unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position
of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled
by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the
court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before
the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo,
et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the
complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for:
Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III,
entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order,
this ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No.
5403 entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Ladys
Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant
that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge
Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case
No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III"
for Support pending before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court
against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing
administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-
DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October
22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao
vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit;
(d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping),
and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON
in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia
Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal
of the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the
respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one
executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered
by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact
that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the
complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the
Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida, respondents sister member of the Bar. All these documentary
evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the
respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of
going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of
adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-

foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and

Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of
law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or
legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the

recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit,
thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition which the IBP Board of Governors
treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No.
XX-2012-545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed
against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a
vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.

We see no merit in Atty. Dealcas arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high
sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be
unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the
ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealcas complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his
bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his
clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for
resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim
of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to
harass them.

The Lawyers Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any
violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or
other disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These
are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld
and keep inviolable.

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyers Oath
not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thus wise:

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any mans cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the
orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must
resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients propensities to
litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating
unfounded suits. While it is the Courts duty to investigate and uncover the truth
behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from
unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the
proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the
unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the
workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of
the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. Atty.
Dealcas bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his
part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not
substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Courts
precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca
had the temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to
wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed
against erring judges and court personnel for lack of merit, i.e. without even
discussing the facts and the law of the case.

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have
promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant
posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain
ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute resolutions
have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court. Whenever the
Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all
its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld, and the minute
resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The
dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course indicates the Courts agreement
with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute
resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court explained why in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the
rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the
legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not duty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis
is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The petitioner contended that the minute
resolutions violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, through
Justice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions within the
constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision." It pointed out that the constitutional
mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course
to and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where
the petition was being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose
stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the
petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition
and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in
the lower courts decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited
himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary." However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit
considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft
of factual and legal bases.

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:

Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andt he
latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned x x x. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Dealcas averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him
directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse
to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or
their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously
substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges
in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the
averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latters
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon
Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and
prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in
which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel. The latters bare allegations of
Judge Madrids partiality or hostility did not suffice, because the presumption that
Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law
and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his
duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative
complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of
the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the
penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40
and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty.
Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court
FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon
1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of
this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015

PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR.,

Respondent.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant)

against Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in
violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After
respondent filed his Answer we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Factual Background

The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as follows:

Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his
deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property situated in
Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City
issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.

Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on,
Complainant complained that Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse
of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.

She narrates as follows:

In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No.
65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The
Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again
filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost and
the case became final and executory.

Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC,
Branch 162, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the
Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than
what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.

Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November
2007 Order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992
which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping the
Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban,
Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent
filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the
resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio
Ygaa of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then complained that
Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant
and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).

Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several
pleadings he had filed had centered on the legality of the court's decision ordering
the cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation
of the title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before
the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the
government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a reversion case if
there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in
favor of Lumberio.

With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained
that the said case does not show that herein counsel committed any act of
dishonesty which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just exercising his
profession to the best of his ability.

In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at

respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible
remedies to obtain relief for his client"5 which he considered as tantamount to
"abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment." He noted that
after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162 issued a Resolution in
Civil Case No. 65147 adverse to his client, respondent filed a barrage of
cases/pleadings such as an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
RTC ruling, a petition for review with the Supreme Court which was denied for
having been filed out of time; a petition for annulment of the RTC judgment which
was dismissed by the CA; another petition for review before this Court which was
again denied; a petition for certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil
case before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon which was dismissed for "improper venue,
res judicata, and violation of the anti-forum shopping law" and that it involved the
same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several inhibitions,
motions and an administrative complaint against the presiding judge. The
Investigating Commissioner, stated:

x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of
Respondent. He as a lawyer could have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent
actions were merely meant to harass the opposing litigant as in fact the Supreme
Court had already issued its final ruling on the matter. After the ruling of the High
Court, Respondent should have known that the case had been finally adjudicated
and no amount of judicial exercise could turn the decision in his client's favor. From
then on, he should have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in court, as
they are futile anyway, because he has his duty to the court above that to his client.

Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule
12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate
administrative penalty.

He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for
four months.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating that:

2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;

xxxx

With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal
duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He
has not done any wrongdoing while taking such routes. He has never been
dishonest;

xxxx

4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it
was not shown that he acted in bad: faith in taking such legal remedies.

5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because

complainant has other recourse available to execute the said decision in her favor
while there were petitions filed, complainant also did not allege that respondent has
abused the judicial process. The courts to which the said petitions were filed also
did not cite the respondent in contempt of court [nor was a warning] given.

xx x x
6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to
undergo dialysis three (3) times in a week. To suspend him for four months would
mean that he would stop his dialysis for four moths [sic] which may cause his
immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy to see one of
its members begging for alms from PCSO and government officials to shoulder his
dialysis of about P100,000.00 per month.9

In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board
of Governors affirmed its earlier Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, saying that there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the Commission on Bar Discipline.

The Court's Ruling

While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, it
cannot be emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client
but to the administration of justice." Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of
Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount
consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the a lawyer for the
losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is
a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has
iterations in various forms:

The Lawyer's Oath:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:

Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be

just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

xxxx

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(Emphasis supplied)

Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied)

Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration
of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him.

In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory
by July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12)
motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment:

Regional Trial Court of Taguig City:

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006

Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant

Motion for Early Resolution

Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the Court
of Appeals

Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA

Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order

Court of Appeals:

Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Appeals

Motion for Reconsideration

Petition for Certiorari

Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy

Supreme Court:

Petition for Certiorari

Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order

From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that
respondent's intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his
duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client,
his other actions belie his claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil case for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a
case of forum-shopping. Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against
the three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion to cite the sheriff in
contempt of court who was simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.

In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his
improper behavior and dilatory tactics. This is not true. In her Order inhibiting
herself from the case, Judge Homena-Valencia stated:

This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as
acting presiding judge of this branch only last September 2005, she does not know
any of the parties from Adam. As such, she could not be inclined to show bias in
favor of one of them. She refuses, however, to be drawn into a discussion, to put it
mildly, with respondent's counsel as to her knowledge of the law.

However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from
further hearing this case although the reasons stated by the defendant are not one
of those provided for in the Rules for the voluntary inhibition of a judge.

Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he,

being a lawyer, is first and foremost an officer of the court.

In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent
was rebuked for the misuse of court processes, thus:

This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the
execution of the 31 July 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 162, which has long attained finality.

xxxx

In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a

mockery of Our judicial system. We take exception to the unjustified delay in the
enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become final
and executory. This is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of
her victory.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.

Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C.
Ygaa17 stated:
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes.
Defendant and counsel are very lucky that the herein plaintiff has the patience of
Job. Should this case reach the attention of the Supreme Court, where the whole
story will be known, they will have a lot of explaining to do.

It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by
abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a
final judgment, and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court. He
has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court.
In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.

Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and
suspension as follows:

Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do x x x.

In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes,19 this Court has imposed
the penalty of suspension ranging from six months to two years. In light of the
following aggravating circumstances - multiplicity of motions and cases filed by
respondent, the malice evinced by his filing of various motions to prevent the
judges and sheriff from fulfilling their legal duties, feigned ignorance of his duties as
an officer of the court, and his lack of remorse for his actions - the Court finds that a
penalty of suspension for 18 months would be commensurate to the damage and
prejudice that respondent has inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby

found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for a period of eighteen (18) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted
in Atty. Villaruel's record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L.

VERANO, JR.

Before this Court is the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper
and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of
influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by
Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent be issued a
warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission
will impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16
April 2013.

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and
Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of
probable cause.

Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions

during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of
bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional
hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the
release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondents alleged violation
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the
law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking
public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor. Atty.
Lozanos verified Complaint Affidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline
of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.

Officers of the IBP, Cebu City Chapter, issued a Resolution condemning the
unethical conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACCs
filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his
Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11
On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as
for investigation, report and recommendation.
RESPONDENTS VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the
charges against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution
also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the
high hopes of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when
the PDEA still refused to release his clients. Sheer faith in the innocence of his
clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release
order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of
Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited." In any case, respondent
continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore
remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the
letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no
evidence was adduced to prove the charges.

However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,

respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.

RULING OF THE COURT

We emphasize at the outset that the Court may conduct its own investigation into
charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints
brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to
the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. By
now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges of a member of the bar.
As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by

complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension
or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x
x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of
the charges. (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable
grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied
by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits
of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code
of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited
to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where
respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,

respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a
direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take
more serious action, viz.:

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see

the Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens
his [sic] kasi he is very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that
day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that
baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x
kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I
did was thinking as a lawyer nowI prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it
convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it
and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office
of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.

xxxx

So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first
with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after
1:00 oclock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor.
Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x
Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your
Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito.
So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usapsabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will
study the matter, those particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang
kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us
away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case.

Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is
very open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a
political family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the
family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they were
together in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him." Upon
questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was
personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondents
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that
the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the
preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being
unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may
be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith in the
judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice. To that end, their clients success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a
member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and
unethical.

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule
15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a
lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the
bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession
is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we
find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the
case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate
penalty for the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence
peddling when she solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter
asked for her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a pending case
with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of
the high court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY
of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that
repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondents bar records. The Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

This refers to the Resolution of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent
Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for
ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), received a complaint, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful3
acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order, the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within
15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent
a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing
on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before
the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared.
She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were
furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a
need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for
resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 oclock in the morning or after
the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondents Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions
of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079,
ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the
sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.

Complainants Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in

connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered
into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate
case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter to Tropical Villas Subdivision in

relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in
her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the
repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her
lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note evidenced
the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to
transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of
contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. When asked
about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the
sheriffs travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil
case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take
a collaborating counsel to handle complainants case. Upon reading a copy of the
complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the
major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the
contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto;
3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of
contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought
up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter
extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency
or emergency. Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the
sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable
ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually
gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt, stating that it is
understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted
that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the
case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again,
complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.

On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been
notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14,
2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went
to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff
gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the
motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see
respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra
Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the
Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were
amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false
documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy of the

reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were
mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that
these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for
P2,500.00 on respondents directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle
of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral
arguments on the case had been set the following month.

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent

as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her
copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondents Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been
engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos
Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed
of Absolute Sale subject of complainants case, but he qualified that he was not paid
his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for
which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him
for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was
declared as no loan and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards
the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the
said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in
covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said
that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations.
Complainants husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent
denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with
the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was
complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would
befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine
to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his representation of

Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since
complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling
of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on
reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply, complainant mainly countered respondents defenses by making

reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted
the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While
respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government
of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving
Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to
respondent was never considered as no loan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of
the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner

found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with
modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner
and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2)
the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he
filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto,
informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had
already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been
issued.

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondents motion for
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law
by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting
to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Courts Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner with respect to respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers
conduct is not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,

both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled
complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the
prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the
land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other
words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth,
the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation,
would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant
amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not
have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose
to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good
faith expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received
various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse,
he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon
demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other
expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by,
the client. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
the client.

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts

from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the
amount of P50,000.00 as representation expenses allegedly for the benefit of the
judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself
signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P25,000.00 and, worse,
he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross
misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of
demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to
ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his clients trust but an
overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and
the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers
owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no
way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest
the publics perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the
said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondents
actuations would seriously erode the publics trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.
At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed
to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire
with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also
remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that
[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend
to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or
emergency but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was
never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondents
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant
and were, thus, considered as no loan, does not justify his inappropriate behavior.
The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter
failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair
dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration
of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or misconduct, the
reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on
both scores.

With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting interests, the

Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who
concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondents
lawyering for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard
of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests. Thus,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services
in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in
complainants case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and
that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were
challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was
made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and
the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the
intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted complainants case, knowing fully that he was
involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from
such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had
close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written
consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree,
but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. For the practice of law is a profession,
a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a

lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended
by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions
of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to
his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less
than the penalty of disbarment.

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court held that it
cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a
private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern
of the Court is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose
against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required
in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. In administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more
than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable. Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive
period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a
rule, imprescriptible.

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of
P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from
complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between
them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for
the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to
his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondents deplorable
act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of
their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already
adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the
small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.43 The Court likewise
aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross

misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby
DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant,
Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit dated August 30, 2008 filed by
complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and
return her money despite several demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of

honor in her best friends wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of
America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant
sought the services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration
lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services
(Contract), whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a
US immigrant visa in complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as
downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance
of the US visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should complainants visa
application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the
interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold
departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment.4
However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period.
Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the
demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a
criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against
respondent.

In his Comment dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to
comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a
certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US
Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant.
Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the
matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including
himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn
referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US visa application had been
denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda
reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless,
assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant. To buttress his
claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family with
Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the
latter.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively
liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would
invite a stiffer penalty.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful

conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to
deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants
downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend
credence to respondents defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda
considering that the latters identity was not proven and in light of respondents
self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any
probative value.

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the
modification increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering
respondent to return the amount of P350,000.02 to complainant within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. In this
regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer,

which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of
her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his
legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration
law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who
supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to
prove Pinedas identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted
were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be given any
credence. Undoubtedly, respondents deception is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law.

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations

under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in
favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must
be held administratively liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature
of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that in
similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the same time,
failed to return the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-
Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for
his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his
client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the
amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In this
case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa
and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting
himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under
these circumstances, a graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the
foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from
the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP,
to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return
the amount of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is
well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings
should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance,
when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid
amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of
this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot

the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as

attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial
Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.
The first letter-complaint, dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the commissioned
notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty.
Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty.
Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty.
Siapno) for notarizing documents without a commission.

In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial
office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial
acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite
notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as
Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan
City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by
Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March
22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however, was never
renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their
allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapnos law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan;
and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage
Agreement showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in
Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
Re: Given Name and Date of Birth, dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan
City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Dagupan City.

Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to
his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote
legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.

On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the
OBC.

The second letter-complaint was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty.
Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his drivers
license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The
said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented before the
Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform
notarial commission within the City of Manila.

The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain
Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmarias
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on
behalf of several lawyers.

In its Resolution, dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the
RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty.
Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to
conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty.
Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a
report and recommendation thereon.

Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno

With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a
hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint.
For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his
secretaries.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was
issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from
January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006.
His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued
another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial
functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the
recommended penalty.

A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty.
Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law
office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that
Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the
commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not
commissioned in the said places to perform such act.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be
emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty.
Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial
Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
at all times.

In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for
notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired
commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray, a lawyer was suspended by the Court for
three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v.
Simpliciano, the respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a
notary public for notarizing several documents after the expiration of his
commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v. Quintana, the Court
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he notarized
documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired commission.

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in
Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the
requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient.
Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public
permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter, dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have
complied with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he
was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal
investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the
reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the
Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.

The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting

capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit
his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this
decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office
of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative
cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct
a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015

FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.,

Respondents.

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Courts disciplinary authority in resolving this

disbarment complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr.,
whom he has accused of gross misconduct.

Antecedents
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Atty. Guicos legal services
included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC (NLRC Case
No. RAB-III-08-9261-05 entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang Makabayan (KMM)
Katipunan CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San
Lorenzo Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu). On September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter
Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC. Atty. Guico filed a timely
appeal in behalf of CVC.

According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty.

Guicos residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare
a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the
appeal to insure a favorable decision. On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to
inform him that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to
proceed to his office at No. 48 Times Street, Quezon City, and to give the money to
his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called Atty.
Guico to confirm that he had delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty.
Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at the UCC Coffee Shop on T.
Morato Street, Quezon City. At the UCC Coffee Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy
of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. The draft decision was
printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of
Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only
produce P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guicos office on July 10, 2007
accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it
was Nardo who received the amount without issuing any receipt.7

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007.
However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only
know the status after Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who
invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked
Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the
negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with
Atty. Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. Chu
confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico
caused the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu
terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.10

In his position paper, Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete
with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for
harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that
Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He further denied handing to Chu a draft
decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used
paper must have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been
pilfered by Chus witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.
 Findings and Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and
receiving P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in
view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and
contempt for the legal profession.

On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP
Commissioner Villanueva in its Resolution No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the
recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension,

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondents violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Jose
C. Guico, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with
Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Eighty Thousand
(P580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion for reconsideration on March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17

Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis--vis Resolution No. XX-2013-
87 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.

Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyers Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from
Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

Ruling of the Court

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to

establish respondent attorneys liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant
evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.

Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses,19 and presented the draft decision
that Atty. Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly
insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper
emanating from Atty. Guicos office, inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed
documents on used paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of the
draft decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guicos participation in the generation of the
draft decision was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chus
insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated from his office, claiming
only that used paper was just scattered around his office. In that context, Atty.

Guicos attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper from his office was futile
because he did not expressly belie the forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty.
Guico stated by way of deflecting the imputation was that the used paper
containing the draft decision could have been easily taken from his office by Chus
witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for Chu, pointing out that
everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was open to the
public xxx and just anybody has access to everything found therein. In our view,
therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully aware that
the used paper had unquestionably come from his office.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses,
especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision
that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guicos office, sufficed to
confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and
receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered
only his general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such denial did not
overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that the
production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise
money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As
such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his
complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyers Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its

Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x
x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every
lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation,
every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would
involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or
she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and comport
himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits
his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to
raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor
case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his
violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from
the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts
constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical
commitments under the Lawyers Oath not to delay any man for money or malice;
and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct
eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal
Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. There is no question
that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity
renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an
essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of
such privilege.

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him

from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he
should be disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership
in the legal profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is

granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as
members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be
ordered to return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was
exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latters interest as the
client. Although the purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to
require Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not
matter that this proceeding is administrative in character, for, as the Court has
pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes:

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily

to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts
silence about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to restitute the complainant
will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning
the clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the
respondents liability. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR.
GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyers Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Guicos personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts and quasi-judicial offices in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015

ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA,

Respondent.

Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa),
for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from non-
payment of debt.

This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Investigating Commissioners report and recommendation. The IBP
resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six (6) months,
likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest.

On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution and the records of the case.

The Factual Background

Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They
agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall
accrue in case of default.

To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note
and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.

Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to
pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and
deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendozas promise that he would
later pay. The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally
deposited it sometime in October 2006; it was Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.
Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty.
Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendozas failure to pay.

On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the
demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry
Return Receipt. Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain
why he failed to pay.

In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint
for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on the
complaint in a Resolution dated January 10, 2011. He filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension on March 18, 2011, which this Court granted in a Resolution dated
October 19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief Comment on January 10,
2012.

Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and that it is
a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of the
complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor any
evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.

The Proceedings before the IBP

On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the Notice

of Mandatory Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.

When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty. Cabrera
marked the complainants documentary exhibits and the mandatory conference was
subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then directed to submit their
respective verified position papers, documentary exhibits and/or affidavits of their
witnesses, if any, within fifteen (15) days.

In her position paper, Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her Complaint-Affidavit.
She argued that Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also civilly.

Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation, admitted that (i) he arrived late during the
scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
(iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate with the complainants
counsel; and (iv) the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same.

Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express manifestation
he made.

The IBP Findings

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively
but also civilly. He gave credence to Ms. Sosas allegations that Atty. Mendoza failed
to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosas attempts to collect. He also took notice of Atty.
Mendozas admission that the obligation is valid.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP ruled:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that [the respondent] is
guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty. Manuel V.
Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and
Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to [the
complainant] with legal interest.

The Courts Ruling

We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in
his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to
and continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-
professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.

Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of

some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: [a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in
character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.

We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of

P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing
he received P500,000.00. Although he initially denied getting this amount and
claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to
prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification
as to the amount.

Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon
maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the
postdated check upon Atty. Mendozas request, and based on his promises that he
would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the
check when finally deposited was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not
dispute.

Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with
the IBP Investigating Officer. He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or
her counsel because he arrived late.

We find Atty. Mendozas excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him to
deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms.
Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his obligation
because of his manifestation that he already had the money.

It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosas request for settlement after
claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying he had the
money, or had no intention of paying in the first place. Atty. Mendoza was also not
candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and
that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains
outstanding after all these years.

In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez23 this Court sitting en banc held:

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in
a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis supplied.]

Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his
obligation,24 Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his
admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire
financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.

We also reiterate that

[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent

and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]

The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendozas failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading
not only his personal integrity but his profession as well.27

To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendozas act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to
pay a valid and just debt.

While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its
recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal
interest.

We take exception to the IBPs order to pay only because the case before us is
solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for
collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases
alone deters us from agreeing with the IBPs order to pay; the administrative
complaint before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability,
while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of
evidence.

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the

complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.

The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to

continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of
justice. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.

We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case to

collect an outstanding debt from a lawyer. However, in the recent case of Heenan v.
Atty. Espejo, this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBPs recommendation
to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant.
We said in this case:

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only
concern is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings
have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not
involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is
whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should
be returned to the complainant. [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]

We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the
Heenan case also did not deny the validity of her loan nor did she proffer any
reason for issuing unfunded checks.

As a final note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in
her present situation. However, because the matter before us is not a civil action
for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding
loan. We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any
future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty.
Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without prejudice to any action we
may take that is not based on the violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.

BAYDO

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O.
Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends
since the mid-1960s when they were both students at the University of the
Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths
of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig
started to court Dr. Perez.

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist
Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would
make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could
have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually
marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.
Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was
lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity
since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the
latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty.
Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their
union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that
he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love
to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig
to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of
his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity
of his marriage to Gomez.

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to
an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.
In a Resolution dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file
their respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968.
He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs
that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.

They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how
the agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven
suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide
them.

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed
a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that
the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in
the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig
and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus,
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his
previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he
left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that
Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was
attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise
pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She
claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm.
She however rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic overtures; she told him that she
could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for
her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which
was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.

On June 2, 2003, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order
setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which
was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested
that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings
already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig
and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 and October 20,
2003, respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-
CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, which recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that Atty. Catindigs act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal
conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants
fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it
was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his

official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondents
bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up
high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In
contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a
prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of
the community.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in
relying solely on Dr. Perezs uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to Dr. Perez testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that
he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig
asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied
Atty. Catindigs motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality,
which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.34 (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may
be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral
conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis ours)

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a

grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central
Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983,
Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that
his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez serious intimacy
problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from
Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree
from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the
same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he
moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away a marriage that
has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained
from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as
he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage
be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.
This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a
blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage
remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that
Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted
to various legal strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise
invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty.
Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to
properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment
is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.

Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the
penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case,
the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since
they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a
dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her
claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents
were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only
proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote
Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to

ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.

PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April
12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities"
which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims
that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly
immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had
a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite
being already married to Jardiolin;

CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved
with DDD;

DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;

EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until
the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived
CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two
women to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of
1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and
assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the
Philippine Government.

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor
Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the
latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC.
In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty.
Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the
OGCC premises itself.6cralawrednad
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land
titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land
titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon
and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for
graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for
grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent
even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents,
spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL
parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time.
Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that
the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8cralawrednad

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman

issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information
was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019.

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in

Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in
"nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female
students in exchange for passing grades.

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio
A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer, respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of

facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition
suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to
substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that
Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked
formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as
well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly
established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), stating that the
allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's
failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."1

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.

(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28,
2007, which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion
to Cancel Hearing, praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly
due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was
opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's Manifestation
praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be complainant's
hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case
was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11,
2007 and the respective subpoenas were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and
that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said
motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more
commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion
were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed

petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court
personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Paraaque City, there
was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting.
Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the
proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in
the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition,
respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl

Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong
(Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report
had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the
email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent
based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl
in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC,
whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed
that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students
during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about
respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not
tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled
that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced
CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of
their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant
included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory

conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the
case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with

Comments), pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for
the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City
to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments), submitting the certified photo copies
of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22,
2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper. Complainant

thereafter filed two Manifestations, asserting that respondent is already barred from
submitting his verified position paper and that any decision or judgment would have
to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner
Villadolid rendered a Report, finding that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code and/or RA
3019 as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents
which support his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited

complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his
alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not
able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages
pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of

marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer
"engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession".

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient
evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. this Commissioner
respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform
his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility."

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting
and approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian
Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off
from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration dated July
3, 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his comment.

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report
dated June 28, 2012) dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to
comment on complainant's motion in an Order dated August 27, 2013. On the same
date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration).

Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration with Leave dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the
Comment and/or Opposition dated September 20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline
forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was
fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain
one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension

proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the
burden of proof according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment

proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by

which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs.

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were
proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their professional
and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by
maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed

disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair
with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked
his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant
evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit. We ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of
his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he
grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative
and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig, the
Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding
our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render a facade of
validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage.
We said:

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment
is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several

adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies
of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same
were not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that
complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead,
questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own
failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence
of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of

marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's

findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman,
the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as
Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees
to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein
attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption against
him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that
complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against
him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were
made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily
admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had
knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant" s
position of being not present in the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he
has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule
10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the
original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to

mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was
able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the
lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; [will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any menial reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out
of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking
the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the

resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN

CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, vs. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY,
Respondent.

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution or the IBP Board of
Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in
the performance of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is
hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years.

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11,
2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial
Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge),
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay
(respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of
the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as
follows:

1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C.

Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;

2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret
L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;

3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to

Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;

4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;

5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa

Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;

6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and
sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;

7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco
and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;

8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita
Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;

9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona

Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;

10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad
Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and
Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila
Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;

13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps.
Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;

14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on
April 1, 2008;

15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development

Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;

16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda
Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;

17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to
Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008;
and

18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and
Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial
Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while respondent was
outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter
contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized
which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign the
documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents came out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau
of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the
country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the
Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.

The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter
endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter
endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to
formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among
others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but
rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he
was out of the country," and that any advice on how to consider or treat the
documents concerned would be welcome.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of
the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

This Court, in its Resolution, dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of
Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on
the said letter. In his comment, dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he
was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he was
out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were
done by his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said secretary
notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization act.
Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had
terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.

The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory conference on
September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation
reiterating his original position and requesting that his attendance be excused. The
mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were directed to file their
respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper, to which he
added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and
notarial practice.

The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III) as
Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June 11,
2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated
photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty.
Abelita III, however, observed that respondents signature on his comment
appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached
documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office secretary.
He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of
the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his
negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his
notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the
proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on
Notarial Practice.

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty

which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as
notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate
revocation of respondents commission as notary public and his disqualification to
be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution, dated September 28, 2013.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of the IBP. He
contended that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any
wrongful intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that
he only committed simple negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.

On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration
of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the
motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed
out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September
28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.

On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for
appropriate action.

The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by
the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18
documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he
was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that
respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary publics secretary
is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretarys act which he
did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed.
He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his
secretary could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such
blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a
simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondents flimsy
excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck
to his secretary.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for
the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without
any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His experience, however,
should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible violations of
his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the
public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial
commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years is appropriate.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to solemnly
perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected by the
notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and
degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public
is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an
unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence
in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to
notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
The people who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the
illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their
documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out
that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force
and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a

significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to
perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several
occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private

document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be
undermined.18

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court
will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when
the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the
balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his
duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be

appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015

CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO,

Respondent.

Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. However,

Emcor, Inc. allegedly failed to cause the registration of the motorcycle under his
name. Pitogo, thus, filed a Civil Complaint before the Regional Trial Court against
EMCOR, Inc.

The motorcycle was eventually registered in Pitogos name based on three (3)
documents notarized by respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello). The
documents indicate that they are registered in Suellos notarial register as follows:

1. Deed of Assignment between

Maria P. Ponce / Rogelio
Ponce and EMCOR, Inc.
Doc. No. 436;
Book No. 83;
Page No. 88;
Series of 20093
2. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Maria P.
Ponce and Mariza G. Ono-on
Doc. No. 437,
Page No. 88;
Book No. 83,
Series of 20094
3. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Mariza
G. Ono-on and Crescenciano M.
Pitogo
Doc. No. 235;
Page No. 85;
Book No. 83;
Series of 20095

Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land Transportation
Office, Danao City, Cebu. On August 3, 2009, he went to Suellos office to have
them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called Suello the next day to tell him
about the importance of these documents to his civil case, Suello disowned the
documents. Suello instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his
notarial register.

In the letter dated August 7, 2009, Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the documents
were important in his civil case pending before the Regional Trial Court. He
requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the three (3) documents
he obtained from the Land Transportation Office. He wanted to determine if the
documents were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did not
receive a reply from Suello.

On September 10, 2009, Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before
the Cebu Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Pitogo alleges that there
were discrepancies between the three (3) documents notarized by Suello and
Suellos entries in his notarial register.

Specifically, Pitogo claims that Suellos notarial register showed that the above
entries pertain to the following documents:

a. Doc. No. 436: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mr. Roel D. Rago;

b. Doc. No. 437: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mrs. Conchita Pitogo Tautho;
c. Doc. No. 235: Contract to Sell of BF Property Development Corporation.

In his Answer to the Affidavit-Complaint, Suello denies having notarized the three
(3) documents obtained from the Land Transportation Office. He denies the
allegation that he disowned the documents. He admits that he certified the
documents as true copies.

In his Position Paper, Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogos
documents on August 3, 2009. Pitogo called Suello the next day to ask for a
certification. When he advised Pitogo that he can get it at his office after verifying
the documents, Pitogo informed him that his secretary already certified them as
true copies. Suello told Pitogo that his secretary was not given such authority.

Suello also claims that Pitogo threatened to file an administrative case against him
if he did not issue a certification stating whether the documents were really
notarized by him or were fabricated. According to Suello, Pitogo needed the
certification that the three (3) documents used to register the motorcycle under his
name were fabricated so he could claim P1.7 million in damages for EMCOR, Inc.s
alleged non-registration of his motorcycle. Pitogos claim against EMCOR, Inc. was
apparently mooted by the registration of the motorcycle under his name.

On January 10, 2012, Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda of the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended Suellos suspension
from the active practice of law for six (6) months, as well as the revocation of his
commission as a notary public. He also recommended Suellos disqualification as
notary public for two (2) years.

On April 15, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued
the Resolution adopting and approving the findings of Commissioner Almeydas
recommendation but further recommended to increase the penalty of
disqualification as notary public to four (4) years, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules and considering respondent violated the Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Joselito Troy Suellos
Notarial Commission is hereby REVOKED immediately if presently commissioned
and DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for four (4) years.25
(Emphasis in the original)

Suello filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 15, 2013 Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors Resolution based on the ground that the penalty
imposed on him was excessive:

1. That the sanction imposed is excessive. The respondent realizes that the mere
existence of those documents with his notarization makes him inevitably
answerable for them. Regardless how unaware he may be of how these came
about, he is still the only one to answer for them. Not the complainant and not any
party who may have access to his office implements to do this. It made him aware
of the need review his procedure to avoid these mistakes. Respondent however
finds the sanction against him is much too excessive and respectfully invokes the
following, to wit:
This is the first infraction lodged against him in his 15 years of practice.
The respondent is not in bad faith and has no dishonest or selfish motive.
There is no actual or potential injury caused to any private party;

Suello also apologized for his oversight:

2. That substantial justice has not been done. The respondent completely
understands that this matter only pertains to him and his liability and not about
anybody or anything else. His indignation distracted him to the mistaken belief that
the complainants dubious motives would not merit his complaint attention because
he did not come with clean hands. After being properly reminded, the respondent
realizes his mistake and respectfully apologizes for his oversight to this Honorable
Commission. The respondent finds it however grossly unjust that he is imposed
with such sanction for resisting to accommodate and be a part of the unscrupulous
undertaking sought to be accomplished motivating the complaint which is much
bigger wrong.

On May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the
Resolution partially granting Suellos Motion for Reconsideration, thus:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent

reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the
motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed
out and taken into consideration under Resolution No. XX-2013-416 dated April 15,
2013. However the Board DEEMED it judicious to reduce the penalty imposed on
Atty. Joselito Troy Suello from DISQUALIFICATION from reappointment as Notary
Public from four (4) years to two (2) years. The IMMEDIATE REVOCATION of his
Notarial Commission, if existing, under said Resolution stands. (Emphasis in the
original)

After reviewing the case records and considering the parties submissions, this court
adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in its
May 3, 2014 Resolution but modifies the penalties imposed upon respondent Atty.
Joselito Troy Suello.

Respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining

his notarial register. Recording every notarial act in the notarial register is required
under Rule VI the Notarial Rules, thus:

Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall
record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization the following:
(1) The entry number and page number;
(2) The date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) The type of notarial act;
(4) The title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) The name and address of each principal;
(6) The competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is
not personally known to the notary;
(7) The name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the
persons identity;
(8) The fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) The address where the notarization was performed if not in the notarys regular
place of work or business; and
(10) Any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or
relevance.

....
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which
the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. . . . .

(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose
appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:

....

(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his
notarial acts[.]30

Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies
on when they encounter written documents and engage in written transactions.
Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by
ensuring that they perform their duties with utmost care. This court explained in
Bote v. Judge Eduardo:

A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. It has the
presumption of regularity and to contradict the veracity of the entry, evidence must
be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. . . .

....

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with

such substantial public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3)
documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of
complainants documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial
register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect
for law and legal processes.

Respondent also appears to have committed a falsehood in the pleadings he

submitted. In his Answer to complainants Affidavit-Complaint, respondent claimed
that he certified complainants documents as true copies. Later, in his Position
Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary. This violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in dishonest and unlawful
conduct.

Respondents secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial
register. The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public.
It cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally
responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register.
Respondents apparent remorse may assuage the injury done privately, but it does
not change the nature of the violation.

Besides, respondents remorse was displayed after a penalty was recommended by

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. It was not motivated by a
realization of a wrong committed on an individual but only by a desire to temper the
penalty. It came too late.

In Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Kilaan,38 the same violations of Notarial Rules and Code of
Professional Responsibility were meted with the penalty of one-year suspension of
notarial commission and three-month suspension from the practice of law.39 We
find the same penalties proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello GUILTY of violating Canon
1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months and is STERNLY WARNED that any similar violation will be dealt with
more severely. His notarial commission is immediately revoked if presently
commissioned. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for
one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS

ADMINISTRATOR WILSON UY, Complainant, v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI
III, Respondent.
This resolves a Complaint for disbarment directly filed before this court by
complainant Wilson Uy, the designated administrator of the estate of Jose Uy. This
Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari) with engaging
in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari is
charged with the use of information that is false and/or appropriated from other
lawyers in signing certain pleadings.

On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofilea (Hofilea) filed a Petition before the Bacolod
City Regional Trial Court praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate
of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 97-241.

Hofilea was initially designated administratrix.4 However, a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofilea as administratix was filed by
Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other
children. In its Order dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court designated Wilson
Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.

Subsequently, Hofilea's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted.
Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution dated September 14, 2007.

In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims
to Jose Uy's estate, Hofilea was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-
El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings (i.e., in the
Comment dated May 27, 2009 filed before the Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El
indicated the following details:

MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)

There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose
Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the
treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy. In its Order dated April 20, 2010,
the Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad
Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.

Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of
Johnny K.H. Uy. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)

On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to

Quash.

Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition. This
Reply was dated December 8, 2010. In signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the
following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)

The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.
Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration dated July
15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)

As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a
Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum dated March 8, 2012. In signing this
Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the
March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-
241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying
the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.

Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by

then she had still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require
Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional details of another
lawyer.

In its Order dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court declined from citing
Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified petition asking that she be so cited had
been filed.

On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for
disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and using another
lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.

In the Resolution dated November 12, 2014, this court directed Maghari to file his
Comment on Wilson Uy's Complaint.

This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, received Maghari's Comment on
March 2, 2015.

For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III
engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may be meted on him.

Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by
complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims
that these entries were mere overlooked errors:

For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had been
printed and ready for signature, all what [sic] he did after cursorily going over it was
to affix his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without giving any
special or particular attention to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers",
considering that these are matters of record and are easily verifiable, thus he gains
nothing by "the usurpation of professional details of another lawyer" and has no
sinister motive or ill-purpose in so doing[.]

He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious entries and instead ascribes
ill motive to complainant. He faults complainant for "nitpicking" and calls him a
"sore loser" and a "disgruntled litigant" who is merely "making a mountain out of a
molehill" and is predisposed to "fault-finding."
He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant," he has provided what are
supposedly his correct professional details:

2009

IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009

2010

IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 3793872 - Jan. 4, 2010 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009

2011

IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City

PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009

2012

IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 4631737 - Jan. 2, 2012 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

II

Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail

to impress.

The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and
respondent admits their existence. This court would perhaps be well counseled to
absolve respondent of liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap on the wrist
if all that was involved were a typographical error, or otherwise, an error or a
handful of errors made in an isolated instance or a few isolated instances. So too, if
the error pertained to only ' one of the several pieces of information that lawyers
are required to indicate when signing pleadings.

None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not merely commit errors in
good faith. The truth is far from it. First, respondent violated clear legal
requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did so
demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes
is a pattern of deceit. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been
appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also larcenous.
Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly
changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to
mock and ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent toyed with the standards
of legal practice.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for
disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws
and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best
of one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court and client:

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can

negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking violation of
statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to
courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the
legal profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as a possible
result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client. Thus,
respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he
took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is

woefully unworthy of an officer of the court. He was not even a good citizen. As
respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to members of the
legal profession, we find it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two (2) years.

III

The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this

requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a
post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was
due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files
an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied)

A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere

means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a
positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has
read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for
delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a
pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken
occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court,
it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of
law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor
of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, something the law strongly proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)

A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply

with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of
legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A
deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.

Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as

part of a counsel's signature:

(1)
Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;
(2)
In Bar Matter No. 1132, this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys number;
(3)
In Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the "number and date of
their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may
indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
(4)
In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code, a lawyer must
indicate his professional tax receipt number;
(5)
Bar Matter No. 1922 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6)
This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a counsel's
contact details.

As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities.

The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt

number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership)
number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek
to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are
able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a
person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar.
With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally
discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if
the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information,
in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus lawyers."46
Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise
compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local
government units.

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from)

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for
"keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the
profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."

Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to

facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service
of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and
facilitate better representation of a client's cause. In Juane v. Garcia, this court took
occasion to expound on the significance of putting on record a counsel's address:

The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar
that it is their inescapable duty to make of record their correct address in all cases
in which they are counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have been in the past
when, because of failure to inform the court of the change of address, litigations
were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the other parties and
the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such
negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a
setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's
failure to receive notice because the latter has changed the place of his law office
without giving the proper notice therefor. It is only when some such situation comes
about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he
has incurred both to his client and to the cause of justice. It is then that the lawyer
is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly declared that he "will conduct"
himself "as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." Too
late. Experience indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it could prove very
expensive.

These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece
of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in
place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to
betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is
wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar.
Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign compliance only, in truth, to
make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the
profession that one brandishes.

IV

We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that respondent acted in manifest

bad faith, thereby exhibiting a pattern of insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and
intent to make a mockery of courts and legal processes.

In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Altenative Motion to

Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy, respondent appropriated four of the five
details (i.e., IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of
Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number) that Atty. Natu-el indicated in the
Comment dated May 27, 2009, which the latter signed and filed before the Court of
Appeals. Atty. Natu-el's details are reproduced as follows:

MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as follows:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)

In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent used what was
supposedly his correct IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt
number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)

The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and
MCLE compliance number, which respondent previously appropriated for himself.

In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011, respondent used what
was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt
number. However, he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)

It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum54 dated

March 8, 2012, that all the professional details that respondent indicated are
supposedly his own:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he

indicated on his pleadings are products of mere inadvertence.

To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer.
These details somehow found their way into respondent's own pleadings. Certainly,
these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer themselves from
a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must
have actually performed the act of copying and transferring; that is, someone must
have intended to copy and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for this
could have only been respondent or someone acting under his instructions; the
pleadings on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added
to the IBP official receipt and professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty.
Natu-el. The facts of modification and addition show active human intervention to
make something more out of markings that could otherwise have simply been
reproduced.

Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were
discarded while some were retained. The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty.
Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no longer his
IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011
Motion for Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number. This
gradual act of segregating informationdiscarding some while retaining others, and
retaining less over timereveals that the author of these markings must have
engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded from those
that were to be retained.

Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim that the error
was committed by a secretary is inconsequential. As this court has stated in
Gutierrez v. Zulueta:

The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is
attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible
lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the
pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock,
stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members
of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply
disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the
office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.

In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has complied with the requirements
of paying his dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, paying his annual
professional tax, and completing the necessary units for Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education in the periods concerned. To put it plainly, there would be no need
for him to use incorrect information if he had complied with all pertinent regulations.

In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his correct professional
details. We emphasize, however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies of
the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other supporting documents. All
that he relies on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but
respondent, himself, was in a better position to produce the documents that could
prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well
mean that they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from producing them. The
latter would be more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation the basic
presumption "[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."
Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his Comment are correct,
it still remains that he (1) used a false IBP official receipt number, professional tax
receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a total of
seven (7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times.

In failing to accurately state his professional details, respondent already committed

punishable violations. An isolated inaccuracy, regardless of the concerned lawyer's
lack of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative severity. In Bumactao v. Fano,
respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano was suspended from the practice of law for the
singular violation of indicating wrong MCLE compliance details:

Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308". . . . . The admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent
endeavors to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers - PLM
and IBP Quezon City Chapter and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise
attributes the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" to his secretary /
liaison, an "honest mistake . . . because of the pressure of his many duties."

We are not impressed.

Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires "practicing members of the bar to
indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number
and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable. . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records."

At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE
compliance. This is a sort of negligence that is hardly excusable. As a member of
the legal profession, respondent ought to have known that non-compliance would
have resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may file before any
tribunal. The grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding, respondent
(by his own account) admits to having complacently relied on the statements of
MCLE providers. His negligence, therefore risked harm not only upon himself - he
being now burdened with the present complaint as a direct consequence - but
worse, upon his clients, the reliefs they seek through their pleadings being possibly
rendered inoperative.

This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers who have willfully
engaged in acts of deceit and falsehood.

In Flores v. Chua, respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was disbarred on this court's
finding of "a habit, attitude, and mindset not only to abuse one's legal knowledge or
training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and values which the
legal profession demands from its members." Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to
have notarized a document that he knew to have been falsified so as to make it
appear that a person had personally appeared before him; this was part of a bigger
design to defraud another.
In Nunga v. Viray, respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was suspended from the practice
of law for three (3) years after having been found to have notarized a document
despite the lapse of his commission as a notary public.

In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores, respondent Atty. Ernesto B. Flores was

suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years after being found to have
falsely stated that he did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve himself of the
charge of forum shopping when, in fact, he had perfected an appeal.

Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e) of the Local
Government Code, Bar Matter No. 1132, and Bar Matter No. 1922, a total of seven
(7) times. The sheer multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we are only
dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether isolated or manifold, these
inaccuracies alone already warrant disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall be
discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even larcenous
intent.

Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a
matter of clerical errors. He willfully used false information. In so doing, he misled
courts, litigantshis own client included professional colleagues, and all others
who may have relied on the records and documents on which these false details
appear.

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is
a mockery of courts, chief of which is this court, considering that this court is the
author of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated. It is this court that
requires respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number, IBP official receipt
number, and MCLE compliance number.

Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local Government Code,
respondent similarly made a mockery of an act of the legislature.

Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also appropriated for himself
another lawyer's professional details in seven (7) separate instances.

In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for three constituent acts of

larceny, taking, use, and profiting.

Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details that belonged to
another. In these seven instances, he used the same swiped details in his own
pleadings. So too, in these seven instances he personally benefited. In these
instances, respondent succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid pleadings
and avoided the fatal consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He was able to
pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that could have been terminated as
soon as his deficient pleadings were recognized.

All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional larceny are similarly acts
of deceit. In using false information taken from another, respondent misled courts,
parties, and colleagues into believing that he was faithfully, truthfully, and decently
discharging his functions.
Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive courts. He was not only
insubordinate and disobedient of regulations; he was also dishonest, deceitful and
duplicitous. Worse, he was mocking and contemptuous.

VI

The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of gravity that warrants

suspension from the practice of law for an extended period.

This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is much graver. The
confluence of: (1) respondent's many violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules
violated; (3) the frequencynay, patternof falsity and deceit; and (4) his manifest
intent to bring courts, legal processes, and professional standards to disrepute
brings to light a degree of depravity that proves respondent worthy of being
sanctioned. Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and ridiculed courts, respondent
rightly stands to be at the receiving end of disciplinary action.

Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds for disciplining lawyers as
specified by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. His deception is well
demonstrated. He ran afoul of every single word, save perhaps his name, in the
Lawyer's Oath. Then again, it was his own signature, his own name, that respondent
Pacifico M. Maghari, III had disgraced.

Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every single chapter of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's foremost

duty "to uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the same Code requires lawyers to "not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any
falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes
upon lawyers the duty of faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of procedure [and] not
misusing] them to defeat the ends of justice." Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to "observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts."

Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many issuances of this court as
regards the information that members of the bar must indicate when they sign
pleadings. He did so in a manner that betrays intent to make a mockery of courts,
legal processes, and professional standards. By his actions, respondent ridiculed
and toyed with the requirements imposed by statute and by this court. He trampled
upon professional standards established not only by this court, in its capacity as
overseer of the legal profession, but by the Republic itself, through a duly enacted
statute. In so doing, he violated his duty to society and to the courts.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to "conduct

himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues."
In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing counsel, respondent did not
only fail to observe common courtesy. He encroached upon matters that, ultimately,
are personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore, not only an act of trickery;
it is also act of larceny. In so doing, he violated his duty to the legal profession.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity

to the cause of his client," while Canon 18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with
competence and diligence."

In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own
client at risk. Deficiencies in how pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party's
cause as unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent
violated his duty to his clients.

It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did was to deviate from
required formalities. Respondent was, himself, quite dismissive, stating that he did
nothing more than "cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention to
details . . . that. . . are matters of record and are easily verifiable." It is equally
tempting to think it would be excessive of this court to engage in an overly rigid,
pedantic emphasis on formalistic niceties.

However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise be dismissed as empty

formalities are, in fact, necessary solemnities. They are not ends in themselves but
crucial means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility of the legal
profession. They are vital to the dispensation of justice. The significance of these
solemnities, along with the legal profession's "high standard of legal proficiency, . . .
morality, honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]" put in contrast with how
respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standards that his
profession demands, demonstrates the propriety of momentarily suspending
respondent from engaging in legal practice.

It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of
the very same badgeshis place in the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the
Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing training
and competencethat are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he
manifested such contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason for
preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these badges
signify.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his
Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent Atty. Pacifico
M. Maghari, III's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA,

Respondent.

This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable

Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-
detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and
Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty.
Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was
assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated
the following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo
ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at
kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang
ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all
detainees should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that
she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the
necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza
undermined his capability, to wit:

(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic
Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for rape, which
was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to
help him.

(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant
and alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.

(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.

In her unverified Answer dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as
the latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of
Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously
detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various
charges against anybody who does not accede to his demand. Atty. Mendoza
contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as
one. She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were
not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as
a waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were
required to submit their respective position papers.

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow
detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full
fledged lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty.
Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees as alleged. The charges
against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is
not the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or
injured by the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons
were attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the
Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty.
Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the
judiciary2 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.

In a Notice of Resolution dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors

resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution dated November 19, 2011 but
the IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution dated May 10, 2013.
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b of the Revised Rules of
Court.

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant
Complaint against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the
allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty.
Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the
Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims
that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and
Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would
show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the
Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to
substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas
statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that
Areola initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused
to acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are
PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza. It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with
Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a
lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before
the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by
cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and
other government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as
more intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her.
In his Reply, he made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using
carabao english. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office" which seriously
undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated with
the way the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all the
more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of
maligning it.

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This
admission corresponds to one of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she
told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for
their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our
legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless
remark is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even
in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2)
months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that
when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith
or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not
disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents
length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and
feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, respondents advanced age, among other things, have had varying
significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court
takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a
PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by
Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration
was due to Atty. Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it
just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5329

HEINZ R. HECK, Complainant, vs. CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A.

GAMOTIN, JR., Respondent.

This administrative complaint was brought against a City Prosecutor whose manner
of dealing with the complainant, a foreigner, had offended the latter. We dismiss the
complaint because of the complainant's failure to prove that the respondent thereby
breached any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics. Indeed, every lawyer
who is administratively charged is presumed innocent of wrongdoing.

In September 2000, complainant Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment

against then City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City. According
to Heck, he was a victim of the "faulty, highly improper, suspicious anomalous and
unlawful practice" by the respondent, who had obstructed justice by delaying cases
and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo
A. Adaza, his business partners and friends.

The controversy arose from the filing in 1999 by Heck of a criminal case for unjust
vexation against one Oliver Cabrera in the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) in
Cagayan de Oro City. After the case against him was dismissed, Cabrera countered
with two criminal cases against Heck one charging the latter with illegal
possession of firearms (I.S. No. 2000-1860) and the other with unlawful
incrimination of an innocent person (Criminal Case No. 1232). Atty. Adaza
represented Cabrera in both cases. The OCP initially dismissed I.S. No. 2000-1860
for insufficiency of evidence, but Atty. Adaza moved for the reconsideration of the
dismissal. The respondent granted the motion for reconsideration. Heck challenged
the order of the respondent. In the meantime, other pending complaints against
Cabrera (for unjust vexation and grave threats) were also dismissed because of
prescription and insufficiency of evidence. Heck moved for the reconsideration of
the dismissals twice, but his motions were denied.

Heck claimed that on September 11, 2000, the respondent scheduled a meeting at
his office to be attended by Heck, his lawyer, his wife and Atty. Adaza. However,
Atty. Adaza did not attend the meeting. Heck alleged, however, that Atty. Adaza and
the respondent held their own separate "private meeting," for which reason Heck
questioned the propriety of the private meeting and the possibility of connivance
between the respondent and Atty. Adaza.

On September 13, 2000, Heck, accompanied by one Ullrich Coufal, went to the
respondents office to pick up documents supposedly promised to him. But he was
denied the documents by certain ladies sitting outside the respondents office who
behaved arrogantly. Upon arriving at his office, the respondent pushed through the
people crowding outside the office. The actuations of the respondent at the time
were described by Heck thuswise:

That Prosecutor Gamotin, Jr. entered his office, the door was held open by a chair.
Passing the door, Prosecutor Gamotin, Jr. furiously KICKED the chair who [sic] was
holding the door to his office open, sending the chair flying onto the other chairs at
his conference table. Then he SLAMMED the door, almost hitting the face of Mr.
Coufal, who had tried to followed [sic] Prosecutor Gamotin, Jr. Observing such
behaviour

I asked (sic) Mr. Coufal that we better leave. We left disgusted the office, (sic)
leaving smiling faces behind us.

On September 15, 2000, Heck, his wife, child, and counsel went to the respondents
office for another meeting. Atty. Adaza arrived and went straight inside the
respondents office and then called Heck and his group in as if the office was his
own. On that occasion, Heck was told that if he agreed, all cases would be settled
and withdrawn. Heck then asked why the respondent was still entertaining Atty.
Adaza despite his having been already suspended from the practice of law by the
Supreme Court. The respondent raised his voice asking how Heck had learned about
the suspension, and whether it was a final decision of the Supreme Court. Moreover,
Heck recalled:

That the City Prosecutor x x x now was screaming at me, as no one has ever
screamed at me in my sixty (60) years of live [sic]. That he x x x "never received
such information and that this Supreme Court decision is not final", he was now
repeating himself again and again. Here Adaza came in and remarked (when
Gamotin Jr. was catching his breath) that he, Adaza had appealed against this
decision[)] Gamotin, Jr. continued screaming at me, (")that he, (Gamotin) is the
["]Authority and the Law."

Heck stated that he tried to explain his situation calmly to the respondent, but the
respondent continued screaming at him, saying:

You foreigner, go home here we the law of the Filipinos, I am the Authority.

Heck then left the office of the respondent upon the prodding of his counsel. He
claimed that his wife and child became very scared.

In his response to the charge of Heck, the respondent averred that: (1) he had no
personal knowledge of Atty. Adazas suspension, because such information had not
been properly disseminated to the public offices; (2) there were no irregularities in
the filing and resolution of the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Adaza; (3) the
September 11, 2000 meeting had not been arranged by him, but by Hecks counsel
in order to discuss the possibility of settlement; hence, he did not take part in the
meeting; (4) he did not display any act of violence, particularly the kicking of the
chair and slamming of the door, aside from such acts being improbable because of
his age and build; (5) the September 14, 2000 meeting was between the parties
counsels to discuss ways to settle their cases, and Heck was the one who did not
agree to the suggestion of withdrawing the cases; (6) it was Heck who acted
arrogantly when he challenged the respondents authority in allowing Atty. Adaza to
appear in court despite his suspension; and (7) he admitted that when Heck uttered
the words: I will not believe the authorities of the Philippines, he slightly raised his
voice to respond: If you will not believe the authorities of the Philippines, you have
no place in this country, you can go home.8

Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidante

It appears that Heck had filed administrative complaints against the respondent in
the Department of Justice (DOJ); as well as in the Office of the Ombudsman.

On October 12, 2001, the DOJ issued a letter-resolution dismissing the

administrative complaint filed by Heck against the respondent, finding no cogent
basis for the charge of abuse of authority and corruption; and ruling that in any case
the respondent had already retired from government service as of June 6, 2001,
rendering the administrative case moot and academic.

Meantime, the administrative cases in the Office of the Ombudsman were referred
to the Public Assistance Bureau and the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of
that office. In its Investigation Report, the FFIB recommended that: (1) the
investigation of the complaint be considered closed and terminated without
prejudice to its reopening should new evidence enough to establish a prima facie
case against the respondent become available; and (2) the alleged breach by Atty.
Adaza of his suspension from the practice of law and the permission given by the
RTC of Cagayan de Oro City be referred to the Supreme Court.
The records were first referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, then to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation of the merits of the disbarment case
against the respondent, and for its report and recommendation.

In its Report and Recommendation filed on June 6, 2011, the OBC observed that
although there was no clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence of misconduct as
to warrant the penalty of disbarment, the respondents conduct should be
sanctioned; that his act of privately entertaining Atty. Adaza and his brother, as well
as allowing his office to be used for a meeting even in his absence raised doubt on
his integrity; that the respondents reaction to Hecks tirade against the countrys
justice system, particularly the respondents retort that Heck should go back to his
country if he did not believe in the Philippine authorities, constituted decorum that
was so unbecoming of a lawyer.

Thus, the OBC recommended:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that

Respondents prayer to dismiss the case for lack of merit be DENIED and that he be
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED with stern warning that a similar act in the future will be
dealt with more seriously.15

Ruling of the Court

Like the OBC, we consider that the evidence adduced by the complainant
insufficient to warrant the disbarment of the respondent. Disbarment is the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the
Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution
only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar.

However, unlike the OBC, we do not find any justification to sanction the
respondent. A lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived
misconduct or wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing
until the proof arrayed against him establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the
complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a
breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics. Otherwise, the lawyer
merits exoneration.

To begin with, the holding of the meeting between Atty. Babarin, Hecks counsel,
and Atty. Adaza in the respondents office was not suspicious or irregular, contrary
to the insinuation of Heck. We are not unmindful of the practice of some legal
practitioners to arrange to meet with their opposing counsels and their clients in the
premises of the offices of the public prosecutors or in the courthouses primarily
because such premises are either a convenient or a neutral ground for both sides.
Accordingly, holding the meeting between Heck and his adversary, with their
respective counsels, in the respondents office did not by itself indicate any illegal or
corrupt activity. We also note that the respondent was not present in the meeting.
Secondly, we cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Hecks
unexpected tirade in his presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an
attack on his person, but to Hecks disrespectful remark against Philippine
authorities in general. Any self-respecting government official like the respondent
should feel justly affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence,
including harsh words like those uttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified
in making the utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected to
maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and
their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in unexpected situations
that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now view the actuation of
the respondent in reacting to Hecks utterance. The Court will not permit the
respondents good record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to Hecks
remark.

Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the respondents actuations to be

arrogant and overbearing, but it is not fair for us to take the respondent to task in
the context of the events and occasions in which the actuations occurred in the
absence of a credible showing that his actuations had been impelled by any bad
motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or
legal ethics.

Lastly, Heck complains that the respondent still entertained Atty. Adaza despite the
latter having been already suspended from the practice of law. The respondent
explains, however, that he "had no personal knowledge of Atty. Adazas suspension
and that such information was not properly disseminated to the proper offices."

We are inclined to believe the respondents explanation.

The Court meted on Atty. Adaza the suspension from the practice of law in its
decision promulgated on March 27, 2000 in Adm. Case No. 4083 entitled Gonato v.
Adaza. When Heck confronted the respondent on September 15, 2000 about his
allowing Atty. Adaza to practice law despite his suspension, the respondent asked
when Heck had learned of the suspension. The respondent thereby implied that he
had been unaware of the suspension until then.

We believe that the respondent was not yet aware of the suspension at that time. In
Heck v. Atty. Versoza (Adm. Case No. 5330, December 5, 2000),18 the Court
clarified that Atty. Adaza's suspension became final and effective only after his
receipt on September 5, 2000 of the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration with finality; and explained that he would be denied his right to due
process if his suspension were to be made operative on March 27, 2000, the date
when the Court ordered his suspension for six months. The Court further clarified in
Heck v. Atty. Versoza that the courts in the country as well as the public would be
informed of the suspension only after the lapse of a reasonable period after
September 5, 2000 considering that as a matter of policy the circularization of the
order of suspension could be done only after the decision upon the suspension had
attained finality.

It was possible that at the occasion when Atty. Adaza appeared before the
respondent on September 15, 2000, his suspension had not yet attained finality, or
that the order of suspension had not yet been known to the respondent.
Accordingly, it will be unjustified to hold the respondent liable for allowing Atty.
Adaza to practice law and to represent his client in the OCP of Cagayan de Oro City.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against respondent
ATTY. CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR.; and CONSIDERS this administrative matter closed
and terminated.

A.C. No. 10910 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594], January 19, 2016

ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO,

Respondent.

In his verified affidavit-complaint, dated September 17, 2012, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale
Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho
(Atty. Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He
accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into a
compromise agreement without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to render
an accounting of funds which were supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.

Complainant's Position

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance
claim action against Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount
Insurance), docketed as Civil Case No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of MDAHI against
Paramount Insurance was P14,863,777.00.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano),
corporate secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their claim to
P64,412,534.18 by taking into account the interests imposed. Atty. Camacho,
however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees
in the amount of P1,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation. MDAHI
agreed and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a
Payment Request/Order Form. On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for
docket fees to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount,
but never did.

Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a
decision in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount
of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a

settlement with Paramount Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of
PI5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the appellate court.
MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme on the
letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI,
Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment, dated August 15, 2011, before the
RTC stating that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events that
transpired. He asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of P1,288,260.00
as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk
of court as the payment period had lapsed.

Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter, dated
August 24, 2011, stating that he was alarmed that the former would accept a
disadvantageous compromise; that it was against company policy to bribe any
government official with respect to the P1,288,260.00 given to the clerk of court;
and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.

Respondent's Position

In his verified answer, dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the
allegations against him. He stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket fees given to him by MDAHI
formed part of his attorney's fees.

He further stated in his position paper that the judgment debt was paid and
accepted by MDAHI without any objection, as duly evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt. Thus, there was no irregularity in the compromise
agreement.

With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he filed a
Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011 before the
RTC. The Court granted the said motion in its April 12, 2012 Order stating that the
amount of PI,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's fees.

On July 6, 2012, the RTC issued an Order resolving the motion for reconsideration
filed by both parties in favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that
only P300,000.00 was previously paid to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees. Based on
the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of P1,288,260.00 which he
received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said
RTC order had attained finality and constituted res judicata on the present
administrative case. He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an
estafa case against him concerning the amount of PI,288,260.00.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough
evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties in their respective position
papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation, dated April 1, 2013
finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of
the CPR and recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension
from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-474,17 dated
April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Board) adopted the said report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Eldrid C. Antiquiera.

Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration before the Board
reiterating that the compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject
the same and that the amount of P1,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees.

In his Comment/Opposition, Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied
that he filed the satisfaction of judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and
that there was a pending estafa case against him before the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, regarding the
P1,288,260.00 handed to him.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted the
report and recommendation of National Director Dominic CM. Solis. The Board
partially granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice,
the charge regarding the failure to account for the money, because it was
premature to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against the Atty.
Camacho. Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered
to six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.

Entering into a compromise

agreement without written
authority of the client

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity in all their dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct
themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or
malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.

In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise agreements for the
benefit of their clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [s]pecial
powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx (3) To compromise, to
submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to
waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already
acquired xxx."

In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court specifies a stringent requirement with respect to compromise
agreements, to wit:
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and
in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot,
without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In the case at bench, the RTC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI
approximately P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise
settlement in the amount of P15,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI
never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter,
MDAHI did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement.

Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a
lower judgment award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment
before the RTC. The said pleading also failed to bear the conformity of his client.
Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M from Paramount
Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the
compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his
client, Atty. Camacho violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Members of
the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession.

Failing to account for

the money of the client

Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which
provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client."

Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount of
PI,288,260.00 as payment of additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the
same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012
Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as unsubstantiated, and
claimed that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the
other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide such issue because there
was a pending estafa case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI
against Atty. Camacho involving the same amount of P1,288,260.00.

The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty.
Camacho for his failure to account for the money of his client. The pending case
against him is criminal in nature. The issue therein is whether he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of P1,288,260.00 entrusted to
him by his client. The present case, however, is administrative in character,
requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of whether Atty.
Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to account for the money of his client.
Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this administrative case shall not, in any
way, affect the separate criminal proceeding.

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability.
The findings in this case will have no material bearing on other judicial action which
the parties may choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful
actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative
liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must
be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of
proof required in each.

Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho
indeed violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested
MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the amount of
P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood that such amount was
necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-
655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the
latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had
lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by him or improperly given to the
clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did
not apply the amount given to him by his client for its intended legal purpose.

Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional
docket fees and receiving such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense
that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is
grossly contradictory to the established purpose of the P1,288,260.00. In its
Payment Request/Order Form, it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released the
said amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket fees, and not for
any other purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of
merit because it constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the
legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a perilous path where the payment of
his attorney's fees is more important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of
accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not
entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere
fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees.

Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he
received the said amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort, the Court held that ethical and
practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue
receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own
records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means
of ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-
655, adjudging MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of
approximately P65,000,000.00. From that date on, there was no more need for
additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the judgment, MDAHI
subsequently released the money for additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who
handed it to Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having been
rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said amount or return it to his client
upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally withheld the said amount by capriciously
invoking the payment of his attorney's fees.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes
on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not
used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return
upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.

Administrative penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a
form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.

In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years
because he accepted a compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed
to turn over the payment to his client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena33 the
lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered into a compromise agreement
without the special authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and dishonest
contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses III,34 another lawyer, who
misappropriated the money entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or
refused to account for despite repeated demands, was disbarred because his lack of
personal honesty and good moral character rendered him unworthy of public
confidence.

In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the
conformity of his client which is evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the
law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for the money he received from his
client, which was supposed to be paid as additional docket fees. He even had the
gall to impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The
palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be countenanced by the Court for
these constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty that a
lawyer owes to his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of
the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his
duties as a member of the Bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public
perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations,
as well as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty. Camacho
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of P1,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which

he received in his professional capacity for payment of the purported additional
docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer's administrative liability, which must include those intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.

Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale

Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay for additional docket fees
which he received from the latter in the amount of P1,288,260.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.