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2017 BAR EXAMINATIONS

CRIMINAL LAW
PART I. REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I
A. Fundamental and General Principles in Criminal Law

Criminal Cases; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Burden of Proof It


is a cardinal principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is the primordial
duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral
certainty. If the prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not
only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts
constitutional duty to acquit him. (ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.)

Double Jeopardy - In sum, although the Sandiganbayan, in the absence of


grave abuse of discretion, may have erred in dismissing the criminal case,
such error may no longer be annulled or set aside because it would place the
respondents in double jeopardy. At any rate, even if we go beyond the
function of certiorari and dissect the prosecution's theory that the
respondents conspired to commit the crime, we still sustain the
Sandiganbayan. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)

Corpus Delicti Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a


crime. It refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not to the physical
body of the deceased. Because corpus delicti may be proven by
circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to present
direct evidence to prove the corpus delicti. Nevertheless, the prosecution
must present the following elements: (a) that a certain result or fact has
been established, i.e., that a man has died; and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for it. In murder cases, such as in the case at bar,
the corpus delicti, the fact of murder of Betonio, was established through
physical evidence, corroborated by several witnesses' testimonies. (People
v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No. 206296, [August 12, 2015])

Criminal Cases; Evidence - Well-settled is the rule in criminal law that the
conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution
evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense.
The accused has no burden to prove his innocence and the weakness of the
defense he interposed is inconsequential. He must be acquitted and set free
as the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRICO MIRONDO Y IZON,.
G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015 )

Alibi; Defenses in Criminal Actions - Anent Parba's alibi, the Court finds
the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a defense is
inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a)
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON, G.R. No.
214506, October 19, 2015 )

Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers,or even
five (5) kilometers were consistently held not too far to preclude the
possibility that the accused was present at the locus criminis.Surely then, a
distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the "physical impossibility"
contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi.Moreover, considering its
doubtful nature, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to support
the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of weight in law. Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime,
especially in cases where the testimonies of the witnesses are categorical,
consistent and untainted by ill-will. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015 )
Appellants alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to
prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed,
but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to
have been at the scene of the crime. Physical imposiblity refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places. Appellant Allain testified that around 7:00
p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was at Kits house, which was located
around 100 meters away from their own house. On the other hand, appellant
Vergel testified that he passed by Kits house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw
Allain thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAAs house is also 100
meters away from their house. Thus, it would show that Kits house is also in
the same vicinity where the crime was committed. Hence, it was not
physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the incident. . (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL
ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21,
2015.)

An alibi, furthermore, deserves scant consideration in the face of a clear


identification of the accused. (PEOPLE VS. CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380,
November 23, 2015)

In order for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the
vicinity of the crime scene. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of
the commission of the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime. Emilio himself admitted that he was just one
kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the
unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove
physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in
question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot
prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as
the perpetrators of the crime. In the present case, Emilio was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover,
alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his
immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor,
as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former
was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's
defense of alibi will not hold. (RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and
DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

Appellants alibi fail to persuade. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene during its commission. Physical impossibility
refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed. In this case, appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. He
was not able to satisfactorily establish his claims that he was in Orion,
Bataan during the time of the commission of the crime and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at or near the place of the crime. Aside
from his own statement, appellant did not bother to present other witnesses
or any other proof to support his defense. His defense of alibi must
necessarily fail. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA
CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Physical Impossibility- Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the


facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused
when the crime was committed. There must be demonstration that they
were so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime
scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v.DIONE BARBERAN AND DIONE DELOS SANTOS,
G.R. No. 208759, June 22, 2016)
Denials - Accused-appellant's defense, which is predicated on a bare denial,
deserves scant consideration. A bare denial is an inherently weak defense
and has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be
easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165. And in the
absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute
such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty stands. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS
MAMALUMPON y BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Denials; Defenses in Criminal Actions - An assessment of the defenses of denial
and alibi necessitates looking into the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies.
Well-settled is the rule that in determining who between the prosecution and
defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is accorded
much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better position to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies. As such,
the findings of the trial court is accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial
facts which if properly considered, could alter the result of the case. (RONALD
IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to
petitioners' denial. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further
crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and
straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.46 Between an
affirmative assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the
former generally prevails.47 The prosecution witnesses recounted the details
of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner, without any hint of
hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could not have done unless
they genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses
could not have mistakenly identified the petitioners as Rodolfo's perpetrators
considering there is so much familiarity among them. The records are also
bereft of any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill
motives when they testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit. (RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and
DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

The lower courts correctly rejected petitioner's defense of denial for being
self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is inherently a weak defense which
cannot outweigh positive testimony of a prosecution witness. "A defense of
denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward
and probable testimony on affirmative matters." In the instant case, the
defense of denial fails even more when the petitioner's co-accused,
Daguman, confirmed that the petitioner had every intent to possess and was
caught in actual possession of shabu. (ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087.
November 23, 2015)

The settled rule is that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as
between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court that, in light of the positive and categorical
testimony of AAA that accused-appellant raped her, the mere denial of
accused-appellant, without any corroborative evidence leaves the court with
no option but to pronounce a judgment of conviction. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG y
MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

As to appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, the Court agrees with the trial
and appellate courts that the same deserve scant consideration. No
jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi and denial, the
most common defenses in rape cases, are inherently weak and easily
fabricated. As such, they are generally rejected. On the one hand, an
accused's bare denial, when raised against the complainant's direct, positive
and categorical testimony, cannot generally be held to prevail. On the other
hand, unless the accused establishes his presence in another place at the
time of the commission of the offense and the physical impossibility for him
to be at the scene of the crime, his acquittal cannot be properly justified.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO.
202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Apart from his weak and unconvincing defenses of denial and alibi, appellant
further claimed that the courts below should have considered the fact that
AAA had a boyfriend during those times of the alleged rape. The Court,
however, finds such claim unmeritorious. It is not uncommon for appellants
accused of rape to shift the blame to another, particularly to the victim's
suitor or boyfriend. But that AAA had a boyfriend at the time of the incidents
is inconsequential and cannot be held to cast doubt on AAA's testimony. It
has been consistently held that no sane girl would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to
public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. While the weight of
the victim's testimony may be countered by physical evidence to the
contrary or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the
rape, the testimony shall be accorded utmost value in the absence of such
countervailing proof. The fact that AAA had a boyfriend does not necessarily
exclude all possibilities of rape. In reality, it barely has anything to do with
the charges she had filed against appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Alibi - Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution


witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the
appellants. Between the categorical statements of the prosecution
eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness. In order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present
at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN,
G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)

Denial; Alibi; All that accused-appellant had offered in defense were denial
and alibi.- As against these details and testimonies, all that accused-
appellant had offered in defense were denial and alibidefenses that
jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable. It is hardly a relief to
accused-appellant that two (2) witnesses have testified in his defense. Even
their testimonies failed to definitively establish that accused-appellant
neither raped nor killed AAA. Defense witness Flordeliza Baron even
admitted that during the critical time between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of May 4,
1999, when the rape and killing most likely took place, she was never really
aware of accused-appellants whereabouts. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.RUBEN BARON, G.R. NO. 213215, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements


of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents
are required, not absolute certainty. In this case, assuming arguendo that
Gomez's statements, as written in her affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is
nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that she was a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of DBI -a high-ranking officer
that may be privy to delicate transactions such as the purported "under the
table" deal involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be
emphasized, that in determining the elements of the crime charged for
purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not
absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's
defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary
stage. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS.
CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)

a. Definition of Criminal Law


i. Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
b. Applicability and Effectivity of the Penal Code
i. Generality
ii. Territoriality
iii.Prospectivity
A. Felonies
a. Criminal Liabilities and Felonies

i. Classifications of felonies
ii. Elements of criminal liability
Elements of Criminal Liability; Intent; Mens Rea - The case of
Villareal v. People is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the
RPC belongs to the classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus
based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. The identity of mens
rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent
- is the predominant consideration. In order for an intentional felony to exist,
it is necessary that the act be committed by means of "dolo" or "malice".
The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex
idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element
of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a
forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which
a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter
alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.
With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional
felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state
of mind accompanying a forbidden act. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y
JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June
15, 2016)
iii.Impossible crime
iv. Stages of execution

Attempted Murder; The fact that petitioner was successful in blocking the
blow with his hand does not, in and of itself, mean that respondents could
not have possibly killed him.- In Rivera v. People, this court noted that the
fact that the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and not
fatal did not negate the liability of the accused for attempted murder. The
attack on the victim in Rivera was described as follows: In the present case,
the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the
victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend
himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit
him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head,
missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting
in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions. The circumstances in Rivera
are starkly similar with (though not entirely the same as) those in this case.
As in Rivera, several assailants took part in pummeling petitioner, and efforts
were made to hit his head with stones or pieces of hollow blocks. A
difference is that, in this case, petitioner managed to parry an attempted
blow, thereby causing a fracture in his right hand, instead of a more serious
and, possibly fatal, injury on his head. In any case, the fact that petitioner
was successful in blocking the blow with his hand does not, in and of itself,
mean that respondents could not have possibly killed him. It does not negate
any homicidal intent. It remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit
petitioner on the head with a hollow block while respondents Calilan and
Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner. (MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN V.
FUENTES, G.R. NO. 201310, JANUARY 11, 2016)

v. Continuing crimes
vi.Complex crimes and composite crimes
b. Circumstances affecting Criminal Liability
i. Justifying circumstance
Self-Defense; Elements of. Basic is the rule that in every criminal case,
the burden of proving the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution
which has the duty of establishing all the essential elements of the crime.
However, in cases where the accused interposes the justifying circumstance
of self-defense, this prosecutorial burden is shifted to the accused who
himself must prove all the indispensable ingredients of such defense, to wit:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The presence or
absence of these essential elements deals with factual matters which are
best left to the discretion of the trial court to ascertain. As the Court has
repeatedly emphasized in many cases, the trial court is in a better position to
determine the credibility of witnesses having heard and observed firsthand
their behavior and manner of testifying during trial. Thus, the reviewing court
is generally bound by the trial court's findings where no substantial reason
exists that would justify a reversal of the assessments and conclusions drawn
by the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y
CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

After taking into account the location and the number of stab wounds
sustained by the victim, the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense further
crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino's back jibing with
Vicente's assertion that the former was stabbed from behind. Then, when the
victim was totally caught by surprise with the initial attack, the second and
third stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered
by Severino invalidates the accused-appellant's allegation that he was only
defending himself for the number of wounds inflicted are rather
demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to end the life of the victim.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R.
NO., FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete or


incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence all the elements of the justifying circumstance, namely:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. (RAFAEL
NADYAHAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 193134,
MARCH 2, 2016)
Self-Defense; Flight - Likewise weakening accused-appellant's contention
that he acted in self-defense was his behavior immediately after the incident.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant himself admitted that upon seeing
the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep to go to his sister's place in
San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the
authorities for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates his plea
of self-defense and indicates his guilt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396 FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

i.Exempting circumstances

Insanity - To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a


defense claiming that he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under
Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from
criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The
defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a
presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary. (SOLOMON
VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
216021, MARCH 2, 2016)

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to


distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from a
mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the
consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the


crime because such defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance. 23
As such, he is duty bound to establish with certainty that he was completely
deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally
punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death. Proving
insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of
the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity
may be established, to wit: Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going
on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only
be measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can
only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts,
motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. Insanity is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. Xxx Establishing the insanity of an
accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude
that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)

Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with
utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against
murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.
The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not indicate that the
defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade
culpability. The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero
already raised the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting
that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently
harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous cases 32 where the Court
denied the defense of insanity as it was raised only when the initial defense
of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere
afterthought. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not


totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article
12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be
confined in an institution where his mental condition may be addressed so
that he may again function as a member of society. He shall remain confined
therein until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for
his release. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from


criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs
of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from
the criminal liability. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
Accident; Elements of. The defense invoked Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code to release the accused-appellant from criminal
liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstances are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2)
with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without fault or intention of causing it. A close scrutiny of the transcripts of
stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was not
performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered
from the narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016) -

ii.Mitigating circumstances

Passion or Obfuscation - In imposing the correct penalty, however, the


Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation
under Article 13(6). of the RPC, because Jabalde lost his reason and self-
control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. There is passion or
obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. For passion and obfuscation to
be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that: (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by
the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length
of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the
obfuscation in the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose
from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. With
her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter, Jabalde is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
(VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

Privileged Mitigating Circumstances; Minority - As the crime of rape


was committed by two persons, the imposable under Article 266(B) of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime.
Since no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime,
the leser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain was
only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Aritcle 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a
person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than
prescribed by the law, but always in the proper period. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No.
199270. October 21, 2015.)

iii.Aggravating circumstances

Before a qualifying circumstance may be taken into consideration, it must be


proved with equal certainty as that which establishes the commission of the
crime. It is not only the central fact of killing that must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to
have been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be
shown by the same degree of proof. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v.
APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15,
2016)

Evident Premeditation - It bears stressing that the Information for murder


instituted in this case alleged only two aggravating/qualifying circumstances
in support thereof, to wit: evident premeditation and treachery. But, as
correctly found by both the RTC and the CA with which finding we are in full
accord the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
did not attend the killing of the deceased Corazon because there is no
evidence at all that the killing was preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the decision to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In fact, the prosecution here has
adduced no evidence at all to show that sufficient time had lapsed before
appellant decided or determined to commit the crime; nor that appellant, by
some convincing act or action, had indeed clung to his determination to kill
the victim; let alone that sufficient time had indeed lapsed or transpired
between the decision to kill and its actual execution, to allow appellant time
or opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389,
FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

To establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded
by reflection during a period of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
cannot be considered. It must be based on external acts and must not be
merely suspected. There must be a demonstration of outward acts of a
criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. The prosecution failed to
satisfy the requisites of evident premeditation. The records contain no
evidence regarding the planning and preparation of the killing of Janjoy. It
was likewise not shown that accused-appellant clung to his detemiination to
kill Janjoy. In fact, the only thing established by the prosecution witness'
testimony was accused-appellant's plan to kill Rovic Vasquez, not Janjoy
Vasquez. Thus, it cannot be said that accused-appellant had a preconceived
plan to kill Janjoy. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO
"TOTONG" AVILA Y ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016)

Abuse of Superior Strength - Abuse of superior strength is present


whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked
the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative
of the presence of this circumstance. The evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate
intent to use this advantage.The prosecution failed to adduce evidence of a
relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except for the showing
that there were two assailants present when the crime was committed.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y
ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016)

Treachery - There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof, which tend directly and (specially to ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the I defense which the offended party might
make. The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means,
method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of
execution. A finding of existence of treachery should be based on "clear and
convincing evidence". The first shot was fired from behind a closed door,
catching the victim by surprise. The second shot to the victim's head was
fired immediately after the door was forced open by the accused-appellant.
Such manner of execution of the crime ensured the safety of accused-
appellant from retaliation and afforded the victim no opportunity to defend
herself. Thus, We hold that the circumstance of treachery should be
appreciated, qualifying the crime to Murder. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y ALECANTE, G.R. No.
201584, June 15, 2016)

The fact that the shooting of the three victims had occurred in quick
succession fully called for a finding of the attendance of treachery in the
attacks against all the victims. Montegrico, Tamanu and Paleg were drinking
together outside their bunkhouse prior to the shooting when the accused
suddenly appeared from the rear of the dump truck, walked towards their
table and shot Montegrico without any warning. That first shot was quickly
followed by more shots. In that situation, none of the three victims was
aware of the imminent deadly assault by the accused, for they were just
enjoying their drinks outside their bunkhouse. They were unarmed, and did
not expect to be shot, when the accused came and shot them. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June
14, 2016)

The attack was mounted with treachery because the two conditions in order
for this circumstance to be appreciated concurred, namely: (a) that the
means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; and (b) that such
means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. The essence of
treachery lay in the attack that came without warning, and was swift,
deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victims no chance to resist, or retaliate, or escape, thereby
ensuring the accomplishment of the deadly design without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No.
194605, June 14, 2016)

What was decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. Jurisprudence has been
illustrative of this proposition. In People v. Flora, for instance, treachery was
appreciated as an attendant circumstance in the killing of two victims, and in
the attempted killing of a third victim, warranting the conviction of the
accused for two murders and attempted murder, notwithstanding that
although the accused had first fired at his Intended victim, he had missed
and had instead hit the two other victims, with the Court observing that the
three victims were all nonetheless "helpless to defend themselves." In a
nother illustrative ruling, People v. Pinto, Jr., treachery was held to attend the
three killings and the wounding of a fourth victim because the attack was
sudden and the victims were defenseless; hence, the killings were murders,
and the wounding frustrated murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016)

As to the finding of treachery, we affirm the rulings of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals. The RPC, in Article 14(16), defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. "There are two (2) conditions that must concur for
treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b)
the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.
'The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim [with] no chance to resist or escape."
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R.
No. 203066, August 05, 2015)
"The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and
is done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. Thus, even frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected[,] and the
victim is unarmed. In the case at bar, treachery is evident. For one, "[t]he
use of a xxx shotgun against [an] unarmed [victim] is undoubtedly
treacherous, as it denies the [victim] the chance to fend off the offender." For
another, the fact that accused-appellant hid first and then blindsided the
victim shows his conscious effort to adopt a deliberate attack which affords
no warning to the victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO
LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. No. 203066, August 05, 2015)

As for the qualifying circumstance of treachery, paragraph 16 of Article 14


of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
(PEOPLE V. SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November 25,
2015])

Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No.
203087. November 23, 2015)

Even if the attack is frontal but sudden and unexpected, giving no


opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself; there would be
treachery. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015)

Treachery is never presumed and it is required that the manner of attack


must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusive as the
crime itself. (PEOPLE VS. CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23,
2015)

From the pronouncement in Cirera v. People, 730 SCRA 27 (2014), it is


apparent that treachery cannot be appreciated if the victims position was
accidental and the accused acted impulsively. The means of attack should
have been deliberately and consciously adopted by accused. (PEOPLE VS.
CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015)

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in its execution which tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended party might make. At this point, it bears
to emphasize that the stabbing was not preceded by any argument between
the victim and the accused-appellant. So, when the accused-appellant
surreptitiously approached the victim from behind, the latter had no inkling
nor reason to believe that his life was in danger. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

On account of the fact that Severino was just casually conversing with
Vicente at that time, his defenses were down. Naturally, Severino was too
stunned by the suddenness of the first stab blow at his back. As a result, the
victim could no longer recover from the initial attack and the other two stab
blows inflicted made it more difficult for Severino to defend himself or
retaliate. This is precisely the essence of treachery wherein the attack must
be deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape. Further, the strategy employed by the accused-appellant in
carrying out the attack guaranteed that he will not be exposed to any risk
which may arise from the defense the victim might make. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

We are likewise convinced that the killing was qualified by treachery. "There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." "The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." In this case,
appellants sudden attack on Corazon inside her apartment amply
demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the crime.
Corazon could not have been aware that her life was in imminent danger
inside the comforts of her own home. When appellant barged in, Corazon
was having coffee with Joan totally unaware that she would be attacked
inside the confines of her own house. When appellant grabbed her neck and
stabbed her in the back, Corazon was afforded no chance to defend herself
and retaliate or repel the attack. Although she struggled, such was not
enough to protect or extricate her from the harm posed by appellant.
Undoubtedly, the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder
under Article 248 of the RPC in view of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. All told, Corazon was unaware of the imminent danger on her life,
and was not in a position to defend herself. Verily, treachery attended the
commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO
DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the


existence of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.In People v. Gunda,it was explained that when the attack against
an unarmed victim is so sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of
what the assailant was about to do, there is treachery. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON, G.R. No. 214506, October
19, 2015 )

As found by the Court of Appeals, treachery attended the shooting against


Judge Velasco, thus: Gilbert was shown to have shot the deceased, Judge
Velasco. The victim was hit three (3) times while on board a motorcycle at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Judge Velasco was approaching his house
while coming from a birthday party when he was shot. He was unarmed and
accompanied by Garabato, his wife, and Christopher Iway. Clearly, Judge
Velasco was unaware of any attack that Gilbert planned against him. To
ensure the success of his criminal design, Gilbert, with the aid of an
unidentified person, fired at the victim three (3) times. What existed in this
case was such a sudden and unexpected attack and without warning on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving Judge Velasco of any real chance to defend
himself, and thereby ensuring, without risk, of its commission . What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation
from the victim, who was unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT
CABALLERO Y GARSOLA, G.R. No. 210673, June 29, 2016)

Rape; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Deadly Weapon;


Committed by Two or More Persons; Penalties; Under Article 266-B of
Republic Act (RAJ No. 8353, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed whenever the crime of rape is committed through the use of a
deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons. As to Roberto, we affirm the
imposition of reclusion perpetua for each of the crimes committed. Under
Article 266-B of RA. No. 8353, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed whenever the crime of rape is committed through the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, it was
sufficiently alleged in the Information and proven during trial that the crime
was committed by Roberto together with Don Juan and Bombasi. Since
neither applicable aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties which is
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed to Roberto pursuant to Article 63 of the
penal code. (PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313, September 2,
2015)

Special Aggravating Circumstances; Illegal Possession of


Unlicensed Firearm; The Supreme Court has clarified that there is no
need to present the firearm itself to prove the existence of an unlicensed
firearm. The Court has clarified that there is no need to present the
firearm itself to prove the existence of an unlicensed firearm. People v.
Narvasa is instructive on this matter, viz.:. . . In People v. Lualhati, this
Court merely stated that the existence of the firearm must be established;
it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented as evidence. Thus,
in People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of the firearm can
be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said
firearm. (PEOPLE V. SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November
25, 2015])

Use of Unlicensed Firearms - Notably, the term unlicensed firearm


includes the unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the
crime, under Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8294. Assuming arguendo
that the actual firearm used by appellant was licensed, he still failed to prove
that he was so authorized to use it by the duly licensed owner. The
prosecution having proven that appellant was not issued a firearms license
or permit to carry or permit to transport firearms, the burden of evidence is
then shifted to appellant to prove his authorization to use the firearm. All
told, the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said
aggravating circumstance in imposing the penalty against appellant.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No.
206291, January 18, 2016)

Use of a motor vehicle - Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is


aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate
escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not
purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the
escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. In People v.
Herbias, the Court held: The use of motor vehicle may likewise be considered
as an aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.
The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in trailing and overtaking
the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellants back rider mercilessly
riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt that the
motorcycle was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their
escape after they accomplished their mission.

Treachery - In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting
of Atty. Segundo was attended by treachery because appellant shot the said
victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon, thus: x x x
Atty. Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his teenage niece as
passenger sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally unaware that
he will be treacherously shot just 200 meters away from his residence. He
was unarmed and was not given any opportunity to defend himself or to
escape from the deadly assault. After he was hit when the gunman fired the
first two shots at him and his niece and after he lost control of his jeep which
bumped an interlink wire fence and stopped, he was again shot three times
by the gunman. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN,
G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)

Evident Premeditation - The essence of evident premeditation, on the


other hand, is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to
be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. As aptly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court conceded that the specific time
when the accused determined to commit the crime, and the interval between
such determination and execution, cannot be determined. After a careful
review of the records, the Court agrees with the CAs finding that no
evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of evident
premeditation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN,
G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)

Qualifying Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength; It is discernible


that respondents took advantage of their superior strength or otherwise
employed means to weaken petitioners defense.-It is discernible that
respondents took advantage of their superior strength or otherwise
employed means to weaken petitioners defense. With this qualifying
circumstance, there is ample basis for pursuing respondents prosecution for
murder, albeit not in its consummated stage. (MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN
V. FUENTES, G.R. NO. 201310, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Relationship; Exemplary Damages. Given that this is a case of a husband


killing his wife where relationship a qualifying circumstance, the award of
exemplary damages is justified. The exemplary damages of P30,000.00
awarded by the CA is maintained as it is consistent with the latest rulings of
the Court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y
BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)

ii. Alternative circumstances

iii. Absolutory cause


Absolutory Cause; Elements of. Article 247 is an absolutory cause that
recognizes the commission of a crime that for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed. The defense must prove the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; (2) the he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of
his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the
accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Having
admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show
the applicability of Article 247. As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when
he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside each other and
were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247
is not applicable in the present case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)

c. Persons Liable and Degree of Participation


i. Principals, accomplices and accessories
Principal by Inducement - The conviction of a person as a principal by
inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the material executor. As applied,
the Sandiganbayan would have been correct in holding petitioner criminally
liable if he indeed made the utterance immediately before the shooting
incident. However, this Court is not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed
made the declaration that started the fray. The court a quo failed to take
note of substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution
witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to
minor details but even to the facts constituting important aspects of the
case, seriously eroding the weight of the evidence of the prosecution, and
casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner Ambagan. (ALBERT
G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-
82, October 14, 2015.)

iv.Conspiracy and proposal

Conspiracy Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a


common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose.
Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. In this
case, the acts of Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi clearly demonstrated unity
of action to have carnal knowledge of AAA: (1) Both Roberto and Bombasi
tied AAA's hands at her back, while a handkerchief was already tied in her
mouth; (2) Both men turned AAA around, touched her body and started to
take her clothes off; (3) Roberto succeeded in undressing AAA, went on top
of her and placed his penis inside her vagina; (4) After satisfying his lust,
Roberto got off from AAA and Bombasi took his tum and inserted his penis
inside AAA's vagina; (5) After Bombasi, Don Juan went on top of MA, kissed
her shoulders and lips and also inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (6)
When they were satiated in their sexual desires, the three accused untied
the rope binding AAA and threatened to cut off her tongue and kill her family
in case she would tell them what happened. Unmistakably, these acts
demonstrated a concerted effort to rape AAA. Since there was a conspiracy
between Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi, the act of one of them was the act
of all and the three of them are equally guilty of all the crimes of rape
committed against AAA. (PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313,
September 2, 2015)
We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or
after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy
is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. The prosecution
had established that appellants held AAAs hands, and when she tried to
shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant
Vergel punched her in the abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness.
It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in
this case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and
ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)

Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. (PEOPLE VS.
ZABALA G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015)

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement


concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be
alleged as a mode of committing a crime or as constitutive of the crime itself.
It need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to
commit the crime as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which
clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit
a crime. More significant, conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on
nothing less than a moral certainty. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, it is, nonetheless, required to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done by each of
the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION),
G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)
As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused. However,
it is required that said acts must clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a
common intent or design to commit a crime. The concurrence of will and
common intent or design to commit a crime is not clearly manifest in the
present case. The charge of conspiracy simply does not hold water. No
convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired
to commit the crime. We find no credible proof that links or gives unifying
purpose to the respondents' individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot
conclude with moral certainty that they conspired, connived, and mutually
helped one another to commit the crime. These acts, on their own and
nothing more, do not support the allegation of conspiracy. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953,
August 05, 2015)

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy.


Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity of action towards the
realization of an unlawful objective among the accused. Its existence can be
inferred from the individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a whole are
in fact related, and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. In this case,
conspiracy was manifested in the spontaneous and coordinated acts of the
accused, where two of them delivered the initial attack on Rodolfo by
stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and the third held him so
that the other two can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo
laid helpless on the ground and had lost consciousness that the accused
hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission of
the crime adequately established a conspiracy among them. (RONALD
IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an


agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words,
or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the
commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.-
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or
conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission
of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. Proof of the
agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND
PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
Conspiracy- We discern no showing from this allegation that Magcamit
extorted money from Jaen, or that he was among those who took part in the
division of the money allegedly extorted from Jaen. For conspiracy to exist, it
must be proven or at least inferred from the acts of the alleged perpetrator
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. It cannot simply be
surmised that conspiracy existed because Magcamit was part of the team
that took part in the buy-bust operation which resulted in Jaen's arrest. In
other words, respondents failed to pinpoint Magcamit's participation in the
extortion that would make him administratively liable.After evaluating the
totality of evidence on record, we find that the records are bereft of
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Magcamit should be held
administratively liable for grave misconduct; Magcamit was dismissed from
the service based on evidence that had not been disclosed to him. By
affirming this dismissal, the CA committed a grave reversible error.
(MAGCAMIT VS. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY G.R. NO. 198140, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Conspiracy - Petitioner averred that respondents Calilan and Lindo took
hold of each of his arms while respondent Fuentes was about to strike him
with a hollow block. It is, therefore, apparent that all three of them acted out
of a common design as is indicative of a conspiracy.- In this case, petitioner
averred that respondents Calilan and Lindo took hold of each of his arms
while respondent Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block. It is,
therefore, apparent that all three of them acted out of a common design as is
indicative of a conspiracy. We sustain the conclusion of Undersecretary
Malenab-Hornilla that there is basis for prosecuting respondents for murder
in its attempted, and not in its frustrated, stage. (MARASIGAN Y DE
GUZMAN V. FUENTES, G.R. NO. 201310, JANUARY 11, 2016)

ii. Multiple offenders (differences, rules, effects)


iii.Include : Obstruction of Justice (P.D. 1829)

B. Penalties

Penalties - Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1]
day to ten [10] days) when only mitigating circumstance is present in the
case. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable
due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, Jabalde shall suffer a
penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor. (VIRGINIA
JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
195224, June 15, 2016)

In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal
on their respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the
penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they
were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason
to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid
similar cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a
criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was
convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. (ROGER
ALLEN BIGLER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LINDA SUSAN
PATRICIA E. BARRETO, G.R. NO. 210972, MARCH 2, 2016)

Prescription of Penalties - As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial


Warden of Negros Occidental, the Court already opined that evasion of
service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. Later,
Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. expounded on the rule that the culprit should
escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty
imposed by final sentence to commence to run, thus: x x The period of
prescription of penalties- so the succeeding Article 93 provides - "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence." (RODOLFO BASILONIA v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ,
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015)

a. Principles (include R.A. No. 9346 Act Prohibiting the


Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines)
b. Classification
c. Duration and Effect
d. Application
e. Graduation of Penalties
f. Accessory Penalties
g. Computation of Penalties
h. Execution and service (include P.A. No. 968 Probation
Law; and R.A. No. 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act)
Penalties; Execution and Service; Penal Colonist - The conferment by
the Director of Corrections of a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to
reduce the latter's sentence. Section 5 of Act No. 2489 is clear and
unambiguous: "[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment receiving
and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties will
automatically have the sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence
of thirty years when receiving the executive approval for this classification
upon which the regular credit now authorized by law and special credit
authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made."
(RUBEN E. TIU v. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON,G.R. No. 211269, June
15, 2016)
Retroactivity of Laws; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; With
the passage of Republic Act (RAJ No. 9344 known as "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006" on 28 April 2006, the provision on retroactivity applies
insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. With the passage of
Republic Act No. 9344 (RA. No. 9344) known as "Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006" on 28 April 2006, the provision on retroactivity applies insofar
as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. This is despite the fact that the
accused is no longer a minor at the time his conviction is promulgated. The
intent of RA. No. 9344 is the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law even if he/she has already exceeded the age limit of 21 years,
so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. He/she
shall be entitled to the right to restoration'; rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with RA. No. 9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live
a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What is important is that the offense
was committed when the accused was still of tender age. (PEOPLE VS.
HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313, September 2, 2015)

Suspended Sentence; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 -


Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of
age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child
has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No.
199270. October 21, 2015.)

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with
the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the judgment of
conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor
reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No.
9344, to wit: SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.
If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in
conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270.
October 21, 2015.)

Youthful Offenders; Discernment In Madali, et al. v People, 595 SCRA


274 (2009), we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, it was
established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act
of covering AAAs mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting
and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No.
199270. October 21, 2015.)

C. Criminal and Civil Liabilities


a. Extinction of Criminal Liabilities
b. Civil Liabilities in Criminal Cases
Civil Liability - Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable. We said in one case: It bears repeating that "an
offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the
social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru
the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the personal
injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v. Gonong, 72
SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this Court in US. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it
clear that the civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the
crime committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x. Under Article 112 of the
RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of the Code
shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law,
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6,
Rule 39 thereof, is applicable. It states:LSection 6. Execution by motion or by
independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
(RODOLFO BASILONIA v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ, G.R. Nos.
191370-71, August 10, 2015)

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several


distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender. If the conduct constitutes a
felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code (ex delicto). This particular civil liability due the offended party is
rooted on facts that constitute a crime. Otherwise stated, civil liability
arises from the offense charged. It is not required that the accused be
convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts
constituting the offense charged are established by preponderance of
evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil liability based on
delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. (PAZ T. BERNARDO,
SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO,
MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5,
2015)
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent
civil liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law; (b)
contracts; (c) quasi-contracts; and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the
civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code
and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil Code. For conduct
constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise
grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Thus, it is entirely
possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of
the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other
than the criminal law. Such civil actions may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action,
subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission. (PAZ T. BERNARDO,
SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO,
MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5,
2015)

As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her


criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the
offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which
can be overcome only by a finding of guilt something that death prevents
the court from making. In a sense, death absolves the accused from any
earthly responsibility arising from the offense a divine act that no human
court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. The intervention of death of
the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal
liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be
imposed on him. (PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS,
MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN
T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)

Independent Civil Liability - The independent civil liabilities, however,


survive death and an action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued
but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced against the estate of the accused. (PAZ T. BERNARDO,
SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO,
MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5,
2015)

Civil Liability in Criminal Cases; Civil Indemnity in case of Death - It is


again timely to raise the civil indemnity for death arising from crime or quasi-
delict. We start by reminding that human life, which is not a commodity, is
priceless. The value of human life is incalculable, for no loss of life from
crime or quasi-delict can ever be justly measured. Yet, the law absolutely
requires every injury, especially loss of life, to be compensated in the form of
damages. For this purpose, damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or, as
otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences that the law imposes for
the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. As such, damages
refer to the amount in money awarded by the court as a remedy for the
injured. Although money has been accepted as the most frequently used
means of punishing, deterring, compensating and regulating injury
throughout the legal system, it has been explained that money in the context
of damages is not awarded as a replacement for other money, but as
substitute for that which is generally more important than money; it is the
best thing that a court can do. Regardless, the civil indemnity for death,
being compensatory in nature, must attune to contemporaneous economic
realities; otherwise, the desire to justly indemnify would be thwarted or
rendered meaningless. This has been the legislative justification for pegging
the minimum, but not the maximum, of the indemnity. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14,
2016)

On April 5, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision in People v. Jugueta


(G.R. No. 202124), whereby it adopted certain guidelines on fixing the civil
liabilities in crimes resulting in the death of the victims taking into proper
consideration the stages of execution and gravity of the offenses, as well as
the number of victims in composite crimes. Other factors were weighed by
the Court. In the case of murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion
perpetna, the Court has thereby fixed P75,000.00 for moral damages,
P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for civil indemnity as
the essential civil liabilities,- in addition to others as the records of each case
will substantiate. Hence, we impose herein the same amounts for such items
of damages in each count of murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016)
Civil Indemnity - We observe that the lower courts failed to award civil
indemnity and moral damages in this case. Civil indemnity is awarded if the
crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty. On the other hand, moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217
of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar
injury. There is no doubt that Haitao suffered physical, mental and emotional
trauma over the kidnapping of Tan and her two-year old son. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, JR., G.R. NO.
192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Turning now to the awards for civil indemnity, and for actual, exemplary and
moral damages made by the CA, we believe that certain modifications are in
order. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the awards for civil indemnity and
for moral damages in favor of Corazons heirs should be increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.20 The CA also correctly upgraded the award of
exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389,
FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Loss of Earning Capacity; Formula - This Court likewise sustains the


award of actual damages in the amount of P74,800.00, which represents
actual expenses incurred for the burial of Corazon; indeed the defense
agreed to pay this sum during the trial. Nevertheless, this Court must correct
the CA's computation relative to the loss of earning capacity. The proper
formula for the computation of recoverable damages for loss of earning
capacity is as follows: Net Earning Capacity= life expectancy x [gross annual
income - living expenses] = 2/3 [80-age of the victim at time of death] x
[gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income] = 2/3 [80-49 years] x
[P67,320.00-P33,660.00] = 20.6666667 x P33,660.00 = P695,640.00.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS,
G.R. NO. 207389 FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Damages; Death due to a crime - As to the award of the damages,


"[w]hen death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and
(5) temperate damages." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO
LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. No. 203066, August 05, 2015)
PART II. REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II)
A. Crime against National Security and Laws of Nations
B. Crimes against the Fundamental Laws of the State
C. Crimes against Public Order

Resistance to a Person in Authority The laying of hands or using


physical force against agents of persons in authority when not serious in
nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not
direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the
disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by
the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real
importance of the transgression, rather than the source of the order
disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be
considered direct assault, but is resistance nonetheless. (People v. Breis y
Alvarado , G.R. No. 205823, [August 17, 2015])

D. Crimes against Public Interest

Copyright Infringement Accordingly, the commission of any of the acts


mentioned in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 49 without the
copyright owners consent constituted actionable copyright infringement. In
Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144 (1996), the Court has
empathically declared: Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private
domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of a copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right
to do which is conferred by the statute on the owner of the copyright.
(MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS ROLANDO MANANSALA and/or MEL
MANANSALA, doing business as DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY
and/or COMIC ALLEY. G.R. No. 166391. October 21, 2015. )

Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged the existence of


computer programs as works or creations protected by copyright. To hold, as
the CA incorrectly did, that the legislative intent was to require that the
computer programs be first photographed, photo-engraved, or pictorially
illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement
invites ridicule. Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged
the existence of computer programs as works or creations protected by
copyright. Such interpretation of Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49
defied logic and common sense because it focused on terms like copy,
multiply, and sell, but blatantly ignored terms like photographs,
photo-engravings, and pictorial illustration. Had the CA taken the latter
words into proper account, it would have quickly seen the absurdity of its
interpretation. (MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS ROLANDO MANANSALA
and/or MEL MANANSALA, G.R. No. 166391. October 21, 2015. )

The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by
itself to show the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement.
There was no need for the petitioner to still prove who copied, replicated, or
reproduced the software programs. Indeed, the public prosecutor and the
DOJ gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioners charge for
copyright infringement against the respondents for lack of evidence. There
was grave abuse of discretion because the public prosecutor and the DOJ
acted whimsically or arbitrarily in disregarding the settled jurisprudential
rules on finding the existence of probable cause to charge the offender in
court. Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ of the
petitioners petition for review. (MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS
ROLANDO MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA, October 21,
2015. )

Falsification by Public Officers; Elements of - The penalty of prision


mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 4.
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x x. Reduced to its
elements, a violation under this provision requires that:L(1) The offender
makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2)
He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; and (3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely
false. The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. The offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody
of the document which he falsifies. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953, August 05,
2015)

In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there


be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in
the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION),
G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)

E. Crimes against Public Morals


F. Crimes commited by Public Officers

Direct Bribery; Elements of. As already stated, Apelo was accused of


committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has the following elements: (a)
that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which Is
his official duty to do; and (d) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION (PDIC) VS. CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2,
2015)

Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of. Cu and Zate were accused of


committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials, the elements of which
are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts
or presents to a public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises are made
or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that
will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
(PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS.
CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)

G. Crimes against Persons


Homicide; Elements of. The Court, in Villanueva v. Caparas, 689 SCRA
679 (2013) held that the following elements must be proven to sustain a
conviction for homicide: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill,
which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
(ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.)

Parricide; Penalties; Death Penalty.- Article 246 of the Revised Penal


Code (RPC) provides that the impossible penalty for parricide is reclusion
perpetua to death. With the enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, the
imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise significant is the
provision found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the
absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying theses to the case
at bar and considering that there are no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances [resent, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly
imposed by the RTC and CA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL
MACAL y BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)

Civil Indemnity. Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the


fact of death of the victim and the commission by the accused-appellant of
the crime of parricide. Current jurisprudence sets civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00. As such, the Court finds it necessary to increase the
civil indemnity awarded by the trial and appellate courts from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y
BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)

Moral Damages. There is no question that Aurias heirs suffered mental


anguish by reason of her violent death. Consequently, the award of moral
damages is in order. There is no question that Aurias heirs suffered mental
anguish by reason of her violent death. Consequently, the award of moral
damages is in order. Similar to civil indemnity, prevailing jurisprudence pegs
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00. on that account, the Court
must also adjust the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR
No. 211062, January 13, 2016)
Murder- Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended
by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The essence of
treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance
to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk
to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely,
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No. 206291, January 18,
2016)

Frustrated Homicide; Elements of - The elements of frustrated homicide


are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none
of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present.39 There being no prior determination by
both the trial and appellate courts of any qualifying circumstance that would
elevate the homicide to murder, the Court will simply limit its discussion to
the first two elements. In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court
considers the presence of the following factors: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. (RONALD IBANEZ,
EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

Homicide; Penalties; Reclusion Temporal - Article 249 of the Revised


Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states that the imposable penalty
upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Hence,
frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be meted on the
petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty
should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor ranging from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
(RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL BOBOT IBANEZ vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term should be that
which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and
the minimum should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC. When neither aggravating nor mitigating are present,
the penalty prescribed by law shall be in its medium period. (PEOPLE VS.
CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015)

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide
the penalty of reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.
There being an incomplete self-defense, the penalty should be one (1)
degree lower or from reclusion temporal to prision mayor to be imposed in its
minimum period considering the presence of one ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender pursuant to Article 64(2). (RAFAEL
NADYAHAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 193134,
MARCH 2, 2016)

Murder; Elements of - In order to convict a person charged with the crime


of Murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or
her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute
Parricide or Infanticide. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No.
214506, October 19, 2015 )
The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide or infanticide.
(PEOPLE V. SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November 25,
2015])

To wit: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed that person; (c) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248; and (d) the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide. (PEOPLE
VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015)

The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT CABALLERO Y
GARSOLA, G.R. No. 210673, June 29, 2016)

"The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are[:] (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide."
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R.
No. 203066, August 05, 2015)

Murder; Penalties - Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as


amended, the penalty for the crime of murder qualified by treachery is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since there were no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed on the accused-appellant in accordance with
Article 63, paragraph 2 of the same Code. Therefore, the Court affirms the
penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Criminal Law; Parricide; Elements of. Parricide is committed when: (1)


a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually
distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide involving
spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim
is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving
the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR
No. 211062, January 13, 2016)

Murder; Penalties; Parole - The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua


to death. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant
to the crime, the trial court and the appellate court correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, following Article 63(2) of the RPC. Such shall
be without eligibility for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R.
No. 203066, August 05, 2015)

Rape. It has become fundamental in rape cases that no woman of sound


mind would be willing to publicize her grueling experience and risk the ordeal
of interrogation, were it not for the purpose of vindicating her honor. The
victims willingness and courage to face the interrogation and medical
examination is a silent but eloquent proof of the truth.

An essential element of the crime of rape is the existence of force and


intimidation inflicted by the perpetrator upon the victim. In the instant case,
the moral ascendancy of the accused-appellant takes the place of the
element of force and intimidation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs
RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Rape; Elements of Rape is committed: 1.) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force,
threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant and (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the above
enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed
in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with
regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for
rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue to
deal with. Thus, if the victims testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused
should be acquitted of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL
ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)

For the prosecution of rape to prosper, the following elements must be


proved: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act
was accomplished (a) through the use of force, threat or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when
the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO,
G.R. No. 203313, September 2, 2015)

Appellants argument that AAAs conduct after the alleged sexual assault,
i.e., washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her private
part, are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been raped
deserves scant consideration. It is not accurate to say that there is a typical
reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. On the contrary, people
react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be
anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement. What is notable in the
records was the fact that after she had regained consciousness at 1 oclock
in the morning of July 17, 1998, she immediately went back to her
employers house and narrated to them what the appellants had done to her,
later reported the rape incident to the police and underwent a physical
examination of her private parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire to
obtain justice for what appellants did to her. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No.
199270. October 21, 2015.)

To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts
are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUIRINO
BALMES Y CLEOFE, G.R. No. 203458, June 06, 2016)
Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. In this type of
rape, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the
age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on
account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RENATO B. SUEDAD, G.R. No. 211026, June 27, 2016)

To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts
are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, the
primordial or single most important consideration is almost always given to
the credibility of the victim's testimony. When the victim's testimony is
credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused person's conviction since,
owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can
be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party. A rape
victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close
relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER GALAGATI, G.R. No. 207231,
June 29, 2016)

The statutory provisions relevant to the case are Article 266-A and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which provide: Article 266-A. Rape, When
and How Committed. - Rape is committed - 1. By a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. Xxx Article 266-B. Penalties. -
Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua. Xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x The elements of the offense charged
are that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge
of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority. Neither the presence nor use of a
deadly weapon nor the employment of physical violence by the accused
upon the victim are essential to a finding that force or intimidation existed at
the time the rape was committed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROGER GALAGATI y GARDOCE, G.R. No. 207231, June 29, 2016)

Accused-appellant is charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised


Penal Code. For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of
age or is demented. (PEOPLE vs. ARCEO, G.R. No. 208842, November
10, 2015)

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution has the burden to prove
that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he
accomplished the act through force, threat or intimidation, or when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12
years of age or was demented. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling on the veracity of AAA's testimony. The Court
finds no reason to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts. AAA
consistently identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual
abuse against her and she unequivocally testified on the manner with which
the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. (PEOPLE vs.
REMEDIOS, G.R. No. 211056, November 10, 2015)

An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against


him and, as such, it must embody the essential elements of the crime
charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on
the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare
for and undertake his defense. It is not necessary, however, for information
to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude,
unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA,
G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)

AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not
expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage
thereof. The fact that she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed his penis
against her vagina did not mean that there was no penetration. Carnal
knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman. This explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already
constitutes consummated rape. In the present case, AAA testified that she
felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis [against her] vagina."
This Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she
felt pain. In fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being
given a bath by her mother after her molestation. This kind of pain could not
have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of accused-appellant's sex
organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of
penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P. PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978, FEBRUARY 1,
2016)

Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by


reclusion perpetua. x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

This Court has held that it takes much more for a young lass to fabricate a
story of rape, have her private parts examined, subject herself to the
indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity
for a young woman, like AAA, to concoct a story which would put her own
father for the most of his remaining life to jail and drag herself and the rest
of her family to a lifetime of shame. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RICARDO LAGBO , G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was
accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of Rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand,
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual
intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her
consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or intimidation,
or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these are not elements of
statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes
that the offended party does not possess discernment and is incapable of
giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain a conviction for
statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the age of
the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant. The foregoing acts of
Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (a) the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GODOFREDO COMBOY y CRONICO,
G.R. NO. 218399, MARCH 2, 2016)

In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a
sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father,
allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma
and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent
desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would
testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if
this crime did not happen," as in this case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. GODOFREDO COMBOY y CRONICO, G.R. NO. 218399, MARCH 2,
2016.)

In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that
the prosecution was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of
her without her consent on two (2) separate occasions, the first occurring
sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and (b) attempted to
have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason
other than his own desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention. Suffice it to say that
Comboy's flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the perpetrator of the
crimes. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GODOFREDO COMBOY y
CRONICO, G.R. NO. 218399, MARCH 2, 2016)
Simple Rape ; Penalty The trial court properly appreciated minority,
which was pleaded in the Information, as an aggravating circumstance.
According to MMM's birth certificate, she was 12 years and 8 months old at
the time of the rape. Said document was offered and presented in evidence
by the prosecution. Nevertheless, "the presence of an aggravating
circumstance cannot serve to raise the penalty to be imposed [because]
simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua, that penalty shall, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, be imposed regardless of any modifying
circumstance that might have attended the commission of the crime.
(PEOPLE vs. ARCEO, G.R. No. 208842, November 10, 2015)

Statutory Rape; Elements - The elements of statutory rape are found in


the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is Committed 1)
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: x x x x d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. As regards this provision, we have previously
held that: When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime
committed is "termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman
below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the
victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL REBANUEL Y
NADERA, G.R. No. 208475, June 08, 2016)

This Court has consistently held that "rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape." What the law punishes in statutory
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus,
force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant
considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim
does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years;
the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern good from evil. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME BRIOSO
ALIAS TALAP-TALAP, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016)
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below
twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it to the
sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary. These are
not elements of statutory rape as the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve. At that age, the law
presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of
giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. To convict an accused of the
crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving; (1) the
age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant. Full penile
penetration of the female genitalia is likewise not required because carnal
knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with
a woman. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORETO SONIDO Y
CORONEL, G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016)

Conviction will therefore lie, regardless of proof of force or intimidation


provided sexual intercourse is proven. Force, threat, or intimidation are not
elements of statutory rape, therefore proof thereof is unnecessary. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual
intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force,
violence, intimidation or threat. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)

It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational


experience, especially from a young victim. It is inaccurate to say that there
is a standard reaction or norm of behaviour among rape victims because
each rape situation is different and dependent on various circumstances.
(PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)

When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, the crime
committed is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape.33 What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years of age.34 In the instant case, there is no dispute that
AAA was four years of age when the crime was committed. Resultantly,
accused-appellant was charged and proven guilty of statutory rape.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P. PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978,
FEBRUARY 1, 2016)

Statutory Rape ; Penalty - Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266 A


(1), paragraph (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, carries the penalty of reclusion
perpetua unless attended by qualifying circumstances defined under Article
266-B. In the instant case, as the victim, AAA, is below seven (7) years old,
specifically four (4) years old at the time of the crime, the imposable penalty
is death. The passage of Republic Act No. 9346 debars the imposition of the
death penalty without declassifying the crime of qualified rape as heinous.
Thus, the appellate court correctly reduced the penalty from death penalty
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO, G.R. No. 214473, June
22, 2016)

Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266 A (1), paragraph (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua unless attended by
qualifying circumstances defined under Article 266-B. The prosecution only
gave proof of AAA's age at the time of the crime but did not substantiate the
allegation of kinship between AAA and appellant. There being no qualifying
circumstance, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, imposed by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is proper.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORETO SONIDO Y CORONEL, G.R.
No. 208646, June 15, 2016)

As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides that the
death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is a child below seven years old.
However, following Republic Act No. 9346,35 the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in lieu of death, but it should be specified that it is without eligibility for
parole, as the RTC did not state it in the dispositive portion of its Decision.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P. PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978,
FEBRUARY 1, 2016)

Incestuous Rape As the Court ruled in People v. Oriliosa, 433 SCRA 689
(2004)in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be
employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would
suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the
victim into submission to his beastly desires. (PEOPLE vs. REMEDIOS, G.R.
No. 211056, November 10, 2015)

Qualified Rape - For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1)
of the aggravating / qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, must be alleged in the
information and duly proved during trial. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No.
217975, November 23, 2015)

Article 266-B of the same Code provides that rape is qualified when certain
circumstances are present in its commission, such as when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.24 Hence,
for a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the
ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and
without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty,
the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at
the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Qualified Rape; Minority and Relationship AAA was 16 years old when
she was raped in March 2004. The fact of the victims age was duly
substantiated by her Birth Certificate which was formally offered in evidence
and marked as Exhibit A. Further, the offender, herein accused-appellant
Bacus is AAAs father. Such fact of relationship between the offender and the
offended party was likewise supported by the Birth Certificate of the latter
and corroborated by the testimonies of the former. Therefore, as aptly held
by the RTC and correctly affirmed by the appellate court, accused-appellant
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for which he
is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26,
2015)

The age of AAA and her relationship to the accused-appellant qualify the
rape committed against her. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
provides: Art. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In this case, the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically
alleged in the information against the accused-appellant. Thereafter, the
prosecution offered in evidence the birth certificate of AAA, which proved
that she was born on September 25, 1988. Thus, AAA was only 14 years old
when the rape incident took place on March 2, 2003. The birth certificate
likewise stated that the accused-appellant Bienvenido Saramosing Remedios
is the biological father of AAA, which fact he likewise admitted during the
trial of the case. (PEOPLE vs. REMEDIOS, G.R. No. 211056, November
10, 2015)

Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain
circumstances are present in its commission, such as when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Hence, in
a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that (1) the victim
is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (2) the offender is
a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In other
words, it is the concurrence of both the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender that will be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. Thus, it is
imperative that the circumstance of minority and relationship be proved
conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be
considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetual. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her relationship
with the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN SARIEGO,
G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

In this case, while it is undisputed that AAA is the daughter of appellant, her
minority was not conclusively established. In People v. Prunaa, the Court laid
down the following controlling guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: In order to remove any
confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents, such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim, would suffice to prove age. 3. If the
certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is
alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to
the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322,
FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

In this case, We find that the prosecution was able to prove that Tuando had
sexual intercourse with AAA, the then 13 year old daughter of his common-
law wife, against her will. The prosecution was able to present the evidence
to support conviction for qualified rape: that (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim under 18 years of age at the time of rape; (2) said
act was accomplished (a) through the use of force, when he boxed her hand
while inserting his penis into AAA's private organ, (b) through the threat of
killing AAA's family and (c) through intimidation being the common-law
spouse of the victim's mother. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL
YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

The concurrence of both the minority of the victim, as proven by her birth
certificate, and her relationship with her offender, qualified the rape raising
the penalty to death. In People v. Floro Barcela, 723 SCRA 647 (2014), it is
essential, as in this case, that both circumstances must be alleged in the
criminal complaint or information and proven as the crime itself. We find
credibility with AAA's narration that she was raped by Tuando. It was when
the victim's senses were weakened by dizziness that the accused laid her on
top of the bed. He undressed the victim, kissed her and inserted his penis
inside the victim's private organ despite appeals and struggle against the
act. Not just the victim but her entire family was threatened with death if she
would expose the commission of the offense. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY
24, 2016)

As testified to by the accused, he and BBB were common-law spouses living


under the same roof with the children of the latter, including AAA. After four
years, he now claims before this Court that upon his separation from BBB, he
entered into a romantic relationship, this time with the minor daughter of his
former partner. When the trial judge asked the accused if he found nothing
wrong with his relationship with a minor, he answered negatively. It is hard
for this Court to fathom that a minor, a 13-year old child-woman, would enter
into a relationship with a man thrice her age and worse, a former common-
law spouse of her own mother. It is even absurd, if not disturbing, to even
entertain the thought that a child like AAA, who has been living with her step
father, the accused, since she was 9 years old, would freely consent to
sexual intercourse with the accused in their own home. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY
24, 2016)

No young girl such as AAA would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or
through the influence of her mother BBB or even his brother CCC, and
undergo the ordeal of having her private parts examined by a medical
doctor, of being questioned by NBI operatives about the details of how she
was raped by Tuando, then eventually being subjected to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire
to seek justice. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON
TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

There is ample basis to conclude that AAA's resumption to normal life after
the commission of rape cannot be taken against her. A victim's reaction after
a harrowing experience, especially in a crime of rape, is subjective and not
everyone responds in the same way. There is no standard form of behavior
that can be anticipated of a rape victim following her sexual abuse. People
respond differently to emotional stress, particularly minor children subjected
to such level of emotional trauma. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
Qualified Rape ; Penalty - Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, the imposable penalty for qualified rape is death. With
the effectivity, however, of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R.
No. 217975, November 23, 2015)

As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides that the
death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender, among others, is the victim's parent. However,
following Republic Act No. 9346, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly
imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of
death, without eligibility for parole. Likewise, the RTC correctly awarded in
AAA's favor the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages. An award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be automatically
awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical
suffering. The CA, in turn, correctly modified the RTC ruling by increasing the
award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. Exemplary
damages are also called for, by way of public example, and to protect the
young from sexual abuse. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO
LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10,
2016)

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death shall be
imposed when the victim of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. However, upon the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 934630 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of death
penalty, shall be imposed on Tuando. Hence, the Court affirms the imposition
of penalty meted by the Court of Appeals. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

Qualified Rape ; Damages; Civil Indemnity - As to the award of


damages, the Supreme Court (SC), deems it proper to increase the same in
consonance with its ruling in People vs. Gamboa, 706 SCRA 508 (2013),
where the amounts of indemnity and damages were increased when the
proper penalty for the crime committed by the accused was death but was
not imposed because of the enactment Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, setting
the minimum thereof, as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)

Pursuant to our recent rulings in People v. Gambao32 and recently by People


v. Colentava,33 we modify the award of damages to AAA from P75, 000.00 to
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 to P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
qualified rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON
TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

Carnal Knowledge with a mental retardate - Carnal knowledge of a


woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of
law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is
not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are
the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the
mental retardation of the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN
DELA ROSA, G.R. No. 206419, June 01, 2016)

The Court has held in a long line of cases that if the mental age of a woman
above twelve years is that of a child below twelve years, even if she
voluntarily submitted to the bestial desires of the accused, or even absent
the circumstances of force or intimidation or the fact that the victim was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, the accused would still be
liable for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The rationale is that if sexual
intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, then it should
follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child
below twelve years would also constitute rape.(PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN DELA ROSA, G.R. No. 206419, June 01, 2016)
Hymenal Laceration; Not an Element of the Crime - The healed
laceration on the victim's hymen does not serve to acquit appellant either.
Hymenal laceration is not an element of statutory rape, as long as there is
enough proof of entry of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of
the female organ of the offended party who is below 12 years of age.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL REBANUEL Y NADERA, G.R.
No. 208475, June 08, 2016)

This Court, in a number of cases, has affirmed the conviction of the accused
for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim's hymen, since
medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim's hymen to remain
intact despite repeated sexual intercourse.29 It has been elucidated that the
strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to another,
such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. In any case, this Court has previously stated that a medical
examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission
of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.30
Moreover, it is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh
lacerations does not negate rape, and although medical results may not
indicate physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established
since medical findings or proof of injuries are not among the essential
elements in the prosecution for rape.31 In the present case, the credible
disclosure of AAA that accused-appellant raped her is the most important
proof of the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

AAA positively identified appellant as the person who raped her. She testified
in a straightforward and clear manner that appellant, whose house was just
located at the back of their house, called her to babysit his one year old son.
When AAA entered appellant's house, he closed the door, kissed her,
removed her clothing and then his own clothes and then inserted his penis
into her vagina, and it was painful. AAA's claim of sexual intercourse was
corroborated by the medical report of Dr. Camarillo which showed the
presence of a deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock position which was
assessed to be three weeks to two months old which was caused by an
insertion of an erected penis or a hard or blunt object. Hymenal lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN RODRIGUEZ y
GRAJO, G.R. NO. 208406, FEBRUARY 29, 2016)

Damages; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages. In


addition to the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant, it is a fundamental
rule that civil indemnity must be awarded if the fact of rape is established
without further need of proof for moral damages. Under existing
jurisprudence, where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not
imposable under the present law, then the following amounts should be
imposed: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages by the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are hereby increased from P50,000.00 to
P100,000.00, and the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
increased to P100,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO
BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Full Penetration and Hymenal Laceration - While indeed AAA's medical


examination did not show traces of injuries or lacerations, the rule is settled
that hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. In concluding that
carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. To be precise, the
touching of the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum by the
penis constitutes consummated rape. Herein, AAA unflinchingly testified that
appellant "inserted his penis but it was not fully inserted though it was
pressed very hard x x x;" and that she did feel appellant's male anatomy
inside her female anatomy but the latter pulled it out "hurriedly." The
examining physician confirmed that any abrasion caused by the incident
could have healed in the intervening period as female genitalia are very
vascular. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORETO SONIDO Y
CORONEL, G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016)

Testimony of Victim - Time and again, this Court has held that when the
offended party is young and an immature girl, as in this case, who has lived
her whole life in a faraway island wherein almost all residents know
everybody, courts are inclined to lend credence to her version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed, if the matter
about which they testified were not true. No young girl would usually concoct
a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor
tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the
trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the
wicked acts committed against her. Indeed in a rural setting the shame of
rape is on the victim, not on the accused. And it will haunt the family of the
victim for a long time. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIONE
BARBERAN AND DIONE DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 208759, June 22,
2016)

Lack of Resistance - From the direct testimony of AAA, she explained that
she was not able to resist or cry help from her relatives since Barberan held
her hands and covered her mouth while De los Santos was raping her. After
De los Santos, Barberan took his turn and raped her. She did not have
sufficient energy to resist the physical restraint employed by two men as she
was immobilized by fear and shock. Lack of physical resistance, to
emphasize, is not an essential element of the crime of rape. A victim should
never be faulted for her lack of resistance to any forms of crime particularly
as grievous as rape. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not
make voluntary the victim's submission to the perpetrator's lust. Besides,
physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused; it is not an essential
element of rape. Rape victims react differently when confronted with sexual
abuse. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIONE
BARBERAN AND DIONE DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 208759, June 22,
2016)

Delay in Reporting Case - Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an


indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant. It is likewise settled in jurisprudence that
human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and
horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. In the
instant case, AAA, being only four (4) years old at the time that she was
violated and threatened with death if she reports the incident, would
naturally be cowed into silence because of fear for her life. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME BRIOSO ALIAS TALAP-TALAP, G.R. No.
209344, June 27, 2016)

Flight an Indication of Guilt - Mention-worthy is appellant's immediate


flight from his home shortly after the incident and his evasion of arrest for
more than six (6) years. Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is
an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible
explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may
be established for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first
available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. In the case
at bar, appellant's flight incontestably evidenced guilt. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO, G.R. No. 214473, June
22, 2016)

Evidence. - Neither does AAA's silence on the incident nor failure to shout or
wake up her siblings affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found
that there is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had
the misfortune of being sexually molested. While there are some who may
have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there
are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to
themselves and attempted to move on with their lives. This is because a
rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by
reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of extreme
psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror for the
perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally
expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest,
access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the
sense of helplessness and the degree of fear. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY
10, 2016)

In resolving rape cases, the Court has always given primordial consideration
to the credibility of the victim's testimony. In fact, since rape is a crime that
is almost always committed in isolation, usually leaving only the victims to
testify on the commission of the crime, for as long as the victim's testimony
is logical, credible, consistent and convincing, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis thereof. In this case, the courts below expressly found
that AAA testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, evincing her credibility. As reproduced in the CA Decision, AAA's
testimony during her direct examination clearly recounted, in detail, the
series of events that transpired during the alleged incidents. Indeed, unless
there appears certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the
lower court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case, the trial court's conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight
and respect, and at times even finality. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate
or certified true copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school
records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the
family may be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both
the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the
victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of
the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

Indeed, qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt


just like the crime itself. In view of the prosecution's failure to establish AAA's
minority with absolute certainty and clearness, the Court cannot sustain
appellant's conviction for the crime of rape in its qualified form.
Consequently, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple
rape, the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Additionally, the damages
awarded by the courts below should also be modified in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. Thus, the award of civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
shall be maintained. In addition, there shall be an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Said amounts shall earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO.
203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

Rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible
and untainted with serious uncertainty. With more reason is this true when
the medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, as in this case.
When the victim's testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physical
evidence of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that
there was carnal knowledge. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN
RODRIGUEZ y GRAJO, G.R NO. 208406, FEBRUARY 29, 2016)
Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty must be taken from the full
range of the penalty next lower in degree, that is arresto mayor, which
ranges from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Absent any
modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is to be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)

Slight Physical Injuries - When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of


the offended parly for labor or of the required medical attendance; or when
there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor
or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

Qualified Rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as


amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case,
however, the relationship of the appellant to the victim was not alleged.
Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and
that appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstance raised
the crime from statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its
qualified form under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death
penalty cannot be imposed in view of Republic Act no. 9346 (An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines), the CA
correctly affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole imposed by the RTC on the appellant. (PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER
BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13, 2016)

Qualified Rape, Damages. In People vs. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013),
the Supreme Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where
facts warranted the imposition of death penalty, if not for prohibition thereof
by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus need no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
to set an example for the public good. We thus increase the awared civil
indemnity from P75,000.00 to P100,000.00; moral damages from P75,000.00
to P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00. (PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047,
January 13, 2016)

Rape; Mental Retardates. For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such
act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape
under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is NOT
necessary, as mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual
act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the
accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. (PEOPLE
vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13, 2016)

Rape-Contrary to the appellants claim, the presence of the victims father


in the room does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other
occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family
are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the
victims family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual
assault is being committed. It is settled the lust is not a respecter of time or
place and rape is known to happen in the most unlike places. (PEOPLE vs.
ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13, 2016)

Rape- It is not proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions of


children who have undergone traumatic experiences. At any rate, it is not
proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experiences. Certainly, a child more so in the case of
AAA who is suffering from mild mental retardation cannot be expected to
act like an adult or do what may be expected of mature people under similar
circumstances. We disagree with the appellants insistence that the initial
reluctance of AAA to reveal the assault tainted her credibility. Young girls
usually conceal their ordeal because of threats made by their assailants. In
this case, the records showed that the appellant threatened to kill AAA if she
would reveal the incident to others. (PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY,
GR No. 204047, January 13, 2016)
Hymenal Lacerations. The lack of hymenal injuries does not mean that no
sexual abuse took place. We find no merit in the appellants contention that
the absence of laceration in the victims hymen negated sexual intercourse.
The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases;
it only further confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in
the process. Additionally, in the present case, the genital examination on
AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005 or more than one year after the rape
took place. At any rate, Dr. Marjorie Rebujio, Medical Officer III at the Benguet
General Hospital, clarified that the lack of hymenal injuries does not mean
that no sexual abuse took place. Dr. Rebujio further explained that the
hymen could be heal fast and that it could go back to is normal structure.
(PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13,
2016)

Statutory Rape; Mental Retardates. Sexual intercourse with a woman


who is mental retardate with a mental age of below 12 years old constitutes
statutory rape. Notably, AAA was also below 12 years old at the time of the
incident, as evidence by the records showing that she was born on March 01,
1993. (PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13,
2016)

H. Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention The essence of the crime


of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. The crime
of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty. When deprivation of liberty occurs under any of the circumstances
listed under Article 267, paragraph 4 is present, the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is consummated. (PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN Y
YANZON, G.R. No. 214502, [November 25, 2015])

Kidnapping; Elements of. We have held that the following elements


must be established by the prosecution to obtain a conviction for
kidnapping, viz.: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed
by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are made; or
(4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female, or a public
officer. If the victim is a minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of detention becomes immaterial. The
essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. (PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN Y YANZON, G.R. No. 214502,
[November 25, 2015])

The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim. Time is not a material ingredient in the
crime of kidnapping. As long as all these elements were sufficiently
established by the prosecution, a conviction for kidnapping is in order.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, JR.,
G.R. NO. 192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Kidnap for Ransom; Elements - In prosecuting a case involving the crime


of kidnapping for ransom, the following elements must be established: (i) the
accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any
manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for
ransom. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY GREGORIO Y AMAR @
"JAY," G.R. No. 194235, June 08, 2016)

Based on the prosecution's evidence, each of the accused-appellants, plus


Jojo, had intentional, direct, and substantial participation in Jimmy's
kidnapping for ransom. Jimmy's abduction, his being taken to and holed up in
a house in Ilocos Norte under guard, the ransom demand and negotiation,
and finally, the ransom payout, which all happened in a span of six days,
took planning and coordination among accused-appellants and Jojo. Accused-
appellant Efren, in particular, was among the four men who abducted Jimmy
in Meycauayan, Bulacan on October 8, 2002. Accused-appellant Efren also
kept guard over Jimmy for six days in Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Therefore,
accused-appellant Efren could not be a mere accomplice as his presence at
the scene/s of the crime was definitely more than just to give moral support;
his presence and company were indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. JAY GREGORIO Y AMAR @ "JAY," G.R. No. 194235, June 08, 2016)
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a
private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived
another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
(iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. A painstaking review of
the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven
in the criminal case on review. The testimony of Cordero sufficiently
established the commission of the crime and both the accused-appellants'
culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants
Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private
individual, Cordero's positive identification of both accused-appellants - as
two of several men who abducted him from the gate of his house, who
brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a bed,
who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days,
and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom
from his family -collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as
the actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and their
intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE LUGNASIN and DEVINCIO GUERRERO, G.R.
NO. 208404, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)

Kidnapping; Corpus Delicti - Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission


of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who
saw it. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact
that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. To prove
the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that
(1) a certain fact has been proven say, a person has died or a building has
been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, JR.,
G.R. NO. 192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.- The elements


of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any drof the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped
and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes
punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R.
NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
Kidnapping; For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home.- It is settled that the crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in
detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND
PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
Same; Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages;
Exemplary Damages; In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508
(2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme Court (SC) set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of
the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,
as follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral
damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the
public good.- In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also
for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and
damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for
prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to
have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary
damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y
CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)

Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary


Damages; In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for
kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity
and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if
not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1)
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the
victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3)
Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.-
In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping
for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts
warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by
R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00
as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's
Resolution until fully paid. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY
PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R. NO.
174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)

A. Crimes against Property

Estafa; Estafa by Means of Deceit; Elements - The elements of estafa by


means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are as follows:
(1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his
money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage. (CORAZON D. ISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 205097, June 08, 2016)

"The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or


simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only
motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the
absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however
fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for
prosecution for estafa under the said provision. (CORAZON D. ISON v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205097, June 08, 2016)

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Ison misrepresented herself as the owner of the fishponds and entered
into the Contract to Sell without authority from Col. Vergara. It was likewise
not amply established that the private complainants were completely
unaware of the pertinent facts concerning the fishponds' ownership. Hence,
the essential element of reliance upon the misrepresentation, which should
have induced the private complainants to part with their money, is wanting.
Inevitably, the Court is constrained to uphold the presumption of innocence
in Ison's favor and acquit her. A perusal of Col. Vergara's Affidavit yields the
following observations. First, he, in fact, asked Ison to look for a buyer of the
fishponds, albeit no written document was issued and the extent of the given
authority was not discussed. Second, Col. Vergara did not explicitly deny that
he granted Ison the authority to sign any contract considering that the latter
still remains to be the registered owner of the fishponds. Third, in the
December of 2004 meeting held in Tropical Hut, Col. Vergara exhibited little
interest as shown by his early departure and his utterance to the effect that
Ison and the private complainants should settle the matter among
themselves. Fourth, Col. Vergara, being the owner of the fishponds and the
one who would sustain the most damage as a result of any unauthorized
sale, never filed any complaint, criminal or otherwise, against Ison. Col.
Vergara's disinterest in filing a complaint or testifying against Ison militates
against the private complainants' claim that Ison had no authority to enter
into the transaction. (CORAZON D. ISON v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205097, June 08, 2016)

Syndicated Estafa; Elements of - Under Section 1 of P.D. 1689, there is


syndicated estafa if the following elements are present: 1) estafa or other
forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five
or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. (DELIA L.
BELITA vs. ANTONIO S. SY, G.R. No. 191087 June 29, 2016)
Third Element - With respect to the third and last element of
syndicated estafa, petitioners claim that P.D. 1689 only applies if the
defrauded parties are rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayons, or
farmers' associations. We agree with the Justice Secretary's holding in his 19
June 2008 Resolution wherein he ruled that PD 1689 applies to corporations
operating on funds solicited from the public. The law is explicit that it covers
defraudations or misappropriation of funds solicited by corporations from the
general public. IBL is such corporation. The operative phrase is "funds of
corporations should come from the general public." IBL is apparently
engaged in the real estate business. Its funds come from buyers of the
properties it sells. In sum, we find that there is probable cause to indict
petitioners for the crime of syndicated estafa under P.D. 1689, in relation to
Article 315, 4th par., [2][a] of the RPC. (DELIA L. BELITA vs. ANTONIO S.
SY, G.R. No. 191087 June 29, 2016)

Estafa; Penalties - Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty prescribed for estafa in which the amount of the fraud is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 is prision correctional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two
months and one day to eight years); if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty thus prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum
period, and one year shall be added for each additional P10,000.00 provided
the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20 years. Considering that the
penalty does not consist of three periods, the prescribed penalty is divided
into three equal portions, and each portion shall form a period,31 with the
maximum period being then imposed.32 However, the floor of the maximum
period - six years, eight months and 21 days - is fixed in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance, or of any showing of the greater extent of the evil
produced by the crime,33 to which is then added the incremental penalty of
one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three years in all.
The resulting total penalty is nine years, eight months and 21 days of prision
mayor, which shall be the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARISSA BAYKER, G.R. NO.
170192, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Theft; Elements of. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the
essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done
with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things. (GUILBEMER FRANCO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 191185, FEBRUARY 1, 2016)
Estafa; Elements of.- The elements of Estafa under this provision are as
follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People, 621 SCRA 538(2010),
the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the
aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the
same, to wit:The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation
or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right. In proving the element of
conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to
give an account of their whereabouts. (CHENG VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 174113, JANUARY 13, 2016

Qualified Theft; Elements - The elements of Qualified Theft committed


with grave abuse of confidence are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;


2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; [and]
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)

To qualify the crime of simple theft to qualified theft, the crime of theft must
be committed with grave abuse of confidence.All of the elements for
qualified theft are present in this case. Proceeding from the fact that
Boquecosa was, on the dates of the crime, a sales clerk and vault custodian
of the Pawnshop, she admitted having pawned the missing pieces of jewelry.
The act, of course, presupposes a previous taking of the items. (People v.
Boquecosa, G.R. No. 202181, [August 19, 2015])

Qualified Theft; Penalty - The penalty for qualified theft is based on the
value of the property stolen, which in this case is P97,984.00. To compute for
the imposable penalty, we must first take the basic penalty for theft, which is
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the
maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of
imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is
deducted from P97,984.00, which leaves a difference of P75,984.00. This
amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00. The resulting quotient of 7 is equivalent to 7 years, which is
added to the basic penalty.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO T.
CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)

In this case, because Cruz committed qualified theft, his penalty is two
degrees higher than the penalty for simple theft, which is reclusion temporal
in its medium and maximum periods to be imposed in its maximum period or
eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty
(20) years, which shall be added to the resulting quotient of 7 years. The
resulting sum shall then be the imposable penalty. Thus, the range of the
imposable penalty is twenty-five (25) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one
(21) days to twenty-seven (27) years. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)

Moreover, as the crime committed is qualified theft, we do not apply the rule
in simple theft that the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years.
The penalty for qualified theft has no such limitation. His penalty exceeds
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the penalty that should be imposed,
therefore, is reclusion perpetua. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)

I. Crimes against Chastity


J. Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons

Bigamy; Elements of. Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: ARTICE 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contact a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. For an accused to be
convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements: [first,] that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; [third,] that he contracts a second of subsequent marriage;
and [lastly] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. (NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)

Marriage License. To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a


marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. The fourth requisite the
marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license
represents the states involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. To prove that a
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
(NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No.
207406, January 13, 2016)

Bigamy - Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be


removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal
Code (RPC) becomes useless. Should the requirement of judicial declaration
of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of
Revised Penal Code becomes useless. [A]ll that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. Further, [a] party may even enter into a marriage aware
of the absence of a requisite usually the marriage obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. (NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR
No. 207406, January 13, 2016)

K. Crimes against Honor (include Administrative Circular 08-2008


Re: Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases, January 25, 2008)

Libel - To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to


have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in
reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.- To be liable for libel, the
following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.16 Malice is bad faith or bad
motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel.17 To determine actual
malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of
whether it is false or not.18 Reckless disregard of what is false or not means
that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication
or possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. (MARY
ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603,
JANUARY 26, 2016)

The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." The
provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature
or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It
is basic in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's criminal
liability from the others' criminal liability only because he was the president
of the company that published the libelous articles instead of being their
author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the others, such
that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of
the libelous articles. The crime of libel would not even be consummated
without his participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who
furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and
entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects and
controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and
should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned
in the publication or not. (MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA
PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603, JANUARY 26, 2016)

Libel; Moral Turpitude; Disqualification of Candidates .- Contrary to


Pichay's argument, the imposition of a fine does not determine whether the
crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,
369 SCRA 126 (2001), we held that a crime still involves moral turpitude
even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v.
People, 565 SCRA 283 (2008), we explained that a fine was imposed on the
accused since they were first time offenders. Having been convicted of the
crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. (MARY
ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603,
JANUARY 26, 2016)

Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration
of a period of five years from his service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec,
587 SCRA 1 (2009), we held that the five-year period of disqualification
would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day
petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. SandiganbayanM
447 SCRA 309 (2004). In this case, since Pichay served his sentence when he
paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16
February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the
House of Representatives until then. Considering his ineligibility due to his
disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay
made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his
certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's
disqualification under Section 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of
a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. (MARY
ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603,
JANUARY 26, 2016)

Oral Defamation or Slander; Oral Defamation or Slander is libel


committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.- Oral Defamation or
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of
livelihood. The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and
maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;
(6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave
when it is of a serious and insulting nature. An allegation is considered
defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put
him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the
statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.It must be stressed that words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (ENRIQUE
G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L.
LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Same; Same; it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes
only a light felony.- Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral
defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of
the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the
social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. "The gravity
depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the
case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger,
with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony." (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11,
2016)
Same; Same; It has been held that a public officer should not be too onion-
skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. - the Court finds that even
though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by profession, his complaint
against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held that a
public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of
criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory
statement was uttered in connection with the public officers
duty. (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Same; Same; Constructive Criticism; When one makes commentaries
about the other's performance of official duties, the criticism is
considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his or her service
to the public.- One of man's most prized possessions is his integrity. There
lies a thin line between criticism and outright defamation. When one makes
commentaries about the other's performance of official duties, the criticism
is considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his or her
service to the public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the part of the public
officer to make room for improvement on the basis of this constructive
criticism in as much as it is imperative on the part of the general public to
make the necessary commentaries should they see any lapses on the part of
the public officer. In this case, however, the criticism was
more destructive than constructive and, worse, it was directed towards
the personal relations of the parties. (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO.
212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Same; Same; Calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was
evidently geared towards his reputation as a private individual of the
community.- Their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation were
not in connection with SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the
circumstances of the incident, calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong
na pulis" was evidently geared towards his reputation as a private individual
of the community. Thus, the defamation committed by De Leon, while only
slight in character, must not go unpunished. (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON
VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO,
G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
PART III. QUASI-OFFENSES
1. Article 365 Criminal Negligence

PART IV. SPECIAL LAWS


1. Anti-Arson Law (P.D. 1613)
2. Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. No. 6539, as amended by R.A. No.
7659)
3. Anti-Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610, as amended)

Child Abuse Law; Children - The victim is 16 years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense. Under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610,
"children" refers to "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over
but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

Child Abuse, defined - In the recent case of Bongalon v. People, the


Court expounded the definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No.
7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and
convicted by the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610. The Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC,
to wit: Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA
to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and
slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts
constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions.
The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of
hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative
of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands
of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
(VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional


outrage after being informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and
whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she
fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front
of the board for about five to ten minutes. It would be unforeseeable that
Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified that
the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed
intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-
year-old boy with heavy blows. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the
flesh of her flesh, is the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain.
The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the
instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and
danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered
by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost
the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that
was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of
intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a
successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
(VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be


incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into account
the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth, as well as, in
harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all
actions concerning him or her. This is equally consistent with the with the
declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and
crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination. Besides, if it was the intention of the framers of the law to
make child offenders liable only of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides
for a lower penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly made
such statements. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

Anti-Child Abuse Law; Sexual Abuse - Under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she
indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness
under Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC,
Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:(1) That the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;r2) That it is done under any
of the following circumstances : A. By using force or intimidation; or b. When
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c.When
the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party
is another person of either sex. Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts
of lasciviousness committed with the consent of the offended party if done
by the same persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in
Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit: 1. if committed against a virgin over
twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in public
authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person
who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or 2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single
or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age.
(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b) of R.A.


No. 7610 when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The law
does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral
coercion or ascendancy is sufficient. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y
MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513,
October 20, 2015 )
Anti-Child Abuse Law; Rape through Sexual Assualt - Article 226-A,
paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person if the victim did not consent either it was done
through force, threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason
or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances
where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No.
7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is
likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides
for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is
a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the
offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No.
7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to
fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition, in which case, the offender may still be held liable for sexual
abuse under R.A. No. 7610.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse; Penalties Under


Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on those who
commit acts of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a
special law, the petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in its medium period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the CA correctly
imposed the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. (PINLAC Y RESOLME V.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 197458, [November 11, 2015])

Anti-Child Abuse Law; Sexual Abuse; Elements. Sexual abuse under


Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 has three essential elements: (1) The accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act
is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) The child xxx is below 18 years old. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26,
2015)

Lascivious Conduct, Defined. Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and


Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows: The
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In accord with the definition stated and applying the same in the instant
case, accused-appellants intentional act of touching AAAs vagina after
undressing her on the 30th of December 2004 amounts to a lascivious
conduct. To determine the penalty due to accused-appellant, in conformity
with the penalty meted out by law, the relationship of the perpetrator with
the victim and the latters age must also be taken into account. In the
present case, it has been duly substantiated with evidence and testimonies
that the perpetrator of the lascivious conduct is the father of the victim.
Supported likewise by proof is the age of the victim at the time of the
incident. As testified to by the victim herself, she was 17 years old at the
time the lascivious conduct was committed against her, thus establishing her
minority. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO.
208354, AUGUST 26, 2015)

4. Anti-Child Pornography Law (R.A. No. 9775)


5. Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)
6. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as
amended)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act As already stated, the individual


respondents were accused of violating Section 3 of RA 3019, the elements
of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c)
that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were
likewise charged with violation of Section 3(g) of the same law, which has the
following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he
entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c)
that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officers.
(PCGG vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159.
October 21, 2015.)

Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 requires that there be injury caused by


giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties
who conspire with public officers. Its elements are: (1) that the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that
said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of
their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused
undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4)
that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. (PCGG
vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159.
October 21, 2015.)

Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public
officers, its core element being the engagement in a transaction or contract
that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The
elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that
he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. (PCGG vs. MA. MERCEDITAS
NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015.)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of


Republic Act No. 3019; Elements. In every prosecution for the violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the State must prove the following essential
elements, namely:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his functions and;
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The first element was present, for Giangan was indisputably a government
official at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged.
(TEOFILO GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of


Republic Act No. 3019. Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the
Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that Giangan and his co-accused had acted
with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they removed the
wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations
evinced good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access
through the road had long been permitted even by the owner and her
predecessor. In that context, Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon
the honest and sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the
nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him.
A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the
wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting
within the scope of their authority. Good faith means honest, lawful intent;
the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to
assist in a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained
of was rendered inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that
the law punished. (TEOFILO GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of


Republic Act No. 3019; Manifest Partiality. The Sandiganbayan further
erred in finding the presence of manifest partiality on the basis that there
had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the accused did not
similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should still not
be imputed against them because they were acting on the complaint against
the inconvenience brought about by the obstruction erected on the access
road. Manifest partiality should be inferred only if there was a clear showing
that there had been others who had been bothered by the similar allegedly
illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their capacities
as barangay officials, did not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity.
Indeed, in People v. Atienza, 673 SCRA 470 (2012), the Court affirmed the
findings of the Sandiganbayan that there was no manifest impartiality or bad
faith on the part of the accused public officials where the evidence adduced
did not show that they had favored other persons similarly situated.
(TEOFILO GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Manifest Partiality; Elements
of. All private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019. The essential elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS.
CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)

7. Anti-Hazing Law (R.A. No. 8049)


8. Anti-Hijacking Law (R.A. No. 6235)
9. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. No. 532)
10. Anti-Plunder Act (R.A. No. 7080, as amended)

Plunder The law on plunder provides that it is committed by "a public


officer who acts by himself or in connivance with . . . ." The term
"connivance" suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act
or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with
another. It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or
passive. Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in
conspiracy with other persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that
Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary
to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by
two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten
wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as
the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million. It
is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed
amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten
wealthwhether through a combination or series of overt acts under Section
1(d) of RA No. 7080is an important element that must be alleged.

Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth
involving at least P50 million by means of a combination or series of overt
acts. Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount
of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth whether through a combination or series of
overt acts under Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 is an important element
that must be alleged. When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it
refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in
Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public
treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six (6)
ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of
criminality.Plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal
acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six
ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of
criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and
be established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to
at least P50 million. Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts
and numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of time.
Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an "effective flexibility"
of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally
contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise included in the broad
statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The
unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards
against. (ENRILE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213455,
[August 11, 2015])

11. Anti-Sexual Harassment (7877)


12. Anti-Torture Act (R.A. No. 9745)
13. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (R.A. No. 9208)

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 - In this case, the assailed RTC


Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Significantly, the present case
involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible
that is characterized by sexual violence and slavery. Accordingly, direct
resort to a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly
sanctioned in this case. (VINSON D. YOUNG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R NO. 213910, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)

14. Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (R.A.


No. 9262)
15. Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22)

Bouncing Checks Law- There are two (2) ways of violating BP 22: (1) by
making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2)
by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issue but failing to do so to cover the full amount of the check when
presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. (JORGE B.
NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June
06, 2016)

Bouncing Checks Law; Elements - The elements of BP 22 under the first


situation, pertinent to the present case, are: r(1) The making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)

Nature and Coverage - The State criminalized such practice because it


was deemed injurious to public interests and was found to be pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. It is an offense against public order and not an
offense against property. It likewise covers all types of checks, and even
checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be
within the ambit of BP 22. For all intents and purposes, the law was devised
to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account user. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)

It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot
belie the dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks
were mere securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are
expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano
v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986), the Court ruled that the gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. (ENGEL PAUL ACA vs.
ATTY RONALDO P. SALVADO, A.C. NO. 10952, JANUARY 26, 2016)

Malum Prohibitum; Intent is immaterial- What BP 22 punishes is the


mere issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. For to determine
the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the public's faith in the stability and commercial
value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and
in banking communities. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum; it is simply the commission of the act that the law prohibits, and
not its character or effect, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial. (JORGE B.
NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June
06, 2016)

Presumption of Knowledge - When the first and third elements of the


offense are present, as in this case, BP 22 creates a presumption juris
tantum that the second element exists. Thus, the maker's knowledge is
presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. The clear
import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions: (1) the
presentment within ninety (90) days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for
payment in full within five (5) banking days from notice. Here, after the
checks were dishonored, HSBC duly notified Reynolds of such fact and
demanded for the payment of the full amount of said checks, but the latter
failed to pay. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)

Bouncing Checks Law; Civil Liability - In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal


action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions, Instead of
instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. This rule
was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P.
22 because creditors used the courts as collectors. (PAZ T. BERNARDO, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)

1. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 9165)

Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs In Valleno v. People, 688 SCRA


343 (2013), the Court ruled that - In order for prosecution for illegal
possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law,
and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of the drug. The prosecution has duly established all these elements. By
virtue of a search warrant, PO1 Veloso found three packets of suspected
shabu in one of the rooms of accused-appellants house. (ALBERT G.
AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-
82, October 14, 2015.)

For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution


mustestablish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug. All the elements were established in this
case. Incident to his lawful arrest, when he was frisked three (3) plastic
packets containing traces of white crystalline substance, later on found to be
traces of a dangerous drug, was taken from his possession. In a number of
cases, it has been declared that mere possession of a regulated drug per se
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possendi sufficient
to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession -
the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, of knowledge or animus
possidendi. Mere possession of the prohibited substance and the burden of
proof is upon accused-appellant to show that he has a license or permit
under law to possess the prohibited drug. The accused-appellant failed to
explain his possession of the prohibited drug. Accused-appellant was misled
in his belief that the burden to prove the lack of license or permit to possess
the prohibited drug lies with the prosecution. (PEOPLE vs. ASIGNAR, G.R.
No. 206593, November 10, 2015)
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs the
following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS POSADA, GR No. 196052, September 2, 2015)

To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,


the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution
was able to establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-
appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-
appellants were caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs during
a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from assailing the
validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the
illegal drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid defense in the
offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V PUNZALAN ,G.R. No. 199087,
[November 11, 2015])

To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the


concurrence of the following elements must be established by the
prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug. (ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

To sustain a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the


following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed said drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN
SONJACO Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)
Constructive Possession The three packets of shabu were found not on
accused-appellants person but on top of a cabinet divider inside her room.
Accused-appellant was deemed to have been in constructive possession of
the packets of shabu because they were under her control and management.
[C]onstructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Accused-appellant is not authorized
by law to possess the shabu. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. Accused-appellants bare
denials will not suffice to overcome the presumption of knowledge. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October
14, 2015.)

The non-presentation of the barangay tanods is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution. The more relevant testimonies are those of the members of the
raiding team who testified that they recovered packets of shabu from
accused-appellants house. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET
PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015.)

Animus Possidendi - Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes


prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of such
possession. The burden of evidence to explain the absence of animus
possidendi rests upon the accused, and this, in the case at bar, the
appellant failed to do. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO
Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)

Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of


knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation of such possession.The burden to
explain the absence of animus possidendi rests upon the accused, and in the
case at bar, this the appellant failed to do. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ALEX MENDEZ RAFOLS, G.R. No. 214440, June 15, 2016)
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs In a catena of cases, this Court laid
down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs or
prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act
No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate
the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN
Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)

For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,


the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in all
these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or
regulated drug as evidence. The narcotic substance itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
ENRICO MIRONDO Y IZON, G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015 )

For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of


dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the
proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti, as evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove the legitimacy of the
operation considering the absence of any document that would prove that
there was indeed a report by the confidential informant of the police officers.
Yet, nowhere in his appellant's brief did he provide any basis, jurisprudential
or otherwise, to support his conclusions that these alleged lapses are fatal to
his prosecution. In fact, as aptly ruled by the CA, the recording of marked
money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for the
prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. Neither is it required that the confidential
informant put his tip down in writing. For as long as the sale of the prohibited
drug is adequately proven, the recording or non-recording thereof in an
official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal. (PEOPLE vs.
DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925, November 9, 2015)

For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section


5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money consummate the illegal transaction. What matters is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence. In this case, the
Court believes'and so-holds that all the requisites for the illegal sale of shabu
were met. As demonstrated by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and the supporting documents they presented and offered, the identities of
the buyer, the seller, the prohibited drug, and the marked money, have all
been proven by the required quantum of evidence.(PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RAUL AMARO Y CATUBAY ALIAS "LALAKS," G.R. No.
207517, June 01, 2016)

For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of


dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165; the following
elements must be present: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
it. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In the
case at bar, it is readily apparent that no sale was consummated as the
consideration, much less its receipt by accused-appellant, were not
established. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN
BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016)
In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary
that the prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery
of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No.
211672, June 14, 2016)

The presence of the following elements required for all prosecutions for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs has been duly established in the instant case:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. Appellant was
apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a buy-bust operation, a form
of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. The
crime is consummated at once at the point when the police officer has gone
through the operation as a buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused,
followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO ENRIQUEZ Y CRUZ, G.R. No. 214503, June
22, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Shabu; Elements of In every prosecution for illegal sale


of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452,
AUGUST 26, 2015)

For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, only the following
elements are essential: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is proof that the sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation of evidence of the seized item, as part
of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-
bust transaction. (PEOPLE vs. ASIGNAR, G.R. No. 206593, November
10, 2015)
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the things sold and the
payment therefor. The Court finds that all elements for illegal sale were duly
established with accused-appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team
of PO3 Palabay. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEL SAPITULA y
PACULAN, G.R. NO. 209212, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Consummation - The commission of


the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires
the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller. The crime is already consummated
once the police officer has gone through the operation as a buyer whose
offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous
drugs to the former. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO Y
STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Marked Money In the


prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution
as long as the sale of dangerous drug is adequately proven and the drug
subject of the transaction is presented before the court.Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust
operation. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the
consummated transaction between the poseur-buyer and accused-
appellants. (PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN, G.R. No. 195194,
[November 25, 2015])

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Lack of consideration - In the case at


bar, there is more reason to acquit accused-appellant of the crime of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs as the prosecution was not able to prove that there
was even a consideration for the supposed transaction. The prosecution
claimed that that there was prior negotiation between the confidential
informant and accused-appellant. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce
any evidence of such prior negotiation. In fact, nothing can be gained from
the records and from the testimonies of the witnesses as to how the
supposed confidential informant conducted the alleged negotiation with
accused-appellant. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to purchase dangerous
drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R. No.
204441, June 08, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Shabu; Penalties it has been established by proof beyond


reasonable doubt that . accused-appellant sold shabu. Under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death
and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to Pl,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and the fine of
P500,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y
BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt,
we likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the
law, the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the
quantity and purity of the substance. Thus, the RTC and CA were within
bounds when they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015,
October 14, 2015.)

Distributing Prohibited Drugs We note that accused-appellants were


charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving away, dispatching in transit
and transporting dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The charge was not limited to the selling of dangerous drugs. The aforesaid
provision of law punishes not only the sale but also the mere act of delivery
of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been
accepted by the seller. In the distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of
any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the prohibited
drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense.(PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y
ULIMPAIN, G.R. No. 195194, [November 25, 2015])
Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs - To transport a dangerous
drug is to "carry or convey [it] from one place to another." For an accused to
be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove its essential element:
the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. (THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R.
NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempting to transport dangerous
drugs. The prosecution proved the essential element of the crime; accused-
appellant would have successfully moved 13.96 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride from Manila to Cebu had she not been apprehended at the
initial check-in area at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. The
prosecution need not present the airline ticket to prove accused-appellant's
intention to board an aircraft; she submitted herself to body frisking at the
airport when 13.96 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride was found in
her person. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y.
TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

Chain of Custody Rule It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the
directives of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is not fatal
and will not necessarily render the items confiscated inadmissible. It is
settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items
confiscated inadmissible. What is important is that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. The succession of
events in this case show that the items seized were the same items tested
and subsequently identified and testified to in court. We thus hold that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-
appellants were duly proven not to have been compromised. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS POSADA, GR No. 196052, September 2, 2015)

Accused-appellant cites as an irregularity the failure of the prosecution to present


photographs of the seized items and that there were no representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of the inventory of
the seized items. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section 21(a) of R.A.
No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No.
206910, October 14, 2015.)

In People v. Salvador, 715 SCRA 617 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled
that the failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the
seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the absence of a member of the
media or the Department of Justice (DOJ), pursuant to Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, is not fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and [the]
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14,
2015.)

The failure of the members of the raiding team to deliver the seized items to
the judge who issued the warrant becomes immaterial because records show
that the chain of custody is intact. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015.)

This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015,
October 14, 2015.)

The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the


prescribed physical inventory and the presence of the enumerated persons.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling
and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14,
2015.)
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method
of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (PEOPLE V. PUNZALAN, G.R. No. 199087,
[November 11, 2015])

The essence of the chain of custody rule is to make sure that the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
dangerous drug recovered from his or her possession.- the prosecution must
prove the corpus delicti18 which in drug-related cases refers to the
dangerous drug itself, in this case, shabu. As repeatedly ruled by this Court,
the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti are properly
preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same are duly
established. The essence of the chain of custody rule is to make sure that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the
same dangerous drug recovered from his or her possession. (ROBERTO
PALO y DE GULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

The prosecution must establish the unbroken chain of custody of the seize
item As held in People of the Philippines v. Edwin Dalawis y Hidalgo: The
rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification of the persons
who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented
in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next linjv in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL AMARO Y CATUBAY ALIAS
"LALAKS," G.R. No. 207517, June 01, 2016)

In cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of


2002, the prosecution must prove "the existence of the prohibited drug[.]"
"[T]he prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has
been preserved," because "the evidence involved the seized chemical is
not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or
substituted." To show that "the drugs examined and presented in court were
the very ones seized [from the accused]," testimony as to the "chain of
custody" of the seized drugs must be presented. Chain of custody is: the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R.
NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized


dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states: (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]The last part of the aforequoted provision
stated the exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN
HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)

The Court ( SC ) notes that there were nagging questions about the post-
examination custody that were left unanswered by the prosecution evidence,
particularly, as to who exercised custody and possession of the specimen
after the chemical examination and how it was handled, stored and
safeguarded pending its presentation as evidence in court. The failure of the
prosecution to provide details pertaining to the said post-examination
custody of the seized item created a gap in the chain of custody which again
raised reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. ( PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRICO MIRONDO Y IZON, G.R. No. 210841,
October 14, 2015 )

Appellant notes the absence of evidence which shows that the buy-bust
operation was exercised in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) or the barangay authorities, and the failure of
the police officers to properly identify and to physically conduct an inventory
of the seized items in his presence, as mandated by Section 21, Paragraph 1,
Article II of RA No. 9165 which provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition
of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.}It bears stressing however,
that failure to strictly comply with the foregoing procedure will not render an
arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence in view of the
qualification permitted by Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, to wit: (a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.] Thus, it has been held that for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved pursuant to the
chain of custody rule, non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 does
not automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused or inadmissible the
items seized. The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused
until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same. (PEOPLE vs. DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925,
November 9, 2015)

In addition to the inventory made of the seized items, the prosecution was
able to prove an unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug from its seizure
and marking to its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis, to
the identification of the same during the trial of the case. Indeed no
photographs of the illegal drug were presented in court despite PO2 Cruz's
assertion that they have been taken although he explained that they went
missing. Yet we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
dangerous drug seized from appellant were duly proven by the prosecution
to have been properly preserved. The identity, quantity and quality of the
same were untarnished. As long as the chain of custody is unbroken, even
though the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the appellant will not be affected. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO ENRIQUEZ Y CRUZ, G.R. No. 214503,
June 22, 2016)

The PDEA agents who apprehended appellants did not deviate from the
procedure prescribed by law and regulations. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article
II of RA 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and
custody of dangerous drugs: 1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR)of RA 9165, which reads: (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items. (People v. Breis y Alvarado , G.R. No.
205823, [August 17, 2015])

To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present


through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from
the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned
over to the investigating officer, forwarded to the laboratory for
determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in
evidence. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of
custody in the handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal
requirements on the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply
with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural
lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other words, to
be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through
records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time
these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to
the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of
their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though
the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.(PEOPLE V.
AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN, G.R. No. 195194, [November 25, 2015])

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless


there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with. Accused-appellants bear the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and
the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.
Accused-appellants in this case failed to present any plausible reason to
impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimony
of PO3 Navarette deserves full faith and credit. In fact, accused-appellants
did not even question the credibility of the apprehending officers. Nor did
they present any reason why the apprehending would fabricate a story to
arrest them. They simply anchored their appeal on denial and the alleged
broken chain of the custody of the seized drug. We have previously ruled
that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and
is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. (PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN, G.R. NO.
195194, [November 25, 2015])

"This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, 'as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.' The most important factor is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or [the] innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs[,] as required under [Section] 21[, Article II of
the IRR] of [R.A.] No. 9165, will not render the accused's arrest illegal or the
items seized from [him] inadmissible." The chain of custody is not
established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated
persons. The IRR of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs states: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.] NO CITATION, PLEASE PROVIDE,
THANKS! :)
The failure of the prosecution to conduct a physical inventory and take
photograph of the seized item does not ipso facto render inadmissible in
evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules
stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been
preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS
MAMALUMPON y BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Chain of Custody; Non-compliance of Section 21, effect of - Anent the


supposed failure to comply with the procedures prescribed by Section 21 of
R.A. 9165, jurisprudence has it that non-compliance with these procedures
does not render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust
operation. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items because the same will be utilized in
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The chain of custody
requirement ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items in order to remove unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence. In addition to the inventory made of the seized
items, the prosecution was able to prove an unbroken chain of custody of the
illegal drugs from their seizure and marking to their submission to the
Southern Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis, to the identification of
the same during the trial of the case. As long as the chain of custody is
unbroken, even though the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the appellant will not be
affected. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO Y STA. ANA,
G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)

It has been ruled time and again that non-compliance with Section 21 of the
IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused." In this case, the chain of custody can be easily established
through the following link: (1) PO1 Blones marked the seized sachet
of shabu handed to him by SPO1 Toring with "ECB-04-19-05." Nothing in the
records will show that SPO1 Toring yielded, at any instance, possession of the
subject sachet to another person, after he acquired custody thereof from the
civilian informant on their way to the police station until he gave it to PO1
Blones for marking; (2) the letter-request for laboratory examination of the
seized item marked "ECB-04-19-05" was signed by Police Superintendent
Anthony Lao Obenza; (3) the said request and the marked item seized, which
were personally delivered by PO1 Blones and SPO1 Toring, were duly
received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-491-
2005 confirmed that the marked item seized from appellant was
methylamphetamine hydrochloride; and (5) the marked item was offered in
evidence. (People v. Cayas, G.R. No. 215714 , [August 12, 2015])

The purpose of Section 21 is "to [protect] the accused from malicious


imputations of guilt by abusive police officers[.]" Nevertheless, Section 21
cannot be used to "thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents."
"Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed
method of handling the corpus delicti [as provided in Section 21] should not
exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant." Thus, "substantial adherence" to
Section 21 will suffice, and, as section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides: [N]on-
compliance with [the] requirements [of Section 21] under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Non-compliance by the apprehending team with Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is
not fatal as long as (1) there is justifiable ground therefor and (2) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team.28 In this case, although a
physical inventory of the bag of marijuana seized from appellant was made
in the presence of a representative from the media and an elective public
official at the PDEA Office, the prosecution offered no justification why a DOJ
representative was not present and why the same item was not
photographed. Significantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs
seized from appellant was not preserved by the apprehending team because
the prosecution failed (a) to identify who actually placed the marking "LQE"
thereon, (b) to show that it was marked in the presence of the appellant, and
(c) to prove the chain of custody of the said item from the crime scene until
it reached the crime laboratory. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE
QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)

Chain of Custody Rule; Substance must be sealed in a plastic


container - What we can deduce from I01 dela Cerna's testimony is the fact
that the seized item was not placed in a plastic container and sealed upon
confiscation. As sworn to by PSI Erma Condino Salvacion, the forensic
chemist who conducted the laboratory test on the seized item, what she
tested were "suspected Marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine paper with
markings 'RDC-D'." Also, when the said item was presented in open court for
identification, it was still wrapped in magazine paper. In People v. Habana, as
reiterated in People v. Martinez, et al., we ruled that: If the substance is not
in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In
this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same
condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory
technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he
should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new
seal since the police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial, the
technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container
when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards
to preserve its integrity. If the sealing of the seized substance has not been
made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer,
messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of
custody, no matter how briefly one's possession has been. Each of them has
to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with

or substituted while in his care. In the case at bar, as the seized substance
was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the officers who
handled said evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the
time it was presented in open court. The prosecution did not. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R.
No. 204441, June 08, 2016)

The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti of the offense charged. In People v. Torres, we
held that the identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that
the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same
item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards
for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized.
However, this Court has also said that while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not "as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar,
the chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently
established, thereby casting doubt on the identity and integrity of the
supposed evidence. Time and again, this Court has held that "the failure to
establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has
been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough
to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused, x x x A conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016)

Chain of Custody Rule; MarkingWhat IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon
seizure of the drugs was to mark the same, which is not to be confused with
taking the physical inventory. Marking is not a requirement of RA 9165 or
its IRR, but has been held to be an initial stage in the chain of custody.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS BREYS Y ALVARADO, G.R. No.
205823, [August 17, 2015])
Although the seized items were marked only at the police station and not
during the actual apprehension and seizure, in People v. Loks, we held that
the "marking of the seized [substance] immediately upon . . . arrival at the
police station qualified as a compliance with the marking requirement."
(PEOPLE VS BOLO Y FRANCO, G.R. No. 200295, [August 19, 2015])

It is likewise true that the seven smaller sachets inside the two plastic
sachets were not initialled. Nevertheless, the marking of the corpus delicti as
a means to preserve its identity should be done only "as far as
practicable."99 In this case, only the two outer sachets could be marked
because the two sachets were heat-sealed.100 The two outer sachets would
have to be opened for the seven smaller sachets to be marked. This would
have contaminated the specimen. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police
station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of
the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station
or office, of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical
inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the
same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be used in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. (ROBERTO PALO y DE
GULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY
10, 2016)
Chain of Custody; Marking - As the first step in the chain of custody,
"marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the police
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the dangerous drug seized.
It is meant to ensure that the objects seized are the same items that enter
the chain and are eventually offered in evidence, as well as to protect
innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence.16 While Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify a time frame for marking or the place where said marking
should be done, the chain of custody rule requires that the marking should
be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2)
immediately upon confiscation.17 Marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.18 In this case, the prosecution evidence failed to
convincingly show who between P/Insp. Baares, as poseur-buyer, and
P/Insp. Demauro, as back-up and arresting officer, marked the bag of
marijuana seized from appellant with the initials "LQE" dated "08-14-2005" at
the PDEA Office. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD,
G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)

The failure to immediately mark the confiscated shabu after its seizure does
not affect its integrity. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS
MAMALUMPON y BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)

Marking Upon Immediate Confiscation - It bears underscoring that


law and its implementing rules in fact are silent on the matter of the marking
of the seized items. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule however
requires that the marking should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. These
requirements were complied with the marking of the seized items in
appellant's presence at the PDEA office. Dir. Ortiz explained that the marking
had to be made there to ensure his men's safety as there were only six (6) of
them who effected the arrest in a slum area. Marking upon immediate
confiscation has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest police
station, or herein, the office of the apprehending team. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ALEX MENDEZ RAFOLS, G.R. No. 214440, June 15,
2016)

Chain of Custody; Substantial Compliance in handling of evidence


sufficient - Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of
custody in the handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal
9
requirements on the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. This Court
has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible
in evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y
CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)

Chain of Custody ; Integrity of the evidence - It is clear from the


foregoing that the substance marked, tested and offered in evidence was the
same item seized from accused-appellant. We have previously ruled that as
long as the state can show by record or testimony that the integrity of the
evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous
whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into
the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then
the prosecution can maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN
HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)

Chain of Custody ; Presumption of regularity - The integrity of the


evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of
regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption
that public officers properly discharged their duties. Here, accused-appellant
failed to convince the Court that there was ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers. Thus, the testimony of PO1 Eclipse deserves full faith and
credit. Accused-appellant did not even question the credibility of the
apprehending officers. He simply insisted that the civilian informant had an
ax to grind against his brother for the latter's failure to repair the cell phone.
It is unbelievable that the apprehending officers would go to the extent of
fabricating a story just to have a reason to arrest accused-appellant and get
back at the latter's brother. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN
HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)

Buy-Bust Operations As to the issue of the non-participation of the PDEA


in the buy-bust operation, suffice it to say that coordination with the PDEA is
not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a
buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
requires the National Bureau of Investigation, Philippine National Police, and
the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all
drug related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEAs
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all,
a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort
to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.
A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the
PDEA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y
ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)

It must be emphasized, at this point, that for a successful prosecution of


offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, all of the following elements must be
satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Succinctly stated, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate
the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti, as evidence. (PEOPLE vs. DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925,
November 9, 2015)

Links that Must be Established in the Chain of Custody in a Buy-Bust


Situation - The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust situation are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of
the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. Here, the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the first three links in the chain
of custody. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R.
NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)

The Court has ruled in People v. Enriquez, SCRA 337 (2013) that the links
that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer, second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer,
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEL SAPITULA y PACULAN,
G.R. NO. 209212, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)

The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust


situation are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover
and submission of the seized and marked illegal drug from the forensic
chemist to the court.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL AMARO Y
CATUBAY ALIAS "LALAKS," G.R. No. 207517, June 01, 2016)

Buy Bust Operations; Defenes; Denial; Frame-upAppellants' defenses


of denial and frame-up were disbelieved by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. We
find no reason to deviate from this rule. The defenses of denial and frame-up
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical assertions of the PDEA
agents who were strangers to appellants and against whom no ill-motive was
established. Further, such defenses failed to overcome the documentary and
physical evidence presented by the prosecution. (People v. Breis y
Alvarado , G.R. No. 205823, [August 17, 2015])

The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of


methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu on the white crystalline
substance inside the plastic sachet received from accused-appellant. The
delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of
the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. This
was further corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in
evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y
BAEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs - We find that the RTC and
the Court of Appeals failed to consider the serious infirmity of the buy-bust
team's non-observance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug
items, particularly the requirement of an inventory and photographs of the
same. In illegal drugs cases, the identity of the drugs seized must be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required arriving at
a finding of guilt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA,
JR. Y PAA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in


Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 ensures the identity and integrity of dangerous
drugs seized. The provision requires that upon seizure of the illegal drug
items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a)
conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof
(c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or
confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the
inventory and be given copies thereof. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)

Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs; Strict Compliance - The


Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive
law that mandates strict compliance. The Congress laid it down as a safety
precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might
fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be
involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs. Only by such strict
compliance may the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of evidence
and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that the
law intended to prevent may be eliminated. Under the principle that penal
laws are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of
the accused, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAA, G.R. No. 206880,
June 29, 2016)

Herein, the requirements of physical inventory and photograph-taking of the


seized drugs were not observed. This noncompliance raises doubts whether
the illegal drug items used as evidence in both the cases for violation of
Section 5 and Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 were the same ones that were
allegedly seized from appellants. Patently, the apprehending team never
conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the seized drugs in the
presence of the appellants or their counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the place of the
seizure, or at the police station. In People v. Gonzales, this Court acquitted
the accused based on reasonable doubt for failure of the police to conduct an
inventory and to photograph the seized plastic sachet. We explained therein
that "the omission of the inventory and the photographing exposed another
weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and
photographing-to be made in the presence of the accused or his
representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media,
Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or
be given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the
procedures outlined by the law and its IRR." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)

Dangerous Drugs Law Cases; Corpus Delicti - Corpus delicti is the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In illegal drugs
cases, it refers to illegal drug itself. When the courts are given reason to
entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item alleged
seized from the accused, the actual crime charged is put into serious
question. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y
PAA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)
Since the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous
drugs itself, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the seized item is the very
same object tested to be positive for dangerous drugs and presented in court
as evidence is essential in every criminal prosecution under R.A. 9165.
Because the existence of the dangerous drug is crucial to a judgment of
conviction, it is indispensable that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt to ensure that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed. To this end, the prosecution must establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized item. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3,
2016)

Dangerous Drugs Law; Informants It has oft been held that the
presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable to
the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the
informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need
to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through
his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants identity is
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only
when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in
obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security
be disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly
witnessed by SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera, their testimonies can take the place of
that of the poseur-buyer. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO
LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)

Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs During a Party; Illegal


Possession of Drug Paraphernalia During a Party; Elements of.- After a review
of the records of the case, the Court holds that Piad was properly convicted
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It was proven that, on April
23, 2005, the police went to his house to conduct a buy-bust operation; that
PO1 Arevalo acted as the poseur-buyer; and that when PO1 Arevalo gave the
marked money to Piad, the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet. A
laboratory examination confirmed that the plastic sachet contained 0.05
gram of shabu. Clearly, all the elements of the said crime were established.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Piad committed the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in flagrante
delicto, he was asked about the source of his drugs. He then brought out a
metal box, which contained two (2) more sachets. It was confirmed in a
laboratory test that these sachets contained 0.06 gram of shabu. With
respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party
and the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the
prosecution also established that after the arrest of Piad, the team found
Villarosa, Carbo and Davis sitting on the floor and surrounded by one (1)
heat-sealed sachet and two (2) unsealed sachets. A laboratory report showed
that these sachets contained a total of 0.03 gram of shabu. The said persons
were also found with an aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable lighters,
which were considered drug paraphernalia. As correctly held by the RTC, the
elements of such crimes were proven because there was a proximate
company of at least two (2) persons without any legal authority to possess
the illicit items, citing Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. PIAD, G.R. NO. 213607, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Same; same; Illegal Sale of Drugs - In the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal
transaction. In the case at bar, the sale was not consummated since there
was no receipt of the consideration. IA1 Natividad arrested Asislo
immediately after the latter opened one of the sacks loaded with bricks of
marijuana. It was also admitted that the agents did not prepare marked
money for the buy-bust operation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs - It was settled in People v. Hoble that


"possession of prohibited drugs, coupled with the fact that the possessor is
not a user thereof, cannot indicate anything else but the intention to sell,
distribute or deliver the prohibited stuff." In an earlier case, the Court
considered three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds as considerable
quantity of drugs, such that possession of similar amount of drugs and the
fact that the accused is not a user of prohibited drugs clearly demonstrates
his intent to sell, distribute and deliver the same. In the case at bar, Asislo
was found in possession of 110 kilograms of dried marijuana leaves
contained in five sacks and a plastic bag, and that his drug test yielded
negative result. The following circumstances strongly indicate that he has
the intention to sell, distribute, deliver or transport the said marijuana.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No.
206224, January 18, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.- "In a prosecution for


illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery
and/or sale are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a
criminal case.20 And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime importance
therefore x xx is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise
established beyond reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO.
198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Illegal Sale of Shabu; Illegal Possession of Shabu; Elements of. For


the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefore. On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January
13, 2016)

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Drug


Pharaphernalia; Elements of - The elements of illegal possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or
control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not
authorized by law.In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established
that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum
tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence. (Saraum vs. People G.R. No. 205472, January 25,
2016)

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act: Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs;


Elements of. The elements that must be established to sustain convictions
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs are settled: In actions involving the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1)
prod that the transactions or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. (HOWARD
LESCANO y CARREON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No.
214490, January 13, 2016)
Illegal Transportation of Drugs - Asislo can still be liable for
violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal delivery
and transportation of marijuana. The essential element of the charge of
illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the dangerous
drug from one place to another. As defined in the case of People v. Mariacos,
"transport" means "to carry or convey from one place to another. There is
no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When
the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the
fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the
perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance
suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. In
the instant case, records established beyond any doubt that accused-
appellant Asislo was found in possession of the sacks containing marijuana,
and was arrested while in the act of delivering or transporting such illegal
drugs to Natividad, the poseur-buyer, at the agreed place in Dontogan,
Green Valley, Baguio City, near a certain "car wash." (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18,
2016)

Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-bust Operations; The Supreme Court held in


People vs. Abedin that coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may
carry out a buy-bust operation; in fact, even the absence of coordination with
the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.- We held in People v.
Abedin16 that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation;
that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not
invalidate a buy-bust operation. Neither is the presentation of the informant
indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are
almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve
their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely
essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed
with since their narrations would be merely corroborative to the testimonies
of the buy-bust team. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY
11, 2016)

Chain of Custody - Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized


movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA MIRANDA y BELTRAN, G.R. No.
205639, January 18, 2016)

Chain of Custody; The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure


that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the
monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the
accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.- The
chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the
identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of
the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. PIAD, G.R. NO. 213607, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Chain of Custody Rule; Physical Inventory and Photographing. At
least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from
whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a
representative of the National Prosecution Service. Section 21(1) requires
at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from
whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a
representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however,
alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the
person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first,
his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the
representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place. Section 21 speels out matters that
ate imperative. Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate
compliance but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21
does not suffice. This is especially so when the prosecution claims that the
seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned
operations, as is the case here. . (HOWARD LESCANO y CARREON vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 214490, January 13, 2016)
Same; Same; Same. Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, leaves room for deviating from its own requirements.
Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
leaves room for deviating from its own requirements. It includes a proviso
stating that noncompliance of [sic]these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. However,
the prosecution failed to establish the existence of any such justifiable
grounds. If at all, its own claims that the buy-bust operation was carefully
conceived of and carried out make its position even more dubious. These
claims are all the more reason to expect that Section 21(1) shall be complied
with meticulously. (HOWARD LESCANO y CARREON vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 214490, January 13, 2016)
Chain of Custody Rule; It must be established with unwavering exactitude
that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused
is the same as that seized from him in the first place.- It must be established
with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first
place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that in
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule - In many cases, this


Court has held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain." Since the law itself provided exceptions to its requirements., the non-
compliance with Section 21 of the IRR is not fatal and does not make the
items seized inadmissible. The most important factor is "the preservation of
the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No.
206224, January 18, 2016)

Chain of Custody Rule;- Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates
that the apprehending team must immediately conduct a physical inventory
of the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance therewith is not
fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending team.While nowhere in the prosecution evidence show
the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the police operatives involved in
the buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and taking a
photograph of the drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such
omission shall not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable
ground" will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to
specifically challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition
and preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He
cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged
non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. (SARAUM VS.
PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Same; Same; Same; - The chain of custody rule requires the identification
of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court. (SARAUM VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO.
205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Same; Same; Same; - While the procedure on the chain of custody should
be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain
an unbroken chain.Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. (SARAUM
VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Same; Same; Same;The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.In this case, the
prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because it
established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from
the time they were first discovered until they were brought to the court for
examination. Even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the
physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not
render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.
There is substantial compliance by the police as to the required procedure on
the custody and control of the confiscated items. The succession of events
established by evidence and the overall handling of the seized items by
specified individuals all show that the evidence seized were the same
evidence subsequently identified and testified to in open court. (SARAUM
VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)

Same; same; same - In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of


dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court.
The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen
submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs,
and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal
drug that was confiscated from him. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)
Chain of Custody Rule; Buy-bust Operation - It is material in every
prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug, which is the
corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the
prohibited drug must be established without any doubt. Even more than this,
what must also be established is the fact that the substance bought during
the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA MIRANDA y BELTRAN, G.R.
No. 205639, January 18, 2016)

Same; Same; Same; The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify
as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their respective possession
resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the drug. "[W]hile
the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is
not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." As such,
what is of utmost importance "is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused." In the case at bench, this Court finds it
exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
drug have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The
inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with
the alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or
break in the chain of custody of the drug. In some cases, the Court declared
that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to
establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the
irregular manner which plagued the handling of the evidence before the
same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the government to
obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. (PEOPLE V.
HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Same; Same; Same; The alleged apprehending team after the alleged
initial custody and control of the drug and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same,
nor did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from
whom the alleged item was confiscated.-Apart from the utter failure of the
prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, yet another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and integrity of
the subject shabu. We refer to the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with
the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the custody and
disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165.
Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and
control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same,
never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever
photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the
alleged item was confiscated. There was no physical inventory and
photograph of the item allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there
any explanation offered for such failure. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO.
198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Same; Same; Same; While the Supreme Court in certain cases has
tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the requisite under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) can be applied only when the evidentiary value
and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in
People vs. Guru 684 SCRA 544.-While this Court in certain cases has
tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the requisite under Section
21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of
the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in People v. Guru. In
the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug
had been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the
identity of the item in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. In
this light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
accorded the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise. (PEOPLE V.
HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1 Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping, to presentation in court or destruction.- The Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure or confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court or
destruction. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; been established by proof beyond


reasonable doubt that appellant sold and possessed shabu and shabu
paraphernalia. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500, 000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved. For the crime of illegal sale of shabu, appellant was properly
sentence to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No.
210454, January 13, 2016)
Illegal Possession of Shabu; Penalties. Appellant was also caught in
possession of 0.19 gram of shabu. The crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, which provides an imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5)
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January
13, 2016)

Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; Penalties;-- Section 12,


Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides that the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one(1) days to four (4) years
and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless
authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January
13, 2016)

16. Illegal Possession of Firearms (P.D. 1866, as amended by


R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591)
17. Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended)

Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law


(ISL), the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Coded (RPC). On the other hand, the
minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. The court then has the
discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending
circumstances are considered. The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. The penalty next lower to that is prision correctional. Prision
correctional ranges from six (6) months and 0ne (1) day to six (6) years;
hence the minimum penalty can be any period within this range. As for the
maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its
medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to 10 years. (NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)

18. Juvenile Justive and Welfare Act (R.A. No. 9344, as


amended by R.A. No. 10630, and in relation to P.D. 603)
19. Obstruction of Justice (P.D. 1829)

Obstruction of Justice (Presidential Decree 1829; Elements of


The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show
that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1 (b)
above. First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the
crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1 (b). The factual allegations in
the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the
truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation
and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the
crime. In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber
serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal
investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck
is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the
transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber.
According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna, the transport of lumber
should be covered with supporting documents that should be in the
possession of the transporter. (Padiernos y Quejada v. People, G.R. No.
181111, [August 17, 2015])

2. Probation Law (P.D. 968, as amended)


Probation Law. - On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently
amended by P.D. No. 1990. Henceforth, the policy has been to allow
convicted and sentenced defendant to apply for probation within the 15-day
period for perfecting an appeal. As modified, Section 4 of the Probation Law
now reads:SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best; Provided, that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation
shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal.An order granting or denying probation shall
not be appealable. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for
probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period for
perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is intended to
encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, to
avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity. If the application for
probation is filed beyond the 15-day period, then the judgment becomes final
and executory and the lower court can no longer act on the application for
probation. On the other hand, if a notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court
that rendered the judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction to act
on the case, except the execution of the judgment when it has become final
and executory. In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation
Law that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction,"
prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. Indeed, the law is very
clear and a contrary interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate.
Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the
law" where the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the
history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. To be sure,
the remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the benefits of probation
even after the remedy of an appeal is to go to the Congress and ask for the
amendment of the law. To surmise a converse construal of the provision
would be dangerously encroaching on the power of the legislature to enact
laws and is tantamount to judicial legislation. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y
MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513,
October 20, 2015 )

It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should not
have been allowed the benefit of probation. As I have previously stated and
insisted upon, probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a
special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender, who
does not possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as
amended. Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally
construed to favor the accused.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the
judgment of conviction, which involves a review of the merits of the case and
the determination of whether the accused is entitled to acquittal. However,
under the recommended grounds for appeal which were enumerated earlier,
the purpose of the appeal is not to assail the judgment of conviction but to
question only the propriety of the sentence, particularly the penalty imposed
or the crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused intends to
apply for probation upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser
offense. If the CA finds it proper to modify the sentence, and the penalty
finally imposed by the appellate court is within the probationable period, or
the crime for which the accused is eventually convicted imposes a
probationable penalty, application for probation after the case is remanded
to the trial court for execution should be allowed.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y
MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513,
October 20, 2015 )

Probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:1.


When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the
penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused
files a notice of appeal; and2. When the accused files a notice of appeal
which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative
prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a
conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in
which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable
period.Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of
the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal
from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused.
(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )

20. Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115)


21. Cybercrime Prevention Act (R.A. 10175)
22. Human Security Act (R.A> No. 9372) defining acts of
terrorism

Special Law; Cattle-Rustling - Presidential Decree No. 533 defines


cattle-rustling as: Section 2. Definition of terms - The following terms shall
mean and be understood to be as herein defined: c. Cattle rustling is the
taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit
or gain, whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation
of any person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking the meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. (ARIEL
LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212186, June 29,
2016)

Cattle Rustling; Elements of - The elements of cattle-rustling are:Ch(1)


large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without
the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means,
method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and
(6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things. (ARIEL LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)

Not all of the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The
carabao transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to
be the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.Alderete's
description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any
distinguishing mark on the carabao that petitioner allegedly stole. In other
cases involving cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle was proven
with certainty because of distinguishing marks on the cattle. (ARIEL LOPEZ
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)