Asset Baseline Study Final British Columbia Transmission

BCTC 2005 TSCP Exhibit B-3B
Introduction and Context

For the Baseline Study
Prepared By
British Columbia Transmission Corporation
April, 2005
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................3
2 Using and Interpreting the Baseline Study ................................................................. 5
3 BCTC Asset Management Strategy ........................................................................... 7
3.1 High Level Asset Management Principles............................................................. 7
3.2 Differences from Historical Practice ...................................................................... 9
3.3 Prioritization........................................................................................................... 9
3.4 Asset Strategy by Class ...................................................................................... 11
3.4.1 Circuit Breakers ............................................................................................... 11
3.4.2 Disconnect Switches ....................................................................................... 14
3.4.3 Circuit Switchers.............................................................................................. 15
3.4.4 Transformers/Tap Changers (excluding HVDC).............................................. 16
3.4.5 Instrument Transformers ................................................................................. 18
3.4.6 Shunt Reactors................................................................................................ 19
3.4.7 Shunt Capacitors ............................................................................................. 20
3.4.8 Station Insulators............................................................................................. 21
3.4.9 Substation Cables and Terminations............................................................... 22
3.4.10 Synchronous Condensers ............................................................................. 23
3.4.11 Gas Insulated Switchgear.............................................................................. 24
3.4.12 Static Var Compensators............................................................................... 26
3.4.13 High Pressure Air Systems............................................................................ 27
3.4.14 Protection and Control Systems .................................................................... 28
3.4.15 Surge Arrestors ............................................................................................. 31
3.4.16 Station Grounding & Surface Treatment ....................................................... 32
3.4.17 Batteries ........................................................................................................ 33
3.4.18 Stand-By Generators and Fuel Systems ....................................................... 34
3.4.19 Facilities General........................................................................................... 35
3.4.20 Fire Protection Systems ................................................................................ 37
3.4.21 Microwave Equipment ................................................................................... 38
3.4.22 Power Line Carrier Equipment ...................................................................... 40
3.4.23 Series Capacitors .......................................................................................... 41
3.4.24 HVDC Pole 1 ................................................................................................. 42
3.4.25 HVDC Pole 2 ................................................................................................. 43
3.4.26 Conductor Systems ....................................................................................... 44
3.4.27 Metal Support Structures............................................................................... 46
3.4.28 Wood Pole Structures.................................................................................... 48
3.4.29 Vegetation / Rights-of-Way............................................................................ 50
3.4.30 Access Roads................................................................................................ 53
3.4.31 Civil Works..................................................................................................... 55
3.4.32 Underground and Submarine Cables & Oil Systems .................................... 57
3.4.33 Manholes & Duct Systems ............................................................................ 59
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1 Introduction
British Columbia Transmission Corporation (BCTC) was established as a British
Columbia Crown Corporation to manage, maintain and operate the BC Hydro
Transmission System (Transmission System) and to provide transparent, open access
to transmission services. The Transmission Asset Condition Assessment project
(Baseline Study) was conducted to fulfill a requirement with BC Hydro under Article 7 of
the Asset Management and Maintenance Agreement (AMMA), one of the key
agreements establishing BC Transmission Corporation (BCTC) as an independent
transmission company.
AMMA required an independent engineering company to conduct the Baseline Study.

Acres International Ltd. (Acres) was selected through a competitive process as the
independent engineering firm to conduct the assessment and establish a baseline for
asset health. The selection of Acres was completed in consultation with and agreement
from BC Hydro, and a copy of the draft Baseline Study Report was also provided to BC
Hydro for review and input prior to the report being finalized, as directed in Article 7.2 of
AMMA.
The key objectives for the project were to:
o Assess the current state of health of the Transmission System Assets in order to
establish a baseline for measuring the performance of BCTC.
o Satisfy requirements of the Asset Management and Maintenance Agreement
between BCTC and BC Hydro which requires an independent expert audit
opinion of asset condition every 3 years.
o Document the methodology and define a repeatable process that can be used in
future audits.
o Develop best practice asset health metrics for the Transmission System Assets.
o Use the Asset Health Indices developed as an input to planning and decision
making for present and future capital replacement and expensed maintenance
requirements.
Before reviewing and interpreting the results of the Baseline Study, and it is important to
understand the scope of the study. AMMA specified that the project had to be
completed within a 12 month window following commencement. As assessing the
health of the Transmission System Assets was potentially a massive undertaking taking
years and tens of thousands of resource hours to complete, the scope and approach
had to be designed to meet time and budget constraints set jointly by BCTC and BC
Hydro. To put this into perspective, the Transmission System Assets1 include over:
- 1000 circuit breakers;

- 4000 disconnect switches;
- 230 transformers and 4200 instrument transformers;
- 2900 relay systems with nearly 8000 relays;
- 2600 surge arrestors;
- 11,500 km of rights of way;
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Assets designated as Substation Distribution Assets are specifically excluded from these counts.
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- 97,000 spans of overhead conductor (~18,000 circuit km);
- 20,000 metal support structures;
- 67,000 wood pole structures;
- 1.3 million support structure insulators;
- 338 km of underground and submarine cable;
- And many other assets and critical sub-components spelled out in detail in
the body of the Baseline Study.
For purposes of analysis and reporting, the transmission assets were categorized into 33
classes of items with similar characteristics or functions.
The biggest challenge in conducting the Baseline Study was gathering the right data in
sufficient quantity to arrive at a meaningful result. Given the constraints in time, budget,
impact to system availability and impact to the equipment, the scope of the study could
not include testing or invasive inspection of specific equipment items to capture new
condition data not already being collected. The same constraints did not allow for the
transformation of paper based records in the field to electronic form, or the design,
implementation or modification of technology infrastructure to enable the systematic
capture of data used to calculate the health indices.
The data used to define the baseline results was generally based on available data in
reasonable electronic form from existing systems. While it was possible to do some
evaluation of data (form, quantity and quality) at the outset of the project, it was not
possible to evaluate every system or record, or to anticipate in advance every data
element required, as the Health Indices had not yet been developed.
As part of that initial evaluation, it was determined that a significant amount of the
expected condition assessment data for substation equipment did not exist in a useable
format, and some manual data collection would be required to produce a meaningful
result. As collecting data on each piece of substation equipment in every substation was
cost prohibitive, a statistical sampling approach was utilized, and approximately half of
the substations were visited by field teams to perform visual inspections of equipment,
and if practical, review field records for further information. The field teams collecting
this data were qualified personnel with knowledge of the assets, selected through a
competitive process to conduct the work. Acres designed the data collection forms,
specified the data to be gathered and trained the teams to be able to consistently
evaluate the condition ratings, using training guides and photographs of real examples
from the field.
There was somewhat more condition data available in existing databases for calculation
of the overhead transmission and underground cable Health Indices than for substation
assets. For those assets, Acres performed a review of the data collection processes to
ensure that the raw data collected during on-going maintenance and inspection activities
had been accurately transferred to the relevant databases.
In addition to a clear understanding of the project objectives and scope, it is necessary

to put the Baseline Study into perspective with respect to a more complete view of Asset
Management. Section 2 provides more insight into using the study and interpreting the
results.
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2 Using and Interpreting the Baseline Study
When looking at the detailed results of the Baseline Study it is important to establish the
context and a frame of reference from which the results should be assessed. As
indicated in Figure 2.1 below, there are a number of considerations that go into
managing the assets. The health or condition of the asset, which was the focus of the
Baseline Study, is only one such consideration. The Baseline Study does not assess
the performance of the assets either individually or as a system, nor is it an assessment
of asset value or the overall performance of the business.
Asset Management Considerations
BUSINESS
PERFORMANCE
Protection of Business Value
SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE
ASSET
PERFORMANCE
ASSET
CONDITION
Asset Management Objective: Find the Balance Focus of the

Baseline Study
Figure 2.1
As the manager of the Transmission System, it is BCTCs duty to define strategies to

manage the assets that balance lifecycle cost, risk of failure and performance of the
Transmission System in order to meet the different and sometimes conflicting needs of
the stakeholders. If the asset management focus were only on improving or maintaining
asset condition, there would be suboptimal decisions with respect to the overall
performance of the system and business, and costs would go up.
Except for items like real property, all assets have a lifecycle, and eventually will have to
be replaced or renewed in some fashion. There is not necessarily a single right
condition rating or health index value at any point in the lifecycle, except when an asset
is new and is expected to be in very good condition (even that is not always the case).
As individual assets operate under different conditions, it is normal to expect a
distribution of asset condition results that will move through stages if the asset is being
managed effectively, and both cost and performance are considered in making
decisions. Asset Health will depend on many factors, as outlined in the discussion of
degradation criteria for each asset in the Baseline Study (Section x.3 of each chapter in
the Baseline Study report).
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While analogous to assessing the health of a human body, asset health in the utility
industry is not as well advanced. There is not an industry standard definition or
methodology to assess asset health, and it is not an exact science. As with the human
body, wide scale exploratory internal inspections are not practical and not always
possible. Professional judgement is still required, and therefore differences of
professional opinion will exist, and is the reason Acres was brought in to perform the
assessment as a qualified but unbiased third party.
As outlined in the introduction above, the project time and budget constraints did not
allow for exhaustive collection of all of the data required for asset health measurements
to be completed. Threshold levels of data were set by Acres for the asset health index
measurements to be qualified as valid (explained in more detail in Acres introduction to
the Baseline Study, and for each asset class in the Baseline Study report). If insufficient
data was available for an asset class, modifications to the ideal health index formulation
were attempted, leading to a less than ideal health index measurement, but still
providing a reasonable indication of asset health. There were four classes of assets
where no result was possible. In three of these classes (station insulators, access roads
and civil works) data to support a health index has simply never been recorded in the
past. For the fourth class, Wood Pole Structures, some data was available, but it was
deemed by Acres to be too inconsistent to report a meaningful result.
Despite the realities of incomplete data and some inherent subjectivity in assessing
Asset Health, the Baseline Study does provide directional guidance in managing the
assets and guiding the strategy with a clarity far advanced from any previous attempts.
BCTC is in agreement with the results, which are consistent with BCTCs view of the
health of the assets prior to the study taking place. BCTC believes that collection of
additional data would not have had a significant impact on the overall result, and that for
the Baseline Study there was the appropriate balance applied between quality of the
results and value for money.
The amount of data used to calculate the health index will increase for future updates of
asset health, as more of the required data will be collected through ongoing
maintenance and inspection activity. The Health Indices may also evolve over time as
more experience with them is gained, but BCTC is aware of the need for appropriate due
diligence around any changes, both to avoid changes due to individual preference and to
document the impact on previously reported results.
As indicated by Acres in the Baseline Study report, a health or condition rating does not
by itself imply a specific course of action or timing, without consideration of the operating
context, risk and financial implications, and of course the overall strategy for managing a
particular asset. Section 3, below, outlines the strategy and philosophy at both a system
level and an asset class level that corresponds to the grouping of assets in the Baseline
Study. It provides further context and a sense of the direction BCTC is going in
addressing the state of Health and Maintenance of the Transmission System.
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3 BCTC Asset Management Strategy
As a new entity, BCTC has been highly focused on a number of tactical considerations
in defining processes and implementing technology to support the day to day operation
and management of the Transmission System. As those start-up initiatives are being
completed, more energy is being directed to reviewing and/or defining appropriate long
term strategies to manage the assets. This section is intended to provide an overview
how BCTC currently views the assets, which should provide additional context and
insight for interpreting the results of the Baseline Study.
3.1 High Level Asset Management Principles

As part of the overall Asset Management Strategy, there are a number of general
principles that guide BCTC in managing the assets:
1. BCTC will apply a lifecycle approach to managing the assets, similar to that
shown in Figure 3.1 below.
Asset Life-Cycle and Processes
Capital
Asset Planning
Strategy Repairs
Planning
Capital
Strategy Concept/
Maintenance
Design
Procurement Planning
Decommission
Revenue & Renewal
Strategy Contract
Management
Commission &
Value Early Life
Determination Replace &
Operation Improve
Risk
Mitigation Repair
Network
Risk Maintain
Evaluation Network
Figure 3.1
This means that BCTC will:
a. Look for an economic balance between maintenance and replacement to

pursue the lowest lifecycle cost for the function without impacting the
required level of performance. BCTC will look for opportunities to make
one time capital investments that result in larger offsetting reductions in
lifecycle OMA costs without negatively impacting performance.
BCTC will include a rigorous financial analysis that will include calculation
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of Net Present Value (NPV) and benefit / cost ratio. Factors that will be
considered include:
Capital costs to buy or construct an asset. This would include

equipment, labour, contingency, interest during construction,
overheads and appropriate spares.
Site remediation, asset dismantling, or clean-up costs
Discounted cash flows relating to maintenance (i.e. incremental
OMA resulting from implementing a project)
Discounted cash flows relating to revenue or cash inflows (i.e.
incremental revenue resulting from implementing a project)
Discounted cash flows related to cost savings (i.e. reduced
maintenance, labour savings, etc)
Time period of periodic cash inflows & outflows, measured in
months or year
Inflation factors
b. Apply an evergreen process for asset replacement, meaning that it will

replace individual assets when it makes sense for that asset, and rather
than waiting for an entire generation of assets to degrade before
replacing. Over time this will serve to smooth the revenue requirement to
manage the assets.
c. Adopt new technologies as they become available and are proven, rather
than replacing like for like.
d. Focus on the overall system, rather than individual components.
e. Focus on asset health rather than defects. Historically the objective was
to track defects in order to drive repair activity. However, individual
defects do not provide a view of the health of the entire asset, or clear
feedback on the effectiveness of the asset management strategy.
f. Define appropriate asset management processes and manage the
process to drive efficiencies over time.
2. In order to ensure a long-term perspective and provide for smoother revenue

requirements, BCTC will view sustaining capital programs over a moving 10
year planning horizon. BCTC will also apply its prioritization framework to focus
on the highest priority work.
3. BCTC is looking to maintain (rather than exceed) compliance with current
reliability targets and standards.
4. Asset Management strategies will support the new safety management and
environment management programs implemented by BCTC.
5. Asset Management strategies include looking for partnership opportunities with
suppliers and other utilities to improve effectiveness and lower costs. This is
currently reflected in the way BCTC is working with Hydro One and ABB to find
alternative and cost effective ways to deal with the premature degradation of
Gas Insulated Switchgear.
6. BCTC will continue to employ Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)
philosophies in maintaining the assets.
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3.2 Differences from Historical Practice
Evolving Strategy and Organizational Focus
In 1999, BC Hydro introduced Reliability Centred Maintenance based on a modified

approach developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). RCM involves a
logical identification of the consequences of system and functional failures to arrive at an
efficient and effective maintenance management strategy that attempts to optimize asset
life cycle costs without negatively impacting performance. The approach adopted uses
maintenance standards specific to the equipment being analyzed, including design
differences between manufacturers of the same types of equipment (e.g. circuit
breakers), differences due to voltage level, or differences in functional intent.
BCTC continues to support RCM as a key component of the overall asset management
strategy, but views RCM as a maintenance philosophy, not an asset management
strategy. In its role as a centralized Asset Manager, BCTC brings focus and consistent
application of RCM principles. The single view of the asset inherent in this new business
model means that BCTC can consistently develop and apply the asset management
strategy, and is able to better prioritize based on implications for overall Transmission
System performance.
Data and Information Management
The exercise of conducting the Baseline Study identified a number of gaps in virtually all
asset categories that must be filled in order to compute a Health Index as prescribed by
Acres in the Baseline Study. In order to address those gaps for future reporting of Asset
Health, BCTC will need to take actions, including:
- Changes to systems and standards to document precise definitions for Health

Index criteria.
- Changes to data capture process to address gaps in condition assessment &
reporting and allow for direct entry into handheld computers the field.
- Ensuring use of an appropriate electronic database to record and store asset
condition, defects, and failures. Maintenance standards will be transferred onto
the handheld computers, thus allowing storage of the test data into electronic
databases and replacing existing paper-based test records.
- Adjusting maintenance process & frequency to more specifically address the
needs of the asset as suggested by the Health Index.
- A quality control process for data capture is being developed and implemented to
ensure consistency.
Program Prioritization
Prioritization is a significant sub-process in the overall asset management decision

framework, and in the development of the Sustaining Capital Portfolio. The BCTC
program prioritization process is now in place, and includes assessing each proposed
investment program using a combination of deterministic and risk-based criteria, as
outlined below:
- Environmental Factors
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mandatory if required to meet new government or regulatory standards;
discretionary if based on BCTC environmental standards.
impact to health and safety of the public, workforce and surrounding
physical environment. Safety is a top priority for BCTC and consequently
has the highest consideration in the capital planning process. Investments
that are based on mitigation of safety hazards to the public, third parties,
employees or contractors are considered to be mandatory. All safety related
investments automatically pre-qualify for inclusion in the annual capital plan.
- Impact on Reliability - the key indicator for reliability is SAIDI.
- Asset Condition and Sustainability - as defined in the Baseline Study
- Financial Impact - based on Cost / Benefit Analysis.
- Societal and Consent to Operate Implications

evaluation of the impact to all customers in the region or community
impacted
other societal factors such as visual impact, sound, odour, location and
economic impact.
The prioritization process is described in more detail in the BCTC F2006 Capital Plan.
The methodology has been presented to IPPs and others at planning workshops and
has received favourable comment, and BCTC will continue to work with stakeholders to
improve the process.
Supply Chain
BCTC is also executing new procurement strategies to look for savings and efficiencies
through long term supply agreements for parts and replacement assets.
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3.3 Asset Strategy by Class
3.3.1 Circuit Breakers
3.3.1.1 Asset Management Strategy

High voltage circuit breakers are used to isolate sections of the power system
and interrupt high currents under fault conditions. They are the ultimate
protection device on the transmission system, and therefore a critical
element, and must be capable of reliably interrupting both load currents and
fault currents in a timely manner.
The Transmission System employs a variety of circuit breakers in terms of

voltage classes (from 12kV up to 500kV), arc extinguishing medium (air
magnetic, air blast, vacuum, minimum or bulk oil, SF6 gas or SF6 and other
gas mixtures), and fall into various types of circuit breakers (live tank, dead
tank or in GIS), vintages and brands.
BCTCs general strategy for circuit breakers is to refurbish rather than

replace, but because of the diversity of the assets in this class, the strategy
must be tailored to individual types of circuit breakers.
BCTCs asset management strategy for circuit breakers continues to evolve

and takes into account variable factors that can have a direct or indirect
effect. It is driven by:
historical reliability of specific types of breakers
availability of OEM support (parts, technical support)
maintenance and overhaul costs
changes in operating conditions
environmental issues such as excessive SF6 gas leakage
seismic withstand requirements
Maintenance practices for circuit breakers take into consideration individual

characteristics of each type of breaker and employ Reliability Centered
maintenance (RCM) methods that are most appropriate for the specific type
of equipment. Maintenance Standards for each type of breaker have been
prepared. These standards describe various diagnostic techniques used to
assess and maintain the health of the asset.
The asset management strategy includes replacement of breakers that have

either reached end-of-life, or meet one of the other criteria such as loss of
OEM support, high overhaul cost, etc.
BCTC has also negotiated a long term supply contract for parts and
replacement with multiple suppliers, which is expected to reduce the cost of
equipment and tendering.
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3.3.1.2 Change from Historical Practice
A Quality Assurance audit program has been initiated to spot check the
performance of field services for preventive maintenance (PM) type activities.
Most audits performed to date indicate adherence to the maintenance
practices specified in the maintenance standard.
3.3.1.3 Sustaining Capital Programs

The current replacement programs for circuit breakers have been initiated to
reduce overhaul costs and mitigate risk, and can be categorized into three
groups as follows:
1. Obsolescence and Unavailability of Spare Parts - Remaining

500kV GE type ATB-80 breakers are being phased out over the
next 4 years. These breakers, although installed only 20 years
ago, would have been rebuilt if parts were available. However, GE
no longer provides parts and technical support for air blast
breakers.
The 500kV GE type AT circuit breakers are also scheduled for

replacement. These breakers are close to 40 years old and have
already been rebuilt once, but parts are no longer available for a
second rebuild. They are currently installed at Ingledow
substation, the key switching station in the BC Hydro system.
Replacement of these breakers will reduce risk due to earthquake
as they are in a seismic zone, but not able to withstand a
significant seismic event.
2. Environmental Issues and Reduction of Overhaul Costs - Under

Environmental issues, the 230kV double pressure breakers (ITE
GB and Westinghouse SF) are being replaced with dead tank
Mitsubishi breakers. The double pressure breakers are leaking
large quantities of SF6 gas, and attempts to overhaul them were
costly and unsuccessful.
The 25kV ABB SACE breakers also leak SF6 gas. Overhaul costs
are relatively high and the results are only temporary, as
continuous corrosion leads to more leaks within a 2 year interval.
A program to replace these breakers is under way.
3. Performance Issues - A recent string of explosive failures on the

500kV Delle type PK8 air blast circuit breakers has raised
questions about the ongoing reliable operation of these units in
the 3 switchyards where they operate. These breakers are also
close to 40 years old. BCTC has reviewed the risks involved and
initiated a replacement program of the remaining 21 units over a 3
year period.
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3.3.1.4 Prioritization Criteria and Risk Factors
Programs are prioritized based on the BCTC Risk and Prioritization Program
guidelines. Units are select to be replaced based on:
historical reliability
change in requirements for operating conditions
environmental issues such as excessive SF6 gas leakage
seismic withstand requirements
Units are then prioritized based on:

Criticality of position in the system
Duty performed
Performance of the unit (MTBF)
Efficient construction costs for mobilization and demobilization
Remaining life
3.3.1.5 Related OMA Initiatives

BCTC continues its OMA program of PM, rebuild and overhaul of circuit
breakers. The 500kV BBC air blast circuit breaker rebuild program has been
successful and is on track.
An assessment of risk and reliability issues to prioritize the replacement of

circuit breakers identified as class failures is in progress. This assessment
will address circuit breakers in the worst condition and recommend a
prioritized replacement or refurbishment program.
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3.3.2 Disconnect Switches

The primary function of a disconnect switch is to isolate apparatus and circuit
elements from the power grid for maintenance and voltage control.
BCTCs asset management strategy for disconnect switches is to extend

serviceable life and defer capital investment through time and condition
based maintenance, and condition-based overhaul. In addition, BCTC has
negotiated long term supply contracts with multiple suppliers for disconnects.
This is expected to reduce the cost of equipment and tendering.
BCTC has commissioned a more detailed assessment of issues regarding

the HV disconnect population and is presently analyzing the
recommendations from this assessment.

As part of the implementation of RCM, time-based maintenance on
disconnect switches at 25kV has been discontinued. Maintenance and
replacement of these devices is now exclusively performed based on
condition assessment.

All switches are in Good or Very Good condition, and no large Sustaining
Capital Programs are planned in the near future.

Key criteria used for prioritizing projects within this asset class are condition-
based.

BCTC has an on-going rebuild program for older (but still reliable) 500kV
and 230kV disconnect switches such as Kearney and ITE switches.
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3.3.3 Circuit Switchers

Circuit switchers have limited fault interrupting capability, relatively slow
interruption times, and are found to require higher maintenance costs than
circuit breakers. Given these characteristics, BCTCs long-term strategy for
circuit switchers is to retire this type of equipment and use circuit breakers for
any new installations or replacements.
BCTC asset management strategy for the remaining circuit switchers in the
system can be described as:
Preventive maintenance based on time intervals and number of
operations
Condition-based overhaul, and
Replacement program for the 500kV S&C switchers that switch
Shunt Reactors, with circuit breakers.

No major changes are contemplated with respect to maintenance; however
the eventual replacement of switchers with circuit breakers is a new practice.

As most of the switchers are in good condition, no new large sustaining
capital programs are planned for this group.
The program for replacing 500 kV S&C shunt reactor circuit switchers in poor
condition with circuit breakers will be completed in 2010.

Programs are prioritized based on the BCTC Risk and Prioritization Program
guidelines. The key criteria used for prioritizing the replacement within this
asset class are primarily related to condition as a result of requirements for
faster operating times of particular positions (for RAS, etc). Grouping within a
substation to reduce mobilization and demobilization savings and overall
lower replacement cost is also a consideration.

Other than existing maintenance initiatives, there are no special OMA
initiatives currently in place.
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3.3.4 Transformers/Tap Changers (excluding HVDC)

Power transformers are used to increase and decrease power system
voltages for efficient power transfer and utilization. BCTCs strategy for
transformers is to extend the effective life and defer replacement as long as
possible while still maintaining a satisfactory level of service. Programs such
as the Oil Regeneration Program and Coil Re-clamping Project are in place
to extend the serviceable life of transformers.
All transformers are subjected to a Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

program, where different acceptance criteria are established for different
equipment voltage classes, and various inspection and testing techniques are
employed to ensure the equipment continues to provide reliable service.
Whenever a problem develops and is detected, more diagnostic testing and
monitoring is carried out to better understand how to resolve the problem and
prevent failure. Condition assessment is primarily determined by gas-in-oil
analysis.

Changes from historical practise include abandonment of certain Oil Quality
tests (Color and Neutralization Number), as these tests have been deemed to
provide little value. The Inhibitor Content test, used for tracking the oxidation
process of oil, has been added to routine oil testing.
Oil samples are now taken from bushings and have successfully detected
some bad bushings and avoided some catastrophic failures.

The scope of the Animal Mitigation Program has been expanded to address
the risk of transformer damages due to animal contacts. The main focus is
installation of bird guards and insulating material onto 12KV and 25KV
secondary bushings to prevent phase to phase and phase to ground faults.

The Transformer Replacement Program will be prioritized based on the
BCTC Risk and Prioritization Program guidelines. The key criteria include the
condition assessment of the unit, as well as the environmental and social
impacts.

In addition to the RCM program, BCTC has several on-going OMA initiatives
for transformers, including:
Oil Leak Repair. As the transformer ages, the oil sealing gasket
material for the tank covers, bushing mounting flanges, etc
deteriorates, allowing oil to leak out. This is a common and on-
going issue.
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Oil Regeneration Program. Through routine oil testing, it has
been determined that the quality of oil has aged and deteriorated
in a number of units. Oil quality has a direct impact on the
serviceable life of transformers, and as a result, the Oil
Regeneration Program will be expanded to treat more units.
Coil Re-clamping Program. This program is intended to extend

the life of transformers. Under this program, when a transformer is
de-oiled for any other purpose ( such as internal inspection ), the
winding clamping pressure will be checked and if it is deemed
necessary, the coils will be re-clamped to restore the mechanical
withstand strength of the coils. This will prevent any mechanical
failures due to short circuit.
Furan Testing. Furan analysis is another important indicator of

condition and is included as routine oil testing.
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3.3.5 Instrument Transformers

The strategy for managing Instrument transformers is specific to the type of
transformer, but would generally be described as life extension at the lowest
long term cost. Oil-filled instrument transformers will no longer be purchased,
and new units purchased will either be SF6 or dry-type units.
A Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) policy has been established and

applied to Instrument Transformers. The maintenance activities consist of
Doble testing and dissolved gas-in-oil analysis, with different acceptance
criteria established for different voltage classes.

As the failure rate of this class of equipment has been low for the past five
years, no change in strategy is anticipated.

Funds have been allocated for the replacement of failing Instrument
Transformers.

The Replacement Program will be prioritized based on the Risk and
Prioritization Program guidelines. Primary considerations are the condition
assessment of the unit, as well as the environmental and social impacts. As
per our strategy, oil-filled units have more significant failure consequences
and will be replaced with either SF6 (for High Voltage units) or dry type units
(for Low Voltage units).

The primary OMA initiative is the on-going RCM program.
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3.3.6 Shunt Reactors

Shunt reactors are used in the transmission system to provide voltage control
and are a critical component for reliable operation of the transmission system.
BCTCs strategy for shunt reactors is to extend the effective life and defer
refurbishment or replacement as long as possible while still maintaining a
satisfactory level of service.
As virtually all of the shunt reactors are under 30 years of age, the strategy is
to closely monitor condition through the defined Health Index, with particular
attention to oil testing and oil regeneration to extend the serviceable life.

Change to historical practise include abandonment of certain Oil Quality tests
(Color and Neutralization Number), as these tests have been deemed to
provide little value. The Inhibitor Content test, used for tracking the oxidation
process of oil, has been added to routine oil testing.
Oil samples are now taken from bushings and have successfully detected
some bad bushings and avoided some catastrophic failures.

There are currently no current sustaining capital programs for shunt reactors.

All 500 KV shunt reactors are crucial to the operation of the Transmission
System, and therefore the focus is to maintain reliability by addressing the
equipment in the poorest condition and the highest risk.

for shunt reactors, including:
Oil Regeneration Program. Through routine oil testing, it has been

determined that the quality of oil has aged and deteriorated in a
number of units. Oil quality has a direct impact on the serviceable life
of shunt reactors, and as a result, the Oil Regeneration Program will
be expanded to treat more units.
Furan Testing. Furan analysis is another important indicator of

condition and is included as routine oil testing.
19
3.3.7 Shunt Capacitors

Shunt Capacitors are used in the Transmission System to provide reactive
power compensation and voltage support during peak loading. BCTCs
strategy is to extend the serviceable life at the lowest long term cost by
focusing on the following three areas:
Maintenance continue to apply RCM principles for maintenance.

Measurement of key equipment condition indicators including Infra-
Red inspection and Doble testing will continue.
Spares - system reliability requires the right spares to be available in

stock. BCTC has initiated a program to inventory the spares and
assess spares adequacy to establish both short and long term spare
stocking levels.
Environmental compliance BCTC has initiated a program to replace

all shunt capacitor PCB cans by 2008 to comply with Federal
Government regulations.

The key change for this asset class is the implementation of new electrical
maintenance standards for all shunt capacitors.

The PCB can replacement is currently the only current sustaining capital
program and will address the shunt capacitors rated in poor condition. There
is no other capital program planned for this asset at this time.

Any future replacement program will be prioritized based on the Risk and
assessment of the unit and impact to system reliability.

In addition to ongoing maintenance, the key initiative is the work to document
and assess the spares inventory for shunt capacitors.
20
3.3.8 Station Insulators

As practical non-destructive testing of internal insulator degradation is not
possible, the strategy for station insulators is to run to failure. Surface
condition is monitored through visual and infra-red inspection as part of the
monthly substation inspection program.
A significant percentage of the current population is still comprised of pin and

cap insulators (over 36 thousand were installed). Pin and Cap insulators
experience separation of the cap from the pin as the cement that attaches the
cap begins to degrade. BCTC has an existing program, started in 2000, to
replace this type of insulator with post insulators. The program strategy is to
replace all pin and cap insulators in an entire station at once.

Pin and cap insulators are being replaced with post insulators.

There is a long-term program for the replacement program for the pin and
cap insulators. The program will replace insulators on a per station basis to
reduce costs associated with construction. This program is approximately
33% complete.

The key factors for prioritization of the stations for the insulator replacement
program are equipment condition and station criticality.

Other than routine maintenance activity, no special OMA initiatives are
planned.
21
3.3.9 Substation Cables and Terminations

BCTC normally uses XLPE cable in substations. The primary strategy for
station cables is to replace on failure. When a failure occurs, BCTC will
replace all cables in the run to protect the replacement cable from
subsequent failures of surrounding cables. This reduces long-term outage
time, and ultimately lowers long term costs.
Condition is assessed through inspections using infra-red thermography to

look for hot spots that would indicate problem terminations or cable damage.
BCTC is currently conducting R&D using mobile partial discharge testing,
which if successful, would be a better indicator of cable and termination
condition.

No changes are contemplated at this point in time.

There are currently no capital programs for substation cables.

Any future replacement program will be prioritized based on the Risk and
assessment of the cable, criticality of the station and the impact to system
reliability.

Other than routine maintenance inspections, there are no special OMA
initiatives related to this asset class.
22
3.3.10 Synchronous Condensers

Synchronous Condensers are used only in special circumstances in the
Transmission System to provide or absorb reactive power, and at present
there are only 5 in the entire system. The Synchronous Condensers at are
key to providing system compensation in both HVDC operations and
Vancouver Island VAR support.
Given the operating environment, Synchronous Condensers are expected to

have an extremely long life. To meet the required system reliability, the
strategy for this asset focuses primarily on maintenance to extend the
serviceable life at the lowest lifecycle cost. BCTC will continue to apply RCM
principles to managing this equipment. Useful equipment condition indicators
such as results from brush wear, gas leaks, and megger readings will
continue to drive maintenance activity. In combination with on-line monitoring,
it is possible to identify problem equipment requiring immediate attention,
either for further analysis or additional preventive maintenance.
BCTC is focusing on three critical subsystems: brush systems, monitoring

systems and circuit breakers. Brush systems and 12kV circuit breakers have
historically been problematic, and BCTC will initiate a technical review to
identify root causes and improve their reliability. Monitoring systems are to be
improved in order to collect data needed for RCM.
As part of the asset management strategy, BCTC pays specific attention to

more effective use of standards, and will focus on process improvement
efforts such as better work planning and coordination, maintenance project
prioritization, quality work improvements and a strategic focus on
subsystems.

There are no significant changes to the historical strategy for this asset.

There is no capital program planned for this asset at this time.
3.3.10.4 Prioritization and Risk Criteria

All projects are evaluated using the same, rigorous prioritization score card
system. The key criteria that typically drive decisions for this asset class are:
Reliability considerations
Asset condition

In addition to the ongoing RCM program, the key OMA initiatives for
Synchronous Condensers are the assessment and improvements to the
critical subsystems, and a review of operational constraints to operate the
machine at an optimal level with the lowest lifecycle costs.
23
3.3.11 Gas Insulated Switchgear

BCTC manages a total of eight Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) installations,
at 230kV and 500kV. The age of most of these installations ranges from 20 to
30 years. The earliest breakers are double pressure SF6 type, while the
latest use the puffer technology to interrupt the arc.
Some of the GIS installations are located in major generating stations, where
availability and reliability of the equipment is paramount. Because GIS
equipment is very unique, the BCTC Asset management Strategy varies with
the type, make and location of the GIS, and is summarized as follows:
Mica (MCA) this is a major generating station (2000MW) and any

major interruption would restrict transmission of power. The first-
generation double pressure 500kV breakers at MCA are both
maintenance-intensive and have a high replacement cost. BCTC is
currently considering possibilities for breaker replacement to drive the
lowest lifecycle cost and reduce risk to a critical point on the power
delivery system. These possibilities include replacing the double
pressure breakers and some of the disconnect and ground switches
with new Hybrids (a Hybrid breaker is a dead tank breaker equipped
with bushing CTs and built-in disconnect and ground switches). The
advantage of this option would be that replacement could take place
with minimal interruptions to the power delivery from the generating
station.
Revelstoke (REV) also a major generating station (2000MW). The

equipment here is more modern, Mitsubishi puffer-type 230kV and
500kV breakers. At present there are no major outstanding issues
with this equipment. The BCTC strategy is to maintain the equipment
using RCM techniques to extend the life as long possible without
impacting performance.
Peace Canyon (PCN) also a major generating plant (2000MW).

The 500kV GIS equipment is of the early puffer type, BBC (currently
ABB) supplied, and of relatively good quality. While some issues
affecting the hydraulic mechanisms have been identified, overall the
GIS is in fair condition. The BCTC strategy is to overhaul the hydraulic
mechanism with the expectation of an additional 20 years of service.
Ashton Creek (ACK) and Sperling (SPG) these 230kV GIS

installations are located in transmission substations. The situation at
these locations and the BCTC strategy is similar to Peace Canyon.
Cathedral Square (CSQ) is a Vancouver underground substation,

and the 230kV GIS there is of Mitsubishi design, similar to
Revelstoke. A recent addition there is of 2 new Mitsubishi breakers.
The BCTC strategy for this site is similar to Revelstoke.
Horsey (HSY) is a 230kV substation in Victoria and the outdoor GIS
was supplied by Delle approximately 25 years ago. The circuit
24
breakers are of a very rare type (FR2) and parts for overhaul are very
expensive. Minor hydraulic and gas leaks have been reported, and
BCTC is considering both refurbishment and replacement options.
Overall, the BCTC strategy for GIS installations is largely driven by the cost of
maintenance or overhaul, and availability of replacement parts.

BCTC is currently negotiating a partnership with ABB and HydroOne, who
have a number of similar BBC installations, to launch an overhaul program.
The program will cover all 3 BBC GIS installations over the next 3 years, and
the partnership is expected to reduce the overhaul costs by pooling together
the two utilities equipment for volume savings.

The MCA circuit breaker replacements have been included in the F2006
Capital Plan.

The key criteria used for prioritizing GIS overhaul/replacement projects are:
historical reliability of specific GIS installations
criticality of position in the system or at generating plant
condition of the unit (MTBF)
estimated remaining life

In addition to ongoing maintenance activity, BCTC is completing the detailed
evaluation of all GIS switchgear installations. Plans for remedial action will be
finalised based on an assessment of risk and criticality, as well as condition.
25
3.3.12 Static Var Compensators

There is only one Static Var Compensator (SVC) in the Transmission
System, located at Dunsmuir substation. The SVC is relatively new and has
been deemed to be in very good condition. It plays an essential role in terms
of providing a fast, dynamic response to Vancouver Island AC transmission
systems reactive power requirements. BCTC intends to monitor the system
performance and apply RCM principles to maintain the asset, and will
continue to look for opportunities to reduce lifecycle costs without negatively
impacting performance.

There has been no major change in strategy from historical practice.


Any future replacement Program will be prioritized based on the Risk and

In addition to ongoing maintenance, BCTC is reviewing the OEMs suggested
maintenance tasks for additional RCM work improvements.
26
3.3.13 High Pressure Air Systems

The strategy for high pressure systems is closely tied to replacement of air
blast circuit breakers. As air blast circuit breakers are being replaced, air
systems will be relocated where needed or retired, depending on condition.
BCTC is in most cases looking to replace air blast circuit breakers by station
so that the supporting air systems can be retired.
BCTC will continue to maintain air systems where required using RCM
principles and ongoing condition assessments. High pressure air systems
are also maintained to meet the requirements of the Boiler Pressure Act.

There are no significant changes from historical practice.

A five year program of air system replacement and/relocation is in place.
This program is completed in conjunction with the air blast circuit breaker
replacement program.

Programs will be prioritized based on the Risk and Prioritization Program
guidelines, linked to prioritization of the air blast breaker replacements.
Primary considerations are the condition assessment of the air systems and
the criticality of the station.

Other than routine maintenance inspections, there are no special OMA
initiatives related to this asset class.
27
3.3.14 Protection and Control Systems

The protection and control systems (P&C) are a supporting component of the
primary circuit elements of the BC Transmission System, but are a critical
component with respect to preserving the life of the primary circuit elements
and maintaining the overall reliability of the system.
With the above system context in mind, the strategic objectives for this asset
class are to:
Sustain current and future protection of the transmission components
and system,
Sustain current and future remote control/monitoring of the
Transmission System,
Preserve the required availability and reliability (security &
dependability) of both the P&C assets and the transmission assets
they protect and control,
Meet system and customer requirements, and industry reliability
standards.
Many of the existing electromechanical and solid state P&C technology

assets are functional but obsolete, and are nearing or already past the life
expectancy of 30 to 40 years. The replacement programs are designed to
mitigate the risk to system security due to misoperation of the ageing assets,
as well as the risk to availability of primary circuit elements due to
unavailability of critical P&C spares.
The obsolete P&C assets are being replaced with proven Protective Relaying
and SCADA RTU digital microprocessor-based hardware and software
technology. BCTC will continue to impose reliable and effective controls
around the best practices of P&C philosophy, application, design,
configuration, installation and testing.
The existing station remote supervisory/telemetry equipment assets used to

control and monitor the Transmission System are also functional but
obsolete, and are nearing or past the original life expectancies of 30 to 40
years. The replacement programs are designed to mitigate the risk to system
security due to failure of the assets, as well as the risk to availability of
primary circuit elements due to unavailability of critical spares.
BCTC manages the asset over the entire lifecycle, and as part of that
strategy, looks for opportunities to make one-time capital investments that
would result in elimination or reduction of ongoing OMA costs without
negatively impacting performance. BCTC expects to see a reduction in OMA
costs as a result of the P&C capital investment in digital, microprocessor-
based technology. The new technology offers the opportunity to apply
revised P&C maintenance strategies, with increased maintenance intervals
and reduced job site times which will result in reduced costs.
28
BCTC is also developing a P&C spares strategy to establish and sustain a
minimum required inventory of critical devices, covering as many of the
required device types as practical. Older P&C devices in serviceable
condition removed during the replacement program will be assessed for
retention as critical spares for the old equipment still in service. Replaced
P&C assets that are not required to supplement the critical P&C spares
inventory will be salvaged.

BCTC is developing new P&C Performance Specification Guides for planning
and design work to be done by BCTC service providers. This is the first time
that a consistent set of specifications has been documented for each basic
P&C category in one source.
BCTC is also looking to significantly reduce overall P&C asset life-cycle costs
through improved P&C engineering planning, design, implementation and
testing.

Sustaining capital programs for P&C Systems can be summarized into four
programs:
1. Line Protection Systems Replacements Replace existing

electromechanical and solid state protective relaying systems with
standard digital microprocessor-based protection systems. Expect
to complete thirty-five 500 kV circuits by F2009, and
approximately two hundred under 500kV circuits by 2015.
2. Station Equipment P&C Systems Replacements

- Transformer Protection Systems Replacements - Replace
existing electromechanical protective relaying systems that have
insecure sudden-pressure gas-relay standby protection with
standard digital microprocessor-based current differential
protection systems. The program will complete P&C
replacements for approximately 56 pre-selected power
transformers by 2009.
An additional transformer protection systems replacement plan

has been initiated, which will replace existing electromechanical
and solid state protective relaying systems with standard digital
microprocessor-based, current differential protection systems.
The plan is to complete replacements for twenty-five to thirty
500kV system tie power transformers by 2012.
- Circuit Breaker Failure Protective Relay Replacements

Replace existing and faulty electromechanical line terminal
breaker failure relays with standard digital microprocessor-
based breaker fail protective relays. The program was started
in 2002, and the plan is to complete replacements for
29
approximately 28 pre-selected line terminal circuit breakers by
2006.
3. Station SCADA Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) Equipment
Replacements - Replace selected existing SCADA radio
supervisory / telemetry remote systems with standard digital
microprocessor-based RTU systems. The plan to complete
replacements for approximately one hundred SCADA Remote
units by 2020.
4. Minor & Emergency Capital P&C Program Add or replace minor
P&C equipment and material and critical failed equipment as
required, typically between $5k and $75k per instance.

All P&C related projects and programs are prioritized on the basis of the
importance and criticality of the primary circuit elements to the Transmission
System, and on the condition and performance of specific P&C assets. All
projects are evaluated using the same, rigorous prioritization score card
system.
For Protective and Control Relaying equipment the key criteria that typically
drive investment decisions are the:
Impact to the Transmission System reliability through demonstrated
P&C misoperation performance and/or MTBF performance-based
history;
Extent of negative impact to the Transmission System, customers and
stakeholders; and
Condition of asset, based on in-service life condition rating or non-
discretionary obsolescence, as related to lack of spare parts, lack of
OEM support and ability to meet present design requirements.
For Real Time Operate (RTO), remote control equipment (RTU), the key
criteria that typically drive investment decisions are the:
Ability to provide System Control Centre Telemetry monitoring points,
to be used by the Transmission System State Estimator (SE), and in
turn be used by advanced system control applications to improve the
security of the Transmission System operations;
Impact to Transmission System reliability through demonstrated RTU
misoperation performance and/or RTU MTBF performance-based
history;
Extent of negative impact on Transmission System delivery capacity,
customers and stakeholders; and
Condition of the asset, based on in-service life condition rating or non-
discretionary obsolescence, as related to lack of spare parts, lack of
OEM support and ability to meet present design requirements.

BCTC is looking to further reduce OMA costs over time by increasing the PM
intervals for P&C systems which have correctly performed all commissioned
P&C application functions for known system disturbance events. This will be
done on the basis of specific system performance analysis.
30
3.3.15 Surge Arrestors

Surge Arrestors do not require extensive maintenance as they are delivered
as sealed units from the factory, and as such the strategy is essentially to run
them to failure. The current maintenance standard calls only for visual and
thermo-vision checks, and occasional washing of insulators in high pollution
areas.
The Transmission System has over 2600 surge arrestors installed from 60kV
up to 500kV. At present approximately 40% of these arrestors are of the old,
SiC gap-type, and as such are in poor condition because they no longer
perform the protective function for which they were designed. The primary
problems are due to sealing failures and gap erosion.
BCTC has initiated a replacement program of these arrestors with the new,
metal oxide type arrestors. As part of the replacement program, BCTC has
negotiated long term supply contracts with multiple suppliers for surge
arrestors, which is expected to reduce the cost of surge arrestors and
tendering.

Other than the standardization to metal oxide type arrestors, no major
changes are being contemplated.

There is an active program for replacement of gap-type surge arrestors,
which is proceeding according to plan.

Key criteria used for prioritizing projects within this asset class:
Condition of the arrestor
Voltage class the 500kV system has highest priority
Criticality of position.

No new OMA initiatives are being contemplated at this time. Should new
methods of testing become available at an acceptable cost (e.g. partial
discharge testing at sites), BCTC will consider adopting them for in/service
testing of existing arrestors.
31
3.3.16 Station Grounding & Surface Treatment

BCTC has initiated a more active strategy to managing this asset with the
objective of extending the life as long as possible before replacement. BCTC
is currently starting a program of detailed condition assessments for this
asset class. A new maintenance standard has been developed and a pilot
project is about to be launched at four substations in the system.
Based on the findings at these substations BCTC will address the

maintenance of this asset class at other locations in the system.

Maintenance programs for the ground grid did not exist historically. It is
expected that some corrective activities will be required at some of the
substations.

No sustaining capital programs can be properly developed until the results of
the pilot and a more detailed assessment of all stations is complete.

Any new initiatives will be prioritized based on the BCTC Risk and
Prioritization Program guidelines. The key criteria for this asset class include
assessment of:
Worker safety
Equipment condition.

Except for the pilot program mentioned above, no other OMA initiatives are
planned at this time.
32
3.3.17 Batteries

Batteries are a supporting component of the primary circuit elements of the
Transmission System, but are a critical component with respect to preserving
the reliability, availability and life of the primary circuit elements and
maintaining the overall reliability of the system. The strategy for batteries is
to extend the life until they can no longer meet the required load test.
BCTC conducts full tests annually, and load testing every 18 years - sooner if
tests indicate problems. Historically batteries have been replaced every 25
years, regardless of condition, but BCTC is looking to move to condition
based replacements using the new health index criteria.
BCTC has also negotiated a long term supply contract with a single supplier
for batteries. This is expected to reduce the cost of batteries and tendering.

The key change from historical practise is a move from time-based to
condition-based replacements.

The upgraded microwave stations operate at 48 volts and as a result the
existing 24-volt batteries and chargers are also being replaced as part of the
microwave equipment upgrade program.

assessment of:
Criticality of the facility

In addition to the ongoing inspection and testing activity, new condition
assessments have been developed for the batteries and chargers. These
assessments will be up to date and provide information on equipment
condition / asset health on a routine basis. Areas where increased
maintenance or replacement required are to be identified.
33
3.3.18 Stand-By Generators and Fuel Systems

Like batteries, standby generators are a supporting component of the primary
circuit elements of the Transmission System, but are a critical component
with respect to preserving the reliability, availability and life of the primary
circuit elements and maintaining the overall reliability of the system. The
strategy for stand-by generators is to extend to the serviceable life where
they are required, but to reassess whether they are still required or
appropriate back-up power for the stations they serve. BCTC will be
evaluating substation generators in F2006.
Because they are not operated for long periods of time, standby generators
do not wear out in the same way that fully utilized generators would, and
most damage occurs on start-up.
Older fuel storage systems pose a potential environmental hazard as they

start to leak, and BCTC is looking at replacement of underground storage
tanks which are not in compliance with current codes and practices
BCTC is looking to apply a more rigorous assessment of condition going

forward and will monitor the condition of stand by Generators and fuel
systems based on the new health index.

New condition assessments will be used to monitor asset health.

BCTC has a replacement program underway and plans to replace 17 of the
41 standby generators for microwave equipment over three years.
Replacement is focused on diesel generators at critical microwave sites
where existing diesel generators are under sized or are no longer supported
by the equipment manufacturer with spare parts and service.

All initiatives are prioritized based on the BCTC Risk and Prioritization
Program guidelines. The key criteria for this asset class include assessment
of:
Criticality of the facility

New condition assessments have been developed for the stand-by
generators and fuel systems at substations. These assessments will be
updated and provide information on equipment condition/asset health on a
routine basis, and will identify areas where increased maintenance or
replacement is required.
34
3.3.19 Facilities General

As categorized for the Baseline Study, Facilities General is a catchall of
components that provide a supporting function to the primary circuit
elements. This category will likely be disaggregated for future reporting to
highlight condition of specific components.
Assets related to facilities generally degrade slowly and do not fail

catastrophically unless there is a major external event (seismic, flood, slide,
etc). Strategies on specific components are as follows:
Facilities, Buildings and Structures BCTC looks to extend the

serviceable life this asset at the lowest long-term cost, and employs a
time based inspection program to assess condition visually. Problems
are repaired as condition dictates. There is an ongoing program for
roof replacement.
Footings and Foundations, Grounds and Landscaping BCTC looks

to extend the serviceable life this asset at the lowest long-term cost
and has a time based inspection program to assess condition visually.
Problems are repaired as condition dictates. There is an ongoing
program for seismic upgrades to comply with current standards.
Spill Response and Containment The strategy for spill containment

is to maintain compliance with environmental standards at the lowest
long term cost. BCTC is placing significant new emphasis on spill
containment. A new environmental index has been developed to
determine the priority of stations requiring upgrades.
Sumps and Sump Pumps The BCTC strategy is to extend the

serviceable life of the asset at the lowest long-term cost through
regular maintenance using RCM principles. Routine maintenance is
performed during the dry season.
Lifting Equipment The strategy for lifting equipment is to extend the

serviceable life at the lowest long-term cost and meet safe operating
standards as defined for specific types of equipment. BCTC inspects
and maintains this equipment according to its standard.
Station Vegetation Control BCTC has and extensive vegetation

management program rated as one of the best in North America in a
2004 benchmarking on vegetation management. Strategy for station
vegetation is reflected in section 3.5.29.
Microwave Towers The strategy for microwave towers is to extend

the serviceable life at the lowest long-term cost. BCTC has towers
inspected annually and has an ongoing painting program as condition
requires. Asset management strategy similar to that for lattice steel
towers for support of conductor systems.
35
BCTC is putting increased focus on station auxiliary equipment as historically
there has not been a standard approach. There have been over 30 new
maintenance standards developed across this asset class over the last year,
which highlights the increased attention being placed by BCTC.

There are a number of sustaining capital initiatives for this asset class,
including minor capital programs for roof replacement on substation buildings,
seismic upgrades, upgrades to auxiliary equipment, improvements in spill
containment, and refresh of gravel the in yard to bring it back up to standard.

All initiatives are prioritized based on the BCTC Risk and Prioritization
Program guidelines. The key criteria for this asset class vary somewhat by
component, but include assessment of:
Equipment condition;
Environmental factors;
Societal factors;
Financial Impact.

In addition to the ongoing maintenance initiatives, the key OMA initiative
going forward is to improve the data collection and storage processes for
these assets to allow centralized access to electronic condition information.
36
3.3.20 Fire Protection Systems

Fire Protection Systems are also a supporting function to the primary circuit
elements. The strategy for fire protection systems is to maintain the
effectiveness of the protection and extend the serviceable life at the lowest
long term cost while meeting current safety and environmental standards.
As part of that strategy BCTC is removing all CO2 and Halon based fire
suppression systems due to their adverse environmental effects and safety
issues.
BCTC is reviewing the requirements for this asset and will install or replace
fire suppression systems at critical substation and microwave sites. BCTC
will begin monitoring the condition of fire protection systems with the new
health index and will start collecting the data to evaluate it on an ongoing
basis.

BCTC will have fire protection systems installed or replaced at facilities based
on priority, fire risk and impacts of disabled systems.
BCTC is now managing fire protection systems centrally for a consistent and
effective approach, while historically this asset was managed locally and
practices were not always consistent.

The phase out all CO2 and Halon based fire suppression system systems due
to adverse environmental impacts and safety concerns is being continued.
All of these systems will be removed from service by 2010.
There is also a program for installation of fire suppression systems at twenty-

five critical microwave sites as replacement systems or new systems over
five years.

Prioritization of projects is based on the impacts of disabled systems due to a
fire, criticality of system, and fire risk. Protection from an external fire (i.e.
forest fire) is not considered, as it cannot be achieved with automatic fire
suppression agents. Risk to stations from external fire is managed through
Vegetation Management.

The only planned initiative is the implementation of the new health index for
the fire protection systems.
37
3.3.21 Microwave Equipment

The strategy for microwave equipment is to meet path reliability requirements
at the lowest long term cost. BCTC manages the asset over the entire
lifecycle, and as part of that strategy looks for opportunities to make one-time
capital investments that would result in elimination or reduction of ongoing
OMA costs, and an overall reduction in lifecycle costs without impacting
performance. As part of the strategy for this asset class, which includes new
standards for path reliability, BC Hydro and now BCTC have been replacing
the obsolete analog microwave equipment with new digital equipment. The
new technology, which enables remote monitoring from a central location and
increased inspection intervals, will reduce OMA costs over the lifetime of the
equipment.
At the end of 2004, the replacement program is about 81% complete, and is
expected to be 100% complete by the end of fiscal 2006.
The digital equipment has an expected lifetime of approximately 20 years,

based largely on availability of manufacturer support and spare parts. BCTC
is developing a strategy to maintain sufficient system spares over the
anticipated useful life of this asset.
Even with remote monitoring of some the core electronic components,

periodic maintenance inspections to assess equipment condition are still
necessary. Annual major inspections are supplemented with minor equipment
checks over the course of the year.
Microwave equipment is subjected to a time-based Reliability Centered

Maintenance (RCM) program, where different acceptance criteria are
established for different equipment types, and various inspection and testing
techniques are employed to ensure the equipment continues to provide
reliable service.

There is no significant change in strategy from historical practice.

The current capital programs are related to the replacement of the analog
microwave equipment with new digital equipment. The upgraded equipment
operates at 48 volts and as a result, the existing 24-volt batteries and
chargers are also being replaced as part of the microwave equipment
upgrade program.

assessment of:
38
Station criticality;
Financial benefit.

As part of the installation of digital equipment, BCTC has increased
inspection intervals at remote sites with new digital equipment. This will be
supplemented by remote diagnostic capabilities from the network
management system, and is expected to reduce OMA expenditures over the
long term.
BCTC also intends to begin collection of the data needed to populate the
condition criteria in the Health Index formulations from the Baseline Study,
since sufficient condition data were not available for the baseline study. This
data will be stored in electronic databases to facilitate analysis, rather than in
field based paper records as was done in the past.
39
3.3.22 Power Line Carrier Equipment

The strategy for power line carrier equipment is to meet availability
requirements at the lowest long term cost. BCTC is currently in the process of
upgrading the Power Line Carrier (PLC) equipment to improve its reliability.
The older equipment still in service is currently functional, but obsolete. The
maintenance strategy is to monitor the condition and replace on failure, within
the parameters of the existing replacement program.

There is no significant change from historical practice.

The Transmission System has a total of fifty-two PLC links made up of
multiple terminals. By the end of 2004, twenty-one links had been replaced.
An additional thirty-one links remain to be done by the end of 2006.

assessment of:
Reliability impact;
Financial benefit.

Other than existing maintenance, there are no special OMA initiatives in
progress for this asset class.
40
3.3.23 Series Capacitors

Series Capacitors are key components in BCTC Transmission System in
terms of system stability and optimization. To meet the required system
reliability, the BCTC strategy is to extend the serviceable life at the lowest
long term cost, by focusing on the following three areas:
1. Maintenance continue to apply RCM principles for maintenance.

Measurement of key equipment condition indicators including infra-red
inspection will continue.
2. Spares - system reliability requires the right spares to be available in
stock. BCTC has initiated a program to inventory the spares and
assess spares adequacy to establish both short and long term spare
stocking levels.
3. Cost Effectiveness - BCTC asset management strategy pays specific
attention to OMA costs. These costs have been trending down due to
the process improvement efforts such as better work planning and
coordination, maintenance project prioritization, quality work
improvements and strategic focus on subsystem work. BCTC will
continue these efforts and explore other value engineering
approaches so as to better meet the required system reliability.

There are now electrical maintenance standards in place for all series
capacitor stations.


Any future replacement Program will be prioritized based on the Risk and

OMA initiatives include assessment of spares and revision of maintenance
standards to incorporate condition criteria as proposed in the new Health
Index.
41
3.3.24 HVDC Pole 1

The strategy for HVDC is to continue to extend the life of the asset through
selected strategic capital investments and ongoing maintenance in order
preserve reliability, and maintain 90% availability until at least 2013.
The HVDC link has been an important regional system, integral within the
transmission grid to provide both firm capacity and standby electrical power
supply to the Vancouver Island. In an event of a loss to the 500kV lines to the
island, the DC systems auto frequency control capability has been
instrumental in reducing fluctuations and stabilizing the islands AC system.
With the high VAR control capability, the DC system has been flexibly used to
increase VAR absorption at both ends of the link. Other HVDC associated
equipment such as filter banks are also used to control both resonance and
harmonics which are prevalent in the connected AC systems.
In executing the HVDC strategy, BCTC is focusing on the following four

areas:
1. Maintenance approaches continue to monitor condition of reactive

equipment as defined by the health index for this asset, and apply
Reliability Centered Maintenance principles to deal with the most
critical maintenance issues.
2. Spares sustainability - BCTC will continue to monitor the critical

spares inventory to ensure this stock level is adequate to support the
long term needs of the asset. We expect the cost to acquire the
spares will continue to be very economical, as parts are acquired from
other utilities as they decommission their HVDC systems.
3. Mercury Arc Valve (MAV) rebuild capability BCTC has chosen a

rebuild rate of about 1.5 valves per year per station at this time to
maintain technical expertise and meet the 3000 hour/year operation of
Pole 1, but this rated could be doubled if required. BCTC will continue
to maintain this rebuild capability going forward.
4. Cost effectiveness- BCTC asset management strategy pays specific

attention to OMA costs. These costs have been trending down due to
the process improvement efforts such as better work planning and
coordination, maintenance project prioritization, quality work
improvements and strategic focus on subsystem work. BCTC will
continue these efforts and explore other value engineering
approaches so as to better meet the required system reliability.

Succession plans, knowledge transfer opportunities and training programs
are now in place to ensure continuity of HVDC expertise, technical proficiency
and quality of services.
42
Smaller but strategic investments such as cooling system improvement will
be done to ensure consistent system availability.

There is a sustaining capital program to ensure air quality for workers
continues to meet WCB requirements.

Work plans/projects are prioritized based on BCTC Risk and Prioritization
program guidelines whose criteria include Reliability, Society/ Consent to
Operate, Finance, Asset Condition, Environment.

Various OMA initiatives are in progress including:
Pole cooling system improvement to improve cooling system
reliability, which is closely linked to HVDC system availability.
Spares inventory database review and updates
The MAV rebuild schedule is currently reviewed to confirm if higher
rate of rebuild is required to meet operating requirements.
A regular maintenance degassing program is under consideration to
maintain Pole 1 reliability.
A detailed assessment of converter transformer condition (e.g. via
FRA, internal visual check, bushing Doble test, etc) to identify specific
maintenance work to be carried out going forward.
Revision of maintenance standards to incorporate condition criteria as
proposed in the new Health Index.
Focused improvement in data collection and testing processes.
3.3.25 HVDC Pole 2

Except for issues related to the mercury arc valves, the strategy and other
considerations for Pole 2 are the same as for Pole 1.
43
3.3.26 Conductor Systems

BCTC bases its asset management strategy for Conductor Systems on the
importance of the circuit to the system and the asset condition itself.
The asset is managed over the entire lifecycle, and as part of that strategy,
BCTC looks for opportunities to make one-time capital investments that
would result in elimination or reduction of ongoing OMA costs, and an overall
reduction in lifecycle costs, without impacting performance.
At this time, the condition of the majority of conductor system assets is

assessed visually, except for conductor splices that are currently evaluated
using infrared technology.
BCTC has begun a program of retrieving and testing samples of conductors,

splices, spacers and spacer dampers from the field that will be used to track
condition. BCTC is also moving toward live-line resistance measurements of
splices as a basis for tracking their condition. These test results and
measurement methods will support future capital replacement or
refurbishment programs.
The maintenance process for all transmission line assets is as follows:
In accordance with BCTC Maintenance Standards, BC Hydro Field

Services personnel inspect all conductor system assets and record
the current asset condition based on visual references provided in the
BCTC Maintenance Manual.
The asset condition information is then recorded in an electronic
database (STARR).
BCTC then develops a work program from this condition database
using RCM principles to prioritize the repairs.
Field Services is then assigned the highest priority repairs.
Field Services performs the work and electronically records it as
complete.
BCTC performs an audit function to ensure compliance.
The inspections are conducted in the next work season, and the
maintenance process cycle is repeated.

BCTC is driving a change from the existing subjective, visual evaluations
towards a metrics-based evaluation system. By performing resistance
measurements on splices on a regular basis, and by taking periodic
conductor, spacer and spacer damper samples from field sites, and by
performing laboratory tests, BCTC expects to avoid significant conductor
system failures and should be able to instigate future replacement or
refurbishment programs in a timely manner.
44
The primary Sustaining Capital Program that addresses conductor systems is
the Overhead Life Extension Program. Within this program, there are several
proposed projects related to conductor systems assets:
Replacement of 2-bundle spacers and 4-bundle spacer dampers that

are at end of life.
Replacement a very old copper conductor that has been assessed as
being at end of life.

All conductor systems related projects are prioritized on the basis of the
importance of the circuit to the system and on the specific component
condition. All projects are evaluated using the same, rigorous prioritization
score card system. The key criteria that typically drive decisions for this
asset class are:
Asset condition
An RCM process is used to prioritise corrective work. The component defect

conditions are sequentially ranked in each of the following categories:
Structural integrity
Due diligence
Impacts and consequences

Under an OMA initiative, BCTC is collecting and analyzing conductor system
component samples that will provide more objective data that can be used to
track degradation and support future maintain capital projects. Over the next
few years, BCTC expects this sampling program will lead to changes in the
field inspection methods and their related maintenance standards.
These initiatives are expected to trigger a shift away from traditional time-
based inspections of all assets to more focussed inspections of only those
assets that require inspections.
45
3.3.27 Metal Support Structures

The asset management strategy for Metal Support Structures is based on the
importance of the circuit to the system, as well as the specific asset condition.
reduction in lifecycle costs without impacting performance. An example of
this strategy for Metal and Wood Support Structures is the investment in
arcing horns to protect insulators from damage due to lightning strikes.
While the cost of the insulators themselves is not high, the labour, equipment
costs and outage costs to replace the insulators are very significant.
At this time, the condition of the majority of Metal Support Structure assets is
assessed visually, except for grillage foundations which are assessed using a
more rigorous procedure involving half-cell measurements.
BCTC has begun a program of retrieving and testing samples of insulators,

guy grips, guy wires and secondary tower members from the field that will be
used to track condition. In the area of insulator assessments, BCTC is
investing in R&D projects that may allow their assessment from helicopters.
These sample test results and potential measurement methods will support
future capital replacement or refurbishment programs.

BCTC Maintenance Manual;
database (STARR);
using RCM principles to prioritize the repairs;
Field Services is then assigned the highest priority repairs;
complete;
BCTC performs an audit function to ensure compliance;
The inspections are conducted in the next work season and the

BCTC is driving a change from existing subjective, visual evaluations towards
a metrics-based evaluation system. By taking periodic samples of insulators,
guy grips, guy wires and secondary tower members from field sites, and by
performing laboratory tests, BCTC expects to avoid significant metal support
structure failures and should be able to instigate future replacement or
refurbishment programs in a timely manner.
46
There are several Sustaining Capital Program that address components in
the metal support structures category. They include the Overhead Life
Extension Program, the Overhead Line Corrosion Protection Program and
the Wind & Ice Storm Withstand Program. Within these programs the
following assets will be addressed:
Protection of insulator strings from lightning damage.
Refurbishment of failed galvanized coatings on towers.
Identification and correction of corroded grillage foundations.
Reinforcement of specific towers to withstand severe ice and wind
storms.

All metal support structures related projects are prioritized on the basis of the
asset class are:
Reliability considerations;
Asset condition.

Due diligence

Under an OMA initiative, BCTC is collecting and analyzing metal support
structure component samples that will provide more objective data that can
be used to track degradation and support future maintain capital projects.
Over the next few years, BCTC expects this sampling program will lead to
changes in the field inspection methods and their related maintenance
standards. These initiatives are expected to trigger a shift away from
traditional time-based inspections of all assets to more focussed inspections
of only those assets that require inspections.
47
3.3.28 Wood Pole Structures

For Wood Pole Structures, BCTC bases its asset management strategy on
the importance of the circuit to the system and the asset condition itself.
BCTC also manages the asset over the entire lifecycle, and as part of that
reduction in lifecycle costs without negatively impacting performance. An
example of this strategy for Metal and Wood Support Structures is the
investment in arcing horns to protect insulators from damage due to lightning
strikes. While the cost of the insulators themselves is not high, the labour,
equipment costs and outage costs are very significant.
At this time, the condition of some of the Wood Pole Structure assets is
assessed visually, but the major asset, wood poles, is assessed using a
rigorous test and treat program. BCTC is evaluating field tests to directly
measure remaining strength of Wood Poles which would be significantly more
accurate in assessing condition to make a replacement decision than current
tests.
BCTC has begun a program of retrieving and testing samples of insulators,

guy grips and guy wires from the field that will be used to track condition. In
the area of insulator assessments, BCTC is investing in R&D projects that
may allow their evaluation from helicopters. Similarly, in the area of anchor
rod assessments, BCTC is experimenting with new technologies that will
enable field personnel to provide more accurate condition assessment.
These sample test results and potential measurement methods will support
future capital replacement or refurbishment programs.

BCTC Maintenance Manual.
database called STARR.
using RCM principles to prioritize the repairs.
Field Services is then assigned the highest priority repairs.
complete.
BCTC performs an audit function to ensure compliance.
The inspections are conducted in the next work season and the
48
BCTC is driving a change from existing subjective, visual evaluations towards
a metrics-based evaluation system. By taking periodic samples of insulators,
guy grips, and guy wires from field sites, and by performing laboratory tests,
BCTC expects to avoid significant wood pole structure component failures
and should be able to instigate future replacement or refurbishment programs
in a timely manner.

There are several Sustaining Capital Program that address components in
the wood poles structure category; the Overhead Life Extension Program and
the Overhead Reliability Improvements Program. Within these programs the
following assets will be addressed:
Protection of insulator strings from lightning damage.

Identification and correction of corroded anchor rods.

All wood pole structures related projects are prioritized on the basis of the
asset class are:
Asset condition.

Due diligence

Under an OMA initiative, BCTC is collecting and analyzing wood pole
structure component samples that will provide more objective data that can
be used to track degradation and support future maintain capital projects.
Over the next few years, BCTC expects this sampling program will lead to
changes in the field inspection methods and their related maintenance
standards.
In addition, many years of paper-based wood pole test and treat data are
being converted to electronic form and are being entered into the STARR
database. This will enable calculation of a health index in future years.
BCTC is also experimenting with promising, new technologies that will enable
more accurate condition assessment of anchor rods.
The above initiatives are expected to trigger a shift away from traditional time-
based inspections of all assets to more focussed inspections of only those
assets that require inspections.
49
3.3.29 Vegetation / Rights-of-Way

The core strategy for managing Vegetation and Rights of Way in the
Transmission System is to maintain the biological diversity of the vegetation
within the boundaries of the RoWs, and to minimize area requiring active
vegetation management. Allowing natural regeneration of selective plant
communities results in an increase in fish and wildlife habitat. The long term
objective of vegetation management is to promote low growing stable plant
communities while returning as much of the ROW as possible back to a
relatively undisturbed condition. This reduces safety hazards to the public
and virtually eliminates line outages from tall growing species. The program
also encourages compatible use, which enhances relationships with local
communities and reduces the area requiring vegetation management.
Execution of the Vegetation Strategy is accomplished through the

implementation of Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM). IVM closely
mirrors the principles embodied in Reliability Centered Maintenance.
Inventory and monitoring of assets is fundamental to both systems; in RCM
the decision to perform work is based on component condition (wear and
tear); in IVM the decision to perform work is based on the growth rate of a
target species in a given area, hazard tree rating, proximity to the line and
limits of approach. Based on this action threshold, a prescription is developed
to address both long and short-term objectives. This equates to the RCM
function of creating a decision model to prioritize work. Based on these
priorities contracts are issued that embody best work practices to meet
objectives. Feedback on the program is defined by ongoing inspection of
work performed, and by evaluation of whether the prescription met objectives.
Where objectives are not achieved corrective action plans are implemented.
IVM includes the following steps:
Complete inventories - Vegetation will be managed based on site

information including, but not limited to, vegetation inventories, species
growth rates, vegetation response to different treatments, fish and
wildlife resources, land ownership and present and potential uses of the
land. Related activities include:
- Commissioning of a comprehensive biophysical inventory of the

transmission rights-of-way. This will be completed in 2009;
- Mapping of known locations of species at risk;
- Mapping of fire risk areas and fuel loading in the Lower Mainland
- Mapping the location of invasive plant species and noxious weeds;
- A project to initiate the use of data loggers for collection of data in
the field has been initiated this will significantly streamline the
inventory process;
- Developing a data base containing all the ROW agreements.
50
Develop Action Thresholds
- The circuits have been rated on importance of reliability and
vegetation programs are prioritized to meet these reliability
requirements
- A risk assessment framework to determine the optimum timing for
work has been implemented.
- Patrolling standards for the timing of patrols and monitoring by
ground and by air have been implemented.
Produce Prescriptions/ Work plans

- Detailed standards have been developed that clearly describe all
vegetation techniques with instructions to the service provider.
- Comprehensive specifications for the contract have been written.
- Detailed prescriptions for work in riparian areas
- Enhanced techniques to reduce the build up of fuel that could serve
as a fire risk are being developed
A complete spectrum of vegetation management techniques is

considered with the best method being applied to each situation
- Vegetation management will be managed to foster the use of

leading edge techniques and innovation will be encouraged.
- A research and development program for ROW management has
been initiated
Optimization of resources
- A review of the contracting strategy has been initiated to determine
the most efficient way of utilizing third party contractors to conduct
vegetation work.
Evaluate Effectiveness
- Accounting systems have been developed that will tie the amount of
money spent to a specific location on the ROW so BCTC can track
dollars spent at each location over time and evaluate the
effectiveness of various techniques
- The comprehensive inventory will provide data on changes in target
species populations over time so BCTC can determine if techniques
are causing an increase or decrease in these incompatible species.

Historically no standards were used to manage this asset, and practices were
very regionalized.
The tracking of the amount of money spent to a specific location on the ROW
so BCTC can track dollars spent at each location over time in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of various techniques is also a key new initiative.
BCTC is looking to apply the same centralized rigor to vegetation as applied

to primary circuit elements.
51
Vegetation management is does have any related capital programs, as all
programs are treated as OMA.

As with other Transmission System programs, BCTC will prioritize vegetation
management programs on the basis of the importance of the circuit to the
system and on the specific component condition.

The vegetation management strategy consists of two separate programs:
1. Reduction in vegetation caused outages from edge trees.
The majority of the tree caused outages on the Transmission System are
from trees falling onto the lines from the right-ofway edge rather than
from trees growing into the lines from within the corridor. A program to
survey the lines and remove those trees estimated to have a high potential
of failure has been established. In addition the Transmission System is at
risk due to the extensive infestation of the mountain pine beetle in BC. An
estimated 14,000 ha of dead lodge pole pine could be adjacent to the
lines. BCTC is investigating the possibility of initiating a salvage logging
operation to remove these extensive stands of dead timber.
2. Elimination of vegetation caused outages from trees growing into the
lines within the ROW.
Programs endeavour as much as possible to maintain the biological
diversity of the vegetation within the boundaries of the ROWs. Allowing
natural regeneration of selective plant communities results in an increase
in fish and wildlife habitat. The long term objective of vegetation
management is to promote low growing stable plant communities while
returning as much of the ROW as possible back to a relatively undisturbed
condition. This reduces safety hazards to the public and virtually
eliminates line outages from tall growing species. The program also
encourages compatible use, which enhances relationships with local
communities and reduces the area requiring vegetation management.
52
3.3.30 Access Roads

Transmission access covers development, maintenance, decommissioning,
safety and regulatory issues related to overhead and underground
transmission lines, as well as substation and communication system
components. Historically transmission access has been managed reactively,
and at present there is no comprehensive overall strategy to deal with all of
the associated transmission access asset items which include roads,
culverts, bridges, helipads, gates, etc.
In order to bring a more strategic approach to managing this extremely broad

asset class, BCTC plans to undertake the following activities:
Proceed to develop an inventory and condition assessment of

transmission access items, including property rights, ownership and
responsibilities;
Coordinate with Vegetation Control, Overhead and Substation
Maintenance teams to categorise Transmission access as: helicopter
access only, heavy vehicle access, 4WD access, foot access and no
maintained access;
Based on the above categories and the priorities set by the teams,
develop a maintenance and/or decommissioning plan to comply with
all federal, provincial and company legal and regulatory requirements.
This process will include development of a risk-based strategy to deal
with existing compliance issues, as well as a longer term strategy to
maintain compliance as part of the ongoing management of the
transmission access assets;
Implement the plan;
Monitor, evaluate and modify the plan as need to meet overall
transmission access requirements.

In the past no overall Province wide strategy was in place to manage
transmission access items. Various maintenance areas applied different
requirements, philosophies and financial considerations. Conflicting
requirements among stakeholders resulted in diverse responses and
suboptimal management of the overall asset.
Centralized management of the asset and implementation of the new overall

Transmission Access Strategy will address the issues above, and bring a
uniform management practice in compliance with all regulations and
requirements in a cost effective manner.

The current capital spending program for this asset class is focused on
creating the initial asset inventory as a base from which informed decisions
can be made. Future capital programs will be developed in support the
evolving strategy to manage this asset.
53
Prioritization will be considered based on access requirements from
Transmission, Substation and Communication Maintenance and Vegetation
crews, as well as relative asset item importance to overall system operation.
The risk criteria take into account the following elements:

Environmental factors
Asset condition
Financial considerations
Society / Consent to operate

The key focus for OMA initiatives is to:
Develop an inventory of assets and perform a condition assessment
of access items;
Develop maintenance standards for access items.
54
3.3.31 Civil Works

Historically civil assets have been managed reactively, and at present there is
no comprehensive strategy to deal with Transmission Civil Asset items. This
is an extremely broad asset category of assets, and in order to bring a more
strategic approach to managing the assets, BCTC plans to undertake the
following activities:
Proceed to develop an inventory and condition assessment of

Transmission Civil Asset items;
Develop a comprehensive risk-based strategy to manage this asset;
Based on the asset inventory and strategy, prioritize asset items
considering line importance, various risks and cost benefit analysis;
Implement asset management strategy;
Monitor, evaluate, update and modify as needed to meet ongoing
requirements.

In the past no overall province wide strategy was in place to manage Civil
Works. Various maintenance areas applied different requirements,
philosophies and financial considerations. The BCTC objective is to have an
adaptive and cost effective asset management strategy meeting all regulatory
and overall asset management requirements.

The current Civil Protective Program addresses some of the Civil Works
requirements, but as there is little information available, it is not necessarily a
comprehensive list. There is also a Corrosion Protection Program in
progress to address overhead transmission and substation civil corrosion
issues

Prioritization for this asset class will be considered based the following
elements:
Environmental factors
Asset condition
Financial considerations
Society / Consent to operate
One of the most significant risk considerations for civil works in the Lower
Mainland and Vancouver Island is seismic risk. Standards continue to evolve
and most of the civil structures that BCTC manages were built to older
standards and have not been upgraded.
Other significant risks include damage from wind and ice loadings as well as
environmental impacts from failing structures.
55
Other than routine maintenance activity, there are no special OMA initiatives
in progress for this asset class.
56
3.3.32 Underground and Submarine Cables & Oil Systems

Underground and submarine cables are only used where overhead lines are
not feasible. Most of the circuits are located in Vancouver, Burnaby,
Coquitlam and Victoria, and include almost all system voltage levels.
would result in elimination or reduction of ongoing OMA costs and outages,
resulting in an overall reduction in lifecycle costs and improved reliability.
While the cables in the Transmission System are some of the oldest in North
America, the circuits have provided reliable service except for three circuits
installed in the 1950s. These early vintage cable circuits were manufactured
without an extruded polyethylene jacket. Without a protective covering,
corrosion on the metallic sheath has resulted random oil leaks. An extensive
replacement program was initiated in 2000 and the last problem section will
be replaced in July 2005.
Most existing cables are fluid filled as they provide the greatest reliability and
the longest life, and the BCTC strategy for new cable installations continues
to include fluid filled cables for the same reasons.
As most underground cables are in ducts, the likelihood of physical damage

is reduced, and the focus of the asset management strategy is to monitor the
oil for signs of cable degradation, and monitor the cable joints for leaks. Oil
pressure is monitored continuously and alarms alert maintenance and
operations personnel immediately.
Underground cable systems in the Transmission System typically have

redundant circuits, and under normal conditions individual cables are only
loaded at half of their design capability. As a result, loading has not been a
major factor in contributing to end of life.
The asset management strategy for submarine cables is to monitor the

condition of cable catenaries and inspect the armour wires at these locations.
Inspections are typically done every 3 to 5 years (depending on the cable)
using an unmanned submersible camera. Because of the modern technology
used to locate the path for laying the submarine cables, they are generally
well supported, and damage to armour wires is rare.
In accordance with BCTC Maintenance Standards, assets are

inspected and the current asset condition is recorded based on visual
references provided in the BCTC Maintenance Manual;
database (STARR);
57
using RCM principles to prioritize the repairs;
Field Services is then assigned the highest priority repairs;
complete;
BCTC performs an audit function to ensure compliance;
The inspections are conducted in the next work season, and the
The overall strategy has not changed significantly, but there is now more
focus on the asset lifecycle and consistency in the way the asset is managed.
This structure allows the Cable Team to respond to changing asset condition
requirements quickly.
3.3.32.3 Sustaining Capital Program
There has been an active sustaining capital program in place for transmission
cable for the last five years. Sustaining capital is focused on:
Replacement of defective cable sections.

Replacements of problem stop joints.
Upgrade of oil alarm and control systems to improve circuit restoration
time.
Upgrade of oil pumping plants and oil reservoir systems
Installation of protective barriers for 500 kV potheads vulnerable to
vandalism.
3.3.32.4 Prioritisation and Risk Criteria
system. The key criteria that typically drive decisions for this asset class are:
Asset condition.

Structural integrity;
Due diligence;
Impacts and consequences.

for the cable asset, including:
Upgrade of pumping plants;
Installation of oil containments for pumping plants at 500 kV cable
terminals and HVDC cable terminals;
Corrosion protection initiatives.
58
3.3.33 Manholes & Duct Systems
reduction in lifecycle costs without impacting performance.
With the exception of drainage and sump pumps for manholes, there are no
real operating or serviceable components to this asset class. The strategy is
to monitor condition to the extent possible, and respond reactively to all other
problems.
Manholes are inspected regularly as part of the inspection process for the
cable joints in the manholes. Duct banks are not accessible for inspection
and there are currently no specific tests to assess duct integrity, other than to
physically excavate an area with a suspected failure.

There are no substantial changes to the way this asset has been managed
historically.

The Manholes and Duct Systems are in good condition, and there is no
sustaining program for Manholes and Duct Systems.

system. The key criterion to drive decisions for this asset class is asset
condition.

Structural integrity;
Due diligence;
Impacts and consequences.

Other than routine maintenance activity, there are no special OMA initiatives
in progress for this asset class.
59
Transmission Baseline Study
Report
Prepared for
British Columbia Transmission Corporation
by Acres International Ltd.
Reference No. BCTC003
April, 2005
Transmission Asset Baseline Study
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
1.0 Circuit Breakers
2.0 Disconnect Switches
3.0 Circuit Switchers
4.0 Transformers/Tap Changers (excluding HVDC)
5.0 Instrument Transformers
6.0 Shunt Reactors
7.0 Shunt Capacitors
8.0 Station Insulators
9.0 Substation Cables and Terminations
10.0 Synchronous Condensers
11.0 Gas Insulated Switchgear
12.0 Static Var Compensators
13.0 High Pressure Air Systems
14.0 Protection and Control Systems
15.0 Surge Arrestors
16.0 Station Grounding & Surface Treatment
17.0 Batteries
18.0 Stand-By Generators and Fuel Systems
Acres International Limited

19.0 Facilities General
20.0 Fire Protection Systems
21.0 Microwave Equipment
22.0 Power Line Carrier Equipment
23.0 Series Capacitors
24.0 HVDC Pole 1
25.0 HVDC Pole 2
26.0 Conductor Systems
27.0 Metal Support Structures
28.0 Wood Pole Structures
29.0 Vegetation / Rights-of-Way
30.0 Access Roads
31.0 Civil Works
32.0 Underground and Submarine Cables & Oil Systems
33.0 Manholes & Duct Systems

Executive Summary
The Transmission Asset Condition Assessment project (Baseline Study) was conducted to
fulfill a contractual requirement with BC Hydro under Article 7 of the Asset Management
and Maintenance Agreement (AMMA), one of the key agreements establishing BC
Transmission Corporation (BCTC) as an independent transmission company to operate and
maintain the BC Hydro Transmission System (Transmission System). Acres International
Ltd. (Acres International) was selected through a competitive process as the independent
engineering firm to conduct the assessment, establish a baseline for asset health, and develop
a framework of condition-based health indices for all assets managed by BCTC that can be
repeated every three years. This report presents the condition assessment methodology and
results of the Baseline Study. It represents the opinions of Acres International.
Baseline Study Description

The Baseline Study involved assessing the condition of 33 different classes of assets in the
Transmission System, including lines, cables, microwave, and transmission substation
equipment. Each chapter in this report represents a particular asset class and describes
specific steps taken and data used in the condition assessment process. The Baseline Study
relied on data supplied by BCTC for each asset class.
Generally, the Baseline Study involved the following:
1. Providing general descriptions of each asset class;

2. Preparing demographic profiles of each type of asset in the Transmission System;
3. Describing typical degradation processes and condition assessment techniques for
each asset class;
4. Formulating a Health Index for each asset class by developing end-of-life criteria;
5. Calculating a numerical condition score for members of each asset class to indicate
their suitability for continued service;
6. Using those condition scores to make relative comparisons about the health of
common asset class members and conclusions about the overall health of each asset
class;
7. Ensuring repeatability by documenting the methodology and data sources used in the
Baseline Study; and
8. Recommending future actions to address asset health conditions, data gathering and
handling, and other issues raised during the Baseline Study.
The Baseline Study did not involve monitoring, sampling or testing of any assets. Results
reflect the analysis of existing electronic data from BCTC plus information obtained in a
i Acres International Limited

limited field survey (Field Survey). In some cases, additional data may exist in hard copy at
substations or field offices, but collection and transformation of that data was not included in
the scope of the study.
The asset condition assessment results of the Baseline Study are intended for use as one input
to an overall asset management planning and decision making methodology. Acres
International has typically used a model similar to that shown in Figure ES.1 when
developing an overall asset management plan, which requires consideration of several factors
to assess the risk and consequences of an assets failure in addition to an assessment of
condition. These risk-based considerations include criticality issues, reliability goals,
compliance requirements and performance expectations. All of these considerations are
critical to the development of an asset management plan that effectively balances relevant
inputs in a manner that meets BCTCs mandate under the AMMA.
Focus of the
Baseline Study
Financial Risk Based

Asset
Inputs Analysis Inputs
Condition
Assessment
PLANNING AND ASSET

Maintenance
puts
Requirements DECISION MANAGEMENT
METHODOLOGY PLAN
Reliability and
Regulatory
Requirements Performance
Data Cost Data
Figure ES.1 Overall Asset Management Planning Approach
Acres International Limited ii

To present the results of the Baseline Study in a consistent form, five standard categories of
asset condition were used to report the results of a normalized health index. The definitions
of the condition designations Very Good through Very Poor used in the Baseline Study are
shown in Table ES.1 below. These designations provide directional guidance in the overall
decision making process, but not without consideration of the other factors included in an
asset management decision.
Health
Condition Description Requirements
Index
Some ageing or minor Normal maintenance
85 - 100 Very Good deterioration of a limited number
of components
Significant deterioration of some Normal maintenance
70 - 85 Good
components
Widespread significant Increase diagnostic testing, possible
deterioration or serious remedial work or replacement needed
50 - 70 Fair
deterioration of specific depending on criticality
components
Widespread serious deterioration Start planning process to replace or
30 - 50 Poor rebuild considering risk and
consequences of failure
Extensive serious deterioration At end-of-life, immediately assess risk;
0 - 30 Very Poor
replace or rebuild based on assessment
Table ES.1 Typical Health Index Scale for Baseline Study
Asset Condition Assessment Results and Conclusions

A summary of asset condition results from the Baseline Study are shown in Table ES.2. The
results shown are based on the condition categories described above.
It should also be noted that while many of the health indices developed are based on either a
composite of components (e.g. HVDC), or on multiple subclasses (e.g. circuit breakers), the
results shown in Table ES.2 are a consolidation of component and subclasses in order to
iii Acres International Limited

provide a more concise view of the overall results. The detailed results are contained and
presented within the body of the main report.
Baseline Asset Condition Results

(Percentage of Total Population)
Chapter Asset Description
Very Very
Poor Fair Good
Poor Good
1 Circuit Breakers 0.5 14.3 6.8 57.9 20.6
2 Disconnect Switches 0 0 0 98.5 1.5
3 Circuit Switchers 1.7 0 0 92.5 5.8
4 Transformers 0 0 6.8 31.6 61.5
5 Instrument Transformers 0 0 2.0 53.1 44.9
6 Shunt Reactors 0 0 6.3 29.4 64.3
7 Shunt Capacitors 0 4.5 0 61.2 34.3
8 Station Insulators Not Rated - Insufficient Data Available for Analysis
9 Station Cables 0 0 16.7 50.0 33.3
10 Synchronous Condensers 0 0 0 100.0 0
11 Gas Insulated Switchgear 0 11.1 44.4 33.3 11.1
12 Static Var Compensators 0 0 0 0 100.0
13 High Pressure Air Systems 0 0 3.7 51.9 44.4
14 Protective Relays 0 59.0 29.0 0 12.0
15 Surge Arrestors 58.7 0 0 36.3 4.9
16 Grounding Systems 0 1.1 19.1 66.0 13.8
17 Batteries 0.8 0 4.8 44.8 49.6
18 Standby Generators 0 0 16.7 60.0 23.3
19 Facilities General 1.0 1.0 11.0 76.0 12.0
20 Fire Protection Systems 2.7 0 24.1 26.8 46.4
21 Microwave Equipment 0 0 19.0 0 81.0
22 Power Line Carrier Equipment 0 0 60.0 0 40.0
23 Series Capacitors 0 0 20.6 0 79.4
24 HVDC Pole 1 0 100.0 0 0 0
25 HVDC Pole 2 0 0 100.0 0 0
26 Conductor Systems 0 0.2 11.9 80.9 7.1
27 Metal Support Structures 0.6 11.3 9.6 68.7 9.7
28 Wood Pole Structures Not Rated - Insufficient Data Available for Analysis
29 Vegetation/Rights-of-Way 14.3 9.1 25.5 17.2 33.9
30 Access Roads Not Rated - Insufficient Data Available for Analysis
31 Civil Works Not Rated - Insufficient Data Available for Analysis
32 Underground & Submarine Cables 4.9 1.2 22.2 66.7 4.9
33 Manholes & Duct Systems 0 0 0.9 92.6 6.5
Table ES.2 Baseline Asset Condition Results
Acres International Limited iv

Generally, many assets are in Good or Very Good condition. Of the assets in Good or Very
Good condition, key conclusions include the following:
Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) 44.4% of GIS are in Good or Very Good condition.
However, 11.1% are also in Poor condition, and a field review of the switchgear done by
BCTC and Acres International showed that many components are degrading at a higher
than expected rate.
High Pressure Air Systems (HPAS) 96.3% are in Good or Very Good condition.
However, ways to retire the HPAS associated with the Air Blast Circuit Breakers that are
being replaced, should be considered.
Batteries 94.4% are in Good or Very Good condition. However, the Field Survey
found that 5 batteries had failed a critical Discharge Test, but field personnel reported
only one to the BCTC asset manager.
Conductor Systems 88% of conductor spans are in Good or Very Good condition, but
the condition of spacer dampers and ancillary equipment puts about 11.9% of conductors
in Fair condition. Because of a lack of condition data, most of the result is based on
equipment age.
Metal Support Structures 78.4% are in Good or Very Good condition, but older
structures at 360 kV and 138 kV have a large percentage in poor condition. Because of a
lack of condition data, most of the result is based on equipment age.
Underground and Submarine Cables Generally, these cables are in Good or Very
Good condition, but some types of SCFF cable are in Very Poor condition due to leaks.
Some of BCTCs assets are in Fair, Poor or Very Poor condition. Of these assets, key
conclusions include the following:
Circuit Breakers 14.8% of circuit breakers are in Poor or Very Poor condition. These
include both Air Blast Circuit Breakers and SF6 Circuit Breakers because of known
design problems in certain models.
Shunt Capacitors 4.5% are in Poor condition due to the presence of PCBs.
Protective Relays - 59% of protective measuring relays are considered to be in Poor
condition and 29% in Fair condition due to age, obsolescence, and lack of spare parts.
Surge Arrestors 58.7% are in Very Poor condition because they are technically
inadequate to perform the duty required.
Station Grounding There is currently not a program to measure station grounding
levels, which may create unacceptable step and touch potentials during ground faults.
This could present safety issues.
Fire Protection Systems The available data show that 2.7% of the systems are in Very
Poor condition since they are CO2 based.
Microwave Equipment - 19% of equipment is in Fair condition due to decreasing
reliability, lack of manufacturer support, and the need for bandwidth changes to conform
to Industry Canada regulations.
Power Line Carrier Equipment - 60% of this equipment is in Fair condition based on
BCTCs new, more stringent, availability criteria.
v Acres International Limited

Series Capacitors 20.6% are in Fair condition and may need improvements,
depending on the criticality of specific units.
HVDC Pole 1 Overall, both HVDC Pole 1 Stations are in Poor condition.
However, the mercury arc valves and their control equipment are kept in good
working condition through an extraordinary operation and maintenance program that
relies on the continued availability of spare parts, trained personnel, and special tools.
Vegetation/Rights-of-Way 48.9% of Vegetation/ROW circuit areas are reported in
Fair, Poor or Very Poor condition.
More detailed descriptions of demographic profiles, asset degradation processes, and specific
health index criteria, weightings and results are contained in the main body of the report.
Acres International Limited vi

Introduction to the Baseline Study
The Transmission Asset Condition Assessment project (Baseline Study) was conducted to
fulfill a contractual requirement with BC Hydro under Article 7 of the Asset Management
and Maintenance Agreement (AMMA), one of the key agreements establishing BC
Transmission Corporation (BCTC) as an independent transmission company to operate and
maintain the BC Hydro Transmission System (Transmission System). Acres International
Ltd. (Acres International) was selected through a competitive process as the independent
engineering firm to conduct the assessment, establish a baseline for asset health, and develop
a framework of condition-based health indices for all assets managed by BCTC that can be
repeated every three years. This report presents the condition assessment methodology and
results of the Baseline Study. It represents the opinions of Acres International.
Baseline Study Description

The Baseline Study involved assessing the condition of 33 different classes of assets in the
Transmission System, including lines, cables, microwave, and transmission substation
equipment. Each chapter in this report represents a particular asset class and describes
specific steps taken and data used in the condition assessment process. The Baseline Study
relied on data supplied by BCTC for each asset class.
Generally, the Baseline Study involved the following:
1. Providing general descriptions of each asset class;

2. Preparing demographic profiles of each type of asset in the Transmission System;
3. Describing typical degradation processes and condition assessment techniques for
each asset class;
4. Formulating a Health Index for each asset class by developing end-of-life criteria;
5. Calculating a numerical condition score for members of each asset class to indicate
their suitability for continued service;
6. Using those condition scores to make relative comparisons about the health of
common asset class members and conclusions about the overall health of each asset
class;
7. Ensuring repeatability by documenting the methodology and data sources used in the
Baseline Study;
The Baseline Study did not involve monitoring, sampling or testing of any assets. Results
reflect the analysis of existing electronic data from BCTC plus information obtained in a
limited field survey (Field Survey). In some cases, additional data may exist in hard copy at
substations or field offices, but collection and transformation of that data was not included in
the scope of the study.
1 Acres International Limited

Field Survey
As described above, a field survey of substation equipment assets was conducted to make an
assessment of current condition and to obtain additional condition-based data. In order to
control the cost of the condition assessment and data collection tasks, data were collected for
only a sample of the population of each substation equipment asset class. The results for the
samples were then extrapolated to the population as a whole. Because sampling was used
instead of an assessment of the entire population, the distributions of Health Index across
each asset class (i.e., how many are in Good condition, Fair condition, etc.) as shown in the
study are estimates of the actual distributions. In general, the samples were chosen to
produce an interval of 5% at 90% confidence.
For most asset classes, about 50% of the population was sampled. A sample of this size is
sufficient to develop statistically relevant results. For very large asset groups, such as
Disconnect Switches, smaller sample percentages were used; and for very small groups, such
as Synchronous Condensers the entire population was assessed. In every case, the samples
were sized to ensure the confidence level of the final results was not reduced.
Ideally, the sample would be randomly selected from all the assets in the population. This
was not deemed to be practical, as it would have necessitated visiting virtually every
substation and reviewing only selected pieces of equipment at each. Instead, the survey
comprised approximately 50% of the substations, randomly selected. This sample of
substations was then checked to ensure that it contained approximately 50% of the total
population for all relevant assets.
Methodology
The methodology used to assess the condition of the members of each asset class was
identical. This methodology is shown in diagrammatic form in the drawing at the end of this
section.
For each asset class the study addresses four principal items carried out in an ordered
sequence. As shown on the drawing these are:
Description of the Asset Class

Demographics of the Asset Class
Degradation Review and Health Index Formulation consisting of:
o Life Expectancy and Failure Issues
o End-of-Life Criteria and Condition Rating
o Health Index Formulation
Health Index Results and Condition Assessment
Details of the principal items shown above are as follows:
Acres International Limited 2

Asset Description
This section provides a brief description of the Transmission System equipment items that
are included in the Asset Class and how those assets function in the overall system. Asset
Classes, such as Circuit Breakers, include sub-classes, such as Oil Circuit Breakers that are
essentially treated as a separate asset group for purposes of this Study and the description of
each sub-class is included in this section.
Asset Demographics
This section includes the statistical characteristics of the total population that makes up the
Asset Class and may include such characteristics as type, manufacturer, age, voltage level,
load rating or other items that may be necessary to demonstrate the magnitude of the Asset
Class within parameters that are relevant for the purposes of this study.
Degradation Review and Health Index
This section includes a general discussion of how and why the component parts of each asset
degrade over time.
Computing the Health Index first required developing end-of-life criteria for various
components of the asset class. Each criterion represents a factor critical in determining the
components condition relative to potential failure.
In assessing the information available against end-of-life criteria, condition states were rated
A through E. For most asset classes, letter condition ratings have the following general
meanings:
A means the component is in as new condition;

B means the component has some minor problems or evidence of aging;
C means the component has many minor problems or a major problem that
requires attention;
D means the component has many problems and the potential for major failure;
E means the component has completely failed or is degraded beyond repair.
Health indexing quantifies equipment conditions relative to long-term degradation factors

that cumulatively lead to an assets end-of-life. Health indexing differs from maintenance
testing, which emphasizes finding defects and deficiencies that need correction or
remediation to keep the asset operating during some time period.

For purposes of formulating the Health Index the letter condition ratings listed above also
received the following numbers shown as factors in the Health Index Formulation table
shown on the drawing:
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1;
E = 0.
For each asset class member the components and tests in the Condition Rating Criteria shown
on the drawing were weighted based on their importance in determining the class members
end-of-life. For example, those that relate to primary functions of the component/asset
received higher weights than those that relate to more ancillary features and functions.
The condition rating numbers listed immediately above (i.e., A = 4, B = 3, etc.) were
multiplied by the assigned weights to compute weighted scores for each component and test.
The weighted scores were totaled for each asset class member.
Totaled scores were used in calculating final Health Indices for each asset class member. For
each member, the Health Index calculation involved dividing its total condition score by its
maximum condition score, then multiplying by 100. This step normalizes scores by
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an Oil Circuit
Breaker in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded
Oil Circuit Breaker would have a Health Index of 0.
Within a given asset class some individual assets may suffer from a fatal flaw that would
not be immediately obvious from the computation of the Health Index based on the end-of-
life criteria established. For instance, within the Air Blast Circuit Breaker asset class, one
type of breaker (Type ATB-80) is known by experience in the industry to be unreliable.
Based on the end-of life criteria established for Air Blast Circuit Breakers, a particular ATB-
80 may have a perfect score, i.e. HI=100 and be classified in Very Good condition. To
ensure that all such breakers are identified for consideration in a replacement program, the
computed Health Index was divided by a factor (in this case 2) as an integral part of the
computer program used to compute the Health Index. Thus the reported Health Index would
be 50, which would cause the breaker to fall into the Poor condition category and as a
minimum would warrant additional attention.
As described above, condition assessment and health indexing require review and use of
substantial information. However, one need not have complete information about an asset
class to compute its Health Index. When only partial data exist it is possible to calculate a
valid Health Index if the maximum condition score for the partial data set is greater than or
equal to 70% of the maximum possible condition score for a full data set (i.e., the 70% Rule).
Acres International Limited 4

For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for Oil Circuit Breakers
shown in the Health Index Formulation table on the drawing, assume an Oil Circuit Breaker
with partial data has a maximum condition score of 82 out of the Health Index maximum
possible score of 120. That Oil Circuit Breaker, therefore, has only 68% of the maximum
score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that Oil Circuit
Breaker with partial data had a maximum condition score of 92, it would have 77% of the
Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
For some members of some asset classes, available data were insufficient to provide a valid
Health Index using the 70% Rule described above. In such cases, in order to provide some
information about the assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off (i.e.,
the 50% Rule). Thus, if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal to
50% of the maximum possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and presented
in the results. Application of this rule does not impact the statistical confidence of the results
of the HI calculation for classes where a sample population was assessed, because the data
used to calculate the HI for a given asset are not a sample.
Health Index Results and Condition Assessment
To present the results of the Baseline Study in a consistent form, five standard categories of
asset condition were used to report the results of a normalized health index. The definitions
of the condition designations Very Good through Very Poor used in the Baseline Study are
shown in the Table below. These designations provide directional guidance in the overall
decision making process, but not without consideration of the other factors included in an
asset management decision.
Health
Index
Some ageing or minor deterioration of Normal maintenance
85 - 100 Very Good
a limited number of components
70 - 85 Good
components
Widespread significant deterioration Increase diagnostic testing, possible
50 - 70 Fair or serious deterioration of specific remedial work or replacement needed
components depending on criticality

30 - 50 Poor rebuild considering risk and consequences
of failure
0 - 30 Very Poor
Typical Health Index Scale for Baseline Study

TRANSMISSION BASELINE STUDY
ASSET CONDITION ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
(example: oil circuit breakers)
Demographics Degradation Review

Asset Description Inventory and Age Health Index Formulation
of Asset Group And Scale
Health Index Formulation

Condition Rating Criteria Oil Circuit Breaker Max.

Data # Weight Rating Factors
Condition Bushings/Support Insulators Condition 1 Condition Criteria Score
Rating 1 1 Bushing/Supports 4 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Condition Leaks 2
A=4 No abnormal indications 2 Leaks 2 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Rating Tank and Mech.
BCondition
=3 Some possible abnormal indications 3 2 3 Tank and Mech. 4 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 16
A=4 No abnormal indications
C =Rating
2 Definite indications
Control of abnormal activity
Mech. 4 4 Control and Mech. 2 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 8
BCondition
A
= =3 4 Some
No possible
abnormal
and abnormal
indications indications
D = 1Rating Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity 3 5 Foundation 3 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 12
C=2 Definite indications of abnormal activity
Foundation 5
=3
E =B0Condition HighSome
levels possible
abnormal, abnormal
cannot indications
be brought to normal
=4
D =A1Rating No abnormal
Definite indications indications
of high levels abnormal activity 6 Overall Condition 4 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 16
C=2 Definite indications
Overall Breaker abnormal activity
ofCondition 6 4
=3 HighSome
levels possible
abnormal, abnormal
cannot indications
be brought to normal 7 Time/Travel 3 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 12
ED=B=0Condition
A1= 4 No abnormal
of high levels abnormal activity
C =Rating
2 Definite indications of abnormal activity
Time/Travel 7 8 Contact Resistance 4 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 16
E =B0Condition
A= =3 4 High Some
levels
No possible
abnormal,
abnormal abnormal
cannotindications
indications be brought to normal 5
D = 1Rating Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity 9 Stored Energy 2 A,E 4,0 8
Contact of abnormal activity
Resistance 8
=3
E =B0Condition High Some
levels possible
abnormal, abnormal
cannot indications
be brought to normal
=4
of high levels abnormal activity 6 10 Oil Analysis 2 A-E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Stored Energy of abnormal activity 9
=3
E =B0Condition High Some
levelspossible
abnormal, abnormal
cannot indications
be brought to normal Maximum Score 120
=4
of high levels abnormal activity
Analysis of abnormal activity 10 7
E =B0Condition
= =3 4 High Some
No
Oil possible
levels abnormal,
abnormal abnormal
cannotindications
indications be brought to normal
D =A1Rating Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity
C=2 Definite
Some indications
possible of abnormal
abnormal activity
indications
6
E =B0A= =3 4 High levels
No abnormalabnormal, cannot
indications be brought to normal 8
D=1 Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity
E =B0 = 3 High Some
levels possible
abnormal, abnormal
cannotindications
be brought to normal HI = 100 x Score / Max. Score
D=1 Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity 9
E=0 High levels abnormal, cannot be brought to normal
D=1 Definite indications of high levels abnormal activity
10
E=0 High levels abnormal, cannot be brought to normal
Summary of Health Index Results
and Condition Assessment
Health Index Scale
Health Health Index Sample Pop. 400 358
Condition Description Requirements 350
Index Very Good 31 60
85 - Very Good Some ageing or minor deterioration of a Normal maintenance Good 184 358 300
100 limited number of components Fair 31 68 250
70 - 85 Good Significant deterioration of some Normal maintenance Poor 0 0 200
components 150
Number of
Very Poor 0 0
50 - 70 Fair Widespread significant or serious Increase diagnostic testing, possible 100 68 60
Total 250 487
Oil Circuit Breakers
deterioration deterioration of specific remedial work or replacement needed 50

% Population 51.3 100 0 0
components depending on criticality 0
30 - 50 Poor Widespread serious deterioration Start planning process to replace or rebuild Very Poor Poor Fair Good Very Good
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
considering risk and consequences of failure
0 - 30 Very Poor Extensive serious deterioration At end-of-life, immediately assess risk; Health Index Categories
TRANSMISSION BASELINE STUDY

ASSET CONDITION ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
1.0 Circuit Breakers
This chapter covers types of switching devices known as circuit breakers. The BCTC-
managed transmission system also includes switching devices such as circuit switchers,
disconnect switches and gas insulated switchgear that are analyzed in separate chapters of
this report.
1.1 Description
The circuit breaker asset class includes several types of mechanical switching devices that
can make, carry and interrupt electrical currents under normal and abnormal conditions.
Transmission system circuit breakers typically serve single loads, transmission line terminals,
and transformer banks.
Circuit breakers represent the single most critical element of any power system. They serve
as the last link in a chain of protective equipment, and must interrupt both load and short
circuit currents reliably when given automated or manual commands.
They operate infrequently. However, when an electrical fault occurs, breakers must operate
reliably and quickly. They also must operate without damaging or disturbing themselves,
and the electrical system as a whole. Typically, they can interrupt currents in 5 cycles (83
milliseconds) or less.
When a circuit breaker interrupts a current, an arc of ionized gas forms inside the breaker.
This arc contains very large amounts of energy that must be absorbed and extinguished by
the breakers main interrupting unit in view of the following factors:
Velocity of contact separation;

Distance between contacts;
Current zero;
Cooling provided by the insulating medium; and
Insulating (i.e., dielectric) strength of the insulating medium
Within the BCTC-managed transmission system, breakers provide switching and protection
in medium, high and extra high voltage applications. Installations include stand-alone [e.g.,
air insulated substations (AIS)] and integrated [e.g., gas insulated switchgear (GIS)]
configurations.
Two categories of breakers exist, live- and dead-tank. Live-tank breakers operate at line
potential isolated from ground by support insulators. Normally, live-tank breakers have
freestanding current transformers. Dead-tank breakers have grounded tanks that typically
incorporate bushing current transformers.
Circuit breakers on the BCTC-managed transmission system represent all current

configurations and technologies. The BCTC-managed system also includes designs from
1-1 Acres International Limited

about 20 different manufacturers. Circuit breakers on the BCTC-managed transmission
system include the following categories:
Oil Circuit Breakers (OCB) - live and dead tank, minimum and bulk oil in AIS;
Air Blast Circuit Breakers (ABCB) live tank in AIS;
Vacuum Circuit Breakers (Vacuum CB)
Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers (AMCB)
SF6 Circuit Breakers (SF6 Breakers) - live and dead tank, single and double pressure
in AIS and GIS;
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 1079 power circuit breakers in 275 AIS and 7
gas insulated substations.
More detailed descriptions of various circuit breaker designs follow:
Oil Circuit Breakers (OCB)

For over 70 years, OCBs have served as the workhorses of switching devices in most
Canadian utilities. Currently, the BCTC-managed transmission system has two main types of
OCBs, and oil serves as the primary interrupting medium for both.
Live Tank (i.e., minimum oil)

Dead Tank (i.e., bulk oil)
At voltages of 138 kV and below, dead tank breakers typically have a single tank containing
all three phases in one volume of oil. At higher voltages, dead tank breakers generally have
three separate single-phase tanks. These breakers generally come pre-assembled from the
factory and require less on-site installation than live tank breakers and associated current
transformers.
OCBs generally perform well at low ambient temperatures. They also readily execute the
infrequent load switching and protection operations common to many utility medium and
high-voltage systems. They do not perform frequent switching applications well. Similarly,
they do not perform well in online or cable switching situations where they may experience
high peak recovery voltages.
OCBs typically have simple installation and maintenance requirements. Generally, 4 to 8

fully rated interruptions represent an OCBs useful service time between major maintenance.
This duty cycle can result in excessive contact erosion, carbonisation of oil, and the need for
maintenance.
Many of the dead tank OCBs on the BCTC-managed transmission system were manufactured
in Canada. The original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) provided service support and
spares for these dead tank OCBs until the late 1990s. Canadian utility staff, in turn,
developed expertise in maintaining and extending the life of these breakers well beyond the
expected life for switchgear.
Acres International Limited 1-2

Air Blast Circuit Breakers (ABCB)
ABCBs interrupt currents by opening a blast valve and allowing high-pressure air to flow
through a nozzle along the arc drawn between fixed and moving contacts. This process
rapidly stabilizes, cools and interrupts the arc. ABCBs have modular designs with each single
phase of a three-phase breaker consisting of two or more columns. The columns support
interrupters connected in series to meet specific system voltage requirements. Before
development of SF6 Breakers, ABCBs provided the only suitable option for switching at 500
kV. The BCTC-managed transmission system currently has 187 ABCBs. BCTC has noted
that early 500kV ABCBs installed on the BCHydro system may be susceptible to major
damage during seismic events.
ABCBs have the highest interrupting ratings and shortest interrupting times of any high- or
extra-high voltage circuit breaker. Many high-voltage ABCBs have opening and closing
resistors plus voltage grading capacitors across multi-break designs. ABCBs also have large
masses supported on long vertical porcelain insulators, making stability a concern in
seismically active areas. In general, the complexity of ABCBs has made maintenance and
reliability a concern.
Unlike all other circuit breaker technologies, ABCBs rely on a directly connected, external
source as an interrupting medium. The medium, high-pressure compressed air typically
comes from central air compressor plants equipped with air storage facilities sized to
accommodate all the ABCBs in a substation. Generally, these central plants serve each
ABCB through local high-pressure air receivers fed from a main ring system. Local air
receivers must have capacities sufficient to provide Open-Close-Open operations without
replenishment from the central plant.
ABCBs must have dry air. Therefore, central air compressor plants typically include air
dryers that remove most moisture from the air. Also, to ensure maximum dryness, many
ABCB systems have additional dryers fitted locally to each ABCB. For purposes of this
study, high-pressure air systems are included as a separate asset class presented in Chapter 13
of this report.
Vacuum Circuit Breakers (Vacuum Breakers)

First developed in the late 1920s, vacuum breakers consist of fixed and moving butt type
contacts in small evacuated chambers (i.e., bottles). A bellows attached to the moving
contact permits the required short stroke to occur with no vacuum losses. Arc interruption
occurs at current zero after withdrawal of the moving contact. Utilities typically install
vacuum breakers indoors in metalclad switchgear. Some utilities install them outdoors in
breaker-in-a-box arrangements. The BCTC-managed transmission system includes 6
vacuum breakers.
After early design, manufacture and application problems, vacuum breaker technology
improved. Vacuum breakers have now become the dominant switching technology for
medium voltage systems below 25kV, and have been commercialised successfully up to
38 kV. Current medium voltage vacuum breakers require low mechanical drive energy, have

high endurance, can interrupt fully rated short circuits up to 100 times, and operate reliably
over 30,000 or more switching operations. Vacuum breakers also are safe and protective of
the environment.
Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers (Air Magnetic Breakers)

Air magnetic breakers represent some of oldest circuit breaker technologies now in use, but
they were generally superseded by SF6 and vacuum technologies in the late 1970s. Today
these breakers have become virtually obsolete and are used only in metalclad switchgear
applications. Air magnetic breakers use the magnetic effect of the current undergoing
interruption to draw an arc into an arc chute for cooling, splitting and extinction. Sometimes,
an auxiliary puffer or air blast piston may help interrupt low-level currents. The BCTC-
managed transmission system contains 9 air magnetic breakers.
Generally, air magnetic breakers are used on medium voltage systems, with most breakers
installed on systems operating at and below 15 kV. The breakers have long interrupting
times, and high thermal, mechanical and electromagnetic properties. Thus, air magnetic
breakers have short duty cycles, require frequent maintenance and approach their end-of-life
at much faster rates than either SF6 or vacuum breakers. They also have limited transient
recovery voltage capabilities and experience restriking when switching capacitative currents.
SF6 Circuit Breakers (SF6 Breakers)

First developed in the late 1960s and based on air blast technology, SF6 breakers had double-
pressure designs (i.e., low pressure tank and high pressure reservoir). SF6 breakers interrupt
currents by opening a blast valve and allowing high pressure SF6 to flow through a nozzle
along the arc drawn between fixed and moving contacts. This process rapidly deionizes,
cools and interrupts the arc. After interruption, low-pressure gas is compressed for re-use in
the next operation. The BCTC-managed transmission system has 390 SF6 Breakers.
Early SF6 designs experience some problems and failures. The BCTC-managed transmission
system still contains some of these early designs. These include ITE and Westinghouse
double-pressure high voltage breakers. Recent SF6 designs have improved the technology
substantially. Because of these improvements, SF6 equipment has become popular and has
replaced oil-filled equipment. In fact, over the last 30 years, single pressure SF6 breakers
have become the technology of choice for transmission class switchgear. The simple design
of SF6 breakers makes them very reliable.
SF6 is a very stable compound with remarkable dielectric properties. Its use has enabled
transmission equipment to become more compact, safer and have fewer maintenance
requirements. Consequently, SF6 equipment has become dominant, and almost no
alternatives exist for switchgear applications at the highest transmission voltage levels.

1.2 Demographics

a) Bulk OCBs
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 413 bulk OCBs. Table 1.2.1 shows
the number of bulk OCBs grouped by voltage level and age group. The 60 kV and 138 kV
voltage levels contain most of bulk OCBs in the system, with 55% and 31% respectively.
The less than 25 kV, 230 kV and 360 kV voltage levels have fewer bulk OCBs, with 3.6%,
9.9% and 0.5% respectively.
Table 1.2.1 also shows that 35.8% of the bulk OCBs are between 30 and 39 years old and
32.9% are in the age range of 20 to 49 years. Also, 6.5% of the bulk OCBs were
commissioned more than 50 years ago.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV
0 to 9 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.5
10 to 19 1 5 5 0 0 11 2.7
Age Group
20 to 29 6 44 79 7 0 136 32.9
30 to 39 5 111 23 7 2 148 35.8
40 to 49 2 44 17 10 0 73 17.7
50 plus 1 22 2 2 0 27 6.5
incomplete 0 0 1 15 0 16 3.9
Total 15 227 128 41 2 413 100.0
Percent 3.6 55.0 31.0 9.9 0.5 100.0
Table 1.2.1 Count of Bulk Oil Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
b) Minimum OCBs
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 74 minimum OCBs. Table 1.2.2
shows the number of minimum OCBs grouped by voltage level and age group. As shown in
the table, the 60 kV and 138 kV voltage levels have similar numbers of minimum OCBs,
with 18.9% and 25.7% respectively. With only 4.1% of the minimum OCBs, the less than 25
kV voltage level has the fewest minimum OCBs. With 51.4%, the 230 kV voltage level has
the most minimum OCBs of any level in the BCTC-managed transmission system.
Table 1.2.2 also shows that 86.5% of the minimum OCBs, were commissioned between 20
and 29 years ago.

Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV
0 to 9 0 2 0 0 2 2.7
10 to 19 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Age Group
20 to 29 2 12 16 34 64 86.5
30 to 39 0 0 1 3 4 5.4
40 to 49 0 0 2 0 2 2.7
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 1 0 0 1 2 2.7
Total 3 14 19 38 74 100.0
Percent 4.1 18.9 25.7 51.4 100.0
Table 1.2.2 Count of Minimum Oil Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage

Level and Age
Air Blast Circuit Breakers

The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 187 ABCBs. Table 1.2.3 shows the
number of ABCBs grouped by voltage level and age group. As shown in the table, the 230
kV and 500 kV voltage levels have most of the ABCBs in the system, with 32.6% and 58.3%
respectively. The less than 25 kV and 138 kV voltage levels have far fewer ABCBs, with
5.3% and 3.7% respectively.
Table 1.2.3 also shows that 64.2% of the ABCBs are between 20 and 29 years old and 32.6%
are in the age range of 30 and 39 years. Only 0.5% of the ABCBs were commissioned
between 40 and 49 years ago.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 138 kV 230 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
10 to 19 0 0 0 5 5 2.7
Age Group
20 to 29 6 3 28 83 120 64.2
30 to 39 3 4 33 21 61 32.6
40 to 49 1 0 0 0 1 0.5
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Total 10 7 61 109 187 100.0
Percent 5.3 3.7 32.6 58.3 100.0
Table 1.2.3 Count of Air Blast Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age

Vacuum Circuit Breakers (Vacuum CBs)
The BCTC-managed transmission system has only 6 vacuum CBs. Table 1.2.4 shows the
number of vacuum CBs grouped by voltage level and age group. As shown in the table, only
the less than 25 kV and 138 kV voltage levels have vacuum CBs, with 33.3% and 66.7%
respectively.
Table 1.2.4 also shows that 66.7% of the vacuum CBs are between 20 and 29 years old.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 138 kV
0 to 9 0 0 0 0.0
10 to 19 0 0 0 0.0
Age Group
20 to 29 2 2 4 66.7
30 to 39 0 0 0 0.0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 2 2 33.3
Total 2 4 6 100.0
Percent 33.3 66.7 100.0
Table 1.2.4 Vacuum Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers (AMCBs)

The BCTC-managed transmission system has 9 AMCBs, all found at voltage levels less than
25 kV. Table 1.2.5 shows the number of AMCBs grouped by voltage level and age group.
Table 1.2.5 also shows that 22.2% of the AMCBs are between 20 and 29 years old and
44.4% are in the age range of 40 to 40 years.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV
0 to 9 0 0 0.0
10 to 19 0 0 0.0
Age Group
20 to 29 2 2 22.2
30 to 39 0 0 0.0
40 to 49 4 4 44.4
50 plus 0 0 0.0
incomplete 3 3 33.3
Total 9 9 100.0
Percent 100.0 100.0
Table 1.2.5 Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age

SF6 Circuit Breakers (SF6 Breakers)
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 390 SF6 breakers. Table 1.2.6 shows
the number of SF6 breakers grouped by voltage level and age group. The BCTC-managed
transmission system has 45.6% of its SF6 Breakers in the 230 kV voltage level. The
remaining SF6 breakers are distributed among the less than 25 kV, 60 kV, 138 kV, and 360
kV, and 500 levels, with those levels having 4.1%, 14.1%, 16.4%, 1.3% and 18.5%
respectively.
Table 1.2.6 also shows that most of the SF6 breaker population is distributed among age
groups 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 20 to 29 years, with those groups having 38.2%,
23.1% and 29.0% respectively. Thus, 90.3% of the SF6 breakers in the BCTC-managed
transmission system were commissioned within the last 29 years.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 11 44 29 34 5 26 149 38.2
10 to 19 5 11 31 33 0 10 90 23.1
Age Group
20 to 29 0 0 4 73 0 36 113 29.0
30 to 39 0 0 0 26 0 0 26 6.7
40 to 49 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0.8
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 0 0 9 0 0 9 2.3
Total 16 55 64 178 5 72 390 100.0
Percent 4.1 14.1 16.4 45.6 1.3 18.5 100.0
Table 1.2.6 Count of SF6 Circuit Breakers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
1.3 Degradation Review and Health Index
1.3.1 Review of Life Expectancy and Failure Issues
Circuit breakers have many moving parts that are subject to wear and stress. They frequently
make and break high currents and experience the arcing that accompanies such
operations. While this asset class consists of several different technologies, they have many
degradation issues in common. For example, all circuit breakers undergo some contact
degradation every time they open to interrupt an arc. Also, arcing produces heat and
decomposition products that degrade surrounding insulation materials, nozzles, interrupter
chambers and grids. The mechanical energy needed for the high contact velocities of these
assets adds mechanical deterioration to their degradation processes.
The rate and severity of degradation depends on many factors, including insulating and
conducting materials, operating environments, and a breakers specific duties. The rate of

contact degradation varies widely for differing technologies. Switching, fault interruption,
and exposure to over-voltages and currents rarely lead to the end-of-life for these assets.
The International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) studies on circuit breaker
longevity identified the following key end-of-life factors for this asset class:
Decreasing reliability/availability/maintainability (RAM);

High maintenance and operating costs;
Changes in operating conditions;
Maintenance overhaul requirements; and
Circuit breaker age.
Outdoor circuit breakers may experience adverse environmental conditions that influence
their rate and severity of degradation. The following represent primary degradation
processes affecting all circuit breaker-related assets:
Corrosion;
Effects of moisture;
Bushing/insulator deterioration; and
Mechanical;
Corrosion and moisture commonly cause degradation of internal insulation, breaker

performance mechanisms, and major components like bushings, structural components, oil,
air and SF6 seals. Corrosion presents problems for almost all circuit breakers, irrespective of
their location or housing material. Rates of corrosion degradation, however, will vary. For
example, oil breaker steel tanks subjected to coastal salt spray or heavy industrial pollution
will degrade faster than SF6 breaker aluminium tanks under similar conditions. Underside
tank corrosion causes problem in many types of dead tank breakers, particularly those with
steel tanks. Another widespread problem involves corrosion of operating mechanism
linkages that result in eventual link seizures. Corrosion also causes damage to metal flanges,
bushing hardware and support insulators.
Moisture causes damage to all insulating systems. Outdoor circuit breakers experience
moisture ingress through defective seals, gaskets, pressure relief and venting devices.
Moisture in the interrupter tank can lead to general degradation of internal components.
Also, sometimes free water collects in tank bottoms, creating potential catastrophic failure
conditions.
Moisture also may cause bushing deterioration, particularly in free-breathing oil circuit
breaker bushings. Paper insulation readily absorbs moisture resulting in discharge tracking
across its surface and eventual bushing failure. Oil impregnated paper bushings exhibit
greater sensitivity to moisture than other bushings. Once inside the paper insulation moisture
becomes difficult to remove and can lead to failures.
Bushing degradation also can result from partial discharges and excessive thermal and
mechanical stress. Externally, coastal salt spray and heavy industrial pollution will degrade

bushings and associated metal parts. In addition, sometimes freezing rain combined with
environmental contamination has led to bushing support insulator failures.
CIGRE studies on circuit breaker reliability have confirmed that mechanical degradation
presents greater end-of-life concerns than electrical degradation. Even for modern SF6
breakers, mechanical degradation causes about 80% of observed problems. Generally,
operating mechanisms, bearings, linkages, and drive rods represent components that
experience most mechanical degradation problems. Gas, oil and air leakage also occur.
Newer breakers typically use simpler operating mechanisms and have seals and fittings that
minimize leaks.
Contacts, nozzles, and highly stressed components experience electrical-related degradation

and deterioration. Electrical defects that arise with aging include:
Loose primary and grounding connections;

Oil, air, SF6 contamination and/or leakage; and
Deterioration of concrete foundation affecting stability of breakers.
While indoor equipment and outdoor equipment generally have different long-term
degradation processes, some of the same principles apply to both. Most circuit breakers are
installed outdoors. When used in general purpose switching applications, this equipment
typically sits inactive for long periods. Such infrequent operation may result in stuck breaker
mechanisms and failures to operate when needed. Some utilities have implemented
rehabilitation programs that include replacement of critical components, other than breaker
tanks. After these rehabilitation activities, utilities generally give as good as new age
classifications to the remanufactured units.
The following sections describe degradation processes specific to each type of technology in
this asset class.
OCB Degradation
For OCBs, the interruption of load and fault currents involves the reaction of high pressure
with large volumes of hydrogen gas and other arc decomposition products. Thus, both
contacts and oil degrade more rapidly in OCBs than they do in either SF6 or vacuum designs,
especially when the OCB undergoes frequent switching operations. Generally, 4 to 8
interruptions with contact erosion and oil carbonisation will lead to the need maintenance,
including oil filtration. Since these breakers contain large volumes of oil, such maintenance
is costly.
Oil breakers also experience restrike when switching low load or line charging currents with
recovery voltage values. Sometimes this can lead to catastrophic breaker failures.
Oil circuit breakers generally require more maintenance than SF6 breakers. Oil circuit
breakers involved in switching operations have even higher maintenance needs.

Air Blast Circuit Breaker (ABCB) Degradation
Mechanically complex operations and constant high air pressure accelerate degradation in
ABCBs. Air leaks and moisture ingress through faulty seals and poorly maintained
compressed air systems typically result in problems for these breakers.
Corrosion often affects the bottom flanges of support insulators. Moisture may seep under
the flange causing corrosion that eventually allows more moisture to penetrate the air system.
Sometimes this can lead to major flashovers with catastrophic results.
Other components susceptible to corrosion include support insulator clamp fixing bolts used
to secure bottom flanges to steel support structures. In severe cases, corrosion of these bolts
can allow moisture to bridge the interface between the external and internal faces of the
flange. In time, and under freezing conditions when more moisture has crossed the interface,
insulators can crack from ice formation between flange faces.
The mechanical linkages of ABCB operating mechanisms may experience corrosion that can
cause link seizures. ABCBs with opening and closing resistors and resistor switching
assemblies are more complex than equivalently rated SF6 breakers. Breakers with these
components have more porcelain clad parts and operational linkages, leading to increased
degradation potential.
Oil leaks in head grading capacitors also raise end-of-life concerns for ABCBs. Older
versions are housed in porcelain bushings filled with insulating oil. Oil leaks allow moisture
to enter, leading to corrosion. Generally, refurbishing, resealing or refilling capacitor units is
not economically viable. Thus, utilities usually replace the complete unit when oil leaks
occur.
Utilities typically do not rely on condition assessments when planning capital programs for
ABCBs. Rather, many major North American utilities automatically rebuild ABCBs after 20
years of service. One utility undertook a major overhaul of certain types of ABCBs to
achieve an anticipated lifespan of 45 years. Some utilities are now considering ABCB exit
strategies because they have higher maintenance requirements than other breakers, especially
when frequent switching requirements exist. BCTC has identified several specific breaker-
types that must be replaced (ATB-80, 500 kV AT, and DEL PKs except PK6V) because of
basic design problems, lack of economically available spare parts, and the risks that they
pose to the system.
SF6 Circuit Breaker Degradation

Most of the high volume SF6 equipment managed by BCTC was installed between the 1970s
and late 1990s. SF6 circuit breakers rarely fail from internal degradation or insulation
breakdowns. When such failures do occur, they typically result from design or manufacture
deficiencies, and they happen early in the breakers life. There is little experience with
failures from long-term SF6 chamber degradation. However, failures have occurred on early
single pressure breaker designs used for MV system fault interruption in switching
applications for capacitor banks, arc furnaces, and boilers.

SF6 insulation systems are sensitive to enhanced stress caused by metal particles or other
protrusions on live parts. Metallic particles generated by moving metal parts in the tank can
accumulate and cause internal flashovers. Particle initiated failures do not appear age-
related, since the problem has occurred on relatively new breakers.
Low temperatures often found in Canada have caused operational problems and failures of
SF6 breakers. Most international testing standards for these breakers specify minimum
temperatures of -30 C, but many Canadian users require operation at -40 C. Some users
even specify temperatures as low as -55 C. Heaters and gas mixtures used to meet these low
temperature specifications create increased maintenance needs and operating costs. Now,
manufacturers have developed breakers that can operate using pure SF6 at temperatures down
to -40 C.
At low temperatures, early double pressure designs experience gas leaks as well as
mechanism and ancillary system problems, including failures. Single pressure designs also
may have gas leaks, with gas seals and valves presenting weak points. SF6 loss and the
ingress of moisture and air compromise breaker performance. Generally, earlier models have
more problems than later ones, since modern equipment has improved seal and valve
designs.
Many earlier SF6 breakers relied on hydraulic or pneumatic assisted mechanisms. These
mechanisms have contributed substantially to the higher failure rates associated with this
generation of equipment. Modern designs usually use spring or spring assisted mechanisms
that require less maintenance and have greater reliability.
SF6 is extremely stable. Even at high arcing temperatures limited SF6 breakdown occurs.
Also, with use of a suitable desiccant most breakdown products recombine to form SF6.
Consequently, SF6 breakers can operate under fault conditions much longer than OCBs or
ABCBs before needing maintenance. Manufacturers generally state that these breakers can
perform 20 to 50 operations at full rated fault levels before requiring maintenance.
Typically, average fault levels are closer to 30% of nameplate rating than 100%. Therefore,
these breakers can undergo more interruptions before needing maintenance than
manufacturers state.
Because of their high duty cycle capability, these breakers normally can withstand long
intervals between internal maintenance. Originally, manufacturers recommended internal
maintenance time ceilings of about 15 years. Some users have conducted pilot strip-downs
after about 15 years and reported pristine state conditions internally. Therefore, many
owners are reluctant to conduct expensive time consuming internal inspections, particularly
when breaker use is well below the manufacturers stated maximum and performance
remains satisfactory.
Many owners are considering extending their internal maintenance intervals. Owners also
are exploring the possibility of using condition monitoring or diagnostic testing to detect
internal degradation. Generally, condition monitoring is critical for repetitive special

purpose switching applications (e.g., capacitor bank switching) that have several hundred
operations per year.
Outages are needed to refill breakers after SF6 leaks occur. Some early double pressure
models have more leakage problems than later models, but these stem mainly from early
design and manufacturing issues. Early designs may need replacement of individual breakers
or breaker types if leaks become frequent. At this time, however, only certain failure-prone
breakers (e.g., double pressure designs) seem to present degradation and end-of-life
concerns.
SF6 maintenance normally includes external non-invasive inspections, pressure checks, leak
detection, and functional tests. SF6 breakers require much less maintenance than OCBs,
ABCBs, and AMCBs.
Recently, concerns have arisen about the greenhouse properties of SF6. It is one of the gases
specifically mentioned in the Kyoto Agreement. Canada has not issued regulations for SF6,
but has made a commitment to reduce the countrys overall greenhouse gas emissions.
Similarly, owners of SF6 equipment have taken responsibility to minimize SF6 emissions. As
such, owners have begun trying to attain emissions rates of about 0.5% by weight of the gas
contained in new equipment. Some have begun SF6 control programs that include detection,
leak remediation, and improved gas handling, plus recycling and reuse of gas from
decommissioned equipment. Some also have inventoried equipment and compiled databases
indicating SF6 usage. BCTC has identified several specific breaker-types that must be
replaced (ITE breakers 230 kV and above, and Westinghouse double pressure breakers type
WCL SF) because of basic design problems, lack of economically available spare parts, and
the risks that they pose to the system.
Condition Assessment Techniques for Circuit Breaker

Several assessment techniques and diagnostic tests exist to assess the condition of these
assets. Key techniques and tests are described below:
a) Visual
This equipment lends itself to visual inspections because key components are visible and
accessible. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion, evidence of
overheating, misalignment, plus cracks and leaks on bushings, support insulators, tanks,
enclosures, drives, linkages and fittings. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of
gaskets and seals as well as the degree of contact erosion on de-energized equipment, such as
vacuum breakers. Internal conditions, control components, and mechanism cabinets can be
inspected visually as well. Visual inspections serve as a start to condition assessment, but
they must be supplemented by detailed reviews of maintenance and test records.
b) Time/Travel Testing
This testing measures velocity, close and trip times, plus wipe and rebound. This test should
occur at regular intervals on all circuit breakers. It offers a way to evaluate a circuit

breakers mechanical condition and helps to ensure that mechanism/linkage performance
meets the manufacturers specifications.
c) Contact Resistance Testing

This test involves determining resistance in the main current carrying circuit by taking
measurements across each interrupter head with breaker closed. Resistance measurements
outside of predetermined values require further investigation. It also is important to review
trends in these measurements over time to see whether or not resistance values have
increased.
In addition to static tests, dynamic tests during circuit breaker operation enable one to see
where main and arcing contacts touch. Dynamic testing provides useful information when
extended arcing contact fingers exist.
d) Bushing Doble Test

This high voltage bridge test measures capacitance and loss angles of high voltage circuit
breaker bushings and other insulating components. Doble test results can be compared
directly to manufacturers standards or to results from similar equipment. Assessing trends
in Doble test results can help detect deterioration of bushings and other internal components
such as interrupters, operating rods, grading capacitors, and support insulators.
e) Stored Energy (Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge Time)

This test helps detect poor motor, pump, compressor and other operational conditions. It
involves measuring recharge times or pressure drops during operation.
f) Insulating Medium
Several tests are used to detect excess moisture, contaminants, and decomposition products in
oil, air and SF6 switchgear insulation systems.
g) SF6 Testing
In SF6 circuit breakers, gas is tested and monitored to assess its ability to serve satisfactorily
as a dielectric and interrupting medium. SF6 gas testing also offers a means to detect internal
degradation. Breakers also have continuous monitors for pressure and density. When these
monitors register deviations from predetermined levels, maintenance staff can take corrective
action. SF6 breakers also receive periodic testing to check moisture content, dew points, and
sometimes the presence of air and decomposition products.
1.3.2 End-of-Life Criteria and Condition Rating
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed transmission circuit breakers first required
developing end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion
represents a factor critical in determining the components condition relative to potential
failure.
The condition assessment and rating process included visual inspections and detailed reviews
of maintenance records and diagnostic test reports extracted from BCTCs asset management

system databases. In addition to maintenance histories, these databases contain information
about operating requirements and conditions, defects, failures, and spares. In assessing the
information available against end-of-life criteria, condition states were rated A through E.
For this asset class, letter condition ratings have the following general meanings:

requires attention;
and
E means the component has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Tables 1.3.1 through 1.3.63 list the end-of-life criteria considered for each asset class
member (e.g., OCBs, ABCBs, SF6 breakers, etc.). In addition, for each asset class member
the tables show the components and tests evaluated (e.g., bushing support insulators, Doble
test, tripping and closing, time/travel). The tables also contain specific definitions used for
each condition rating (i.e., A E) in the assessment of this asset class.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Bushings/Support Insulators are not broken and are free of chips, radial
cracks, flashover burns, copper splash and copper wash. Cementing and
fasteners are secure.
B Bushings/Support Insulators are not broken, however there are some minor
chips and cracks. No flashover burns or copper splash or copper wash.
Cementing and fasteners are secure.
C Bushings/Support Insulators are not broken, however there are some major
chips and cracks. Some evidence of flashover burns or copper splash or
copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged, or cementing or fasteners
are not secure.
E Bushings/Support Insulators, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged
beyond repair.
Table 1.3.1 Bushing Support Insulators Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any of the bushing-metal interfaces. No oil
leakage or water ingress at any of the flanges, manholes, covers, breathers,
pipes or gauges. Oil levels are acceptable.
B Minor oil leaks evident, no moisture ingress likely.
C Clear evidence of oil leaks but rate of loss is not likely to cause any
operational or environmental impacts
D Major oil leakage and probable moisture ingress at the bushings, or at one
other location indicate the immediate need for a major reconditioning or
replacement.
E Significant oil leakage and moisture ingress resulting in damage/degradation
beyond repair.
Table 1.3.2 Leaks
Condition
Description
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on main tank. No external or internal rust in cabinets.
No rust, corrosion or paint peeling on tanks or cabinets, sealing very
effective no evidence of moisture or insect ingress or condensation.
B No rust or corrosion on main tank, some evidence of slight moisture ingress
or condensation in mechanism box.
C Some rust and corrosion on both tank and on mechanism box, requires
corrective maintenance within the next several months.
D Significant corrosion on main tank and on mechanism box. Defective sealing
leading to water ingress and insects/rodent damage. Requires immediate
corrective action.
E Corrosion, water, insect or rodent damage or degradation beyond repair.
Table 1.3.3 Tank and Mechanism Box Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and switches all in good condition.
Operating mechanism, trip and close coils, relays, auxiliary switches, motors,
compressors, springs are all in good condition. No sign of overheating or
deterioration. Linkages, drive rods, trip latches are clean, lubricated, free from
cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction. Mechanical integrity of
dampers/dashpots, and oil levels, is acceptable. No visible evidence of poor
mechanism settings, looseness, loss of adjustment, excess bearing wear or
other out of tolerance operation.
B Normal signs of wear with respect to the above characteristics.
C One or two of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
D More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
E Control and mechanism components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.4 Control and Mechanism Components
Condition
Description
Rating
A Concrete foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling. Support steel
and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion. Ground connections are
direct to tank, cabinets, supports without any intervening paint or corrosion.
C One of the above characteristics is unacceptable.
D Two or more of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
E Foundation, supports or grounding are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.5 Foundation/Support Steel/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Breaker externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
connections are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating.
Number of breaker operations on counter, and run timer readings on auxiliary
motors, are below average range for age of breaker. Appears to be well
maintained with service records readily available.
E The circuit breaker is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.6 Overall CB Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Close travel, wipe, overtravel, rebound and time are all within specified
limits. Trip time and velocity are within specified limits. Trip free time is
within specified limits. Interpole close and trip contact time spread is within
specified limits for the specific application.
E Two or more of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be
brought into acceptable condition.
Table 1.3.7 Time Travel
Condition
Description
Rating
A Values well within specifications with high margins
B Values close to specification (little or no margin)
C Values do not meet specification (by a small amount)
D Values do not meet specification (by a significant margin)
E Values do not meet specification and cannot be brought into specification
condition.
Table 1.3.8 Contact Resistance
Condition
Description
Rating
A Within specification.
E Cannot be put to specification condition.
Table 1.3.9 Stored Energy (Air Tank/Spring Recharge Time)
Condition
Description
Rating
A No abnormal indications
B Some possible abnormal indications
C Definite indications of abnormal activity
D Definite indications of high levels of abnormal activity
E High levels of abnormal activity that cannot be brought into normal
condition.
Table 1.3.10 Oil Analysis

Condition
Description
Rating
chips and cracks. Some evidence of flashover burns or copper splash or copper
wash. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged or cementing or fasteners are
not secure.
beyond repair.
Table 1.3.11 Bushings/Support Insulators Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No air leakage at any of the bushing-metal interfaces, pressure vessel, heads
or piping interfaces, as determined by audible inspection, by inspection of
maintenance records, and inspection of pressure gauges (isolated from air
system).
B Minor air leakage as determined by audible inspection and maintenance
records
C Significant air leakage, not immediately critical to breaker operation and not
causing excessive compressor run times.
D Extensive leakage requiring unacceptable compressor operation and
requiring corrective maintenance or replacement in the near term.
E Extensive leakage and unacceptable compressor operation that is beyond
repair.
Table 1.3.12 Air Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
A No external or internal rust or corrosion on pressure vessels, heads, or on
control/mechanism box. No paint peeling on tanks or boxes.
Control/mechanism box sealing effective no evidence of moisture or insect
ingress or condensation.
B No rust or corrosion on pressure vessels, heads, some evidence of moisture
ingress into box. Paint beginning to peel.
C Some rust and pain peeling corrosion on both pressure vessels, heads and on
control/mechanism box. Requires corrective maintenance within the next
several months.
D Major corrosion on pressure vessels, heads and on control/mechanism box.
Requires immediate corrective action.
E Major corrosion beyond repair on pressure vessels, heads and
control/mechanism box
Table 1.3.13 Pressure Vessel/Heads and Control/Mechanism Box Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Operating mechanism, coils, relays, auxiliary switches, motors, compressors,
springs, all in good condition. No sign of overheating or deterioration.
E Control valves and mechanism box components are damaged/degraded
beyond repair.
Table 1.3.14 Control Valves and Mechanism Box Components

Condition
Description
Rating
A Resistors housings are externally clean, and are free of chips, radial cracks,
flashover burns, and corrosion free. No external evidence of overheating No
visible evidence of poor switch settings, looseness, loss of adjustment, excess
bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation. All primary connections are
in good condition
E Tripping and closing reactors are damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 1.3.15 Tripping and Closing Resistors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Verify from current inspection records that contact resistance and time/travel
(erosion and wipe) results were within tolerance. Check operation counter
and fault interruption log to verify subsequent duty is within specified limits.
D Two of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
E Drive Rods/Contacts/Blast Valves are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.16 Drive Rods/Contacts/Blast Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Capacitor housings are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks,
flashover burns. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
B Capacitor housings are not broken, however minor chips and/or cracks,
and/over flashover. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
C Capacitor housings are not broken, however major chips and/or cracks,
and/over flashover burns. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
D Capacitor housings are broken/damaged or cementing or fasteners are not
secure.
E Capacitor housings, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond
repair.
Table 1.3.17 Grading Capacitors Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
free of damage and corrosion and are made direct to Support insulator bases,
cabinets and support steel, without any intervening paint or corrosion.
E Foundation, supports, grounding are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Number of breaker operations on counter is below average range for age of
breaker. Appears to be well maintained with service records readily
available.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Close travel, wipe, overtravel, rebound and time for main contacts and
resistor switch contacts, are all within specified limits. Trip time and velocity
are within specified limits. Trip free time is within specified limits. Interpole
close and trip contact time spread is within specified limits for the specific
application.
Table 1.3.20 Time/Travel

Condition
Description
Rating
A Values well within specifications with significant margin
B Values within, but close to specification (little or no margin)
D Values do not meet specification by a significant margin
condition.
Condition
Description
Rating
D Values do not meet specification by a significant margin.
condition.
Table 1.3.22 Air Consumption Test (Isolated from HP Air System)
Condition
Description
Rating
A No abnormal indications, within specification
B High readings on moisture
C Probable indication of electrical activity - PD tracking on drive rods
D Definite indications of electrical activity - PD
E Levels of electrical activity that cannot be brought into specification
condition.
Table 1.3.23 Moisture Content

SF6 Breakers
Condition
Description
Rating
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged or cementing or fasteners
are not secure.
beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A No SF6 leakage at any of the bushing-metal interfaces, tank or piping
interfaces, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure gauge and SF6 refill
maintenance records
B Minor SF6 leakage, not more than 0.5%, per year, by weight, of the total
quantity of SF6 in the breaker, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure
gauge and refill maintenance records
C SF6 leakage of up to 1.5%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
the breaker, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure gauge and refill
maintenance records
D SF6 leakage of up to 2%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
maintenance records.
E SF6 leakage exceeding 2%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
Table 1.3.25 SF6 Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
A No external or internal rust in mechanism box. No paint peeling on tanks or
cabinets. Box sealing very effective no evidence of moisture or insect
or condensation in box
corrective action.
E Corrosion, water, insect or rodent damage or degradation beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and switches are all in good
condition. No blown fuses. Operating mechanism, trip and close coils, relays,
auxiliary switches, motors, compressors, springs, are all in good condition.
No sign of overheating or deterioration. Linkages, drive rods, trip latches are
clean, lubricated, free from cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction.
Mechanical integrity of dampers/dashpots, and oil levels, are acceptable. No
visible evidence of poor mechanism settings, looseness, loss of adjustment,
excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation.
E Control and mechanism box components are damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Table 1.3.27 Control and Mechanism Box Components

Condition
Description
Rating
E Contacts/nozzles/blast valves are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.28 Contacts/Nozzles/Blast Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
flashover burns. No signs of overheating, overpressure or leaks. Cementing
and fasteners are secure.
E Grading capacitors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
free of damage and corrosion and are made direct to tank, cabinets, supports
without any intervening paint or corrosion.
Table 1.3.30 Foundation/Support Steel/ Grounding Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
condition.

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 1.3.34 Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge Time
Condition
Description
Rating
A No abnormal indications, within IEC specification
B High readings on moisture, air or CF4
C Probable indication of electrical activity (decomposition by-products)
D Definite indications of electrical activity (decomposition by-products)
E High levels of abnormal activity that cannot be brought into normal
condition.
Table 1.3.35 Gas Analysis (decomposition by-products, moisture, air, etc. based on
evaluation provided with test report)
Vacuum Circuit Breakers
Condition Description
Rating
A Vacuum bottle areas free of contamination, chips, cracks, flashover burns, or
indications of overheating or PD traces. All cemented, elements are secure.
E Vacuum bottle areas are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.36 Vacuum Bottle Integrity

Rating
A Support Insulators and drive rods are clean, not broken and are free of chips,
cracks, flashover burns or PD traces. All cemented, epoxied or bolted fasteners
are secure.
B Support Insulators and drive rods are not broken, however there are some
minor chips and cracks. No flashover burns. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
C Support Insulators and drive rods are not broken, however there are some
major chips and cracks. Some evidence of flashover burns. Cementing and
D Support insulators and drive rods are broken/damaged or cementing or
fasteners are not secure.
E Support insulators and drive rods, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged
beyond repair.
Table 1.3.37 Support and Drive Insulators
Rating
A No external or internal rust or corrosion. No evidence of moisture or insect
ingress or condensation. Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and
switches all in good condition. Trip and close coils, relays, auxiliary switches,
motors, springs are all in good condition.
Linkages, shafts, rods, trip latches are clean, free from cracks, distortion,
abrasion or obstruction. No visible evidence of poor mechanism settings,
looseness, loss of adjustment, excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance
operation. No sign of overheating or deterioration.
E Mechanism cabinet and components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.38 Mechanism Cabinet and Components

Rating
A Bushings are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks, flashover burns,
copper splash and copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
B Bushings are not broken, however there are some minor chips and cracks. No
flashover burns or copper splash or copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
C Bushings are not broken, however there are some major chips and cracks. Some
evidence of flashover burns or copper splash or copper wash. Cementing and
D Bushings are broken/damaged, cementing or fasteners are not secure.
E Bushings, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond repair.
Table 1.3.39 Bushings Condition (Breaker-in-a-Box Type)
Rating
A Floor is level. Support steel and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion.
Ground connections are free of damage and corrosion and are made direct to
enclosure, cabinets; supports without any intervening paint or corrosion.
E Enclosure/truck or grounding is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.40 Enclosure/Truck/Grounding Condition
Rating
A Breaker externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary connections
are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or restriking on vacuum
bottle. Number of breaker operations on counter is below average range for age of
breaker. Appears to be well maintained with service records readily available..

Rating
A Close travel, rebound and time are all within specified limits. Trip time and
velocity are within specified limits. Trip free time is within specified limits
E Two or more of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be brought
into acceptable condition.
Rating
condition.
Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers
Rating
A Arc chutes are clean and are free of chips, cracks, flashover burns. Fasteners are
secure.
B Arc chutes are clean, however there are some minor chips and cracks. No flashover
burns. Fasteners are secure.
C Arc chutes are not broken, however there are some major chips and cracks. Some
evidence of flashover burns or tracking. Fasteners are secure.
D Arc chutes are broken/damaged beyond repair or are not field repairable. Fasteners
are not secure.
E Arc chutes or fasteners are are broken/damaged beyond repair.
Table 1.3.44 Arc Chute Condition

Rating
A Support Insulators and drive rods are clean, not broken and are free of chips,
cracks, flashover burns or PD traces. All cemented, epoxied or bolted fasteners are
secure.
B Support Insulators and drive rods are not broken, however there are some minor
chips and cracks. No flashover burns. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
C Support Insulators and drive rods are not broken, however there are some major
chips and cracks. Some evidence of flashover burns. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
D Support Insulators and drive rods are broken/damaged, or cementing or fasteners
are not secure.
E Support Insulators, drive rods, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged or
degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.45 Support and Drive Insulators
Rating
A No external or internal rust or corrosion. No evidence of moisture or insect ingress
or condensation. Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and switches all in
good condition. Trip and close coils, relays, auxiliary switches, motors, springs are
all in good condition.
Linkages, shafts, rods, trip latches are clean, free from cracks, distortion, abrasion
or obstruction. No visible evidence of poor mechanism settings, looseness, loss of
adjustment, excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation. No sign of
overheating or deterioration.
E Mechanism cabinet and components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.46 Mechanism Cabinet and Components

Rating
A Arc chutes are clean, free from damage, overheating and tracking. Arcing and main
contacts are in good condition with no erosion Verify from current INSP records
that contact resistance and time/travel results were within tolerance. Operation
counter and fault interruption log indicates duty is within specified limits.
E Two of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be brought into
acceptable condition.
Table 1.3.47 Condition of Contacts
Rating
A Floor is level. Support steel and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion.
Floor is level. Ground connections are free of damage and corrosion and are made
direct to enclosure, cabinets; supports without any intervening paint or corrosion.
E Enclosure/truck or grounding is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 1.3.48 Enclosure/Truck/Grounding Condition
Rating
A Breaker externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary connections
are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or restriking on arc
chutes. Number of breaker operations on counter is below average range for age of
breaker. Appears to be well maintained with service records readily available.

Rating
A Close travel, wipe, overtravel, rebound and time are all within specified limits. Trip
time and velocity are within specified limits. Trip free time is within specified
limits.
E Two or more of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be brought
Rating
condition.
1.3.3 Health Index Formulation

For purposes of formulating the Health Index for this asset class, the letter condition ratings
listed above also received the following numbers shown as factors in Tables 1.3.52
1.3.56 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
For each asset class member (e.g., OCBs, ABCBs, SF6 breakers), the components and tests
shown in the tables above were weighted based on their importance in determining the class
members end-of-life. For example, those that relate to primary functions of the

component/asset received higher weights than those that relate to more ancillary features and
functions.
The weighted scores were totalled for each asset class member.
Totalled scores were used in calculating final Health Indices for each asset class member.
For each member, the Health Index calculation involved dividing its total condition score by
its maximum condition score, then multiplying by 100. This step normalizes scores by
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an OCB in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded OCB would
have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for OCBs in Table 1.3.52
below, assume an OCB with partial data has a maximum condition score of 82 out of the
Health Index maximum possible score of 120. That OCB, therefore, has only 68% of the
maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that OCB
with partial data had a maximum condition score of 92, it would have 77% of the Health
Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
For some members of this asset classes, available data were insufficient to provide a valid
Health Index using the 70% Rule described above. In such cases, to provide BCTC with
some information about the assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off
(i.e., the 50% Rule). Thus, if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal
to 50% of the maximum possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and
presented in the results.
Table 1.3.52 1.3.56 show the component/test condition criteria, weightings, condition
ratings as both letters and numbers (i.e., the Factors column), plus the total possible
maximum score for each member of this asset class.

Oil Circuit Breaker Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Condition Criteria Rating Score
1 Bushing/Support Insulators 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Leaks 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Tank and Mechanical Box 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Control & Mechanism
4 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Components
Foundation Support
5 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
6 Overall CB Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
7 Time/Travel 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
8 Contact Resistance 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
9 Stored Energy 2 A,E 4,0 8
10 Oil Analysis 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Note : Formula is the same for all types of OCBs Max Score = 120 HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 1.3.52 Health Index Formulation for Oil Circuit Breakers
Air Blast Circuit Breaker Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Bushings/Support Insulators 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Air Leaks 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Pressure Vessel/Heads and
3 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Control/Mechanism Box
Control Valves and Mechanism
4 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Box Components
5 Tripping & Closing Resistors 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Drive Rods/Contacts/Blast
6 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Valves
7 Grading Capacitors 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Foundation/Support
8 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
Air Consumption Test (Isolated
12 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
from HP Air System)
13 Moisture Content 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Max Score = 148 HI = 100*Score/Max
Note. In case of obsolete breakers (of type ATB-80, 500 kV AT and DEL PKs except PK6V) divide HI by 2
Table 1.3.53 Health Index Formulation for Air Blast Circuit Breakers

SF6 Circuit Breaker Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
2 SF6 Leaks 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
3 Tank and Mechanism Box 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
4 Control & Mechanism Components 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Contacts/Nozzles/Blast Valves
5 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition
Foundation/Support
7 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
9 Time Travel 3 A,E 4,0 12
Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge
11 2 A,E 4,0 8
Time
12 Gas Analysis 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Note. In case of obsolete breakers (ITE breakers 230 kV and above, and Westinghouse double pressure breakers type WCL
SF) divide HI by 2
Table 1.3.54 Health Index Formulation for SF6 Circuit Breakers
# Vacuum Circuit Breaker Weight Condition Factors Maximum

1 Vacuum Bottle Integrity 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Support and Drive Insulators 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Mechanisms Cabinet and
3 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Components
Bushings
4 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
(i.e., Bushings-in-a-Box)
5 Enclosure/Truck/Grounding 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Table 1.3.55 Health Index Formulation for Vacuum Circuit Breakers

Air Magnetic Circuit Breaker Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Arc Chutes 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Support and Drive Insulators 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Mechanism Cabinet and
3 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 6
Components
4 Contacts 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Enclosure/Truck/Grounding 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Table 1.3.56 Health Index Formulation for Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers
1.3.4 Health Index Scale
After performing all of the steps described above, the Health Index scale shown in
Table 1.3.57 was used to determine the overall condition of the circuit breaker asset class.
Health
Index
of components
70 - 85 Good
components
50 - 70 Fair deterioration of specific depending on criticality
components
0 - 30 Very Poor
Table 1.3.57 Circuit Breaker Health Index Scale

1.4 Health Index Results and Condition Assessment
1.4.1 Condition Rating and Health Index Results
As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for each type of circuit
breaker in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 summarize the
results, which are also illustrated in Figures 1.4.1 through 1.4.6.
Health Index
Air Blast Vacuum Air Magnetic
Results Oil CBs SF6 CBs * Sum
CBs CBs * CBs*
Classification
Very Good 31 8 82 0 0 121
Good 184 49 93 6 2 334
Fair 35 1 1 0 0 37
Poor 0 46 40 0 0 86
Very Poor 0 0 3 0 0 3
Total Results 250 104 219 6 2 581
Based on Field
Survey
Percentage of 51.4 55.6 56.2 100 22.2 53.9
Total
Population
Surveyed
*HIs were calculated using the 50% Rule instead of the 70% Rule due to insufficient data 1
Table 1.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Circuit Breakers
Health Index
Vacuum Air Magnetic
Results Oil CBs Air Blast CBs SF6 CBs Sum
CBs CBs *
Classification
Very Good 60 14 146 0 2 222
Good 358 88 166 6 6 624
Fair 68 2 2 0 1 73
Poor 0 83 71 0 0 154
Very Poor 0 0 5 0 0 5
Total 486 187 390 6 9 1,078
* Results extrapolated from surveyed distribution assets due to unreliable transmission data
Table 1.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Rating Results for Circuit Breakers
1
See subsection 1.3.3 above for a description of the 70% and 50% Rules used in this study.

400 358
350
Oil Circuit Breakers 300
Number of
250
200
150
100 68 60
50
0 0
0
Very Poor Poor Fair Good Very Good
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Health Index Categories
Figure 1.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Oil Circuit Breakers
100 88
83
90
80
70
Number of
60
50
40
30
20 14
10 0 2
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 1.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Air Blast Circuit Breakers

180 166
Number of SF6 Breakers

160 146
140
120
100
80 71
60
40
20 5 2
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 1.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for SF6 Circuit Breakers
7
6
Vacuum Circuit Breakers
6
5
Number of
4
3
2
1
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 1.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Vacuum Circuit Breakers

Air Magnetic Circuit Breakers
7 6
6
5
Number of
4
3 2
2
1
1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 1.4.5 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Air Magnetic Circuit
Breakers
700 624
600
Circuit Breakers
500
Number of
400
300 222
200 154
73
100
5
0
Figure 1.4.6 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for All Circuit Breakers

1.4.2 Condition Assessment Conclusions
78.5% of Circuit Breakers are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

improvements are expected in the near term.
6.8% of Circuit Breakers are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital
improvements may be required depending on criticality issues.
14.3% of Circuit Breakers are in Poor condition. Planning for refurbishment or
replacement is needed considering risk and consequences of failure.
0.5% of Circuit Breakers are in Very Poor condition or at their end-of-life.

2.0 Disconnect Switches
2.1 Description
Under normal operating conditions, disconnect switches isolate various other equipment
from system voltages. The BCTC-managed transmission system has 4,198 disconnect
switches.
Several configurations and ratings exist for specific applications of these switches. They
have continuous current ratings up to 4000 A. Configurations include vertical and horizontal
break, pantograph, side break and center break.
Typically, systems of 230 kV and below use three-phase group assemblies, while extra-high
voltage levels use single-phase assemblies. All transmission switches operate as three-phase
assemblies with either mechanical or electrical ganging.
Outdoor air-insulated disconnect switches typically consist of manual or motor operated

isolating devices mounted on support insulators and metal support structures. Many high
voltage disconnect switches (e.g., line and transformer isolating switches) have motor-
operators and the capability of remote-controlled operation. Almost all 500 kV switches
have motor-operators.
Disconnect switches have limited current-breaking capability. They normally operate off-
load (i.e., the associated breaker is opened first) and have little rated interruption capability.
Since their historical uses have involved only low-level currents, disconnect switches have
seldom received testing or nameplate interruption ratings. Occasionally, to aid in current
interruption, users may add arcing horns, whips and other arc control devices.
2.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 4,198 disconnect switches.

Table 2.2.1 shows the number of disconnect switches grouped by voltage level and age
group. The 60 kV, 138 kV, 230 kV and 500 kV levels contain most of the disconnect
switches, with 28.3%, 19.5%, 25% and 18.5% respectively. The 360 kV level has very few
disconnect switches with only 0.6% of the total number.
Table 2.2.1 also shows that 51.3% of the disconnect switches are in the age range of 20 to 29
years and 23.2% are within the age range of 30 to 39 years. Only 0.6% of the disconnect
switches with identified age data were commissioned more than 40 years ago.

Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 15 95 39 41 0 82 272 6.5
10 to 19 47 100 155 103 0 75 480 11.4
Age Group
20 to 29 166 479 327 602 17 563 2,154 51.3

30 to 39 25 459 187 240 6 55 972 23.2
40 to 49 1 9 1 3 2 0 16 0.4
50 plus 2 7 0 0 0 0 9 0.2
incomplete 82 38 110 60 2 3 295 7.0
Total 338 1,187 819 1,049 27 778 4,198 100.0
Percent 8.1 28.3 19.5 25.0 0.6 18.5 100.0
Table 2.2.1 Count of Disconnect Switches Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Generally, disconnect switches have no preset life expectancy. Assuming normal operating
conditions, users can expect 40 to 50 years of life from a disconnect switch. As described
below, many factors can contribute to the degradation of switch components. These include
harsh environmental conditions, infrequent operation, corrosion, lubrication failure, and
design problems. In addition, the lack of supply or manufacturer support for older designs
may drive end-of-life decisions for certain types of disconnect switch.
BCTC has a preventative maintenance program to detect and correct defects and developing
faults in disconnect switches. It is based on Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
techniques. BCTCs Maintenance Standards contain maintenance procedures for specific
types of disconnect switches. BCTC conducts major inspections and overhauls of disconnect
switches every 8-years. The utility also performs contact resistance tests and blade angular
motion checks on that same 8-year interval. BCTC conducts Thermograph tests on a six-
month basis. In conformance with its maintenance standards, BCTC also periodically
inspects, tests, and exercises components such as operating rods, linkages, support insulators
and disconnect blades. BCTC also has an ongoing rebuild program for disconnect
switches such as Kearney/ITE switches.
Failure Modes
Disconnect switches commonly fail due to the following:
Bearing failures;
High contact resistance at hinge or jaw ends;
Misalignment of isolating blades causing closing operation failures;
Support insulator failures; and

Lubrication failures.
In Canada, low temperatures and high ice accumulation have caused in-service problems and
failures of disconnect switches. Generally, international test standards applied to most
switches do not account for the low ambient temperatures found in Canada. Similarly,
Canadian icing conditions generally exceed those used for international testing.
Degradation and End-of-Life Issues

Disconnect switches have many moving parts that are subject to wear and operational stress.
Except for parts contained in motor-operator cabinets, switch components are exposed to the
ambient environment. Thus, environmental factors, along with operating conditions, vintage,
design, and configuration all contribute to switch degradation. Critical degradation processes
include corrosion, moisture ingress, ice formation, and a combination of these factors that
may result in permanent damage to major components such as contacts, blades, bearings,
drives and support insulators.
Generally, the following represent key end-of-life factors for disconnect switches:
Decreasing reliability, availability, and maintainability;

Maintenance overhaul requirements;
Obsolete design, lack of parts and service support; and
Switch age.
Application criticality and manufacturer also play key roles in determining the end-of-life for
disconnect switches. Generally, absent a major burnout, widespread deterioration of live
components, support insulators, motor-operators, and drive linkages define the end-of-life for
these switches. However, routine maintenance programs usually provide ample opportunity
to assess switch condition and viability.
Disconnect switches have components fabricated from dissimilar materials, and use of these
different materials influences degradation. For example, blade, hinge and jaw contacts may
consist of combinations of copper, aluminum, silver and stainless steel, several of which have
tin, silver and chrome plating. Further switch bases may consist of galvanized steel or
aluminum.
Most disconnect switches have porcelain support and rotating insulators. The porcelain
offers rigidity, strength and dielectric characteristics needed for reliability. However,
excessive deflection or deformation of support or rotating stack insulators can cause blade
misalignment and other problems, resulting in operational failures.
Disconnect switches must have the ability to open and close properly even with heavy ice
build-up on their blades and contacts. However, these switches may sit idle for several
months or more. This infrequent operation may lead to corrosion and water ingress damage,
increasing the potential for component seizures. Bearings commonly seize from poor

lubrication and sealing, despite manufacturers claims that such components are sealed,
greaseless and maintenance-free for life.
Normally, when blades enter or leave jaw contacts, they rotate to clean accumulated ice from
contact surfaces. To accomplish this, hinge ends have rotating or other current transfer
contacts. These contacts are often simple, long-life copper braids. However, some switches
have more complex rotating contacts in grease-filled chambers. Without proper maintenance
these more complex switches may degrade, causing blade failures.
Condition Assessment Techniques

The following generic techniques and diagnostic tests provide information about the
condition of disconnect switches:
a) Visual
Visual inspections can detect deterioration of the switch assembly. They also can find
external contamination, corrosion, evidence of overheating, and misalignment, as well as
cracks and leaks on insulators, disconnect blades, contacts, high voltage connections, motor
operator cabinets and power trains. Visual inspections must be supplemented by records
reviews.
b) Time to Close/Open
Time to close and open checks verify the correct operation of control circuitry, linkages, gear
reducers, motor operators, rotating insulator columns and blades.
c) Contact Resistance
Contact resistance tests verify the correct operation of rotating transfer and jaw contacts.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed disconnect switches first required
failure.

requires attention;

and
repair.
Tables 2.3.1 through 2.3.9 list the end-of-life criteria considered for each component or test
evaluated for this asset class. The tables also contain the specific definitions used for each
condition rating (i.e., A E) in the assessment of this asset class.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Support /Drive Insulators are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks,
flashover burns, copper splash and copper wash. Cementing and fasteners
are secure.
B Support/Drive Insulators are not broken, however there are some minor chips
and cracks. No flashover burns or copper splash or copper wash. Cementing
C Support/Drive Insulators are not broken, however there are some major chips
and cracks. Some evidence of flashover burns or copper splash or copper
D Support/Drive Insulators are broken/damaged or cementing or fasteners are
not secure.
E Support/Drive Insulators, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond
repair.
Table 2.3.1 Support/Drive Insulators
Condition
Description
Rating
cabinets, sealing effective no evidence of moisture or insect ingress or
condensation. Box securely fixed to support steel.
Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and switches all in good condition.
Operating motor, coils, relays auxiliary switches, position indicators, and
counters all in good condition. No sign of overheating or deterioration.
B No rust or corrosion on box, some evidence of slight moisture ingress or
condensation in mechanism box.
C Some rust and corrosion on interior and exterior of mechanism box.
D Significant corrosion on mechanism box. Defective sealing leading to water
ingress and insect damage.
E Mechanism box corroded beyond repair or water/insect damage/degradation
beyond repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Linkages, levers, shafts, pipes, couplers, gear boxes, stops are clean, well
lubricated, free from corrosion, cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction. All
fasteners are tight. No visible evidence of poor settings, stops/toggle,
operation.
C One of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
E Gear box, reducers or guides damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 2.3.3 Gear Box, Reducers and Guides
Condition
Description
Rating
A Verify that disconnect blades are not miss-aligned; exhibit no excessive
corrosion, or erosion especially at the jaw ends. Contact engagement is within
tolerance. Verify that current transfer braids/rotating contacts at the hinge end
are not showing any signs of overheating. Verify that all moving and bearing
surfaces, contacts, trunions, bearings etc. are well lubricated.
E Blades, contacts, counterbalances or links damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 2.3.4 Blades, Contacts, Counterbalances, Links
Condition
Description
Rating
A All connectors are tight, free from corrosion and show no sign of overheating.
Live conductors are adequately supported and impose no excessive loading
on switch during normal or fault current carrying duty.
E Connectors or conductors have failed or are damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Table 2.3.5 Live Connectors and Conductors

Condition
Description
Rating
A Concrete foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling. Support
steel and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion. All ground
connectors are tight, free from corrosion and show no sign of overheating.
Ground connections are free of mechanical damage and are made directly to
boxes, operating pipes and supports without any intervening paint or
corrosion.
Table 2.3.6 Foundation/Support Steel/Grounding
Condition
Description
Rating
A Switch externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
Appears to be well maintained with service records readily available..
E Disconnect switch as failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 2.3.7 Overall Disconnect Switch Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Equipment cannot be put to specification condition
Table 2.3.8 Thermograph Test

Condition
Description
Rating

listed above also received the following numbers shown as factors in Table 2.3.10 below.
A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
For this asset class, the components and tests shown in the tables above were weighted based
on their importance in determining the class members end-of-life. For example, those that
relate to primary functions of the component or asset received higher weights than those that
relate to more ancillary features and functions.
Totaled scores were used in calculating final Health Indices for each asset class component.
For each component, the Health Index calculation involved dividing its total condition score
by its maximum condition score, then multiplying by 100. This step normalizes scores by
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a disconnect
switch in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded
switch would have a Health Index of 0.

equal to 70% of the maximum possible condition score for a full data set. For example,
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for Disconnect Switches in Table 2.3.10
below, assume a disconnect switch with partial data has a maximum condition score of 67
out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 112. That disconnect switch, therefore,
has only 60% of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other
hand, if that disconnect switch with partial data had a maximum condition score of 80, it
would have 71% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
Tables 2.3.10 shows the component/test condition criteria, weightings, condition ratings as
both letters and numbers (i.e., the Factors column), plus the total possible maximum score
for each member of this asset class.
Disconnect Switches Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Support/Drive Insulators 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Control and Mechanism Box
2 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Components
3 Gear Box, Reducers and Guides 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Blades, Contacts,
4 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Counterbalances, Links
5 Live Connectors and Conductors 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
Overall Disconnect Switch
7 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Condition
8 Thermograph Test 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Max Score = 112
HI = 100*Score/Max
1
* If Disconnect Switch insulators are cap and pin then the HI is divided by 2
Table 2.3.10 Health Index Formulation for Disconnect Switches
Table 2.3.11 was used to determine the overall condition of the disconnect switch asset class.
1
Note: Health Index Formulation presented in Table 2.3.10 above states that the HI should be divided by 2 for
disconnect switches with cap and pin insulators. No data were available to indicate the presence of cap and pin
insulators, so the HI was not divided by 2.

Health
Index
of components
70 - 85 Good
components
components
0 - 30 Very Poor
Table 2.3.11 Disconnect Switch Health Index Scale
As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for disconnect switches in
the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 summarize the results,
which are also illustrated in Figure 2.4.1.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Switches
Very Good 7
Good 448
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total Results Based on Field Survey 455
Percentage of Total Population Surveyed 10.8
Table 2.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Disconnect Switches

Health Index Results Classification Number of Switches
Very Good 65
Good 4,133
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total 4,198
Table 2.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Rating Results for Disconnect

Switches
4,500
4,133
4,000
Disconnect Switches
3,500
3,000
Number of
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500 0 0 0 65
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 2.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Disconnect Switches
All disconnect switches are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements are
expected in the near term.

3.0 Circuit Switchers
3.1 Description
Generally, circuit switchers consist of motor operated, three-phase, load carrying and
interrupting devices mounted on support insulators and metal support structures. Some also
may incorporate disconnect blades for isolating purposes. Several manufacturers have
produced circuit switchers including ABB, Alsthom, Joslyn, Siemens, Westinghouse and
S&C Electric, the predominant supplier for many years. The BCTC-managed transmission
system currently has 120 S & C circuit switchers.
Typically, circuit switchers incorporate some or all of the following:
Support insulators and interrupter chamber

Disconnect switch
Motor operator
Drive train assembly
Support structure
Circuit switcher interrupters include air, vacuum and SF6. Normally, SF6 interrupters are
used at higher voltages. The SF6 interrupters were first developed and installed in the late
1960s. Some of the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) no longer supply or support
the older SF6 interrupters. BCTC has an active program for replacing 500 kV S&C circuit
switchers with circuit breakers that will be completed in 2010. Retired circuit switchers are in
some cases modified for use as disconnect switches.
Circuit switchers typically can carry and break loads ranging from 600 A to 4000 A. They
are used in medium-, high- and extra-high voltage applications. Circuit switchers have
limited fault interruption capability. Their primary duty involves load current switching.
Occasionally, however, they serve as protection devices for transformers, underground cables
and other equipment in locations that experience low short circuit levels. Sometimes their
uses include shunt capacitor and shunt reactor switching. In general, circuit switchers offer a
low cost alternative to the more commonly used circuit breaker and disconnect switch
combination. Recently, to compete with the circuit switcher market, some US manufacturers
have marketed a live tank SF6 breaker-disconnect switch package with a common support
structure.
3.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 120 circuit switchers. Table 3.2.1
shows the number of circuit switchers grouped by voltage level and age group. The 138 kV
voltage level has 40.8% of the total population of circuit switchers, the most found in any
single voltage level. The 60 kV level has 21.7%, the 500 kV level has 19.2%, the 230 kV
level has 17.5% and the less than 25 kV level has 0.8% of the systems circuit switchers. The
360 kV level has no circuit switchers.

Table 3.2.1 also shows that 65.8% of the circuit switchers are within the age range of 20 to
29 years old and that 23.3% are within the age range of 30 to 39 years old. None of the
circuit switchers were commissioned more than 40 years ago.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 0 1 3 0 0 4 3.3
10 to 19 0 1 3 2 1 7 5.8
Age Group
20 to 29 1 18 26 12 22 79 65.8
30 to 39 0 6 15 7 0 28 23.3
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 0 2 0 0 2 1.7
Total 1 26 49 21 23 120 100.0
Percent 0.8 21.7 40.8 17.5 19.2 100.0
Table 3.2.1 Count of Circuit Switchers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Degradation processes for circuit switchers depend on their vintage, design and
configuration. However, all circuit switchers degrade in ways similar to the degradation of
live tank SF6 circuit breakers and disconnect switches. See Chapters 1 and 2 of this report
for detailed degradation reviews of these breakers and switches. This section highlights
specific degradation features of circuit switchers.
Circuit switchers have many moving parts that are subject to wear and stress. They
frequently make and break high currents and experience the arcing that accompanies
such operations. While this asset class consists of several different technologies, they have
many degradation issues in common. For example, all circuit switchers undergo some
contact degradation every time they open to interrupt an arc. Also, the mechanical energy
needed to create the high contact velocities of these assets adds mechanical deterioration to
their degradation processes. The rate and severity of circuit switcher degradation depends on
many factors, including the quality of the switcher, its particular duties, and its operating
environment. International studies on switching equipment longevity identified the
following key end-of-life factors for this asset class:


Circuit switcher age.
Reliability, application criticality and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) support all
affect the longevity of some switcher types and ratings. For example, the OEM S&C once
made 500 kV switchers used by BCTC for switching shunt reactors. However, S&C no
longer makes or supports these circuit switchers, effectively ending the life of existing
switchers when they need replacement parts. Switchers also may sustain operational damage
too impractical or costly to repair, thereby ending their lives. Widespread gas leaks and
deterioration of operating mechanisms, drive linkages, brains, supporting structures, and
ancillary components like bushings and insulators also end the life of circuit switchers.
Regular maintenance offers frequent opportunities to assess the condition and viability of
switchers in a system. BCTC has a preventative maintenance program to detect and correct
defects and developing faults in circuit switchers. It is based on Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) techniques. BCTCs Maintenance Standards contain procedures for
maintaining specific types of circuit switchers. In conformance with its maintenance
standards, BCTC performs periodic inspections, maintenance and testing of operating
mechanisms, rods and linkages, brain mechanisms, porcelain housings, support insulators
and disconnect blades. The utility also conducts contact resistance and grading resistor tests
at regular intervals. Many switcher designs, however, have interrupters that are sealed for
life, making them inaccessible for regular inspection and maintenance.
In the late 1960s, circuit switchers with SF6 gas interrupters were developed. After initial
design and manufacturing problems they gained widespread acceptance as low cost
switching and protection devices. Many initial failures occurred, but these early switchers
remained acceptable for less critical applications. Common early design failure resulted
from:
SF6 gas leaks;

Water ingress into switcher brains causing interrupter failures, particularly under
freezing conditions;
Failure to complete opening or closing operations resulting in failure of interrupters
and isolating blades; and
Failure of interrupter grading resistors.
Even in new SF6 circuit switchers, leaks occur because the equipment operates at relatively
high pressures. Switchers with interrupters sealed for life have pressure indicators that must
have visual inspections every 2 months. Because these indicators are at line potential, they
cannot be connected to substations annunciation systems.

indicating SF6 usage.
Condition Assessment Techniques for Circuit Switchers

a) Visual
Circuit switchers have visible and accessible assemblies that make visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections help detect external contamination, corrosion, and evidence of
overheating, misalignment, and cracks or leaks on insulator and interrupter housings, SF6
pressure indicators, disconnect blades, high voltage connections, motor mechanisms, cabinets
and power trains. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals.
Visual inspections serve as a start to condition assessment, but they must be supplemented by
detailed reviews of maintenance and test records.
b) Contact Resistance Testing

This test involves determining resistance in the main current carrying circuit by taking
measurements across each interrupter head with switchgear closed. Resistance
measurements outside of predetermined values require further investigation. It also is
important to review trends in these measurements over time to see whether or not resistance
values have increased.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed circuit switchers first required developing
end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a
factor critical in determining the components condition relative to potential failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Insulators porcelains are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks,
flashover burns, copper splash and copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
B Insulators porcelains are not broken, however there are some minor chips
C Insulators porcelains are not broken, however there are some major chips
D Insulators porcelains are broken/damaged, or cementing or fasteners are not
secure.
E Insulators porcelains, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond.
Table 3.3.1 Insulators Porcelains Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
interfaces, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure indicator.
B Minor SF6 leakage at bushing-metal interfaces, tank or piping interfaces, as
determined by inspection of SF6 pressure indicator.
C Moderate SF6 leakage at bushing-metal interfaces, tank or piping interfaces,
as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure indicator.
D Major SF6 leakage at bushing-metal interfaces, tank or piping interfaces, as
determined by inspection of SF6 pressure indicator.
E Complete loss of pressure.

Condition
Description
Rating
Operating motor, coils, relays, shunt trip (if applicable), auxiliary switches,
position indicators, and counters all in good condition. No sign of overheating
or deterioration.
E Switch motor operator components damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 3.3.3 Switch Motor Operator
Condition
Description
Rating
condensation. Box securely fixed to support steel
or condensation in
C Some rust and corrosion on interior and exterior of mechanism box, requires
ingress and insect damage. Requires immediate corrective action.
E Control and mechanism box corroded beyond repair or water/insect damage
beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Linkages, levers, shafts, pipes, couplers, gearboxes, stops are clean, free from
corrosion, cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction. All fasteners are tight.
No visible evidence of poor settings, stops/toggle, looseness, loss of
adjustment, excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation.
E Power train and brain components damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 3.3.5 Power Train and Brain Operation

Condition
Description
Rating
A Verify that disconnect blades are not miss-aligned, exhibits no excessive
corrosion, or erosion especially at the fault closing (jaw) end. Contact
engagement is within tolerance.
E Disconnect blades or contacts damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 3.3.6 Disconnect Live Parts Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Line conductors are adequately supported and impose no excessive loading
on switcher during normal or fault interrupting duty.
E Connectors or conductors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 3.3.7 Connectors and Conductor Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from distortion and corrosion. Ground
connections are free of damage and corrosion and are made direct to cabinet
and supports without any intervening paint or corrosion
E Foundation, supports and grounding damaged/degraded beyond repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Switcher externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
Number of operations on counter is below average range for age of switcher.
Appears to be well maintained with service records readily available.
E Circuit switcher has failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 3.3.9 Overall Switcher Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Close travel and time of interrupter and disconnect blade, are all within
specified limits. Trip time and velocity, with/without shunt trip are within
specified limits. Interpole spreads are within limits.
brought into acceptable limits.
Condition
Description
Rating
E Equipment cannot be put to specification condition.


A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2,
D = 1, and
E = 0.
Totalled scores were used in calculating final Health Indices for each asset class component.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a circuit switcher
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded circuit
switcher would have a Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for circuit switchers in Table 3.3.12
below, assume a circuit switcher with partial data has a maximum condition score of 90 out
of the Health Index maximum possible score of 132. That switcher, therefore, has only 68%
of the maximum Health Index score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other
hand, if that switcher with partial data had a maximum condition score of 96, it would have
73% of the maximum and a valid Health Index.
Table 3.3.12 shows the component/test condition criteria, weightings, and condition ratings
as both letters and numbers (i.e., the Factors column), plus the total possible maximum
score for each member of this asset class.

Circuit Switchers Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Insulators/Porcelains 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 16
2 SF6 Leaks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 12
3 Switch Motor Operator 2 A, E 4,0 8
4 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 8
Components
5 Power Train and Brain Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 16
6 Disconnect Live Parts 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 12
7 Connectors and Conductors 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 12
Foundation/Support
8 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
9 Overall Switcher Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 16
10 Time/Travel 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 8
11 Contact Resistance 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2.1,0 12
Max Score= 132 HI = 100*Score/Max
* If number of operations today is 3250 or greater the HI is divided by 4 (based on reaching 4000 operation
within next 5 years)
Table 3.3.12 Health Index Formulation for Circuit Switchers
Table 3.3.13 was used to determine the overall condition of the circuit switcher asset class.
Health
Index
of components
70 - 85 Good
components
components
0 - 30 Very Poor
Table 3.3.13 Health Index Scale for Circuit Switchers

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for circuit switchers in the
BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 summarize the results, which
are also illustrated in Figure 3.4.1.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Switchers
Very Good 3
Good 48
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 1
Table 3.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Circuit Switchers
Health Index Results Classification Number of Switchers
Very Good 7
Good 111
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 2
Total 120
Table 3.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Rating Results for Circuit Switchers

120 111
100
Circuit Switchers 80
Number of
60
40
20 7
2 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 3.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Circuit Switchers
98.3% of Circuit Switchers are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

1.7% of Circuit Switchers are in Very Poor condition or at their end-of-life.

4.0 Transformers/Tap Changers (excluding HVDC)
4.1 Description
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 234 three-phase transformers with capacities
up to 400 MVA. Generally, this asset class includes the most critical, costly and long
delivery components on the BCTC-managed transmission system. Power transformers
perform step-up and step-down voltage change operations in over 300 BCTC-managed
substations. The BCTC-managed transmission system has 77 transformers with under-load
tap changers (LTC).
Power Transformers
Power transformers in the BCTC-managed transmission system are static devices that
operate at primary voltages ranging from 12 kV to 500 kV. They consist of insulated
windings installed on laminated iron cores and immersed in oil that insulates and cools the
equipment. The transformer assembly may also include LTCs, bushings, radiators, fans and
pumps, instrument transformers, protection and control systems, foundations, structural steel
supports, and spill containment systems.
The BCTC-managed transmission system now includes the following types of power
transformers:
Two winding, step-down transformers, three-phase banks, ranging from 1 MVA to 85

MVA that transform 230 and 115 kV system voltages to lower customer voltages;
Autotransformers, three-phase banks, rated up to 400 MVA, that provide
transformation between primary transmission voltage levels of 500, 345, 230 and
138 kV; and
Several small special purpose, grounding, exciter, station service, and converter
transformers.
About 30% of the BCTC-managed transformers are rated at 100 MVA or below. About 26%
are rated at 250 MVA or higher. 40% operate on the 69, 138 and 230 kV systems. About
48% have applications on the 500 kV system.
National and international standards provide design and performance guidelines. Canadian
standards, such as CAN/CSA C88, prescribe transmission system requirements, including
those for power transformers. Users often modify or supplement standards with
specifications and procedures specific to their individual systems. For example, users may
address issues such as increased overloads, over-voltage and tap-changer capabilities,
transportation and other limiting dimensions, and arrangements for coolers and other
accessories. At the factory, each fully assembled production unit receives dielectric,
temperature rise, sound level and functional tests before delivery. Generally, units undergo
tests to determine their short circuit withstand capability. An existing transformer fleet
normally represents diverse products from 20 or more OEMs, many of whom may no longer

be in business. Many higher MVA rated units originate offshore, where international rather
than Canadian design requirements apply.
As three-phase banks, power transformer assemblies can include either three single-phase
units or one three-phase unit. The user determines assembly configurations based on
economics, reliability, availability, maintainability, and transportation considerations.
Generally, users also specify any limiting dimensions dictated by factors such as
transportation, accessibility and interchangeability. Sometimes, for example, utilities up-rate
older substations and need to ensure that new higher capacity units can fit into existing
transformer pockets.
Power transformers consist of the following key components that are discussed in more detail
below:
Core and Coils

Insulation
Bushings
Cooling
Tanks
De-energized Tap Changers
Load Tap Changers (LTC)
a) Core and Coils

User demands for efficiency, reduced noise, less weight, smaller dimensions, and lower costs
have resulted in recent improvements in core materials as well as the shape and construction
of the core. Today, users evaluate all no-load and load (i.e., iron and copper) losses when
purchasing transformers. Thus, newer transformers operate more efficiently than older
designs.
Three-phase core-type units consist of three or five limbs. Single-phase core-type units can
consist of either one or two limbs. Users may also require specialty transformers such as
phase shifters, static VAR and HVDC converters.
Designers try to make cores with materials that have low degradation potential. Primarily,
designers try to avoid hot spots, reduce electromagnetic losses, minimize mechanical stress,
and prevent excessive circulating currents. Proper stacking and handling help enhance
magnetic properties of the transformer. Similarly, core structure design can eliminate
mechanical stress. For example, designs with clamping windings independent from the core
help reduce excessive mechanical stress on the core.
Over time, core steel improvements have included changes from hot- rolled to cold-oriented
steel. In addition, developments such as laser scribed, plasma treated, cold-rolled steels, and
thinner lamination have improved quality and reduced losses.
Power transformers must have long-term reliability. Designers achieve this reliability by
providing sufficient cooling ducts, effective core-section grounding, and magnetic shielding

to protect against circulating currents from leakage fluxes. Supports must withstand
transportation and operational forces.
The design and construction of windings also contribute to the reliability of power
transformers. Transformer windings experience many extreme conditions including
overloads caused by above-normal temperatures; through-faults that cause displacements,
and surges from lightning and switching that may result in localized over-voltages.
Transformers may have various winding types, depending on voltage ratings, continuous
current, and short circuit requirements. Winding designs must withstand transient over-
voltages caused by lightning and switching surges. Winding designs also must provide
appropriate series capacitance and proper voltage distribution, while maintaining high coil
mechanical strength.
Designers and users must take care that measures taken to mitigate against one condition do
not adversely affect a units ability to withstand another condition. For example, adding
spacers to improve windings short-circuit strength also can reduce their cooling properties.
However, since those cooling properties are critical, one must carefully consider spacer
arrangements and distances in making such adjustments.
b) Insulation
Insulation systems include a combination of oil, paper, pressboard, and core-steel insulation
that consists of paper insulated coil conductors.
Insulating oil must have very low moisture (i.e., 5 ppm water) and air content (i.e., 0.5%).
Established acceptable contaminant levels are used to assess DGA and other field test results.
Single sheet and laminated insulation board forms an integral part of transformer insulation
systems. Contamination and moisture can cause failures. Under factory conditions and after
drying, the cellulose in new units must have moisture contents less than 0.5% of the
material's weight.
A 150-ton core may have 50,000 individual laminations, with a collective area measured in
hectares. Core-steel laminations must have proper surface insulation.
c) Bushings
Specialty suppliers usually make transformer bushings. Users often specify certain types and
manufacturers after considering interchangeability and stock spare availability. Because
bushings interact with tanks and other surrounding parts, they must have compatible designs,
particularly in high- and extra-high voltage applications. Typical types include stud and oil
impregnated condenser bushings. Most are porcelain clad. Less common bushing types
include epoxy resin impregnated condenser bushings.
d) Cooling
Natural oil and air circulation (ONAN) or forced oil and air circulation (OFAF) normally
provide cooling and associated megavolt ampere (MVA) ratings. Combinations of these
cooling methods also exist. All of the larger units have one or more groups of fans and many

also have with one or more pumps. Forced oil cooling may be directional (i.e., directed
through the winding) or non-directional.
Generally, the temperature drop over a winding depends on the duct length, duct width, loss
density, and oil velocity. Shorter duct lengths lead to lower temperature drops over the
winding. Thus, hotspot temperatures near the top of the winding are also lower.
Pumps must not introduce contaminants (e.g., bearing metallic particles, air) into the tank.
Generally, cooling systems have continuous monitors to ensure that pump, fan or power
supply failures do not reduce the transformers rated output beyond certain established
values.
All cooling classes have radiator coolers. To protect against corrosion, this equipment
usually is hot-dip galvanized and painted. Radiators may be mounted separately mounted or
on via headers tanks. .
e) Tanks
Main tanks consist primarily of heavy section, welded steel plates with outer and inner
structural steel stiffeners on the sides. They also have large structural steel beams at their
base. Conservator tanks and radiators also consist of steel construction. Tanks must
withstand full vacuums and the lowest ambient temperatures likely encountered.
f) Tap Changers
A de-energized load tap changer is a device that alters power transformer turn ratios over
small ranges to cause changes in output voltage as needed. The change in high voltage
winding ratios typically occurs by dividing the physical winding into two halves in
combination with the use of several selectable winding taps. Typically, these allow changes
of about plus or minus 5% in the high side winding ratio. The changes occur in two steps.
Since transformers with off load tap changers have no provision for load switching, the
changes must occur when the transformer is de-energized.
Power Transformer Accessories

Transformer accessories and auxiliary systems consist of instrument transformers, protection,
control and monitoring systems, power supplies, pressure relief devices, foundation and
structural steel supports, and often deluge, fire protection and spill containment systems.
High- and low-voltage bushings have bushing current transformers for purposes of relaying
and for metering.

These devices fitted to power transformers ensure that output voltages stay within required
levels. To do this, LTCs alter the number of turns in one transformer winding, thereby
changing the ratio of transformers on a system. The BCTC-managed system has many
transformers with Reinhausen LTCs.

Both on-load and de-energized tap changers exist. On-load tap changers generally consist of
a diverter switch and a selector switch operating as a unit to transfer current from one voltage
tap to the next. About 33 % of BCTC-managed transmission power transformers incorporate
on-load tap changers for voltage regulation.
LTCs consists of the following basic components:
A resistor or reactor to prevent short circuiting of any tapped section, and

A duplicate circuit to carry load current while switching occurs on another.
Most modern LTCs use high-speed resistor switching. Windings may be tapped at the line
end, the middle or the star point. Typically, tapping occurs at the middle or the star point
because this imposes the least electrical stress between the tap changer and ground. Tapping
at either of these points also reduces fault current stress on the tap windings. Some designs
incorporate a separate tap coil winding around the main coil to improve short circuit
performance. In these designs, the LTC may be on the high- or low-voltage side, depending
on several factors.
The LTC compartments usually have their own conservator tanks segregated from the main
tank. Normally, tank designs allow installation of a jib hoist for withdrawal of the diverter
switch.
Users normally expect LTCs to operate between 200,000 and 400,000 times before requiring
major maintenance. LTCs must have a high level of reliability, since failures can affect the
entire power transformer.
4.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 234 power transformers. Table 4.2.1
shows the number of transformers grouped by voltage level and age group. The table shows
that the 60 kV level has 3.4%, the 138 kV level has 3%, the 500 kV level has 47.9%, the less
than 25kV level has 5.6%, and the 360 kV level has 5.1% of the total transformers in the
system. Note that voltage levels for 3.8% of the transformers could not be identified.
Table 4.2.1 also shows that 52.6% of the transformers are within the age range of 20 to 29
years and that 78.7% are within the age range of 20 to 49 years. Also, 2.6% of the
transformers were commissioned more than 50 years ago.

Voltage
Incomplete
Percent
25 kV
138 kV
230 kV
360 kV
500 kV
60 kV
Total
0 to 9 1 0 0 3 2 7 0 13 5.6
10 to 19 3 0 3 2 0 3 0 11 4.7
Age Group
20 to 29 6 3 1 39 5 69 0 123 52.6
30 to 39 1 0 2 20 2 32 4 61 26.1
40 to 49 0 1 1 6 3 0 0 11 4.7
50 plus 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 6 2.6
incomplete 2 1 0 0 0 1 5 9 3.8
Total 13 8 7 73 12 112 9 234 100.0

Percent 5.6 3.4 3.0 31.2 5.1 47.9 3.8 100.0
Table 4.2.1 Count of Transformers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Table 4.2.2 shows the number of transformers grouped by MVA level and age group. As
shown in the table, transformers in the 51-150 MVA group represent 35.9% and of the
population. The system has 53.9% of its transmission transformers in levels of 151 MVA and
higher.
MVA
Incomplete
101-150
151-250
Percent
51-100
> 250
Total
1-50
0 to 9 0 5 1 2 4 1 13 5.6
10 to 19 1 3 1 2 4 0 11 4.7
Age Group
20 to 29 6 38 12 33 34 0 123 52.6
30 to 39 3 10 7 23 14 4 61 26.1
40 to 49 2 1 3 1 4 0 11 4.7
50 plus 1 0 0 3 2 0 6 2.6
incomplete 0 3 0 0 0 6 9 3.8
Total 13 60 24 64 62 11 234 100.0

Percent 5.6 25.6 10.3 27.4 26.5 4.7 100.0
Table 4.2.2 Count of Transformers Grouped by MVA and Age

Table 4.2.3 shows the number of transformers grouped by each relevant transformer type
and age group. As shown in the table, transformers of the No LTC and LTC types represent
59.4% and 32.9% of the population respectively.
Transformer Type
With LTC No LTC Other Total Percent
0 to 9 3 10 0 13 5.6
10 to 19 2 7 2 11 4.7
Age Group
20 to 29 46 74 3 123 52.6
30 to 39 23 34 4 61 26.1
40 to 49 2 9 0 11 4.7
50 plus 1 5 0 6 2.6
incomplete 0 0 9 9 3.8
Total 77 139 18 234 100.0

Percent 32.9 59.4 7.7 100.0
Table 4.2.3 Count of Transformers Grouped by Type and Age
Power Transformers
Oil filled power transformers consist of bushings, steel tanks, oil, paper, pressboard, and
core-steel insulation. Transformers have no preset life expectancy, but users generally expect
transformers to have a life of 40 to 50 years, assuming normal loads and operation
conditions. Several life threatening degradation processes may affect various components of
this equipment.
Transformers operate under many extreme conditions, and both normal and abnormal
conditions affect their aging and breakdown. Overloads cause above-normal temperatures;
through-faults can cause displacement of coils and insulation; and lightning and switching
surges can cause internal localized over-voltages. Moisture, particles and acids degrade
transformer insulation. In forced oil cooled units, static electricity also may affect insulation.
Conditions degrading transformer insulation eventually can lead to equipment failures.
Transformers generally represent the most costly components of power systems. In addition,
the consequences of transformer failure are significant. Major failures affect customers, cost,
safety and the environment. Also, failures usually require detanking and off-site repairs.
Some of the major recorded transformer failures have resulted from insulation and winding
faults, bushing failures, faulty load tap changers, and failed winding accessories.

The condition of cores and coils typically dictate the service life of a transformer. These
components undergo operating stresses like overloading, short circuit thermal and
electromagnetic effects, plus transient and dynamic over-voltages. These stresses cause
cumulative and non-reversible degradation to paper insulation and other cellulose materials
associated with winding conductors in transformers.
Transformer aging rates depend on equipment designs, safety margins, loading, system and
operating environments. Utilities perform relatively little maintenance on transformer cores
and coils. They do conduct periodic dissolved gas in oil analysis (DGA), oil temperature
monitoring, gas accumulation and core leakage current testing. Some utilities relocate aging
units when their rating becomes inadequate for particular substations. However, such
relocation also may result in transportation-induced degradation.
Several auxiliary components support transformers, including containment, cooling, and

protection and control systems, plus bushings. The condition of auxiliary components affects
overall performance of any transformer unit. For example, tank gaskets typically begin to
deteriorate after about 15 years of service. Resultant oil leaks become progressively worse
over time. Cooling/radiator systems can rust and corrode during the same time frame,
degrading a units cooling capabilities. Components typically require maintenance regimes
and overhauls to sustain their performance over the equipments expected service life.
Typically, these overhauls occur at about the mid-life of a transformer.
Degradation of foundations and structures that support buswork and connections impose
stress on bushings and other transformer components. Thermal and mechanical failures may
result from misaligned and inadequately supported bus conductors as well as misaligned and
loose connectors.
Utilities generally manage transformers through time based preventive maintenance

programs. They make replace and refurbish decisions based on transformer duties, criticality,
problems noted, ongoing maintenance requirements and associated costs. Generally, only
after complete winding and associated insulation replacement will a unit have such an
increase in life expectancy that it becomes equivalent to a new unit.
Traditionally, utilities have used manufacturers recommendations to design transformer

maintenance programs. Generally, manufacturers made conservative (i.e., risk averse)
maintenance recommendations and applied conservative safety margins during design.
Some utilities, however, have used end-of-life assessments to design maintenance programs
for their transformers. For example, one North American utility studied two 45-year old
GSU transformer units and concluded that these transformers had remaining useful lives of
about 27 years. They also estimated that in about 10 years these transformers would have
about 50% of their useful lives left. The utility extrapolated this information to other similar
transformers in their system and justified continued transformer operation, deferral of major
capital expenditures, and reconsideration of future replacement strategies. The utilitys
analysis consisted of reviewing the transformers technical and operating records plus
assessing loss-of-life over a 40-year period. The study included internal and external
inspections that revealed no defects. It also included analyses of oil, winding impedance, and

swept frequency responses. In addition, the utility reviewed loading data and found that the
units normally operated at lower loads than rated, which helped account for the equipments
minimal loss of life.
Other utilities have installed condition-monitoring systems to measure critical parameters

associated with transformer degradation. While such monitoring is not economical for
widespread application it did offer those utilities sufficient information to develop new
maintenance programs for the transformers studied. Generally, monitoring results allowed
the utilities to extend maintenance intervals with confidence.
Some utilities have undertaken large-scale rehabilitation and refurbishment programs for
existing transformers. These programs do not directly extend transformer life, but they do
help ensure that units achieve a normal life expectancy. Rehabilitation includes correcting
known defects, replacing gaskets, overhauling accessories and wiring, and repairing leaks.
Refurbishment includes rehabilitation activities plus replacing accessories, upgrading or
uprating transformers, re-clamping windings, and removing cores and coils from the tanks.
BCTC has an oil rejuvenation program to re-use old oil.

LTCs are dynamic devices with many moving parts subject to wear and stress. LTCs
frequently make and break high currents and undergo arcing that accompanies such
operations. A few specialty suppliers dominate the market for higher rated LTCs.
Reinhausen represents the most prominent of these suppliers, and the system managed by
BCTC has many Reinhausen LTCs.
Excessive arcing cause overheating, contact burning, insulating oil contamination, and short-
circuit failure. Drive shafts and gearboxes experience radial and axial wear. Shaft problems
cause many LTC failures. Transition resistors can experience open circuit failures, causing
excessive contact wear. Relays, interlocks, limit switches, motor drives, springs and remote
tap position indicators can fail from wear and other operational factors.
The LTC compartment and its oil remain segregated from the main tank. This minimizes the
risk of contaminating the main windings with arc decomposition products. Horizontal
surfaces (e.g., the top) of diverter switches often accumulate carbon and copper deposits
associated with small convection currents created in the oil during each tap change. LTC
compartment oil requires filtration and treatment, typically after a specified number (e.g.,
50,000 or more) of LTC operations.
LTCs require considerable maintenance to ensure reliable operation. In many cases, LTCs
have shorter lives than the life expected for their transformers core assembly. However,
LTC overhauls and replacements help ensure total unit longevity.
LTC failures can have severe consequences, including customer supply, costs, safety and
environmental problems. LTC failures also often require off-site repairs. While LTC failure
rates worldwide are low, many major utilities experience several LTC-related major failures

per year. While LTC reliability has improved over the years, they are still a major cause of
transformer outages. LTCs contribute to about 25-30% of transformer failures.
A review of various users experience with modern LTCs revealed defects with two specific
designs. One design has a weak reversing switch that tends to overheat and coke up. This
creates high resistance connections that overheat until they burn open or initiate ground
faults. Another design exhibits excessive operating mechanism wear, making contact
alignment difficult and causing premature and extensive contact burning. Manufacturers have
modified these design problems and have instituted remedial programs for existing defective
models.
faults in transformers and tap changers. It is based on Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM) techniques. BCTCs Maintenance Standards contain maintenance procedures for
specific types of transformers and tap changers. About 26% of the LTCs on the BCTC-
managed transmission system are between 30 to 40 years old and about 7% are over 40 years
of age.

condition of transformers and tap changers:
a) Visual
Transformers have many visible and accessible components, making visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion, misalignment,
evidence of overheating, plus cracks and oil leaks on bushings, tanks, radiators, fans, pipes
and fittings. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals. For both
transformers and LTCs, internal inspections of control cabinets can help assess conditions
and components. Visual inspections can be done on all accessible LTC mechanical features.
Visual inspections must be supplemented by records reviews.
b) Oil Analysis (e.g., DGA, Furan, moisture, metals)

Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) determines the quantities of various gases dissolved in oil.
DGA often serves as a primary means to assess insulation and to identify faults such as
insulation aging and overheating, arcing in oil, and partial discharge damage. Interpretation
of DGA requires special skills and knowledge of transformer types, insulation structure,
range of acceptable levels, and risks. It also requires understanding possible causes of gas
evolution such as aging, poor contacts, overheating, arcing, and partial discharge.
Recording DGA results and analyzing trends overtime is key to assessing deterioration.
When oil in an existing transformer is reconditioned or replaced, it will result in a step
change (reduction) in furan, moisture and metal content level. Both the old and new levels
should be recorded and taken into consideration while analyzing future trends.

c) Doble Test
This test involves applying a voltage to bushing terminals and measuring capacitance and
loss angles using a bridge technique. Doble test results can be compared directly to
manufacturers standards or to results from other similar transformers. Assessing trends in
Doble test results can help detect deterioration of bushing insulation and other internal
components such as support insulators.
d) Insulating Medium
oil, air and transformer insulation systems.
e) Thermograph (IR)
Data from this test provide useful warnings of hot spots and other thermal problems within or
outside transformers.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed transformers and tap changers first required
developing end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class, including LTC-
equipped and non-LTC equipped transformers. Each criterion represents a factor critical in
determining the components condition relative to potential failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Rating
B Bushings are not broken, however minor chips and cracks, are visible.
C Bushings are not broken, however major chips, and some flashover burns and
copper splash are visible. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
D Bushings are broken/damaged or cementing and fasteners are not secure.
Table 4.3.1 Transformer Bushing Condition
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any of the bushing-metal interfaces or at
gaskets, weld seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors.
D Major oil leakage and probable moisture ingress. If left uncorrected it could
cause operational and/or environmental problems.
E Oil leaks or moisture ingress have resulted in complete failure or
damage/degradation beyond repair.
Table 4.3.2 Transformer Oil Leaks
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on main tank. No external or internal rust in cabinets
no evidence of condensation, moisture or insect ingress. No rust or corrosion
on weld seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors. All wiring, terminal
blocks, switches, relays, monitoring and control devices are in good
condition.
or condensation in cabinets
C Some rust and corrosion on both tank and on cabinets.
D Significant corrosion on main tank and on cabinets. Defective sealing leading
to water ingress and insects/rodent damage.
E Corrosion, water ingress or insect/rodent damage or degradation is beyond
repair.
Table 4.3.3 Transformer Main Tank/Cabinets and Control Condition

Rating
A No rust or corrosion on body conservator tank. No rust, corrosion on weld
seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors.
B No rust or corrosion on conservator.
C Some rust and corrosion on conservator.
D Significant rust and corrosion on conservator. Could lead to major oil leakage
or water ingress.
E Major oil leakage or water ingress has resulted in damage/degradation beyond
repair.
Any seal failure on a sealed tank transformer.
Note. For transformers employing sealed tanks or air bags, a failure of the
seal would be indicated by the presence of air in the tank, which can be
detected by measuring oxygen or nitrogen content while conducting gas in oil
analysis.
Table 4.3.4 Transformer Conservator/Oil Preservation System Condition
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on body of radiators. Fan and pump enclosures are free
of rust and corrosion and securely mounted in position, pump bearings are in
good condition and fan controls are operating per design.
E Fan and pump enclosures damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 4.3.5 Transformer Radiators/Cooling System Condition
Rating
tight, free of corrosion and made directly to tanks, radiators, cabinets and
supports, without any intervening paint or corrosion.
E Foundation, supports, or grounding damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 4.3.6 Transformer Foundation/Support Steel/Grounding Condition

Rating
A Power transformer externally is clean, and corrosion free. All primary and
secondary connections are in good condition. All monitoring, protection and
control, pressure relief, gas accumulation and silica gel devices, and auxiliary
systems, mounted on the power transformer, are in good condition. No
external evidence of overheating or internal overpressure. Appears to be well
E More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be
Table 4.3.7 Overall Power Transformer Condition
Rating
A DGA overall factor is less than 1.2
B DGA overall factor between 1.2 and 1.5
C DGA overall factor is between 1.5 and 2.0
D DGA overall factor is between 2.0 and 3.0
E DGA overall factor is greater than 3.0
Where the DGA overall factor is the weighted average of the following gas scores:
Scores
1 2 3 4 5 6 Weight
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Table 4.3.8 Transformer DGA Oil Analysis

Condition Rating Description
A Less than 1.0 PPM of 2-furaldehyde
B Between 1 1.5 PPM of 2-furaldehyde
C Between 1.5 3 PPM of 2-furaldehyde
D Between 3 - 10 PPM of 2-furaldehyde
E Greater than 10 PPM of 2-furaldehyde
Table 4.3.9 Transformer Furan Oil Analysis
Condition Rating Description

A Less than 20 years old
B 20-40 years old
C 40-60 years old
D Greater than 60 years old
E Not Applicable
Table 4.3.10 Transformer Age

Only to be Used if Furan Analysis is Not Available
Rating
A Values well within acceptable ranges; power factor less than 0.05%
B Values close to acceptable ranges; power factor between 0.05 - .5%
C Values exceed acceptable ranges; power factor between 0.5 1%.
D Values considerably exceed acceptable levels; power factor between 1 -
2%
E Values are not acceptable> 2%, immediate attention required; power
factor greater than 2%
Table 4.3.11 Winding Doble Test
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Where minimum requirement is the Moisture test along with either the IFT or
dielectric test:

Moisture PPM Factor IFT Factor Dielectric Str. kV Factor
(T oC Corrected) F1 dynes/cm F2 F3
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2
greater than 40 6 <13.5 4 less than 30 4
Table 4.3.12 Transformer Oil Quality Test
Rating
A No hot spots are noticeable, no temperature excess over reference point of
transformer at normal temperature
B Small hotspots are identified but do not require further investigation, excess
of 0-9 degrees over reference point
C Significant hot spots are identified and further investigation is required,
excess of 10-20 degrees over reference point
D Serious hot spots are identified that need further investigation/attention as
soon as possible, excess of 21-49 degrees over reference point
E Critical hotspots are identified that need immediate attention, excess of more
than 50 degrees over reference point
Table 4.3.13 Transformer Thermograph (IR)
Rating
A Passed test, DGA overall factor less than 3
E Failed test, overall DGA factor greater than 3
Table 4.3.14 Transformer Bushing DGA Analysis

Rating
A No external corrosion or rust on the LTC tank, conservator or switch
compartments. No rust or corrosion on tank, cover plates, weld seals, flanges,
valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, qualitrol or other relays and fittings
associated with the LTC.
E More than two unacceptable characteristics that cannot be made acceptable
Table 4.3.15 Tap Changer Tank Condition
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any interfaces , cover plates, weld seals,
flanges, valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, qualitrol or other relays
and fittings associated with the LTC. Verify that LTC conservator oil level
gauge is at correct value.
cause operational and/or environmental problems
E Oil leakage or moisture ingress that has caused damage/degradation beyond
repair.
Table 4.3.16 Tap Changer Tank Leaks
Rating
A No external sign of deterioration of tank gaskets, weld seams or gaskets on
valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, qualitrol or other relays and fittings
associated with the LTC. Weather seal of LTC mechanism cabinet is in good
condition. Dynamic seals of drive shaft are in good condition.
E More than two unacceptable characteristics that cannot be brought into
Table 4.3.17 Tap Changer Gaskets, Seals and Pressure Relief Condition

Rating
A No external or internal rust in cabinets. No rust, corrosion or paint peeling on
cabinets, sealing very effective no evidence of moisture or insect ingress or
condensation. All control devices are in good condition.
B No rust or corrosion, some evidence of slight moisture ingress or
condensation in mechanism cabinet or control circuitry.
C Some rust and corrosion on mechanism cabinet or some deterioration of
control circuitry, requires corrective maintenance within the next several
months.
D Significant corrosion on mechanism cabinet or significant deterioration of
control circuitry. Defective sealing leading to water ingress and insects/rodent
damage. Requires immediate corrective action.
E Corrosion, water ingress, or insect/rodent damage/degradation that is beyond
repair.
Table 4.3.18 Tap Changer LTC Control and Mechanism Cabinet
Rating
A Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, heaters, motors, contactors and switches all
in good condition. LTC operating mechanism, shafts, brakes, gears, bearings,
indicators are free from corrosion, abrasion or obstruction and are lubricated.
No sign of overheating or deterioration on any electrical or mechanical
components..
B A small percentage of the wiring, terminal blocks, relays and switches are in
a degraded condition. LTC operating mechanism is in good condition
C About 20% of the wiring, terminal blocks, relays and switches are in a
degraded condition. LTC operating mechanism is in fair condition.
D Significant amount of wiring, terminal blocks, relays and switches are in very
poor condition. Fuses blow periodically. One or more of the LTC operating
mechanism components is in imminent danger of failure. Requires immediate
corrective action.
E Components have failed or are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 4.3.19 Tap Changer Control and Mechanism Cabinet Component Condition

Rating
A Tap changer external components, including the mechanism cabinet
components, are all in good operating condition, and free from corrosion,
deformation, cracks and obstruction. No external evidence of overheating or
switch contact failure. Operation counter readings are below the critical
range for this type of LTC. Appears to be well maintained with service
records readily available.
E More than two characteristics that are unacceptable and cannot be brought
Table 4.3.20 Overall Tap Changer Condition
Rating
A Oil tests passed; DGA overall factor <5 or limited metal content
E Any failed oil test; DGA overall factor > 5 or serious metal content
Table 4.3.21 Tap Changer Oil Analysis (DGA Metal Content)
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Where minimum requirement is the Moisture test along with either the IFT or dielectric test:
Moisture PPM Factor IFT Factor Dielectric Factor

(T oC Corrected) F1 dynes/cm F2 Str. kV F3
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2
Table 4.3.22 Tap Changer Oil Quality Test


4.3.24 below.
A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2
D = 1, and
E = 0.
The weighted scores were totaled for each asset class member. Because of the importance
of the winding Doble test, Furan or transformer DGA tests, if any of the tests scored an E,
then the Health Index was divided by 2.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a transformer in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded transformer
would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for transformers in
Table 4.3.23 below, assume a transformer with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 70 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 116. That transformer, therefore,
hand, if that transformer with partial data had a maximum condition score of 82, it would
have 71% of its maximum and a valid Health Index.

For this asset class, available data were insufficient to provide a valid Health Index using the
70% Rule described above. In this case, to provide BCTC with some information about the
assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off (i.e, the 50% Rule). Thus,
if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal to 50% of the maximum
possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and presented in the results.
Tables 4.3.23 4.3.24 show the component/test condition criteria, weightings, condition
# Transformers Weight Condition Factors Maximum

1 Bushing Condition 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
2 Oil Leaks 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Main Tank/Cabinets and Controls 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Conservator/Oil Preservation
4 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
System (Airbag Integrity)
5 Radiators/Cooling System 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
6 Foundation/Support Steel/Ground 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
7 Overall Power Transformer 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
8 DGA Oil Analysis* 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
9 Furan Oil Analysis* 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
10 Winding Doble Test* 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
11 Oil Quality Test 3 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 12
12 Thermograph (IR) 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
13 Bushing DGA Oil Analysis 4 A, E 4, 0 16
Max Score= 116, HI = 100*Score/Max.
*In the case of a score of E, overall Health Index is divided by 2
If Furan data is not available Use Age data per Table 4.3.10
Table 4.3.23 Transformer Health Index Formulation
# Tap Changers Weight Condition Factors Maximum

1 Tank Condition 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
2 Tank Leaks 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Gaskets, Seals and Pressure Relief 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
4 LTC Control and Mechanism Cabinet 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Control and Mechanisms Cabinet
5 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Component and operation
6 Overall Tap Changer Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
7 DGA,Moisture, Metal Content 4 A, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
8 Oil Quality Tests 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 60, HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 4.3.24 Tap Changer Health Index Formulation

In calculating the final Health Index for a Power Transformer with a Tap Changer, the Power
Transformer Health Index represents 80% and the Tap Changer Health Index represents
20%.
Table 4.3.25 was used to determine the overall condition of the transformer and tap changer
asset class.
Health
Index
of components
70 - 85 Good
components
components
0 - 30 Very Poor
Table 4.3.25 Health Index Scale for Transformers and Tap Changers
As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for power transformers in

Health Index Results Classification Number of Transformers
Very Good 70
Good 36
Fair 8
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
* HIs were calculated using the 50% Rule instead of the 70% Rule due to insufficient data1
Table 4.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Transformers
Health Index Results Classification Number of Transformers
Very Good 144

Good 74
Fair 16
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total 234
Table 4.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for

Transformers
1

160 144
Number of Transformers
140
120
100
74
80
60
40
16
20
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 4.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Transformers
93.2% of Transformers are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

6.8% of Transformers are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital
improvements may be required in the next five years to prevent failure.

5.0 Instrument Transformers
5.1 Description
Instrument transformers change high voltage system currents and voltages from high values
to values safely accommodated by control, metering and relay systems. Two basic
equipment categories exist, current transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs).
Within the VT category, two distinctly different types of transformers exist, inductive and
capacitive transformers (CVT). Inductive transformers resemble power transformers. CVTs,
however, function as capacitive dividers. CVTs can have multiple functions that include
coupling carrier frequency signals to power line carriers, moderating the switching duty on
adjacent circuit breakers (i.e., short line fault), and supplying control, metering and relay
systems.
Recent technological developments have coupled optical current and voltage transducers as
replacement technology for conventional instrument transformers. This technology had its
first trial application in 1986. However, it still has not gained widespread acceptance.
Most high voltage instrument transformers use oil in a porcelain enclosure for insulation.
Some instrument transformers (e.g., those at medium voltages) also use dry insulation. Some
CTs and VTs have SF6 insulation. CVTs contain mineral oil impregnated paper and
polypropylene dielectric as insulation.
National and international standards provide guidance to manufacturers in the design, testing
and performance of instrument transformers. Users also modify and supplement these
requirements to meet their own systems needs. For example, they may specify special
features such as increased over-voltage and over-current capabilities, increased CVT
capacitance, as well as accuracy classes. Before delivery, manufacturers test each unit for
dielectric potential, ratio, accuracy and temperature rise. Users also may repeat some of
these tests in the field after installation.
System reliability depends heavily on the reliability of instrument transformers. Breakdowns

of this equipment prevent information flow to protective relays, leaving systems unprotected.
Thus, this equipment must withstand all types of system faults
Current Transformers
Several different types of current transformers exist for use in specific applications. Two
main types of core arrangements include:
The tank type with its core in a tank at the ground end (i.e., hair-pin and eye-bolt types),
and
The inverted or live head type with the core situated on the top (i.e., line) end of the
transformer.

The tank type has good stability and seismic characteristics. The tank forms part of the
support for these CTs. Under normal operating conditions, this design also imposes little
stress on support insulators and offers good temperature control. The design has some short
circuit and continuous current limitations, but meets the needs of most utilities.
The live head type can accommodate the highest currents and system voltages. The design is
most economical at voltages of 230 kV and above. However for oil insulated CTs, this
design is relatively unstable and unsuitable in high seismic areas. The design also imposes
high stress on support insulators. SF6 insulated live head CTs are acceptable.
Instrument transformers have dry, epoxy-molded oil, oil-quartz and SF6 insulation systems.
Each type of insulation has certain advantages in specific applications. Oil insulated CTs
have hermetic seals. In some of these CTs, changes in volume are compensated by a
stainless steel bellows system. In the BCTC-managed transmission system, those using
rubber compensation bellows have exhibited problems due to deterioration of the rubber.
Support insulators can be porcelain, epoxy, or reinforced composite materials. Head and
tank housings consist of corrosion resistant aluminum alloys.
CTs experience both static and dynamic stress. High voltage bus conductors impose static
stress. Wind, vibration, pressure increases, and seismic activity impose dynamic stress. Use
of pressure relief devices and adequate support for expansion compensated bus conductors
can avoid service problems. For SF6 CTs, explosion-proof designs prevent risks of fire,
explosion, personnel and collateral damage after faults in the equipment. Explosion-proof
designs are not available for oil insulated CTs.
BCTC has adopted a policy of purchasing dead tank breakers with bushing CTs. This policy
has eliminated the need for external CTs.
Voltage Transformers
a) Inductive Voltage Transformers (Inductive VTs)
Inductive VTs normally have cores located in a tank at the base of the VT. Inductive VTs
operate at voltages of 230kV and below. At higher voltages, Inductive VT cores are found
between two support insulators in a cascade arrangement. However, this configuration
usually is uneconomic, and CVTs offer more cost-effective solutions. CTs and VTs have
similar insulation systems, support insulators, sealing systems, and tank construction. CTs
and VTs also have similar static and dynamic stresses.
b) Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVTs)

Modern CVTs consist of capacitive voltage dividers and inductive intermediate voltage
transformers located in a tank at their base. Their secondary windings supply required
outputs. Insulator shells house capacitor elements. Normally, these shells consist of
porcelain, but composite shells are available. In the past, some designs incorporated series
connected capacitor can units externally mounted on support insulators.
Capacitive element technology has advanced greatly in the past 20 years. In the past, oil and
paper were major constituents of insulation systems. Later PCB-containing oils served as

insulation. Recent designs, however, use alternate layers of aluminum foil, improved low
loss polypropylene film, and kraft paper impregnated by synthetic oils with high gas
absorbing qualities. New designs are more cost effective, efficient and environmentally
acceptable than earlier technology.
5.2 Demographics
Oil Current Transformers (Oil CTs)

The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 1,164 Oil CTs. Table 5.2.1 shows
the number of Oil CTs grouped by voltage level and age group. The 500 kV and 230 kV
voltage levels have 38.6% and 37.1% of the total population respectively.
Table 5.2.1 also shows that 58.7% of the Oil CTs are within the age range of 20 to 29 years
old. Also, none of the identified Oil CTs was commissioned more than 40 years ago.
Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 500 kV Incomplete
0 to 9 0 5 3 9 43 0 60 5.2
10 to 19 27 3 50 40 96 0 216 18.6
Age Group
20 to 29 4 54 91 272 262 0 683 58.7

30 to 39 6 0 26 89 24 0 145 12.5
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 6 3 4 22 24 1 60 5.2
Total 43 65 174 432 449 1 1,164 100.0
Percent 3.7 5.6 14.9 37.1 38.6 0.1 100
Table 5.2.1 Count of Current Transformers Oil Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Dry Current Transformers (Dry CTs)

The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 191 Dry CTs. Table 5.2.2 shows the
number of Dry CTs grouped by voltage level and age group. The less than 25 kV voltage
level contains most of the Dry CTs with 70.7% of the total population.
Table 5.2.2 also shows that 25.1% of the Dry CTs are within the age range of 20 to 29 years.
Also, none of the identified Dry CTs was commissioned more than 40 years ago.

Voltage
25 60 138 230 500 Total Percent
Incomplete
kV kV kV kV kV
0 to 9 6 18 0 6 3 0 33 17.3
10 to 19 13 6 2 1 0 0 22 11.5
Age Group
20 to 29 39 1 6 0 2 0 48 25.1
30 to 39 3 0 0 0 0 1 4 2.1
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 74 5 0 0 2 3 84 44.0
Total 135 30 8 7 7 4 191 100.0
Percent 70.7 15.7 4.2 3.7 3.7 2.1 100
Table 5.2.2 Count of Dry Current Transformers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
SF6 Current Transformers (SF6 CT)

The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 201 SF6 CTs. Table 5.2.3 shows the
number of SF6 CTs grouped by each relevant voltage level and age group. The 230 kV, 138
kV, and 500 kV voltage levels, have 51.2%, 28.4%, and 19.9% of the total SF6 CT
population respectively. Note that no SF6 CTs are in the 360 kV or less than 25 kV voltage
levels. As a safety measure, BCTC has made a policy decision to purchase SF6 CTs as
replacements for 138 kV 500 kV applications.
Table 5.2.3 shows that 46.3% of the SF6 CTs are within the age range of 10 to 19 years, and
34.3% are within the age range of 0 to 9 years. Thus 80.6% of the SF6 CTs are less than 20
years old.
Voltage
Total Percent
60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 1 5 35 28 69 34.3
10 to 19 0 48 39 6 93 46.3
Age Group
20 to 29 0 0 7 6 13 6.5
30 to 39 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 4 22 0 26 12.9
Total 1 57 103 40 201 100.0
Percent 0.5 28.4 51.2 19.9 100.0
Table 5.2.3 Count of SF6 Transformers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age

Series Capacitor Station Current Transformers
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 70 series capacitor station CTs.
Table 5.2.4 shows that all of these transformers are found at the 500 kV voltage level.
Table 5.2.4 also shows that 53.9% of the series capacitor station CTs are between 30 and 39
years old, while 23.7% are less than 9 years old. There are no series capacitor station CTs
older than 40 years.
Voltage
Total Percent
500 kV Incomplete
0 to 9 18 0 18 23.7
10 to 19 0 0 0 0.0
Age Group
20 to 29 0 0 0 0.0
30 to 39 24 14 38 53.9
40 to 49 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 0 14 14 22.4
Total 42 28 70 100.0
Percent 60 40 100.0
Table 5.2.4 Count of Series Capacitor Station Current Transformers Grouped by

Voltage Level and Age
Voltage Transformers (VTs)

The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 1,353 voltage transformers (VTs).
Table 5.2.5 shows the number of VTs grouped by voltage level and age group. The less than
25 kV and 60 kV voltage levels have 21% and 64.6% of the total population respectively.
None of the identified VTs are found at voltages higher than 230 kV.
Table 5.2.5 also shows that 42.4% of the VTs are within the age range of 20 to 29 years, and
1.9% older than 40 years. In the age ranges of 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 30 to 39
years, the percentage distribution is 20.0%, 8.6%, and 19.5% respectively.

Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV
0 to 9 34 219 11 7 271 20.0
10 to 19 21 56 19 20 116 8.6
Age Group
20 to 29 170 302 54 47 573 42.4

30 to 39 10 241 13 0 264 19.5
40 to 49 0 7 11 0 18 1.3
50 plus 1 4 3 0 8 0.6
incomplete 48 45 10 0 103 7.6
Total 284 874 121 74 1,353 100.0
Percent 21.0 64.6 8.9 5.5 100
Table 5.2.5 Count of Voltage Transformers Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Capacitive Voltage Transformer (CVTs)
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 1,283 CVTs. Table 5.2.6 shows the
number of CVTs grouped by voltage level and age group. The 230 kV, 138 kV and 500 kV
voltage levels have 44.7%, 32.7%, and 19.3% of the total population respectively.
Table 5.2.6 also shows that 47.5% of the CVTs are within the age range of 20 to 29 years
old. The age ranges of 10 to 19 years and 30 to 39 years have about the same number of
CVTs each, with 17.1% and 17.9% respectively. Only 0.7 % of the CVTs in the system are
older than 40 years.
Voltage
Total Percent
60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 5 62 69 0 17 153 11.9
10 to 19 3 77 85 3 52 220 17.1
Age Group
20 to 29 12 176 270 1 150 609 47.5

30 to 39 5 93 110 11 11 230 17.9
40 to 49 0 1 7 0 0 8 0.6
50 plus 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.1
incomplete 2 11 32 0 17 62 4.8
Total 27 420 574 15 247 1,283 100.0
Percent 2.1 32.7 44.7 1.2 19.3 100
Table 5.2.6 Count of Capacitive Voltage Transformers Grouped by Voltage

Level and Age

High voltage instrument transformers (HVIT) have no preset life expectancies. Typically,
users expect 25 to 40 years of service from a HVIT, assuming normal operating conditions.
Thus, HVITs have shorter life expectancies than power transformers.
The following represent important factors affecting HVIT operation:
Degradation of internal insulation;

General degradation/corrosion;
Oil and SF6 leaks;
Environmental conditions; and
Static and dynamic stress
HVITs have more complex and more risk-prone dielectric designs than power transformers.
They operate at the same voltage as power transformers, but with a fraction of the insulation
and with tight electrical dimensions.
HVIT insulation tends to have greater dielectric and thermal stress than does power
transformer insulation. Therefore, HVIT insulation degrades, fails sooner, and has a shorter
life than the power transformer insulation. Insulation in both inductive capacitors and
external insulators undergoes cumulative and non-reversible degradation from steady states,
over-voltages and over-currents. HVIT degradation rates depend on equipment design,
safety margins, and operational and environmental conditions.
Periodic oil, gas (e.g., DGA), Doble and transformation ratio testing can help pinpoint
internal winding insulation and other dielectric problems. Dissipation factor measurements
also may assist in evaluating HVITs, but little formal guidance exists on acceptable results
for this equipment. However, when supplemented by DGA or SF6 analysis, dissipation
factor measurements may add value to the HVIT condition assessment process.
Corrosion affects HVITs in spite of the wide use of corrosion resistance aluminum alloys in
this equipment. Outdoor operations have increased corrosion risks. Routine external visual
inspections mitigate risks of internal contamination that can cause HVIT failures. For
example, periodic visual inspections can detect corrosion-related deterioration around joints,
weld, and seals. Such inspections also help find oil or SF6 leaks. Even minor degradation
and leaks should lead to more thorough sampling and analysis. Generally, SF6 units have gas
density monitors that trigger warning systems when leaks occur.
Static stress from poorly implemented HV bus connections may cause HVIT degradation and
failure. Unit bushings and insulators may experience thermal and mechanical failures from
misaligned and inadequately supported bus conductors or misaligned and loose connectors.

Some HVITs use SF6 gas. Recently, concerns have arisen about the greenhouse properties of
SF6. It is one of the gases specifically mentioned in the Kyoto Agreement. Canada has not
issued regulations for SF6, but has made a commitment to reduce the countrys overall
greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, owners of SF6 equipment have taken responsibility to
minimize SF6 emissions. Some have begun SF6 control programs that include detection, leak
remediation, and improved gas handling, plus recycling and reuse of gas from
BCTC closely monitors the SF6 gas in the system that it manages. BCTC conducts an annual
survey of SF6 related equipment. The utility then prepares a report for review and action if
needed.
Maintenance and Diagnostic Procedures

HVIT maintenance programs help to ensure that the equipment functions safely and meets
system requirements over time. Maintenance programs commonly include transformation
ratio and radiographic tests, plus periodic oil and SF6 gas sampling. Failed units typically are
replaced rather than rehabilitated because users fear that undiscovered defects may lead to
catastrophic failures, system disruption and risks to personnel. Continuous HVIT monitoring
is not cost effective.
faults in HVITs. It is based on Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) techniques.
BCTCs Maintenance Standards contain maintenance procedures for specific types of
HVITs.
Failures
HVITs are highly reliable, with reported failure rates at about 0.05% worldwide. Typically,
failure rates increase as operating voltages rise. In the past, VT ferro-resonance and CT
remanence problems caused failures, but design improvements have solved those problems.
Now most failures occur because of oil or SF6 leaks, and such failures are not generally
catastrophic.
Insulation failures normally occur either very early or very late in the life of HVITs. Early
insulation failures result from poor design, manufacture and installation. Late failures result
from degradation and can be catastrophic.
Because of their small size, internal breakdowns or arcs can have catastrophic results,
particularly in oil filled units. Several utilities have reported explosive failures, extensive
damage and forced outages of adjacent equipment. Some Western US utilities recently
reported explosive failures with resulting debris found over 200 feet away from the failure
site.
SF6 insulated units are not explosive and present little risk of fire or collateral damage. Over
the last 15 years, the number of explosive failures in 500 kV oil-filled porcelain-housed CTs,

has caused some US utilities to purchase only SF6 filled CTs, either in porcelain or composite
housings.

Several assessment techniques and diagnostic tests exist to evaluate the condition of these
a) Visual
This equipment lends itself to visual inspections because the overall grounded assembly is
visible and accessible. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion,
misalignment, and evidence of overheating, plus cracks and leaks on insulator housings,
tanks, and high voltage connections. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of
gaskets, seals, terminal box, and secondary connections. Visual inspections serve as a start to
condition assessment, but they must be supplemented by detailed reviews of maintenance
and test records.
b) Transformation Ratio Test

The transformation ratio test, carried out periodically on all HVITs, helps confirm that the
equipment still performs its basic functions correctly and in accordance with specified
requirements.
c) Doble Test
This high voltage bridge test measures capacitance and loss angles of high voltage insulating
components. Doble test results can be compared directly to manufacturers standards or to
results from other similar equipment. Assessing trends in Doble test results can help detect
deterioration of bushings and other internal components such as interrupters, operating rods,
grading capacitors, and support insulators.
d) Thermograph (IR)
This test occurs at substations and provides useful warnings of hot spots and other poor
primary connections.
e) Insulating Medium
oil and SF6 insulation systems. For HVITS, these tests are conducted periodically, with
frequency determined by performance history as well as the specific type or family of HVIT
equipment.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed instrument transformers first required
developing end-of life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion
failure.


requires attention;
and
repair.
Oil Filled CTs

Condition
Description
Rating
B Bushings/Support Insulators are not broken, however minor chips and cracks
are visible. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
C Bushings/Support Insulators are not broken, however major chips, and some
flashover burns and copper splash are visible. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/severely damaged or cementing and
E Bushings/Support Insulators or cementing and fasteners have completely
failed, are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 5.3.1 Bushing/Support Insulators Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any of the bushing-metal interfaces. No
external sign of deterioration of gaskets, weld seams or valves on tanks or
heads. Weather seal of terminal box in good condition.
cause operational and/or environmental problems. The CT needs major
reconditioning.
E Oil leaks or moisture ingress have resulted in complete failure or
Table 5.3.2 Oil Leaks/Gaskets and Seals Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No external corrosion or rust on tank, head or terminal box. No rust,
corrosion or evidence of moisture in terminal box.
B No external corrosion or rust on tank, head or terminal box. Some evidence of
moisture ingress or condensation in terminal box.
C Significant rust and corrosion on tank, head or terminal box, requires
D Serious rust and corrosion on tank, head or terminal box, high probability of
failure. Requires immediate corrective action.
E Rust and corrosion on tank, head or terminal box have caused equipment
failure or damage/degradation beyond repair.
Table 5.3.3 Tank/Heads/Terminal Box Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Current transformer primary connectors are tight, free from corrosion and
show no evidence of overheating. Primary conductors are adequately
supported and impose no excessive loading under normal or fault currents.
E Primary connectors or conductors have completely failed or are
damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 5.3.4 Primary Connectors/Conductors Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A All interconnecting conduit and cabling and fittings are free from damage and
corrosion and in good condition All wiring, terminal blocks, switches, relays,
monitoring and control devices are in good condition.
E Secondary connections or controls have completely failed or are
Table 5.3.5 Secondary Connections/Control Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
direct to bases, boxes and supports without any intervening paint or
corrosion.
E Foundation, supports, or grounding damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 5.3.6 Foundation/Support/Steel/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Current transformer externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and
secondary connections are in good condition. No external evidence of
overheating. Appears to be well maintained with service records readily
available.
E Current transformer has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Table 5.3.7 Overall CT Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Within specification
E Does not comply
Table 5.3.8 Transformation Ratio Test
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 5.3.9 Thermograph (IR)
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 5.3.10 Standard Oil Quality Test
Oil Filled CVTs

Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
failed, are damaged/degraded beyond repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
cause operational and/or environmental problems. The CVT needs major
reconditioning.
E Oil leaks and moisture ingress have resulted in complete failure or
Condition
Description
Rating
A No external corrosion or rust on cans or terminal box. No rust, corrosion or
evidence of moisture in terminal box.
B No external corrosion or rust on cans or terminal box. Some evidence of
C Significant rust and corrosion on cans or terminal box, requires corrective
maintenance within the next several months.
E Rust and corrosion on tank, head or terminal box have caused failure or
damage/degradation beyond repair
Table 5.3.13 Unit Cans/Terminal Box Condition
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Capacitive voltage transformer externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary
and secondary connections are in good condition. No external evidence of
available.
E CVT has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 5.3.17 Overall CVT Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
E Does not comply
Condition
Description
Rating
Oil Filled VTs

Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged or cementing and fasteners
are not secure.
failed or are damaged/degraded beyond repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
cause operational and/or environmental problems. The VT needs major
reconditioning.
E Oil leaks and moisture ingress have resulted in complete failure or
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion or evidence of moisture in terminal box.
Table 5.3.22 Heads/Terminal Box Condition
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion.
E Foundation, supports, or grounding damaged or are damaged/degraded
beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Voltage transformer externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and
available.
E VT has completely failed or damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 5.3.26 Overall VT Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
E Does not comply
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 5.3.29 Standard Oil Quality Test
SF6 Filled CTs and VTs

Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
failed or are damaged/degraded beyond repair

Condition
Description
Rating
interfaces, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density monitoring
device and SF6 refill maintenance records
quantity of SF6 in the CT, as determined by inspection of SF6
pressure/density monitoring device and refill maintenance records
C SF6 leakage of up to 1%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
the CT, as determined by inspection SF6 pressure/density monitoring device
and refill maintenance records
D SF6 leakage between 1% and 2%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of
SF6 in the CT, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density
monitoring device and refill maintenance records
the CT, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density monitoring
device and refill maintenance records
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion or evidence of moisture in terminal box. Weather seal of terminal
box in good condition.
Table 5.3.32 `Tank/Heads/Terminal Box Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion.

Condition
Description
Rating
overheating or overpressure. Pressure relief and gas density monitoring
devices operational. Appears to be well maintained with service records
readily available.
E CT has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair
Condition
Description
Rating
E Does not comply
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
E High levels of electrical activity (decomposition by-products) that cannot
be corrected
Table 5.3.39 Gas Analysis (decomposition by-products, moisture, air etc. based on

Dry CTs
Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
failed or are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
E Primary connectors or conductors have completely failed or are degraded
beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion.
Condition
Description
Rating
available.
E CT has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
E Does not comply
Condition
Description
Rating


5.3.51 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, HVIT
equipment in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded
HVIT equipment would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for oil filled CTs in
Table 5.3.47 below assume an oil filled CT with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 80 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 120. That oil filled CT, therefore,
hand, if that oil filled CT with partial data had a maximum condition score of 84; it would
have 70% of its maximum and a valid Health Index.

For some members of this asset class, available data were insufficient to provide a valid
Health Index using the 70% cut-off described above. In such cases, to provide BCTC with
(i.e., the 50% Rule). Thus, if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal
to 50% of the maximum possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and
presented in the results.
Oil Filled CTs Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Bushing/Support Insulator 3 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Oil Leaks/Gaskets and Seals 3 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Tank/Heads/Terminal Box 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Primary Connectors/Conductors 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Secondary Connections/Control 3 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
7 Overall CT Condition 3 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 12
8 Transformation Ratio Test 2 A, E 4,0 8
10 Standard Oil Quality Test 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score= 108
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 5.3.47 Oil Filled CTs Health Index Formulation

Oil Filled CVTs Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Unit Bushings/Support Insulator 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Oil Leaks/Gaskets and Seals 6 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 24
3 Unit Cans/Terminal Box 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Primary Connectors/Conductors 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Secondary Connections/Control 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Foundation/Support
6 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
7 Overall CVT Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
8 Transformation Ratio Test 1 A,E 4,0 4
9 Thermograph (IR) 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 108
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 5.3.48 Oil Filled CVTs Health Index Formulation
Oil Filled VTs Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
2 Oil Leaks/Gaskets and Seals 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Head/Terminal Box 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
7 Overall VT Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
8 Transformation Ratio Test 2 E,D 4,0 8
10 Standard Oil Analysis 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score= 108
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 5.3.49 Oil Filled VTs Health Index Formulation

SF6 Filled CTs Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
2 SF6 Leaks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Tank/Heads/Terminals 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Secondary Connectors/Control 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
7 Overall CT Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 104
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 5.3.50 SF6 Filled CTs Health Index Formulation
Dry CTs Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Foundation/Support
4 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
5 Overall CT Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 72
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 5.3.51 Dry CTs Health Index Formulation
Table 5.3.52 was used to determine the overall condition of the instrument transformer asset
class.

Health
Index
of components
70 - 85 Good
components
components
0 - 30 Very Poor
Table 5.3.52 Health Index Scale for Instrument Transformers
As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for each type of instrument
transformer in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 summarize
the results, which are also illustrated in Figures 5.4.1 through 5.4.6.

Health Index Results
Oil CTs* Oil CVTs Oil VTs* SF6 CTs* Dry CTs Sum
Classification
Very Good 82 106 24 9 6 198
Good 61 72 63 15 36 223
Fair 1 1 3 0 6 12
Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Results Based
on Field Survey 144 179 90 24 48 433
Percentage of Total
12.4 14.0 6.7 11.9 25.1 10.3
Population Surveyed
* HIs were calculated using 50% Rule instead of the 70% Rule due to insufficient data1
Table 5.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Instrument

Transformers

Oil CTs Oil CVTs Oil VTs SF6 CTs Dry CTs Sum
Classification
Very Good 663 760 361 75 24 1,883
Good 493 516 947 126 143 2,225
Fair 8 7 45 0 24 84
Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,164 1,283 1,353 201 191 4,192*
* Due to insufficient condition data, this total does not include the 70 series capacitor station current
transformers described in subsection 5.2 above.
Table 5.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Instrument

Transformers
1

700 663
Oil Current Transformers

600
493
500
Number of 400
300
200
100
0 0 8
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 5.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Oil Current Transformers
Capacitive Voltage Transformers
800 760
700
600 516
Number of
500
400
300
200
100 7
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 5.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Oil Capacitive Voltage
Transformers

1,000 947
900
Voltage Transformers
800
700
Number of
600
500
361
400
300
200
100 45
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 5.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Oil Voltage Transformers
140 126
Number of SF6 Instrument
120
Transformers
100
75
80
60
40
20
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 5.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for SF6 Current

Transformers

160
Dry Instrument Transformers

143
140
120
Number of 100
80
60
40 24 24
20
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 5.4.5 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Dry Current

Transformers
2,500 2,225
Instrument Transformers
2,000 1,883
Number of
1,500
1,000
500
0 0 84
0
Figure 5.4.6 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for All Instrument

Transformers

98% of Instrument Transformers are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

2% of Instrument Transformers are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or
capital improvements may be needed depending on criticality.

6.0 Shunt Reactors
6.1 Description
Shunt reactors absorb excess reactive power, typically during light load conditions. They
resemble power transformers, but unlike transformers shunt reactors operate at or close to
100% of nameplate rating when in service. Shunt reactor components include insulated
windings installed on a laminated iron core and immersed in a tank of oil for insulation and
cooling. In addition, reactor assemblies consist of bushings, radiators, instrument
transformers, protection and control systems, foundation and structural steel support, and
frequently spill containment systems.
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 126 shunt reactors, ranging in capacity from 10
MVA to 150 MVA. The shunt reactors absorb reactive power on the system, and include
static, oil filled, and steel core devices operating at system voltages between 12 kV and 500
kV. Most units have applications on the 500 kV system, and these play particularly critical
roles in system operation. Shunt reactors represent high cost assets, and have long delivery
times.
Shunt Reactor Design Characteristics

Shunt reactors are considered three-phase banks that may either consist of three single-phase
units or a single three-phase unit. Existing reactor fleets normally represent diverse products
of several original equipment manufacturers (OEM), some of which are no longer in
business.
Large oil filled, shunt reactors consist of bushings, oil, paper, pressboard, core-steel and
paper insulation. Oil and paper form the major constituents of the insulation system. The
core consists of thin, lightly insulated, steel laminations. Generally, tanks and radiators
fabricated from steel and porcelain clad bushings are common. While the fundamental
concept has remained unchanged, over time designs have become more cost effective,
compact and energy efficient. Improvements in design and fabrication techniques coupled
with more effective core and coils materials have resulted in reductions in volume and weight
per MVAr of rating. Computer assisted design tools have resulted in optimization of
dielectric, current carrying, magnetic and cooling characteristics.
National and international organizations have developed design, testing, and performance
standards that aid manufactures in the development of shunt reactors. Many users also
supplement or modify these standards to meet specific needs, especially for larger MVA
rated units. For example, they may specify features such as increased over-voltage
capabilities, special sound level requirements, transportation and other limiting dimensions,
plus special arrangements of coolers and other accessories. At the factory, each fully
assembled production unit receives several dielectric, temperature rise, sound level and
functional tests before delivery.

Shunt Reactor Components
Critical components of shunt reactors include:
Core and Coils

Insulation
Bushings
Cooling
Tanks
a) Core and Coils

Magnetic circuits have not changed significantly in the last century. However, key
developments have occurred in two areas - the improvement of core materials, and the shape
and construction of the core in relation to surrounding windings. Designers try to build cores
that do not degrade due to core and coil construction. Designs avoid hot spots, reduce losses,
prevent circulating currents, and avoid physical handling of cores. Designers enhance the
magnetic properties of reactors by proper stacking and handling, and by using structures that
reduce stress during transport and operation. User achieve long-term reliability by providing
sufficient cooling, effective grounding of core sections, and magnetic shielding to protect
against circulating currents.
The quality of winding design and construction frequently determines the reliability of a
reactor. Windings must withstand many extreme conditions over their lifetime including
over-voltages, lightning and switching surges. Various winding types (e.g., helical, single
and multi layer) are used depending on voltage and MVAr ratings. Designs must provide
appropriate series capacitance and proper voltage distribution across the winding while
maintaining high mechanical strength in the coil.
b) Insulation
The reactor insulation system combines oil, paper, pressboard, and core-steel insulation.
Insulating oil must have very low levels of moisture and air. Manufacturers usually try to
attain values of less than 5 ppm water and less than 0.5% dissolved air. Established
acceptable levels of solid and gaseous contaminants are used to assess results of DGA and
other tests in the field.
Both single sheet and laminated insulation board form integral parts of reactor insulation. A
core of 150 tons may have more than 50,000 individual laminations that require proper
surface. The dual electrical and mechanical roles of the insulation necessitate a high level of
quality since contamination or moisture can cause failure. New units must be dried until the
cellulose material has a moisture content of less than 0.5% of its weight.
c) Bushings
Usually specialty suppliers make bushings and types vary depending on voltage and current
ratings. Typical types include stud and oil impregnated condenser bushings. Most bushings
are porcelain clad, but composite and epoxy resin impregnated condenser types also exist.
Users specify types and manufacturers to ensure compatibility with tanks and surrounding
parts, particularly for HV and EHV.

d) Cooling
Natural oil and air circulation normally cool reactors and achieve MVAr ratings. All reactors
have radiator coolers that normally are hot-dip galvanized and painted for corrosion
protection. The radiator coolers may be separately mounted or tank mounted via headers.
e) Tanks
Main tanks consist primarily of heavy welded steel plates with outer and inner structural steel
stiffeners on their sides and large structural steel beams at their base. Conservator tanks and
radiators also are made from steel and must meet requirements of the main tank. Tanks must
withstand full vacuums and the lowest possible ambient temperatures. Main tank designs
must withstand transport by road, sea and rail. Base designs must accommodate some or all
of the following features to facilitate movement to final fixed foundation locations: jacking
steps, blocking areas, hauling eyes and reinforced rolling areas.
To avoid eddy current losses caused by flux leakage, main tanks of larger units also require
magnetic shielding. The shields consist of grain-oriented magnetic sheets applied as
laminated strips to tank walls.
To minimize corrosion and moisture ingress problems, tank designs must avoid sharp edges,
connections of dissimilar metals, areas where water can collect, and parts inaccessible for
shot blasting and painting. Also, tank frames and stiffening members must have closed
rectangular tubes (U-profile). Bushing, manhole and pipe flanges must be a minimum of 10
mm above tank covers to minimize water ingress. Generally, tanks must have forms that can
hold long-term surface treatments.
Reactor Accessories
Accessories and auxiliary systems consist of instrument transformers, protection, control and
monitoring systems, power supplies, pressure relief devices, foundation and structural steel
supports, and often deluge, acoustic enclosure, fire protection and spill containment systems.
Bushings usually have current transformers for relaying and metering. Bushing potential
devices also may be provided. Secondary wiring ends in a terminal box or control cabinets.
Several versions of gas detection and monitoring devices exist, but normally only minimal
monitoring or protection is provided.
6.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 126 shunt reactors. Table 6.2.1
shows the number of shunt reactors grouped by each relevant voltage level and age group.
The 500 kV voltage level contains most of the systems shunt reactors, with 85.7%. The 10
shunt reactors at the less than 25 kV level are neutral reactors.
Table 6.2.1 also shows that 86.5% of the shunt reactors are within the age range of 20 to 29
years old, and that none are older than 29 years.

Voltage Level
Total Percent
25 kV 138 kV 230 kV 500 kV
0 to 9 0 0 4 3 7 5.6
10 to 19 2 0 1 5 8 6.3
Age Group
20 to 29 8 2 1 98 109 86.5
30 to 39 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Incomplete 0 0 0 2 2 1.6
Total 10 2 6 108 126 100.0
Percent 7.9 1.6 4.8 85.7 100.0
Table 6.2.1 Count of Shunt Reactors Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Shunt reactors have no preset life expectancies, and several factors can influence degradation
of equipment components. In general, users expect 40 to 50 years of life from a reactor,
assuming normal loading and operating conditions.
Longevity of these units depends largely on the condition of their core and coils. Reactors
have operating stresses that include dielectric, thermal and electromagnetic effects of steady
state, transient and dynamic over-voltages. Switching devices that restrike during de-
energizing also add stress to unit winding conductor insulation, resulting in cumulative and
non-reversible degradation. Reactor aging rates depend on the design, safety margins,
operating conditions and environmental factors. Cores and coils receive relatively little
maintenance aside from periodic dissolved gas in oil analysis (i.e., DGA and oil temperature,
gas accumulation and core leakage current monitoring.
Normal and abnormal operating conditions influence reactor aging. Lightning and switching
surges can cause internal localized over-voltages. Over-voltages cause above-normal
temperatures. Insulation degrades through exposure to moisture, particles, and acids. Such
conditions can eventually lead to failures.
Shunt reactors generally represent one of the most costly components of power systems. In
addition, the consequences of reactor failure are significant. Major failures affect cost, safety
and the environment. Also, failures usually require detanking and off-site repairs. Some of
the major recorded reactor failures have resulted from bushing failures, internal insulation
and winding faults, as well as failed winding accessories.

Several auxiliary systems support shunt reactors. These include containment, cooling, and
protection and control systems, plus bushings. The condition of auxiliary components affects
overall performance of any reactor unit. For example, tank gaskets typically begin to
deteriorate after about 15 years of service. Resultant oil leaks become progressively worse
over time. Cooling and radiator systems can rust and corrode during the same time frame,
degrading a units cooling capabilities. Components typically require regular maintenance
and overhauls to sustain performance over a reactors expected service life. Typically these
overhauls occur at about the mid-life of a reactor.
stress on bushings and other reactor components. Thermal and mechanical failures may
result from misaligned and inadequately supported bus conductors as well as misaligned and
loose connectors.
Utilities generally manage reactors through time based preventive maintenance programs.
They make replacement and refurbishment decisions based on reactor duties, criticality,
problems noted, plus ongoing maintenance requirements and associated costs. Traditionally,
utilities have used manufacturers recommendations to design reactor maintenance programs.
Generally, manufacturers made conservative (i.e., risk averse) maintenance recommendations
and applied conservative safety margins during design.
Some utilities have undertaken large-scale rehabilitation and refurbishment programs for
existing reactors. These programs do not directly extend a reactors life, but they do help
ensure that units achieve a normal life expectancy. Rehabilitation includes correcting known
defects, replacing gaskets, overhauling accessories and wiring, and repairing leaks.
Refurbishment includes rehabilitation activities plus replacing accessories, re-clamping
windings, and removing cores and coils from tanks. Generally, only after complete winding
and associated insulation replacement will a unit have such an increase in life expectancy that
it becomes equivalent to a new unit.
faults in shunt reactors. It is based on Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) techniques.
BCTCs Maintenance Standards contain maintenance procedures for specific types of shunt
reactors.

condition of shunt reactors:
a) Visual
Shunt reactors have many visible and accessible components, making visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion, misalignment,
evidence of overheating, plus cracks and oil leaks on bushings, tanks, radiators, pipes and
fittings. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals. Visual
inspections can help assess internal conditions and components of control and mechanism
cabinets. Visual inspections, however, must be supplemented by records reviews.

arcing in oil, overheating of insulation, insulation aging, and partial discharge damage.
Interpretation of DGA requires special skills and knowledge of reactor types, insulation
structure, range of acceptable levels, and risks. It also requires understanding possible causes
of gas evolution such as aging and partial discharges in bushings and other components.
Recording DGA results and analyzing trends overtime are keys to the assessment of
deterioration. When oil in an existing transformer is reconditioned or replaced, it will result
in a step change (reduction) in furan, moisture and metal content level. Both the old and new
levels should be recorded and considered when analyzing future trends.
c) Doble Test
This test involves applying a voltage to bushings and measuring capacitance and loss angles
using a bridge technique. Doble test results can be compared directly to manufacturers
standards or to results from other similar transformers. Assessing trends in Doble test results
can help detect deterioration of bushings and other internal components such as support
insulators.
d) Insulating Medium
oil, air or reactor insulation systems.
e) Thermograph (IR)
Data from this test provide useful warnings of hot spots and other thermal problems within or
outside reactors.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed shunt reactors first required developing

requires attention;
and

repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
E Bushings or cementing and fasteners have completely failed, are damaged
beyond repair or have completely degraded.
Table 6.3.1 Bushing Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Oil leaks and moisture ingress resulted in complete failure or degradation
beyond repair.
Table 6.3.2 Oil Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
condition.
E Corrosion on main tank and cabinets beyond repair or water/insect/rodent
damage beyond repair..
Table 6.3.3 Main Tank/Cabinets and Controls Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on body conservator tank. No rust, corrosion on weld
seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors.
B No rust or corrosion on conservator.
C Some rust and corrosion on conservator.
D Significant rust and corrosion on conservator. Could lead to major oil leakage
or water ingress.
repair.
Any seal failure on a sealed tank shunt reactor.
Note. For reactors employing sealed tanks or air bags, a failure of the seal
would be indicated by the presence of air in the tank, which can be detected
by measuring oxygen or nitrogen content while conducting gas in oil analysis.
Table 6.3.4 Conservator/Oil Preservation System Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 6.3.5 Radiators/Cooling System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Foundation, supports or grounding damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Shunt Reactor externally is clean, and corrosion free. All primary and
E Shunt Reactor has failed or is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 6.3.7 Overall Shunt Reactor Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Table 6.3.8 DGA Oil Analysis
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 6.3.9 Furan Oil Analysis
Condition
Description
Rating
A Less than 20 years old
B 20-40 years old
C 40-60 years old
D Greater than 60 years old
E Not Applicable
Table 6.3.10 Shunt Reactor Age

Only to be Used if Furan Analysis is Not Available

Condition
Description
Rating
D Values considerably exceed acceptable levels; power factor between 1 - 2%
E Values are not acceptable> 2%, immediate attention required; power factor
greater than 2%
Table 6.3.11 Winding Doble Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
Factor IFT Factor Dielectric Factor
(T oC Corrected)
F1 dynes/cm F2 Str. kV F3
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2
Table 6.3.12 Oil Quality Test

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A Passed test, DGA overall factor less than 3 PPM
E Failed test, overall DGA factor greater than 3 PPM
Table 6.3.14 Bushing Oil Analysis

A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2,
D = 1; and
E = 0.

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a shunt reactor
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded shunt
reactor would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for shunt reactors in
Table 6.3.15 below, assume a shunt reactor with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 90 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 132. That shunt reactor, therefore,
hand, if that shunt reactor with partial data had a maximum condition score of 95 it would
have 72% of the maximum and a valid Health Index.
assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off (i.e., the 50% Rule). Thus,
Table 6.3.15 shows the component/test condition criteria, weightings, condition ratings as

Shunt Reactors Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Bushing Condition 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
2 Oil Leaks 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Main Tank/Cabinets and Controls 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
4 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
5 Radiators/Cooling System 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Foundation/Support
6 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Steel/Grounding
7 Overall Reactor Condition 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
8 Furan Oil Analysis* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
9 DGA Oil Analysis* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
10 Winding Doble Test* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
11 Oil Quality Test 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
13 Bushing DGA Oil Analysis 4 A,E 4,0 16
* In case of a score of E, overall HI is divided by 2
If Furan data is not available Use Age data per Table 6.3.10
Table 6.3.15 Shunt Reactor Health Index Formulation
Table 6.3.16 was used to determine the overall condition of the shunt reactor asset class.
Health
Index
Some aging or minor deterioration
85-100 Very Good of a limited number of Normal maintenance
components
Significant deterioration of some
70-85 Good Normal maintenance
components
Widespread significant
Increase diagnostic testing, possible
deterioration or serious
50-70 Fair rebuild or replacement needed
deterioration of specific
depending on criticality
components
Start planning process to replace or
30-50 Poor Widespread serious deterioration rebuild, considering risk and
At end-of-life, immediately assess
0-30 Very Poor Extensive serious deterioration risk; replace or rebuild based on
assessment
Table 6.3.16 Health Index Scale for Shunt Reactors

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for Shunt Reactors in the
are also illustrated in Figure 6.4.1. Note, as described in subsection 6.3.3 above, the 50%
Rule was applied in calculating the Health Index for this asset since available data were
insufficient to use the 70% Rule.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Shunt Reactors*
Very Good 58
Good 26
Fair 6
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Table 6.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Shunt Reactors
Health Index Results Classification Number of Shunt Reactors
Very Good 81
Good (1) 37
Fair 8
Poor (1) 0
Very Poor 0
Total 126
(1) Note: 19 of the AEI 500kV shunt reactors have potential winding neutral shield problems. These are being
monitored and could be considered in Poor Condition
Table 6.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results

for Shunt Reactors

90 81
Number of Shunt Reactors

80
70
60
50
37
40
30
20
8
10 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
*Note, however, that 19 AEI 500kV shunt reactors have potential winding neutral shield problems. These are
being monitored and could be considered in Poor Condition
Figure 6.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Shunt Reactors
93.7% of Shunt Reactors are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

6.3% of Shunt Reactors are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital

7.0 Shunt Capacitors
7.1 Description
Shunt capacitors provide reactive compensation and voltage support to transmission systems,
usually during heavy load conditions. The shunt capacitor population on the BCTC-managed
transmission system consists of 67 three-phase shunt capacitor banks. These shunt capacitors
provide reactive power on the transmission system at substations. They are on free standing
racks, mounted on support insulators operating at system voltages between 12 kV and
230 kV.
When in service, shunt capacitors always operate at or close to 100% of nameplate rating.
Capacitor bank components include capacitor units, base support and inter-rack insulators,
interconnecting buswork, as well as racks and support steel, all commonly installed on
concrete foundations. Capacitor assemblies may consist of inrush current limiting reactors,
capacitor unit fuses, surge arresters, disconnect and ground switches, instrument transformers
and associated protection and control devices. Tanks are made from stainless steel and
porcelain clad bushings are common.
Large shunt capacitor banks consist of insulators, liquid impregnated polypropylene insulated
capacitor units with either internally or externally mounted fuses and interconnecting bus-
work. Usually, capacitor units have wye (Y) connected series-parallel arrangements to meet
voltage and MVAr rating requirements. They may have grounded or ungrounded neutrals.
While banks are usually configured for air insulated outdoor installations other
configurations (e.g., metal-clad arrangements) also exist.
Capacitor unit technology has advanced substantially in the last 20 years. In the past, oil and
paper were the major constituents of capacitor bank insulation systems. Because of the need
for more cost-effective, compact and energy efficient designs, the technology has developed
over time. Recent capacitors are wound from alternate layers of aluminium foil, an improved
low loss polypropylene film, and kraft paper impregnated synthetic oil with high gas
absorption qualities. Unit ratings now reach 600 kVAr or more, up from 200 kVAr in the
1980s.
National and international organizations have developed design, testing, and performance
standards that aid manufactures in the development of shunt capacitors. Many users also
supplement or modify these standards to meet specific needs, especially for larger MVA
rated units. For example, they may specify features such as increased over-voltage
capabilities, special sound level requirements, transportation and other limiting dimensions,
plus special arrangements of coolers and other accessories. At the factory, each fully
assembled production unit receives several dielectric, temperature rise, sound level and
functional tests before delivery.

Shunt Capacitor Components
Critical components of a capacitor bank include:
Capacitor units (including fuses)

Insulators
Interconnecting buses
Racks and support steel
Designers try to build banks with capacitors and other materials that have specific loss
properties and operating characteristics that do not degrade over time. Electrical clearances,
insulators and overcurrent protection add reliability under normal and abnormal operating
conditions. Banks must have sufficient support to withstand transport and operational forces.
Extreme conditions such as transient and temporary over-voltages may substantially affect a
capacitor, and the capacitor must withstand such conditions throughout its life. The quality
of a units internal insulation frequently determines its reliability.
Capacitor Bank Accessories

Accessories and auxiliary systems consist of instrument transformers, surge arresters,
disconnect and ground switches, protection, control and monitoring systems, power supplies
and foundations. For purposes of this report, associated capacitor circuit breakers and
switchers are discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, Circuit Breakers and Circuit Switchers.
7.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 67 shunt capacitors. Table 7.2.1
shows the number of shunt capacitors grouped by voltage level and age group. The less than
25 kV voltage level contains most of the shunt capacitors, with 61.2% of the total. The 138
kV level has the next highest number of shunt capacitors with 16.4% of the total. The 60 kV
level has 7.5%, and the 230 kV level has 10.4% of the systems shunt capacitors.
Table 7.2.1 also shows that 88% of the shunt capacitors are less than 29 years old and none
are more than 40 years old.

Voltage
Total Percent
25 kV 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV Incomplete
0 to 9 14 2 2 4 0 22 32.8
10 to 19 20 1 7 2 0 30 44.8
Age Group
20 to 29 3 2 1 1 0 7 10.4
30 to 39 2 0 0 0 0 2 3.0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 2 0 1 0 3 6 9.0
Total 41 5 11 7 3 67 100.0
Percent 61.2 7.5 16.4 10.4 4.5 100.0
Table 7.2.1 Count of Shunt Capacitors Grouped by Voltage Level and Age
Capacitor banks consist of capacitors, fuses, insulators and support structures. They are
essentially static devices, considered robust and reliable with no preset life expectancies.
While several factors may affect their condition, users generally expect capacitor banks to
have useful lives of 30 40 years, assuming normal operations. Generally, capacitors reach
their end-of-life when units, structures, insulators, and fuses deteriorate to the point where
maintenance becomes uneconomic.
Capacitors undergo exposure to extreme temperatures, other environmental conditions, birds,

rodents and small animals. During service, capacitor banks also experience steady state,
transient and dynamic over-voltage conditions. Switching devices that restrike during de-
energizing impose additional stress on capacitors. Such stress results in cumulative and non-
reversible degradation of insulation in capacitor units and external insulators. Degradation
rates depend on design, safety margins, system conditions and environmental factors.
Capacitor banks receive little maintenance except periodic inspections, cleaning, unit
capacitance testing, and replacement of failed units and fuses.
In the past, bushing and fuse failures, contamination and small animals have caused major
failures. Fuse degradation results primarily from the failure of seals and ingress of moisture.
While users have reported some corrosion in capacitor units and support steelwork, it occurs
primarily in coastal areas from salt spray but is rare elsewhere. Internal degradation occurs
in insulators, but this is difficult to detect with standard visual inspection methods.
stress on bushings and other capacitor components. Thermal and mechanical failures may
result from misaligned and inadequately supported bus conductors. Misaligned and loose
connectors can cause thermal and mechanical failures of bushings and insulators.

faults in shunt capacitors. It is based on Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
techniques.
Canada has environmental laws and regulations for chlorobiphenyls (i.e., polychlorinated
biphenyls, PCBs) that include requirements for certain PCB equipment. Canada also has
proposed amendments to its chlorobiphenyl regulations that would phase-out PCB equipment
such as capacitors containing 500 mg/kg or more of PCBs by the year 2007. BCTC has a
program to replace any relevant capacitors by that deadline.

condition of shunt capacitors. In addition to the following assessment techniques, protection
unbalance alarms also provide alerts about the condition of shunt capacitors. Typically, the
failure of 2 or 3 cans in a string cause these alarms to sound.
a) Visual
Shunt capacitors have many visible and accessible components, making visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion, evidence of leaks,
internal unit failures, blown fuses, misalignment, plus chips, cracks and other insulator
defects. Visual inspections must be supplemented by record reviews and annual infrared (IR)
tests.
b) Doble and Capacitance Bridge Test

This test involves applying a test voltage to a capacitor unit and measuring capacitance and
loss angles using a bridge technique. Doble test results can be compared directly to
manufacturers standards or to results from other similar capacitors. Assessing trends in
Doble test results can help detect deterioration of bushings and other internal components
such as support insulators.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed shunt capacitors first required developing


requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Support Insulators (rack and inter-rack) are not broken and are free of
contamination, chips, radial cracks, flashover burns, copper splash and copper
B Support Insulators (rack and inter-rack) are not broken, however minor
contamination, chips and cracks are visible. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
C Support Insulators (rack and inter-rack) are not broken, however major
contamination, chips, and some flashover burns and copper splash are visible.
D Support Insulators (rack and inter-rack) are broken/damaged or cementing
and fasteners are not secure.
E Support Insulators (rack and inter-rack), or cementing and fasteners are
broken/damaged beyond repair.
Table 7.3.1 Rack Support Insulators Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Support steel and bolts are tight and free from corrosion. High voltage
connections are made directly to buses, structures, fuses and capacitor units
E Supports or connections are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 7.3.2 Rack Structure Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Some external sign of deterioration of gaskets/ weld seams on cans. No
bulging of cans. No signs of oil leaks or oil stains on cans. Some external
corrosion or rust on cans
B Some external sign of deterioration of gaskets/ weld seams on cans. No
bulging of cans. No signs of oil leaks or oil stains on cans. Some external
corrosion or rust on cans
C Some external sign of deterioration of gaskets/ weld seams on cans. Bulging
of cans. Signs of oil leaks or oil stains on cans. Extensive external corrosion
or rust on cans. Requires corrective maintenance within the next several
months.
D Major external sign of deterioration of gaskets/ weld seams on cans. Bulging
of many cans. Many signs of oil leaks or oil stains on cans. Extensive external
corrosion or rust on cans. High probability of failure. Requires immediate
corrective action.
E Cans or their components have failed or are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 7.3.3 Condition of Capacitor Units
Condition
Description
Rating
A No Fuses are blown, fuses and stand off rail insulators are free of
contamination, chips, flashover burns, Fasteners are secure.
B No or fuses are blown, fuses and stand off rail insulators have moderate
contamination, no chips or flashover burns, Fasteners are secure..
C More than three fuses are blown but are not sufficient to impose excessive
voltage on remaining units. Fuses and stand off rail insulators have moderate
contamination and some flashover burns, Fasteners are secure.
D Sufficient fuses are blown to impose excessive voltage on remaining units.
Fuses and stand off rail insulators have heavy contamination with some
flashover burns. Fasteners are secure.
E Fuses, stand off rail insulators, or fasteners are contaminated or
Table 7.3.4 Condition of Capacitor Unit Fuses

Condition
Description
Rating
A Shunt Capacitor high voltage connectors are tight, free from corrosion and
show no evidence of overheating. All bus conductors are adequately
E Connectors or conductors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 7.3.5 Condition of Connectors/Conductors
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 7.3.6 Foundation/Support Structure/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A System is externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
connections are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or
any other abnormality. Appears to have been well maintained.
E Shunt capacitor is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 7.3.7 Overall Shunt Capacitor Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Within specifications all cells
B Small number of cells (~<2%) do not meet specification
C Significant number of cells (~2-7%) do not meet specification
D Many cells (~7-10%) do not meet specification
E Many cells (~>10%) do not meet specification
Table 7.3.8 Capacitance Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A Total absence of any unusual hotspots
B Some minor indications noted but are not of concern
C Some indications noted requiring further investigation
D Definite abnormalities noted requiring corrective action
E Definite abnormalities that cannot be corrected.
Table 7.3.9 Thermography (IR)
Condition
Description
Rating
A No alarms
B 1 alarm per year
C 2 alarms per year
D 3 alarms per year
E More than 3 alarms per year
Table 7.3.10 Unbalance Protection

A = 4;
B = 3,

C = 2,
D = 1, and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a shunt capacitor
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded shunt
capacitor would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for shunt capacitors in
Table 7.3.11 below, assume a shunt capacitor with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 54 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 80. That shunt capacitor,
therefore, has only 68% of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On
the other hand, if that shunt capacitor with partial data had a maximum condition score of 58
it would have 73% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.

Shunt Capacitors Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Rack Support Insulators 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
2 Rack Structure 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Capacitor Units 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Capacitor Unit Fuses 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Connectors/Conductors 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Structure/Grounding
Overall Shunt Capacitor
7 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition
8 Capacitance Test 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
9 IR Thermography 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
10 Unbalance Alarms 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Note. If capacitor is considered PCB equipment, divide HI by 2.
Table 7.3.11 Shunt Capacitor Health Index Formulation
Table 7.3.12 was used to determine the overall condition of the shunt capacitor asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 7.3.12 Health Index Scale for Shunt Capacitors

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for shunt capacitors in the
are also illustrated in Figure 7.4.1. Note, as described in subsection 7.3.3 above, the 50%
Health Index Results Classification Number of Capacitors
Very Good 18
Good 32
Fair 0
Poor 2
Very Poor 0
Table 7.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Shunt Capacitors
Health Index Results Classification Number of Capacitors
Very Good 23
Good 41
Fair 0
Poor 3
Very Poor 0
Total 67
Table 7.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Shunt

Capacitors

45 41
40
Shunt Capacitors
35
30
Number of
25 23
20
15
10
5 3
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 7.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Shunt Capacitors
95.5% of Shunt Capacitors are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

4.5% of Shunt Capacitors are in Poor condition. Planning for refurbishment or
replacement should begin, considering the consequences of failure associated with
these assets.

8.0 Station Insulators
8.1 Description
In substations, insulators support overhead bus conductors to provide adequate basic impulse
insulation levels (BIL) that enable bus conductors to withstand over-voltage conditions.
Most station insulators consist of porcelain, but both composite (e.g., fibre-reinforced resin
with silicone rubber sheds) and solid polymeric (e.g., epoxy) insulators exist, particularly at
lower voltage levels. Substations located in areas with high levels of ambient air pollution
generally have insulators coated with silicone compounds to improve their performance.
Station type insulators have several different designs. Older installations may use suspension
insulators to support bus conductors. Generally, newer compact stations have post-type
insulators. However, cap and pin insulators also are widely used. BCTC has a program to
replace all cap and pin insulators in the next 10 years.
8.2 Demographics
BCTC does not gather data related to this asset class. Therefore, no demographic data are
available for station insulators overall. However, BCTC has determined that there are about
26,000 pin and cap type insulators used in the BCTC-managed transmission system. These
insulators are known to fail and are the subject of an ongoing replacement program.
Insulators experience both electrical and mechanical stress. Loss of either dielectric or
mechanical strength can cause their degradation and failure. Mechanical stress may result
from several environmental factors, including wind, ice and snow loading. Operational
factors such as vibrations from switchgear and short-circuits also cause mechanical stress.
Electrical damage may result from repeated over-voltages and flashovers. Air-borne
contaminants, ice and snow accumulation may cause flashovers. Station insulators can
withstand and recover from occasional electrical flashovers. These flashovers rarely damage
porcelain insulators. However, after tracking and water ingress, flashovers may penetrate or
puncture the insulator bulk causing permanent damage. Electrical failures weaken insulators
through mechanical overstressing.
Porcelain insulators fail through radial cracking, circumferential cracking (i.e., doughnut
cracking), head cracks, and punctures. Radial and circumferential cracks occur in the shed,
and although very fine, close inspections can detect them. Radial cracks can extend up into
the insulator head. Insulator caps often hide head cracks and punctures making them hard to
detect visually. Over time, cap and pin insulators experience wear and tear on their metal

parts. Some insulators develop a condition called cement growth. This condition causes
expansion of the cement that attaches the metal cap to the porcelain. It results in separation
and breakage of the insulator. Improper porcelain curing during manufacture also has caused
cracking and failures in some insulators.
Polymeric and composite insulators may experience long-term surface degradation. Also,
electrical stresses may degrade the bulk of insulators, particularly their hollow internal
surfaces and the laminated material interfaces of composite insulators. Contaminants may
lead to tracking and surface degradation decreasing insulator performance. Resin-based
materials used in insulator bulks are susceptible to minute manufacturing defects. When
such defects occur in areas of high electrical stress, electrical treeing and failures may result.
Generally, degradation of these types of insulators may take months or years.
Some insulators have coatings (e.g., silicone grease) to reduce impacts from ambient air
pollution. These coatings can degrade over time, leading to performance reduction.
Washing typically restores contaminated coatings. However, after several washings coatings
must be reapplied.
Mechanical failures and frequent performance problems (e.g., numerous flashovers)

generally determine the end-of-life for insulators. Also, when maintenance costs outweigh
replacement costs, economic considerations may dictate an insulators end-of-life.
Critical insulator defects (e.g., cracks) are often small and hard to detect, making condition
assessment difficult. Since insulators consist of brittle materials (e.g., porcelains),
mechanical failures can occur quickly with little prior warning or evidence of deterioration.
Cement growth, moisture ingress and internal corrosion represent key processes that degrade
insulators over time. Generally, visual and non-destructive methods cannot detect these
processes and other internal degradation readily. Visual inspections, however, can detect
surface degradation on polymeric and composite insulators.
Most inspection procedures for porcelain insulators are designed to detect cracked porcelains
and to report external damage and deterioration. However, porcelain crack detection is
difficult. Under dry conditions, cracks may be undetectable. Also, un-cracked but
contaminated insulators may exhibit surface activities similar to those generated by cracks.
Destructive examination of recovered units represents the main way to assess developing
insulator degradation. This technique is not practical for routine condition assessment.
However, it can help assess risks associated with certain batches or locations. For example,
when performance or failures indicate inherent problems in an insulator batch, it may be
appropriate to test intact units recovered from service to determine the problems extent and
the life of the remaining population.
Ancillary equipment or components also affect the overall condition of station insulators.
Thus, connectors, clamps, conductors, and structure grounding require consideration when
determining the health of these assets. Current carrying capability is used to assess the

condition of connectors, clamps and conductors. Resistance testing helps determine the
condition of structure grounding.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed insulators first required developing end-of-
life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a factor
critical in determining the components condition relative to potential failure.
The condition assessment and rating process included visual inspections and reviews of
records in BCTCs asset management system databases. In addition to maintenance
histories, these databases contain information about operating requirements and conditions,
defects, failures, and spares. In assessing the information available against end-of-life
criteria, condition states were rated A through E. For this asset class, letter condition ratings
have the following general meanings:

requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Not a risk/type insulator, no failures expected
C This type of insulator is known to fail occasionally.
E High-risk insulator, failure can be expected or has occurred.
Table 8.3.1 Risk Type of Insulator (e.g. Cap & Pin)

Condition
Description
Rating
A Protective coating as new.
B Protective coating shows minor deterioration/fading
C Protective coating shows some deterioration/fading
D Protective coating has severely deteriorated
E Protective coating has deteriorated beyond repair
Table 8.3.2 Protective Coating of Insulator
Condition
Description
Rating
A Insulators are not broken and are free of chips and radial cracks,. Cementing
B Insulators are not broken, however minor chips and cracks, are visible.
C Insulators are not broken, however major chips are visible. Cementing and
D Insulators are broken/damaged or cementing and fasteners are not secure.
E Insulators or cementing and fasteners are broken/damaged or degraded
beyond repair.
Table 8.3.3 Broken, Chipped or Cracked Insulators
Condition
Description
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on insulator parts. No flashover burns.
B Some evidence of slight corrosion. No flashover burns.
C Some rust and corrosion on insulator parts or some flashover burns and
copper splash are visible.
D Significant rust and corrosion on insulator parts and/or significant flashover
burns.
E Insulator parts have rust, corrosion or flashover burns beyond repair.
Table 8.3.4 Corrosion/Flash Over Burns

Condition
Description
Rating
A Connectors are tight, free from corrosion and show no evidence of
overheating. Conductors are adequately supported.
E Connectors or conductors are broken/damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 8.3.5 Connectors/Conductor Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Foundations, supports or grounding are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
condition.


A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an insulator in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded insulator
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for insulators in Table 8.3.8 below,
assume an insulator with partial data has a maximum condition score of 34 out of the Health
Index maximum possible score of 52. That insulator, therefore, has only 65% of the
maximum Health Index score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand,
if that insulator with partial data had a maximum condition score of 40 it would have 77% of
the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.

Station Insulator Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Risk Type of Insulator (e.g. Cap
1 4 A,C,E 3,1,0 12
& Pin)
2 Protective Coating of Insulator 1 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 4
Broken, Chipped or Cracked
3 2 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 8
Insulators
4 Corrosion/Flash Burns 2 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 8
5 Loose/Damaged Connections 1 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 4
Foundation/Support
6 2 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding Condition
7 Thermography Test 2 A,B,C,D,E 4.3,2,1,0 8
Max Score= 52
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 8.3.8 Insulators Health Index Formulation
Table 8.3.9 was used to determine the overall condition of the insulator asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 8.3.9 Health Index Scale for Insulators

BCTC has identified 36,635 pin and cap type insulator stacks in the transmission and
distribution systems it manages. Of those, about 26,000 are part of the BCTC-managed
transmission system. All of the insulator stacks are judged to be in Very Poor condition
because of their known failure characteristics. There is an existing program, initiated in 2000,
to replace these insulator stacks that, at this time, is about 33% complete.
No data were available to assess the condition of Station Insulators overall. In addition,
because of the large number and variety of insulators, it was not cost effective to conduct a
specific detailed survey of insulators as part of this baseline study. However, monthly checks
of these assets are performed as part of routine station inspections.

9.0 Substation Cables and Terminations
9.1 Description
This asset class covers insulated cables used in transmission stations to interconnect power
equipment. Typically, cables used in transmission stations are short runs contained in a
controlled environment. Often they are installed in ducts or trenches and receive regular
visual inspections. Potheads and other types of cable end terminations facilitate connections
with power equipment. Generally, substation cables are cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE)
or paper insulated, lead covered (PILC) and they operate at voltages up to 230 kV.
9.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 36 substation cables. Table 9.2.1
shows the number of substation cables grouped by voltage level and age group. The 60 kV
and 230 kV voltage levels have most of the substation cables, with 41.7% and 30.6%
respectively. The 138 kV voltage level has 5.6% of the substation cables, and 22.3% of the
substation cables have incomplete voltage level information.
Table 9.2.1 also shows that 25% of the substation cables are in the age range of 30 to 39
years, 22.2% are less than 9 years old, and 8.3% are between 10 to 19 years. Note that
44.4% of the station cables have incomplete age information.
Voltage
Years 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV Incomplete Total Percent
0 to 9 8 0 0 0 8 22.2
10 to 19 0 0 2 1 3 8.3
Age Group
20 to 29 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
30 to 39 0 0 4 5 9 25.0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Incomplete 7 2 5 2 16 44.4
Total 15 2 11 8 36 100.0
Percent 41.7 5.6 30.6 22.2 100.0
Table 9.2.1 Count of Substation Cables Grouped by Voltage Level and Age

Cables used in transmission stations are typically short runs contained in a controlled
environment and subject to regular visual inspection. PILC cables have reliable service lives
of 40 - 50 years. The average life expectancy of XLPE cables is 30 to 35 years.
Insulation systems in both XLPE and PILC cables degrade with age. The rate of degradation
depends on insulation thickness, operating temperatures, voltage stresses, plus the presence
of moisture and other impurities inside cable insulation systems. It is difficult to predict the
useful life of cable insulation. Normalized historic failure rates offer the most reliable and
practical means to assess the health, condition and remaining life of medium voltage cables.
For station cables, moisture ingress represents a key cause of failure, since moisture
deteriorates cable insulation. Moisture can penetrate into the cable through jacket
degradation as well as poorly installed terminations and splices. Water treeing has resulted
in premature aging and failures in earlier vintages of XLPE cables. For PILC cables,
deterioration results from damage, lead sheath corrosion, moisture ingress, loss of oil and
drying of paper insulation. Newer XLPE vintages have tree retardant insulation, making
them more resistant to moisture-related failures.
Degradation in cables is difficult to detect. In paper-insulated cables, visual inspections help

evaluate sheath and jacket damage, age and overall cable condition. Polymeric cables
present greater evaluation challenges. A polymeric cable that seems in perfect condition may
fail, while one that seems in poor condition might last a long time.
While partial discharge tests are often recommended to detect potential failures and predict
remaining life, these tests are difficult to perform and to interpret. Examination of a cables
internal design and manufacturing processes help to identify failure risks, and may be more
reliable and practical than partial discharge tests. For example, tape shields found in cables
manufactured prior to the 1980s, may have impurities that potentially reduce the cables life.
Terminations and potheads represent the most unreliable and problematic components of
cables. Lead sheath cables have filled terminations and XLPE cables have polymeric
terminations. Electrical activity associated with voids and moisture ingress may cause
failures in porcelain and compound filled potheads. Visual inspections can help detect leaks,
damage and other problems in potheads and polymeric terminations. Pothead failures may
be violent and dangerous, and the risk of failures increases with pothead age. Regular
inspections and discharge testing may reduce pothead failures. Because of the catastrophic
nature of termination failures, even one incident may lead utilities to institute such systematic
testing programs.
Polymeric terminations are prone to discharge-related failures and moisture ingress. In many
cases, these failures result from incorrect installation and design flaws that create electric
stresses. However, electrical activity associated with voids and moisture ingress also result

in failures of polymeric terminations. Generally, degradation and failure processes for these
components are not well understood. Discharge testing and monitoring using ultrasonic and
electromagnetic detectors can help discover deterioration. Thus, some utilities have begun
non-invasive discharge and detection programs to identify high-risk terminations.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed substation cables first required developing
end-of life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a

requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Potheads and electrical exposed conductors/connectors are clean, corrosion
free and are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or any
other abnormality. Potheads are not broken and are free of chips, radial
E Potheads or connectors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 9.3.1 Pothead/Connectors Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
E Foundation, supports, or grounding are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Overall installation is externally clean, corrosion and leak free. All cable
sections and connections are in good condition. No external evidence of any
deterioration, overheating or abnormality.
B Normal signs of wear with respect to the above characteristics and/or
evidence of past repair.
C One or two of the above characteristics are unacceptable and/or evidence of
multiple repairs or failures
E Cable is damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 9.3.3 Overall Cable Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
condition.
Table 9.3.4 Thermograph Scan


A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
D = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a cable in perfect
condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded cable would have a
Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for cables in Table 9.3.5 below, assume
a cable with partial data has a maximum condition score of 24 out of the Health Index
maximum possible score of 36. That cable, therefore, has only 67% of the maximum score,
and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that cable with partial data
had a maximum condition score of 26 it would have 72% of the Health Index maximum and
a valid Health Index.

Station Cables & Terminations Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Pothead/Connectors/Terminations 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Foundation/Support
2 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
3 Overall Cable Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Thermograph Scan 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 48
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 9.3.5 Substation Cables and Terminations Health Index Formulation
Table 9.3.6 was used to determine the overall condition of the substation cable asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 9.3.6 Health Index Scale for Substation Cables

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for substation cables in the
are also illustrated in Figure 9.4.1.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Cables
Very Good 9
Good 14
Fair 5
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Table 9.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Substation Cables
Health Index Results Classification Number of Cables
Very Good 12
Good 18
Fair 6
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total 36
Table 9.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results For Substation

Cables

20 18
18
Number of Cables
16
14 12
12
10
8 6
6
4
2 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 9.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Substation Cables
83.3 % of Substation Cables are in Good or Very Good condition. No additional

capital improvements are expected in the near term.
16.7% of Substation Cables are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital
improvements may be required depending on criticality of the assets.

10.0 Synchronous Condensers
10.1 Description
Synchronous condensers are large rotating machines used to provide or absorb reactive
power for system compensation and improve short circuit ratios of the system. Synchronous
condensers share similar characteristics, failure modes and other issues with large turbine
generators used to produce electricity. However, synchronous condensers have no
mechanical loads and no prime-mover or driving mechanism.
Synchronous condensers consist of stators, rotors and associated windings. Stator windings
typically operate at high voltages, and have composite insulation consisting of mica tape on a
fibreglass backing, impregnated with a synthetic resin. Rotor windings experience
substantial mechanical stress. They have epoxy-glass or aramid-based insulation.
Synchronous condensers have various cooling systems and media. Generally, stators have
direct liquid-cooling systems while rotors use hydrogen for cooling. Typically, this
equipment and its auxiliaries are housed in buildings to ensure that it has the infrastructure
needed to support its operation.
10.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 5 synchronous condensers.
Table 10.2.1 shows location, equipment numbers, manufacturer codes, commission notice to
energise (CNE) dates, and rated voltages for the 5 synchronous condensers. The
synchronous condensers with identified voltage levels and CNE dates are about 35 years old
and rated as 12.7 kV. Also, four of the five assets are at Vancouver Island Terminal.
Equipment Manufacturer CNE Rated

Substation Size
Number Code Date Voltage
VANCOUVER ISLAND SC1 TOS 1969 12.7 kV 50 MVA
TERMINAL
VANCOUVER ISLAND SC2 TOS 1969 12.7 kV 50 MVA
TERMINAL
VANCOUVER ISLAND SC3 ASA unknown unknown 100 MVA
TERMINAL
VANCOUVER ISLAND SC4 ASA unknown unknown 100 MVA
TERMINAL
KELLY LAKE SC2 ASA 1970 12.7 kV 75 MVA
Table 10.2.1 List of Synchronous Condensers

Synchronous condensers experience the same degradation processes as other electrical

rotating machines. Thermal, mechanical, electrical and environmental stresses can cause
deterioration over time. Mechanical problems often manifest themselves as electrical or
other forms of degradation. Mechanical problems also generally cause failures and the end-
of-life for these machines.
Rotating machines such as synchronous condensers represent major assets for electric
utilities. As a result, substantial knowledge and numerous diagnostic tests and condition
assessment techniques exist for this equipment. Typically, however, synchronous condensers
do not come equipped with monitoring devices. Thus, some disassembly is often needed to
determine their condition. For this reason, utilities often conduct full condition assessments
only at major maintenance and overhaul intervals. When in operation this equipment offers
few opportunities for assessment except for checking parameters such as voltage, stator
winding, stator and rotor currents, real and reactive power, plus core and bearing
temperatures.
Recently, BCHydro field services reported that the slip-rings on Synchronous Condenser No.
2 at Vancouver Island Terminal were found in very poor condition and recommended that the
maintenance interval be reduced to 6 months.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed synchronous condensers first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Tables 10.3.1 through 10.3.12 list the end-of-life criteria considered for each component or
test evaluated for this asset class. The tables also contain the specific definitions used for
Condition
Description
Rating
A Enclosure is level and secure and free from cracks and corrosion. Ventilation
systems are in good condition. No evidence of repair, damage or any other
form of deterioration. Appears to have been well-maintained.
E Enclosure components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 10.3.1 Enclosure Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Components in good condition and free from any indications of deterioration,
corrosion, damage or any other abnormality. Terminals and wiring are clean
and secure. Insulators, bus connections are clean and secure. Switchgear
components and contacts clean and in good condition. Controls clean and in
good condition.
E Exciter, switchgear or controls are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 10.3.2 Exciter, Associated Switchgear & Controls Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion, damage or any other abnormality. No evidence of overheating,
thermal, mechanical, electrical or environmental stress. No indications of
excessive wear, breakage, looseness, cracked insulation and residues
E Components are degraded/damaged beyond repair.
Table 10.3.3 Slip Rings/Brushes Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 10.3.4 Core Condition (visual inspection with system disassembled)
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 10.3.5 Windings Condition (visual inspection with system disassembled)
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion, damage or any other abnormality. Pumps and piping are leak free.
Motor Bearings in good condition. Terminals and wiring are clean and
secure. Fans and pumps are functioning properly
Table 10.3.6 Cooling System Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion, damage or any other abnormality. Pumps and piping are leak free.
Motor Bearings in good condition. Terminals and wiring are clean and
secure. Control devices appear in good condition.
Table 10.3.7 Oil System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
corrosion, leaks, damage or any other abnormality. Terminals and wiring are
clean and secure. Control and monitoring devices appear in good condition.
Table 10.3.8 Gas System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Foundation, supports or grounding damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 10.3.9 Foundations/Support Steel/Grounding

Condition
Description
Rating
A All tests passed no deficiencies noted
B Minor deficiencies noted. Corrective action not required at this time
C Significant deficiencies noted. Correction actions required.
D Components are not fit for service
E Components are not fit for service and beyond repair.
Table 10.3.10 Core Tests (knife test, loop test and/or EL-CID)
Condition
Description
Rating
A All tests passed no deficiencies noted
D Components are not fit for service
E Components are not fit for service and beyond repair.
Table 10.3.11 Windings Tests (Hipot, DC Ramp, Cap/DF, TVA probe, Partial
Discharge)
Condition
Description no deficiencies noted
Rating
A All tests passed.
D Component is not fit for service
E Components is not fit for service and beyond repair.
Table 10.3.12 Field Winding tests (recurrent surge, impedance, NDE)

A = 4;
B = 3;

C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a synchronous
condenser in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded
condenser would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for synchronous condensers
in Table 10.3.13 below, assume a condenser with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 64 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 100. That condenser,
therefore, has only 64% of the Health Index maximum score, and would not have a valid
Health Index. On the other hand, if that condenser with partial data had a maximum
condition score of 71 it would have 71% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health
Index.

Synchronous Condenser Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Enclosure 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Exciter, Associated Switchgear &
2 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Controls
3 Slip Rings/Brushes 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Core Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Windings 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
6 Cooling System 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
7 Oil System Condition 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
8 Gas System Condition 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Foundations/Support
9 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Steel/Grounding
10 Core Tests 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
11 Windings Tests 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
12 Field Winding Tests 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Table 10.3.13 Synchronous Condenser Health Index Formulation
Table 10.3.14 was used to determine the overall condition of the synchronous condenser
asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 10.3.14 Health Index Scale for Synchronous Condensers

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for synchronous condensers
in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 10.4.1 and 10.4.2 summarize the results,
which are also illustrated in Figure 10.4.1. Note, as described in subsection 10.3.3 above,
the 50% Rule was applied in calculating the Health Index for this asset since available data
were insufficient to use the 70% Rule.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Condensers
Very Good 0
Good 5
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Percentage of Total Population Surveyed 100
Table 10.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Synchronous

Condensers
6
Synchronous Condensers
5
5
4
Number of
1
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 10.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results For Synchronous Condensers

100% of Synchronous Condensers are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital


11.0 Gas Insulated Switchgear
11.1 Description
In gas-insulated switchgear (GIS), SF6 gas pressurized grounded metal enclosures house all
gas filled components except entrance bushings. The BCTC-managed system has GIS at the
500 kV and 230 kV voltage levels.
GIS are compact and represent an attractive alternative to outdoor air insulated substations
(AIS), particularly where space constraints and harsh environmental conditions exist.
Typical GIS incorporate some or all of the following components that are described in
greater detail below:
Circuit breakers;
Switches - disconnect and ground switches;
Buswork;
Interfaces - SF6/air entrance bushings; SF6/cable terminations; SF6/transformer
terminations;
Instrument transformers current and voltage transformer;
Surge arresters; and
Protection, control, monitoring equipment.
GIS Circuit Breakers

Within BC, the transmission system has 44 high voltage (HV) and extra high voltage (EHV)
SF6 circuit breakers installed in gas insulated substations. BCTC manages 40 of these and
BC Hydro maintains 4 unit breakers at Revelstoke. This circuit breaker population has
several first generation double pressure breakers as well as some single pressure breakers.
First developed in the late 1960s, double pressure (i.e., low pressure tanks, high pressure
reservoirs) SF6 circuit breakers incorporate air blast technology. Current interruption occurs
when blast valves open letting high pressure SF6 flow through a nozzle along the arc drawn
between fixed and moving contacts. The arc stabilizes rapidly when the cold SF6 flows along
it. After interruption, the low-pressure exhaust gas is compressed back into the high-pressure
reservoir for re-use during the next operation.
Double pressure designs became obsolete after development of single-pressure designs in the
1970s. Now, single pressure SF6 insulated circuit breakers have become the technology of
choice for transmission class switchgear. Single pressure designs do not require
compressors. Self-blast and other related techniques have resulted in simple and reliable
operating mechanisms for single pressure designs.
SF6 is a very stable compound with remarkable dielectric properties. Use of SF6 has enabled
the design of compact, low maintenance, safe and reliable switchgear, particularly when
compared with air blast and oil filled equipment. Consequently, SF6 equipment has become
dominant for switchgear applications at high transmission voltage levels. Some SF6

equipment is used at medium voltage levels, but generally vacuum breakers are more
economical at such voltages.
GIS Disconnect Switches and Ground Switches

Disconnect and ground switches perform similar functions in both GIS and AIS. However,
switches operating in pressurized GIS environments have more restricted ranges of motion
and reduced electrical clearances.
Disconnect switches provide electrical isolation of associated circuit breakers, buses and line
exits during both maintenance and normal service. Whether in AIS or GIS, disconnect
switches have little rated interrupting capability since they open off-load (i.e., associated
breakers open first). Initially GIS disconnect switch designs operated reasonably well at 138
and 230 kV, but had poor performance at 500 kV. In the 1990s, new standards and test
procedures eliminated this poor performance problem.
Where temporary grounds are not feasible, many locations within the GIS have permanently
installed ground switches to facilitate workplace safety. Some of these ground switches (e.g.,
line/cable terminal locations) have fully rated fault-making capability.
Buswork
Metal enclosed concentric SF6 insulated buses connect to other live GIS components such as
circuit breakers, disconnect switches and interfaces with overhead lines, cables and
transformers. Most buswork consists of aluminium conductors and enclosures, with bus
conductors supported by epoxy resin insulators. Bus arrangements can include three
conductors in one enclosure or three separate single-phase enclosures. Single-phase
arrangements dominate at 500kV and 230kV ratings where reliability is a major
consideration. However, when more compact and economical installations are required, the
three-in-one arrangement may be used. In some areas (e.g., underground generating plants
and GIS located far from line or transformer terminations) bus runs may extend for several
hundred meters.
Interfaces (i.e., SF6 to Air Entrance Bushings; SF6 to Cable Terminations;

SF6 to Transformer Terminations)
In many instances, bushings supply the interface between GIS and air-insulated conductors.
In other cases, specially designed SF6-to-cable interfaces connect with underground power
cables. Occasionally direct connections to power transformers exist.
a) SF6 to Air Entrance Bushings

SF6 to air bushings are similar to apparatus bushings used on breakers and transformers. GIS
suppliers normally provide a variety of bushing designs, and user preference generally
determines the type of bushing used. In the past, porcelain housings typically enclosed the
bushings. However, composite insulated bushings have recently gained acceptance. Oil
paper condensers, resin impregnated paper, and SF6-filled bushing technology have been
applied at air terminations.

b) SF6 to Cable Terminations
Usually, SF6 cable interfaces have custom designs. However, some international standards
exist and reflect user requirements for maintenance, accessibility and testing of associated
underground cables. Normally, these interfaces have removable test links enabling HVDC
and other tests required for cable installations.
c) SF6 to Transformer Terminations

Generally, customers prefer to have air insulated transformer connections. These
connections provide high impedance to surges generated by disconnect switches within the
GIS. These connections also help avoid risks of transformer damage.
GIS Instrument Transformers (i.e., Current Transformers, Voltage Transformers)

a) Current transformers
Current transformers on the GIS provide input to protection, control and metering equipment.
Generally, transformers include a ring core current transformer mounted on a bus enclosure.
Both 2- and 3-phase arrangements exist, but 2-phase arrangements are more common.
Current transformer designs are usually simple and reliable.
b) Voltage Transformers
Space constraints and the lack of air-insulated interfaces may dictate integration of voltage
transformers into GIS. When used, cost-effective air insulated capacitor voltage transformers
are installed at the SF6 air interface. Pressure resistance, aluminium flanged housing holds
the GIS voltage transformer core and windings. Epoxy cone insulators seal the housing,
support the tap connection to the live GIS bus, and attach to a corresponding flange on the
GIS enclosure.
GIS Surge Arresters

Space constraints and underground cable connections may dictate integration of surge
arresters into GIS. When used, air-insulated metal oxide surge arresters are installed at the
SF6-air interfaces. Pressure resistant aluminium flanged housing contains and supports the
active metal oxide. Generally, one side has solid grounding. Epoxy cone insulators seal the
housing, support the tap connection to the live GIS bus, and attach to a corresponding flange
on the GIS enclosure. When required, some installations may have test links.
GIS Protection, Control & Monitoring Equipment

Generally, GIS installations have local protection, control and monitoring cabinets or
cubicles wired to major equipment controls and status indicators, and monitoring devices
such as the SF6 gas density monitors, and circuit breaker energy storage monitors.
11.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 7 stations equipped with GIS
systems. More than one GIS system may exist in a station, for example, Cathedral Square
has both 1984 and 2002 versions of Mitsubishi 230kV GIS. Table 11.2.1 shows the systems

grouped by each relevant voltage level, manufacturer and date of installation. The table
shows that GIS is used only at the 230 kV and 500 kV voltage levels. Also, Table 11.2.1
also shows that all of the GIS systems are in the age range of 20 to 30 years old except the
2002 addition to Cathedral Square.
Location & Rating Manufacturer No. of CBs Indoor or Outdoor I/S Date
Mica 500kV ITE 4 Indoor 1976
Peace Canyon500kV BBC 4 Indoor 1979
Revelstoke 500kV Mitsubishi 7 Indoor 1982
Revelstoke 230kV Mitsubishi 3 Indoor 1982
Ashton Creek 230kV BBC 6 Indoor 1979
Sperling 230kV BBC 4 Indoor 1979
Horsey 230kV Alsthom 6 Outdoor 1982
Cathedral Sq 230kV Mitsubishi 4 Indoor (UG) 1984
Cathedral Sq 230kV Mitsubishi 2 Indoor (UG) 2002
*Note: Revelstoke also has 4 unit breakers that are maintained by BC Hydro.
Table 11.2.1 Tabulation of HV and EHV GIS Installations

All BCTC-managed GIS were designed and installed in the 1970s and early 1980s. At that
time, no standards existed for GIS and many suppliers used component designs applicable to
air insulated switchgear.
Thus, many early GIS components had several design flaws. These included pull rod
separation, blast valve distortion, contact erosion, air and SF6 gas compressors, heaters and
other ancillary equipment. Switches, buses, insulators and interface equipment had even
more serious defects.
Worldwide, about 4% of GIS have 550 kV system applications. In 1992, CIGRE reported a
worldwide failure rate of about 5% for 550 kV GIS. In 1998, a similar study reported a
failure rate of about 3%. However, 550 kV rated GIS constitutes only about 4% of the total
GIS population worldwide. Generally, 230 kV GIS perform better than 550 kV GIS, largely
due to the lower operational stress and safety margins in 230 kV designs. Worldwide, 550 kV
GIS have more failures than GIS applications on 115 kV and 230 kV systems. For all
voltage classes, North American GIS have higher failure rates than GIS in service elsewhere.
While some 550 kV and 230kV SF6 GIS have had problems over time, the majority of GIS
installations in use today perform satisfactorily. Worldwide, GIS installed since the 1990s
and rated at 550 kV and above has had excellent performance.

GIS for HV and EHV systems must have substantial reliability, especially at key locations
such as output sites for large generating plants. Environmental conditions influence
degradation of outdoor GIS. Outdoor GIS have degradation processes similar to those of SF6
breakers installed in AIS substations. However, the compact and complex nature of GIS
makes them more difficult and costly to maintain and repair.
BCTC-managed GIS installed in the mid to late 1970s, represent obsolete first generation
technology. These GIS have poor performance records and operate only with certain
restrictions. Generally, the following components present the most problems: disconnect
switches, insulators, bushings and gas. The double pressure breakers associated with these
GIS also have performed worse than other types of breakers. These early GIS models have
required monitoring, corrective action and design changes to remain in service. Other GIS in
the BCTC-managed system have satisfactory performance, comparable to other GIS in
service throughout North America.
Only rarely do the duties performed by GIS lead directly to this equipments end-of-life.
International studies have identified the following as key factors associated with the end-of-
life for GIS:

Age of device.
Generally, GIS maintenance programs concentrate on managing known problems. Routine

maintenance involves regular visual inspection to detect general degradation, leaks and the
condition of ancillary equipment. Breakers, switches and their mechanisms also receive
functional testing. Partial discharge measurements can help determine the condition of solid
insulation. Doble testing along with gas sampling and analysis provide internal condition
information.
The main factors affecting operation of GIS include the following, which are discussed in
greater detail below:
Mechanism operation and performance

Switching of charging, load and fault currents by circuit breakers
Switching of charging currents by disconnect switches
Degradation of solid insulation
Degradation of gas insulation
General degradation/corrosion
SF6 leaks and environmental factors
Post fault maintenance
Hydraulic mechanism and leaks
Nitrogen accumulation and leaks

Mechanism Operation and Performance
The mechanism must operate correctly in devices that break charges, loads and fault currents.
Generally, mechanism malfunction causes most operational problems in GIS. Corrosion and
lubrication failure may compromise mechanism performance by preventing or slowing its
operation.
Visual inspections, trip and timing tests, plus routine and proper lubrication ensure proper
mechanism operation. Generally, timing tests serve as the primary means to make certain
that mechanisms operate within prescribed limits. Lubrication plays a critical role in proper
mechanism performance. For example, metallic particles may adhere to lubricants on
moving parts of disconnect switches, enhancing stress and potentially causing dielectric
failures. Both over- and under-use of lubricants may compromise mechanism performance.
Lubricants also must have properties appropriate for their particular uses. In addition, it is
critical to have well-defined, documented, and routinely implemented lubrication procedures
for this equipment.
Failures Related to Circuit Breakers

GIS in 230 kV and 500 kV systems have either first generation double pressure or first
generation single pressure circuit breakers. Generally, single pressure designs have had
satisfactory performance. ITE, the GIS original equipment manufacturer (OEM), first
designed GIS with two-pressure dead tank breakers like those used in AIS. That design
experienced several problems, including pull rod separation, blast valve distortion, grading
capacitor and contact failures, gas leaks, plus compressor and heater failures. To improve
performance, these models have required substantial repair and refurbishment.
Failures Related to Disconnect Switches

When originally designed, no standards existed for GIS disconnect switches now in service.
In particular, switches were not designed to handle fast front transient over-voltages
associated with switching EHV GIS bus charging currents. This resulted in failures that
included flashovers within switch enclosures and caused breakdowns of interconnected
equipment. Utilities retrofitted some switches to improve performance. They also imposed
operating restrictions on defective switch designs kept in service. Currently, BCTC restricts
500 kV GIS disconnect switches made by ITE to operations involving only de-energized
buses.
Degradation and Condition Monitoring of Solid Insulation

Solid insulation such as that in entrance bushings, internal support insulators, plus breaker
and switch operating rods have caused many GIS failures, particularly in 500 kV high-stress
applications. Manufacturing, shipping, installing, maintaining and operating the GIS can
cause defects in the insulation. Defects include voids in epoxy insulators, delamination of
epoxy and metallic hardware, and protrusions on conductors. In floating components, fixed
and moving particles can lead to failures. Partial discharge (PD) activity usually leads to
flashovers.

Many older GIS have unreliable spring-type bonding contacts to eliminate component (e.g.,
insulator) floating. These springs degrade due to the thermal and mechanical stresses
imposed on them and result in widespread partial discharge.
Insulation in original ITE GIS designs has several problems. At both 230 kV and 500 kV
applications problems include: poor connections between the center conductor and the
insulators cast in electrodes; poor spring contacts at the same the same location; and partial
discharges from the enclosure side floating cone insulators
When these insulators were designed, little was known about the detrimental effects of SF6
decomposition products on the then common silica-filled insulators. However, when
exposed to high voltage arcing, silica-filled insulators display charred areas that become
electrically conductive and create surface weak points that deteriorate until the insulator fails.
All modern HV insulators contain alumina-filled epoxy resin. This filling does not char and,
therefore, maintains its surface resistance.
Monitors now exist that can detect dielectric integrity and partial discharge activity of
insulation components. Monitoring, however, may only prove cost-effective in failure
sensitive locations.
Many of the existing GIS have only a few access points suitable for monitoring. Ultra-high
frequency (UHF) and acoustic techniques represent the two most effective monitoring
techniques now available. To determine their utility in particular situations, one must weigh
several issues, including:
Whether or not the technology has sufficient sensitivity to detect defects of critical
interest;
Whether or not the technology can distinguish between signal and background noise;
Whether or not the perceived benefits of advanced failure warnings, outweigh the costs
and risks of a run-to-failure policy;
Whether or not the technology can be readily implemented, and data correctly interpreted
Because of welded designs, limited access points, age and high background noise, it is
unlikely that either UHF or the acoustic technology will prove effective at the more
problematic BCTC GIS locations. Portable UHF systems might prove useful to detect noisy
insulators, but would not be effective in monitoring bus exits due to lack of access points.
No matter what technology one uses, however, periodic measurements do not provide a
guarantee against future problems.
Degradation of Gas Insulation

Gas sampling and analysis for moisture, air and arc decomposition products help assess
internal conditions. The use of desiccants can make these analyses more difficult.

Bus Sections in GIS
These devices are less active than many of the components described above. Maintenance
consists of discharge detection and visual inspections to assess general degradation and
corrosion.
Corrosion and General Deterioration

Corrosion and general deterioration increase risks of moisture ingress and SF6 leaks,
particularly in outdoor GIS. If not treated, these factors may cause the end-of-life for GIS.
However, visual inspections and corrective action can help detect and address these potential
problems.
SF6 Leaks and Environmental Factors

GIS is designed and manufactured for outdoor use, but it generally has better long-term
performance when installed indoors. Outdoor GIS, particularly older ITE designs, have
higher than acceptable SF6 gas leaks because of the poor quality of fittings, connectors,
valves, by-pass piping, general enclosure porosity and flange corrosion. Indoor installations
reduce problems from corrosion, moisture ingress, low ambient temperatures and SF6 leaks.
Outages are needed to refill breakers after SF6 leaks occur. Some early double pressure
models have more leakage problems than later models, but these stem mainly from early
design and manufacturing issues. Early designs may need replacement of individual breakers
or breaker types if leaks become frequent. At this time, however, only certain failure-prone
breakers (e.g., double pressure designs) seem to present degradation and end-of-life
concerns.
Post Fault Maintenance

GIS have more costly, difficult and time-consuming post fault maintenance requirements
than air insulated switchgear. Older GIS have even more post-fault maintenance problems.
Accessibility, fault location, fault level and duration, degree of compartmentalization,
isolation requirements, pressure relief, burn-through protection, parts and service capabilities
all help determine post-fault maintenance needs. Switchgear types, user expertise, and
availability of OEM support also affect post-fault maintenance needs. Various national and
international organizations have developed guidelines and procedures for safe and

environmentally responsible post-fault maintenance of this equipment. Many users also have
produced more specific, tailored, supplementary guidance for maintenance staff.
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

Utilities have applied RCM to GIS equipment on distribution and transmission systems.
RCM is widely used for medium voltage equipment, including medium voltage metalclad
switchgear. The RCM process requires critical reviews of equipment duties, degradation and
failure modes. It also requires identification of significant parameters needing attention
during maintenance. Avoiding and promptly correcting mechanism and discharge-related
problems are critical to ensure the safe and efficient operation of GIS. Non-intrusive testing
and diagnostic tools exist to measure breaker trip and timing performance and to detect
discharge activity for this equipment. Visual inspections also are used to augment and
support these tests and tools. Increasingly, these non-invasive maintenance activities are
replacing more intrusive techniques. RCM, gas analysis and internal condition assessments
of GIS have shown that utilities can extend the time between intrusive maintenance activities.
Generally, internal examinations have found little evidence of significant degradation in this
equipment.
RCM techniques were applied in developing BCTCs Maintenance Standards. These

standards detail maintenance activities for specific types of circuit breakers, disconnect
switches and GIS assemblies in the BCTC-managed system.
Failures Related to GIS Interfaces (SF6 Air/Cable/Transformer)

Interfaces with air, underground cables and power transformers experience electrical over-
voltages, mechanical stresses and changes in environmental conditions. Interface failures
can contribute to overall GIS failures, making careful design and installation of interfaces
critical. Bushings, the most common interface, present many problems. US users have
reported explosive failures of oil/paper condenser bushings, and Canadian users have
experienced failures from SF6 insulated bushings. No one has reported failures of
impregnated paper bushings. Some US GIS users have begun using composite bushings.
End-of-Life Issues
Because of its reliability and relatively young age, users generally have not developed end-
of-life strategies for GIS. However, this is not true for BCTC where the systems are of older
vintage and an in-depth condition assessment in the summer of 2004 indicates that apparent
age is much higher than calendar age. Equipment is unique and corrective maintenance and
spares are very expensive. This has brought BCTC to start considering end-of-life strategies
for the equipment. Specific problems associated with individual devices typically dictate
management plans for this equipment. Conditions of concern in this equipment include
dielectric failures, internal insulation degradation from partial discharge, operational
restrictions from switching deficiencies, moisture absorption, gas leakage and corrosion, and
lack of ongoing support from the OEM.
Specific problems (e.g., insulation deterioration and corrosion) have caused some users to
replace some GIS components such as line exit bus ducts, bushings and even circuit breakers.

In addition, discharge problems in solid insulation also have lead to phase outs of relatively
new equipment. However, most GIS are less than 30 years old and not near their end-of-life.

a) Visual
GIS equipment lends itself to visual inspections because key components are visible and
accessible. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion, evidence of
overheating, misalignment, plus cracks and leaks on bushings, enclosures, piping, drives,
linkages and fittings. Visual inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals.
Internal conditions, control components, and mechanism cabinets can be inspected visually
as well. Visual inspections serve as a start to condition assessment, but they must be
supplemented by detailed reviews of maintenance and test records.
b) Time/Travel Testing
This testing measures velocity, close and trip times, plus wipe and rebound for circuit
breakers. This testing also measures open and close times for switches. It offers a way to
evaluate the mechanical condition of GIS, and helps ensure that equipment meets
manufacturers specifications. This test should occur at regular intervals (e.g., about every 6
years) on all circuit breakers and switches.
c) Contact Resistance Testing

This test involves determining resistance in the main current carrying circuit of breakers and
switches by taking measurements across each interrupter head with switchgear closed.
Access generally occurs through the insulated terminals of associated ground switches.
Resistance measurements outside of predetermined values require further investigation. It
also is important to review trends in these measurements over time to see whether or not
resistance values have increased.
In addition to static tests, dynamic tests during circuit breaker operation enable one to see
where main and arcing contacts touch. Dynamic testing provides useful information when
extended arcing contact fingers exist.
d) Doble Test
This high voltage bridge test measures capacitance and loss angles of high voltage circuit
breaker bushings and other insulating components. Doble test results can be compared
directly to manufacturers standards or to results from other similar GIS equipment.
Assessing trends in Doble test results can help detect deterioration of bushings and other
internal components such as interrupters, operating rods, grading capacitors, and support
insulators.
e) Stored Energy (Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge Time)

This test helps detect poor motor, pump, compressor and other operational conditions. It
involves measuring recharge times or pressure drops during operation.

f) Insulating Medium
oil, air and SF6 switchgear insulation systems.
g) SF6 Testing
In SF6 circuit breakers, the gas is tested and monitored to assess its ability to serve
satisfactorily as a dielectric and interrupting medium. SF6 gas testing also offers a means to
detect internal degradation. Breakers also have continuous monitors for pressure and density.
When these monitors register deviations from predetermined levels, maintenance staff can
take corrective action. SF6 breakers also receive periodic testing to check moisture content,
dew points, and sometimes the presence of air and decomposition products. Desiccant
materials make testing difficult in some GIS-related breaker compartments.
11.3.2 Site Inspections and Experience Comparisons
Background
In October 2004, BCTC and Acres International (through its subject matter expert at
Kinectrics Inc.) conducted site inspections of the GIS equipment at selected stations. The
team examined two similarly rated and configured GIS installations at Sperling (indoor) and
Horsey (outdoor) substations. ABB (BBC) supplied the indoor 230 kV four breaker bay GIS
at Sperling in 1979. Areva (Alsthom) supplied the outdoor 230 kV four breaker bay GIS at
Horsey in 1982.
Other GIS equipment installed on the BCTC-managed transmission system includes several
sets of 500 kV and 230 kV GIS manufactured by Mitsubishi. BCTC and other utilities have
found that the Mitsubishi equipment has performed very well since its installation. The
Mitsubishi equipment is considered to be in Good condition. BCTC purchased an extension
to the Cathedral Square GIS in 2002, which is considered to be in Very Good condition.
A comparison was made of BCTCs experience at the 500 kV Mica GIS station with the
experience of other users of similar equipment.
Sperling 230 kV GIS

In many ways, the overall design of the Sperling GIS is similar to other ABB installations at
BCTC and worldwide. Until the late 1980s, ABB delivered over 250 breaker bays of 230
kV GIS using many similar components, including the ELK hydraulically operated breaker.
To a large extent, ABB also standardized other components such as disconnect and ground
switches and instrument transformers.
The Sperling GIS is completely free of any external rust or corrosion. Gas leakage is minimal
and there is no evidence of internal partial discharge or moisture in the gas. The design is
dielectrically sound, operates at a relatively low working stress, in single phase enclosures,
apart from a short section of three phase ring bus interconnection. The primary areas of
concern are the operating mechanisms and to a lesser extent the control system.

The installation employs circuit breakers and hydraulic operating mechanisms that are now
obsolete. They are still supported by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), but at
very high costs. Circuit breakers typically have been operated 300 - 600 times since
installation, with many of these being no-load maintenance and test operations. Hydraulic
pump start-ups number between 1200 to almost 7000, with higher numbers indicating major
hydraulic system problems. The condition of the hydraulics and associated nitrogen
accumulators is a concern at both Sperling and Horsey. Hydraulic oil has leaked because of
stuck valves. In addition, breakers have failed to operate and oil is still visible on the floors
of some breaker mechanism cabinets
Typical Sperling GIS breaker operating mechanism problems occur when the pilot or main
valves fail to reseat properly after operation. When this happens oil drains from the high to
low pressure system causing spillage. The hydraulic mechanism is a high energy, high speed
type for 1970-vintage puffer interrupters. These impose large mechanical stresses on
associated components and structures. Modern interrupters use self-blast interrupting
techniques and impose much less stress on components and structures. Longer lifecycle,
therefore, result from the use of modern interrupters.
At Sperling, maintenance overtime has occurred in a piecemeal fashion or on an as-needed

basis. About ten years ago a general overhaul was given to the active parts, hydraulics and
accumulator systems on the breakers at Sperling. In addition, hoses were replaced, and other
items with problems were either replaced or repaired. Recently, a pilot overhaul of a single
breaker hydraulic and accumulator system was done. While this overhaul was more
extensive than the one ten years ago, it still was not complete. It also offered no guarantee of
extending the equipments life another 20 25 years because not all of the critical hydraulic
components were brought to an as new condition. A slight deformation or wear-out of a 25
year old valve seal can still result in a major hydraulic oil leak and failure of the breaker to
operate on command.
The electro-mechanical control relays and timers installed in the control cubicles of the GIS
are obsolete and approaching their end-of-life. Also, exposure to humid conditions inside a
switchgear building has taken a toll on the outdated clockwork type mechanisms.
Based on this inspection, aside from the operating mechanism and control issues, the
condition of the Sperling GIS is generally acceptable. The Sperling 230kV GIS should be
considered to be in Fair condition overall.
Horsey 230kV GIS

In many ways, the situation for the Horsey GIS is similar to that of the Sperling GIS,
especially with regard to hydraulic mechanism issues. However, Horsey is an outdoor
installation and is exposed to severe coastal area environmental conditions. Horsey also is
considered a critical installation as one of the primary supply points to the provincial capital.
Its role in supply coupled with the accelerated degradation from an outdoor installation,
makes the Horsey situation potentially more critical than Sperling.

The overall design of the Horsey GIS is different in many respects to other Areva (Alsthom)
installations in North America and worldwide. Until the late 1980s, Areva delivered over
370 breaker bays of 230 kV GIS worldwide, but there were apparently only two other
customers for the 230 kV GIS using the FR2 circuit breaker design supplied for Horsey.
There were only three other FR2 breakers supplied in Canada, but these were installed in
230 kV AIS. The FR2 breakers at Horsey are considered orphan breaker designs with
correspondingly high costs for replacement parts.
At Horsey, the enclosures, housings and flanges appear relatively free of external corrosion.
However, there are signs of serious corrosion on switch operating linkages, bearings and
some threaded connection points. There are reports of switch drives seizing up and failing to
operate. Gas leakages have also occurred since 1999 maintenance records indicate eight
separate incidents requiring SF6 gas top-up, but this is not yet considered to be a major
problem. One breaker is exhibiting high contact resistance, and the moisture content of
several gas compartments is excessive. Measured dew points around -5 C have been
reported. In some places gas compartments have been retrofit with desiccant containers.
This has alleviated moisture problems to some extent. However, the presence of the
desiccant has made gas analysis more difficult.
The 230 kV GIS design is dielectrically sound and operates at a relatively low working stress
in single phase enclosures. However, recent partial discharge or other activity has resulted in
the detection of arc decomposition products. Exposure of the epoxy cone insulators at the
bolted flanges have become points of moisture absorption and ingress. To correct this
problem, an epoxy paint finish has been applied to the external surfaces of most insulator
flanges. While gas compartments have been retrofit with desiccant containers to reduce
moisture, this has also made gas analysis more difficult.
GIS manufacturers have used several spacer materials in trading off between early resistance
to tracking damage (Areva Alsthom) and longer-term resistance to arcing and partial
discharge by-products (ABB). An understanding of materials used and their sensitivities to
electrical stresses and electrochemical processes is critical to projecting the end-of-life for
GIS. The combination of high moisture and decomposition products from partial discharge
activity can cause problems for these particular insulators as they age.
Degradation of operating mechanisms presents a primary area of current concern. These

include circuit breaker hydraulics and drives/linkages as well as the bearings of disconnect
and ground switches. Typical hydraulic problems include pilot or main valve failures to
reseat properly after operation. Such reseating failures allow oil to drain from the high to
low pressure system, resulting in oil spillage. At Horsey, there is some evidence of hydraulic
system seal degradation.
At Horsey, maintenance overtime has occurred in a piecemeal fashion or on an as-needed

basis. Since 1999, maintenance records indicate at least 13 separate incidents involving
Horsey GIS hydraulics. These incidents resulted in oil, valve and seal replacements. It
would be difficult and costly to return the hydraulic and accumulator systems to as new
condition because the breakers in these systems have been out of production for almost 25
years.

Operating rods, bearings and other hardware associated with disconnect and ground switches
now show evidence of corrosion. Corrosion also has penetrated into some threaded
connection points. In addition, some ground switch drives have seized-up and failed to
operate at times.
The unique circuit breaker design combined with the degradation associated with an outdoor
installation in a corrosive environment presents challenges in making efurbishment and
replacement decisions at Horsey.
Based on this inspection, Horsey is considered to be in Poor condition overall.
Mica 500 kV GIS

ITE pioneered the introduction of GIS in North America with installation of the first 362 kV
GIS in Cleveland in 1970. The basic unit was the two-pressure GB breaker. The GB breaker
had several prototype flaws, including separating pull rods, distorting blast valves, contact
erosion, and failure prone air and SF6 gas compressors, heaters and auxiliary equipment.
Other GIS components (e.g., disconnect switches, buses, insulators and interface equipment)
were subject to even more serious design and installation flaws. Performance of the ITE GIS
was poor at all voltage levels, but especially at the 550 kV rating. A higher percentage of
ITE GIS than the industry norm were applied at extra high voltages, including at 500 kV, the
typical North American standard voltage. Worldwide, only about 4% of the total GIS
population is applied at 550 kV.
During the period from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, ITE supplied over 160 GIS
breakers, 470 disconnect switches and over 83,000 ft of 1 ph. SF6 bus duct in the US and
Canada. The reported failure rate of North American GIS with ITE as a major contributor
ranged from 0.5% per breaker bay year at 145 kV to over 11% at 550 kV. Actual failure
rates may vary somewhat up or down from those percentages due to poor reporting systems.
In 1992, CIGRE reported a worldwide failure rate of about 5% for 550 kV GIS. A similar
1998 study reported a failure rate of about 3%. The 550 kV rated GIS represents only a
small portion (i.e., about 4%) of the total GIS population. Thus, a small variation in the
sample population could cause significantly different results. Generally, 550 kV GIS have
much smaller margins for poor quality than GIS at other voltages. However, in the 1970s
and 1980s when ITE first supplied this equipment to North American utilities, the need for
stringent quality control was not fully understood.
Outdoor GIS, particularly the ITE designs, have higher than normal gas leaks because of the
poor quality of fittings, connectors, threaded fittings, valves, by-pass piping, general porosity
of enclosures and some flange corrosion. The need to refill GIS breakers, switches and other
compartments after SF6 gas leaks is a major cause of outages. Individual early versions of
SF6 breakers (e.g., double pressure designs) have presented particular problems. Increases
in such problems over time might result in decisions to replace individual breakers, switches,
or the complete GIS. At this time, while long term degradation may present concerns for

certain early and failure prone breakers, such degradation is not generally considered
significant for the overall population of SF6 breakers.
North American users have replaced several of the ITE GIS. However, the majority of other
well designed GIS are performing satisfactorily after 25 or more years of service.
Based on this discussion, the Mica 500 kV ITE GIS is considered to be in Poor condition
overall.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed GIS first required developing end-of-life
criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a factor critical in

requires attention;
and
repair.
member. In addition, for each asset class member the tables show the components and tests
evaluated. The tables also contain the specific definitions used for each condition rating (i.e.,
A E) in the assessment of this asset class.

GIS Circuit Breaker
Condition
Description
Rating
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged beyond repair or are not
field repairable or cementing or fasteners are not secure.
beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
interfaces, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure gauge and SF6 refill
maintenance records
quantity of SF6 in the breaker, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure
gauge and refill maintenance records
C SF6 leakage of up to 1.5%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
maintenance records
D SF6 leakage of up to 2%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in

Condition
Description
Rating
cabinets. Box sealing very effective no evidence of moisture or insect
or condensation in box
corrective action.
E Main tank and mechanism box corroded, damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Wiring, terminal blocks, relays, contactors and switches are all in good
condition. No blown fuses. Operating mechanism, trip and close coils, relays,
auxiliary switches, motors, compressors, springs, are all in good condition.
No sign of overheating or deterioration. Linkages, drive rods, trip latches are
clean, lubricated, free from cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction.
Mechanical integrity of dampers/dashpots, and oil levels, are acceptable. No
excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation.
E Control or mechanism box components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
E Contacts, nozzles or blast valves are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.5 Contacts/Nozzles/Blast Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
flashover burns. No signs of overheating, overpressure or leaks. Cementing
E Grading capacitors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
free of damage and corrosion and are made direct to tank, cabinets, supports
E Foundation, supports or connections are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.7 Foundation/Support Steel/ Grounding Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
E Breaker is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
brought into acceptable limits.
Condition
Description
Rating
E Values to not meet specification and cannot be brought into specification
condition.

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 11.3.11 Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge Time
Condition
Description
Rating
E Electrical activity that cannot be brought into specification condition.
Table 11.3.12 Gas Analysis (decomposition by-products, moisture, air, etc. based on
GIS Bus
Condition
Description
Rating
D Bushings/Support Insulators are broken/damaged beyond repair or are not
field repairable or cementing or fasteners are not secure.
beyond repair.
Table 11.3.13 Entrance Bushing Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A No SF6 leakage at any of the bushing-metal interfaces, bus and equipment
enclosures or piping interfaces, as determined by inspection of SF6
pressure/density gauges and SF6 refill maintenance records
quantity of SF6 in the GIS, as determined by inspection of SF6
pressure/density gauge and SF6 refill maintenance records
C SF6 leakage of up to 1%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in
the GIS, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density gauge and SF6
refill maintenance records
D SF6 leakage up to 2%, per year, by weight, of the total quantity of SF6 in the
GIS, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density gauge and SF6 refill
the GIS, as determined by inspection of SF6 pressure/density gauge and SF6
refill maintenance records.
Table 11.3.14 SF6 Leaks (Gasket and Seals)
Condition
Description
Rating
A No external or internal rust in control cabinet. No paint peeling on main
enclosures or cabinets. Control cabinet sealing very effective no evidence of
moisture or insect ingress or condensation.
B No rust or corrosion on main enclosures, some evidence of slight moisture
ingress or condensation in control cabinets.
C Some rust and corrosion on both main enclosures and on control cabinets,
requires corrective maintenance within the next several months.
D Significant corrosion on both main enclosures and on control cabinets.
Defective sealing of control cabinets leading to water ingress and insect
E Enclosure and control cabinets are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.15 Enclosure and Control Cabinets Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Operating mechanism, coils, relays, auxiliary switches, motors, compressors,
springs, all in good condition. No sign of overheating or deterioration.
E Control components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.16 Control Components Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Linkages, drive rods, trip latches clean, stops are clean, well supported and
lubricated, free from cracks, distortion abrasion or obstruction. Verify the
electrical and mechanical integrity of open and close coil assemblies. No
excess bearing wear or other out of tolerance operation. No signs of hydraulic
leakage
E Mechanism and linkages components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.17 Mechanism and Linkages Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
on associated components during normal or fault current carrying duty.
E Conductors or connectors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.18 Bus Conductors and Connectors Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A SF6 density is within acceptable limits in all compartments. Solid insulation,
epoxy spacers are free from decomposition products and free from PD
activity
E Internal insulation is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.19 Internal Insulation Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
free of damage and corrosion and are made directly to enclosure, control
cabinets, building and supports without any intervening paint or corrosion.
Condition
Description
Rating
A GIS enclosure externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
Number of breaker/switch operations on counter, and run timer readings on
auxiliary motors, are below average range for age of GIS. Appears to be well
E GIS bus components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.21 Overall GIS Bus Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
E Electrical activity that cannot be put into specification condition.
Table 11.3.22 Gas Analysis (Decomposition by-products, moisture, air etc. based on
GIS Disconnect Switch

Condition
Description
Rating
A Support /Drive Insulators are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks,
flashover burns, copper splash and copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
B Support/Drive Insulators are not broken, however there are some minor chips
C Support/Drive Insulators are not broken, however there are some major chips
D Support/Drive Insulators are broken/damaged beyond repair or are not field
repairable or cementing or fasteners are not secure.
E Support/Drive Insulators, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond
repair.
Table 11.3.23 Support/Drive Insulators

Condition
Description
Rating
condensation. Box securely fixed to support steel. Wiring, terminal blocks,
relays, contactors and switches all in good condition. Operating motor, coils,
relays auxiliary switches, position indicators, and counters all in good
condition. No sign of overheating or deterioration.
B No rust or corrosion on box, some evidence of slight moisture ingress or
condensation in mechanism box.
C Some rust and corrosion on interior and exterior of mechanism box.
ingress and insect damage.
E Control and mechanism box components are damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Linkages, levers, shafts, pipes, couplers, gear boxes, stops are clean, well
lubricated, free from corrosion, cracks, distortion, abrasion or obstruction. All
fasteners are tight. No visible evidence of poor settings, stops/toggle,
operation.
E Gear box, reducers and guides are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.25 Gear Box, Reducers and Guides

Condition
Description
Rating
and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion. All ground connectors
are tight, free from corrosion and show no sign of overheating. Ground
connections are free of mechanical damage and are made directly to boxes,
operating pipes and supports without any intervening paint or corrosion.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Switch externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
E Disconnect switch is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 11.3.27 Overall Disconnect Switch Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
limits. Trip time and velocity are within specified limits.
Table 11.3.28 Time to Close/Open

Condition
Description
Rating
condition.

11.3.33 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
For each asset class member, the components and tests shown in the tables above were
weighted based on their importance in determining the class members end-of-life. For
example, those that relate to primary functions of the component/asset received higher
weights than those that relate to more ancillary features and functions.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a GIS in perfect
condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded GIS would have a
Health Index of 0.

equal to 70% of the maximum possible condition score for a full data set (i.e., 70% Rule).
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for the GIS in
Table 11.3.30 below, assume a GIS bus with partial data has a maximum condition score of
97 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 144. That GIS bus, therefore, has
only 67% of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other
hand, if that GIS with partial data had a maximum condition score of 108, it would have 75%
of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off (i.e., 50% Rule). Thus, if
the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal to 50% of the maximum
After determining the Health Index for each class member, an overall Health Index also was
calculated for a complete GIS assembly consisting of appropriate circuit breakers, switches,
and buswork. Table 11.3.33 shows the components considered, weightings and maximum
scores possible in computing this overall Health Index.

SF6 Circuit Breaker Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
2 SF6 Leaks 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
3 Tank and Mechanism Box 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Control & Mechanism
4 2 A,E 4,0 8
Components
Contacts/Nozzles/Blast Valves
5 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition
Foundation/Support
7 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
9 Time Travel 3 A,E 4,0 12
Air/Hydraulic/Spring Recharge
11 2 A,E 4,0 8
Time
Max Score= 144
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 11.3.30 Health Index Formulation for GIS Circuit Breakers
Gas Insulated Switchgear Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Entrance Bushing Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 SF6 Leaks (Gaskets & Seals) 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
3 Enclosure and Control Cabinets 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
4 Control Components 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Mechanism and Linkages 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
6 Bus Conductor and Connectors 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
7 Internal Insulation 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Foundation/Support
8 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
9 Overall GIS Bus Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score= 132
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 11.3.31 Health Index Formulation for GIS Bus (Including VTs and CTs)

Disconnect Switches Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Support/Drive Insulators 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Components
3 Gear Box, Reducers and Guides 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Foundation/Support
4 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
Overall Disconnect Switch
5 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Condition
6 Time to close/open 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Max Score= 76
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 11.3.32 Health Index Formulation for GIS Disconnect Switch
# Condition Criteria Weighting Actual Score

1 Circuit Breakers (normalized score for all) 70% 70
2 GIS Bus (Including VTs and CTs) (normalized score 10% 10
for bus)
3 Disconnect Switch (normalized score for all) 20% 20
Max Score= 100
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 11.3.33 Overall Health Index Formulation for GIS Assembly
The Health Index scale shown in Table 11.3.34 was used to determine the overall condition
of the GIS asset class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 11.3.34 GIS Equipment Health Index Scale

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for Gas Insulated
Switchgear in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Table 11.4.1 summarizes the
results, which are also illustrated in Figure 11.4.1.
No. of Indoor or I/S Health Index

Location & Rating Manufacturer
CBs Outdoor Date Classification
Mica 500kV ITE 4 Indoor 1976 Poor
Peace Canyon500kV BBC 4 Indoor 1979 Fair
Revelstoke 500kV Mitsubishi 7 Indoor 1982 Good
Revelstoke 230kV Mitsubishi 3 Indoor 1982 Good
Ashton Creek 230kV BBC 6 Indoor 1979 Fair
Sperling 230kV BBC 4 Indoor 1979 Fair
Horsey 230kV Alsthom 6 Outdoor 1982 Fair
Cathedral Sq 230kV Mitsubishi 4 Indoor (UG) 1984 Good
Cathedral Sq 230kV Mitsubishi 2 Indoor (UG) 2002 Very Good
Table 11.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results

for Gas Insulated Switchgear

4.5
4
Gas Insulated Switchgear

4
3.5
3
3
Number of
2.5
2
1.5
1 1
1
0.5 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 11.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Gas Insulated Switchgear
Based on the results of the site inspections and information available in PassPort:
44.4% of the GIS station equipment is in Very Good or Good condition. No capital
44.4% of the GIS station equipment is in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or
capital improvements may be needed depending upon criticality issues.
11.1% of the GIS station equipment is in Poor condition. Refurbishment or
replacement may be needed considering risks and failure consequences.

12.0 Static Var Compensators
12.1 Description
Static var compensators (SVC) improve dynamic stability of transmission systems by
supplying and consuming reactive power under varying operating conditions. System
reactive power requirements vary. Generally, under light loads transmission lines generate
reactive power, creating a need for compensators to absorb the excess. Under heavy loads,
transmission lines consume reactive power and compensators must supply more. Under
rapidly changing load conditions, compensators must adjust quickly to maintain voltage
conditions within acceptable ranges.
Common SVC installations include locations with a need for considerable absorption of
excess reactive power. Such locations commonly include long submarine and underground
high voltage cable networks, since cables produce between twenty to forty times more
reactive power per kilometer than overhead lines.
Key functions of a SVC include:
Limiting over-voltages during normal load conditions on systems with extensive high
voltage cable interconnections;
Stabilizing system voltage during supply system disturbances such as forced outages,
and plant or load rejection on the supply side;
Minimizing temporary over-voltages;
Damping power swings between weak interconnecting systems; and
Maximizing power transfer and economic return for transmission system operators.
SVC systems may incorporate some or all of the following components:
Thyristor valves for TSR and for TSC;

Cooling system/heat exchanger;
SVR Control equipment;
Reactors, air cored;
Capacitor-banks;
Disconnect switches and circuit breakers (circuit breaker 18CB1 operates frequently
since it is used for shunting SVC 18V1 to meet BCTCs loss specifications);
Step-down transformer (normally required when a SVC is used for transmission
applications;
Instrument transformers, CTs and VTs; and
Building to accommodate thyristor valves, control, protection and auxiliary systems.
SVC systems generally consist of shunt connected inductors or capacitors, or a combination

of both, one of which is variable. Thyristor switched reactors typically serve as inductors
and thyristor switched capacitors serve as capacitors. To provide bulk or steady state
reactive power sources, systems may incorporate additional mechanically switched shunt

capacitors or reactors. Typical SVCs can generate and absorb reactive power in a controlled
manner.
The term static means that this equipment has no moving or rotating parts. This property
makes SVCs able to respond rapidly to changing network conditions. Also, the absence of
moving components minimizes mechanical wear and reduces routine and preventative
maintenance needs. Also, since SVCs consist of passive elements, they do not contribute to
short circuit levels.
SVCs improve the steady state and dynamic performance of high voltage AC transmission
networks. They also maximize the capability of existing transmission facilities. SVCs
facilitate higher power flows through transmission networks, reducing blackouts and
brownouts and providing greater network operational flexibility. When faults occur, SVCs
assist in recovery by supporting transmission systems until the occurrence ends.
12.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has one SVC. Table 12.2.1 shows that this SVC
operates at the 18.8 kV voltage level. Also, based on the commission notice to energize
(CNE), that SVC is 11 years old. It is located at the Dunsmuir Substation.
Equipment Manufacturer
Substation CNE Date Rated Voltage
Number Code
DUNSMUIR 18V1 ABB 1993 18.8 kV
DUNSMUIR 18V2/3 ABB 1993 18.8 kV
DUNSMUIR 18V4 ABB 1993 18.8 kV
Table 12.2.1 BCTCs SVC (showing each phase)

The first installations of SVCs occurred in the late 1970s. Since most SVCs are less than 30
years old, the industry has little experience in defining common failure modes or key factors
causing SVCs end-of-life.
Results of surveys conducted by various international organizations indicate that while some
early failures occurred, most SVCs have performed acceptably overtime. Surveys have
found no apparent generic degradation issues. In addition, users reported few failures of
conventional components such as transformers, capacitors, reactors, circuit breakers and
switches. One early SVC user reported a coupling transformer failure, and others reported
thyristor and control system failures. However, users reported that these early life problems
decreased with time.

While specific SVC degradation processes remain unknown, utilities generally expect this
equipment to degrade and age like similar assets used in other transmission network
applications. The following three SVC components, however, may have substantially
different degradation processes and longevity:
SVC thyristor valves;

SVC control systems; and
SVC cooling systems.
Key parameters affecting degradation of the three components listed above include:
Decreased reliability/availability/maintainability (RAM) of SVC system;

Increased maintenance and operating costs;
Inability to provide required performance under new operating conditions;
Increased maintenance and overhaul requirements of specific components;
Design obsolescence;
Age of device;
Corrosion and general deterioration; and
Coolant and oil leaks that may cause environmental impacts.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed SVCs first required developing end-of-life

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings are not broken and are free of chips, radial
B Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings are not broken, however minor chips and
cracks, are visible. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
C Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings are not broken, however major chips, and
some flashover burns and copper splash are visible. Cementing and fasteners
are secure.
D Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings are broken/damaged or cementing and
E Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings, cementing or fasteners are
broken/damaged beyond repair.
Table 12.3.1 Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Enclosure is clean and well ventilated. Floor is level and free from cracks.
Support steel, racks and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion.
Table 12.3.2 Thyristor Units Enclosure/Room

Condition
Description
Rating
A Thyristor Units externally are clean, and corrosion free. All primary and
secondary electrical connections are in good condition. All monitoring,
protection and control, auxiliary and cooling system components, mounted on
the thyristors are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or
internal overpressure. Appears to be well maintained with service records
readily available
Table 12.3.3 Thyristor Units Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Thyristor Unit Controls appear in good operating condition. No evidence of
misfiring or maloperation. All secondary electrical connections are in good
condition. All monitoring, annunciation, metering. Protection and control
devices associated with the operation and control of the thyristors are in good
condition. No external evidence of overheating, aging or damage. Appears to
be well maintained with service records readily available
Table 12.3.4 Thyristor Unit Controls Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A All open bus and cable connections tight, free from short circuit, mechanical
or thermal damage, and No corrosion on bolted or welded connections.
Ground connections are tight, free of corrosion and made directly to tanks,
pipes, operating equipment, cabinets and supports, without any intervening
paint or corrosion.
Table 12.3.5 Connectors/Conductors Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A MOV units are clean and free from contamination or evidence of over voltage
or overheating. All connections are tight. No corrosion on mounting hardware
or on connections.
Table 12.3.6 MOV Units Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A No external sign of deterioration of gaskets, weld seams, pipes, flanges or
valves on heat sinks, heat exchangers, pumps, reservoir/expansion tanks,
deionisers, liquid flow pressure and temperature monitoring and control
devices. Fan and pump enclosures are free of rust and corrosion and securely
mounted in position. No leakage of coolant observed. Fans and pumps
operate correctly, without excessive noise, in manual and automatic modes.
Weather seals on terminal boxes are in good condition.
Table 12.3.7 Cooling System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Fire detection system installed and operational. Deluge fire protection system
installed and operational if applicable. Fire barriers/walls are installed
between flammable power units located in close proximity. Concrete or other
spill containment provision is installed and in good condition.
Table 12.3.8 Fire Detection/Protection Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A The complete SVC system is free of any obvious defects and is operating
reliably in accordance with specified requirements. Outage rates, redundancy
and spares provisions are acceptable. All primary and secondary connections
are in good condition. All monitoring, protection and control devices, and
auxiliary systems are in good condition. No external evidence of overloading,
over voltage or misfiring. Audible noise levels are within prescribed limits.
Table 12.3.9 Overall SVC Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No abnormal indications
C Definite indications of abnormal activity
D Definite indications of high levels of abnormal activity
E High levels of abnormal activity that cannot be made normal.
Table 12.3.10 Coolant Analysis
Condition
Description
Rating
condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 12.3.12 Control System Test

A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1, and
E = 0.
For each asset class member, the components and tests shown in the tables above were
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a SVC in perfect
condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded SVC would have a
Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for a SVC in Table 12.3.13 below,

assume a SVC with partial data has a maximum condition score of 68 out of the Health Index
maximum possible score of 104. That SVC, therefore, has only 65% of the maximum score,
and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that SVC with partial data
had a maximum condition score of 74, it would have 71% of the Health Index maximum and
Static Var Compensator Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Bus Insulators/Entrance Bushings
1 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Condition
2 Thyristor Units Enclosure/Room 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Thyristor Units 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Thyristor Unit Controls 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
6 MOV Units 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
8 Fire Detection/Protection 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
9 Overall SVC Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
10 Coolant Analysis 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
12 Control System 2 A,E 4,0 8
Max Score = 104
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 12.3.13 Health Index Formulation for Static Var Compensator
Table 12.3.14 was used to determine the overall condition of the SVC.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 12.3.14 Health Index Scale for Static Var Compensators

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for the SVC in the BCTC-
managed transmission system. Tables 12.4.1 and 12.4.2 summarize the results, which are
also illustrated in Figure 12.4.1
Health Index Results Classification Number of Compensators
Very Good 1
Good 0
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Percentage of Total Population Surveyed 100
Table 12.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for the BCTC-Managed
Static Var Compensator

1.2
Static Var Compensators

1
1
0.8
Number of
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 12.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for the BCTC-Managed Static
Var Compensator
The SVC is in Very Good condition. No capital improvements are expected in the near term.

13.0 High Pressure Air Systems
13.1 Description
High-pressure air systems (HPAS) in stations supply energy to air-blast circuit breakers
(ABCB), allowing the breakers to operate. Consequently, HPAS must have sufficient
capacity and pressure to ensure that breakers can meet specifications that may include many
close-open operations in rapid sequence. HPAS also must provide dry and clean air required
for proper breaker operation.
HPAS consist of several separate subsystems that include:
The compressor;
The air dryer;
Pipes, connectors and valves;
Receivers and storage tanks; and
Monitoring and control equipment.
13.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system consists of 72 compressors, 40 dryers and 117
receivers at 27 sites. Table 13.2.1 shows the age demographics of the compressors, dryers
and receivers. As shown in the table, 46.3% of the compressors, 50% of the dryers and
48.8% of the receivers with known age are between 20 and 29 years old.
High Pressure Air System Components

Years
Compressors % Dryers % Receivers %
0 to 9 3 5.6% 5 20.8% 0 0.0%
10 to 19 12 22.2% 6 25.0% 5 12.2%
Age Group
20 to 29 25 46.3% 12 50.0% 20 48.8%

30 to 39 14 25.9% 1 4.2% 14 34.1%
40 to 49 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.9%
50 plus 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
SubTotal 54 100.0% 24 100.0% 41 100.0%
Incomplete 18 N/A 16 N/A 76 N/A
Total 72 40 117
Table 13.2.1 Count of High Pressure Air System Components

HPAS consist of compressors, air dryers, high-pressure pipe work and valves, plus receivers
and storage tanks. HPAS provide air for ABCBs. To operate safely and effectively, ABCBs
must have high quality air. Contaminants and moisture in HPAS, therefore, can result in
deterioration and ultimately catastrophic failure of ABCBs.
Because of the close association between ABCBs and HPAS, one must consider the
longevity of ABCBs in making end-of-life decisions about HPAS. Because of their
mechanical complexity, ABCBs require increased maintenance with age. The technical
obsolescence, deterioration, and maintenance costs of ABCBs have lead many utilities to
replace ABCBs with newer technology (e.g., SF6 breakers).
Compressors
HPAS compressors provide short bursts of activity to top-off stored air pressure for ABCBs.
Since ABCBs operate infrequently, HPAS compressors do too. Compressors have many
moving parts, and degradation generally relates to the amount of time that compressors
operate. Critical degradation processes include corrosion, wear and deterioration of internal
parts such as valves and seals. Preventive maintenance includes frequent inspections,
functional checks and less frequent minor overhauls
Air Dryers
Original dryer designs used heat to dry the air in HPAS. These early dryers had complex
piping and valving arrangements prone to leaks and breakdowns. As they age, these dryers
require more maintenance and have increased operational problems. Generally, utilities have
replaced these older dryers with simpler chemical desiccant dryers that require much less
maintenance. Maintenance includes inspection, desiccant replacement, and air quality
evaluations. Significant degradation can result in leaks and inefficient operation requiring
dryer refurbishment and replacement.
High-Pressure Pipework/Valves/Receivers
HPAS have several high-pressure pipes, valves and vessels to store and deliver air to circuit
breakers in various locations in a substation. They experience general degradation,
corrosion, wear and tear. These deterioration processes can lead to leaks, valve
malfunctions, and HPAS inefficiencies that ultimately can compromise the quality of air
delivered to the ABCB. HPAS, therefore, require regular inspections and maintenance.
Maintenance often includes valve replacements since normally it is not viable to repair leaky
valves in this equipment.
End-of-Life Issues
As described above, regular maintenance for HPAS includes repair or replacement of
inefficient and faulty components. Rising maintenance costs or failure to provide high

quality air typically define the end-of-life for HPAS. Some HPAS components are classified
as pressure vessels. These regulated components require specific testing to ensure
compliance. In a deteriorating HPAS, costs associated with meeting pressure vessel
regulatory requirements may lead to replacement decisions for the HPAS as a whole.
One cannot make end-of-life decisions about the HPAS without considering their associated
ABCBs. Further, the condition of the HPAS can influence ABCB management, including
replacement priorities.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed HPAS first required developing end-of-life

requires attention;
and
repair.

Compressors
Condition
Description
Rating
A All components are clean; corrosion free and are in good condition. No
external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to
have been well maintained.
put into acceptable condition.
Table 13.3.1 Compressor Enclosure/Assembly Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A All components are clean; corrosion and leak free and are in good condition.
No external evidence of overheating, deterioration or abnormality or damage.
Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 13.3.2 Compressor Motor Piping & Fittings Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No air or oil leaks are observed
B Minor leaks are observed but corrective action not required
C Minor leaks are observed but corrective action is recommended.
D Major leaks are observed system capability is in doubt.
E Major leaks are observed and system damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.3 Compressor Oil & Air Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
A All components are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition. No
external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to have
been well maintained.
Table 13.3.4 Compressor Condensate and Purge System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A All electrical conductors, connectors, cabling and controls are clean,
corrosion free and are in good condition. No external evidence of
overheating, embrittlement of insulating jackets or other deterioration or
abnormality. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 13.3.5 Compressor Power Supply/Monitoring/Control Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling. Support steel and/or
anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion. Ground connections are direct
E Foundation, supports or groundings damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.6 Compressor Foundation/Supports/Grounding Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
No external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to
E Cooling system components damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.7 Compressor Cooling System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
No external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to
E Compressor is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.8 Compressor Overall Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Moisture levels well within specifications with high margins
B Moisture levels close to specification (little or no margin)
C Moisture levels do not meet specification (by a small amount)
D Moisture levels do not meet specification (by a significant margin)
E Moisture levels do not meet specification and cannot be brought into
specification condition.
Table 13.3.9 Compressor Air Moisture Content

Condition
Description
Rating
A Alarms operate properly within specifications
E Alarms operates out of specification, operates inconsistently or does not
otherwise operate properly
Table 13.3.10 Compressor Alarms/Operation Set Points
Condition
Description
Rating
A Pump performance is satisfactory and within specifications
E Pump performance is not satisfactory (does not meet specifications) pumps
operates inconsistently or does not otherwise operate properly
Table 13.3.11 Compressor Pump-up Time
Air Dryers
Condition
Description
Rating
All components are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition. No
A external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to have
More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be
E
Table 13.3.12 Dryer Enclosure/Assembly Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
All components are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition. No
A external evidence of deterioration or abnormality or damage. Appears to have
More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be
E
Table 13.3.13 Dryer Filters/Desiccant/Strainers Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.14 Dryer Heater Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.15 Dryer Control/Monitoring/Wiring Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No leaks are observed
E Major leaks are observed and the system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.16 Dryer Air Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
Foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling. Support steel and/or
A anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion. Ground connections are direct
Table 13.3.17 Dryer Foundations/Supports/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Overall installed system is clean, corrosion and leak free and is in good
condition. All connections are secure. No evidence of overheating, or other
deterioration or abnormality. Appears to have been well maintained.
E Dryer system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.18 Dryer Overall Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Moisture levels do not meet specification and cannot be put into specification
condition.
Table 13.3.19 Dryer Air Moisture Content
Condition
Description
Rating
A Alarm operates properly within specifications
E Alarms operates out of spec, operates inconsistently or does not otherwise
operate properly
Table 13.3.20 Dryer Alarms/Operation Set Points

Air Receivers
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.21 Receiver/Pressure Vessels/Pipes & Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Pressure relief systems are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition.
No external evidence of deterioration, abnormality or damage. Appears to
Table 13.3.22 Receiver Pressure Relief Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Major leaks are observed and the system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.23 Receiver Air Leaks

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.24 Receiver Foundations/Supports/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Overall installed system is clean, corrosion and leak free and is in good
condition. All connections are secure. No evidence of overheating, or other
E Receiver system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.25 Receiver Overall Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.26 Receiver Air Moisture Content
Condition
Description
Rating
A Pressure relief device operations properly within specification
E Pressure relief device operates out of spec, operates inconsistently or does
not otherwise operate properly
Table 13.3.27 Receiver Pressure Relief Operation

High-Pressure Pipework/Valves
Condition
Description
Rating
A All pipes and valves are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition. No
external evidence of overheating, deterioration or abnormality or damage.
Table 13.3.28 Pipework/Valves Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Major leaks are observed and system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.29 Pipework/Valves Air Leaks
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.30 Pipework Foundation/Supports/Grounding Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Overall installed system is clean, corrosion and leak free and is in good
A condition. All connections are secure. No evidence of overheating, or other
E Pipework system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 13.3.31 Pipework Overall Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 13.3.32 Pipework Air Moisture Content

13.3.36 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1, and
E = 0.
For each asset class member), the components and tests shown in the tables above were

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an HPAS in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded HPAS
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for compressors in Table 13.3.33 below,
assume a compressor with partial data has a maximum condition score of 54 out of the
Health Index maximum possible score of 84. That compressor, therefore, has only 64% of
the maximum Health Index score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other
hand, if that compressor with partial data had a maximum condition score of 60, it would
have 71% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
calculated for a complete HPAS assembly consisting of appropriate compressors, dryers,
pipe work and valves, plus receivers and relief valves. Table 13.3.37 shows the components
considered, weightings and maximum scores possible in computing this overall Health Index.

HPAS - Compressors Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Air Compressor
1 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Enclosure/Assembly
Air Compressor Motor/Piping &
2 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Fittings
3 Oil & Air Leak 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Condensate & Purge System 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Power
5 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Supply/Monitoring/Control
6 Foundations/Supports/Grounding 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Overall Condition of Air
8 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Compressors
9 Air Moisture Content 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
10 Alarms/Operation Setpoints 2 A,E 4,0 8
11 Pump-up Time/Run Hours 2 A,E 4,0 8
Table 13.3.33 HPAS - Compressors Health Index Formulation
HPAS - Dryers Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Air Dryer Enclosure/Assembly 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Air Dryer
2 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Filters/Desiccant/Strainers
3 Air Dryer Heaters 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Air Dryer
4 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Control/Monitoring/Wiring
5 Air Leaks 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
7 Overall Condition of Air Dryers 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
9 Alarms/Operation Setpoints 2 A,E 4,0 8
Max Score= 76
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 13.3.34 HPAS - Dryers Health Index Formulation

HPAS - Receivers Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Air Receivers/Pressure Vessels,
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Pipes & Valves
2 Pressure Relief Valves 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
3 Air Leaks 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Foundations/Supports/
4 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Grounding
Overall Condition of Receivers
5 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
& Valves
7 Pressure Relief Operation 2 A,E 4,0 8
Max Score= 64
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 13.3.35 HPAS - Receivers Health Index Formulation
HPAS Pipes & Valves Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Pipes & Valves 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Air Leaks 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Overall Condition of Pipes &
4 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Valves
5 Air Moisture Content* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score= 64
HI = 100*Score/Max
*Measured at the breaker
Table 13.3.36 HPAS Pipes and Valves Health Index Formulation
Subsystem Health Weighting Max

Component
Index Factor score
Compressors 0-100 0.3 30
Dryers and Valves 0-100 0.2 20
System, Pipes and Valves 0-100 0.3 30
Air Receivers and Relief
0-100 0.2 20
Valves
Max Score= 100
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 13.3.37 Overall System Health Index Formulation for HPA Systems

After performing all of the steps described above, the Health Index Scale shown in
Table 13.3.38 was used to determine the overall condition of the HPAS asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 13.3.38 Health Index Scale for High Pressure Air Systems

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for each type of HPAS
equipment in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 13.4.1 and 13.4.2 summarize
the results, which are also illustrated in Figures 13.4.1 through 13.4.5.

Health Index Results Overall
Compressors Dryers Receivers Pipe Systems
Classification Systems
Very Good 9 8 39 8 8
Good 24 25 16 8 10
Fair 6 1 0 1 1
Poor 0 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 0 0
Total Results Based on
Field Survey 39 34 55 17 19
Percentage of Total
54.2 85.0 47.0 63.0 70.4
Population Surveyed
Table 13.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for High Pressure Air
Systems
Health Index Results Overall

Compressors Dryers Receivers Pipes
Classification Systems
Very Good 17 9 83 13 12
Good 44 30 34 13 14
Fair 11 1 0 1 1
Poor 0 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 0 0
Total 72 40 117 27 27
Table 13.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for High

Pressure Air Systems

50 44
High Pressure Air System

45
40
Compressors
35
Number of
30
25
20 17
15 11
10
5 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 13.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Compressors

High Pressure Air System Dryers
35
30
30
25
Number of
20
15
9
10
5 1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 13.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Dryers

90 83

80
70
60
Number of
Receivers 50
40 34
30
20
10 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 13.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Air Receivers
14 13 13
12
Pipe Systems
10
Number of
8
6
4
2 1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 13.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Pipe Systems

16
14
High Pressure Air Systems

14
12
12
Number of 10
8
6
4
2 1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 13.4.5 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Overall High Pressure Air
Systems
96.3% of HPAS are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements are
3.7% of HPAS are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital improvements
may be required depending on the criticality issues associated with the asset.

14.0 Protection and Control Systems
14.1 Asset Description

Protection and Control (P&C) systems monitor the BCTC-managed transmission system and
take corrective action when needed to ensure safe, reliable and stable power transmission.
P&C devices continually measure vital power system parameters (e.g., voltage, current,
phase angle and frequency). P&C systems detect abnormal conditions and initiate
appropriate automatic corrective actions. These systems include Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment (i.e., Remote Terminal Units or RTU) at stations.
Table 14.1.1 below indicates the typical components of a P&C system:
Components Types / Categories

Protective Measuring relays Electro-mechanical, Solid State, Digital
Auxiliary relay devices Simple relays, Timers, Logic Controllers
Miscellaneous mounting and 19 inch rack, Steel panel, Measuring relay cases,
connecting equipment, i.e. panels Auxiliary relay cases; Terminal blocks, Crimps, Current
or racks, mounting hardware, links, Fuses; AC current switches, DC blocking
terminations and isolating devices switches; AC wiring, DC wiring, Panel interconnecting
cables.
Table 14.1.1 Typical Protection System Components
Protection systems consist of single or multiple protective measuring relays plus auxiliary
devices that provide scheme logic functions. Tele-protection equipment is used with
peripheral communication systems to provide high-speed protection signalling between P&C
schemes located at different stations. Panels or racks, mounting hardware, terminations,
isolating devices and wiring facilitate installation of relays (i.e., measuring and auxiliary).
Protective Measuring Relays

The three basic categories of protective measuring relays are described below:
a) Electro-mechanical Relays
Electro-mechanical relays rely on physical, electrical and magnetic properties to detect fault
conditions. Usually, these relays use electro-magnetic rotating disks or cups, springs,
mechanical contacts, shading coils, phase-shifting circuitry, capacitors, inductors, and
resistors. They often have actual current or voltage transformer outputs flowing through
detection circuitry. Typically, electro-mechanical relays have large burdens and may require
secondary instrument transformers. Generally, each relay performs only one protection
function, which necessitates the use of multiple devices.

Electro-mechanical measuring relays were installed on the BCTC-managed transmission
system between 1950 and 1990, making them the oldest relays in service. However, at the
present time demographic records indicate that electro-mechanical relays still predominate.
b) Solid-State Relays
During the 1970s, the development of solid-state protective relays improved on the earlier
electro-mechanical types. With the exception of output contacts that may employ electro-
mechanical relays, solid-state relays have fewer moving parts than electro-mechanical relays.
However, they still have many analogue components (e.g., transistors, op-amps, electrolytic
capacitors, resistors, diodes). These relays do not employ digital signals or microprocessors.
During a period of rapid expansion between 1970 and 1990, mainly solid-state primary relays
were installed on the BCTC-managed system. As a result, the BCTC-managed transmission
system still has a large population of solid-state relays.
c) Microprocessor-Based Relays:
Microprocessor-based relays represent the most modern category of protective relays. They
perform their protective functions using software algorithms with the numerical processing
capabilities of high-speed microprocessor components such as Digital Signal Processor
(DSP) chips. This category of relays has much broader capabilities than electro-mechanical
or solid-state relays. Since 1990, all new protective measuring relays and protection logic
schemes and refurbishments on the BCTC-managed transmission system have been
microprocessor-based. As a result, the population of microprocessor-based relays on the
BCTC-managed transmission system is growing but remains limited.
Auxiliary Devices:
Auxiliary devices include auxiliary relays and timers. Generally, the following three
categories of auxiliary relays exist: (1) relays manufactured by ASEA and used in their
modern combi-flex case known as RX; (2) relays and timers manufactured by ASEA and
used in their original case known as RR; and (3) panel-mounted relays and timers that
include devices made by Westinghouse, General Electric, English Electric and other
manufacturers. Between 1930 and 1960, only panel-mounted relays were installed on the
BCTC-managed transmission system, and most of these were either RX or RR.
Miscellaneous Mounting and Connecting Equipment

Other miscellaneous mounting and connecting equipment includes steel panels or racks,
measuring and auxiliary relay cases, mounting hardware, terminal blocks, crimps, current
links, and fuses; AC current switches, DC blocking switches, AC wiring, DC wiring, and
panel interconnecting cables.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
Equipment
SCADA RTUs used in the BCTC-managed system are predominantly older radio equipment
now considered obsolete. Since the early 1980s more modern equipment has been installed.

14.2 Asset Demographics
14.2.1 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 2,891 protective relay systems that consist of
7,747 individual measuring relays. Table 14.2.1 shows the number of protective relay
systems installed for different voltage levels. Each primary and stand-by protection relay
scheme for a given protected asset is considered as a separate protective relay system.
Table 14.2.2 shows the same for the individual relay types. As shown in Table 14.2.2, most
(i.e., 4,183) of the relays are electro-mechanical. These demographics do not include
specialized protection and control relaying systems for HVDC, series capacitors, remedial
action schemes (RAS), or auto-reclosing, synchronism check and synchronism control relays.
Voltage Level Number of Systems

Below 25 kV 40
25 kV 10
60 kV 697
138 kV 549
230 kV 813
300 kV 15
360 DC kV 15
500 kV 496
Unknown 256
Total 2,891
Table 14.2.1 Relay System Demographics Grouped by Voltage
Voltage Digital Solid Electro-

Unknown Total
Level State mechanical
Below 25 kV 9 15 67 21 112
25 kV 0 7 28 8 43
60 kV 246 311 914 5 1,476
138 kV 170 308 855 15 1,348
230 kV 259 484 1,257 49 2,049
300 kV 0 2 64 11 77
360 DC kV 3 13 31 0 47
500 kV 74 768 816 458 2,116
Unknown 87 153 151 88 479
Total 848 2,061 4,183 655 7,747
Table 14.2.2 Relay Demographics Grouped by Voltage and Type

The BCTC-managed transmission system also has a total of 434 RTUs. As shown in
Table 14.2.3 most (i.e., 271) of these RTUs are of the older radio supervisory/telemetry type.
Function Radio Type RTUs Post 1980 RTUs Total

SCADA Control
271 163 434
Systems
Table 14.2.3 RTU Demographics Grouped by Type

Two techniques exist to determine the potential for failures in this asset class. The first
technique relies on generic and qualitative degradation indicators readily assessed through
visual inspections and testing. The second technique relies on converting recent quantitative
asset performance and failure data into in-service performance ratings.
Protection and control assets have significant differences from any other transmission assets
since conventional condition assessment techniques (i.e., based on physical inspections and
test results) often fail to predict end-of-life reliably for protection and control devices.
Reliable health and condition assessments for this asset class must consider the degree of
design or functional obsolescence, recorded mean time between failures, and the in-service
age of relays. Therefore, condition assessment techniques for this asset class combine results
of physical inspections, calibrations, and maintenance records with results of recent operating
performance, in-service age and degree of obsolescence.
Health and Condition Assessment of Protective Measuring Relays

Health and condition assessment methods for the three different categories of protective
measuring relays are described below:
a) Electro-mechanical Relays
Since relays depend on physical, electrical and magnetic properties of electrical and
mechanical components (e.g., rotating disks, springs, mechanical contacts, shading coils,
capacitors, inductors, and resistors), gradual changes in the properties of these components
directly affect relay operation. For example, any wear, corrosion or dust accumulation on
moving parts can increase friction and affect relay accuracy and calibration. Similarly, aging
of mechanical springs may cause changes in spring constants and affect relay accuracy and
calibration. Repeated making and breaking of electric current leads to deterioration of relay
output contacts and may lead to relay malfunction.

The phenomenon of silver migration occurs when silver-plating from the back of relay case
terminals is deposited on insulation between the terminals. Silver migration tends to occur in
locations with high levels of ambient air pollution. In extreme cases, severe silver deposits
can cause terminal shorting and require case replacement. However, it is a slow process that
typically takes 25 30 years to advance to this replacement point.
Visual inspections, calibrations and test results serve as key indicators of the health and
condition of electro-mechanical relays.
Visual inspections can detect the following types of defects:
Bent or worn contacts;

Silver migration on rear case of relay;
Frayed or cracked insulation on conductors within the device;
Weak connections and poor terminations;
Broken Flexitest switch jaws;
Dirty contacts;
Leaking capacitors;
General wear and tear;
Nameplate discoloration;
Peeling of labels;
Peeling of insulation wrapping and covering over coils;
Clouding of front dust cover; and
Dust accumulation.
Calibration and test record reviews can detect the following types of defects:
Loss of calibration;
Inability to calibrate the relay within the specified range;
Loosening of internal components from vibration;
Contact welding and pitting; and
Failure of internal components such as coils, magnets, resistors, capacitors.
b) Solid-State Relays:
Solid-state relay components are mounted on printed circuit boards. Common input card
failures result from overstressing electronic components due to over-current or over-voltage
sensing circuit conditions. Output contacts also may wear out and eventually fail. Power
supply card failures also may lead to relay failures.
Visual inspections, calibrations and test results serve as key indicators of the health and
condition of solid-state relays. Visual inspections can detect the following types of defects:
Leaking capacitors;
Dust accumulation;
Leaking batteries;

Signs of overheating;
Discoloration of nameplate;
Peeling of labels; and
Clouding of front dust cover.
Calibration and test record reviews can detect the following types of defects:
Inability to calibrate relay within the specified range;

Dirty, sticking or worn contacts;
PCB containing capacitors;
Damaged components on printed circuit boards; and
Defective printed circuit boards.
c) Microprocessor-Based Relays:
As described above, the key difference between microprocessor-based relays and
conventional solid-state relays is the use of software algorithms and numerical processing in
microprocessor-based relays. Aging processes and failure modes are more difficult to define
and predict for microprocessor-based relays than for the other two types of relays. However,
microprocessor-based relays often have self-diagnostic capabilities that can assist in
assessing their health.
Visual inspections and test results serve as key indicators of the health and condition of
microprocessor-based relays. Visual inspections can detect the following types of defects:
Peeling of labels; and
Dust accumulation.
Electrical tests can detect the following types of defects:
Defective printed circuit boards;

Damage from exposure of device to excessive transient over-voltage or over-current;
Faulty input measuring circuit components (metering checks); and
Faulty output trip and tele-protection signal circuit components (trip output tests).
Health and Condition Assessment of Tele-Protection Devices

Since tele-protection telecommunications equipment uses the same types of solid-state
components as those in solid-state protective measuring relays, similar condition assessment
methods and criteria apply to tele-protection devices.
Health and Condition Assessment of SCADA RTU Devices

When RTUs are housed in station yard cabinets, water ingress and rodent entries can cause
equipment failures.

Visual inspections and test results serve as key indicators of the health and condition of
SCADA RTU equipment. For example, one can assess the physical condition of RTUs by
visually inspecting them and comparing observed conditions to asset specific condition
criteria. In addition, ongoing defect reporting can provide data to establish performance
benchmarks for reference. The combination of results provides an indication of failure
probability. Generally, visual inspections can detect the following types of defects in
SCADA RTU equipment.
Evidence of mice inside RTU cabinet;

Cabinet seals at cable entrance;
Doors left open for supplementary cooling;
Peeling of labels;
Clouding of front dust cover;
Leaking capacitors;
Dust accumulation on printed circuit boards;
Leaking batteries; and
Signs of overheating.
Reviews of maintenance and tests records can detect the following types of defects:
Dirty or sticking contacts; and

PCB containing capacitors.
Health and Condition Assessment of Auxiliary Devices

Auxiliary relays may use either electro-mechanical or solid-state device designs or a
combination of the two. Auxiliary relays have aging mechanisms similar to those described
for protective measuring relays.
Reviews of visual inspections and various test results can detect defects and assist in
assessing the condition of auxiliary devices. Visual inspections can indicate the following
types of defects:
Worn-out or burnt contacts;

Frayed insulation;
Mechanical damage or reduced mechanical strength;
Poor connections;
Poor terminations; and
General wear and tear.
Reviews of field test results and other test reports can detect the following defects:
Loss of timing calibration;

Loosening of internal components; and

Contact welding and failure of various internal components such as coils, magnets,
resistors, capacitors, transistors, diodes or printed circuit boards.
In addition, documented defects that have lead to specific device failures can be used to
derive generic in-service performance ratings for that device.
Health and Condition Assessment of Miscellaneous Mounting and Connecting

Equipment
The condition assessment methods and degradation indicators for key mounting and
connecting equipment are described below:
a) Terminations
Terminations include terminal blocks, crimps, current links, and fuse holders. Typical
protection systems are mounted on either single or multiple panels. Each panel has its own
set of terminal rails that can hold from 50 to several hundred terminal blocks. Terminal
blocks facilitate interaction among various protection panels.
Protection relays have their own terminations that typically include blocks with screw in
terminations on the back of each relay. Wires connect to these blocks via crimps.
AC cables from current transformers typically located in switchyards terminate via current
links. Also, AC cables from voltage transformers terminate via fuse holders.
For terminations, visually detected degradation indicators include deteriorating terminal

blocks that may crack with age, dislodged wire crimps, stripped or worn screw threads,
potentially hazardous termination conditions, archaic means of isolation, and multiple
terminations that have become obscure from many system modifications.
b) Isolation Devices
AC current switches isolate AC current and voltage sources. Upon isolation, current sources
must be shorted to avoid generation of dangerous and destructive high voltages across
terminals. For safety, AC current switches automatically introduce internal current source
shorting upon isolation.
DC blocking switches isolate all types of DC inputs and outputs that interface with protection
devices. During routine maintenance, a series of connected blocking switches is used to
block trip outputs from being sent by the protective relay system.
Two broad categories of switches exist, Flexi-test and old style panel mounted knife
switches. Visual inspections of these components can detect the following types of defects:
Broken or damaged switch handles;

Broken Flexi-test switch jaws or shorting links;
Burnt-out contacts; and
Deteriorating terminations.

c) Wiring and Cabling
Key indicators of control wiring and cabling degradation include frayed and brittle
insulation, loss of crimping strength, and cracked lead insulated current cables.
In-Service Life of Protection and Control Systems

Age in itself does not serve as an effective determinant of a particular assets end-of-life.
However, replacing equipment deemed near the end of its useful life pre-empts the failure of
critical equipment. For protection and control systems this poses a unique problem, since
these systems operate only infrequently to clear power system faults. Lack of reliability in
these systems, however, can present severe risks since this can lead to extended power
system outages, catastrophic equipment failures and compromise public safety.
Generally, failure rates for protection and control devices, particularly solid-state devices,
follow conventional bathtub curves. Thus, in-service life can serve as a valid condition
assessment measure for this asset class. Typically, the accepted manufacturer and industry
end-of-life age (i.e., design life) is 30 - 40 years for electro-mechanical devices, 20 - 25 years
for solid state and microprocessor devices, and 18 - 20 years for SCADA RTU.
Comparing the in-service equipment age to the manufacturers stated design life can provide
an indication of the state of equipment. For purposes of this study, the Health Index
Formulation incorporates condition criteria that represent this comparison. These are shown
in the tables in subsections 14.3.2 and 14.3.3 below.
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)

Protection systems consist of either single or multiple protective measuring relay units and
many auxiliary devices that provide logic functions. Protective measuring relays monitor
electrical quantities directly from instrument transformers in the power system. These
devices have predictable life spans but can operate when not required (i.e., mis-operate) or
fail to operate when needed. Since auxiliary devices that provide the scheme logic functions
for a protection relay system are more robust than the protective measuring relays,
performance measurements focus on the protective measuring relays.
Most protection systems involve many measuring functions that require auxiliary logic to
achieve required results. Electro-mechanical measuring relays usually provide a single
function. For this reason, most electro-mechanical based protection systems have many
single measuring relays mounted on the same rack or panel. For example, a typical high
voltage line protection system may consist of twelve individual electro-mechanical
measuring relays. A typical solid-state relay based line protection system may consist of
three individual relays along with auxiliary relay logic. A typical digital relay based line
protection system will consist of one multi-functional measuring relay. Digital relays unlike
either electro-mechanical or solid state relays can be programmed to provide all logic usually
reserved for auxiliary devices in other systems. Therefore, when comparing performance
measurements, the health indices for different categories of protective measuring relays must
be calculated separately.

MTBF serves as the industry accepted in-service performance index. For protective
measuring relays, multiplying a devices average age by the total population of that type of
device, then dividing by the number of documented failures, provides an accurate MTBF
index defined as Device-Years/Failure [i.e., MTBF = (Average Age x Total Population) /
Number of Failures]. This index provides a quantitative measure of relative performance for
categories of protective measuring relays. For purposes of this study, the Health Index
Formulation incorporates this index in the condition criteria. These are shown in the tables in
subsections 14.3.2 and 14.3.3 below.
Equipment Obsolescence
Two categories of equipment obsolescence exist: non-discretionary and discretionary
obsolescence events. Non-discretionary events have a sense of immediate urgency for
equipment replacement. For discretionary events, no urgency exists to replace equipment.
a) Non-discretionary Obsolescence
Non-discretionary obsolescence may result from either of the following events:
Unavailability of spare parts and manufacturer support; and

Inability of past designs to meet present needs.
As equipment ages, the availability of spare parts increasingly becomes an issue. Often parts
begin to wear out just as manufacturers drastically cut back on product support. Generally,
spare parts availability becomes a problem after 25 30 years of service. Sometimes parts
can be reused from equipment previously removed from service. However, such reuse offers
only a temporary fix.
Many older protection systems have designs that do not meet present standards. For example,
earlier electro-mechanical relays lack many basic protection features that could cause
equipment damage even when operating correctly. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) Guides and IEEE Standards for protective relaying systems provide useful
comparative guidance. Where designs fall short of these recognized standards the protection
system may be deemed obsolete.
In some cases, when certain protection and control system components cannot fulfill their
intended functions, the entire protection and control system may be deemed obsolete. For
example, telecommunications play a critical role in linking protection systems between
stations. This tele-protection link is required to transfer trip remote power circuit breakers
and isolate faulted elements such as transformers. The link also facilitates data transfer
between systems needed for secure operation. When telecommunications systems reach their
end-of-life, metallic cable may be replaced with fibre optics. Many protection schemes that
rely on metallic cable cannot be adapted to fibre optic technology. Thus, such protection
schemes may be forced into obsolescence because of peripheral obsolescence and
replacement.

b) Discretionary Obsolescence
The definition of a protection relay has undergone fundamental change. Modern digital
protection relays based on microprocessors have many resident features previously
unavailable. Examples of such features include metering, monitoring, remote interrogation
and distance to fault. All of these provide benefits that include both cost savings and reduced
power system outage time. By definition then, these newer protective relaying systems have
made other older protection relays obsolete. Station operations have become increasingly
dependent on such new features since they also affect resources. For example, replacing
older single function devices with new multi-functional devices has arguable intrinsic cost
benefits.
The deregulated environment may dictate use of sophisticated switching techniques. Under
deregulation, seamless switching without the need for station operator intervention may
become critical. Modern microprocessor based protection relays can switch setting groups
allowing automatic adaptations to changing power system conditions. Typical conditions that
benefit from this feature include operator initiated switching and step changes in system
loading. All of this occurs transparently to station operators and significantly enhances their
capability. Older and simpler protection relays cannot readily adapt to changing system
conditions that occur under present demands. This lack of adaptability limits system
operation.
Because digital relays are microcomputers optimized for protection applications they can be
designed with complex and enhanced algorithms. One such algorithm has the capacity to
monitor high resistance ground faults on distribution feeders. This type of algorithm could
add substantially to the safe operation of low voltage distribution systems.
Usually, regular maintenance and inspection pre-empt failures of protection equipment when
needed. Cursory visual inspections cannot provide accurate assessments of the health of
electro-mechanical and solid-state protection devices. These devices require more extensive
testing for accurate health assessments. Digital technology, however, is different since these
devices can run extensive self-diagnostic routines while remaining in service. Checked items
include the state of the CPU, ROM, RAM, internal power supply, and the loss of input
quantities. In many cases, two independent memories store programmable setting images and
routinely compare the images for anomalies. Relay failure alarms then immediately indicate
failures or anomalies.
Regulatory bodies have extended mandatory maintenance cycles for Bulk Electricity System
protections that use self-diagnosing protective measuring relays. Also, since single digital
devices generally replace many electro-mechanical devices and peripheral logic, the overall
time required for equipment maintenance is much less. Thus, digital technology as a
replacement represents an ongoing cost reduction in mandatory maintenance.
As protection systems become less reliable or reach their end-of-life, users must set priorities
for their replacement based on their application in the power system. For example, certain
classes of power system equipment and voltage levels are more critical than others. In

setting priorities, it is important to assess risks by considering and comparing the potential
for and consequences of failure for various power system elements.
Thus, utilities must consider several factors in setting protection system replacement
priorities. For example, they can first analyze a category of protective measuring relays for
failure histories, retention of calibration and overall deterioration. In doing so, the overall
MTBF for that particular relay category can influence decisions. Second, utilities can
analyze the larger protection system in which the measuring relays serve as components.
These analyses should consider measures such as fraying and brittle insulation as well as
overall deterioration and tightly tied wire bundles that may lead to hazardous situations and
impacts on customer reliability
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed protection and control systems first
required developing end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class.
Components analyzed included protective measuring relays, auxiliary relays, and
miscellaneous mounting and connecting equipment. Each criterion represents a factor critical
in determining the components condition relative to potential failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Primary Measuring Relays
Condition
Condition State Description
Rating
No wear and tear noticeable.
Table 14.3.1 Results of Physical/Visual Inspection
Condition
Rating
A Calibrations have not been needed and functional test passed
B Small adjustments in calibrations have been occasionally needed and
functional test passed
C Small adjustments in calibrations are regularly needed and functional test
passed
D Major calibration has been needed or a functional test failed
E Equipment is so damaged or degraded that calibration is not possible.
Table 14.3.2 Assessment Based on Calibration and Test Reports
Condition
Rating
A An MTBF of better than 100 device-years/failure
B An MTBF of between 75-100 device-years/failure
C An MTBF of between 50-75 device-years/failure
D An MTBF of between 25-50 device-years/failure
E An MTBF of less than 25 device-years/failure
Table 14.3.3 Rating Based on Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)

Condition
Rating
A In-service life to design life ratio of 0% to 20%
B In-service life to design life ratio of 20% to 40%
C In-service life to design life ratio of 40% to 80%
D In-service life to design life ratio of 80% to 100%
E In-service life to design life ratio of 100% or more
Table 14.3.4 Rating Based on In-Service Life
Condition
Rating
A The device has available spare parts and meets present design needs
E The device does not have available spare parts or does not meet present
design needs
Table 14.3.5 Rating Based on Non-Discretionary Obsolescence
Condition
Rating
A This device is not considered obsolete in its present operational environment
B This device is not of the current installation type for its present operational
environment
C This device may become obsolete in its present operational environment
within the next 5 years
D This device may become obsolete in its present operational environment
within the next 3 years
E This device is considered obsolete in its present operational environment
Table 14.3.6 Rating Based on Discretionary Obsolescence

Auxiliary Relays
Condition
Rating
Condition
Rating
passed
SCADA RTU Equipment

Condition
Rating

Condition
Rating
passed
Condition
Rating
D An MTBF of less than 25-50 device-years/failure
Table 14.3.11 Rating Based on Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
Condition
Description
Rating
A In-service life to design life ratio of 0% to 20%
B In-service life to design life ratio of 20% to 40%
C In-service life to design life ratio of 80% to 80 %
D In-service life to design life ratio of 80% to 100%
E In-service life to design life ratio of 100% or more
Table 14.3.12 Rating Based on In-Service Life

Misc. Hardware and Connecting Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating

A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
For this asset class, the components and tests shown in the tables above were weighted
based on their importance in determining the class members end-of-life. For example, those
that relate to primary functions of the component or asset received higher weights than those
that relate to more ancillary features and functions.
The condition rating numbers (i.e., factors) listed immediately above (i.e., A = 4, B = 3, etc.)
were multiplied by the assigned weights to compute weighted scores for each component and
test. The weighted scores were totalled for each asset class member.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an electro-

mechanical protective measuring relay in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100
while a completely degraded electro-mechanical relay would have a Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for P&C systems in Table 14.3.14
below, assume a P&C system with partial data has a maximum condition score of 91 out of
the Health Index maximum possible score of 136. That system, therefore, has only 67% of
the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that
system with partial data had a maximum condition score of 97, it would have 71% of the
for each member or line section in this asset class.

Asset Condition Maximum
Condition Criteria Weighting Factors
Component Ratings Score
Protective Results of 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Measuring physical/visual
Relays inspections
Assessment based on 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
calibration and test
reports
Ratings based on 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
MTBF
Rating based on In- 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Service Life
Rating based on 3 A,E 4,0 12
Non-Discretionary
Obsolescence
Rating based on 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Discretionary
Obsolescence
Auxiliary Relays Results of 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
physical/visual
inspections
reports
SCADA RTU Results of 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Equipment physical/visual
inspections
reports
Ratings based on 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
MTBF
Rating based on In- 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Service Life
Misc. hardware Results of 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
and connecting physical/visual
equipment inspections
Max Score = 136
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 14.3.14 Health Index Formulation for Protection and Control Systems

For this study, BCTC did not have any of the information required by the Health Index
Formulation shown in Table 14.3.14 above. Thus, it was not possible to compute valid
Health Indices for this asset class using the Health Index Formulation for P&C systems.
Table 14.3.15 was used to determine the overall condition of the P&C system asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 14.3.15 Health Index Scale for Protection and Control Equipment

As described above, because of the lack of data a condition-based Health Index was not
derived for this asset class. However, the demographic data shown in subsection 14.2 above
provided some information about the age and types of P&C systems in the BCTC-managed
transmission system. This demographic data was used to offer BCTC the following
observations about the potential condition of equipment in this asset class.
Protective Measuring Relays

Based on the demographics of the relay population, 59% of the protective relays are electro-
mechanical and considered functional, but obsolete. Original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) no longer support these types of relays. Further, these relays are not compatible
with modern computer-based equipment now being installed on the BCTC-managed
transmission system. On this basis, for purposes of this study, 59% of the protective

measuring relays are considered to be in Poor condition due to obsolescence and the inability
to obtain adequate new spare parts. BCTC replacement programs for obsolete relays are
discussed below.
Also, based on the demographics of the relay population, 29% of the protective relays are
based on solid state technology and considered functional but obsolete. These relays, too,
could experience failure problems. However, unlike the electro-mechanical relays, BCTC
indicates that it can obtain spares for the solid state technology relays while these relays are
being replaced with digital technology. Thus, for purposes of this study, the 29% of
protective relays that are solid state technology are considered in Fair condition based on
their obsolescence, potential for failure, and availability of adequate spares.
The remaining 12% of protective measuring relays in the BCTC-managed transmission

system are modern digital equipment that fully meets protective function requirements.
These relays also are fully compatible with modern computer-based equipment now being
installed on the BCTC-managed transmission system. On that basis, for purposes of this
study, 12% of the protective measuring relays are considered to be in Very Good condition.
Figure 14.4.1 shows the condition of protective relays based on the use of demographic data.
Percentage of Protective Relays
70
59
60
50
40
29
30
20 12
10
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 14.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Protective Relays
SCADA System Equipment

Based on the demographics of the SCADA equipment population, 38% of SCADA RTUs are
modern but not necessarily digital. Also, based on the demographics of the population, 62%
of the SCADA RTUs are pre-1980, radio-based and considered functional, but obsolete. For

purposes of this study, the modern RTUs are considered to be in Good condition. The older
RTUs are considered to be in Fair condition since they are functional but obsolete.
Figure 14.4.2 shows the condition of SCADA RTUs based on the use of demographic data.
Percentage of SCADA Systems
70 62
60
50
38
40
30
20
10
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 14.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for SCADA Systems

15.0 Surge Arrestors
15.1 Description
Surge arresters limit transient over-voltages by diverting the energy to local grounds. Surge
arrestors, therefore, protect other adjacent equipment from electrical stresses. Transient over-
voltages may result from lightning strikes, switching surges and other system-generated
disturbances.
Arrestors operate on the principle of non-linear impedance to ground. Up to a certain turn-

on voltage, arresters appear as a high impedance and have little effect on power system
operation. However, after the voltage exceeds a pre-defined threshold, the arrester appears as
a low impedance, diverts energy to ground and prevents the voltage from rising too much
above the pre-defined threshold.
Traditionally, surge arresters have consisted of blocks of special ceramic material with
nonlinear behaviour. Modern arresters use blocks made of zinc oxide (ZnO). Older arresters
have blocks of silicon carbide. Silicon carbide arresters, however, have inadequate
protection levels, cannot support line voltages, and are considered obsolete. These arresters,
therefore, usually include spark gaps in series with the arrestors main elements. Most
modern ZnO arresters do not have spark gaps. They also respond faster and perform better
than silicon carbide arrestors, and have become the technology of choice.
Station arresters are used at all voltages, and come in different shapes and sizes. For higher
voltages, arresters consist of long stacks of ZnO or other blocks housed in polymeric or
porcelain enclosures that resemble insulators. Arrester specifications include not only
operating voltages but also energy capacities. Some large arresters may use more than one
stack of ZnO blocks in parallel to meet energy capacity requirements.
15.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 2,608 surge arrestors. Table 15.2.1 shows the
number of surge arrestors grouped by voltage level and age group. The table shows that most
of the systems surge arrestors fall into the 60 kV, 138 kV and 230 kV voltage levels, with
those levels having 31.0% and 23.0% and 22.3% of the total population respectively. The
less than 25 kV and 500 kV voltage levels each have fewer surge arresters, with 9.6% and
12.4% respectively.
Table 15.2.1 also shows that 43.3%, of the surge arrestor with known age are between 20
and 29 years old. The age ranges 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years and 30 to 39 years each have
about the same number of surge arresters, with 16.2%, 13.5% and 15.9 % respectively. The
system also has 1.0% of its surge arresters between the ages of 40 and 49 years.

Voltage
25 60 138 230 360 500 Total Percent
Incomplete
kV kV kV kV kV kV
0 to 9 31 130 122 77 12 50 0 422 16.2
10 to 19 30 116 106 66 1 32 0 351 13.5
Age Group
20 to 29 124 285 199 285 4 225 6 1,128 43.3

30 to 39 3 223 87 93 3 1 4 414 15.9
40 to 49 6 20 0 0 0 0 0 26 1.0
50 plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
incomplete 57 34 86 60 1 16 13 267 10.2
Total 251 808 600 581 21 324 23 2,608 100.0
Percent 9.6 31.0 23.0 22.3 0.8 12.4 0.9 100.0
Table 15.2.1 Count of Surge Arrestors Grouped by Voltage Level and Age

Arrestors commonly fail from moisture ingress or ceramic block breakdowns (i.e., valve
elements). Moisture ingress can occur through malfunctions of arrestor housing seals or
damage to the housing itself. Moisture commonly increases abnormal electrical activity
across outside valve element surfaces. This can cause increases in leakage currents,
overheating of arrestors and failures of this equipment.
Arrestor valve elements consist of solid-state devices that do not degrade significantly over
time. However, external mechanical forces and energy absorption can crack blocks and
cause internal punctures. Visual inspections cannot detect these forms of damage readily.
Sometimes, however, increases in leakage currents may indicate that such degradation has
occurred.
Many companies use leakage current measurements to detect abnormalities in arrestor

assemblies. However, in the BCTC-managed transmission system these measurements are
not made. Such measurements work best with gapless arrestor designs. In these designs,
testing can occur with the equipment online and in normal operation. Increased leakage
currents also may result in arrestor heating. Some companies, therefore, have had success in
adapting thermo-vision techniques to identify deterioration in arrestor systems.
Silicon Carbide arrestors (i.e., gap type) are considered obsolete and at their end-of-life since
abnormalities are difficult to detect and they have had poor performance.

Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed transmission surge arrestors first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Porcelains and pressure relief device are not broken and are free of chips,
radial cracks, flashover burns, copper splash and copper wash. Cementing
B Components are not broken, however there are some minor chips and/or
cracks, and/over flashover burns and/or copper splash and/or copper wash.
C Components are not broken, however there are some major chips and/or
cracks, and/over flashover burns and/or copper splash and/or copper wash.
D Components are broken/damaged or cementing or fasteners are not secure.
E Components, cementing or fasteners are broken/damaged beyond repair.
Table 15.3.1 Porcelain/Pressure Relief Condition

Condition
Description
Ratings
A Electrical conductors and connectors to the arrester are clean, corrosion free
and are in good condition. No external evidence of overheating or any other
Table 15.3.2 Connectors/Conductors Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A If surge arrestor is NOT a gap type
E If surge arrestor IS a gap type
Table 15.3.4 Surge Arrestor Type (Gap or Other)
Condition
Description
Rating
A There IS a pressure relief device installed.
E There is NOT a pressure relief device installed
Table 15.3.5 Pressure Relief Device

Condition
Description
Rating
A Arrester is externally is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
E Arrestor is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 15.3.6 Overall Condition

A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a surge arrestor
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded surge
arrestor would have a Health Index of 0.

using the weightings and maximum possible scores for surge arrestors in Table 15.3.7 below,
assume an arrestor with partial data has a maximum condition score of 24 out of the Health
Index maximum score of 36. That arrestor, therefore, has only 67% of the maximum score,
and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that arrestor with partial data
had a maximum condition score of 26 it would have 72% of the Health Index maximum and
Surge Arrestors Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Porcelain/Pressure Relief 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Foundation/Support
3 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Steel/Grounding
Overall Surge Arrestors
4 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition
Max Score = 36
HI = 100*Score/Max
Note1. HI is divided by 4 if Surge Arrestor is Gap-Type
Note2. HI is divided by 4 if no Pressure Relief Device exists on Surge Arrestor
Table 15.3.7 Health Index Formulation for Surge Arrestors
Table 15.3.8 was used to determine the overall condition of the surge arrestor asset class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 15.3.8 Health Index Scale for Surge Arrestors

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for station surge arrestors in
Health Index Results Classification Number of Arrestors
Very Good 15
Good 110
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 178
Table 15.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Surge Arrestors

Health Index Results Classification Number of Arrestors
Very Good 129

Good 947
Fair 0
Poor 0
Very Poor 1,532
Total 2,608
Table 15.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Surge

Arrestors
1,800
1,532
1,600
1,400
Surge Arrestors
1,200
Number of
947
1,000
800
600
400
129
200 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 15.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Surge Arrestors
41.3% of Surge Arrestors are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital

58.7% of Surge Arrestors are in Very Poor condition and are considered to be at their
end-of-life.

16.0 Station Grounding and Surface Treatment
16.1 Description
Grounding systems in stations dissipate maximum ground fault currents without interfering
with power system operation or causing voltages dangerous to people or equipment. Safety
hazards from inadequate grounding include excessive ground potential rises and excessive
step and touch potentials. Generally, grounding system assets provide suitable paths for
ground currents to follow from power equipment and conductors into the earth.
Consequently, complete grounding systems include buried conductors, ground rods and
connections, plus soil and vegetation in the area. Soil and vegetative conditions affect water
retention and drainage, which impact overall performance of the grounding system.
Typically, ground grids consist of buried conductors, rods and the connections between the
buried components as well as connections between the grid and power equipment.
Grounding conductors are typically copper. Connections are made with compression type or
Cadweld connectors. The depth of burial and materials used for backfill are carefully
specified.
For safety and system performance, ground grids are bonded to most metallic structures in
the station yard. These can include system and transformer neutrals, apparatus grounds,
buildings and fences.
Surface treatments can have significant effects on step and touch potential, particularly in
station yard areas where heavy ground currents can flow during system faults. Surface
treatments, therefore, play integral roles in station grounding systems. To ensure safety, the
top layer of earth must have great resistivity, which is accomplished by installing high
resistivity surface stone, free from weeds and fines.
16.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 282 substations. Each substation has
a single grounding system. Table 16.2.1 shows the number of grounding systems
(substations) grouped by each region and relevant age group. The table shows that the counts
of grounding systems are distributed fairly evenly by region.
Table 16.2.1 shows that 35.1% of the grounding systems are 50 or more years old, and that
31.9% are 30 to 39 years old. Also, 80.1% of the grounding systems are over 30 years old.

Region
Total Percent
FV MET NEW NIC NVI OK SVI TRG TSA
0 to 9 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 10 3.5
Age Group
10 to 19 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 1.8
20 to 29 1 4 10 2 2 10 5 1 6 41 14.5
30 to 39 12 6 11 14 8 19 3 4 13 90 31.9
40 to 49 1 7 10 7 0 4 2 2 4 37 13.1
50 plus 18 30 0 1 8 8 8 20 6 99 35.1
Total 35 47 33 26 21 42 20 28 30 282 100.0
Percent 12.4 16.7 11.7 9.2 7.4 14.9 7.1 9.9 10.6 100.0
Table 16.2.1 Count of Station Grounding Systems Grouped by Region and Age

Grounding Systems
Transmission station grounding systems keep ground potential rise, step and touch potentials
below specified limits when maximum (i.e., worst case) ground faults occur. Under fault
conditions, the following factors determine step and touch potentials:
Magnitude of the fault current;

Resistance of ground combined with the ground grid consisting of station electrodes,
transmission line sky wires and distribution neutrals; and
Ground resistivity of upper and lower layers of earth.
Increases in system capacity and fault currents at a station may lead to unacceptable
performance of the ground grid. Corrosion of buried conductors and connectors, mechanical
damage to buried electrodes, plus burning-off of grounding conductors and connectors during
heavy fault currents also may lead to unsatisfactory performance. Further, changes in
resistivity of upper or lower layers of earth may adversely affect ground grid characteristics.
To assess the health of a ground grid, one must confirm that the grounding networks design
coordinates well with existing fault currents. Grounding integrity tests can then confirm the
resistance of individual underground connections. After performing those tests, soil
resistivity can be re-measured and simulated using software to analyse worst case ground
potential rise, step and touch potentials. Fall of potential measurements can assist in further
verifying the system. Fault simulation tests can be used to measure ground potential rise plus
step and touch potentials.
Generally, station grounding assessments require more consideration of the systems

capability and functionality than of its condition. However, if the systems condition is of
most interest, one can conduct visual assessments of above ground connections. Continuity

checks also can help ensure that the system remains intact below ground. Performing
continuity tests involves comparing measured resistance between nearby grid points against
expected resistance values.
Surface Treatment
Current BCTC standards require use of 150 mm of crushed rock as surface treatment at each
substation. The rock must extend 1.5 meters beyond the fence. Over time, settlement,
construction activity and vehicle movement inside the substation may reduce cover depth.
Safety dictates routine inspections of rock depth to ensure that it meets standards.
Weeds and fines can contaminate the rock surface treatments and lead to lower resistivity and
unacceptable conditions. Sample boxes and AC ground resistance meters measure surface
treatment resistivity, which should meet design specifications.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed station ground and surface treatments first
required developing end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each
criterion represents a factor critical in determining the components condition relative to
potential failure.
Generally, the Health Index is based on evaluating grounding systems for the following:
Adequacy of design in view of existing fault current levels;

Adequacy of electrode components; and
Adequacy of surface stone resistivity.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Individual yards show considerable conductor redundancy (meshing),
adjacent yards interconnected with multiple paths, conductors at specified
depth, sized for fault duty, with an adequate number of ground rods for winter
conditions.
B Installation has minor variations from originally specified or variation is only
at isolated (~1 or 2) locations
C Installation has significant variation from original specifications or variation
is noted at multiple locations
D Installation major deviations from original spec or has been significantly
damaged
E Installation is damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 16.3.1 Ground Grid
Condition
Description
Rating
A Risers/bonds are in good condition (without any intervening paint or
corrosion), mechanically supported, paralleled for redundancy, sized for fault
duty, terminated with rated connectors. Check risers on wood poles within
yard.
Table 16.3.2 Risers/Bonds to Equipment/Structures/Neutrals/Overhead Ground

Wires/Attachment Points

Condition
Description
Rating
A Robust conductors are located around the interior perimeter; all panels and
equipment are bonded with redundancy, while metallic objects on roof have
lightning protection.
Table 16.3.3 Buildings
Condition
Description
Rating
A Frequent riser conductors thread through fence fabric and are bonded to
barbed wire, gates bonded side-to-side, with gradient control grids under
swing area.
Table 16.3.4 Fences/Gates
Condition
Description
Rating
A Stone has specified size range and thickness, is free of weeds and
contamination by fines, has proper grading to prevent ponding of water.
B Minor deficiencies in ground/soil/gravel conditions.
C Significant variations in the above, corrective maintenance recommended
D Major variations - corrective maintenance/repair essential
E Surface stone is damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 16.3.5 Condition of Surface Stone

Condition
Description
Rating
A Measured resistivity using a sample box with de-ionized water exceeds
design value, while the stone is within the specified size range, thickness, and
is free from contamination or weeds.
E Unacceptable results (fail)
Table 16.3.6 Surface Stone Resistivity
Condition
Description
Rating
A Measured resistance between accessible grid points (micro ohms) for all
equipment and free standing structures falls under value expected from
distance and conductor size.
B Close to specification (little or no margin).
C Do not meet specification (by a small amount)
D Do not meet specification (by a significant margin)
E Do not meet specification by a significant margin and cannot be brought into
specification.
Table 16.3.7 Grid and Bond Integrity
Condition
Description
Rating
A Ground potential rise is well within specification, while measured current
splits show good interconnections to overhead ground wires and neutrals.
Touch potentials on structures, meshes, fences, gates and at neighbouring
residences is contained within safe body withstand.
B Close to specification (little or no margin)
C Do not meet specification (by a small amount)
D Do not meet specification (by a significant margin)
E Do not meet specification by a significant margin and cannot be brought into
Table 16.3.8 Current Injection Test


A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, station
grounding and surface treatments in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100
while completely non-functional grounding and surface treatments would have a Health
Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for station grounding in
Table 16.3.9 below, assume the grounding with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 60 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 92. That grounding, therefore, has
only 65% of the Health Index maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On
the other hand, if that grounding with partial data had a maximum condition score of 65 it
would have 71% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.

Station Grounding & Surface

Condition Maximum
# Treatment Weight Factors
Rating Score
Condition Criteria
1 Ground Grid Installation 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Risers/Bonds to
Equipment/Structures/Neutral/
2 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Overhead Ground
Wires/Attachment Points
3 Buildings, Fences, Gates 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Condition of Surface Stone 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Surface Stone Resistivity 3 A,E 4,0 12
6 Grid and Bond Integrity 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
7 Current Injection Test 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Table 16.3.9 Health Index Formulation for Station Grounding & Surface Treatment
Table 16.3.10 was used to determine the overall condition of the station grounding and
surface treatment asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 16.3.10 Health Index Scale for Station Grounding and Surface Treatment

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived on a station-to-station basis

for Grounding Systems and Surface Treatment in the BCTC-managed transmission system.
Tables 16.4.1 and 16.4.2 summarize the results, which are also illustrated in Figure 16.4.1.
Note, as described in subsection 16.3.3 above, the 50% Rule was applied in calculating the
Health Index for this asset class since available data were insufficient to use the 70% Rule.
Health Index Results Classification Number of Grounding Systems
Very Good 13
Good 62
Fair 18
Poor 1
Very Poor 0
Table 16.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Station Grounding
Systems
Health Index Results Classification Number of Grounding Systems
Very Good 39
Good 186
Fair 54
Poor 3
Very Poor 0
Total 282
Table 16.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Station

Grounding Systems

200 186
Station Grounding Systems

180
160
140
Number of
120
100
80
54
60 39
40
20 0 3
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 16.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Station Grounding

Systems
79.8% of Station Grounding Systems are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital
19.1% of Station Grounding Systems are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or
capital improvements may be required depending upon criticality.
1.1% of Station Grounding Systems are in Poor condition. Planning for replacement
or refurbishment should begin, considering risk and consequences of failure.

17.0 Batteries
17.1 Description
Station batteries provide stand-by power for critical equipment. They also play a vital role in
the safe, stable and reliable operation of electric power systems. They supply power for
control, operation, monitoring and annunciation, including protection and control devices,
switchgear, circuit breakers, and power transformers.
Station batteries consist of a bank of cells that, when connected in series, provide the
required voltage level for the battery bank. Generally, BCTC-managed transmission stations
have two types of batteries, lead acid and nickel cadmium. Lead acid batteries have
electrodes made of lead (-) and lead dioxide (+). Sulphuric acid acts as the electrolyte. The
nominal voltage per cell is about 2.1 V, and a 120 V battery bank consists of about 58 cells.
Nickel cadmium batteries have electrodes made of cadmium (-) and nickelic hydroxide (+).
They operate in an alkaline electrolyte of potassium hydroxide. The nominal cell voltage is
about 1.2 V, and a battery bank consists of about 100 cells. Nickel cadmium batteries can
pack a much higher charge density with a more compact size than lead acid batteries.
The capacity of battery banks is measured in Ampere-hours. Generally, batteries are designed
to provide power for 6 - 8 hours of operation after a power failure. Battery banks at
transmission stations typically have capacities ranging from about 400 Ampere-hours to over
2000 Ampere-hours.
Each battery bank has a battery charger that automatically keeps the battery charged in ready
mode. A battery charger typically consists of a solid-state rectifier circuit plus associated
controls. Under normal operating conditions, battery banks have an expected useful life of
about 15-20 years.
17.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 627 battery systems. Table 17.2.1
shows the functional and voltage demographics of these batteries. As shown in the table, 267
batteries are substation batteries of which 251 are 125 V. Of the substation batteries, Lead
Calcium and Lead Antimony represent the most common types with 175 and 42 batteries
respectively. The BCTC-managed system has 223 telecommunication batteries and most of
these (i.e., 170) are 24 V. The system also has 105 microwave batteries of which 22 are 24 V
and 68 are 48 V.

Incomplete
Battery Function 12 V 24 V 48 V 125 V Total
Data
Capacitor 6 6
General 1 10 1 12
Lead Calcium 2 173 175
Nickel Cadmium 9 9
Lead Antimony 42 42
Lead Selenium 7 7
VRLA 2 2
Automotive 4 8 2 14
Substation Total 5 6 2 251 3 267
Standby Generator Set 2 10 5 17
Control 9 4 2 15
Telecommunication Station 13 170 20 20 223
Microwave Station 22 68 15 105
TOTAL 29 212 90 251 45 627
Table 17.2.1 Battery Demographics Grouped by Function, Type and Voltage
Table 17.2.2 shows the age demographics of the batteries. Of the batteries with known age,
about 26% are more than 20 years old.
Function Type
Total Percent
Years Gen. Sub. Ctrl. Telec. MW
0 to 4 1 31 2 31 43 108 17.2
5 to 9 1 37 3 36 2 79 12.6
Age Group
10 to 14 3 51 4 31 1 90 14.4
15 to 19 4 52 0 22 3 81 12.9
20 to 24 0 57 0 26 1 84 13.4
25 plus 1 21 0 19 2 43 6.9
Incompl. 7 18 6 58 53 142 22.6
Total 17 267 15 223 105 627 100.0
Percent 2.7 42.6 2.4 35.6 16.7 100.0
Table 17.2.2 Battery Demographics Grouped by Function and Age

Primary causes of substation battery degradation include:
Declining capacity
Increasing internal resistance (i.e., decreasing terminal voltage under load)
Elevated self discharge
Declining Capacity
The charge storage capacity of batteries decreases with usage, age and the environment.
Generally, if specified to deliver a capacity of 100% when new, a battery would require
replacement when it reaches 80% of its initial capacity.
In lead acid batteries, capacity reduction results from two actions: (1) formation of a thin
layer on the negative electrode (i.e., sulfation); and (2) acid corrosion of the positive
electrode grid. Sulfation typically occurs when a battery does not have a fully saturated
charge. Positive plate corrosion, however, results from repeated battery overcharging. In
nickel cadmium batteries, loss of capacity results from formation of crystals on electrodes.
Increasing Internal Resistance

Station batteries must have low internal resistance to ensure constant terminal voltage under
load. When internal resistance increases, battery bank terminal voltage drops and destroys
the batterys ability to carry out its functions. When new, lead acid batteries have low
internal resistance. However, this resistance increases with use, primarily from sulfation and
grid corrosion. Internal resistance of nickel cadmium batteries also increases with age.
Elevated self-discharge:
Self-discharging means that the battery discharges even when no load exists. Elevated self-
discharge rates further reduce aging battery capacity. However, nothing can be done to
reverse self-discharge of an aging battery. In this regard, lead acid batteries have superior
performance compared to nickel cadmium batteries.
Inspection and Maintenance Issues

Regular inspections and operating tests help track the health and condition of station
batteries. Routine maintenance activities help to detect and rectify deficiencies before they
cause permanent battery damage. Reviewing trends in maintenance records also can provide
early warnings of potential failures.
In spite of frequent maintenance, batteries often fail. For this reason, batteries have monitors
and warning alarms. Early monitors measured basic battery parameters and used pre-set
levels to trigger alarms. More modern monitoring devices now identify and warn against
developing failures.

In sealed units, internal deterioration is difficult to detect. However, changes in electrical
characteristics can help predict failures. Batteries consist of many individual cells.
Deterioration of these individual cells includes cracking, container leakage, corrosion of cell
terminal connections, and damage to battery bank racks. Individual cells may experience
degradation and failures. Deterioration of several cells, however, usually indicates potential
widespread failures and functional failure of the total battery.
Batteries require chargers to ensure satisfactory performance. Battery chargers have a high
degree of reliability and much longer lives than batteries themselves. Nevertheless, problems
do occur. As with other electronic devices, it is often difficult to detect battery charger
deterioration before failure. Normal maintenance involves testing charging rates to assess
functionality. Generally, chargers are replaced when such testing reveals functional failures.
Typically, battery maintenance and inspection involve (1) visual inspections for signs of
leaks, internal degradation, and evidence of deterioration/damage to connections and external
components; and (2) measurements of electrical characteristics and individual cell
performance. Utilities typically inspect and test individual sample cells on a 3 or 6-month
basis.
BCTC conducts full testing annually. BCTC performs battery load testing at installation and
at 18 years. BCTC also performs load testing if unusual conditions are noted in Cellcorder
during annual inspections. BCTC replaces batteries after 25 years, regardless of their
condition.
Historically, factors used to assess the end of a batterys life have included age, appearance,
and the history of specific gravity and cell voltage measurements. Now, battery load tests
provide the best indication of a batterys condition. Typically, load tests are used to identify
and confirm the condition of batteries that appear deficient based on previous inspections or
evaluations.
Utilities generally coordinate battery charger testing with overall battery maintenance
programs. Charger testing involves several functional tests, each with defined criteria. Failure
of any functional test may lead to further investigations or replacement consideration.
Typically, every three months battery chargers receive an inspection and some testing.
Annually, they receive a full range of tests. These tests involve measuring cell characteristics
and conducting physical examinations for obvious signs of deterioration or damage.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed batteries first required developing end-of-
For both individual battery cells and entire battery banks, the condition assessment and rating
process included visual inspections and reviews of records in BCTCs asset management


C means the component has many minor problems or a major problem that requires
attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Room, racks etc. are clean, corrosion free and in good condition. No evidence
of any abnormality. Room ventilation and environmental controls are
functioning normally. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 17.3.1 Battery Room/Enclosure/Racks Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Battery Containers, electrical conductors and connectors are clean; corrosion
and build-up free and are in good condition. No external evidence of
overheating or any other abnormality. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 17.3.2 Battery Containers/Terminals/Conductors Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Electrolyte is clean and free from sediment and appears in good condition.
Plates are clean and free from corrosion or build-up of sulphates or other
contaminants. No external evidence of overheating or any other abnormality.
Table 17.3.3 Plates/Electrolyte Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Charging current and voltage appear to be normal, based on past experience
and specifications
B Possible abnormal values need to be confirmed by test
C Probable abnormal values
D Definite indications of abnormal behaviour.
E Abnormal values that cannot be brought into normal range.
Table 17.3.4 Charge Rate Float
Condition
Description
Rating
A Overall installation is clean, corrosion free. All primary and secondary
Table 17.3.5 Overall Battery Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Well within BCTC standards all cells
B Small number of cells (~<2%) do not meet BCTC standards
C Significant number of cells (~2-8%) do not meet BCTC standards
D Many cells (~8-10%) do not meet BCTC standards
E Many cells (~>10%) do not meet BCTC standards
Table 17.3.6 Specific Gravity Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A Well within BCTC standards all cells
B Small number of cells (~<2%) do not meet BCTC standards
C Significant number of cells (~2-8%) do not meet BCTC standards
D Many cells (~8-10%) do not meet BCTC standards
E Many cells (~>10%) do not meet BCTC standards
Table 17.3.7 Voltage on Float Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A Within BCTC standards or unchanged according to historical data all cells
B A few (<2%) cells show significant deviation (20% higher impedance) or a
significant number of cells show minor deviations in impedance
C From 2-8% cells show significant impedance increases
D From 8-10% of cells show significant impedance increase
E >10% of cells show significant impedance increase
Table 17.3.8 Impedance Test


A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a battery in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded battery
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for batteries in Table 17.3.9 below,
assume a battery with partial data has a maximum condition score of 60 out of the Health
Index maximum possible score of 92. That battery, therefore, has only 65% of the maximum
score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that battery with
partial data had a maximum condition score of 65 it would have 71% of the Health Index
maximum and a valid Health Index.
for each member of this asset class. Specific consideration is given to a failed discharge test,
as it is a direct indicator of battery failure, resulting in halving the Health Index result.

Batteries Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Battery Room/Enclosure/Racks 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Battery
2 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Containers/Terminals/Conductors
3 Plates/Electrolyte 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Charge Rate - Float 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Overall Battery Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Specific Gravity Test (Per BC
6 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Hydro Maintenance Std.)
7 Voltage on Float Test 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Impedance Test (per BC Hydro
8 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Maintenance Std.)
Max Score = 92
HI = 100*Score/Max
Note. If a Battery has failed a discharge test overall Health Index is divided by 4
Table 17.3.9 Batteries Health Index Formulation
Table 17.3.10 was used to determine the overall condition of the batteries asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 17.3.10 Health Index Scale for Batteries

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for each type of Battery in
Health Index Results Classification Number of Battery Banks
Very Good 52
Good 47
Fair 5
Poor 0
Very Poor 5
Table 17.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Batteries
Health Index Results Classification Number of Battery Banks
Very Good 311

Good 281
Fair 30
Poor 0
Very Poor 5
Total 627
Table 17.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Batteries

350
311
300 281
Number of Batteries
250
200
150
100
50 30
5 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 17.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Batteries
94.4% of Batteries are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements are
4.8% of Batteries are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital
improvements may be required depending on criticality.
0.8% of Batteries are in Very Poor condition or at their end-of-life.

18.0 Standby Generators & Fuel Systems
18.1 Description
In the event of power failures, standby generators must supply power for critical systems
within a facility. Standby generator capacities are matched with essential load requirements
within a facility. At some locations, generator capacity is matched to the size of station
service transformers. Typically, diesel engines power standby generators, but propane also is
used as a fuel source. Other components of this asset class include transfer switches that
allow loads to be transferred automatically to standby generators during power interruptions.
Fuel storage systems also serve as one of the components of this asset class.
18.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system includes 60 standby generators located in
substations and 41 located at microwave repeater stations. There are 54 diesel and 6
propane-fuelled generators located in substations. Table 18.2.1 shows non-microwave
standby generators grouped by age. As shown in the table, all generators with known age are
less than 40 years old.
Non-Microwave
Years %
Standby Generators
0 to 9 13 32.5%
10 to 19 4 10.0%
Age Group
20 to 29 13 32.5%
30 to 39 10 25.0%
40 to 49 0 0.0%
50 plus 0 0.0%
SubTotal 40 100.0%
Incomplete 20 N/A
Total 60
Table 18.2.1 Count of Non-Microwave Standby Generators Grouped by Age
BCTC also manages 41 standby generators for microwave equipment. Of these, BCTC has
scheduled 17 for replacement because they are either obsolete or do not meet load
requirements. Table 18.2.2 shows microwave equipment standby generators grouped by
age.

Microwave
Years %
Standby Generators
0 to 9 1 2.4%
not being replaced
10 to 19 1 2.4%
Age Group of
Generators
20 to 29 9 22.0%
30 to 39 13 31.7%
40 to 49 0 0.0%
50 plus 0 0.0%
SubTotal 24 58.5%
Being Replaced 17 41.5%
Total 41 100%
Table 18.2.2 Count of Microwave Standby Generators Grouped by Age

Most failures in rotating electrical machines result from deterioration of rotors and stator
windings. Generator winding deterioration results from several factors including insulation
thermal degradation of insulation, loosening of windings, improper insulation impregnation,
electrical slot discharge, contamination in the end windings and inadequate spacing between
coils of mechanical hardware.
Stand-by generators operated only occasionally. Consequently, they experience little wear
and tear from prolonged use. Rather, in stand-by generators, degradation results from long
periods of inactivity. Such degradation includes corrosion, friction, and accumulation of
dust, debris and other contaminants. Depending on the degree of deterioration, wear or
damage may occur during periodic start-ups that can reduce the generators longevity.
Fuel storage tanks experience corrosion and rust, resulting in leaks. Transfer switches have a
limited operating life due to contact arcing.
Routine preventive maintenance commonly includes visual inspections, operational tests,

measurements and other checks to assess the health and condition of this asset class.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed standby generators first required
failure.


requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Enclosure/house. is clean, and in good condition. No evidence of any
abnormality or deterioration. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 18.3.1 Enclosure/House Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Fuel system (tanks, connecting pipes, pumps, etc) is clean, corrosion and leak
free and in good condition. No evidence of any abnormality, leak or other
deterioration. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 18.3.2 Fuel System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Generator is clean, corrosion free and in good condition. No evidence of any
abnormality or deterioration. Appears to have been well maintained.
Table 18.3.3 Mechanical Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 18.3.4 Condition of Associated Switchgear/Cabling/P&C

Condition
Description
Rating
direct without any intervening paint or corrosion.
Condition
Description
Rating
A The entire installation appears clean and corrosion free. All connections are in
good condition. No external evidence of overheating or any other abnormality
Appears as new or to have been well maintained.
E Generator is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 18.3.6 Overall Standby Generator Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Switch operates properly
E Switch operates inconsistently or does not operate properly
Table 18.3.7 Transfer Switch Change of State
Condition
Description
Rating
A Well within specifications with high margins
E Do not meet specification by a significant margin
Table 18.3.8. Contact Resistance

Condition
Description
Rating
A Generator starts and operates properly with respect to voltage, output
current/power, frequency, etc. when loaded as per stations requirements
E Generator operates inconsistently or does not operate properly
Table 18.3.9 Run Test (On Load)

A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1. And
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a standby
generator in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded
standby generator would have a Health Index of 0.

For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for standby generators in
Table 13.3.10 below, assume a generator with partial data has a maximum condition score of
68 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 104. That generator, therefore, has
hand, if that generator with partial data had a maximum condition score of 74 it would have
71% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
Table 18.3.10 show the component/test condition criteria, weightings, condition ratings as
Standby Generators Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Enclosure/House 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Fuel System Condition 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Mechanical Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition of Associated
4 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Swgr/Cabling/P & C
Foundation/Support
5 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Steel/Grounding
Overall Standby Generator
6 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition
7 Transfer Switch Change of State 3 A,E 4,0 12
8 Contact Resistance 2 A,E 4,0 8
9 Run Test (on load) 4 A,E 4,0 16
Max Score = 104
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 18.3.10 Health Index Formulation for Standby Generators
Table 18.3.11 was used to determine the overall condition of the standby generator and fuel
system asset class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 18.3.11 Health Index Scale for Standby Generators

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for standby generators in
the BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 18.4.1 and 18.4.2 summarize the results
for station generators other than microwave generators. Figure 18.4.1 also illustrates the
results. Note, as described in subsection 18.3.3 above, the 50% Rule was applied in
calculating the Health Index for station generators since available data were insufficient to
use the 70% Rule.
The condition of standby generators for microwave equipment was not assessed in this
baseline study. However, BCTC has a replacement program underway and plans to replace
17 of the 41 standby generators for microwave equipment.

Health Index Results Classification Number of Generators
Very Good 6
Good 15
Fair 4
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Table 18.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Standby Generators
(other than microwave)
Health Index Results Classification Number of Generators
Very Good 14
Good 36
Fair 10
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total 60
Table 18.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Standby

Generators (other than microwave)

Substation Standby Generators
40 36
35
Number of 30
25
20
14
15
10
10
5
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 18.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Standby Generators

(other than microwave)
83.3% of Standby Generators other than microwave are in Good or Very Good
condition. No capital improvements are expected in the near term.
16.7% of Standby Generators other than microwave are in Fair condition. Increased
maintenance or capital improvements may be needed depending on the equipments
criticality.

19.0 Facilities General
19.1 Description
Facilities, Buildings and Structures
Buildings at transmission stations provide suitable environments for electrical equipment and
serve as a base for administrative and service work. These structures must conform to
BCTCs technical requirements for various types of facilities. They also need to conform to
local building codes and relevant workplace health and safety regulations.
Footings and Foundations; Grounds and Landscaping

A series of footings and foundations typically provides support for substation equipment.
Foundation materials usually consist of reinforced concrete. Since they have load (e.g.,
static, dynamic and possibly seismic) requirements based on the equipment supported,
footings and foundations require proper engineering. In addition, they must conform to
elevation and height constraints of particular stations. To ensure stability over time, designs
for footings and foundations also must consider environmental issues such as local climate
and soil conditions.
Proper landscaping provides a pleasant environment for workers and the substations
neighbours. Landscaping also aids in controlling soil erosion, maintaining overall site
cleanliness, and facilitating a safe and efficient workplace. Landscaping, therefore, must be
considered as part of the overall facility design.
Spill Response and Containment

Current spill response practices involve containing spilled materials, protecting various
natural resources and reporting certain spill incidents. BCTC has environmental best
management practices for spill response, and substations have various plans that present
types of spill containment expected at those stations. Generally, spill containment systems
consist of concrete vaults large enough to contain any potential spill from a particular piece
of equipment (e.g., transformer). Also, such systems must be decoupled from normal
drainage systems.
Sumps and Sump Pumps

Sump pumps may be used wherever the potential exists for water build-up. For example,
sump pumps can help keep basement facilities dry or clear water build-up in spill
containment systems. Sump pumps are particularly critical in low water table areas.
Lifting Equipment
Frequently, lifting equipment within buildings and structures facilitates maintenance
activities. Lifting equipment ranges from small systems that assist in managing spare parts
inventories to large systems that can move entire circuit breaker poles. In some cases, lifting
equipment plays an important role in quickly restoring power after failures or interruptions.

Vegetation Control
Although vegetation is not an asset per se, the control of vegetation in substation yards
represents a normal maintenance activity that helps protect various other assets. For
example, unwanted vegetation (e.g., weeds) in certain areas can adversely affect grounding
system performance. Vegetation control also adds to station yard aesthetics and facilitates
cleanliness and safety in the area.
Microwave Towers
Microwave towers are tall metal lattice structures used to mount microwave and other
antennae for system communications (i.e. for system control, relaying). Recently, some
utilities have moved away from using microwave systems in favour of fibre-based
communications. However, BCTC does not plan to replace the BCTC-managed microwave
systems presently installed.
19.2 Demographics
Facilities in the BCTC-managed transmission system consist of 256 buildings, 210 yards and
grounds, 24 sumps and sump pumps, 99 microwave towers, 50 pieces of lifting equipment
and 102 spill containment systems. Table 19.2.1 shows these demographics.
Facilities Number of units

Buildings 256
Yards and Grounds 210
Sumps and Sump Pumps 24
Microwave Towers 99
Lifting Equipment 50*
Spill Containment 102**
* Database shows only 24 lifting apparatus, but this baseline studys field survey of about 50% of substations
found an additional 26 lifting apparatus.
** Database shows only 81 spill containment systems, but this baseline studys field survey of about 50% of
substations found an additional 21 spill containment systems.
Table 19.2.1 Facility Demographics

Buildings
Buildings at transmission stations house electrical equipment and serve as a base for
administrative and service work. Environmental conditions continuously affect buildings.

Because of the presence of electrical equipment, the potential for water ingress presents
particular concerns for these assets. Thus, buildings must be weatherproof. Regular
preventative maintenance, with occasional major refurbishment of roofs, windows and doors,
helps ensure the long-term viability and integrity of buildings. Generally, for well-
maintained buildings, operational issues dictate the assets longevity.
Roof maintenance presents the biggest problem for transmission buildings. Generally, roof
water proofing systems have a shorter life than buildings. Utilities typically replace roofs on
a 15 20-year cycle.
Building inspections usually occur as part of routine station visual inspections at 1 3 month
intervals. Most utilities have inspection checklists to help identify defects and provide
overall condition evaluations. Inspection reports also help set priorities for repair programs.
Inspections, therefore, help ensure that minor problems receive prompt and effective
correction to keep buildings fit for their stated purpose.
Utilities have differing approaches to major building degradation and refurbishment. In

many cases they do not carry out specific, regular condition assessments for buildings and
roofs. Rather, they conduct detailed assessments when routine inspections or other reports
indicate a need. In most cases, the potential for water ingress gets particular attention.
Other Facility Assets

When inspecting buildings, utilities also often inspect various other transmission-related
facilities, including sump pumps, lifting equipment and landscaping. Regular maintenance
programs typically correct deficiencies, but the condition of these assets generally does not
affect the overall state of this asset class substantially.
Spill containment and other civil works also represent important station subsystems. Made
primarily from concrete, these facilities may crack, corrode, and shift.
Facility assets also include steel microwave towers. These have many similarities to metal
transmission structures, and also face the same degradation processes. For example, as with
metal structures, microwave towers may undergo corrosion and foundation deterioration.
However, with proper maintenance, these structures generally last a long time.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed facilities first required developing end-of-
For facility assets the condition assessment and rating process included visual inspections
and reviews of records in BCTCs asset management system databases. In addition to
maintenance histories, these databases contain information about operating requirements and
conditions, defects, failures, and spares. In assessing the information available against end-

of-life criteria, condition states were rated A through E. For this asset class, letter condition
ratings have the following general meanings:

requires attention;
and
repair.
Buildings and Structures

Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Roof elements straight and level.
Gutters and Spouts in good condition. No leaks noticeable. Appears as new
or to have been well maintained.
C One or two of the above characteristics are unacceptable. Minor maintenance
suggested.
D More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable. Significant
maintenance or repair is required.
Table 19.3.1 Buildings and Structures Roof Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Wall elements straight and level.
Paint on surfaces clean and free from cracking, discoloration or
flaking/peeling. Caulking, flashings and other seals in good condition. No
wall cracks or other damage. Appears as new or to have been well
maintained.
suggested.
Table 19.3.2 Buildings and Structures Walls Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. No leaks noticeable. Paint on
surfaces clean and free from cracking, discoloration or flaking/peeling. Locks
and mechanisms in good working condition. Appears as new or to have
suggested.
Table 19.3.3 Buildings and Structures Doors/Windows/Louvres Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Floors are straight and level.
Foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling.. Caulking, flashings
and other seals in good condition. No floor cracks or other damage. Appears
as new or to have been well maintained.
suggested.
Table 19.3.4 Buildings and Structures Floors/Foundations Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Lighting adequate and in good
working condition. Electrical wiring and tables, AC and DC in good
condition. HVAC in good working condition.
suggested.
Table 19.3.5 Buildings and Structures Lighting/Power/HVAC Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Structural elements straight and
level. Paint on surfaces clean and free from cracking, discoloration or
flaking/peeling. Caulking, flashings and other seals in good condition.
suggested.
E Buildings or structures damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 19.3.6 Buildings and Structures Overall Condition
Sumps and Sump Pumps

Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Components are mechanically
sound and functional with no indications of excessive wear or looseness.
Pump and its connections free from any indications of leaks. Pump and its
controls are fully functional. Appears as new or to have been well
maintained.
suggested.
E Sumps or sump pumps are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 19.3.7 Sumps and Sump Pumps Overall Condition

Lifting Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating
level. No indications of wear or corrosion. All components are mechanically
sound, functional and free from any indications of overheating (motor and
electrical components), excessive wear, damage or any other abnormality.
Electrical conductors are in good condition. Signage present and accurate.
Controls are functional and in good condition. Appears as new or to have
suggested.
E Lifting equipment components are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 19.3.8 Lifting Equipment Overall Condition
Station Vegetation
Condition
Description
Rating
A Station yard is free from unwanted vegetation. Landscaped areas (if any) are
healthy, properly trimmed and maintained
E Station vegetation has not been maintained.
Table 19.3.9 Overall Grounds/Landscaping/Vegetation Control
Drainage and Civil Works

Condition
Description
Rating
A Drains and sewers appear in good condition. All systems are free from any
obstructions. No indications of wear or corrosion.
Table 19.3.10 Civil Works Drainage and Sewers Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Containment system, connecting pipes, etc. appears in good condition and
free from cracks, leaks, surface staining and deterioration. All systems are
free from any obstructions
Table 19.3.11 Civil Works Spill Containment Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Wall systems appear in good condition and free from cracks, leaks, surface
staining and deterioration.
Table 19.3.12 Civil Works Retaining Walls Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Concrete foundation is level and free from cracks and spalling. No staining
evident. Support steel and/or anchor bolts, if applicable, are tight and free
from corrosion. Ground connections are direct to tank, cabinets, supports
Table 19.3.13 Civil Works Foundation/Concrete Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A General impression of civil works - in good condition and free from cracks,
leaks discolouration and deterioration.
B Normal signs of wear with respect to the above characteristics. Some minor,
non-urgent and routine maintenance could be performed
C One of the above characteristics is unacceptable. Some minor maintenance
required
D Two or more of the above characteristics are unacceptable. Major
maintenance is required
E Civil works damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 19.3.14 Civil Works Overall Condition
Microwave Towers
Condition
Description
Rating
A Paint and coating in good condition. No signs of structural fatigue or
hardware failure. No damaged steel members, guys or anchors. Appears to
Table 19.3.15 Microwave Towers Lattice Steel Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A All electrical conductors, connectors, cabling, lighting, cabinet boxes and
controls are clean, corrosion free and are in good condition. Appears to have
Table 19.3.16 Microwave Towers Lighting/Control Cables/Terminal Box and

Components Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
and/or anchor bolts, if applicable, are tight and free from corrosion. Ground
connections are direct to tank, cabinets, supports without any intervening
paint or corrosion.
Table 19.3.17 Microwave Towers Foundation/Grounding Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
level. Paint on surfaces clean and free from cracking, discoloration or
flaking/peeling. Wiring and control cabinets in good condition. Appears as
new or to have been well maintained.
suggested.
E Microwave tower is damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 19.3.18 Microwave Towers Overall Condition

19.3.24 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and

E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a facility in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100, while a completely degraded facility
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for facilities in
Table 19.3.19 below, assume a facility with partial data has a maximum condition score of
54 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 80. That facility, therefore, has only
68% of the maximum Health Index score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the
other hand, if that facility with partial data had a maximum condition score of 56 it would
For some members of this asset class, available data were insufficient to provide a valid
Health Index using the 70% Rule described above. In such cases, to provide BCTC with
(i.e., 50% Rule). Thus, if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal to
50% of the maximum possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and presented
in the results.

Buildings & Structures Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Roof Condition 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Wall Condition 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Doors/Windows/Louvres
3 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Condition
4 Floors/Foundations Condition 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
5 Lighting/Power/HVAC Condition 2 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 8
6 Overall Building Condition 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score = 80
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.19 Health Index Formulation for Buildings and Structures
Sumps and Sump Pumps Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall Condition of Sumps and
1 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Sump Pumps
Max Score = 4
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.20 Health Index Formulation for Sumps and Sump Pumps
Lifting Equipment Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall Condition of Lifting
1 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Equipment
Max Score = 4
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.21 Health Index Formulation for Lifting Equipment
Grounds-Landscaping Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall Grounds, Landscaping
1 1 A,E 4,0 4
and Vegetation Control
2 Retaining Walls Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Foundation/Concrete Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score = 32
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.22 Health Index Formulation for Grounds-Landscaping

Spill Containment Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
1 Drainage/Sewers Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Spill Containment Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
3 Civil Works Overall Condition 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score = 48
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.23 Health Index Formulation for Drainage and Civil Works
Microwave Towers Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Tower Lattice Steel Condition 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Lighting/Control Cables/Terminal
2 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Box & Components Condition
3 Foundation/Grounding Condition 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Overall Microwave Towers
4 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Condition
Max Score = 24
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 19.3.24 Health Index Formulation for Microwave Towers
Table 19.3.25 was used to determine the overall condition of the facilities asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 19.3.25 Health Index Scale for Facilities

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for each component of the
facilities asset class. Tables 19.4.1 and 19.4.2 summarize the results, which are also
illustrated in Figures 19.4.1 through 19.4.4. No condition data were available for microwave
towers. Also, data on sumps and sump pumps were insufficient to perform an overall
condition assessment.
Health Index
Results Buildings Sumps Lifting Equip. Grounds Spill Containment
Classification
Very Good 10 0 0 8 12
Good 153 2 35 98 49
Fair 16 0 0 12 0
Poor 1 0 0 1 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 2 0
Total Results Based on
Field Survey 180 2 35 121 61
Percentage of Total
Population Surveyed
70.3 8.3 70.0 57.6 59.8
Table 19.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Facilities General
Health Index
Results Buildings Sumps Lifting Equip. Grounds Spill Containment
Classification
Very Good 14 N/A 0 14 20
Good 218 N/A 50 170 82
Fair 23 N/A 0 21 0
Poor 1 N/A 0 2 0
Very Poor 0 N/A 0 3 0
Total 256 24 50 210 102
Table 19.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Facilities

General

250
218
Number of Buildings 200
150
100
50 23 14
0 1
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 19.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Buildings
60
Number of Lifting Equipment
50
50
40
Items
30
20
10
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 19.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Lifting Equipment

180 170
Foundations, Grounds and

160
Number of Stations:
140
Landscaping
120
100
80
60
40 21
14
20 3 2
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 19.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Foundations, Grounds

and Landscaping
90 82
Spill Containment Systems
80
70
60
Number of
50
40
30 20
20
10 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 19.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Spill Containment
90.6% of Buildings, 100% of Lifting Equipment, 87.6% of Foundations, Grounds and

Landscaping and 100% of Spill Containment are in Good or Very Good condition.
No capital improvements are expected in the near term.

Of the 24 sumps or sump pumps in the BCTC-managed transmission system, only 2
were assessed in the survey and both were determined to be in Good condition. Other
sumps and sump pumps scheduled to be surveyed were located in manholes and not
accessible for inspection
9.0% of Buildings and 10% of Foundations, Grounds and Landscaping are in Fair
condition. Increased maintenance or capital improvements may be needed depending
on the criticality issues.
0.4% of Buildings and 1% of Foundations, Grounds and Landscaping are in Poor
condition. Planning is needed for refurbishment or capital improvement considering
risk and consequences of failure.
1.4% of Foundations, Grounds and Landscaping are in Very Poor condition and an
immediate assessment of risk is needed to plan improvement strategies.
BCTC reported that microwave towers are inspected under a contract service
arrangement. However, data regarding microwave tower condition was not available
in time for this study.

20.0 Fire Protection Systems
20.1 Description
Fire protection systems include several components that protect BCTC-managed
transmission facilities from fire threats. BCTC manages several different designs and
vintages of fire protection. Generally, fire protection system components include:
Fire Detection Systems

Fire Extinguishing Systems
Fire Stops
Fire Response Devices
Fire Detection Systems

Fire detection systems include the following categories:
Heat Detectors: These systems use temperature sensitive devices as detectors. One type
has fixed temperature detectors with fusible alloy elements that operate when exposed to
pre-determined temperatures. Another type operates on rates of temperature rise. This
type also may include fusible alloy elements for fixed temperature operation.
Light Obscuring Detectors: In these detectors, smoke interferes with a light beam
between a light source and photocell. The variation in photocell output initiates an alarm.
Typically, these detectors are used to protect large areas where the source and photocell
can be positioned some distance apart.
Light Scattering: This type of detector operates on the Tyndall effect in which a
darkened chamber separates the photocell and light source such that light cannot fall on
the photocell. When smoke enters the chamber light from the source scatters and falls on
the photocell. The cell output then causes initiation of an alarm.
Ionization Detectors: These detectors contain a radioactive source (e.g., an alpha
particle) that ionizes air passing through a chamber in which current flows between two
electrodes. When smoke enters the chamber current flows decrease, initiating an alarm.
Fire Extinguishers
Fire extinguishers have the following standard ratings:
Class A extinguishers for ordinary combustibles such as wood or paper;

Class B extinguishers for fires involving flammable liquids, such as grease, gasoline,
oil, mineral insulating oil etc.;
Class C extinguishers for electrically energized fires; and
Class D extinguishers for flammable metals.
Fire extinguishers also include the following types:

a) Water Deluge Extinguishers (e.g., Sprinklers): Generally, these systems are suitable
for Class A fire extinguisher locations as well as transformer rooms or station basements
with underground cables.
b) Carbon Dioxide Extinguishers: These systems store compressed liquid CO2 and are
most effective on Class B and Class C fires.
c) Dry Chemical Extinguishers: These systems contain a dry extinguishing agent (e.g.,
sodium bicarbonate) that starts to decompose and release CO2 at 70 C.
d) Halon Based Extinguishers: These systems are no longer installed because they use
chemicals that have been regulated under various environmental laws and regulations.
Fire Stops
Fire stops prevent the spread of fire by sealing ducts and cable trays that potentially can
transmit fire or smoke from one part of a substation to another.
Fire Response Devices

Fire response devices include fire alarms, signage and safety lighting that direct staff to safe
areas.
Fire Protection on the BCTC-Managed System

The BCTC-managed system has fire protection devices associated with buildings and indoor
equipment as well as devices associated with outdoor equipment. Generally in the future,
BCTC plans to use NOVEC 1230 or ENERGEN products, which are gas-based fire
protection systems.
a) Buildings and Indoor Equipment

Within the BCTC-managed transmission system, buildings constructed recently have modern
state-of-the-art fire detection systems, but older detection devices exist in . Fire protection
systems installed in buildings include:
Carbon Dioxide Based Systems: Odorless, electrically non-conductive gas that is highly
effective as a fire suppression agent. However, its use has been discontinued primarily
for safety reasons.
Halon Systems: Liquefied, compressed gas that stops the spread of fire by chemically
disrupting combustion. While very effective for controlling flammable liquid and
electrical fires, they contain chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), chemicals subject to
environmental regulations because of their potential to deplete the ozone layer.
Sprinklers: These are normally installed in basement areas over 300 square feet;
Fire Hoses: Hoses connected to municipal water systems are provided inside some
buildings.
Certain indoor equipment (e.g., oil-filled transformers and oil-filled cable potheads) requires
dedicated fire protection such as water deluge systems with hose cabinets. These water
deluge systems have high-velocity water sprays with relatively large droplet sizes directed
against convection air currents. The systems can extinguish fires on, under, or immediately
around protected equipment. They meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Standard No. 15, and normally include fully automatic air or electrically supervised cycling
type dry-pipe open head deluge systems. Generally, the systems include open head spray
nozzles attached to piping systems connected to water supplies through deluge valves.
Detection systems installed in the same area as nozzles cause the valves to open. When the
valves open, water flows into the piping system and discharges from all nozzles.
b) Outdoor Equipment
Oil filled transformers in outdoor stations have fire detection systems. SCADA systems
monitor heat detectors and provide information to respective control centres. Only a few
transformers at attended stations have no SCADA systems. Unless considered vulnerable to
fire, other outdoor equipment generally does not have fire detection systems.
20.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 112 fire protection systems of various types.
These include 24 halon systems (10 in substatations and 14 at microwave sites). Because of
their potential to deplete ozone, certain halon-based fire suppressants will not be produced in
Canada after 2010. BCTC, therefore, has plans to replace halon systems in the BCTC-
managed transmission system before that date. At this time, 15 of the existing halon systems
are in service and 9 are disconnected.
The BCTC-managed transmission system also includes 15 CO2 systems (4 at susbstations

and 11 at microwave sites). The potential for health and safety risks has led to the practice of
removing CO2 systems at all facilities. At this time, 3 CO2 systems are still in service and 12
are disconnected.
The PASSPORT database contains very limited information about the types and ages of
these fire protection systems. However, the earliest record shows a system 37 years old, and
the newest system is 7 years old.

The rate and degree of degradation in these systems depends on several factors, including
both their operating duties and their operating environment. Regular inspection, preventive
maintenance, and minor repairs help keep these systems in a healthy condition. Components
that require regular inspection and monitoring include valves, detection system parts, piping,
and nozzles. National Fire Protection Association (N.F.P.A) Standard 15, Sections 5.4 and
3-1.2 provide guidance on proper water spray densities and coverage. Maintenance activities
for deluge fire protection systems also include nozzle alignment and hydraulic calculation
checks.
Routine substation inspections typically include inspections of fire protection systems.

These inspections usually occur on one to three month intervals, but for remote stations

inspections may occur annually. In doing on-site field inspections, utilities use standardized
checklists to enable consistent and ready identification of defects. These checklists also have
comment sections for more detailed assessment information. Inspection reports help set
priorities and establish work programs to correct deficiencies. With increased use of
centralized surveillance systems and the reliability of SCADA, utilities have increased the
period of time between on-site field inspections.
Standard maintenance practices are more defined than utility practices to reduce major
degradation or to refurbish these systems. In many cases utilities do not carry out specific,
regular, independent and detailed assessments of these systems. Rather, such detailed
assessments occur when inspections or other reports indicate specific needs.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed fire protection systems first required
failure.

attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A All components clean and free from corrosion, damage, deterioration or any
other abnormalities. Appears as new or to have been well maintained.
Table 20.3.1 Detector/Alarm System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A All components clean and free from corrosion, leaks, damage, deterioration or
any other abnormalities. Appears as new or to have been well maintained.
Table 20.3.2 Fire Extinguishing Equipment Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 20.3.3 Deluge System Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 20.3.4 Water Supply/Piping/Quality/Delivery Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A All components clean and free from corrosion, damage, deterioration or any
other abnormalities. Appears as new or to have been well maintained.
Table 20.3.5 Fire Walls/Barriers Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
E Fire protection system is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 20.3.6 Overall Fire Protection System Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A NO CO2 systems are present
E CO2 systems ARE present
Table 20.3.7 Presence of CO2 Systems

Condition
Description
Rating
A All components tested operate properly
E More than 10% of the samples do not operate properly
Table 20.3.8 Operation of Detectors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Test pass
E Test fail
Table 20.3.9 Deluge System Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A All components tested operate properly
E More than 10% of the samples do not operate properly
Table 20.3.10 Fire Extinguisher Test

A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a fire protection
system in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded
fire protection system would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for fire protection systems
in Table 20.3.11 below, assume a system with partial data has a maximum condition score of
22 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 36. That system, therefore, has only
61% of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if
that system with partial data had a maximum condition score of 26, it would have 72% of its
maximum and a valid Health Index.

Fire Protection Systems Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Condition of Detector/Alarm
1 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
System
Condition of Fire Extinguishing
2 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Equipment
3 Condition of Deluge Systems 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Condition of Water
4 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Supply/Piping/Quality/Delivery
5 Condition of Fire Walls/Barriers 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Overall Fire Protection System
6 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Condition
7 Operation of Detectors 1 A,E 4,0 4
8 Deluge System Test (Outdoor only) 1 A,E 4,0 4
9 Fire Extinguisher Test 1 A,E 4,0 4
Max Score = 36
HI = 100*Score/Max
Note. For CO2 systems divide Health Index by 4
Table 20.3.11 Health Index Formulation for Fire Protection Systems
Table 20.3.12 was used to determine the overall condition of the fire protection system asset
class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 20.3.12 Health Index Scale for Fire Protection Systems

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for Fire Protection Systems
in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Table 20.4.1 summarizes the results, which are
also illustrated in Figure 20.4.1. Note, as described in subsection 20.3.3 above, the 50%
Health Index Results Classification Number of Fire Protection Systems
Very Good 52
Good 30
Fair 27
Poor 0
Very Poor 3
Total 112
Table 20.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Fire Protections Systems
60
52
Number of Fire Protection
50
40
Systems
30
30 27
20
10
3
0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 20.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Fire Protection Systems

73.2% of Fire Protection Systems are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital
24.1% of Fire Protection Systems are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or
capital improvements may be required depending upon criticality of equipment.
2.7% of Fire Protection Systems are in Very Poor condition or at their end-of-life and
immediate assessment of risk is needed to develop a replacement or refurbishment
strategy.

21.0 Microwave Equipment
21.1 Description
Microwave radio equipment includes antennae, radio and multiplex equipment. They serve
as a traditional way to provide effective communication between major substation and
generation sites and central control facilities. Microwave systems require line-of-sight and
numerous mountaintop repeaters that are difficult to access.
21.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has microwave equipment installed at 116 different
locations. In the late 1990s BC Hydro began a program to replace the analog microwave
equipment with new digital equipment in four phases. BCTC reports that 94 of the
equipment sets had been replaced by the end of 2004, making the replacement program about
81% complete.
The upgraded equipment operates at 48 volts. Because of this, BCTC also plans to replace
all existing 24-volt batteries as part of the microwave equipment upgrade program.

Determining a microwave systems end-of-life, requires reviewing the condition of the

systems various components, reviewing emergency repair records, determining spare parts
availability, and analyzing its capabilities against required functionality. Generally, some
correlations exist between age and system condition. However, age serves as only one
criterion in performing an end-of-life assessment for this asset class. Overall microwave
system condition assessment includes consideration of the following:
Physical condition;
Functional requirements and performance;
Need for periodic adjustments and/or calibration;
Frequency of emergency/preventative maintenance;
Spare parts availability; and
Technical support (i.e., either in-house or OEM)
Components Installed Outdoors

Outdoor components consist of waveguides, antennas and connections. Outdoor components
experience the following types of degradation:
Wiring insulation deterioration;

Mechanical (support structures);
Corrosion; and
Moisture ingress.
The rate and severity of degradation in this equipment depend on its operational duties and
environmental factors. Corrosion and moisture ingress, or combinations of these, represent
the most critical degradation processes in microwave equipment. Components particularly
affected by moisture and corrosion include tower footings and antenna dishes. Outdoor
components of microwave systems generally have long service lives, and age is not usually a
good indicator of this equipments condition.
Components Installed Indoors

Main indoor components include digital radio racks, DACS, and SONET multiplexers.
Indoor components experience the following types of degradation:

Cabinetry or rack damage or wear;
Poor electrical connections due to corrosion, vibration or other physical problems; and
High operating temperature.
a) Wiring damage
Any wiring open circuit can prevent microwave system operation. Wiring insulation
degradation can lead to equipment failures. Insulation testing occurs through visual
inspection. Defects are noted during measurements of other routine tests.
b) Faulty Electronics
Microwave electronics range from capacitors and resistors to solid-state printed circuit
boards. All electronic components have finite lifetimes. Modern highly integrated electronic
equipment consists of application specific integrated circuits, surface mounted components,
and multi-layer boards. Microwave equipment may have dual-redundant electronic modules
with automatic failovers, making the equipments Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
higher than the MTBF for any individual circuit card. In the BCTC-managed system, faulty
electronics are identified and repaired promptly to ensure proper system operation.
c) Diagnosis of Faults
Environmental conditions in relay and switch-rooms can affect microwave equipments
condition and reliability. Humidity, temperature, dust and pollution can cause component
degradation. Moisture and high humidity promote corrosion and should be avoided. When
plant temperatures fall below the dew point condensation can occur. When water enters
equipment rooms through roof or other leaks, it can affect performance and aggravate
corrosion. The presence of verdigris1 in microwave equipment indicates active corrosion,
likely exacerbated by coastal salt or industrial pollutants. Routine inspections and
1
The substance verdigris is a copper corrosion product. Verdigris forms from the combination of air, water
vapor, acid, and copper (or copper alloy mix). It forms a blue, or blue-green solid.

maintenance can detect and mitigate corrosion, but providing proper environmental
conditions can prevent corrosion altogether.
d) Cabinets or Racks
Generally, microwave equipment is mounted in 19-inch racks for ease of installation and
standardization. Typical degradation processes for these racks include:
Corrosion; and
Loss of mechanical strength through use (e.g. swing front panels).
Generally, visual inspections offer the best form of condition assessment for cabinets and
racks.
e) Terminal blocks and connectors

Typically, terminations and connectors experience mechanical degradation. In damp
locations verdigris also is common. Generally, the BCTC-managed system does not have
this problem because the environment is usually conditioned. Typical problems for these
components include:
Failed crimped terminations due to movement;

Cracked terminal blocks; and
Stripped threads.
Visual inspections may detect problems, but other routine tests can more clearly define
deficiencies.
f) Fuses and Links

Fuses and links experience verdigris on contact surfaces from dampness. In addition, wiring
connections may experience mechanical damage from over tightening. Generally, it is not
practical to determine the electrical condition of a fuse. Alarms identify failures.
g) Wiring
Wiring insulation may degrade from fraying and brittleness. Older microwave panels have
rubber-based insulation that deteriorates over time. In many cases, this deteriorated
insulation falls away when touched, exposing conductors. Absent severe over-heating,
modern PVC cables do not tend to have this problem.

Microwave equipment contains many electronic components, making effective condition
assessment difficult. Most standard condition assessment techniques have limited value in
determining the long-term viability of this equipment. Generally, assessment and
maintenance activities involve a combination of different measurements supported by visual
inspection. Condition assessments contribute somewhat to end-of-life determinations for
microwave equipment. However, issues related to obsolescence and reliability typically
determine this equipments longevity.

condition of microwave equipment:
a) Visual
Visual inspections enable detection of contamination, corrosion and evidence of mechanical
degradation in all indoor and outdoor components. When no operational failures have
occurred, these inspections serve as the first line of defence in condition assessment for
microwave equipment.
b) Diagnostic Testing
Failure of diagnostic tests usually results in replacement of either components or complete
assemblies. The number and frequency of such failures can help measure overall degradation
of these systems and may help define their end-of-life.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed microwave equipment first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Equipment is in as new condition, completely acceptable
B The equipment has minor damage
C The equipment has significant damage
D The equipment has failed but can be repaired.
E The equipment is damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 21.3.1 Physical Damage
Condition
Description
Rating
A 20% above current requirements
B 10% above current requirements
C 5% above current requirements
D 0 above current requirements
E Insufficient capacity to meet current requirements
Table 21.3.2 Bandwidth Availability
Condition
Description
Rating
A 3 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
B 2 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
C 1.5 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
D 1 year since last required recalibration or emergency service
E Recalibration or emergency service required within the last year
Table 21.3.3 Increased Maintenance
Condition
Description
Rating
A Spares are on the shelf
B Spares are available within 24 hours
C Spares are available within 4 weeks
D Spares are available within 2 weeks
E Spares are not available within 2 weeks
Table 21.3.4 Spare Parts Availability

Condition
Description
Rating
A Manufacturer support is available for specific equipment version
E Manufacturer support is not available for specific equipment version
Table 21.3.5 Technical Support
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 21.3.6 Ground Connection

21.3.8 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, microwave
equipment in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely non-
functional microwave equipment would have a Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for indoor microwave equipment in
Table 21.3.7 below, assume indoor equipment with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 52 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 80. That indoor equipment,
Health Index. On the other hand, if that indoor equipment with partial data had a maximum
condition score of 59, it would have 74% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health
Index.
Condition Maximum
# Condition Criteria Weight Factors
Ratings Score
1 Physical Damage 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
2 Bandwidth Availability 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Increased Maintenance 5 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 20
4 Technical Support 5 A,E 4,0 20
5 Spares Parts Availability 6 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 24
Max Score = 80
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 21.3.7 Health Index Formulation for Microwave Indoor Equipment

# Condition Criteria Weight Condition Ratings Factors Maximum Score
2 Ground Connection 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Spares Available 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Max Score = 40
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 21.3.8 Health Index Formulation for Microwave Outdoor Equipment
Table 21.3.9 was used to determine the overall condition of the microwave equipment asset
class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 21.3.9 Health Index Scale for Microwave Equipment

BCTC did not have sufficient condition data in electronic form to enable calculation of a
Health Index for microwave equipment.
However, BCTC has an existing program to replace all existing microwave installations due
to increasing unreliability, lack of manufacturer support, and the need for bandwidth changes
to conform to Industry Canada regulations. BCTC had replaced 94 sets of equipment by the
end of 2004. Using this information and the Health Index Scale above, the 94 sets of new
equipment are considered to be in Very Good condition, and the 22 sets scheduled for
replacement are considered to be in Fair condition and adequate for continued service until
replacement.
100 94
90
Number of Microwave
80
Equipment Sets
70
60
50
40
30 22
20
10 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 21.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Microwave Equipment
81% are in Very Good condition. No capital improvements are expected in the near
term.
19% are in Fair condition.

22.0 Power Line Carrier Equipment
22.1 Description
Power Line Carrier (PLC) communication involves transmitting information using the
electrical power line as the communication medium. PLC represents a highly reliable and
robust system of communication that transmits information as modulated radio signals over
selected 115 kV, 230 kV and 500 kV transmission lines. While offering limited signal
transmission bandwidth, PLC provides a cost effective communication solution for areas that
do not have other communications media or areas that do not need greater bandwidths.
PLC systems consist of terminal equipment (e.g., transmitters, receivers, tone equipment and
ancillary equipment) at each end of the power line. The system also includes coupling
equipment (e.g., line traps, couplers, co-axial cables and hybrid equipment) that connects the
terminal equipment to the power line. To separate PLC signals from electrical power, PLC
signals are transmitted at frequencies ranging from 30 kHz to 300 kHz while electrical power
is transmitted over the same line at 60 Hz.
While microwave systems require line-of-sight and numerous mountaintop repeaters, PLC
systems follow existing transmission paths and have terminal equipment located at substation
and generation sites. PLC equipment, therefore, is more readily accessed than microwave
equipment.
22.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system includes 82 stations installed with PLC systems.
The PASSPRT database indicates that those locations have a total of 115 individual PLC
systems. PASSPORT contains very limited information about the age of these PLC systems.
However, the database shows that the oldest PLC is 44 years old and the newest is 3 years
old.
BCTC has an ongoing program to upgrade existing obsolete or inadequate PLC equipment to
modern digital equipment. This program is designed to provide 99.994% availability. The
BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 52 PLC links that may comprise multiple
terminals. BCTC reports that 21 links had been replaced by the end of 2004. An additional
31 links remain to be done.

Determining a power line carrier (PLC) systems end-of-life, requires reviewing the
condition of the systems various components, reviewing emergency repair records,
determining spare parts availability, and analyzing its capabilities against required

functionality. Generally, some correlation exists between age and system condition.
However, age serves as only one criterion considered in an end-of-life assessment for PLCs.
Overall PLC equipment condition assessment includes consideration of the following:
Physical condition;
Functional requirements and Performance;
Need for periodic adjustments and/or calibration;
Frequency of emergency/preventative maintenance;
Spare parts availability; and
Technical support (i.e., either in-house or OEM).
Components Installed Outdoors

Outdoor components experience the following types of degradation:

Mechanical (support structures);
Corrosion; and
Moisture ingress.
The rate and severity of degradation in this equipment depends on its operational duties and
environmental factors.
Corrosion and moisture ingress, or combinations of these, represent the most critical
degradation processes in PLC systems. Components particularly affected by moisture and
corrosion include end board line traps. Weakening occurs because insulated tie rods and
spacers deteriorate with exposure to moisture. Also, corrosion causes deterioration in
support insulators and related fixings. Ambient air pollution and salt also degrade support
insulators located in heavy industrial or coastal areas. Tuning circuit capacitor voltage
transformers experience oil leaks that may lead to PLC failures. Oil leaks from capacitors in
PLC low voltage cabinets also have posed problems.
Generally, age is not a good indicator of equipment condition. Also, electronics, rather than
high voltage equipment, tend to present most problems in this equipment. Outdoor
components of PLC systems generally have long service lives.
Components Installed Indoors

Indoor components experience the following types of degradation:

Poor electrical connections due to corrosion, vibration or other physical problems.
a) Wiring damage
Any wiring open circuit will prevent correct PLC equipment operation. Wiring insulation
degradation can lead to equipment failures. Insulation testing occurs through visual
inspection. Defects are noted during measurements of other routine tests.

b) Faulty Electronics
PLC equipment electronics range from balancing resistors to solid-state printed circuit
boards. All electronic components have finite lifetimes. Modern highly integrated electronic
equipment consists of application specific integrated circuits, surface mounted components,
and multi-layer boards.
c) Diagnosis of Faults
Environmental conditions in relay and switch-rooms can affect a PLC systems condition and
reliability. Humidity, temperature, dust and pollution can cause component degradation.
Moisture and high humidity promote corrosion and should be avoided. When plant
temperatures fall below the dew point condensation can occur. When water enters PLC
equipment rooms through roof or other leaks, it can affect performance and aggravate long-
term corrosion. The presence of verdigris1 in PLC equipment indicates active corrosion,
likely exacerbated by coastal salt or industrial pollutants. Routine inspections and
maintenance can detect and mitigate corrosion, but providing proper environmental
conditions can prevent corrosion altogether.
d) Cabinets or Racks
Generally, PLC equipment is mounted in 19-inch racks for ease of installation and
standardization. Typical degradation processes for these racks include:
Corrosion,
Loss of mechanical strength through use (e.g. swing front panels).
Generally, visual inspections offer the best form of condition assessment for cabinets and
racks.
e) Terminal Blocks and Connectors

Typically, terminations and connectors experience mechanical degradation. In damp
locations verdigris also is common. Generally, the BCTC-managed system does not have this
problem because the environment is conditioned. Typical problems for these components
include:
Failed crimped terminations due to movement,

Cracked terminal blocks,
Stripped threads.
Visual inspections may detect problems, but routine tests should clearly identify problems .
f) Fuses and Links

Fuses and links experience verdigris on contact surfaces from dampness. In addition, wiring
connections may experience mechanical damage from over tightening. Generally, it is not
practical to determine the electrical condition of a fuse. Alarms identify failures.
1
The substance verdigris is a copper corrosion product. Verdigris forms from the combination of air, water
vapor, acid, and copper (or copper alloy mix). It forms a blue, or blue-green solid.

g) Wiring
Wiring insulation may degrade from fraying and brittleness. Older PLC panels have rubber-
based insulation that deteriorates over time. In many cases, this deteriorated insulation falls
away when touched, exposing conductors. Absent severe over-heating, modern PVC cables
do not tend to have this problem.

PLC systems contain many electronic components, making effective condition assessment
difficult. Thus, most standard condition assessment techniques have limited value in
determining the long-term viability of this equipment. Generally, assessment and
maintenance activities involve a combination of different measurements supported by visual
inspection. Condition assessments contribute somewhat to end-of-life determinations for
PLC equipment. However, issues related to obsolescence and reliability typically determine
the longevity of this equipment.
condition of PLC equipment:
a) Visual
Visual inspections enable detection of contamination, corrosion and evidence of mechanical
degradation in all indoor and outdoor components. When no operational failures have
occurred, these inspections serve as the first line of defence in condition assessments for PLC
equipment.
b) Diagnostic Testing
Failure of diagnostic tests usually results in replacement of either components or complete
assemblies. The number and frequency of such failures can help measure overall degradation
of these systems and may help define their end-of-life.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed PLC equipment first required developing

attention;

and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 22.3.1 Physical Damage
Condition
Description
Rating
A 20% above current requirements
B 10% above current requirements
C 5% above current requirements
D 0 above current requirements
E Insufficient capacity to meet current requirements
Table 22.3.2 Spare Capacity
Condition
Description
Rating
A 3 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
B 2 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
C 1.5 years since last required recalibration or emergency service
D 1 year since last required recalibration or emergency service
E Recalibration or emergency service required within the last year
Table 22.3.3 Increased Maintenance

Condition
Description
Rating
A Spares are on the shelf
B Spares are available within 24 hours
C Spares are available within 4 weeks
D Spares are available within 2 weeks
E Spares are not available within 2 weeks
Table 22.3.4 Spare Parts Availability
Condition
Description
Rating
A Manufacturer support is available for specific equipment version
E Manufacturer support is not available for specific equipment version
Table 22.3.5 Technical Support
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 22.3.6 Ground Connection

22.3.8 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and

E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, PLC equipment
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely non-functional PLC
equipment would have a Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for indoor PLC equipment in
Table 22.3.7 below, assume indoor equipment with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 55 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 84. That indoor equipment,
Health Index. On the other hand, if that indoor equipment with partial data had a maximum
condition score of 62, it would have 74% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health
Index.
Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
2 Spare Capacity 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Technical Support 5 A,E 4,0 20
5 Spares Parts Availability 6 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 24
Max Score = 84
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 22.3.7 Health Index Formulation for PLC Indoor Equipment

Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
2 Ground Connection 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Spares Available 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Max Score = 40
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 22.3.8 Health Index Formulation for PLC Outdoor Equipment
Table 22.3.9 was used to determine the overall condition of the PLC equipment asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 22.3.9 Health Index Scale for PLC Equipment

BCTC did not have sufficient condition data in electronic form to enable calculation of a
Health Index for PLC equipment.
Of the 52 PLC links in the BCTC-managed transmission system, 21 will have been replaced
by the end of 2004, and an additional 31 remain to be done. Using this information and the
Health Index Scale above, the 21 links of new equipment are considered to be in Very Good
condition, and the 31 links scheduled for future replacement are considered to be in Fair
condition and adequate for continued service until replacement.
Number of PLC Equipment Sets
70
60
60
50
40
40
30
20
10
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 22.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Power Line Carrier
Equipment
40% are in Very Good condition. No additional capital improvements are expected in
the near term.
60% are in Fair condition, as the equipment does not meet the established availability
criteria.

23.0 Series Capacitors
23.1 Description
Series capacitors are mounted on support frames that are fully insulated to ground.
Capacitors are connected in series with high voltage transmission lines to reduce transfer
reactance of at power frequencies.
The benefits of using series capacitors include:
Increased stability of the transmission system;

Improved voltage stability of the corridor; and
Optimized power sharing between parallel circuits.
Zinc oxide varistors and circuit breakers serve as primary protective devices for series
capacitors. Varistors limit voltage across capacitors. They are supplemented by forced-
triggered spark gaps to handle excess current during fault sequences. Bypass circuit breakers
extinguish the park gaps.
Capacitors are rated for operation during normal, steady state conditions as well as severe
system contingencies
For purposes of this study the series capacitor asset class includes the following components:
Series Capacitors
Capacitor Platform
Metal Oxide Varistors
Signal Links (fibre-optic)
Trigger Gaps
Current Limiting Damping Equipment
Instrument Transformers and Transducers
Protective Relay and Control Equipment
The BCTC-managed transmission system has eleven 500 kV series capacitor installations,
including some built in the early 1970s. All series capacitor components and accessories are
mounted on platforms with full insulation to ground through cross-braced stand-off
insulators.
The capacitor bank at each location consists of individual capacitor units in parallel-series
combinations. Each capacitor unit includes several parallel-connected capacitor elements
plus a single bushing. Each element has a built-in fuse.
Current transformers (CTs) provide input to protective and metering functions for equipment
on series capacitor platforms. Platform-located CTs connect with relays, electronic
equipment and auxiliary power sources located either on the platform or at ground,

depending on equipment vintage and design. Fibre optic cables provide communication
between platforms and ground potential. In some designs, the same fibre optic cables supply
required auxiliary power to platform optical CTs. Systems also include sufficient
redundancy in cables and transmission channels.
Series capacitor over-voltage protective systems consist of metal oxide varistors, bypass
gaps, damping reactors and resistors, and bypass circuit breakers. Varistors provide series
capacitor over-voltage protection. Bypass gaps spark over during excess varistor energy
events. Bypass breakers close automatically during prolonged gap conduction and other
platform contingencies. These breakers also allow operators to insert or bypass series
capacitors. Damping reactors limit capacitor discharges from gap sparkover and bypass
breaker closures.
23.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 11 series capacitor installations. Table 23.2.1
shows that the rated voltage for all series capacitor installations is 500 kV. Based on the
commission notice to energize (CNE), the series capacitors range from 1 33 years of age.
Also, Nokia made seven of the eleven systems.
Equipment Manufacturer Rated

Capacitor Station CNE Date Capacitance
Number Code Voltage
AMERICAN
5CX1 NOK 1990 500 kV 539 MVAR
CREEK
AMERICAN
5CX2 NOK 1990 500 kV 539 MVAR
CREEK
CHAPMANS 5CX1 ABB 1996 500 kV 554 MVAR
CREEKSIDE 5CX1 NOK 1998 500 kV 525 MVAR
GUICHON 5CX1 NOK 2003 500 kV 420 MVAR
KENNEDY 5CX1 NOK 1971 500 kV 725 MVAR
MCLEESE 5CX1 ABB 2003 500 kV 616 MVAR
Table 23.2.1 List of Series Capacitor Systems

Series Capacitor
Capacitor banks consist of capacitors, fuses, insulators and support structures. They are
static devices with minimal maintenance requirements. Typical maintenance involves visual
inspections and other non-invasive tests, including infrared surveys.
Internal degradation of capacitors and fuses results primarily from failures of seals and
moisture ingress. Visual inspections help detect oil leaks, bushing corrosion, cracks in rack
supporting insulators, and abnormal heating effects. Maintenance includes regular
capacitance measurements for individual cans. Cans that do not meet specified values are
replaced.
Platform Insulation
Series capacitor components are mounted on insulated platforms. Cross-braced standoff
insulators provide the platform with full insulation to ground. Over time, platforms
experience corrosion, misalignment, electrical discharges, insulator cracks and loose
connections of bus work. Regular maintenance includes correction of these deficiencies. A
platforms end-of-life generally occurs when structures and support insulators have so much
deterioration that maintenance becomes uneconomic.
Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV)

The BCTC-managed system has MOVs at all series capacitor locations except Kennedy.
MOVs protect series capacitors from high voltages. MOVs connect in parallel to capacitor
banks.
Fibre Optics to Platform

Fibre optic cables facilitate communication between the platform and ground potential. In
addition, in some designs, fibre optic cables supply required auxiliary power to platform-
located optical current transformers. Substantial redundancy exists in the numbers of cables
and transmission channels used in series capacitor banks.
Generally fibre optic cables experience deterioration from high attenuation and failure.
Routine maintenance activities include inspections for loose connections, rubber skirt
slippage, plus cracks, damage and deterioration.
Trigger Gaps
Trigger and spark gaps help protect series capacitors. In the BCTC-managed system, trigger
or spark gaps serve as the primary protection for series capacitors at Kennedy. At American
Creek and Guichon, forced gaps bypass the MOV during excess energy events. McLeese,
Chapmans and Creekside have no trigger gaps. At these locations, breakers bypass the MOV
under excess energy conditions.

Regular maintenance for spark gap components includes inspections for cracks or damage to
support insulators, correct spacing, cracks in gaps, plus leaks and signs of bulged capacitor
cans. Spark gaps generally reach their end-of-life when gaps or gap components deteriorate
to the point where maintenance becomes uneconomic. Also, flashover voltages beyond set
tolerances can result in end-of-life conditions for series capacitors.
Platform Current Transformers

Platform current transformers (CTs) measure line current, and provide information needed
for series capacitors and platform protection. All these CTs are mounted on high voltage
platforms. In the BCTC-managed system, these CTs also are used at Kennedy to measure
spark gap currents and MOV currents at other sites. At American Creek and Guichon sites,
these CTs also supply auxiliary power.
Regular maintenance for platform CTs includes inspections for exterior corrosion and cracks
along with primary injection tests after changing or adjusting this equipment. Platform CTs
generally reach their end-of-life when they deteriorate to the point where maintenance
becomes uneconomical. Also, Doble test results beyond set tolerances can indicate the end-
of-life for platform CTs.
Damping Reactor and Resistor

Damping reactors are dry-type reactors, typically considered maintenance free devices.
Regular maintenance includes visual inspections to ensure that the reactors are clean, have
intact paint, and no broken wires or damaged fibreglass ties.
Protective Relay and Control Equipment

Chapter 14 of this report describes protection and control systems, including their
degradation processes.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed series capacitors first required developing
For this asset class, letter condition ratings have the following general meanings for various
components and tests:


requires attention;
and
repair.
Capacitors
Condition
Description
Rating
A No bulged units and no leaks around bushings
B Fewer than 5% of the units with one of the above problems
C Fewer than 10% of the units with one of the above problems.
D Fewer than 20% of the units with one of the above problems.
E Greater than 20% of the units with one of the above problems.
Condition
Description
Rating
A No Problems - Very Good Condition: No chips, radial cracks, flashover
burns, copper splash and/or copper wash. Cementing and fasteners are secure.
B Minor Problems Good Condition: Minor chips and/or cracks and/or
flashover burns and/or copper splash and/or copper wash are present.
C Major Problems Poor Condition: Major chips and/or cracks and/or
Table 23.3.2 Condition of Bushings and Insulators

Condition
Description
Rating
A MOV units are clean and free from contamination or evidence of over voltage
or overheating. All connections are tight. No corrosion on mounting hardware
or on connections.
Table 23.3.3 Metal Oxide Varistors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Housings have no chips, radial cracks, flashover burns, copper splash and/or
B Housings have minor chips and/or cracks and/or flashover burns and/or
copper splash and/or copper wash are present. Cementing and fasteners are
secure.
C Housings have major chips and/or cracks and/or flashover burns and/or
secure.
D Housings are broken or damaged and/or cementing or fasteners are not
secure.
E Housings, cementing or fasteners are broken or damaged beyond repair.
Table 23.3.4 Varistor Housings Condition
Trigger Gaps
Condition
Description
Rating
A Gaps in good condition, no extensive pitting or corrosion of gap surfaces,
operating voltage within design tolerance, gaps adjustments possible, housing
in good condition with no signs of corrosion or rust.
B One of the above characteristics is unacceptable.
C Two of the above characteristics is unacceptable.
D More than two of the above characteristics are unacceptable, but repair is still
possible
brought into acceptable condition
Table 23.3.5 Trigger Gaps Condition (Kennedy Only)

Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, grading resistors show no visible signs of damage,
connections in good shape, no bulged or leaky grading capacitors, all
components values within design tolerance. Appears to be well maintained
with service records readily available.
possible
Table 23.3.6 Trigger Gap Voltage Dividers Condition (Kennedy only)
Damping Reactors and Resistors

Condition
Description
Rating
A Very Good Condition, no broken wires, no damaged fibreglass ties, no
discolouration, reactors clean
B Good Condition, no broken wires, minor damage to fibreglass ties, minor
discolouration or paint peeling
C Poor Condition, some broken wires or broken fibreglass ties, major
discolouration or UV damage
D Very Poor Condition, signs of surface tracking, damaged electrical
connections, many broken fibreglass ties, severe discoloration or UV damage,
signs of overheating or winding collapse
E Damping reactors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 23.3.7 Condition of Damping Reactors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, case free of rust and corrosion, resistance within acceptable
tolerance, support insulators in good condition, no external evidence of
overheating or internal damage to grids. Appears to be well maintained with
service records readily available
possible
Table 23.3.8 Condition of Damping Resistors

Current Transformers
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, primary and secondary connections are in good condition,
no signs of rust or corrosion on case, bushings in good condition, power
factor test within specification.
Table 23.3.9 Current Transformer Condition
Protection and Control

Condition
Description
Rating
C One of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
Table 23.3.10 Protection and Control Condition

Connectors and Conductors
Condition
Description
Rating
during normal or fault current carrying duty.
E Connectors or conductors have failed or are damaged/degraded beyond
repair.
Table 23.3.11 Connectors and Conductors

Platform Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating
A No Problems - no chips, radial cracks, flashover burns, copper splash and/or
B Minor problems - minor chips and/or cracks and/or flashover burns and/or
secure.
C Major problems - major chips and/or cracks and/or flashover burns and/or
secure.
D Insulators broken or damaged, or cementing or fasteners are not secure;
functional failure likely
E Insulators, cementing or fasteners are broken or damaged beyond repair;
functional failure exists.
Table 23.3.12 Platform Insulation
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good condition, no failed fibres, cladding in good condition
B Deteriorating condition on cladding, evidence of some cracking
C No remaining healthy spare installed fibres
D Major cracking of cladding and no remaining spare installed fibres
E Fibres damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 23.3.13 Fibre Optics to Platform Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No signs of rust, no damage to frame members, hardware secure.
B Normal signs of wear and tear, slight evidence of rust.
C Some evidence of rust and corrosion, damage to members, loose or missing
hardware
D Significant signs of rust and corrosion, bent or missing members, rusted or
missing hardware.
E Frame is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 23.3.14 Condition of Frame


23.3.16 below.
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a series
capacitor in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely non-
functional series capacitor would have a Health Index of 0.
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for series capacitors in Table 23.3.15
below, assume a capacitor with partial data has a maximum condition score of 48 out of the
Health Index maximum possible score of 76. That capacitor, therefore, has only 63% of the
maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that series
capacitor with partial data had a maximum condition score of 58, it would have 76% of the

Condition Maximum
# Condition Criteria Weighting Factors
Rating Score
1 Condition of Capacitor Units 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Condition of Bushings and 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Insulators
3 Metal Oxide Varistors 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Varistor Housings 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
5 Trigger Gaps* 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
6 Trigger Gap Voltage Dividers* 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
7 Damping Reactor: General 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Condition
8 Damping Resistor: General 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Condition
9 Condition of Current Transformers 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
10 Protection and Control 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
11 Conductors/Connectors 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Maximum score = 76
Health Index is actual score/76 100%.
* Kennedy Only
Table 23.3.15 Series Capacitors Health Index Formulation
Condition Maximum
Rating Score
1 Platform Insulation 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
2 Fibre Optics to Platform 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Frame Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Maximum score = 28
Health Index is actual score/24 100%.
Table 23.3.16 Series Capacitors Platform Equipment Health Index Formulation
Table 23.3.17 was used to determine the overall condition of the series capacitor asset class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 23.3.17 Health Index Scale for Series Capacitors

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for series capacitors in the
BCTC-managed transmission system. Tables 23.4.1 and 23.4.2 summarize the results,
which are also illustrated in Figures 23.4.1 and 23.4.2.
Health Index Results Classification Capacitor Banks Station Platforms
Very Good 22 5
Good 0 0
Fair 6 0
Poor 0 0
Very Poor 0 0
Total Results Based on Field Survey 28 8
Percentage of Total Population Surveyed 82.4 62.5
Table 23.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Rating Results for Series Capacitor Banks

Health Index Results Classification Capacitor Banks Station Platforms
Very Good 27 8
Good 0 0
Fair 7 0
Poor 0 0
Very Poor 0 0
Total 34 8
Table 23.4.2 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for Series

Capacitor Banks
30 27
Number of Series Capacitor
25
20
Banks
15
10 7
5
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 23.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Series Capacitor Banks

9
8
Number of Series Capacitor

8
7
Platforms 6
5
4
3
2
1
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 23.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Series Capacitor Station
Platforms
79.4% of Series Capacitors and 100% of Series Capacitor Station Platforms are in
Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements are expected in the near
term.
20.6% of Series Capacitors are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital

24.0 HVDC Pole 1
24.1 Description
The HVDC Pole 1 system has two stations. Major components of HVDC Pole 1 are
described below.
Mercury-Arc Valves
Pole 1 consists of two, six-pulse mercury-arc valve groups made up of six main valves and a
bypass valve. Each valve has four parallel anodes fed from a common mercury cathode pool.
A demineralised water-cooling system cools the cathode tank and a closed air circulating
system cools the anode. The cathode cooling units have duplicate circulation pumps. A
current divider ensures that the four anodes share current. Other auxiliary equipment in the
valve hall includes anode and cathode reactors, auxiliary power transformers and gate pulse
isolating transformers.
Each station has two sets of conditioning equipment, and some of this equipment has been
automated with Power Line Carriers to improve processing.
Since manufacturers no longer make mercury-arc valves, continued operation of the BCTC-
managed mercury-arc valves depends on maintaining an adequate supply of spare parts.
Spare parts come from the decommissioning of other mercury arc valve systems. Critical
spares for the mercury-arc valves include the following:
Main Anode Porcelains

Excitation Anode
Cathode Porcelains
Cathode Igniters
Electrode Grids
In addition to the above, the AC and DC wall bushings also are important in valve operation.
Pole 1 has oil-filled condenser type bushings that use metallic condenser foils for voltage
stress grading. Pole 1s bakelized paper design relies on bonding between the paper layers
and metallic foils used for stress grading.
Converter Transformers and Smoothing Reactors

ASEA manufactured the converter transformers of Valve Group 5 at Arnott and Valve
Group 1 at VIT. These transformers have three single-phase units per valve group. CGE
manufactured subsequent transformers for Valve Groups 6 and 2. Neither terminal has any
spare units at this time.
Each station has a smoothing reactor connected in series with the high voltage line. The
smoothing reactors are constructed similar to transformers. However, because these units
carry direct current they do not have the same type of magnetic core as transformers.

Damping Resistors and Capacitors
Resistor and capacitor damping circuits connect in parallel with each mercury arc valve.
Damping resistors and capacitors limit the rate of rise and the peak of reverse voltage across
mercury arc valves.
A valve damping resistor assembly consists of three resistors mounted in a star arrangement
on top of a common support porcelain. Forced-oil and forcedair systems cool the
assemblies. Each HVDC Pole 1 station has four valve damping resistor assemblies. Each
station also has twelve valve damping capacitors, each with six series connected capacitor
units.

Full operational functionality requires communication between Arnott and VIT. HVDC
systems have more extensive controls than those found in typical AC substations. Controls
operate the valves for all steady state and transient modes, including start, stop, and various
power levels. Controls also provide protective functions for DC equipment. Pole 1 has
obsolete control equipment and its continued operation depends on the availability of spare
parts. Chapter 14 of this report contains a complete description and analysis of the protection
and control asset class.
AC Filters
The Pole 1 filter bank consists of four tuned filters (5th, 7th, 11th and 13th) and a high pass
bank. At VIT, the Pole 1 filter bank also includes one arm tuned to the 3rd harmonic. A
common oil-filled unit houses the reactors and resistors that require continuous oil flow when
energized. To minimize the need for spares, the reactor/resistor units for the 5th and 7th
filter arms are identical to the 11th and 13th filter arms.
Pole 1 has internally fused filter capacitors. Capacitor banks used for AC filters consist of
capacitors, fuses, insulators and support structures. These essentially static devices have
minimal maintenance requirements, typically confined to visual inspections and other non-
invasive checks.
Station Service
Pole 1 has a 575 V station service transfer system that provides power to the auxiliary
systems needed to operate the converter station. Important loads fed by the station service
include Pole 1 and Pole 2 cooling systems, Pole 1 first grade power MG sets, Pole 2 first
grade chargers, degassing equipment and building services.
Two separate station service transformers bring power to station service buses A and C that
are separated by a normally open tiebreaker. After loss of one incoming supply, the breakers
operate automatically to restore voltage to the interrupted bus.

Electrodes
A sea electrode at Sansum Narrows on Vancouver Island serves as the anode station. The
electrode consists of 28 graphite cylindrical bars immersed in an ocean front salt-water pool.
The bars are about 2400 mm long, 100 mm in diameter and weigh about 38 kilograms each.
They are connected in a matrix of four in series with seven electrodes in parallel.
A land electrode on the mainland at Boundary Bay near Arnott serves as the cathode station.
It consists of 46 silicon iron rods, each 89 mm in diameter and 2130 mm in length, immersed
in a coke breeze.
The electrode stations are connected to the DC system by overhead lines running to VIT and
Arnott respectively. They also attach in the neutral connection of Poles 1 and 2.
24.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system includes an HVDC system that links Vancouver
Island with the Mainland. This system is separated into two poles of different type and
vintage. Pole 1 is based on mercury arc valve technology and was built in 1968.
Table 24.2.1 shows the main components of Pole 1 and their ages.
Pole 1 includes 36 mercury arc valves, 14 converter transformers, 10 damping reactors, 3

damping resistors and 2 harmonic filter banks located at two stations, Arnott and Vancouver
Island Terminal (VIT). The harmonic filter bank at VIT consists of 6 harmonic filters, while
the one at Arnott consists of 5 harmonic filters. Each filter has sets of reactors, capacitors and
resistors.
Harmonic Filter
Mercury Damping
Converter Components
Years Arc Resistors and
Transformers (Reactors, Capacitors
Valves Capacitors
and Resistors)
0 to 9 0 1 2 3
10 to 19 0 0 0 0
Age Group
20 to 29 0 6 3 7
30 to 39 36 6 8 17
40 to 49 0 0 0 0
50 plus 0 0 0 0
Incomplete 0 1 0 15
Total 36 14 13 42
Table 24.2.1 HVDC Pole 1 Age Demographics

Pole 1 Reliability
In conformance with International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) protocols,
BCTC collects reliability data for the HVDC system that it manages. Each year, BCTC
prepares a report summarizing Pole 1s annual reliability. They classify forced outage data
into the following six categories:
AC and auxiliary equipment

Valves
Control and protection
DC equipment
Transmission lines and cables
Other
Mercury-Arc Valves
Pole 1 consists of two, six-pulse mercury-arc valve groups made up of six main valves and a
bypass valve. The system went into commercial service in the late 1960s. Since that time,
thyristor valve technology has replaced mercury-arc valves.
A mercury-arc valve maintenance includes periodic reconditioning to disassemble, rebuild

and restore every valve to like new condition. For each valve, reconditioning generally
must occur between 50,000 60,000 hours of operation. Also, the reconditioning process
takes about six months to a year to complete. Since Pole 1 consists of 12 valves,
reconditioning is a continuous process.
Generally, the average operating time since rebuild determines the condition of valve groups.
If an average of 45,000 operating hours had elapsed since a valve groups last rebuild, then
six valves would require reconditioning in a very short time to ensure continued reliable
operation.
Performance of mercury-arc valves depends on the reconditioning programs quality. The

programs quality depends on the expertise of maintenance personnel. Conditioning
equipment must also function properly to ensure continued mercury-arc valve operation.
With normal staff turnover, maintaining the quality of the reconditioning program requires
continuous training of new personnel. Mercury-arc valves consist of 1950s and 1960s
technology. To learn about the technology and its reconditioning processes, workers must
receive on-the-job training including documentation and exposure to experienced personnel.
It takes a long period of time for a technician to achieve expertise in the proper maintenance
of mercury-arc valves.

Mercury-arc valve maintenance also depends on having an adequate supply of spare parts.
Since no one now manufactures mercury-arc valve technology, major spares can be obtained
only from other mercury-arc valve systems undergoing decommissioning. Thus, the
availability of critical spares plays a key role in determining the end-of-life for mercury-arc-
valves. Critical spares for the mercury-arc valves include the following:
Main Anode Porcelains

Excitation Anode
Cathode Porcelains
Cathode Igniters
Electrode Grids
AC and DC wall bushings also represent important components in the operation of mercury-
arc valves. Pole 1 bushings have oil filled condensers that use condenser foils for voltage
stress grading. The bakelized paper bushing design relies on bonding between the paper
layers, with metallic foil used as stress grading. Bushing condition assessment involves
measuring loss angles and capacitance for these components using Doble test equipment.

ASEA manufactured the converter transformers of Valve Group 5 at Arnott and Valve Group
1 at VIT. These converter transformers consist of three single-phase units per valve group.
CGE manufactured the transformers for Valve Group 6 and Valve Group 2. BCTC has no
spare units at either terminal.
Generally, insulation condition largely determines the end-of-life for converter transformers.
The insulation consists of oil and cellulose (i.e., paper/pressboard). Of the two insulation
components, cellulose plays a more important role in determining the transformers
longevity. While oil can be treated and changed, its condition always affects degradation of
the cellulose.
Oxidation is one of several degradation factors for oil and cellulose in transformers. Because
oxidation occurs more rapidly than other degradation processes, it serves as the primary
process resulting in a transformers end-of-life. Three factors most significant in determining
oxidation rates for oil and cellulose include oxygen, temperature and moisture.
Each station has a smoothing reactor connected in series with the high voltage line.
Smoothing reactors and transformers have similar construction. They also have similar
degradation processes and end-of-life indicators
a) Oil Degradation
Oil is a mixture of complex hydrocarbon compounds that oxidize over time. The rate of
oxidation increases as oil ages. As oil oxidizes, it creates organic acids that may form sludge
if the equipment does not receive proper maintenance. Sludge formation significantly affects
the transformers cooling capability, causing higher operating temperatures that further
increase oxidation rates.

The following measurements help determine the condition of oil in transformers:
Acidity
Breakdown strength
Moisture content
b) Paper Degradation
The paper insulation system consists of insulation oil, oil impregnated paper and oil
impregnated pressboard. The paper and pressboard spacers are made of cellulose
impregnated with oil. Cellulose consists of chains that break through aging. However, the
length of the cellulose chains determines its mechanical properties. As cellulose ages,
therefore, it loses tensile strength and ductility.
The degree of polymerization (DP) determines a chains average length. DP tests are
destructive and performed on paper samples. New transformers should have paper DP values
greater than 1,000. DP values decrease as paper ages. DP values below 250 indicate brittle
and fragile paper, and signal the end of a transformers life.
Transformer degradation and failure also can result from electrical activity initiated by the
presence of moisture in paper, or when other minor defects occur in transformer active areas.
One can use oil analysis to evaluate the condition of paper. The relative levels of carbon
dioxide and carbon monoxide in dissolved gas indicate paper degradation. However, the level
of Furans in oil provides a better indication of paper degradation. Furans are bi-products of
oxidation, and a relationship exists between the level of Furans in oil and the DP value of
paper.
Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) also can detect the occurrence of partial discharges and other
electrical and thermal faults in the transformer.
c) Testing Transformer Oil Samples

Transformer oil testing provides the primary means of condition assessment. Sampling and
analysis can occur without interrupting the system, and at very low costs. Since oil analysis
has been done for many years, results are well understood and easily used with a high-degree
of confidence.
Oil analysis provides information about three critical factors that reflect present conditions
and predict future transformer performance. Factors include:
Oil condition (i.e., its moisture, acidity and breakdown strength measurements),
Cellulose insulation condition (i.e., Furan, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and
moisture measurements); and,
Incipient electrical or thermal faults in the transformer (i.e., from DGA results).
Other oil related tests exist (e.g., interfacial tension, power factor) but they have less value
than the tests described above.

Oil analysis provides a powerful diagnostic and condition assessment technique. Combining
that analysis with information such as specifications, operating history, loading conditions
and system related issues, provides a useful means to assess transformer conditions and to
identify high-risk units. Combining and evaluating this information facilitates development
of effective transformer management strategies.
d) Frequency Response Analysis

Converter transformers that supply mercury-arc valves experience significant short circuit
stresses during valve arcback and arcthrough. Arcbacks occur when valves conduct in a
reverse direction, and arcthroughs occur when valves conduct during scheduled blocking
periods. These valve malfunctions can result in line-to-line faults and three phase faults.
Transformer life is affected by the cumulative total of arcbacks and arcthroughs that have
occurred over its time in service.
In the BCTC-managed system, Pole 1 transformers experienced frequent arcbacks during its
first four years of operation. Arcbacks can result in transformer winding displacement and
wedging within the winding structure. Frequency response analysis (FRA) tests can help
assess transformer winding shifts. When carried out on Pole 1 transformers, FRA tests
helped determine some internal winding shifts in two BCTC-managed converter transformers
that ultimately were removed from service. BCTC is evaluating this technique. For purposes
of this report, it is not used in calculating the Health Index.

The rate of rise and peak of reverse voltage across mercury-arc valves is limited by the use of
resistor-capacitor damping circuits connected in parallel with each valve. Valve damping
resistors are forced-oil and forced-air cooled. They consist of three resistors mounted in a
star arrangement on top of common support porcelains.
Pole 1 has four valve damping resistor assemblies and 12 valve damping capacitors at each
station. Like the mercury-arc valves, damping resistors are no longer manufactured. Thus,
continued availability of spare parts presents operational and end-of-life concerns for Pole 1
mercury arc valves.
This equipment plays a vital role in reducing and controlling mercury-arc valve arcbacks and
consequential arcbacks. Continued reliable operation of this equipment requires the
availability of spare resistors and porcelains. Similar to other oil-filled equipment oil testing
serves as a primary condition assessment tool.
Condition assessment methods used for shunt and filter capacitors also apply to damping
capacitors. When individual capacitors or their structures and insulators degrade so much
that maintenance becomes uneconomic this equipment has reached its end-of-life.

Control and Protection
HVDC systems have more extensive controls than those found in typical AC substations.
Controls operate the valves for all steady state and transient modes, including start, stop, and
power levels. Controls also provide protection for DC equipment. Chapter 14 of this report
describes degradation processes and end-of-life issues applicable to all protection and control
systems.
Pole 1 has obsolete control equipment that is potentially near its end-of-life. While easy to
maintain, the controls of Pole 1 rely on the availability of spare parts for continued operation.
The Pole 1 control equipment is well beyond its normal useful life and, although now in good
condition, it requires continued vigilance and presents maintenance challenges to ensure that
it stays in this condition.
Pole 1 also has standard relays and auxiliary devices for protection. While these protection
devices are similar to those found in other typical AC substations they are obsolete and now
operating beyond their normal useful life. .
AC Filters
Pole 1s 5th and 7th filter arms are identical to its 11th and 13th filter arms. This minimizes
concerns about the availability of spares.
a) Filter Capacitor Banks

AC filter capacitor banks consist of capacitors, fuses, insulators and the support structure.
These static devices require minimal maintenance that typically includes visual inspections
and other non-invasive tests. Moisture ingress can degrade capacitors and internal fuses.
Insulators can experience internal degradation. Support structures can experience corrosion
from environmental factors.
In addition to visual inspection, routine maintenance involves, non-invasive tests (e.g.,

infrared surveys) and corrective activities. Visual inspections can identify specific
deterioration such as moisture-related defects and corrosion. More detailed surveys may
follow visual inspections, after identification of particularly poor conditions. Inspection and
survey results help determine whether the equipment requires continued maintenance,
refurbishment or complete replacement. When individual components of overall capacitor
bank assemblies degrade so much that maintenance becomes uneconomic, the capacitor bank
has neared its end-of-life.
Canada has laws that ban the use of certain PCB-containing equipment after 2007. The oil in
capacitor banks may contain PCBs above legally allowable levels. As such, the 2007
regulatory deadline will determine this equipments end-of-life. This regulatory deadline,
however, has no effect on the actual health of the equipment.
b) Oil-Filled Filter Resistor/Reactors

Similar to other oil-filled equipment, filter resistors and reactors require maintenance and
testng to assess their condition

condition of HVDC Pole1:
a) Visual
HVDC Pole 1 has many visible and accessible components, making visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion. Visual
inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals, and can help assess internal
conditions and components. However, visual inspections must be supplemented by records
reviews, and may require follow-up surveys and corrective activities.

c) Doble
may help detect deterioration of insulation and other internal components.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed HVDC Pole 1 equipment first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.
Mercury Arc Valves
Condition
Description
Rating
A Less than 20,000 hours
B Between 20,000 and 30,000 hours
C Between 30,000 and 40,000 hours
D Between 40,000 and 45,000 hours
E > 45,000 hours
Table 24.3.1 Valve Group Average Operating Time
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good condition, no excessive or abnormal vibration of pumps, no leaks,
piping and heat exchangers have no rust or corrosion
Table 24.3.2 Valve Cooling Equipment

Condition
Description
Rating
A Good condition, batteries condition within specification, acceptable mean
time between failure for components in rectifiers, inverters and transfer
switch. Appears to be well maintained with service records readily available.
Table 24.3.3 Valve First Grade Power Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating
A Greater than three valves per year
B Three valves per year
C Two valves per year
D One valve per year
E Less than one valve per year
Table 24.3.4 Ability to Rebuild
Condition
Description
Rating
A Technology is current and is widely supported in terms of spare parts and
technical service
B Technology is not a current type, but is well supported in terms of spare parts
and technical service
C Technology may become obsolete within the next 10 years and/or has limited
support in terms of spare parts and technical service
D Technology may become obsolete within the next 5 years and/or has very
limited support in terms of spare parts and technical service
E Technology is obsolete and is not supportable in terms of spare parts and
technical service
Table 24.3.5 Technological Obsolescence

Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
secure.
D Bushings broken or damaged, or cementing or fasteners are not secure;
E Bushings, cementing or fasteners are broken or damaged beyond repair;
Table 24.3.6 Condition of Wall Bushings
Condition
Description
Rating
A No change from base tests
B Less than 40% increase from base tests
C 40% to 80% increase from base tests
D 80% to 100% increase from base tests
E Greater than 100% increase from base tests
Table 24.3.7 Doble Test Level for Wall Bushings
Converter Transformers
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
E Oil leakage and moisture ingress resulting in damage/degradation beyond
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
condition.
E Main tank or cabinets have corrosion, water ingress or insect/rodent
Table 24.3.10 Transformer Main Tank/Cabinets Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on body of radiators or conservator tank. No rust,
corrosion on weld seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors.
B No rust or corrosion on conservator, some evidence of slight
corrosion/deterioration of radiator.
C Some rust and corrosion on both conservator and radiator.
D Significant rust and corrosion on both conservator and radiator. Could lead to
major oil leakage or water ingress.
repair.
analysis.
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Table 24.3.15 Transformer Oil Analysis (DGA)

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 24.3.16 Transformer Furan Oil Analysis
Condition
Description
Rating
greater than 2%
Table 24.3.17 Transformer Winding Doble Test
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 24.3.20 Transformer Bushing Oil Analysis
Condition
Description
Rating
valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, Qualitrol or other relays and fittings

Condition
Description
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any interfaces , cover plates, weld seals,
flanges, valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, Qualitrol or other relays and
fittings associated with the LTC. Verify that LTC conservator oil level gauge is
at correct value.
C Clear evidence of oil leaks but rate of loss is not likely to cause any operational
or environmental impacts
repair.
Table 24.3.22 Tap Changer Tank Seals
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
months.
repair.
Table 24.3.24 Tap Changer LTC control and Mechanism Cabinet
Condition
Description
Rating
components..
B A small percentage of the wiring, terminal blocks, relays and switches are in a
degraded condition. LTC operating mechanism is in good condition
corrective action.

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A Oil tests passed; DGA overall factor<3 or limited metal content
E Any failed oil test; DGA overall factor>3 or serious metal content
Table 24.3.27 Tap Changer Oil Analysis (DGA, Metal Content)
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Condition
Description
Rating
A Porcelain housing in good condition, no chips or cracks, no oil leaks, gaskets
in good condition, oil pumping equipment in good condition.
B Minor chips and cracks, are visible in housing. Cementing and fasteners are
secure, minor oil leaks evident, no moisture ingress likely.
C Major chips and/or cracks and/or flashover burns and/or copper splash and/or
copper wash are present. Cementing and fasteners are secure. Clear evidence
of oil leaks but rate of loss is not likely to cause any operational or
environmental impacts,
D Housing broken or damaged, or cementing or fasteners are not secure;
functional failure likely. Major oil leakage and probable moisture ingress. If
left uncorrected it could cause operational and/or environmental problems.
E Porcelain housings, cementing or fasteners are broken or damaged beyond
repair; functional failure exists. Oil leakage and moisture ingress resulting in
Table 24.3.29 Damping Resistor General Condition
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Table 24.3.31 Oil Analysis (DGA)
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Harmonic Filters
Capacitor Banks
Condition
Description
Rating
A New
B In service for sometime with no problems
C Minor problems
D Major problems and poor condition, but repair possible
E Equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 24.3.33 General Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A Hardware in good condition, fitting of tubes is good, no sign of UV damage
on tubes.
Table 24.3.35 Condition of Fuses

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
hardware
missing hardware.
Oil-Filled Filter Reactors

Condition
Description
Rating
D Bushings, cementing or fasteners are broken, but repair is possible
E Bushings damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 24.3.38 Oil Filled Filter Reactors -Condition of Bushings

Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no abnormal fan or pump noise
B Poor door seals, some abnormal fan vibration or noise indicating some bad
fans.
C Abnormal fan vibration or abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating
bad oil pump
D Abnormal fan vibration and abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating
bad oil pump, but repair still possible.
E Many bad fans, abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating bad oil
pump, equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 24.3.39 Oil Filled Filter Reactors -Other Ancillary Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no problems
B Minor oil leaks, limited rust or corrosion
C Major oil leaks or widespread/severe corrosion
D Major oil leaks and widespread/severe corrosion
E Major oil leaks and widespread/severe corrosion, equipment
damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 24.3.40 General Condition of Reactors, Corrosion of Tank or Radiators, Oil

Leaks etc.
Dry-Type Filter Reactors

Condition
Description
Rating
A No broken wires, no damaged fibreglass ties, no discolouration, reactors
clean
B No broken wires, minor damage to fibreglass ties, minor discolouration or
paint peeling
C Some broken wires or broken fibreglass ties, major discolouration or UV
damage
D Signs of surface tracking, damaged electrical connections, many broken
fibreglass ties, severe discoloration or UV damage, signs of overheating or
winding collapse
E Reactor damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 24.3.41 Dry Type Reactors General Condition

Filter Resistors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good condition, case free of rust and corrosion, resistance within acceptable
possible
Table 24.3.42 Condition of Resistors Oil Quality Test
Condition
Description
Rating
hardware
missing hardware.

Condition
Description
Rating
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
A Spare parts available for estimated service 5 years
B Spare parts available for estimated service 4 to 5 years
C Spare parts available for estimated service 2 to 3 years
D Spare parts available for estimated service 1 to 2 years
E Spare parts available for estimated service < 1 year
Table 24.3.47 Spare Parts for Protection and Control
Condition
Description
Rating
A Modern digital control
E Control equipment composed of discrete components, greater than thirty
years old
Table 24.3.48 Control Obsolescence
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 24.3.49 Mean Time Between Failure for Protection Equipment


24.3.59 below.
A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a mercury-arc
valve in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely non-
functional mercury-arc valve would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for mercury-arc valves in
Table 24.3.50 below, assume a valve with partial data has a maximum condition score of 45
out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 72. That valve, therefore, has only 63%
of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that
valve with partial data had a maximum condition score of 52, it would have 72% of the

calculated for the complete HVDC Pole 1 assembly consisting of appropriate valves,
transformers, damping resistors and capacitors, harmonic filters, protection and control plus
equipment reliability. Table 24.3.50. shows the components considered, weightings and
maximum scores possible in computing this overall Health Index.
Condition Maximum
Rating Score
1 Valve Group Average 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Operating Time
2 Valve First Grade Power 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Ability to Rebuild 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Technological Obsolescence* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
6 Wall Bushing Condition 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
7 Wall Bushing Doble Test 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Maximum score = 72
HI = 100*Score/Max.
*In the case of a score of D or E, overall Health Index is divided by 2
Table 24.3.50 Mercury-Arc Valve Health Index Formulation

Transformers Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
2 Oil Leaks 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Conservator/Oil Preservation System
4 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
(Airbag Integrity)
13 Bushing DGA Oil Analysis 4 A,E 4,0 16
Max Score= 116
HI = 100*Score/Max
*In the case of a score of E, Overall Health Index is divided by 2
Table 24.3.51 Transformer and Smoothing Reactor Health Index Formulation
Tap Changers Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
2 Tank Leaks 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 LTC Control and Mechanism Cabinet 1 A,E 4,0 4
Control and Mechanism Cabinet
5 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Component
7 DGA, Metal Content 4 A,E 4,0 16
Max Score= 76
HI = 100*Score/Max

Damping Resistors and Capacitors Health Index Formulation
Condition Maximum
Rating Score
1 Damping Resistor general 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
condition
2 Reliability of Capacitor Units 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Dissolved Gas Analysis 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Standard Oil tests: Moisture, 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Acidity and Dielectric
Strength Factors
Maximum score = 40.
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.53 Damping Resistors and Capacitors Health Index Formulation
Harmonic Filters Health Index Formulation

Condition Maximum
Rating Score
1 General Condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Condition of Fuses 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Insulators
5 Condition of Frame 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Maximum score = 36
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.54 Filter Capacitor Banks Health Index Formulation
Condition Criteria for Condition Maximum

# Weighting Factors
Inspections Rating Score
1 Condition of Resistors 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Maximum score = 16
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.55 Filter Resistor Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
1 Condition of Bushings 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
2 Other Ancillary Equipment 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 General condition of reactors, 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
corrosion of tank or radiators,
oil leaks etc
5 Standard Oil Tests: Moisture, 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Acidity and Dielectric
Strength Factors
Maximum score = 48
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.56 Oil-Filled Filter Reactors Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
Maximum score = 12
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.57 Dry Type Filter Reactors Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
1 Spare Parts for Protection and 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Control
2 Control Obsolescence 4 A, E 4, 0 16
3 Protection Equipment MTBF 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Maximum score = 28
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 24.3.58 HVDC Protection and Control Health Index Formulation

Subsystem Health Weighting Max
Component
Index Factor Score
Mercury Arc Valves 0-100 0.5 50
Converter Transformers 0-100 0.1 10
Damping Resistors and
0-100 0.05 5
Capacitors
Harmonic Filter Capacitor Banks 0-100 0.1 10
Harmonic Filter Oil Filled 0-100
0.05 5
Reactors
Harmonic Filter Dry Type 0-100
0.05 5
Reactors
Harmonic Filter Resistors 0-100 0.05 5
Protection and Control 0-100 0.1 10
Max Score = 100
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 24.3.59 Overall HVDC Pole 1 Health Index Formulation
Table 24.3.60 was used to determine the overall condition of the HVDC Pole 1 asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 24.3.60 Health Index Scale for HVDC Pole 1

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for HVDC Pole 1.
Table 24.4.1 summarizes the results, which are also illustrated in Figures 24.4.1 through
24.4.5. Note, as described in subsection 24.3.3 above, the 50% Rule was applied in
calculating the Health Index for this asset since available data were insufficient to use the
70% Rule.
Health Index Converter Damping Harmonic

Mercury Protection
Results Trans- Resistors Filter
Arc Valves and Control
Classification formers & Capacitors Equipment
Very Good 0 6 0 0 0
Good 0 7 13 34 0
Fair 0 0 0 8 1 Lot
Poor 24 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 12 1 0 0 0
Total 36 14 13 42 1 Lot
Table 24.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results For HVDC Pole 1 Equipment
30
Number of HVDC Pole 1
24
Mercury Arc Valves
25
20
15 12
10
5
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 24.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Mercury Arc Valves

8
7
7
6
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 24.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Converter Transformers
14 13
Damping Resistors and
12
10
Capacitors
8
6
4
2
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 24.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Damping Resistors and
Capacitors

Harmonic Filter Components
40
34

35
30
25
20
15
10 8
5
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 24.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Harmonic Filter

Equipment
2.5
2
2
Substations
1.5
0.5
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 24.4.5 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for HVDC Pole 1 Stations

Overall, both HVDC Pole 1 Stations are in Poor condition based on the criticality of
the mercury arc valves to the continued successful operation of HVDC Pole 1. All the
Mercury Arc Valves are in Poor or Very Poor condition, and are very close to their
end-of-life. However, the mercury arc valves and their control equipment are kept in
good working condition through an extraordinary operation and maintenance
program. This program relies on the continued availability of spare parts within the
BCTC-managed system, the availability of skilled and well trained personnel to
refurbish the equipment routinely, the availability of specific tools required for this
refurbishment, and continued funding at a level to support all aspects of this operation
and maintenance program.
92.9% of Converter Transformers, 100% of Damping Resistors and Capacitors and
81% of Harmonic Filter Equipment are in Good or Very Good condition. If BCTC
continues its current level of operation and maintenance, no capital expenditures are
19% of Harmonic Filter Equipment is in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or
capital improvements may be needed depending on criticality.
7.1% of Converter Transformers are in Very Poor condition or at their end-of-life.

25.0 HVDC Pole 2
25.1 Description
HVDC Pole 2 (Pole 2) consists of two stations and has the following major components.
Thyristor Valves
Pole 2 has two six-pulse, air-cooled thyristor valve groups per station. Each valve group
consists of three double valves contained within fibreglass insulating structures. Each valve
incorporates 15 power modules with two thyristors in parallel on a common heat sink and 12
parallel units connected in series. The power modules also house voltage-grading circuits,
snubber circuits, gate drive units, power supplies and status lamps. In addition to the valves,
cooling equipment, bypass vacuum switches and wall bushings also play critical roles in the
continuing operation of the valves are important for the continuing operation of the valves.
A fibreglass structure houses valve components, directs a cooling air stream, and acts as the
insulation between valve components and ground.
Pole 2 has a total of 4320 thyristor cells per terminal. GE manufactured the thyristor cells for
the first thyristor valve groups of Pole 2. CGE supplied the cells for the second thyristor
valve groups.
Pole 2 also has a total of 720 gate pulse transformers. In their early operation, these gate
pulse transformers had high failure rates.
Each thyristor level has protective circuitry to prevent the valves from sustaining high over
voltages in the forward direction. The valves now have 4320 Voltage Break Over boards in
service. Each thyristor level has resistors and capacitors (i.e., snubber circuits) to control
voltages across the thyristors during the switching operations. The resistors are low
inductance, encapsulated air-cooled devices.
Fibre optic cables carry firing signals from the Pole 2 valve controls to the valves. A forced
air system also cools the thyristor valves. Air is forced through the valves and hot air passes
through an air-to-air heat exchanger. A wet cooling tower cools the exchanger.
Bypass vacuum switches are used in the start-up and protection of Pole 2 valve groups. These
are special custom built devices with closing times of about 30 msec. Each bypass switch
consists of an operating mechanism upon which are mounted eight series connected vacuum
bottles located in a porcelain housing. The vacuum bypass switches are located outdoors in
the switchyards and connected across each Pole 2 valve group.
Each valve group has two DC and three AC oil impregnated paper type wall bushings,
horizontally mounted on the building wall.

CGE manufactured the thyristor valve groups converter transformers. They have three
single-phase units per pole, together with a permanently connected spare transformer. Each
terminal has a single-phase spare that can be readily connected to either valve group.
Each station also has a smoothing reactor connected in series with the high voltage line.
These smoothing reactors have construction similar to transformers, but do not have the same
magnetic cores.

Full operational functionality requires communication between Arnott and VIT. HVDC
systems have more extensive controls than those found in typical AC substations. Controls
operate the valves for all steady state and transient modes, including start, stop, and various
power levels. Controls also provide protective functions for DC equipment. Pole 2 has
obsolete control equipment and its continued operation depends on the availability of spare
parts. Chapter 14 of this report contains a complete description and analysis of the protection
and control asset class.
AC Filters
Harmonic filters minimize the amount of harmonic currents flowing into the AC system and
provide about 50%of the reactive power absorbed by the thyristor converters. The Pole 2
filters at both Arnott and VIT consist of four tuned filters (5th, 7th, 11th and 13th) and a high
pass bank. The tuned arms have oil-filled and naturally cooled reactors. The high pass filters
have epoxy dry type air-cooled reactors. To minimize the need for spares, the reactors for
the 5th and 7th filter arms are identical to the 11th and 13th filter arms.
Pole 2 has externally fused filter capacitors that contain PCBs. Each tuned arm has a series
connected capacitor section that can be shorted out to correct filter tuning in response
ambient temperature changes. Capacitor banks for the AC filters consist of capacitors, fuses,
insulators and support structures. These essentially static devices have minimal maintenance
requirements, typically confined to visual inspections and other non-invasive checks.
Station Service
Pole 2 has a 575 V station service transfer system that provides power to the auxiliary
systems needed to operate the converter station. Important loads fed by the station service
include Pole 1 and Pole 2 cooling systems, Pole 1 first grade power MG sets, Pole 2 first
grade chargers, degassing equipment and building services.
Two separate station service transformers bring power to station service buses A and C that
are separated by a normally open tiebreaker. After loss of one incoming supply, the breakers
operate automatically to restore voltage to the interrupted bus.

Electrodes
A sea electrode at Sansum Narrows on Vancouver Island serves as the anode station. The
electrode consists of 28 graphite cylindrical bars immersed in an ocean front salt-water pool.
The bars are about 2400 mm long, 100 mm in diameter and weigh about 38 kilograms each.
They are connected in a matrix of four in series with seven electrodes in parallel.
A land electrode on the mainland at Boundary Bay near Arnott serves as the cathode station.
It consists of 46 silicon iron rods, each 89 mm in diameter and 2130 mm in length, immersed
in a coke breeze.
The electrode stations are connected to the DC system by overhead lines running to VIT and
Arnott respectively. They also attach in the neutral connection of Poles 1 and 2.
25.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system includes an HVDC system that links Vancouver
Island with the Mainland. This system is separated into two poles of different type and
vintage. Pole 2, which is based on thyristor valve technology, was built in 1977.
Table 25.2.1 shows that the main components of this system are 2 thyristor valve modules,
13 converter transformers, 2 damping reactors and 2 harmonic filter banks at two stations,
Arnott and Vancouver Island Terminal. Each harmonic filter bank has 5 harmonic filters,
each of which has sets of reactors, capacitors and resistors.
Harmonic Filter
Thyristor Components
Converter Damping
Years Valve (Reactors,
Transformers Reactors
Modules Capacitors and
Resistors)
0 to 9 0 0 0 18
10 to 19 0 1 0 3
Age Group
20 to 29 2 12 2 38
30 to 39 0 0 0 0
40 to 49 0 0 0 0
50 plus 0 0 0 0
Incomplete 0 0 0 13
Total 2 13 10 72
Table 25.2.1 HVDC Pole 2 Age Demographics

Pole 2 Reliability
In conformance with International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) protocols,
BCTC collects reliability data for the HVDC system that it manages. Each year, BCTC
prepares a report summarizing Pole 2s annual reliability. They classify forced outage data
into the following six categories:
AC and auxiliary equipment;

Valves;
Control and protection;
DC equipment;
Transmission lines and cables; and
Other.
Thyristor Valves
Pole 2 consists of two six-pulse, air-cooled thyristor valve groups per station. In addition to
the valves, cooling equipment, bypass vacuum switches and wall bushings are important for
the continuing operation of the valves.
a) Valve Structure
The fibreglass structure that houses and insulates valve components has a normal life
expectancy of about 30 years. At Pole 2, contamination combined with high humidity, has
caused surface tracking, insulation flashover and damage to valve structures. Major failures
have occurred and repairs have required lengthy outages.
Toshiba researchers have recommended that this type of insulation have a minimum creepage
distance of 13 mm/kV. At Pole 2, high voltage valve structures V8 and V4 operate with an
insulation creepage distance of 6.6 mm/kV, and low voltage valve structures V7 and V3 have
a creepage distance of 13.2 mm/kV. Tests by Toshiba indicate that partial discharge activity
increases with temperature and humidity. Further, life expectancy decreases with
temperature. When relative humidity falls below 30%, voltage stress increases partial
discharge activity. When humidity exceeds 70%, the insulations ability to withstand
voltages falls rapidly.
For Pole 2, there is no practical way to reduce voltage stress on valve structures. Thus,
operation under stressed conditions requires regular monitoring of the insulation, which can
deteriorate linearly over time. Generally, the increasing need for repairs determines the end-
of-life for these components. To extend the life of Pole 2s valve insulation, BCTC has
cleaned valve halls and structures during maintenance. In addition, maintenance has
included air seal and valve hall improvements. BCTC also has added new pressurization and
humidity control systems. The utility also has reduced peak operating temperatures and
instituted partial discharge monitoring for all valve halls.

b) Thyristors
As described above, the GE supplied thyristor cells at Pole 2, had relatively high leakage
currents when they were placed in service. Leakage current increases with both voltage and
junction temperature. Excessive leakage currents expose thyristors to risk of avalanche
breakdown in the reverse mode, and avalanche multiplication in the off state. In 1981, GE
wrote to BC Hydro that if the leakage current exceeded 25 mA when tested with a 225 V test
kit, the utility should consider the cell defective and replace it.
The leakage current distribution in cells of a valve can lead to unequal steady state voltages
across a thyristor series string. These unequal voltages increase as junction temperatures
increase, exacerbating voltage-sharing errors and placing overvoltage stress on cells with low
leakage currents. The worst over-voltages occur in valves that have many cells with high
leakage currents and only a few cells with low leakage currents. Generally, increases in cell
leakage currents under given junction temperatures and voltages indicate progressive
degradation in a thyristor.
At this time, the Pole 2 thyristors have only a few cells with high leakage currents. However,
if more cells begin to exhibit this problem, the risk of cell failure will increase. Failure rates
and spare thyristor availability represent key factors in determining the end-of-life of these
components.
c) Valve Electronics
Pole 2s gate pulse transformers had a high failure rate during their early operation. Those
failures were attributed to manufacturing problems. Damping circuit resistors may
experience failures from overheating. After overheating has occurred, resistors become
discoloured and may become open circuits. Visual inspection can detect evidence of
overheating.
d) Fibre Optic Guides

Fibre optic cable casing should have no visible cracking or damage.
e) Bypass Vacuum Switches

In the past, Pole 2s bypass vacuum switches have had internal flashovers requiring major
repairs and complete replacements. End-of-life conditions for bypass vacuum switches are
similar to those described for circuit breakers in Chapter 1 of this report. Flashovers of these
devices have occurred in the past caused by moisture from condensing internally on the
vacuum bottles. The bypass switches at VIT terminal uses a dry airflow system, while at
Arnott the area is allowed to breathe through a desiccant dryer.
f) Wall Bushings
With aging, the oil-impregnated paper of Pole 2s wall bushing may become vulnerable to
partial discharge causing gas build-up within the bushing. Measuring loss angles and
capacitance can help assess bushing condition. Each bushing has a voltage tap that permits
true readings of bushing loss angles. However, in-situ measurements require disconnecting
the main power at either end of the bushing. While this is practical at the indoor end of the
valve hall, access is difficult at the bushings air end in the DC yard.

As mentioned in the description of this asset, CGE manufactured Pole 2s thyristor valve
converter transformers. The short circuit duty of these transformers is not significant when
compared with that of Pole 1.
Generally, insulation condition largely determines the end-of-life for converter transformers.
The insulation consists of oil and cellulose (i.e., paper/pressboard). Of the two insulation
components, cellulose plays a more important role in determining the transformers
longevity. While oil can be treated and changed, its condition always affects degradation of
the cellulose.
Oxidation is one of several degradation factors for oil and cellulose in transformers. Because
oxidation occurs more rapidly than other degradation processes, it serves as the primary
process resulting in a transformers end-of-life. Three factors most significant in determining
oxidation rates for oil and cellulose include oxygen, temperature and moisture.
Each station has a smoothing reactor connected in series with the high voltage line.
Smoothing reactors and transformers have similar construction. They also have similar
degradation processes and end-of-life indicators
a) Oil Degradation
Oil is a mixture of complex hydrocarbon compounds that oxidizes over time. The rate of
oxidation increases as oil ages. As oil oxidizes, it creates organic acids that may form sludge
if the equipment does not receive proper maintenance. Sludge formation significantly affects
the transformers cooling capability, causing higher operating temperatures that further
increase oxidation rates.
The following measurements help determine the condition of oil in transformers:
Acidity;
Breakdown strength; and
Moisture content.
b) Paper Degradation
The paper insulation system consists of insulation oil, oil impregnated paper and oil
impregnated pressboard. The paper and pressboard spacers are made of cellulose
impregnated with oil. Cellulose consists of chains that break through aging. However, the
length of the cellulose chains determines its mechanical properties. As cellulose ages,
therefore, it loses tensile strength and ductility.
The degree of polymerization (DP) determines a chains average length. DP tests are
destructive and performed on paper samples. New transformers should have paper DP values
greater than 1,000. DP values decrease as paper ages. DP values below 250 indicate brittle
and fragile paper, and signal the end of a transformers life.

Transformer degradation and failure also can result from electrical activity initiated by the
presence of moisture in paper, or when other minor defects occur in transformer active areas.
One can use oil analysis to evaluate the condition of paper. The relative levels of carbon
dioxide and carbon monoxide in dissolved gas indicate paper degradation. However, the level
of Furans in oil provides a better indication of paper degradation. Furans are bi-products of
oxidation, and a relationship exists between the level of Furans in oil and the DP value of
paper.
Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) also can detect the occurrence of partial discharges and other
electrical and thermal faults in the transformer.
c) Testing Transformer Oil Samples

Transformer oil testing provides the primary means of condition assessment. Sampling and
analysis can occur without interrupting the system, and at very low costs. Since oil analysis
has been done for many years, results are well understood and easily used with a high-degree
of confidence.
Oil analysis provides information about three critical factors that reflect present conditions
and predict future transformer performance. Factors include:
Oil condition (i.e., its moisture, acidity and breakdown strength measurements);
Cellulose insulation condition (i.e., Furan, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and
moisture measurements); and,
Incipient electrical or thermal faults in the transformer (i.e., from DGA results).
Other oil related tests exist (e.g., interfacial tension, power factor) but they have less value
than the tests described above.
Oil analysis provides a powerful diagnostic and condition assessment technique. Combining
that analysis with information such as specifications, operating history, loading conditions
and system related issues, provides a useful means to assess transformer conditions and to
identify high-risk units. Combining and evaluating this information facilitates development
of effective transformer management strategies.

HVDC systems have more extensive controls than those found in typical AC substations.
Controls operate the valves for all steady state and transient modes, including start, stop, and
power levels. Controls also provide protection for DC equipment. Chapter 14 of this report
describes degradation processes and end-of-life issues applicable to all protection and control
systems, including those in this asset class.
Pole 2 has obsolete control equipment potentially near its end-of-life. The design and lack of
documentation for Pole 2s controls make troubleshooting and maintaining the system
problematic. Pole 2 also has standard relays and auxiliary devices for AC protection. These
protection devices are similar to those found in other typical AC substations.

Pole 2 controls get power from a first grade power system made up of two independent
inverters fed from separate batteries and rectifiers. Factors important in assessing this
equipments condition and end-of-life are similar to those for battery chargers, batteries and
uninterruptible power supplies. Chapter 17 of this report describes degradation processes for
batteries and their components.
AC Filters
The Pole 2 filters at both Arnott and VIT consist of four tuned filters (5th, 7th, 11th and 13th)
and a high pass bank. Only the high pass bank has resistors. All Pole 2s capacitors contain
PCBs.
a) Filter Capacitor Banks

AC filter capacitor banks consist of capacitors, fuses, insulators and support structures.
These static devices require minimal maintenance that typically includes visual inspections
and other non-invasive tests. Moisture ingress can degrade capacitors and internal fuses.
Insulators can experience internal degradation. Support structures can experience corrosion
from environmental factors.
In addition to visual inspection, routine maintenance includes non-invasive tests (e.g.,

infrared surveys) and corrective activities. Visual inspections can identify specific
deterioration such as moisture-related defects and corrosion. More detailed surveys may
follow visual inspections after identification of suspect conditions. Inspection and survey
results help determine whether the equipment requires routine maintenance, refurbishment or
complete replacement. When individual capacitor bank components degrade so much that
maintenance becomes uneconomic, the capacitor bank has neared its end-of-life.
Canada has laws that ban the use of certain PCB-containing equipment after 2007. The oil in
capacitor banks may contain PCBs above legally allowable levels. As such, the 2007
regulatory deadline will determine this equipments end-of-life.
b) Oil-Filled Filter Resistor/Reactors

Similar to other oil-filled equipment, filter resistors and reactors require maintenance and
testing to assess their condition
c) Dry-Type Filter Reactors

Dry-type filter reactors are generally described as maintenance free. Maintenance typically
consists of visual inspection to see if they are clean, have intact paint, and have no broken
wires or fibreglass ties.
d) Filter Resistors
Filter resistors are static devices with minimal maintenance requirements such as visual
inspection and other non-invasive tests.

Station Service
Pole 1 and Pole 2 depend on proper operation of the station service transfer system. For
example, tie breakers that do not close after losses of bus power can cause forced outages for
certain valve groups. Such outages can cause a loss of transmission capability. Complete
station service outages result in bipole shutdowns throughout the outages. BC Hydro
recently upgraded this equipment at Pole 2.
Electrodes
Anode bars such as those in the sea electrode at Sansum Narrows have an expected
decomposition rate of 20 grams per 1000 ampere-hours of operation. Generally, a bar
reaches its end-of-life after decomposition of about 75% of its weight. Visual inspection
generally can detect the remaining life of a bar.
For the Boundary Bay cathode station, one can assess the condition of rods by measuring
individual rod currents. Failed rods are likely whenever measurements show reduced
currents. An evaluation of the condition of the electrodes was not part of this baseline study.

condition of HVDC Pole2:
a) Visual
HVDC Pole 2 has many visible and accessible components, making visual inspections
effective. Visual inspections can detect external contamination, corrosion. Visual
inspections also can verify the condition of gaskets and seals, and can help assess internal
conditions and components. However, visual inspections must be supplemented by records
reviews, and may require follow-up surveys and corrective activities.

c) Doble Test

can help detect deterioration of insulation and other internal components.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed HVDC Pole 2 equipment first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.
Thyristor Valves
Condition
Description
Rating
A No identified discharge activity
B Small discharge activity
C Frequent discharge activity causing minor damage
D Frequent discharge activity causing major damage, but equipment is still
repairable
E Frequent discharge activity causing major damage and valve flashovers,
equipment degraded beyond the ability to repair
Table 25.3.1 Valve Insulation System

Condition
Description
Rating
A Failure rate < 0.05% per year
B Failure rate from 0.05% to 0.1% per year
C Failure rate from 0.1% to 1.0% per year
D Failure rate from 1.0% to 1.5% per year
E Failure rate greater than 1.5% per year
Table 25.3.2 Thyristor Failure Rate
Condition
Description
Rating
A No thyristor gate drive failures
B Failure rate 1 per year
C Failure rate from 1 to 4 per year
D Failure rate from 5 to 10 per year
E Failure rate greater than 10 per year
Table 25.3.3 Gate Drive Units
Condition
Description
Rating
A No pulse transformer failures
B Failure rate 1 per year
Table 25.3.4 Pulse Transformers
Condition
Description
Rating
A No thyristor electronic component failures
B Failure rate < 20 per year
Table 25.3.5 Other Valve Electronics

Condition
Description
Rating
A Good condition, no failed fibres, cladding in good condition
B Deteriorating condition on cladding, evidence of some cracking
C No remaining healthy spare installed fibres
D Major cracking of cladding and no remaining spare installed fibres
E Fibres damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 25.3.6 Fibre Optics to Valves
Condition
Description
Rating
A Technology is current and is widely supported in terms of spare parts and
technical service
B Technology is not current installation, but is well supported in terms of spare
parts and technical service
C Technology may become obsolete within the next 10 years and/or has limited
support in terms of spare parts and technical service
D Technology may become obsolete within the next 5 years and/or has very
limited support in terms of spare parts and technical service
E Technology is obsolete and is not supportable in terms of spare parts and
technical service
Table 25.3.7 Technological Obsolescence
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no previous problems, no excessive vibration, noise or
abnormal operating temperature.
B Good Condition, no previous problems, some vibration and noise indicating
need for bearing overhaul.
C Poor Condition, minor previous problems
D Poor Condition, major previous problems and bearing replacements, perhaps
indicating warn shaft and /or bearing seat and making bearing replacement
difficult.
E Poor Condition, major previous problems and bearing replacements, perhaps
indicating warn shaft and /or bearing seat and making bearing replacement
difficult, and equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 25.3.8 Valve Hall Blowers Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no previous problems, cellulose fill in good condition
B Good Condition, minor previous problems, cellulose fill in poor condition,
evidence of some rust or corrosion
C Poor Condition, cellulose fill in poor condition, evidence of major rust or
corrosion
D Significant corrosion on heat exchangers, cellulose fill in poor condition
E Significant corrosion on heat exchangers, cellulose fill in poor condition and
equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 25.3.9 Condition of Heat Exchangers
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no previous problems
B Good Condition, minor previous problems
C Poor Condition, minor previous problems
D Poor Condition, major previous problems
E Equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 25.3.10 Cooling Control Circuits
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, air-drying system in good order, insulation testing within
specification, operating time within specification, operating mechanism.
C Two of the above characteristics are unacceptable.
D Three of the above characteristics are unacceptable
E Equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 25.3.11 Vacuum Bypass Switches - Condition

Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
secure.
Table 25.3.12 Vacuum Bypass Switches Bushings
Condition
Description
Rating
secure.
secure.
Table 25.3.13 Condition of Wall Bushings
Condition
Description
Rating
A No change from base tests
B Less than 40% increase from base tests
C 40% to 80% increase from base tests
D 80% to 100% increase from base tests
E Greater than 100% increase from base tests
Table 25.3.14 Wall Bushings Doble Test

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
E Oil leakage and moisture ingress resulting in damage/degradation beyond
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
condition.
E Main tank or cabinets have corrosion, water ingress or insect/rodent
Table 25.3.17 Transformer Main Tank/Cabinets Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A No rust or corrosion on body of radiators or conservator tank. No rust,
corrosion on weld seals, flanges, valve fittings, gauges, monitors.
B No rust or corrosion on conservator, some evidence of slight
corrosion/deterioration of radiator.
C Some rust and corrosion on both conservator and radiator.
D Significant rust and corrosion on both conservator and radiator. Could lead to
major oil leakage or water ingress.
repair.
analysis.

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
E Foundation, supports, or grounding damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Table 25.3.22 Transformer Oil Analysis (DGA)
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 25.3.23 Transformer Oil Analysis (Furan)
Condition
Description
Rating
greater than 2%
Table 25.3.24 Transformer Winding Doble Test

Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4 or 5
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 25.3.27 Transformer Bushing Oil Analysis

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A No oil leakage or water ingress at any interfaces, cover plates, weld seals,
flanges, valve fittings, pressure relief diaphragms, Qualitrol or other relays
and fittings associated with the LTC. Verify that LTC conservator oil level
gauge is at correct value.
repair.
Table 25.3.29 Tap Changer Tank Seals
Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
months.
repair.
Table 25.3.31 Tap Changer LTC control and Mechanism Cabinet
Condition
Description
Rating
components.
B A small percentage of the wiring, terminal blocks, relays and switches are in
a degraded condition. LTC operating mechanism is in good condition
corrective action.

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A Oil tests passed; DGA overall factor<3 or limited metal content
E Any failed oil test; DGA overall factor>3 or serious metal content
Table 25.3.34 Tap Changer Oil Analysis (DGA, Metal Content)
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Where minimum requirement is the Moisture test along with either the acidity or dielectric
test:
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Harmonic Filters
Capacitor Banks
Condition
Description
Rating
A New
B In service for sometime with no previous problems
C Minor previous problems
D Major previous problems and poor condition, but repair possible
Table 25.3.36 General Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
A Hardware in good condition, fitting of tubes is good, no sign of UV damage
on tubes.
Table 25.3.38 Condition of Fuses

Condition
Description
Rating
Condition
Description
Rating
hardware
missing hardware.
E Frame damaged/degraded beyond repair
Condition
Description
Rating
A Non PCB dielectric
E PCB dielectric
Table 25.3.41 PCB Filled

Condition
Description
Rating
Table 25.3.42 Oil Filled Filter Reactors -Condition of Bushings
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, , no abnormal fan or pump noise
B Poor door seals, some abnormal fan vibration or noise indicating some bad
fans.
C Many bad fans, abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating bad oil pump
D Many bad fans, abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating bad oil
pump, but repair still possible.
E Many bad fans, abnormal oil pump vibration or noise indicating bad oil
pump, equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 25.3.43 Oil Filled Filter Reactors -Other Ancillary Equipment
Condition
Description
Rating
A Good Condition, no problems
B Minor oil leaks, limited rust or corrosion
C Major oil leaks or widespread/severe corrosion
D Major oil leaks and probable moisture ingress. If left uncorrected it could
cause operational and/or environmental problems and widespread/severe
corrosion
E Major leaks and widespread/severe corrosion, equipment damaged/degraded
beyond repair
Table 25.3.44 General Condition of Reactors, Corrosion of Tank or

Radiators, Oil Leaks etc.

Dry-Type Filter Reactors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Very Good Condition, no broken wires, no damaged fibreglass ties, no
discolouration, reactors clean
B Good Condition, no broken wires, minor damage to fibreglass ties, minor
discolouration or paint peeling
C Poor Condition, some broken wires or broken fibreglass ties, major
discolouration or UV damage
D Very Poor Condition, signs of surface tracking, damaged electrical
connections, many broken fibreglass ties, severe discoloration or UV damage,
signs of overheating or winding collapse
E Reactor damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 25.3.45 Dry Type Reactors General Condition
Filter Resistors
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Good condition, case free of rust and corrosion, resistance within acceptable
possible
Table 25.3.46 Condition of Resistors
Condition
Description
Ratings
hardware
missing hardware.

Condition
Description
Rating
B DGA overall factor is 1.2 1.5
Scores
Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6
H2 <=100 <=200 <=300 <=500 <=700 >700 2
CH4 <=120 <=150 <=200 <=400 <=600 >600 3
C2H6 <=50 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H4 <=65 <=100 <=150 <=250 <=500 >500 3
C2H2 <=3 <=10 <=50 <=100 <=200 >200 5
CO <=700 <=800 <=900 <=1100 <=1300 >1300 1
CO2 <=3000 <=3500 <=4000 <=4500 <=5000 >5000 1
Condition
Description
Rating
A F1 + F2 + F3 = 0 or 1
B If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 2 or 3
C If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 4 or 5
D If: F1 + F2 + F3 = 5
E If: F1 + F2 + F3 > 5
Moisture PPM
(T oC Corrected)
(From DGA test)
less than 20 0 >20 0 >50 0
20 - 30 2 16-20 1 >40 50 1
>30 40 4 13.5-16 2 30 - 40 2

Condition
Description
Rating

Condition
Description
Rating
A Spare parts available for estimated service 5 years
B Spare parts available for estimated service 4 to 5 years
C Spare parts available for estimated service 2 to 3 years
D Spare parts available for estimated service 1 to 2 years
E Spare parts available for estimated service < 1 year
Table 25.3.51 Spare Parts for Protection and Control
Condition
Description
Rating
A Modern digital control
E Control equipment greater than thirty years old
Table 25.3.52 Control Obsolescence
Condition
Description
Rating
Table 25.3.53 Mean Time Between Failure for Protection Equipment


25.3.62 below.
A = 4;
B = 3,
C = 2,
D = 1, and
E = 0.
producing a number from 1-100 for each asset class member. For example, a thyristor valve
in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded thyristor
valve would have a Health Index of 0.
equal to 70% of the maximum possible condition score for a full data set. For example, using
the weightings and maximum possible scores for thyristor valves in Table 25.3.54 below,
assume a valve with partial data has a maximum condition score of 65 out of the Health
Index maximum possible score of 112. That valve, therefore, has only 58% of the maximum
score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that valve with partial
data had a maximum condition score of 82, it would have 73% of the Health Index maximum
and a valid Health Index.

Condition Maximum
Rating Score
1 Valve Insulation System 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Thyristor Failure Rate 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Gate Drive Units 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Pulse Transformers 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Other Valve Electronics 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
6 Fibre Optics to Valve 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
7 Technological Obsolescence* 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
8 Condition of Valve Hall 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Blowers
9 Condition of Heat Exchangers 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
10 Cooling Control Circuits 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
11 Vacuum Bypass Switches 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
12 Wall Bushing Condition 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
13 Wall Bushing Doble Test 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Max Score= 112
HI = 100*Score/Max
*In the case of a score of D or E, overall Health Index is divided by 2
Table 25.3.54 Health Index Formulation for Thyristor Valves (includes Cooling System)

Transformers Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
2 Oil Leaks 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
4 1 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 4
13 Bushing DGA Oil Analysis 4 A,B,C,D, E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Max Score= 116
HI = 100*Score/Max
*In the case of a score of E, overall Health Index is divided by 2
Table 25.3.55 Transformer/Smoothing Reactor Health Index Formulation
Tap Changers Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
2 Tank Leaks 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
LTC Control and Mechanism
4 1 A,E 4,0 4
Cabinet
Control and Mechanism Cabinet
5 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Component
7 DGA, Metal Content 4 A,E 4,0 16
Max Score= 76
HI = 100*Score/Max

Condition Maximum
Rating Score
3 Condition of Fuses 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Insulators
Maximum score = 36
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 25.3.57 Filter Capacitor Banks Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
1 Condition of Resistors 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Maximum score = 16
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 25.3.58 Filter Resistor Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
1 Condition of Bushings 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
2 Other Ancillary Equipment 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 General condition of reactors, 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
corrosion of tank or radiators, oil
leaks etc
5 Standard Oil Tests: Moisture, IFT 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
and Dielectric Strength Factors
Maximum score = 48
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 25.3.59 Oil-Filled Filter Reactors Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
Maximum score = 12
HI = 100*Score/Max.
Table 25.3.60 Dry Type Filter Reactors Health Index Formulation

# Weighting Factors
1 Spare parts for Protection and 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Control
2 Control Obsolescence 4 A,E 4,0 16
3 MTBF for Protection 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Maximum score = 28
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 25.3.61 HVDC Protection and Control Health Index Formulation
Subsystem Weighting
Component Max score
Health Index Factor
Thyristor Valves 0-100 0.5 50
Converter Transformers 0-100 0.15 15
Harmonic Filter Capacitor 0-100
0.1 10
Banks
Harmonic Filter Oil Filled 0-100
0.05 5
Reactors
Harmonic Filter Dry Type 0-100
0.05 5
Reactors
Harmonic Filter Resistors 0-100 0.05 5
Protection and Control 0-100 0.1 10
Max Score= 100
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 25.3.62 Overall HVDC Pole 2 Health Index Formulation
Table 25.3.63 was used to determine the overall condition of the HVDC Pole 2 asset class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 25.3.63 Health Index Scale for HVDC Pole 2

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for HVDC Pole 2.
Table 25.4.1 summarizes the results, which are also illustrated in Figures 25.4.1 to 25.4.4.
Note, as described in subsection 25.3.3 above, the 50% Rule was applied in calculating the
Health Index for this asset since available data were insufficient to use the 70% Rule.
Health Index
Thyristor Converter Harmonic Protection and
Results
Valves Transformers Filter Equipment Control
Classification
Very Good 0 9 0 0
Good 0 4 72 0
Fair 0 0 0 1 Lot
Poor 4 0 0 0
Very Poor 0 0 0 0
Total 4 13 72 1 Lot
Table 25.4.1 Summary of Extrapolated Condition Assessment Results for HVDC Pole
2 Equipment

4
4

Thyristor Valves
3
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 25.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Thyristor Valve Modules
10
9
9
8
7
6
5 4
4
3
2
1 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 25.4.2 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Converter Transformers

Harmonic Filter Components
80 72

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 25.4.3 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for Harmonic Filter

Equipment
2.5
2
2
Substations
1.5
0.5
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 25.4.4 Summary of Condition Assessment Results for HVDC Pole 2 Substations

Overall, both HVDC Pole 2 Stations are in Fair condition based on the criticality of
the thyristor valves to the continued successful operation of HVDC Pole 2. Increased
maintenance or capital improvements may be needed in the near future after assessing
criticality issues.
100% of Converter Transformers, Harmonic Filter Equipment, Damping Resistors,
and Capacitors are in Good or Very Good condition.
All four Thyristor Valve Modules are in Poor condition and are approaching their
end-of-life. However, the valves are kept in good working condition through an
extraordinary operation and maintenance program. This program relies on the
continued commercial availability of spare parts, the availability of skilled and well
trained personnel to refurbish equipment routinely, the availability of specific tools
required for this refurbishment, and continued funding at a level to support all aspects
of this operation and maintenance program.

26.0 Conductor Systems
26.1 Description
Electrical current flows through transmission line conductors facilitating the movement of
power throughout transmission systems. These conductors are supported by either metal or
wood pole structures to which they are attached by insulator strings suitable for the voltage at
which the conductors operate. The conductors are sized for the amount of current to be
carried and other design requirements. Metal and wood pole structures are evaluated
separately in subsequent chapters. For purposes of this study, the conductor system asset
class consists of the following subcomponents:
Phase conductors that provide a low impedance path for currents during power
transmission;
Conductor splices and dead end fittings that provide a low impedance and
mechanically strong connection of conductors in tension;
Static or ground wires that shield against lightning and provide a low resistance path
for line-to-ground fault currents;
Spacer dampers that maintain sub-conductor separation and prevent damage to sub-
conductors from wind-induced vibration;
Marker balls or aircraft warning spheres that provide visual warning of conductor
locations to approaching aircraft; and
Armour and patch rods that stiffen, protect, and maintain a continuous profile of
conductors at points where hardware attaches to them.
Conductors have high tensile strength, enabling them to be stretched over long spans. As
load current passes through a conductor its resistance causes its temperature to rise. The
temperature change is proportional to the square of the load current passing through the
conductor. The rise in temperature causes the conductor to lengthen and sag between points
of support, reducing the height of the conductor above ground. This may reduce the lines
clearance from ground by 3 meters or more, depending on the conductors temperature
increase, ambient temperature, wind and solar conditions, and the distance between points of
support. Such clearance reductions make it critical to limit the load carried by each
transmission circuit to a level within that circuits design capability.
Steel reinforced aluminum conductors have galvanized steel core strands that supply most of
their strength. The steel core has both tensile and ductile properties, allowing the core to
withstand both longitudinal forces and bending movements without failure. The steel core
enables a conductor to withstand forces from its own weight, plus forces associated with
wind, snow and ice.
A layer of individual aluminum wire strands is arranged over the steel core at a pitch length
dependent on the diameter of the steel core. Additional aluminum wire strand layers are then
applied in reverse pitches, alternating with each layer. This alternating pitch design
minimizes torsion underload.

The transmission system managed by BCTC uses mainly aluminum-based conductors of the
following types:
Aluminum Conductors Steel Reinforced (ACSR),

Aluminum Stranded Conductors (ASC),
Aluminum Alloy Conductors Steel Reinforced (AACSR).
The BCTC-managed transmission system also has a few hard-drawn copper-stranded

conductors, and some high strength and extra high strength Copperweld conductors.
Generally, the BCTC-managed transmission system uses ASC in shorter span wood pole
lines of 69 kV, 138 kV and 230 kV. It also has ASC in slack spans that enter substations.
The system uses ACSR for longer spans at all transmission voltages needing sag
minimization.
The aluminum wires used in both ACSR and ASC consist of a wrought alloy called 1350-
H19. The strength of that alloy diminishes when the conductor operates above 100 C for
extended periods. The galvanized steel wires in the core of ACSR consist of standard
strength steel (about 180,000 psi). AACSR cores consist of extra-high strength steel wire
(about 250,000 psi) that is more difficult to cut than standard strength steel. Typically, the
aluminum alloys used in AACSR are 6101-T81 or 5005-H19. These alloys have as much as
50% greater strength than the 1350 alloy mentioned above. The 5005 alloy begins to anneal
when operating temperatures exceed 75 C. The 6101 alloy begins to anneal at operating
temperatures above 100 C. All three alloys look alike, so one cannot tell them apart
visually. However, when tested, the 1350 alloy bends more readily than either the 5005 or
6101 alloys.
The 5005-alloy conductor is no longer manufactured. However, the Peace and Mica 500 kV
transmission systems in BC use 5005 alloy conductors in intermediate ice-loading zones.
The Mica system also has 6101 alloy conductors on its heaviest ice-loading zones. The
BCTC-managed transmission system also has 6101 alloy conductors on most long water-
crossings built in the last 30 years.
26.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed system has 97,154 spans of transmission line conductors. Of these
spans, the 500 kV system has about 15.2%, the 360 kV system has about 0.6%, the 230 kV
system1 has about 15.1%, the 138 kV system has about 26.2%, and the 60 kV system has
about 42.2%. Table 26.2.1 shows the age demographics of conductor spans for the different
voltage levels. About 69.4% of the conductor spans with known age profiles are between 20
and 40-years old.
1
Included with 230 kV are 2 lines (2L099 and 2L101) energized at 287 kV.

Age 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV Unknown Total
0 9 yrs 97 0 0 0 165 0 262
10 19 years 1,018 1,714 1,274 0 1,482 0 5,488
20 29 years 10,677 2,846 6,182 0 8,501 0 28,206
30 39 years 9,077 9,851 3,503 38 3,905 0 11,134
40 49 years 4,752 4,717 1,665 0 0 0 7,111
50+ years 2,504 3,136 1,234 237 0 0 18,579
Unknown* 12,837 3,194 838 351 726 633 97,154
Grand Total 40,962 25,458 14,696 626 14,779 633
*Note: For purposes of this study demographics were based on data in the STARR database, which was not
designed to provide information about conductor spans. System drawings and other non-electronic records
could also provide additional information about these assets.
Table 26.2.1 Conductor Demographics, Number of Spans
Ancillary components of conductors include marker balls and spacer dampers. A total of
1,438 marker balls exist on the BCTC-managed system. Table 26.2.2 summarizes age
demographics of spacer dampers. The table shows that most spacer dampers, about 82.7% of
the total population, are between 21 and 40-years old.
Age Four-Bundle Two-Bundle Total

0 10 yrs 12,000 12,000
11 20 years 20,900 20,900
21 30 years 106,100 2,807 108,907
31 40 years 75,800 2,261 78,061
40+ years 3,932 3,931
No Data 2,187 2,187
Grand Total 214,800 11,187 225,987
Table 26.2.2 Spacer Damper Age Demographics
Table 26.2.3 shows geographic2 demographics of conductor spans.
2
Geographic designations for the BCTC-managed system:
CKT Cranbrook Transmission
FVT Fraser Valley Transmission
MCT Metro Coastal Transmission
OST Okanagan Shuswap Transmission
PCT Peace Canyon Transmission
PGT Prince George Transmission
TET Terrace Transmission
TNT Thompson Transmission
TVI Vancouver Island Transmission

Regional Area Number of Conductor Spans
CKT 10,149
FVT 13,097
MCT 12,306
OST 8,962
PCT 7,354
PGT 17,131
TET 5,143
TNT 12,717
TVI 10,295
Grand Total 97,154
Table 26.2.3 Geographic Breakdowns of Transmission Conductors

As described above, this asset class consists of conductors, conductor splices, static and
ground wires, spacer dampers, marker balls, armour and patch rods. Generally, the condition
of conductors has the greatest effect on the overall health of this asset class. However, the
condition of accessory components also plays a role in determining the health of the class.
This section describes degradation processes for each component in the conductor system
asset class.
Degradation of Overhead Conductors

To work properly, conductors must retain both their conductive properties and mechanical
(i.e., tensile) strength. Aluminum conductors have three primary modes of degradation,
corrosion, fatigue and creep. The rate of each degradation mode depends on several factors,
including the size and construction of the conductor as well as environmental and operating
conditions. Most utilities find that corrosion and fatigue present the most critical forms of
degradation.
Generally, corrosion represents the most critical life-limiting factor for aluminum-based
conductors. Visual inspection cannot detect corrosion readily in conductors. Environmental
conditions affect degradation rates from corrosion. Both aluminum and zinc-coated steel
core conductors are particularly susceptible to corrosion from chlorine-based pollutants, even
in low concentrations. ACSR used in extreme marine environments may have a useful life of
only 30 years, even with the use of anti-corrosion measures (e.g., greasing). Under minor
marine pollution, aluminum conductors still have a relatively short life of about 50 years.
Fatigue degradation presents greater detection and assessment challenges than corrosion
degradation. In extreme circumstances, under high tensions or inappropriate vibration or

galloping control, fatigue can occur in very short timeframes (i.e., less than 20 years).
However, under normal operating conditions, with proper design and application of vibration
control, fatigue degradation rates are relatively slow. Under normal circumstances,
widespread fatigue degradation is not commonly seen in conductors less than 70 years of
age. Also, in many cases detectable indications of fatigue may only exist during the last 10%
of a conductors life.
In designing transmission lines, engineers ensure that conductors receive no more than 60%
of their rated tensile strength (RTS) during heaviest anticipated weather loads. The tensile
strength of conductors gradually decreases over time. When conductors experience
unexpectedly large mechanical loads and tensions beyond 50% of their RTS, they begin to
undergo permanent stretching with noticeable increases in sagging.
Overloading lines beyond their thermal capacity causes elevated operating temperatures.
When operating at elevated temperatures, aluminum conductors begin to anneal and lose
tensile strength. Each elevated temperature event adds further damage to the conductor.
After loss of 10% of a conductors RTS, significant sag occurs, requiring either resagging or
replacement of the conductor. Because of their steel cores, ACSR can withstand greater
annealing degradation than ASC.
Phase to phase power arcs can result from conductor galloping during severe storm events.
This can cause localized burning and melting of a conductors aluminum strands, reducing
strength at those sites and potentially leading to conductor failures. Visual inspection readily
detects arcing damage.
Other forms of conductor damage, include:
Broken strands (i.e., outer and inners)

Strand abrasion
Elongation (i.e., change in sags and tensions)
Burn damage (i.e., power arc/clashing)
Birdcaging
After conductor stretching has occurred, one can estimate damage severity by measuring sag
in the affected spans and then comparing the measured sag to originally installed (i.e., as
constructed) sag under prevailing ambient conditions. This technique, however, requires
verification and documentation of actual original sags at line commissioning.
Sometimes it is difficult visually to detect broken, abraded, burned and birdcaged conductor
strands from the ground. However, use of a helicopter may improve the effectiveness of
such visual inspections. Sometimes one also can detect these types of damage using portable
infrared, light sensitive UV imaging, and RI or TVI detection devices. Other devices useful
on energized lines and in the detection of inner steel corrosion include the following:
Chubu Electric Device

Fugikura Device

Cormon Device
Cross Checker Device
Emat (now under evaluation by BCTC)
Laboratory tests on representative samples of transmission line conductors also can provide
reliable evidence of the components deterioration and remaining life. The most common
laboratory tests include the following:
Tension Test:
Based on ASTM E8-01 Standard Test Methods for Tension Testing of Metallic Materials,
this test allows determination of a conductors RTS through individual constituent wire
testing. Test results can be compared to the conductors original RTS.
Table 26.3.1 below shows how to rate a conductors condition and its RTS using Tension
Test results. The minimum acceptable RTS is 85% of the conductors original RTS.
Remaining Tensile
Rating Comment
Strength
>105% RTS Very Good Substantially exceeds the RTS
100%-104.9% RTS Good Exceeds the RTS
90%-99.9% RTS Fair Does not meet the RTS
Marginally exceeds the minimum acceptable
85%-89.9% RTS Marginal
tensile strength
Does not meet the minimum acceptable tensile
<85% RTS Poor
strength
Table 26.3.1 Use of Tension Test Results in Rating Conductor Condition
Torsional Ductility Test:

Based on ASTM A938-1997 Standard Test Method for Torsion Testing of Wire, this test
estimates the number of turns to failure for individual steel wires. The test relates the
number of turns to failure to a subjective assessment about the degree of corrosion on steel
strands.
In performing the test, one clamp of the test machine remains stationary while the other
rotates along the axis of the test wire. That wire is tensioned to a predefined value, and then
twisted until it fails. The device records the number of turns to failure to the closest one
tenth of a turn. New steel wires average about 30-40 turns to failure. As the wires age their
surface corrodes and the number of turns to failure decreases. If the average number of turns
to failure falls below a minimum threshold value, the conductor may warrant early
replacement due to the severity of its corrosion.

Table 26.3.2 shows the conductor rating process based on results of the torsional ductility
test.
Remaining Torsional
Rating Comment
Ductility
>20.0 Very Good Have retained most of their torsional ductility
15.0 19.9 Good Moderate decrease in torsional ductility
10.0 14.9 Fair Significant decrease in torsional ductility
Marginally exceeds the minimum acceptable
5.0 9.9 Marginal
torsional ductility requirement
Does not meet the minimum acceptable torsional
<5.0 Poor
ductility requirement
Table 26.3.2 Conductor Rating Using the Torsional Ductility Test
Remaining Zinc Galvanizing Test

Based on ASTM A90/A90M-01 Standard Test Method for Weight (Mass) of Coating on
Iron and Steel Articles with Zinc or Zinc-Alloy Coatings, this test measures the amount and
weight of zinc remaining on each steel wire to determine the extent of zinc degradation for
the conductor. The test first involves removing flakes of rust, dirt and other corrosion
products from test samples. The cleaned samples are then weighed and the zinc galvanizing
removed using hydrochloric acid. The sample is then reweighed, and the remaining
thickness of zinc calculated from that final weight.
Table 26.3.3 shows the conductor rating process based on results of the remaining zinc
galvanizing test.
Remaining Zinc
on Outer Steel Rating Comment
Wires
>90% Very Good Very little zinc on outer surface lost
70%-89.9% Good Moderate amount of zinc on outer surface lost
50%-69.9% Fair Significant amount of zinc on outer surface lost
<50% Marginal Most zinc on outer surface lost
0% Poor All zinc on outer surface lost Stage 3
Table 26.3.3 Conductor Ratings Using the Remaining Zinc Galvanizing Test

Degradation and Failure of Conductor Splices
Conductor splices generally have a larger cross-sectional area than the conductor itself.
When properly installed, splices should outlast the conductor. However, when improperly
installed, splices can reduce a conductors life. Improperly crimped splices represent the
weakest link in conductors under tension. Sharp splice edges also may lead to increased
corona levels.
In extreme cases, splice failures lead to excessive conductor annealing that may cause the
conductors strands to be pulled from the compression splice. Any strand damage that occurs
during splice installation may lead to localized weakening of the conductor and premature
splice failure. Failure to use non-oxidizing grease in splices also may lead to the
development of hot spots and splice failure.
Visual inspection and the use of thermo vision scanners can detect splices in poor condition.
Degradation of Static or Shield Wires

Shield wires generally consist of steel stranded conductors. Due to relatively low numbers of
lightning incidents, few static or shield wires exist on the transmission system managed by
BCTC.
Generally, corrosion degrades shield wires over time by reducing the wires cross-sectional
areas and causing a loss of tensile strength. Excessive current flow during lightning surges
and line-to-ground faults also may result in localized burning of steel strands in these
components.
Visual inspections can detect deterioration in static and shield wires. Also, the laboratory
tests described above to assess conductor degradation apply to these components as well.
Degradation of Spacer Dampers

The transmission system managed by BCTC uses two types of spacer dampers, those that
accommodate two-bundle phase configurations and those that accommodate four-bundle
phase configurations. Typically, spacer dampers are placed up to 75 meters apart.
Spacer dampers generally consist of cast aluminum frames with articulated arms extending
from the frame corners to conductor clamping points. The point at which each arm attaches
to the frame is generally called a hub. Each hub contains an elastomeric element to dampen
conductor vibrations and to allow the arm to articulate limited distances on each side of its
neutral position. The type of conductor clamp at the end of each arm can vary, depending on
the age and manufacturer.
Spacer dampers are designed to withstand a variety of static and dynamic scenarios. Spacer
dampers must have the capability to endure a lifetime of large amplitude vibrations, ranging
from wake-induced oscillations or galloping, to small amplitude Aeolian vibrations. Spacer
dampers must accommodate sub-conductor movements that occur when ice drops from one
or more subconductors. They also must accommodate static conditions that exist when one

or more subconductors hold ice while the rest remain bare. Such situations cause torsion on
the spacer damper frame, resulting in rotation of individual arms to their fullest extent.
Spacer dampers also need to withstand the large compressive forces generated when fault
currents causes subconductors to collapse together.
Spacer dampers generally protect the large investments made by utilities in their conductors.
In serving this protective role, spacer dampers can incur several types of damage, including:
Clamp loosening,
Damage to elastomeric components,
Aging of the elastomeric elements,
Broken frames.
Degradation of Marker Balls

To comply with Transport Canada regulations and for purposes of due diligence, utilities
install maker balls or aircraft warning spheres on transmission line conductors. Pilots must
pull up and fly over these warning devices whenever seen or detected. The Standards
Obstruction Markings publication from Transport Canadas Air Navigation System
Requirements Branch specifies the allowable size, shape, colour and relative locations of
aircraft warning devices. Generally, transmission lines that cross major rivers and those that
cross airport flight approaches have maker balls or aircraft warning spheres. Installation of
these warning devices almost always occurs on the top wire of the crossing.
The transmission system managed by BCTC has mainly white and international orange 36
and 52 spheres. They are made of fibreglass and have a horizontal or vertical flange joint.
The spheres are usually suspended from the supporting conductor or messenger wire like a
pendulum. They may connect to a supporting clamp assembly by an aluminum plate, or be
supported by an aluminum boomerang-style structure attached to the fibreglass flange.
Spheres typically last 10 to 15 years, after which colour fading dictates replacement.
Problems that may lead to premature replacement include:
Mechanical or electrical damage,

Wind damage,
Aeolian vibration,
Fiberglass fatigue, and
Damage due to gunshots.
Degradation of Armour Rods

Armour rods provide stiffness and protection to conductors at connection clamp points.
Deterioration and aging of armour rods may manifest itself in broken strands from the
following causes:
Corrosion
Conductor vibrations

Excessive wear due to conductor motion
Arcing
Damage in excessive windstorms
Armour rod damage is relatively uncommon and can be detected through visual inspections.
Extra Long Spans

Within the BCTC managed systems there are numerous extra long spans, across valleys,
large rivers, ocean inlets or other obstacles. Due to their unusual design they need to be
managed differently because of different condition criteria and the amount of risk involved in
the case of failure as well as the high cost of maintenance.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed conductor systems first required developing

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no mechanical damage to the conductor and the conductor is in as
new condition
B There are signs of normal wear but no significant damage to conductor
C There is significant damage to conductor requiring planned corrective action.
D There is major damage to the conductor requiring emergency repairs
E The conductor is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 26.3.4 Mechanical Damage to Conductors
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no strand damage due to arcing and the conductor is in as new
condition
C There is significant damage to conductor strands due to arcing requiring
planned corrective action.
E There is damage/degradation to the conductor strand beyond repair.
Table 26.3.5 Conductor Strand Damage due to Arcing
Condition
Description
Rating
A Remaining tensile strength >100% RTS
B Remaining tensile strength Between 95% and 100% of RTS
C Remaining tensile strength Between 90% and 95% of RTS
D Remaining tensile strength between 85 % and 90% of RTS
E Remaining tensile strength < 85% RTS
Table 26.3.6 Loss of Tensile Strength due to Annealing
Condition
Description
Rating
A Remaining zinc on outer steel wires >70%
B Remaining zinc on outer steel wires between 50% and 70%
C Remaining zinc on outer steel wires between 20% and 50%
D Remaining zinc on outer steel wires between 0% and 20%
E No Remaining zinc on outer steel wires
Table 26.3.7 Corrosion of Steel Core

Condition
Description
Rating
A Remaining torsional ductility >15
B Remaining torsional ductility between 12 and 15
C Remaining torsional ductility between 8 and 12
D Remaining torsional ductility between 5 and 8
E Remaining torsional ductility < 5
Table 26.3.8 Reduction in Torsional Ductility
Condition
Description
Rating
A Condition of conductor splices and terminations like new
B Only marginal increase in resistance or temperature rise detected through
thermal vision, requiring no corrective action
C Significant increase in resistance or temperature rise detected through thermal
vision, requiring corrective action at next planned maintenance
D Major deterioration in resistance or temperature rise detected through thermal
vision requiring emergency repairs
E Conductor splices or terminations are damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 26.3.9 Condition of Conductor Splices and Terminations
Condition
Description
Rating
A Condition of warning spheres like new
B Only marginal wear of warning spheres or fading of color, requiring no
corrective action
C Significant damage to warning spheres or fading of color, requiring corrective
action at next planned maintenance
D Major damage to warning spheres or fading of color requiring emergency
repairs
E Spheres are damaged/degraded beyond repair or missing
Table 26.3.10 Condition of Aircraft Warning Spheres

Condition
Description
Rating
A No damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning spheres
C Significant damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning
spheres, requiring corrective action at next planned maintenance
E Damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning spheres is beyond
repair
Table 26.3.11 Conductor Damage at the Point of Connection of Aircraft

Warning Spheres
Condition
Description
Rating
A Mounting clamps in new condition no damage
C Some hardware components loose, requiring corrective action at next planned
maintenance
E Critical hardware components damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 26.3.12 Spacer Damper mounting clamps
Condition
Description
Rating
A Damper frame in new condition no damage
C Some damage to damper frame, requiring corrective action at next planned
maintenance
E Damage to damper frame beyond repair
Table 26.3.13 Damper Frame Damage
Condition
Description
Rating
A Damper frame in new condition no damage
C Some damage to elastomeric components, requiring corrective action at next
planned maintenance
E Elastomeric components are damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 26.3.14 Damper Elastomeric Component Damage

Condition
Description
Rating
A No damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning spheres
C Significant damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning
spheres, requiring corrective action at next planned maintenance
E Damage to conductor at the point of connection of warning spheres is beyond
repair
Table 26.3.15 Conductor Damage at the Point of Connection of Aircraft

Warning Spheres
Condition
Description
Rating
A Armour rods in new condition no damage
C Some damage to armour rods, requiring corrective action at next planned
maintenance
E Armour rods are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 26.3.16 Armour Rods Damage

A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, wood pole
structures in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded
wood pole structures would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for conductors in
Table 26.3.17 below, assume a conductor with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 48 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 72. That conductor, therefore, has
hand, if that conductor with partial data had a maximum condition score of 52, it would have
72% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
The Health Index formulated for conductor systems consists of condition criteria for
conductors, conductor splices, aircraft warning spheres, spacers and dampers, and armour
rods as shown in Table 26.3.17 below.

Conductor Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Conductors
1 Mechanical damage to conductor 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
strands (gun shot, cuts, abrasion,
birdcaging)
2 Strand damage due to arcing 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
3 Loss of strength due to annealing of 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
conductors
4 Corrosion of steel core 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
5 Benchmarking of tensile, torsion and 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
ductility strength through Lab tests
Max Score = 72
HI = 100*Score/Max
Conductor Splices
6 Condition of conductor splices, 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
terminations (resistance measurement
or thermal vision)
Max Score = 12
HI = 100*Score/Max
Aircraft Warning Spheres attached to Conductors
7 Mechanical damage (gun shots, wind 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
damage)
8 Damage to conductors at the point of 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
connection due to fatigue
Max Score = 20
HI = 100*Score/Max
Spacers and Dampers
9 Condition of mounting clamps 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
(loose, broken, missing hardware)
10 Damage to damper frame (cracked, 1 A,C,E 4,2,0 4
broken)
11 Damaged elastomeric components 1 A,C,E 4,2,0 4
12 Damage to conductors at the point of 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
connection due to fatigue
Max Score = 32
HI = 100*Score/Max
13 Damage to armour rods 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8

Max Score = 8
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 26.3.17 Health Index Formulation for Conductor Systems

Because of the sizeable effect that individual components may have on a conductor systems
end-of-life, the Health Index calculation for this asset class involved a different approach
from that used for asset classes described in previous chapters of this report. The approach
used for conductor systems involved developing a composite Health Index (Composite HI)
that combined the end-of-life criteria for specific individual conductor system components.
The Composite HI applies to a single conductor at a tower location (i.e., single span).
Figure 26.3.1 illustrates the Composite HI formulation and calculation process for conductor
systems. Tables 26.3.18 26.3.22 below also show specific steps in the process.
Conductor
- Strands damage
- Corrosion Ancillary
Spacer Dampers - Tensile, torsionand Components
and ductility tests
Markerballs - Armour
(Counted Separately) - Splices
Conductor System Health Index

- Degrade for spacer dampers and markerballs CV
(0-26 pts total)
- Average points from conductor (5-100 pts)
- Degrade for Ancillary CV (0-13 pts)
Final Conductor System HI
Figure 26.3.1 Conductor System Composite Health Index Information Combination

Process
Calculation of the Composite HI required use of condition information from the STARR
maintenance management system. However, some of the information from STARR did not
correspond exactly to the condition criteria presented in Table 26.3.17 above. Table 26.3.18
below compares those condition criteria to condition information available in the STARR
system. The table also shows how the original condition criteria were adjusted to use
information available in STARR.

Health Index Condition Related STARR
Comment
Criteria Condition Criteria
Conductor
Mechanical damage to conductor General Condition of Conductor score used
strands (gun shot, cuts, abrasion, Conductor directly as explained in
birdcaging) Tables 26.3.19 and
26.3.20
Strand damage due to arcing Included in General General Condition used
Condition
Loss of strength due to annealing Included in General General Condition used
of conductors Condition
Corrosion of steel core Included in General General Condition used
Condition
Benchmarking of tensile, torsion Included in General General Condition used
and ductility strength through Condition
Lab tests
Conductor Splices
Condition of conductor splices, General Condition of Splice score used as
terminations (resistance Splice explained in Table 26.3.22
measurement through thermal
vision)
Aircraft Warning Spheres
Mechanical damage (gun shots, General Condition of Markerball score used as
wind damage) Markerball explained in Table 26.3.21
Damage to conductors at the Included in General General Condition used
point of connection due to fatigue Condition
Spacers and Dampers
Condition of mounting clamps General Condition of Spacer score used as
(loose, broken, missing Spacer explained in Table 26.3.21
hardware)
Damage to damper frame General Condition of Damper score used as
(cracked, broken) Damper explained in Table 26.3.21
Damaged elastomeric Included in General General Condition used
components Condition
Damage to conductors at the Included in General General Condition used
point of connection due to fatigue Condition
Armour Rods
Damage to armour rods General Condition of Armour score used as
Armour explained in Table 26.3.22
Table 26.3.18 Condition Criteria to STARR Information Adjustments
When the STARR system had no condition assessment values for a given asset, age was used
as a surrogate for condition in assigning the condition ratings needed for health indexing.

Table 26.3.19 below shows the condition ratings assigned to various age ranges for purposes
of this study.
Age Condition Rating Conductor and Ancillaries

<20 yrs A
20-50 yrs B
>50yrs C
Unknown Age* C
*A C rating was chosen for unknowns because a lack of data is typically associated with older facilities.
Table 26.3.19 Condition Values For Non-Entries in STARR
Each conductor was then grouped. A similar grouping process was applied to ancillary
equipment. Table 26.3.20 below shows how a conductor earned points based on its CV.
CV Points Description
E 29 Conductor at EOL
D 49 Widespread significant deterioration
C 69 Significant deterioration
B 84 Some signs of deterioration
A 100 Limited signs of deterioration
Table 26.3.20 Conductor Condition to Conductor Points Conversion
The condition of spacer dampers and markerballs also affected a conductors Composite HI
by adjusting the point score downward for each defective spacer damper or markerball.
Table 26.3.21 below illustrates how a conductor lost points based on the condition of these
components.
D-E 26 At most one condition category reduced
C 16 Partial reduction
B 7 Small reduction
A 0 No effect
Table 26.3.21 Spacer Damper and Markerball to Conductor Points Reduction
The condition of ancillary components such as armour and splices also affected the overall
Health Index calculation by adjusting the point score downward for each defective
component. Table 26.3.22 below shows how a conductor lost points based on the condition
of these ancillary components.

A-B 0 No effect
Table 26.3.22 Armour and Splices Condition to Conductor Points Reduction
As shown in Tables 26.3.21 and 26.3.22, a conductor could lose a maximum of 39 points
from its total score. These include a loss of 26 points based on the condition of spacers and
marker balls, and another 13 points based on the condition of armour and splices.
In this study, ground wire condition was analyzed independently from conductors. Ground
wire conditions were rated simply as A E.
Table 26.3.23 was used to determine the overall condition of the conductor system asset
class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 26.3.23 Health Index Scale for Conductor Systems

As described in subsection 26.3.3 above, when the STARR system had no condition
assessment values, condition ratings were based on age to compensate for the lack of STARR
data. See Table 26.3.19 above for the age/condition rating conversion process used in this
study.
Table 26.4.1 summarizes the results of the Composite HI calculated for conductor systems.
Figures 26.4.1 through 26.4.6 also illustrate the results of the Composite HI.
Health Index
Results 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV DC Unknown Sum
Classification
Very good 1,902 1,714 1,273 0 1,976 0 0 6,865
Good 34,668 20,117 11,419 38 12,330 0 0 78,572
Fair 4,328 3,612 1,995 585 390 132 500 11,542
Poor 64 15 9 3 83 1 0 175
Very poor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 40,962 25,458 14,696 626 14,779 133 500 97,154
Table 26.4.1 Summary of Composite HI Results for Conductor Systems
40000
Number of 60kV Conductor
34668
35000
30000
25000
Spans
20000
15000
10000
4328
5000 1902
0 64
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.1 Summary Composite HI Results for 60 kV Conductor Systems

25000

20117
20000
15000
Spans
10000
5000 3612
1714
0 15
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.2 Summary of Composite HI Results For 138 kV Conductor Systems
12000 11419
10000
8000
Spans
6000
4000
1995
2000 1273
0 9
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.3 Summary of Composite HI Results for 230 kV Conductor Systems

700

585
600
500
Spans
400
300
200
100 38
0 3 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.4 Summary of Composite HI Results for 360 kV Conductor Systems
14000
12330
12000
10000
Spans
8000
6000
4000
1976
2000 390
0 83
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.5 Summary of Composite HI Results For 500 kV Conductor Systems

90000
Number of Conductor Spans

78572
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000 11542
6865
10000 0 175
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 26.4.6 Summary of Composite HI Results For all Conductor Spans
87.9% of transmission line conductor spans are in Good or Very Good condition. No
capital improvements are expected in the near term.
11.9% of transmission line conductor spans are in Fair condition. Increased
maintenance or capital improvements may be needed depending on criticality issues.
0.2% of transmission line conductor spans are in Poor condition. Planning should
begin to replace or rebuild considering risk and failure consequences.

27.0 Metal Support Structures
27.1 Description
Transmission metal structures support insulators and current carrying conductors on high
voltage and extra high voltage overhead transmission lines. Overhead lines on the BCTC-
managed transmission system operate at 500 kV, 360 kV, 230 kV, 138 kV and 60 kV.
Generally, circuit structures on overhead transmission lines fall into two categories, dead end
and suspension structures. Dead end circuit structures have dead end insulator assemblies
designed to support conductor tension. Suspension circuit structures have line post or
suspension insulator assemblies designed to support the weight of conductors and to
withstand forces from wind, ice or line angles.
For purposes of this analysis, the metal support structures asset class consists of the
following subcomponents:
Lattice towers and steel poles that include rigid and guyed structures, both of which
support insulators and conductors;
Structural foundations that support lattice and monopole structures and include
several different types and designs;
Anchor rods and guys that form part of the anchoring system for guyed structures;
Insulators that provide adequate insulation levels and clearance between energized
conductors and grounded structures;
Insulator hardware used as connecting devices for the insulators; and
Grounding and counterpoise that provide a low impedance path for fault current
flow.
The Transmission Engineering Standards Manual contains information about metal support
structures, including framing dimensions and materials used in the structures. BC Hydro
Engineering and regional field offices maintain design drawings and documents for the
system. Structure Data Sheets contain detailed information about structures on 500 kV and
some 230 kV and 138 kV lines. Design profile drawings provide the following structure
specific information:
Structure type and height;

Span length;
Ground elevation;
Conductor elevation;
Insulator and insulator assembly type;
Remarks about nearby rivers, roads, and pipelines.

27.2 Demographics
BCTC has 20,214 transmission line metal support structures. Of these structures, the 500 kV
system has about 72.8.5%, the 360 kV system has about 1.6%, the 230 kV system has about
15.6%, the 138 kV system has about 8.8%, and the 60 kV system has about 1.1%.
Table 27.2.1 shows the age demographics of metal support structures for the different
voltage levels. About 78.4% of the structures with known age profiles are between 20 and
39-years old.
Age 60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV Total

0 9 yrs - - - - 165 165
10 19 yrs 4 18 127 - 1,473 1,622
20 29 yrs 90 4 1,859 - 8,452 10,405
30 39 yrs 9 670 826 38 3,900 5,443
40 49 yrs 64 150 96 - - 310
50+ years - 895 144 219 - 1,258
Unknown 62 51 111 63 724 1,011
Grand Total 229 1,788 3,163 320 14,714 20,214
Table 27.2.1 Metal Support Structures Demographics
Table 27.2.2 shows the number of insulators on metal support structures for different voltage
levels. For the last 15 years, most new insulator installations on the BCTC-managed system
have been glass type.
Number of Insulators on
Voltage Level
Metal Support Structures
60 kV 9,934
138 kV 64,703
230 kV 148,821
360 kV 35,469
500 kV 1,019,544
Totals 1,278,471
Table 27.2.2 Insulators By Voltage Level

Table 27.2.3 shows geographic1 demographics of metal support structures.
Regional Area Number of Structures

CKT 1,730
FVT 2,756
MCT 1,942
OST 2,852
PCT 1,137
PGT 3,904
TET 1,329
TNT 2,523
TVI 2,041
Grand Total 20,214
Table 27.2.3 Geographic Breakdowns of Metal Support Structures

As described above, this asset class includes structures; foundations; anchors; guys and
fittings; insulators; insulator hardware; and grounding and counterpoise. The following
sections describe degradation processes for each of these components.
Degradation or Failure Modes of Towers and Structures

Lattice tower and steel pole designs always include a factor of safety much greater than 1.
The strength of structural members gradually decreases over the life of a metal tower.
Towers and structures reach end-of-life conditions when their actual strength falls below
their design strength, or when the safety factor falls below 1.
Degradation or reduction in the strength of towers and structures results from the following:
1

a) Corrosion
Corrosion of lattice steel members and hardware reduces their cross-sectional area causing a
reduction in strength. Similarly, corrosion of tubular steel poles reduces the effectiveness of
the tubular walls. Rates of corrosion may vary, depending upon environmental and climatic
conditions (e.g., the presence of salt spray in coastal areas or heavy industrial pollution).
Zinc galvanizing, protective paint coatings and a combination of galvanizing and painting
help safeguard against excessive corrosion. In addition, sometimes cathodic protection is
used to limit the corrosion rates. For galvanized structures, the degree of zinc coating loss
(i.e., galvanization) provides a good indication of corrosion levels. Visual inspection can
detect the degree of corrosion, the condition of protective coatings, and the extent of rust on
steel members.
b) Structural Fatigue
Structural fatigue results from repeated structural loading and unloading of support members.
Temperature variations, plus wind and ice loadings lead to changes in conductor tension.
Tension changes result in structural load variations on angle and dead end towers. Other
changes such as foundation displacements and breaks in wires, guys and anchors may result
in abnormal tower loading.
Conductor galloping and Aeolian vibrations also cause structural fatigue. Damage from
galloping does not occur frequently, and has a higher probability of occurrence in dead-end
structures than tangent structures due to the rigidity of dead-end support hardware. Aeolian
vibrations may cause fatigue failure in lattice steel tower cross-arms. In addition, long
flexible secondary lattice steel tower members are particularly susceptible to wind-induced
vibration from vortex resonance.
c) Hardware Failure
Aeolian vibrations and subconductor-induced oscillations may cause hardware failure (i.e.
loosening, breaking of nuts/bolts) and lead to disconnected lattice members. Major storms
may cause bolt elongation. Lines designed with higher tensions and exposed to extreme cold
temperatures at wind speeds of 3 km/hr to 24 km/hr may sustain considerable damage from
Aeolian vibrations.
d) Damage During Severe Storm Events

During events such as high wind, ice storms, rockslides, earth slides, and snow slides, the
loading on certain steel members may exceed their design capacity and result in damage.
Possible damage to towers includes deflected, bowed, bent or twisted lattice steel tower
members. Potential steel pole damage includes bending and denting of tubular sections and
slippage of pole sections from normal seated positions. Damaged tower members may
undergo compression, tension, flex or torsion. Broken, elongated and missing members also
can cause tower deflection. Other possible damage includes elongation and tear-out of bolt
holes, misalignment, bending or shearing of bolts, permanent bowing and twisting of tower
members, and member material failure.

e) Damage to Guys and Anchor Bolts
Usually the tilting, uplifting and deflecting of guyed metal support structures results from
broken or overstretched guys or partially pulled out anchor rods. For guyed towers, damage
to guys and anchor bolts may lead to reduced tower strength.
Two visual inspection methods exist to assess the condition of these guys and anchor bolts.
First, ground or helicopter inspection using binoculars can identify excessively bowed or
twisted components and hardware connection failures. Second, climbing inspections offer
closer views to further evaluate damage identified from the ground, and to detect additional
damage not readily observable through ground level inspections.
Climbing inspections can determine the degree of distortion resulting from compression
failure. They also can serve to identify some connection failures. Generally, they cannot
readily identify moderate bolt hole elongation since bolt heads and nuts hide these types of
defects. However, climbing inspections also facilitate removal of heads and nuts to better
observe possible bolt hole elongation.
In addition to visual inspections, dye penetration and analysis can help determine the
structural condition of tower members, bolts and bolt holes. One can perform this non-
destructive technique on energized overhead lines to help identify deterioration such as
cracks, fractures, breaks, creep, and fatigue.
Laboratory tests also exist to assess the extent of corrosion or deterioration in protective paint
and zinc coatings and to measure reductions in strength from component fatigue.
Degradation or Failure Modes of Tower Foundations

Two primary forms of tower foundation degradation exist:
Structural damage during severe wind storms may result in much less foundation strength
than originally designed;
Gradual deterioration of foundation components resulting from degradation mechanisms
such as steel corrosion and concrete spalling or cracking.
The following represent the most common types of transmission tower foundations:
a) Rock Foundations
Rock foundations are used where structurally sound rock exists at or near ground surface.
These foundations generally consist of two or more un-tensioned anchor bolts grouted in
holes drilled into rock. On uneven rock surfaces, concrete levelling pads provide flat
surfaces for steel footings. Splice or base plate connections are used to attach tower legs to
rock foundations.
Tower uplift loads as well as compression and downward thrust are transferred through the
concrete pad and anchor bolts to the rock beneath. Rock foundations have a low chance of
failure from compression loads. Generally, because of practical design considerations, rock

foundations can resist much greater compression loads than tower legs. When rock
foundation failures do occur, they usually result from uplift loads.
Typically, the grout used to bond anchor bolts and rock constitutes the weakest component of
rock foundations. Grout may deteriorate in weathered or crumbling rock or where the
foundation has undergone heavy blasting or seismic vibrations. Grout failure can result in
uplift and bending of anchor bolts.
Other types of rock foundation degradation include cracking or opening of natural fissures in
the rock. Also, cracking or spalling of the concrete pad may result in foundation damage.
Generally, confirmation of rock foundation damage requires full-scale uplift tests. However,
storm events that result in severe damage may produce some readily visible signs. These
include concrete cracking and spalling.
b) Pile Foundations
Pile foundations are tailored to site-specific soil conditions. Commonly, they are used in soft
soils with low load resistance capacity or in soils that cannot support shallow spread, augured
concrete foundations, or pad and pier footings. Wood pilings are very common in British
Columbia, but elsewhere piles usually consist of steel or concrete. Most piled foundations
also have a reinforced concrete pile cap to tie the tops of piles together and to transfer tower
loads to the piles.
Pile foundations transfer compression loads to soil through end bearings in stronger and
deeper soil strata and cohesion between the piles and soil. Such cohesion serves to resist
uplift loads.
Pile foundation-weakening results from foundation displacement during events such as

severe storms. Soil disturbances may indicate pile foundation displacement. Minor
displacements may support structural loads temporarily. However, when one suspects such
displacements, it is prudent to determine if the structure has stayed within its acceptable
limits by taking displacement differentials or foundation level measurements.
Visual inspections can detect soil disturbances. Settling of the foundation and surrounding
soil indicates potential foundation defects from excessive compression loads. Upward
foundation and soil displacement indicates potential foundation damage from uplift.
Concrete footing deterioration such as spalling, cracking or breaking also indicates
foundation degradation.
c) Grillage Foundations
Grillage foundations are used in soil conditions between the two extremes described above.
Such conditions range from weak rock to firm-to-compact soil sub-grades.
Steel grillage foundations consist of galvanized steel grids or frames that form mats or pads
at the base of an excavation. These pads attach to tower legs by one or more steel members.
The steel members transfer the loads from the tower to the mat. Grillage foundations resist

compression loads by bearing on soil under the mats. Gravity provides resistance to uplift
loads (i.e., foundation weight plus the soil weight sitting on and mobilized by the mat). The
overall size of the mat and the depth of the foundation depend on potential loads and soil
parameters. In good to average soil conditions the required uplift capacity dictates foundation
size.
When standard earth grillage footings cannot provide sufficient bearing capacity, plank mats
may be used. In British Columbia, however, pile foundations are used instead. Plank mats
spread load to keep bearing pressure on soil within acceptable limits. Generally, grillage
does not attach directly to plank mats. However, when it does, this attachment adds to the
structures ability to resist uplifts.
Events such as severe storms can cause soil disturbances as well as foundation displacement
and uplift, all potentially damaging to grillage footings. Other forms of foundation
degradation include steel corrosion and concrete deterioration. Acidic soils accelerate
corrosive degradation of grillage foundations. Since such damage occurs primarily below
ground, visual inspections may not readily detect loss of steel.
One method to assess the condition of grillage foundations involves the following five steps:
1. Identifying potential high-risk grillage foundation assets;

2. Mapping sites with potentially acidic environments;
3. Testing soil and ground water acidity levels;
4. Visually reviewing structure conditions, which BCTC does using half cell evaluation; and
5. Excavating highest risk grillages to confirm conditions.
d) Steel Pole Foundations

Typically, steel pole foundations are cylindrical steel reinforced concrete structures with
anchor bolts connecting the pole to its base. Common degradation processes include
corrosion of foundation rebar, concrete spalling and storm damage.
Degradation and Failure of Anchors, Guys and Fittings

Degradation or reduction in the strength of anchors, guys and fittings occurs from the
following:
Corrosion of steel members;

Deterioration of concrete;
Fatigue due to varying load conditions; and
Excessive loading during abnormal storm events.
Visual inspections generally can detect the extent of deterioration in anchors, guys and
fittings. Laboratory tests can further corroborate visual inspection results.

Degradation and Failure of Insulators
Generally, transmission systems rely on dead-end, suspension, jumper, strut / line post and
pin type insulators. The insulating portion may consist of porcelain, toughened glass or
polymer. Metallic parts are usually manufactured from zinc coated ductile and/or malleable
iron.
Transmission line insulators may degrade and fail due to loss of either dielectric or
mechanical strength. Suspension and line post insulators may experience mechanical loading
from tensile, torsional, cantilever, vibration and compression forces resulting associated with
conductor vibrations, galloping, snow or ice accumulation, and sudden ice shedding. In
worst-case conditions, line post, strut and pin type insulators may experience a combination
of cantilever, transverse and tensile forces simultaneously. Impact or contact induced
damages also may occur, depending on the factors such as design, spacing, proximity to
other phase strings, conductor galloping, as well as wind speed and direction.
Ice and snow accumulation may induce flashovers resulting in dielectric failure. In British
Columbia, rime ice (i.e., in-cloud icing) may cause flashovers. Flashover incidences depend
on several factors including surface contamination from pollution, string configuration,
insulator angles, shed or shell rib design, conductivity, number of bridged components, wind
speed and direction, and melting rates for snow and ice. Electrical flashovers can cause both
external and hidden internal damage to porcelain and composite insulators, but there can be
no hidden damage to toughened glass insulators, since these will shatter. Factors such as
installation, handling, accessories, service and environmental conditions also all play roles in
causing internal and external insulator damages.
a) Porcelain Insulators
For over a hundred years, manufacturers have used porcelain in insulators. The porcelain
consists of a fired or vitrified combination of clay, feldspar, quartz, and alumina for
transmission class insulators. To improve the mechanical characteristics of porcelain,
manufactures also apply a glazing that puts the porcelain into compression and improves the
mechanical tensile properties anywhere from 50%-100%.
Cap and pin insulator components include a dielectric shell made of porcelain cemented
between cap and pin metal end fittings. The basic suspension insulator components include
dielectric, termination and intermediaries. Since porcelain shells are strongest when in
compression, porcelain suspension insulators are designed to put the porcelain shell in
compression, even when tension exists between the cap and pin. To ensure that the porcelain
does not crack, manufacturers also design the steel pin and cap to have a lower mechanical
strength. The mechanical rating for these types of insulators can range from 15,000 lbs to
66,000 lbs (67 kN to 294 kN), with an option to connect two or more strings in parallel to
accommodate higher mechanically operated transmission line designs.
Galvanized steel hardware physically connects insulator strings to a tower. The conductor
consists of bolted clamps (e.g., dead-end, suspension, angle, tangent, strain) and fittings to
accommodate the insulator hardware (e.g., tongue and groove, ball and socket). Insulator
cotter keys prevent insulators in a string from uncoupling. In some older insulator designs

the cotter keys were made of an unusually soft alloy or were too short for the sockets in
which they were installed. In other designs, conductor motion could cause certain lightly
loaded inclined suspension strings to wobble and rotate around the string axis at its center,
crushing the cotter keys and causing the string to separate and the conductor to drop.
Transmission class line post / pin type porcelain insulators come in several designs that have
either a metallic HV fitting or a porcelain conductor groove to accommodate the HV
conductor. Galvanized steel HV fitting designs include standard and swivel clamps for
clamp-top designs, slack span dead-end clamps, armour grip supports, clamps and armour
grips with load limiters. Generally, tie tops are not very common in transmission line
insulators.
Visual inspection can detect the following external insulator damage readily:
Broken porcelain from the shell caused by flashovers, lightning or impact damage from
vandalism,
Visible metal fatigue, deformation, hairline cracks or material loss of the galvanized pin,
cap, end fittings, metal base/mounting assembly from tensile mechanical overloading
caused by line galloping or heavy line icing;
Flashover burn markings on the porcelain shell resulting from burns, arching damage, or
galvanizing;
Cotter key slippage or pullout that has been squashed from galloping, conductor uplifting,
or ice shedding, all of which can uncouple the string and drop the conductor; and
Insulator induced conductor impact or dent damage from severe insulator string galloping
due to high wind conditions.
Stresses from high wind or ice storm conditions also can cause internal damage from
mechanical tensile, dynamic, torsional overload conditions, and upward forces. Latent
damages, typically internal to the porcelain shell, metal fitting and hardware include:
Internal cracks under the metal cap or inside the porcelain head from ice-induced
lightning flashovers or line galloping that essentially cause electrical shorts that may
distort an insulator strings voltage profile;
Radial cracks, caused by cement growth through the porcelain shell;
Doughnut (i.e., circumferential) porcelain shell cracks under the metallic cap from causes
similar to those listed above, but found more in older insulator designs; and
Metal fatigue hairline cracks of the galvanized pin, cap, end fittings, metal base/mounting
assembly caused by tensile mechanical overloading from line galloping or heavy line
icing.
Close-up visual inspection from a bucket truck or helicopter is required to search for
physical evidence of the following types of damage:
Complete or partial shell breakage with exposure of the white porcelain body;
Circumferential cracking resulting in separation of the cap from the shell (i.e., donut
failure of suspension insulators);
Radial cracks;
High-energy flashover burn markings on the porcelain glazing and metal fittings; and

Cracks, fatigue and deformation damages of the metal fittings.
Additional techniques to detect insulator degradation and failure of individual insulators in a

string include:
Insulated Shorting Stick (Buzz tester)

Resonant Frequency by Manual Tapping
High Voltage Megger
Electrical Field and Voltage Distribution Measurements
UV Light Amplification Detection
Radio and TV Interference Detection
Dye Penetration & Analysis
High Voltage Testing
M&E Testing
Tensile Testing
Cantilever Testing
Cotter Key Inspection & Testing
Fluorescent Dye Penetration
b) Glass Insulators
Glass suspension insulators generally have no hidden defects because the glass shell shatters
during flashovers, providing a visible indication of damage. The toughening stresses for
glass remain constant at temperatures ranging from -50C to +80C (-50F to +165F) of its
original value, similar to the glazing used for porcelain. In North America, toughened glass
insulators are used mainly as suspension insulators, with minor usage in pedestal and post
insulator applications.
The mechanical strength of glass suspension insulators generally remains unaffected by

fatigue or glass shell shattering because of compliance with modern standards such as CSA
C411.1. Design and construction is similar to that of porcelain suspension insulators, but
with some dimensional and weight differences.
Damage to glass insulators includes the following, which are typically external and easily
detected through visual inspection:
Glass shell breakage from flashovers and contact with other insulators caused by tensile
mechanical overloading from line galloping or heavy line icing;
Visible metal fatigue, deformation, hairline cracks and material loss of the galvanized pin
(i.e., ball and shank region) and cap;
Flashover burn markings of the glass shell resulting from lightning.
or ice shedding, all of which can uncouple the string and drop the conductor.

c) Composite Insulators
BCTC uses composite insulators in the following applications:
Composite line post insulators that offer a great range of cantilever strengths and are
about half the weight of equivalent post insulators
Composite line V insulators used for tangent, light or medium angle applications; and
Composite suspension insulators used for jumper, tangent or light angle conductor
support applications and to withstand loaded conductor tensions in dead end assemblies.
Composite insulators consist of glass fibre reinforced rods covered in either EPDM or
silicone rubber weather sheds with appropriate end fittings. While composite insulators offer
a range of mechanical strengths and lower weight than other types of insulators, the EPDM
silicone rubber material also is soft and easily cut, ripped or punctured by sharp objects. The
integrity of the sheath and weather sheds is critical. Failure commonly occurs when moisture
enters into the glass fibre rod area.
Composite post insulator failures are not as common as composite suspension insulator
failures. When subjected to high mechanical loading, composite line posts can undergo large
deflections before ultimate failure. In response to differential conductor tensions, if the
insulator deflects along the direction of the line this helps to reduce high loading and to avoid
failures. Composite line post failures seldom cause line drops. Instead, the glass fibre rod
tends to bend causing insulator folding and fracturing.
Corona, a discharge cause by electrical overstress, is frequently luminous and may or may
not produce audible sound, depending upon the level of activity. Corona activity eventually
results in cutting and erosion damage to sheath and shed material. Thus, abnormal audible
noise from composite line insulators indicates increased corona activity and requires closer
investigation. Night vision equipment can detect corona activity at the live end.
Noticeable damage around the insulators live end includes cuts, splits, holes, erosion,
chalking, crazing, tracking, or burning of the rubber shed and sheath material, plus separation
or degradation of the rubber sheath material where it meets the metal end fittings. Any signs
of power arc, lightning damage, or corrosion on the metal end fittings also indicate
deterioration of the component.
Degradation and Failure of Insulator Hardware

Degradation or reduction in strength of insulator hardware may occur due to the following:
Corrosion of steel members

Loss in strength due to fatigue
Loosening of hardware due to conductor vibrations
Hardware failure during major storm events
Close-up visual inspections generally can determine the extent of degradation. Laboratory
testing can further corroborate results of visual investigations.

Degradation and Failure of Grounding and Counterpoise
Grounding transmission towers and structures dissipates fault currents during short circuits or
lightning events. Counterpoises further reduce ground resistance by connecting individual
tower ground grids in parallel.
Common causes of deterioration and failure for buried ground electrodes and counterpoise
include corrosion, mechanical damage, and burning off of conductor strands and connectors
during heavy fault currents. The BCTC-managed transmission system includes
counterpoises with steel conductors that are subject to corrosion and rust. Electrodes and
counterpoises buried at depths less than 1 meter may experience pronounced corrosion from
rusting. Integrity testing that measures the electrical resistance of counterpoise between two
towers can help assess the extent of corrosion or mechanical damage in such components.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed metal support structures first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.
Tables 27.3.1 through 27.3.16 list the end-of-life criteria considered for each component

Condition
Description
Rating
A Remaining zinc on steel surfaces >70%
B Remaining zinc on steel surfaces between 50% and 70% and/or minor rust
C Remaining zinc on steel surfaces between 5% and 50% and/or significant rust
D Remaining zinc on steel surfaces between 0% and 5% and/or significant rust,
but repair is possible
E No remaining zinc, major rust and outer steel surfaces have degraded beyond
repair.
Table 27.3.1 Loss of Galvanization
Condition
Description
Rating
A No signs of structural fatigue
B Signs of minor structural fatigue, requiring no corrective action
C Signs of significant structural fatigue, requiring corrective action during next
planned maintenance
D Signs of major structural fatigue requiring emergency repairs
E Structural fatigue beyond repair.
Table 27.3.2 Signs of Structural Fatigue
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no loss of galvanization, corrosion or loss of strength in hardware
and no hardware is missing or damaged
C There is significant deterioration of hardware due to corrosion and fatigue or
there are some missing hardware requiring planned corrective action
D There is major deterioration of hardware or a large amount of hardware is
damaged or missing requiring emergency repairs
E Hardware is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 27.3.3 Hardware Failure

Condition
Description
Rating
A No damage to steel members
B Minor damage to steel members, requiring no corrective action
C Significant damage to steel members, requiring corrective action during next
planned maintenance
D Major damage to steel members requiring emergency repairs
E Steel members damaged beyond repair or missing
Table 27.3.4 Damage to Steel Members
Condition
Description
Rating
A The guys and anchors are fully tensioned and in like new condition; no
evidence of rust
B Minor slack on guys and anchors, does not require corrective action; small
amount of rust is evident
C There is significant slack in guys, requiring planned corrective action;
significant rusting has occurred
D There is major slack in guys or major evidence or rust, requiring immediate
emergency repairs.
E Guys or anchors are damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 27.3.5 Condition of Guys and Anchors
Condition
Description
Rating
A Cathodic protection scheme fully functional with proper potential difference
between electrodes
C Cathodic protection scheme only partially functioning with less than required
potential difference between electrodes
E Cahtodic protection scheme not working
Table 27.3.6 Condition of Cathodic Protection

Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no displacement of footings from the original installed condition
C There is significant displacement of footings, requiring planned corrective
action
E There is major displacement of footings, requiring immediate emergency
repairs or replacement.
Table 27.3.7 Vertical or Horizontal Displacement of Footings
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no damage to structural members of foundation
C There is significant damage to structural members of foundation, requiring
planned corrective action
E There is major damage to structural members of foundation, requiring
immediate emergency repairs or replacement
Table 27.3.8 Damage to Foundations Structural Members
Condition
Description
Rating
A No deterioration of foundation concrete or steel
B Normal wear of foundation concrete and steel
C Significant deterioration of foundation concrete and steel requiring planned
corrective action
D Major deterioration of foundation concrete requiring emergency repairs
E Foundation concrete is damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 27.3.9 Deterioration of Foundation Concrete and Steel

Condition
Description
Rating
A The insulators shells are not chipped, or broken and they are in as new
condition
B Minor chipping of insulator shells, does not require corrective action
C The insulator shells have significantly large chips or breaks, requiring
D The insulator shells have major cracks or are broken, requiring immediate
emergency repairs.
E Insulator shells are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 27.3.10 Chipped, Broken Insulator Shell Assessment
Condition
Description
Rating
A There are no flashover burn marks on insulator shell and they are in as new
condition
C There are significant flashover burn marks on insulator shell, requiring
E There are major flashover burn marks on insulator shell, requiring immediate
emergency repairs or replacement
Table 27.3.11 Flashover Burn Marks on Insulator Shell
Condition
Description
Rating
A The insulator assembly is free from metal fatigue or corrosion and it is in as
new condition
C Significant metal fatigue or corrosion of the insulator assembly is evident,
requiring planned corrective action
E Evidence of major metal fatigue and/or corrosion is present, requiring
Table 27.3.12 Visible Metal Fatigue or Corrosion of Metal Assembly
Condition
Description
Rating
A The cotter key is securely in its place
E The cotter key has slipped out of its place and there is danger of the insulator
assembly coming apart
Table 27.3.13 Cotter Key Slippage

Condition
Description
Rating
A There are no failed insulators in the string
C 0 25% of the insulators in a string have failed
E >25% of the insulators in a string have failed
Table 27.3.14 Failed Insulators in a String
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no loss of galvanization, corrosion or loss of strength in insulator
hardware due to fatigue
C There is significant deterioration of insulator hardware due to corrosion and
fatigue requiring planned corrective action
E There is major deterioration of insulator hardware requiring emergency
repairs or replacement
Table 27.3.15 Loss of Strength in Insulator Hardware
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no deterioration of the grounding electrode and counter poise
C There is significant deterioration of the grounding electrode and counter poise
E There is major deterioration of the grounding electrode and counter poise
requiring emergency repairs or replacement
Table 27.3.16 Grounding Electrode and Counterpoise

A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;

D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, metal support
metal support structures would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for structure steel in
Table 27.3.17 below, assume a structure steel with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 48 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 72. That structure steel,
the other hand, if that structure steel with partial data had a maximum condition score of 52,
assets health, a Health Index was calculated as described below using available STARR
data.
The Health Index formulated for metal support structures consists of condition criteria for
structure steel; structure foundations; insulators and hardware; grounding; and anchors, guys
and fittings as shown in Tables 27.3.17 to 27.3.21 below.

Structure Steel Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Condition of paint and zinc
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
coatings and/or extent of rust
2 Signs of structural fatigue 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Hardware failure 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Damaged steel members 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
5 Damage to guys or anchor bolts 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition of Cathodic
6 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
Protection
Max Score= 72
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 27.3.17 Health Index Formulation for Structure Steel
Tower Foundation Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
1 Vertical displacement of footings 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
Horizontal displacement of
2 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
footings
Damage to load carrying
3 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
structural members
4 Damage to Secondary Members 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
5 Deterioration of concrete / steel 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Max Score= 54
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 27.3.18 Health Index Formulation for Tower Foundations
Anchors, Guys and Fittings Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall condition of guys,
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
anchors and fittings
Reduction in strength due to
2 corrosion and fatigue or major 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
storm events
Max Score= 28
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 27.3.19 Health Index Formulation for Anchors, Guys and Fittings
(All Equipment on a Structure)

Insulator Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Overall Condition of Insulators
1 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
and Insulator Hardware
2 Chipped or broken insulator shell 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Flashover Burn marks on
3 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
insulator shell
4 Visible metal fatigue, rusty cap 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
5 Cotter key slippage or pull out 4 A,E 4,0 16
Failed individual insulator in a
6 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
string
7 corrosion and fatigue or major 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
storm events
Max Score= 88
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 27.3.20 Health Index Formulation for Insulators and Insulator Hardware
(All Insulators on a Structure)
Grounding and Counterpoise Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall condition of grounding
1 3 A,C,E 4,2, 0 12
and counterpoise
Conductivity of grounding
2 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
electrode and counterpoise
Max Score= 28
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 27.3.21 Health Index Formulation for Grounding and Counterpoise
Because of the sizeable effect that individual components may have on a metal support
structures end-of-life, the Health Index calculation for this asset class involved a different
approach from that used for most asset classes described in previous chapters of this report.
The approach used for metal support structures involved developing a composite Health
Index (Composite HI) that combined the end-of-life criteria for specific individual metal
support structure components.
Figure 27.3.1 illustrates the Composite HI formulation and calculation process for metal
support structures. Tables 27.3.22 27.3.27 below also show specific steps in the process.

Tower Foundation
Insulators
Structure Steel
Anchors/Guys
Grounding and
Structure Health Index Counterpoise
- Average points from Structure Steel (5 - 100 pts)
- Degrade for Foundation CV (0-20 pts)
- Degrade for Insulator CV (0-26 pts)
- Degrade for Anchors and Guys CV (0-20 pts)
- Degrade for Grounding CV (0-6 pts)
Final Structure HI
Figure 27.3.1 Metal Support Structures Health Index Information Combination

Process
correspond exactly to the condition criteria presented in Tables 27.3.17 27.3.21 above.
Table 26.3.22 compares those condition criteria to condition information available in the
STARR system. The table also shows how the original condition criteria were adjusted to
use information available in STARR.

Related STARR Condition
Health Index Condition Criteria Comment
Criteria
Structure Steel
Condition of paint and zinc coatings Included in General Condition General Condition used
and/or extent of rust
Signs of structural fatigue General Condition of Steel Steel Structure score used
Structure directly as explained in Table
27.3.24
Hardware failure Condition of Hardware and Bolts Steel Structure score used
directly as explained in Table
27.3.24
Damaged steel members Included in General Condition General Condition used
Damage to guys or anchor bolts Included in General Condition General Condition used
Condition of Cathodic Protection Included in General Condition General Condition used
Tower Foundations
Vertical displacement of footings General Condition of Footing Footing score used as explained
in Table 27.3.25
Horizontal displacement of footings Included in General Condition General Condition used
Damage to load carrying structural Included in General Condition General Condition used
members
Damage to secondary members Included in General Condition General Condition used
Deterioration of concrete / steel Included in General Condition General Condition used
Insulators and Insulator Hardware
Overall Condition of Insulators and General Condition of Hardware, Insulator score used as explained
Insulator Hardware Jumpers and Insulators in Table 27.3.26
Chipped, broken insulator shell Included in General Condition General Condition used
Flashover Burn marks on insulator Included in General Condition General Condition used
shell
Visible metal fatigue, rusty cap Included in General Condition General Condition used
Cotter key slippage or pull out Included in General Condition General Condition used
Failed individual insulator in a string Included in General Condition General Condition used
Reduction in strength due to corrosion Included in General Condition General Condition used
and fatigue or major storm events
Anchors, Guys and Fittings
Overall condition of guys, anchors and General Condition of Grip, Guy Anchors, Guys and Fittings
fittings wire, Guy guard, Guy insulator score used as explained in Table
and Guy rod 27.3.25
Reduction in strength due to corrosion Included in General Condition General Condition used
Grounding and Counterpoise
Overall condition of grounding and General condition of counterpoise Grounding score as explained in
counterpoise Table 27.3.27
Conductivity of grounding electrode Included in General Condition General Condition used
and counterpoise
Table 27.3.22 Condition Criteria to STARR Information Adjustments
When the STARR system had no condition assessment values for a given asset, age was used
as a surrogate for condition in assigning the condition ratings needed for health indexing.

Table 27.3.23 below shows the condition ratings assigned to various age ranges for purposes
of this study.
Age Condition Rating Structure, Foundation & Ancillaries

<20 yrs A
20-50 yrs B
50-75 yrs C
> 75 yrs D
Unknown Age* C
*A C rating was chosen for unknowns because a lack of data is typically associated with older facilities.
Table 27.3.23 CAV Conversion Table
Table 27.3.24 shows how the Structure Steel earned points based on its CV.
Condition Points Description

E 29 Structure at EOL
Table 27.3.24 Structure Steel Condition to Structure Points Conversion
The condition of foundations and anchors/guys affected the overall Composite HI of a metal
support structure by adjusting the point score downward for each defective foundation or
anchor/guy component. Table 27.3.25 below illustrates how metal support structures lost
points based on the condition of these components.

D-E 20 Significant Reduction
C 10 Partial Reduction
A-B 0 No effect
Table 27.3.25 Foundation and Anchors/Guys Condition to Structure Points Reduction
The condition of insulators and hardware also affected the overall Composite HI of metal
support structures by adjusting the point score downward for each defective component.

Table 27.3.26 below illustrates how metal support structures lost points based on the
condition of insulators and hardware.

D-E 26 Insulator close to or at EOL
B 7 Some deterioration
A 0 No effect
Table 27.3.26 Insulator and Hardware Condition to Structure Points Reduction
The condition of grounding also affected the overall Composite HI calculation by adjusting
the point score downward for each defective component. Table 27.3.27 below shows how
metal support structures lost points based on the condition of these components.

A-B 0 No effect
Table 27.3.27 Grounding Condition to Structure Points Reduction
As shown in Tables 27.3.25 to 27.2.27 above, an asset could lose a maximum of 72 points
from its total score. These include a loss of 40 points based on foundation and guy/anchors
condition, 26 points based on the condition of insulators, and another 6 points based on the
condition of grounding.
Table 27.3.28 was used to determine the overall condition of the metal tower asset class as
well as for the individual components (structure steel, foundations, insulators, anchors/guys
or grounding).

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 27.3.28 Health Index Scale for Metal Support Structures

A condition based Health Index was derived for transmission line metal support structures, as
a composite score from the assessments performed on the lattice steel/steel poles, footings
and ancillary components such as insulators, guys and groundings.
assessment values, condition ratings were based on age to compensate for the lack of STARR
data. See Table 27.3.23 above for the age/condition rating conversion process used in this
study.
Table 27.4.1 summarizes the composite Health Index results, which are also illustrated in
Figures 27.4.1 through 27.4.6.

60 kV 138 kV 230 kV 360 kV 500 kV Sum
Classification
Very Good 24 15 119 0 1,805 1,963
Good 161 816 2,251 37 10,625 13,890
Fair 9 32 249 13 1,644 1,947
Poor 34 921 492 241 595 2,283
Very Poor 1 4 52 29 45 131
Total 229 1,788 3,163 320 14,714 20,214
Table 27.4.1 Summary of Condition Rating Results for Metal Support Structures
180 161
160
140
Number of 60kV
Metal Structures
120
100
80
60
34
40 24
20 9
1
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 27.4.1 Summary of Composite HI Results for 60 kV Metal Support Structures

1000 921
900 816
800
Number of 138kV
Metal Structures
700
600
500
400
300
200
100 4 32 15
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
2500 2251
2000
Number of 230kV
Metal Structures
1500
1000
492
500 249
52 119
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100

300
241
250
Number of 360kV
Metal Structures 200
150
100
50 29 37
13
0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
12000
10625
10000
Number of 500kV
Metal Structures
8000
6000
4000
1644 1805
2000
595
45
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100

16000
13890
14000
Metal Structures
12000
Number of 10000
8000
6000
4000 2283 1947 1963
2000 131
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 27.4.6 Summary of Composite HI Results for All Metal Support Structures
78.4% of transmission line metal support structures are in Good or Very Good
condition. No additional capital improvements are expected in the near term.
9.6% of transmission line metal support structures are in Fair condition. Increased
maintenance or capital improvements may be needed depending on criticality issues.
11.3% of transmission line metal support structures are in Poor condition. Planning
for refurbishment or replacement may be needed considering risks and failure
consequences.
0.6% of transmission line metal support structures are in Very Poor condition or at
their end-of-life. Since these structures could fail in the near future, they require an
immediate assessment of risk and development of replacement or refurbishment
strategies to prevent failure during adverse weather conditions.

28.0 Wood Pole Structures
28.1 Description
Safety, reliability and security govern the mechanical and structural designs of overhead
transmission lines. These lines require a variety of support structures, including wood pole
and metal support structures. Chapter 27 of this report contains the analysis of metal towers,
and this chapter discusses the wood pole structure asset class. For purposes of this study, the
wood pole structure asset class consists of the following components:
Wood pole structures, including both rigid (i.e., self-supporting) and guyed structures;
Timbers (Crossbars), including cross-braces and timber on wood pole structures;
Anchor rods and guys that help hold guyed structures in place;
Insulators that shield and provide clearance between energized conductors and
grounded structures; and
Insulator hardware that serves as connecting devices for the insulators.
Wood pole structures safely suspend overhead conductors and associated overhead ground
wire. In the transmission system managed by BCTC, wood pole structures support insulators
and current carrying conductors on 230 kV, 138 kV and 69 kV overhead transmission lines.
Most wood pole structures in the BCTC-managed transmission system are made from
Western Red Cedar.
The Transmission Engineering Standards Design Manual used by BCTC contains structural
information about wood pole structures, including framing dimensions and materials used in
the structures. BC Hydro Engineering and regional field offices maintain design drawings
and other descriptive documents about wood pole structures in the system. Structural Data
Sheets have detailed information on some of the 230 kV and 138 kV lines. Design profile
drawings also provide the following specific information:
Structure type and height;

Span length;
Ground elevation;
Conductor elevation;
Insulator and insulator assembly type;
Remarks about nearby rivers, roads, and pipelines.
28.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 62,785 transmission wood pole structures,
which include 98,093 individual wood poles. Of the structures, the 60 kV system has about
53.5%, the 138 kV system has about 31.2% and the 230 kV system has about 15.3%. The
360 kV and 500 kV systems have only emergency wood pole structures. Table 28.2.1 shows
the number of wood pole structures grouped by each relevant voltage level.

Voltage Level Number of Structures
60 kV 33,586
138 kV 19,563
230 kV 9,636
Total 62,785
Table 28.2.1 Wood Pole Structures Grouped by Voltage Level
Table 28.2.2 shows the number of insulators on wood pole structures, again grouped by
relevant voltage levels.
Voltage Level Number of Structures

60 kV 120,492
138 kV 488,553
230 kV 377,233
Total 986,278
Table 28.2.2 Insulators on Wood Pole Structures, Grouped by Voltage Level
Table 28.2.3 shows geographic1 demographics of wood pole structures and circuits,
including kilometre lengths as well as numbers of guys and poles.
1

Regional Number of Number of Number Number of
Circuit km
Area Structures Circuits Guys Poles
CKT 643 7,528 50 1,533 12,449
FVT 1,010 10,191 90 3,852 13,845
MCT 1,395 8,365 99 3,345 11,586
OST 395 2,974 16 924 6,049
PCT 1,555 4,815 15 309 5,910
PGT 1,527 11,431 46 2,341 17,443
TET 474 3,061 24 933 4,768
TNT 1,230 9,715 34 4,062 17,497
TVI 957 4,705 61 1,983 8,546
Grand Total 9,186 62,785 435 19,282 98,093
Table 28.2.3 Geographical Breakdowns of Transmission Wood Pole

Structures and Circuits
An attempt was made to create a profile of wood poles against age. However, the data
contained in STARR does not provide sufficient information regarding the age of individual
wood poles to create a valid demographic tabulation.

As described above, this asset class includes, wood poles, timbers, anchor rods and guys,
insulators, and insulator hardware. The following subsections describe degradation processes
for each of these components.
Degradation and Failure Modes of Wood Poles

Because wood is a natural material, it has somewhat different degradation processes from
those affecting other physical assets on transmission and distribution systems. For wood
poles, the most critical degradation processes involve biological and environmental
mechanisms such as fungal decay, wildlife damage and effects of weather.
Fungi attack both external surfaces and the internal heartwood of wood poles. The process of
fungal decay requires the presence of fungus spores plus water and oxygen. For this reason,
the area of the pole most susceptible to fungal decay occurs at and around the ground line.
To prevent the decay of wood poles, utilities treat them with preservatives before installation.
The preservatives have two functions: (1) to keep out moisture that supports fungi, and (2) to
kill off the fungal spores. Today, several effective and acceptable wood pole preservatives
exist. Typically, poles treated before installation have a long life (i.e., in excess of 50 years)

before significant damage occurs. To protect its wood poles against fungi, insects and decay,
BC Hydro has treated them with the following chemicals:
Penta 10# or Penta 12#

Copper Sulfate (CCA)
Copper Naphthenate Ultra
ACZA treatment (used on one of the BCTC-managed transmission lines)
Currently, to maximize protection, BCTC commonly treats entire poles (i.e., full treatment).
However, older poles often only received partial treatment at their base (i.e., butt treatment)
in the area most susceptible to fungal decay around and below the ground line. BCTC has
also started using fire retardant treatment for high fire risk areas.
In addition to fungal decay, various wildlife activities also cause external damage to wood
poles. The types of wildlife that may damage wood poles vary from insects such as termites,
to small mammals and birds such as woodpeckers. Other common causes of damage to
wood poles include:
Rock and earth slides;

Snow slides and creep;
Ice or heavy snow drop off;
Random impact;
Foundation movement;
Vandalism;
Lightning;
Motor vehicle accidents (most common);
Forest fires (wild fires); and
Lack of bonding, which causes fires.
Assessing the condition and remaining life of wood pole structures poses problems for
utilities worldwide. Because poles serve as structural items, strength represents the primary
concern in condition assessment. Being a natural material, potentially large variations exist
in the original mechanical properties and strength of wood poles. Knots, checks and heart rot
all can affect a poles strength. Typically, variability in fiber strength results in a broad bell
curve for load distribution, even for brand new poles. Over time, degradation processes
further widen that bell curve.
A classification system exists to estimate the original strength of wood poles. That system is
species-specific and based on the minimum circumference of a pole needed to withstand
certain loads. Wood poles receive grades and a class designation based on potential strength
(i.e., Class 1, 2, 3). The smaller the class number the greater the strength of the pole.
Generally, transmission line loading requirements dictate use of Class 2 or lower (i.e.,
stronger) poles.

The following represent some of the more critical factors affecting wood pole strength as
poles age:
Original type and class of wood pole;

Original defects in wood (e.g. knots, cracks or rot);
Rate of decay in service life which depends on type of treatment and environmental
conditions;
Pole damage by woodpeckers, insects, and other wildlife; and
Induction burns.
Several types of damage also can deform boltholes in poles. Generally, such deformities do
not present immediate problems. However, in some cases deformed holes can result in both
failure of the structure and failure of other components attached to the pole. Bolts also can
become loose, elongated, bent, cracked, sheared/broken and lost.
Wood pole assessment techniques normally start with a simple visual inspection of poles.
Because areas near the ground line have greater susceptibility to degradation, visual
inspection and assessment methods generally concentrate on the 300 mm (12 inches) above
and below ground level. Basic physical tests often accompany visual inspections. Physical
tests include prodding tests to determine external conditions and hammer tests to detect
evidence of internal decay. Linemen typically use this approach as a safety procedure before
climbing. While clearly subjective, when used by experienced staff these simple tests have
proven effective at detecting suspect poles. In many cases, utilities use such processes to
estimate the remaining life of poles and to determine the need for replacement.
Visual inspection can detect the following types of wood pole damage readily:
Fiber damage that may occur when wind hits a wood pole with force beyond the poles
bearing capacity;
Partial damage that may result when objects hit wood poles and reduce effective pole
circumference. If the damage affects only part of a poles cross-section the utility may
keep the pole in service with a reduced factor of safety.
Wood splits from various causes that may accelerate the end of a poles life, depending
upon the extent of the split damage;
Mis-orientation from excessive transverse forces that may result in pole tilting as well as
stretching (i.e., loosening) and breaking of guys and guying systems;
Burning from conductor faults and insulator flashovers that may damage wood poles,
wooden support cross-braces and timber, reducing the ability of these structures to
withstand mechanical stress changes or causing their complete loss through fire; and
Wood cracks or checks across the top of timber and cross-braces (H-frame) that may hold
moisture and cause decay or weaken the structures through freeze/thaw forces during
winter.
Visual inspection also can detect problems with pole foundations. Wood pole installation
involves burying poles directly in soil or swampy areas, or mounting them on rocky ground.

In many instances, holes are blown out with explosives in British Columbia. The installation
depth depends on the foundation and footing types, total pole length and class of pole.
The types of damage and deterioration that affect foundations over time include pole tilting
and uplifting as well as foundation defects and disturbances. Foundation damage usually is
visually obvious because of soil movement around the pole. For direct buried poles, one can
normally observe a notch around the pole near the ground. If the notch on the pole is well
above the existing ground then the pole needs re-insertion back to its original depth.
Although incidents involving pole uplift are rather rare in British Columbia, once uplift has
occurred, adequacy of pole depth needs consideration and investigation. If significant
foundation disturbance has occurred, the soil may require re-excavation and repacking.
When rock-mounting poles, the existing rock may be broken and then wedged around the
pole, with soil added as additional fill. In other instances, the rock may be augered and the
pole placed in a tightly fitted hole, then backfilled with augered material or soil. Little
possibility of foundation damages exists for poles augered into solid rock. However, the
inherent rigidity of such foundations can result in damage at the pole base instead.
While not common, some wood poles are installed in swampy ground such as muskeg or
muck. When swamp depth exceeds about 3 meters, wood pole installation generally includes
use of swamp mats and four way guying.
Riprap protection also may be added for poles potentially exposed to washouts, grass fires,
undesirable guying, uplift conditions and low bearing soil capacity. Visual inspection can
detect damage to riprap. Riprap must be maintained in its original condition and requires
maintenance after any damage.
Over the past 20 years, utilities have sought objective and accurate means to assess pole
condition and remaining life. As a result, a wide range of wood pole assessment and
diagnostic tools and techniques has developed. These include techniques designed to apply
traditional probing and hammer tests in more controlled, repeatable and objective ways. For
example, to determine the severity of external rot, devices now exist to measure the
resistance of a pin fired into the pole. Also, instrumented hammers can now record and
analyze hammer blow vibrations to identify patterns that indicate the presence of decay.
Decay resistance drills and augers that sample through poles also are used widely as direct
condition assessment tools.
Indirect and non-destructive techniques such as ultrasonics, X-rays, and electrical resistance
have received widespread testing. Of these, ultrasonics has attracted much interest, leading
to the development of commercial instruments used by many utilities. Ultrasonic techniques
use the attenuation of ultrasonic signals to indicate decay and the reflection of signals to
detect voids. Ultrasonic instruments can quantify damage and verify the depth and severity
of horizontal and longitudinal pole cracks. Other condition assessment tools currently under
development include the use of radar and laser technologies.

Many questions still exist about the dependability and interpretation of data from these
relatively new assessment devices. Manufacturers and suppliers make claims about the high
quality of their products and data. It is, however, difficult to test the claims of different
suppliers effectively. Several comparative studies have been done using various
commercially available products. Unfortunately, because of the large variability in species
and original pole strength, these studies have produced inconclusive results. No matter
which product or procedure is used, the most critical factor in achieving useful information is
development and use of a consistent and reliable approach.
Degradation and Failure of Timbers and Cross Braces

Wooden timbers and cross-braces have the same types of decay and deterioration as those
associated with wood poles themselves. Deterioration rates for these components are a
function of:
Type and class of wood;

Original defects in wood (e.g. knots, cracks or rot);
Rate of decay in service life which depends on type of treatment and environmental
conditions;
Damage by woodpeckers, insects, etc.; and
Induction burns.
As with wood poles, the following represent additional causes of damage to timber and
cross-braces:
Rockslide or earth slide;

Snow slide;
Ice or heavy snow drop-off;
Random impact; and
Vandalism.
Similar to wood poles, visual inspection can detect the following types of cross-arm and
cross-brace damage readily:
Fiber damage that may occur when wind hits with force beyond the wood components
bearing capacity; and
Partial damage that may result when a sharp object hits any part of these wood
components.
Degradation and Failure of Insulators

The types of insulators and string configurations typically used in transmission systems
include dead-end, suspension, jumper, strut / line post and pin. The insulating portion may
consist of porcelain, toughened glass, or polymer. The metallic parts usually are made from
zinc coated ductile or malleable iron.

Both electrical and mechanical stresses may affect transmission line insulators. Degradation
and eventual failure generally result from the loss of either dielectric or mechanical strength.
Mechanical loading on suspension and line post insulators consists of a combination of
tensile, torsional, cantilever, vibration and compression forces resulting from factors such as
conductor vibration and galloping, accumulation of high density snow or ice, and sudden ice
shedding. Line post, strut and pin type insulators are unique since they may experience a
combination of cantilever, transverse and tensile forces simultaneously. Impact or contact
induced damage also may occur depending on the suspension insulator string design, spacing
or proximity of other phase strings, conductor galloping, as well as wind speed and direction
(e.g., parallel or transverse).
Although freezing rain is not a common problem in British Columbia, ice and snow
accumulation may induce flashovers resulting in dielectric failure. Insulator flashover
incidences depend on a number of factors, including surface contamination of the insulator
before icing, string configuration, angle of the insulators, wind speed and direction, shed or
shell rib design, conductivity of the ice or snow, number of suspension insulators or sheds
bridged, and melting rates of snow or ice. Electrical flashovers can cause both external and
internal damage to porcelain and composite insulators, but there can be no hidden damage to
toughened glass since it will shatter. Installation, handling, accessories (e.g., corona and
arcing ring), and service conditions (e.g., over-voltages, lightning, pollution, climate), all
play roles in the degradation of insulators.
a) Porcelain Insulators
For over a hundred years, manufacturers have used porcelain in insulators. The porcelain
consists of a fired or vitrified combination of clay, feldspar, quartz, and alumina for
transmission class insulators. To improve the mechanical characteristics of porcelain,
manufactures also apply a glazing that puts the porcelain into compression and improves the
mechanical tensile properties anywhere from 50%-100%.
Cap and pin insulator components include a dielectric shell made of porcelain cemented
between cap and pin metal end fittings. The basic suspension insulator components include
dielectric, termination and intermediaries. Since porcelain shells are strongest when in
compression, porcelain suspension insulators are designed to put the porcelain shell in
compression, even when tension exists between the cap and pin. To ensure that the porcelain
does not crack, manufacturers also design the steel pin and cap to have a lower mechanical
strength. The mechanical rating for these types of insulators can range from 15,000 lbs to
66,000 lbs (67 kN to 294 kN), with an option to connect two or more strings in parallel to
accommodate higher mechanically operated transmission line designs.
Galvanized steel hardware physically connects insulator strings to a tower. The conductor
consists of bolted clamps (e.g., dead-end, suspension, angle, tangent, strain) and fittings to
accommodate the insulator hardware (e.g., tongue and groove, ball and socket). Insulator
cotter keys prevent insulators in a string from uncoupling. In some older insulator designs
the cotter keys were made of an unusually soft alloy or were too short for the sockets in
which they were installed. In other designs, conductor motion could cause certain lightly

loaded inclined suspension strings to wobble and rotate around the string axis at its center,
crushing the cotter keys and causing the string to separate and the conductor to drop.
Transmission class line post / pin type porcelain insulators come in several designs that have
either a metallic HV fitting or a porcelain conductor groove to accommodate the HV
conductor. Galvanized steel HV fitting designs include standard and swivel clamps for
clamp-top designs, slack span dead-end clamps, armour grip supports, clamps and armour
grips with load limiters. Tie tops for transmission line pin insulators are not very common.
Visual inspection can detect the following external insulator damage readily:
Broken porcelain from the shell caused by a flashover (lightning) or impact damage
(vandalism);
Visible metal fatigue, deformation, hairline cracks or material loss of the galvanized pin,
cap, end fittings, metal base/mounting assembly from tensile mechanical overloading
caused by line galloping or heavy line icing;
Flashover burn markings on the porcelain shell resulting from burns/arching
damage/galvanizing;
or ice shedding, all of which can uncouple the string and drop the conductor; and
Insulator induced conductor impact or dent damage from severe insulator string galloping
due to high wind conditions.
Stresses from high wind or ice storm conditions also can cause internal damage from
mechanical tensile, dynamic, torsional overload conditions, and upward forces. Latent
damages, typically internal to the porcelain shell, metal fitting and hardware include:
Internal cracks under the metal cap or inside the porcelain head from lightning flashovers
or line galloping, which in essence cause electrical shorts in the insulator that can distort
the insulator strings voltage profile;
Radial cracks (come from cement growth) through the porcelain shell from causes similar
to those listed above for internal porcelain shell cracks;
Doughnut (i.e., circumferential) porcelain shell cracks under the metallic cap from causes
similar to those listed above, but found more in older insulator designs; and
Metal fatigue hairline cracks of the galvanized pin, cap, end fittings, metal base/mounting
assembly caused by ensile mechanical overloading from line galloping or heavy line
icing.
Close-up visual inspection from a bucket truck or helicopter is required to search for physical
evidence of the following types of damage:
Complete or partial shell breakage with exposure of the white porcelain body;
Circumferential cracking resulting in separation of the cap from the shell (i.e., donut
failure of suspension insulators);
Radial cracks;
High-energy flashover burn markings on the porcelain glazing and metal fittings; and

Cracks, fatigue and deformation damages of the metal fittings.
Additional techniques to detect insulator degradation and failure of individual insulators in a

string include:
Insulated Shorting Stick (Buzz tester)

Resonant Frequency by Manual Tapping
High Voltage Megger
Electrical Field and Voltage Distribution Measurements
UV Light Amplification Detection
Radio and TV Interference Detection
Dye Penetration & Analysis
High Voltage Testing
M&E Testing
Tensile Testing
Cantilever Testing
Cotter Key Inspection & Testing
Fluorescent Dye Penetration
b) Glass Insulators
Glass suspension insulators generally have no hidden defects because the glass shell shatters
during failures providing a visible indication of damage. The toughening stresses for glass
remain constant at temperatures ranging from -50C to +80C (-50F to +165F) of its
original value, similar to the glazing used for porcelain. In North America, toughened glass
insulators are used mainly as suspension insulators, with minor usage in pedestal and post
insulator applications.
The mechanical strength of glass suspension insulators generally remains unaffected by

fatigue or glass shell shattering because of compliance with modern standards such as CSA
C411.1. Design and construction is similar to that of porcelain suspension insulators, but
with some dimensional and weight differences.
Damage to glass insulators includes the following, which are typically external and easily
detected through visual inspection:
Glass shell breakage from flashovers and contact with other insulators caused by tensile
mechanical overloading from line galloping or heavy line icing;
Visible metal fatigue, deformation, hairline cracks and material loss of the galvanized pin
(i.e., ball and shank region) and cap;
Flashover burn markings of the glass shell resulting from lightning;
or ice shedding, all of which can uncouple the string and drop the conductor.

c) Composite Insulators
The BCTC-managed transmission system uses composite insulators in the following
applications:
Composite line post insulators that offer a great range of cantilever strengths and are
about half the weight of equivalent post insulators;
Composite line V insulators used for tangent, light or medium angle applications; and
Composite suspension insulators used for jumper, tangent or light angle conductor
support applications and to withstand loaded conductor tensions in dead end assemblies.
Composite insulators consist of a glass fibre reinforced rod covered in either EPDM or
silicone rubber weather sheds with appropriate end fittings. While the composite insulators
offer a great range of mechanical strengths and much lower weight than other types of
insulators, the EPDM silicone rubber material also is soft and easily cut, ripped or punctured
by sharp objects. The integrity of the sheath and weather sheds is critical. Failure commonly
occurs when moisture enters into the glass fibre rod area.
Composite post insulator failures are not as common as composite suspension insulator
failures. When subjected to high mechanical loading, composite line posts can undergo large
deflections before ultimate failure. In response to differential conductor tensions, if the
insulator deflects along the direction of the line this helps to reduce high loading and to avoid
failures. Composite line post failures seldom cause line drops. Instead, the glass fibre rod
tends to bend causing insulator folding and fracturing.
Corona, a discharge cause by electrical overstress, is frequently luminous and may or may
not produce audible sound, depending upon the level of activity. Corona activity eventually
results in cutting and erosion damage to sheath and shed material. Thus, abnormal audible
noise from composite line insulators indicates increased corona activity and requires closer
investigation. Night vision equipment can detect corona activity at the live end.
Noticeable damage around the insulators live end includes cuts, splits, holes, erosion,
chalking, crazing, tracking, or burning of the rubber shed and sheath material, plus separation
or degradation of the rubber sheath material where it meets the metal end fittings. Any signs
of power arc, lightning damage, or corrosion on the metal end fittings also indicate
deterioration of the component.
Degradation and Failure of Insulator Hardware
Degradation or reduction in strength of insulator hardware may occur due to the following:
Loss of galvanization and corrosion of steel members;

Loss in strength due to fatigue;
Loosening of hardware due to conductor vibrations; or
Hardware failure during major storm events.

Degradation and Failure of Anchors, Guys and Fittings
Degradation or reduction in the strength of anchors, guys and fittings occur due to the
following:
Loss of galvanization and corrosion of steel members;

Deterioration of concrete;
Fatigue due to varying load conditions; or
Excessive loading during abnormal storm events.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed wood pole structures first required
failure.

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no fiber damage, pole delamination or deformation of pole and the
pole is in as new condition
B There are normal signs of wear with respect to the above characteristics.
Table 28.3.1 Degree of Fiber Damage, Delamination, Deformed Holes
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no damage to the pole and the pole is in as new condition
B Normal signs of wear with respect to these characteristics.
C One or two of these characteristics are unacceptable.
D More than two of these characteristics are unacceptable.
E More than two of these characteristics are unacceptable and cannot be
Table 28.3.2 Degree of Mechanical Damage, Severity of Cuts, Cracks, Checks or

Splits, Holes, Felling Breaks
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no evidence of burn marks and the pole is in as new condition
B A minor burn mark is present but it does not impact pole strength
C There is significant damage to the pole from burn mark requiring remedial
repairs
D There is extensive damage to the pole requiring immediate repairs.
E Burn damage is beyond repair.
Table 28.3.3 Severity of Burn Marks

Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no disorientation, the pole is perfectly straight
B There is minor pole disorientation, but is acceptable and does not require
corrective action
C There is significant disorientation, requiring planned corrective action
D Major disorientation of the pole is present requiring immediate emergency
repairs.
E Pole is disoriented beyond repair.
Table 28.3.4 Disorientation of the Pole
Condition
Description
Rating
A The guys and anchors are fully tensioned and in like new condition; no
evidence of corrosion
B Minor slack on guys and anchors, does not require corrective action; minor
corrosion present
C Significant slack in guys or significant corrosion, requiring planned corrective
action
D Major slack in guys or severe corrosion, requiring immediate emergency
repairs.
E Guys or anchors are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 28.3.5 Condition of Guys and Anchors
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no wood rot and the pole is in like new condition
B Minor wood rot, does not require corrective action
C There is significant wood rot, requiring planned corrective action
D There is major wood rot, requiring immediate emergency repairs.
E Wood rot is beyond repair.
Table 28.3.6 Interior Wood Rot

Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no displacement of footings from the original installed condition
C There is significant displacement of footings, requiring planned corrective
action
E There is major displacement of footings, requiring immediate emergency
repairs.
Table 28.3.7 Vertical or Horizontal Displacement of Footings
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no fiber damage, delamination or deformation of crossarms and
timber and they are in as new condition
B Minor fiber damage, delamination or deformation of crossarms and timber,
does not require corrective action
C There is significant fiber damage, delamination or deformation of crossarms
and timber, requiring planned corrective action
D There is major fiber damage, delamination or deformation of crossarms and
timber, requiring immediate emergency repairs.
E Cross braces or timbers have fiber that is damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 28.3.8 Crossbraces and Timber - Fiber Damage, Delamination, Deformed Holes
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits of crossarms and timber and
they are in as new condition
B Minor rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits in crossarms and timber, does not
require corrective action
C There is significant rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits in crossarms and timber,
D There is major rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits rot, cuts, cracks, checks or
splits in crossarms and timber, requiring immediate emergency repairs.
E Crossbraces or timbers have rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits that have
damaged/degraded these members beyond repair.
Table 28.3.9 Crossbraces And Timber - Rot, Cuts, Cracks, Checks or Splits

Condition
Description
Rating
A The insulators shells are not chipped, or broken and they are in as new
condition
B Minor chipping of insulator shells, does not require corrective action
C The insulator shells have significantly large chips or breaks, requiring
D The insulator shells have major cracks or breaks that require immediate
emergency repairs.
E Insulator shells are damaged/degraded beyond repair
Table 28.3.10 Chipped, Broken Insulator Shell Assessment
Condition
Description
Rating
A There are no flashover burn marks on insulator shell and they are in as new
condition
C There are significant flashover burn marks on insulator shell, requiring
E There are major flashover burn marks on insulator shell, requiring immediate
emergency repairs or replacement
Table 28.3.11 Flashover Burn Marks on Insulator Shell
Condition
Description
Rating
A There insulator assembly is free from metal fatigue or corrosion and it is in
as new condition
C Significant metal fatigue or corrosion of the insulator assembly is evident,
E Evidence of major metal fatigue and/or corrosion is present, requiring
Table 28.3.12 Visible Metal Fatigue Or Corrosion
Condition
Description
Rating
A The cotter key is securely in its place
E The cotter key has slipped out of its place and there is danger of the insulator
assembly coming apart
Table 28.3.13 Cotter Key Slippage

Condition
Description
Rating
A There are no failed insulators in the string
C 0 25% of the insulators in a string have failed
E >25% of the insulators in a string have failed
Table 28.3.14 Failed Insulators in a String
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no loss of galvanization, corrosion or loss of strength in insulator
hardware due to fatigue
C There is significant deterioration of insulator hardware due to corrosion and
fatigue requiring planned corrective action
E There is major deterioration of insulator hardware requiring emergency
repairs or replacement
Table 28.3.15 Loss of Strength in Insulator Hardware
Condition
Description
Rating
A There is no slack in guys and no deterioration of guys, anchors or fittings and
they are in as new condition
B Minor slack in guys and/or minor deterioration of guys, anchors or fittings,
does not require corrective action
C Significant slack in guys and/or significant deterioration of guys, anchors or
fittings, requiring planned corrective action
D Major slack in guys and/or major deterioration of guys, anchors or fittings,
requiring immediate emergency repairs
E Anchors, guy wires, or fittings are damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 28.3.16 Anchors, Guy Wires and Fittings


A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, wood pole
wood pole structures would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for timbers and cross
braces in Table 28.3.19 below, assume a timber/cross brace with partial data has a maximum
condition score of 27 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 40. That timber,
the other hand, if that timber/cross brace structure with partial data had a maximum condition
score of 29, it would have 73% of the Health Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
Tables 28.3.20 through 28.3.22 shows the component/test condition criteria, weightings,
condition ratings as both letters and numbers (i.e., the Factors column), plus the total
possible maximum score for each member of this asset class.

Wood Pole Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Degree of fibre damage,
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
delamination, deformed holes
Degree of mechanical damage,
2 severity of cuts, cracks, checks or 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
splits, holes, felling breaks
3 Severity of burn marks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Disorientation of the pole 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 Internal wood rot 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
6 Vertical displacement of footings 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
Horizontal displacement of
7 4 A,C,E 4,2,0 16
footings
Wood Pole Remaining Strength
8 0.7 0-100% 1 70
Measurement(*)
Max Score= 162(*) HI = 100*Score/Max
(*) If wood pole remaining strength measurement is not available, Health Index has a maximum of 92 and is
still considered valid.
Table 28.3.17 Health Index Formulation for Wood Poles
Timber Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall Condition of Timber and
1 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Cross Braces
Degree of fiber damage,
2 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
delamination, deformed holes
Degree of damage and
3 deterioration due to rot, cuts, 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
cracks, checks or splits
Table 28.3.18 Health Index Formulation for Timbers and Cross Braces
(All Timbers on a Structure)

Insulator Condition Maximum
# Weight Factors
Overall Condition of Insulators and
1 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
Insulator Hardware
2 Chipped, broken insulator shell 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Flashover Burn marks on insulator shell 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
4 Visible metal fatigue, rusty cap 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
5 Cotter key slippage or pull out 4 A,E 4,0 16
6 Failed individual insulator in a string 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
Reduction in strength due to corrosion
7 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
Table 28.3.19 Health Index Formulation for Insulators and Insulator Hardware
(All Insulators on a Structure)
Anchors, Guys and Fittings Condition Maximum

# Weight Factors
Overall condition of guys,
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
anchors and fittings
2 corrosion and fatigue or major 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
storm events
Max Score= 28
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 28.3.20 Health Index Formulation for Anchors, Guys and Fittings
(All Equipment on a Structure)
Because of the sizeable effect that individual components may have on a wood pole
structures end-of-life, the Health Index calculation for this asset class involved a different
approach from that used for most asset classes described in previous chapters of this report.
The approach used for wood pole structures involved developing a composite Health Index
(Composite HI) that combined the end-of-life criteria for specific individual wood pole
structure components.
Figure 28.3.1 illustrates the Composite HI formulation and calculation process for wood pole
structures. Tables 28.3.23 28.3.27 below also show specific steps in the process.

Timbers
Insulators
Wood Poles
Anchors/Guys
Structure Health Index
- Average points from poles (5-100 pts)

- Degrade for Timber CV (0-20 pts)
- Degrade for Insulator CV (0-26 pts)
- Degrade for Anchors and Guys CV (0-20 pts)
Final Structure HI
Figure 28.3.1 Wood Pole Structure Health Index Information Combination Process
correspond exactly to the condition criteria presented in Tables 28.3.20 28.3.22 above.
Table 28.3.23 compares those condition criteria to condition information available in the
STARR system. The table also shows how the original condition criteria were adjusted to
use information available in STARR.

Related STARR Condition
Health Index Condition Criteria Comment
Criteria
Wood Poles
Degree of fiber damage, delamination, Included in General Condition General Condition used
deformed holes
Degree of mechanical damage, severity of General Condition of Wood Wood Pole score used directly as
cuts, cracks, checks or splits, holes, felling Poles, Stub Poles, Pole Caps explained in Table 28.3.25
breaks and Footings
Severity of burn marks Included in General Condition General Condition used
Disorientation of the pole Included in General Condition General Condition used
Internal wood rot Included in General Condition General Condition used
Vertical displacement of footings Included in General Condition General Condition used
Horizontal displacement of footings Included in General Condition General Condition used
Wood Pole Remaining Strength Included in General Condition General Condition used
Measurement
Timbers and Cross Braces
Overall Condition of Timber and Cross General Condition of Timbers Timber and Cross Brace score
Braces and Cross Braces used directly as explained in
Table 28.3.26
Degree of fiber damage, delamination, Included in General Condition General Condition used
deformed holes
Degree of damage and deterioration due to Included in General Condition General Condition used
rot, cuts, cracks, checks or splits
Insulators and Insulator Hardware
Overall Condition of Insulators and General Condition of Insulator score used directly as
Insulator Hardware Hardware and Insulators explained in Table 28.3.27
Chipped, broken insulator shell Included in General Condition General Condition used
Flashover Burn marks on insulator shell Included in General Condition General Condition used
Visible metal fatigue, rusty cap Included in General Condition General Condition used
Cotter key slippage or pull out Included in General Condition General Condition used
Failed individual insulator in a string Included in General Condition General Condition used
Reduction in strength due to corrosion and Included in General Condition General Condition used
fatigue or major storm events
Anchors, Guys and Fittings
Overall condition of guys, anchors and General Condition of Grip, Anchors, Guys and Fittings
fittings Guy wire, Guy guard, Guy score used as explained in
insulator and Guy rod Table 28.3.26
Reduction in strength due to corrosion and Included in General Condition General Condition used
fatigue or major storm events
Table 28.3.21 Health Index Criteria to STARR Criteria adjustments.
When the STARR system had no condition assessment values for a given asset, an attempt
was made to use age as a surrogate for condition in assigning the condition ratings needed for
health indexing. Table 28.3.24 below shows the condition ratings assigned to various age
ranges for purposes of this study.

Age Condition Rating Poles, Timbers & Accessories
<20 yrs A
20 - 40 yrs B
40-50 yrs C
>50 D
Unknown Age B
Table 28.3.22 STARR Condition Assessment Value Conversion Table
Each component was then grouped. For all timbers at a wood pole structure, the worst
condition rating was kept. A similar process was applied to insulators and guys. All the
anchors and guys for a structure were grouped together, and the worst condition rating found
was assigned to the category.
Each wood pole earned points based on its CV, as shown in Table 28.3.25 below. These
points were then averaged for the wood pole structure.

E 29 Pole at EOL
Table 28.3.23 Pole Condition to Structure Points Conversion
The condition of timbers and insulators affected the overall Composite HI calculation for a
wood pole structure by adjusting the point score downward for either defective timbers or
anchors/guys. Table 28.3.26 below illustrates how the structure lost points based on the
condition of the timber and anchors/guys.

A-B 0 No effect
Table 28.3.24 Timbers and Anchors/Guys Condition to Structure Points Reduction

The condition of insulators also affected the Composite HI calculation for a wood pole
structure by adjusting its point score downward for each defective component.
Table 28.3.27 shows how the wood pole structure lost points, based on the condition of its
insulators.

B 7 Small reduction
A 0 No effect
Table 28.3.25 Insulators to Structure Points Reduction
As shown in Tables 28.3.25 and 28.3.27, a wood pole structure could lose a maximum of 66
points from its total score. These include a loss of 20 points based on the condition of
timbers, 20 points based on the condition of anchors/guys, and 26 points from the condition
of insulators.
Table 28.3.28 was used to determine the overall condition of wood pole structures as well as
the condition of individual components (e.g., wood poles, timbers, insulators, anchors/guys).
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 28.3.26 Health Index Scale for Wood Pole Structures

assessment values, an attempt was made to base condition ratings on age to compensate for
the lack of STARR data. Using age data as a surrogate for condition data appeared to offer a
way of developing a baseline condition assessment for purposes of this study. However,
STARR contains very little reliable information on the age of wood poles in the BCTC-
managed transmission system.
Because usable condition information was very limited, and because surrogate age data was
both limited and unreliable, no Health Indices were calculated for wood pole structures.
No conclusions can be drawn about the condition of wood pole structures in the BCTC-
managed transmission system.

29.0 Vegetation/Rights-of-Way
29.1 Description
The BCTC-managed transmission system contains more than 75,000 hectares of land in
transmission line rights-of-way (ROW). Vegetation management in these ROW directly
affects reliability and safety of the transmission system.
BCTC organizes the ROW it manages into the following operating jurisdictions:
Vancouver Island;
Lower Mainland;
Southern Interior; and
Northern Interior.
29.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission systems ROW have an estimated area of 75,798 Ha and
estimated length of 11,539 km. The estimated area and length are believed to be within 20%
of the actual values. Table 29.2.1 shows the area of ROW grouped by region. The order of
ROW distribution among the regions based on area is first Southern with the largest area of
ROW, then Northern, Lower Mainland, and then Vancouver Island with 37%, 35%, 20%,
and 8% respectively.
Area (Ha) Percent

Lower Mainland 14,842 20%
Region
Southern 28,239 37%

Northern 26,679 35%
Vancouver Island 6,038 8%
Total 75,798 100%
Table 29.2.1 Area and Length of ROW Grouped by Region
Table 29.2.2 shows the length of ROW grouped by region. The order of ROW distribution
among regions based on length is the same as the distribution listed above for area. That is,
Southern, Northern, Lower Mainland, and Vancouver Island with a distribution of 35%,
34%, 22%, and 9% respectively.

Length (kM) Percent
Lower Mainland 2,537 22%
Region
Southern 4,018 35%
Northern 3,891 34%
Vancouver Island 1,093 9%
Total 11,539 100%
Table 29.2.2 Length of Vegetation Right of Way Grouped by Region

The degradation of transmission line ROW involves uncontrolled growth and encroachment
of tall growing vegetation species such as coniferous and deciduous trees into the safe
transmission line envelope. These trees species are known as target trees. To ensure the
safety and reliability of transmission systems, utilities must eliminate outages from
vegetation growing into the lines from under the conductors and mitigate for outages caused
by vegetation falling onto the lines from the edges of the ROW. Inadequate vegetation
management can increase system fault levels and require costly corrective actions. Adverse
weather conditions increase the potential for faults associated with vegetation
ROW conditions depend on several factors including the following:
The amount and type of herbicide allowed;

The quality of tree/brush cutting and treatment;
The agreements with landowners;
The species of trees/vegetation;
The local climate and growing environment (e.g. latitude, topography, soil type etc);
Change in use of land under/near the lines; and
Forest fires, beaver activity, root rot, insect kill, unstable ground and exposure due to
logging can weaken trees at the edge of the ROW.
In developing ROW maintenance management programs it is important to evaluate differing

conditions that may exist on various ROW throughout a transmission system. After
considering such differences (e.g., in vegetation, climate, terrain, wildlife), utilities can best
determine management schedules and approaches. Effective vegetation management
programs are inspection-based.
Visual inspections to detect encroaching vegetation can help prevent deterioration. Common
methods to manage ROW vegetation include the following:

Use of herbicides;
Mowing;
Trimming;
Slashing; and
Removal of hazardous trees.
ROW extend across many different vegetation types and topographical features, ranging
from flat land to mountains and swamps. In BC, the growth of conifers and certain
hardwood species is slower in the north than in the south. As a result, to adequately control
vegetation ROW must have planned clearing cycles that reflect growth patterns in different
parts of the province.
Maintenance requirements also vary on ROW in urban versus rural areas. For example,
ROW in urban, highly developed areas may require almost no maintenance. On the other
hand, ROW in urban and suburban neighbourhoods may require intensive maintenance,
depending upon adjacent land uses and community standards. However, ROW in rural areas
have maintenance cycles based on growth rates of the vegetation found on the ROW (i.e.,
typically shorter cycles in the south and longer cycles in the north).
The condition, height and growth of trees have serious impacts on transmission systems.
Within the ROW, tree densities can substantially affect costs of ROW maintenance If not
managed adequately tree growth and density can result in the need for intensive maintenance.
In addition, trees falling into the ROW from the edge can cause outages. Therefore, edge
trees require explicit assessments to determine their condition and potential impact to the
reliability of the transmission system.
Generally, the operational reliability for ROW depends heavily on impacts from trees. ROW
reliability criteria, therefore, must include considerations of tree types, growth, hazards, and
density within the ROW. The potential for tall trees to fall into nearby lines also requires
assessment. Hazard trees are trees with defects that increase their potential to fail (e.g., dead,
dying or leaning trees) located near targets such as transmission lines.
Generally, ROW assessments should consider:
Vegetation condition within the ROW corridor;

Vegetation condition along the ROW corridor edges; and
Vegetation condition on lands immediately outside of the ROW.
Optimum ROW Condition

Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed ROW first required developing optimum
ROW condition criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents
a factor critical in determining the components condition relative to its potential to fail and
cause an outage.

In assessing the information available against the optimum ROW condition criteria, condition
states were rated A through E. For ROW, letter condition ratings have the following general
meanings:
A means the ROW has no vegetation or very limited target vegetation with no risk
of failure;
B means the ROW has limited target vegetation with low risk of failure that does
not significantly affect the maintenance schedule or warrant immediate corrective
action (i.e., acceptable until the next maintenance period);
C means the ROW has significant target vegetation with medium risk of failure, that
would require remedial action to achieve appropriate performance level (i.e.,
maintenance interval may need to be advanced);
D means the ROW has extensive target vegetation with high risk of failure, that
requires immediate action to achieve appropriate performance level (i.e., correct
as soon as possible); and
E means the line has been decommissioned and maintenance of the ROW no longer
occurs.
Tables 29.3.1 through 29.3.7 list the optimum ROW condition criteria considered for each
component evaluated for this asset class. The tables also contain the specific definitions used
for each condition rating (i.e., A E) in the assessment of ROW.
Condition
Description
Rating
A 90% of vegetation is less than 4 m in height
B Majority of vegetation is more than 4m in height and the ROW is scheduled
for maintenance this year
C Vegetation is within the WCB limits of approach and a Certified Utility
arborist is required for the work
D Vegetation is within the limits for flash over potential as specified in the
NERC standard
E Line has been decommissioned and maintenance of the ROW no longer
occurs.
(*) Specified height varies with operating voltage of line
Table 29.3.1 Vegetation Height Within ROW

Condition
Description
Rating
A Fewer than 500 stems per ha
B 500 to 5,000 stems per ha
C 5,000 to 15,000 stems per ha
D 15,000 to 20,000 stems per ha
occurs.
Table 29.3.2 Deciduous Target Tree Stems Per Hectare
Condition
Description
Rating
A Fewer than 500 stems per ha
B 500 to 5,000 stems per ha
C 5,000 to 8,000 stems per ha
D 8,000 to 10,000 stems per ha
occurs.
Table 29.3.3 Coniferous Target Tree Stems Per Hectare
Condition
Description
Rating
A Less than 1% of the circuit contains hazard trees
B 1% to 10 % of the circuit contains hazard trees
C 10% to 20% of the circuit contains hazard trees
D 20% to 25% of the circuit contains hazard trees
occurs.
Table 29.3.4 Hazard trees

Condition
Description
Rating
A 95% of the ROW is cleared to the full operational width
B 80% to 95% of the ROW is cleared to the full operational width
C 50% to 80 % of the ROW is cleared to the full operational width
D Only 50% of the ROW is cleared to the full operational width
occurs.
Table 29.3.5 ROW Encroachment
Condition
Description
Rating
A Limited fuel loading
B Low fuel loading
C Medium fuel loading
D High fuel loading
occurs.
Table 29.3.6 Fire Hazard Assessment ( i.e., Fuel Loading)
Condition
Description
Rating
A No outages in last three years
B One outage in last three years
C Two outages in last three years
D More than two outages in the last three years
occurs.
Table 29.3.7 Outages Caused by Vegetation
Health indexing quantifies an assets condition relative to long-term degradation factors that
cumulatively lead to complete deterioration. Health indexing differs from maintenance

A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and,
E = 0.
For this asset class, the components shown in the tables above were weighted based on their
importance in determining the class members status relative to its optimum condition. For
example, those that relate to primary functions of the asset received higher weights than
those that relate to more ancillary features and functions.
multiplied by the assigned weights to compute weighted scores for each component. The
weighted scores were totalled for each asset class member.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a ROW in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded ROW
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for ROW in Table 29.3.8
below, assume a ROW with partial data has a maximum condition score of 62 out of the
Health Index maximum possible score of 96. That ROW, therefore, has only 65% of the
maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that ROW
with partial data had a maximum condition score of 71, it would have 74% of the Health
Index maximum and a valid Health Index.
for each member or line section in this asset class.

Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
1 Vegetation height within ROW 4 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 16
2 Deciduous target trees stems per ha 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Coniferous target trees stems per ha 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Hazard Trees 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 ROW Encroachment 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
6 Fire Hazard Assessment 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Outages Caused by Vegetation Last
7 6 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 24
Three Years
Max Score = 96
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 29.3.8 Health Index Formulation for Vegetation/ROW
For this study, BCTC did not have any of the information required by the Health Index
Formulation shown in Table 29.3.8 above. Thus, it was not possible to compute valid Health
Indices for this asset class using the Health Index Formulation for Vegetation/ROW.
However, BCTC has some general ROW assessment information for vegetation along
corridors, corridor edges and immediately outside corridors. Through discussions with
BCTC field staff, this information was used to develop a simplified temporary health index
for Vegetation/ROW. Table 29.3.9 below presents the simplified Temporary Health Index
Formulation for Vegetation/ROW used in this study. However, it is recommended that
ongoing Vegetation/ROW condition assessment processes use the criteria and approach
presented as the Health Index Formulation shown in Table 29.3.8 above.
Maximum
# Condition Criteria Weight Condition Rating Factors
Score
1 Corridor Assessment 4 Green, Yellow, Red 2,1,0 8
2 Edge Assessment 2 Green, Yellow, Red 2,1,0 4
3 Off-ROW Assessment 1 Green, Yellow, Red 2,1,0 2
Max Score= 14
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 29.3.9 Temporary Health Index Formulation for Vegetation/ROW
Table 29.3.10 was used to determine the overall condition of the Vegetation/ROW asset
class.

Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 29.3.10 Health Index Scale for ROW

As described in subsection 29.3.3 above, BCTC did not have any of the data needed to
populate the recommended Health Index Formulation for Vegetation/ROW. To provide
BCTC with an estimate of the condition of Vegetation/ROW, a simplified temporary Health
Index was derived for Vegetation/ROW using information gained through discussions with
BC Hydro field staff. The Health Index results presented below are based on estimates for
the Lower Mainland, Southern Interior and Vancouver Island made after discussions with
field staff, rather than systematic measurement and analysis. Table 29.4.1 summarizes the
results, which are also illustrated in Figure 29.4.1.

Category Number of Circuit Areas
Very Poor
99
0-30
Poor
63
30-50
Fair
176
50-70
Good
119
70-85
Very Good
234
85-100
Invalid 20
Total 711
Table 29.4.1 Summary of Condition Rating Results for Vegetation
250 234
Number of Circuit Areas
200 176
150
119
99
100
63
50
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 29.4.1 Summary of Actual Condition Assessment Results For Vegetation
51.1% of the Vegetation/ROW circuit areas are in Good or Very Good condition.
25.5% of the Vegetation/ROW circuit areas are in Fair condition.
9.1% of the Vegetation/ROW circuit areas are in Poor condition. Additional
vegetation management needed; establish priorities considering risk and
consequences.
14.3% of the Vegetation/ROW circuit areas are in Very Poor condition, which is
consistent with BCTCs Vegetation Management Plan.

30.0 Access Roads
30.1 Description
The BCTC-managed transmission system uses a combination of main access roads, access
tracks, helipads, boat launches and, where appropriate, signage for access to the transmission
system. Main access roads also may include culverts, bridges, waterbars, cross ditches,
modified armoured swails, ditches, utility crossings, and gates. The assets included in this
chapter consist of access roads and access tracks only.
Access roads and tracks provide vehicular and pedestrian access from public roadways to
transmission line rights-of-way, substations and microwave locations. BCTC emphasizes the
safe and reliable operation of transmission facilities in an environmentally, socially and
fiscally responsible manner. To meet these operational goals, workers and equipment must
have access to transmission operating facilities..
Access roads and tracks enable maintenance and emergency activities throughout the
transmission system. Depending upon the location, they may be paved or unpaved. In some
locations, fences, gates and locks prevent trespass from access roads onto rights-of-way.
Access roads and tracks facilitate power restoration after transmission line breakdowns.
Thus, the condition of access roads and tracks can directly affect the reliability and safety of
transmission systems. Generally, access roads and tracks also require vegetation management
to ensure unimpeded access during all seasons.
30.2 Demographics
Comprehensive inventories, regularly scheduled inspections and condition assessments of
transmission access facilities are needed to develop an appropriate access road management
program. BCTC is gathering such data for this asset class. However, at this time no
demographic data for access roads or tracks is available.

Paved and unpaved transmission system access roads experience the same deterioration as
any other road system. Weather causes most degradation of access roads. Fast moving water
during major rainstorms causes soil erosion. After rainstorms, poor drainage can lead to
standing water and puddles in roadways. These conditions degrade surfaces and result in
potholes. Vegetation also can grow on or along access roads, leading to deterioration and
poor driving conditions.

Security fences, gates and locks experience vandalism, corrosion and rust. Signage
deficiencies and lighting also affect road performance. All of these factors require
consideration in assessing the condition of access roads.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed access roads first required developing end-
of life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a factor
A means the road is in as new condition;

B means the road has some minor problems or evidence of degradation;
C means the road has many minor problems or a major problem that requires
attention;
D means the road has many problems and the potential for major failure; and
E means the road has completely failed or is damaged/degraded beyond normal
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Road or track is free of obstruction and can be travelled safely at appropriate
speeds. Road or track is of sufficient width to meet designated requirements
and turnarounds/parallel lanes are at appropriate intervals. Bridges and utility
crossings are adequate to meet loading conditions.
E Driving lane conditions are unacceptable and cannot be brought into
Table 30.3.1 General Condition of Driving Lanes

Condition
Description
Rating
A Road or track clears water without problems, puddles or potholes are not
evident. No damage of road due to water or snow. Culverts are in good
working condition. Waterbars have not been damaged by snow plow or other
activity. Cross ditches and modified armoured swails are in good condition.
Ditches are clear and not silted up.
E Surface or subsurface drainage is unacceptable and cannot be brought into
Table 30.3.2 Surface and Subsurface Drainage Condition
Condition
Description
Rating
A Road surface is free from unwanted vegetation. Danger trees are not evident
and tree growth/hanging trees are not affecting road traffic.
B Normal signs of vegetation growth with respect to the above characteristics.
Table 30.3.3 Vegetation Control
Condition
Description
Rating
A Road shoulders are in good condition and no erosion can be seen.
B Few minor examples of erosion or shoulder deterioration are noticeable
C Many minor erosions or shoulder deteriorations are noticeable but road is still
safe for travel.
D Major erosion is evident and road is difficult or unsafe for travel.
E Road is unsafe and cannot be made safe for travel.
Table 30.3.4 Soil Erosion Along Road Shoulders

Condition
Description
Rating
A Gates, fences and locks are in good working order and are well maintained.
Table 30.3.5 Condition of Gates, Fences, Locks
Condition
Description
Rating
A Signage is appropriate for this road
B Signage is somewhat deficient or in deteriorated condition
C Signage are deficient and/or in deteriorated condition
D Signage is unacceptable for this road
E Signage is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 30.3.6 Signage and Illumination

that cumulatively lead to an assets end of life. Health indexing differs from maintenance
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
on their importance in determining the class members end of life. For example, those that

The condition rating numbers listed immediately above (i.e., A = 4, B = e, etc.) were
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, an access road in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded access road
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for access roads in
Table 30.3.7 below, assume an access road with partial data has a maximum condition score
of 47 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 72. That access road, therefore, has
hand, if that access road with partial data had a maximum condition score of 53, it would
Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
1 General condition of driving lanes 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Surface and subsurface drainage 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
3 Vegetation control 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
4 Soil erosion along road shoulders 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
5 Condition of gates, fences, locks 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
6 Signage 1 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 4
Max Score= 40
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 30.3.7 Access Roads Health Index Formulation

Table 30.3.8 was used to determine the overall condition of the access road asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 30.3.8 Health Index Scale for Access Roads

No data were available to calculate a Health Index for access roads.

31.0 Civil Works
31.1 Description
Civil works include support structures such as foundations, retaining walls, berms and rip
rap. Civil works also include diverters for erosion control to protect tower foundations
constructed in rivers or streams. Generally, civil works consist of earth and concrete
structures. Some concrete structures also may include reinforced steel.
31.2 Demographics
BCTC is in the process of gathering data about this asset class. However, at this time no
demographic data about civil works is available.
Degradation of civil works commonly includes corrosion of reinforcing steel, spalling of

concrete, and soil erosion in the surrounding areas. Mechanical forces and flood-water from
major storm events also may damage civil works, especially those constructed in rivers and
streams.
The presence of acidic salts (e.g., sulfates, chlorides) affects corrosion rates. Similarly, salts
in soil can affect rates of spalling in concrete. Moisture ingress and variations in temperature
also affect concrete degradation rates. Heavy uplift forces during major storm events can
sometimes lead to dislocation of civil works. Frequent flooding and poor drainage also can
cause deterioration in civil works.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed civil works first required developing end-
of-life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a factor

requires attention;
and
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A Concrete is level and free from cracks and spalling. Support steel and/or
rebar, if applicable, are tight and free from corrosion.
E Concrete is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 31.3.1 Concrete Condition (Spalling, Cracks, Rebar Corrosion)
Condition
Description
Rating
A Drains and sewers appear in good condition. All systems are free from any
obstructions. No indications of wear or corrosion.
Table 31.3.2 Drainage and Condition of Storm Sewers Where Applicable

Condition
Description
Rating
A Assets are in good condition and no soil erosion can be seen.
B Few minor examples of erosion or deterioration are noticeable and additional
maintenance should be considered.
C Many minor erosions or deteriorations are noticeable and some remedial
work is required.
D Major erosion is evident and major remedial work is urgently required.
E Major erosion has resulted in damage/degradation beyond remediation.
Table 31.3.3 Soil Erosion
Condition
Description
Rating
A No evidence of displacement
B Few minor examples of displacement are noticeable and additional
maintenance should be considered.
C Displacement is clearly noticeable and some remedial work is required.
D Major soil displacement is evident and major remedial work is urgently
required.
E Rip rap is displaced beyond repair.
Table 31.3.4 Signs of Rip Rap Displacement (Due to excessive compression or lift
forces)

A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.

producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, civil works in
perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while completely degraded civil works
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for civil works in
Table 31.3.5 below, assume a civil structure with partial data has a maximum condition
score of 32 out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 48. That civil structure,
the other hand, if that civil structure with partial data had a maximum condition score of 35,

Condition Maximum
Component Condition Criteria Weighting Factors
Ratings Score
Berms, Rip Concrete condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Rap, Retaining (spalling, cracks, rebar
Walls corrosion)
Drainage and condition 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
of storm sewers where
applicable
Soil Erosion 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Signs of soil 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
displacement for rip
raps (Due to excessive
compression or lift
forces)
Max. Score = 48
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 31.3.5 Civil Works Health Index Formulation
Table 31.3.6 was used to determine the overall condition of the civil works asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 31.3.6 Health Index Scale for Civil Works

No data were available to calculate a Health Index for civil works.

32.0 Underground and Submarine Cables and Oil Systems
32.1 Description
Self Contained Fluid Filled (SCFF) Cables [Lead and Aluminum Sheathed]
SCFF cables are single core cables with hollow conductors, insulating fluid, and internally
pressurized taped impregnated-paper insulation. Pumping plants, gravity or pre-pressurized
reservoirs supply pressure up to 1.4 MPa (e.g., 5L29/31). Metallic sheaths of lead or aluminum
surround the insulation and contain the fluid impregnant. Insulated jackets are extruded over the
metallic sheaths. These jackets provide both sheath corrosion protection and electrical
insulation. SCFF cables can be direct buried, installed in ducts, or on racks in shafts or tunnels.
When provided with armour wires, SCFF cables also may have submarine applications.
High Pressure Fluid Filled Pipe Type (HPFF) Cables

HPFF cables consist of three single cores and conductors insulated with impregnated-paper
tapes, externally pressurized with an insulating fluid installed together inside a continuously
welded steel pipe. This pipe contains insulating fluid and a pumping plant provides pressure on
the order of 1.4 MPa. An extruded layer of polyethylene, polypropylene or coal tar coating
insulates and protects the steel pipe, providing corrosion protection and electrical insulation.
HPFF cable circuits also have cathodic protection systems that assist in protecting the pipes
from minor coating damage. Generally, HPFF cables are buried in backfills with enhanced heat
dissipating properties.
Self Contained Gas Filled (SCGF) Submarine Cables (i.e., 1L17 and 1L18)
SCGF cables are single conductor cables consisting of a hollow conductor insulated with
impregnated paper tapes, internally pressurized at 2 MPa with nitrogen gas. The paper
impregnant is a very viscous compound. A reinforced lead alloy sheath contains the gas
pressure, and the cable has galvanized steel wire armour. This design allows use of long lengths
unlimited by pressure constraints. The continuous gas pressure allows for monitoring of the
sheath integrity via a gas pressure monitoring system.
Extruded Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE) Cables

XLPE cables consist of single cores with extruded cross-linked polyethylene insulation.
Generally, metallic sheaths (i.e., lead, copper or aluminum) encase transmission class XLPE
cable cores, providing hermetically sealed environments for the insulation. Polymeric jackets
are extruded over the metallic sheaths. More modern designs, however, now tend to use metal
laminates insulated with polyethylene extruded jackets. These jackets provide both corrosion
protection and electrical isolation.
Mass Impregnated (MI) Cables

MI cables are used for transmission voltages up to 69 kV AC and for long high voltage DC
submarine applications. Since these cables have no pressurization, they have no feeding
pressure limitations for the fluid insulation. MI cables consist of conductors insulated with
paper tapes impregnated with viscous insulating compound. The insulated conductors are

covered with lead alloy or aluminum sheaths to prevent water ingress. Insulating jackets
applied over the sheath provide corrosion protection. When provided with armour wires, MI
cables also may have submarine applications.
For more detailed descriptions of underground cable systems see Underground Transmission
Systems Reference Book, 1992 Edition, prepared by J.A. Williams and P.L. Ostermann, Power
Technologies, Inc. for the Electric Power Research Institute, 1992.
32.2 Demographics
Underground and Submarine Cables
The BCTC-managed transmission system has a total of 348.1 km of underground and submarine
cable. Table 32.2.1 shows the lengths of cables grouped by each relevant voltage level and
cable type.
Length km
Total Percentage
Voltage kV 60 138 230 DC 500
SCGF 0.0 57.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.6 16.5%
HPFF 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.7%
Cable Type
SCFF (AC Pb) 16.2 4.2 52.2 0.0 76.0 148.6 42.7%
SCFF (AC Al) 9.8 1.1 58.9 0.0 0.0 69.8 20.1%
SCFF (DC Pole 2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.5 (1) 0.0 30.5 8.8%
MI (DC Pole 1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.6 (1) 0.0 31.6 9.1%
XLPE 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 2.2%
Total 33.7 62.9 113.4 62.1 76.0 348.1 100%
Percentage 10% 18% 33% 18% 22% 100%
Note: Pole 1 has 3-cables; Pole 2 has 2-cables therefore cable lengths will be 3 times and 2 times the circuit length
shown respectively.
Table 32.2.1 Length of Cable Grouped by Voltage Level and Cable Type
Table 32.2.2 shows the lengths of cables grouped by each relevant voltage level and
manufacturer. The table shows that Pirelli and BICC are the two major manufacturers by length
of cable. These manufacturers produced 29.8% and 22.6% of the cables by length respectively.
The distributions of the lengths of cable by voltage level are the same as those shown in Table
32.2.1.

Length km
Total Percentage
Voltage kV 60 138 230 DC 500
BICC 0.0 61.8 16.8 0.0 0.0 78.6 22.6%
CWC 20.2 1.1 52.1 0.0 0.0 73.4 21.1%
Fujikura 2.6 0.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 11.5 5.2%
Manufacturer
Furukawa 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.4%

Hitachi 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1%
Les Cables de Lyon 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.6 0.0 31.6 9.1%
Pirelli 9.1 0.0 26.3 30.5 38 103.9 29.8%
Nexans (STK) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38 38 10.9%
Sumutomo 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.7%
Silec 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1%
Total 33.7 62.9 113.4 62.1 76 348.1 100%
Percentage 10% 18% 33% 18% 22% 100%
Table 32.2.2 Length of Cable Grouped by Voltage Level and Manufacturer
Table 32.2.3 shows the lengths of cables grouped by each relevant voltage level and installation
type. This table demonstrates that 56.2% of the systems cable is submarine. Thus, 43.8% of the
cables are installed underground. For the system as a whole, 31.8% are installed in Duct Banks
and 12% are Direct Buried. The distributions of the lengths of cable by voltage level are the
same as those shown in Table 32.2.1.
Length km
Total Percentage
Voltage kV 60 138 230 DC 500
Install Type
Direct Buried 5.8 1.1 34.9 0.0 0.0 41.8 12%
Duct Bank 27.9 4.2 78.5 0.0 0.0 110.6 31.8%
Submarine 0.0 57.6 0.0 62.1 76 195.7 56.2%

Total 33.7 62.9 113.4 62.1 76 348.1 100%
Percentage 10% 18% 32% 18% 22% 100%
Table 32.2.3 Length of Cable Grouped by Voltage Level and Install Type
Table 32.2.4 shows the lengths of cables grouped by each relevant age group and cable type.
The distributions of the lengths of cable by cable type are the same as those shown in
Table 32.2.1. The table also shows that the cable distribution between age groups 20 to 29
years, 30 to 39 years, and 40 to 49 years is 36%, 24%, and 31% respectively. By length; 2% of
the cables are over 50 years old.

Length km
0-10 20-29 30-39 40-49 50 years Total Percentage
Age
years years years years plus
SCGF 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.6 0.0 57.6 16.5%
HPFF 8.9 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 3.2%
Cable Type
SCFF (AC Pb) 0.0 78.1 32.3 31.2 7 148.6 42.7%

SCFF (AC Al) 9.3 12.4 20.3 18.9 0.0 60.9 17.5%
SCFF (DC Pole 2) 0.0 30.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.5 8.8%
MI (DC Pole 1) 0.0 0.0 31.6 0.0 0.0 31.6 9.1%
XLPE 6.3 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 7.7 2.2%
Total 24.5 124.5 84.4 107.8 7.0 348.1 100%
Percentage 7% 36% 24% 31% 2% 100%
Table 32.2.4 Length of Cable Grouped by Cable Type and Age
Oil Systems
As seen in Table 32.2.5, the BCTC-managed system has a total of 14 pumping plants and 197
oil reservoirs.
Structure Count
Oil Reservoir 197
Pumping Plant 14
Table 32.2.5 Count of Oil System Structures
Table 32.2.6 shows the count of pumping plants grouped by cable type and relevant age group.
86% of the pumping plants are between the age groups 20 to 29 years, and all others are
between 30 and 39 years. Notably, no pumping plants were commissioned in the last 20 years.
Cable Type SCGF HPFF SCFF(Al) SCFF(Pb) Total Percentage

0 to 9 years 0 0 0 0 0 0%
10 to 19 years 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Age
20 to 29 years 0 1 0 11 12 86%
30 to 39 years 0 0 2 0 2 14%
40 to 49 years 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Total 0 1 2 11 14 100%
Percentage 0% 7% 14% 79% 100%
Table 32.2.6 Count of Pumping Plants Grouped by Cable Type and Age

Degradation and Failure of SCFF Cable Systems

SCFF cable systems have a long history of reliable service, and in many places they have
remained operational after four decades of service. When operated within design limits, and
with proper maintenance of insulating fluid pressure and sheath integrity, SCFF cables rarely
have dielectric failures.
a) Degradation and Failure of SCFF Cables

Generally, corrosion, fatigue, creep and external factors cause most damage and failures in
SCFF cables. Inspections of dielectric conditions on older cables typically do not reveal
substantial deterioration. Exceptions include greatly overloaded cables and cables subjected to
thermal runaway conditions caused by poor surrounding soil conditions. Also, long-term
exposure to elevated temperatures results in deterioration of mechanical and dielectric properties
of cable insulation. Surveys indicate that dielectric deterioration does not present significant
end-of-life issues unless cables are subjected to prolonged periods above their maximum
allowable temperatures.
In practice, maintaining the integrity of the metallic sheath presents the primary concern with
SCFF cables. Selecting proper sheath material and design, then adequately protecting sheaths
during transportation, installation and operation help maintain this integrity. Corrosion, fatigue
and creep cause most damage to metallic sheaths in service. Corrosion of reinforcing tapes or
armour wires also may compromise sheath integrity. Widespread sheath damage causes end-of-
life concerns.
Deterioration or damage of jackets presents potentially serious problems. Transient over-

voltages, high operating temperatures and soil contamination can damage these jackets.
Damaged jackets do not protect sheaths against corrosion that can cause sheath failure resulting
in leaks of insulating compound. In addition, damaged jackets adversely affect sheath bonding,
allowing excess sheath circulating currents to flow. Circulating currents can lead to cable
overheating and premature cable aging. Annual inspections and maintenance can help identify
and repair damaged jackets. If not managed effectively, reduction of cable life can occur.
Further, if widespread sheath corrosion occurs, multiple insulating fluid leaks may end a
circuits life prematurely.
b) Degradation and Failure of SCFF Joints and Terminations

SCFF cable joints and terminations may experience insulating fluid leaks from improper
sealing, damage to sheath interrupters, or thermo-mechanical problems. These types of
problems, however, generally have occurred only in early generations of SCFF cables.
Typically, degradation of these components does not present end-of-life concerns since these
parts are easily repaired or rehabilitated, extending overall circuit life. Widespread degradation
of components, however, may result in circuit replacement decisions for economic reasons.

c) Degradation and Failure of SCFF Pressurizing Equipment
When pressurizing equipment fails, the resulting cable insulation damage may be widespread,
effectively ending a circuits life. Insulating fluid reservoirs, pipe work, insulator couplings,
valves, gauges and pressure switches all can degrade. However, degradation of these
components should not cause circuit end-of-life concerns since these components can receive
economical inspection, maintenance and repair. In addition, multi-stage pressure alarms
provide warnings of pending failures.
d) Condition Assessment Techniques

The condition of the pressure retaining system plays a key role in determining the longevity of
SCFF cable circuits. Over-sheath jacket testing, therefore, provides an effective, economical
and reliable way to monitor cable condition. The testing involves somewhat invasive
techniques since one must remove the circuit from service to test and repair the jacket.
Tests of the sheath bonding system are also important. If bonding system connections and
performance are verified during installation, routine tests thereafter can evaluate sheath fault
voltage limiters, jacket resistance, and resistance of linked contacts. Where cathodic protection
systems exist, testing these systems operation and conducting close interval pipe potential
surveys also can help prevent sheath corrosion.
Sampling and testing insulating fluid for chemical and dielectric properties can provide overall
cable condition information. However, since this fluid does not circulate freely, any given
sample may provide information only about the circuit near the sampling point. To overcome
this problem and determine overall cable condition sampling at several locations may be
needed.
For insulating fluids, residual gas pressure (RGP) testing and trend analysis can provide an
effective way to detect cable deterioration. RGP involves reducing sample pressure until
dissolved gas starts to evolve. For newly installed modern cable, this should at about 5 Torr1.
Generally, when RGP tests result in Torr values exceeding 60, cables require investigation.
Evaluating RGP trends and comparing RGP values between separate hydraulic sections can
provide useful information about cable condition and specific activity.
When RGP testing results in excessive Torr values, dissolved gas analysis (DGA) also can help
pinpoint problems. DGA tests measure concentrations of different gases present in a sample.
Through DGA testing, therefore, one can distinguish hydrocarbon gases from atmospheric
gases. The breakdown of insulating fluids generates hydrocarbon gases, while the
decomposition of insulating paper creates atmospheric gases.
While no clearly defined limits exist for dissolved gas in cable oils, some basic guidelines
follow:
The presence of any hydrocarbon gas indicates that some form of electrical activity or
insulation deterioration is taking place;
1
760 Torr = 1 Bar = 1 atmosphere = 101.3 kPA; 5 Torr = 6.6 mBar = 0.066 atmosphere. Note that older cables
may have had higher residual gas pressures when new.

Low energy discharges in insulating fluids emit hydrogen and methane gases;
Acetylene indicates the presence of arcing in insulating fluids;
Thermal deterioration of the paper insulation produces carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide
and water (carbon monoxide reaches saturation level first and represents the more sensitive
indicator); and
The presence of oxygen within the oil can accelerate thermal aging of insulating papers.
Measuring an insulating fluids 60Hz or ac electric breakdown strength, dielectric dissipation

factor at room temperature and at 100C, and moisture content also offers useful information.
Electrical tests can determine the presence of contaminants in the oil (e.g. metallic particles,
moisture). While electric breakdown strength varies from sample to sample, consistently low
values (i.e., values below 30kV/mm) indicate potential problems.
Moisture increases dissipation factors and accelerates aging rates for the cables oil-paper
system. Aging also produces moisture. Moisture values below 20 ppm are normal. Moisture
levels above this value and moisture increases give rise for concern. Dissipation factor tests on
cables isolated from the system also provide useful condition information.
Where the potential for thermo-mechanical joint damage exists, radiographic or endoscopic
examinations may help detect developing problems.
Degradation and Failure of HPFF Cable Systems

Like SCFF cable systems, HPFF cable systems have inherently reliable insulation and expected
lengthy useful lives when maintained at proper pressures and operated within design
temperatures.
a) Degradation and Failure of HPFF Cables

High oil pressures eliminate voids in paper insulation by dissolving trapped gases. High oil
pressures also suppress any discharge activity. HPFF insulation deterioration does not normally
present critical end-of-life issues for these cables. Pressure maintenance, however, does
represent a key issue in determining the cables end-of-life. In assessing HPFF cable
conditions, critical evaluation factors include carrier pipe soundness, pipe casting condition, and
pressure system reliability.
b) Degradation and Failure of HPFF Joints and Terminations

As with SCFF cables, HPFF cable joints and terminations generally should not result in end-of-
life issues, since these components can be economically repaired and replaced. HPFF cables
have 3 individually jointed and insulated phases contained in an oversized pipe section.
Ongoing routine maintenance and repair can readily detect and correct most cable problems.
However, some 345 kV HPFF cables have experienced thermo-mechanical failures. Restricting
cable movement using spiders within the joint sleeves can correct this problem.
c) Degradation and Failure of HPFF Pumping Plants

Pumping plants regulate insulating fluid pressures within operating ranges to ensure system
integrity without imposing damaging pressure to pipes or accessories. Their proper

performance depends on the correct functioning of relays, transducers, pressure switches, relief
valves and pumps. While pumping plants are usually reliable, deficiencies, when found, must
be corrected promptly to ensure circuit performance and reliability.
Complete replacement of a pumping plant entails considerable expense. Similarly, plant

refurbishment may prove both inconvenient and expensive. Older plants may present
maintenance and repair problems because of the lack of replacement parts and the need for
substantial plant modifications when adding modern equipment. Pumping plant problems,
therefore, can influence overall asset management decisions. For example, the need for major
plant expenditures may signal the end of a short-length circuits life when replacement of the
complete cable system provides the most appropriate and economic long-term solution to plant
operational problems.
d) Other HPFF Degradation and Failure Factors

Insulating fluid leaks may cause environmental contamination, and therefore, represent key
concerns for HPFF cables. While localized pipe failures are readily managed, widespread pipe
corrosion can create end-of-life concerns for HPFF cable circuits. Therefore, one must pay
particular attention to pipe coating conditions and to cathodic protection systems.
e) HPFF Condition Assessment Technique

Proper maintenance of cable health requires assessing cable coatings and identifying defects.
Traditional pipe coating integrity testing involves applying dc voltage between the pipe and
ground, calculating the coating resistance and comparing that resistance to industry reference
values. Recently, some utilities have used coating attenuation surveys to pinpoint coating
damage locations. These surveys involve measuring attenuation rates of injected high frequency
signals
Testing the cathodic protection system helps ensure pipe protection. This involves evaluating
components of the system for proper operation and conducting close interval pipe potential
surveys.
Where the potential for thermo-mechanical joint damage exists, radiographic or endoscopic
examination of joints may help detect developing problems.
Analysis of HPFF cable insulating fluid provides a useful means to detect deteriorating internal
conditions. The following tests apply readily to HPFF cables:
DGA of insulating fluid;

Moisture content;
Dielectric dissipation factor at room temperatures and at 100C; and
Electric breakdown strength (expressed as kV/mm)
When HPFF cables are isolated from the system, dissipation factor tests also may provide
valuable degradation information. These low frequency and low voltage tests offer data as
effective as high voltage measurements.

Pumping plant assessment typically involves checking pump operations, relief valve and alarm
settings, and testing local and remote alarm annunciation. Pumping plants regularly monitor
insulating fluid pressure and typically use pumping cycles to maintain safe pressure levels.
Degradation and Failure of SCGF Cable Systems

Like other pressurized impregnated paper insulated cables, when operated within design limits
and given proper maintenance (e.g., for gas pressure and sheath integrity), SCGF cables should
not experience dielectric failures.
a) Degradation and Failure of SCGF Cables

Generally, external factors present the greatest hazards in submarine applications. For these
cable systems, water penetration into the dielectric represents the most critical end-of-life issue.
To prevent the ingress of water, SCGF cables must remain continuously pressurized, whether in
service or not. Pressurization is particularly important for faulted cables. Also, as with SCFF
cables, maintenance of sheath integrity is essential. For submarine cables, sheath protection
generally occurs through the use of armour wires, embedding or suitable mechanical methods.
SCGF cables do not require pumping plants. Rather, the pressurizing system in these circuits
consists of nitrogen bottles with regulators, gauges and low-pressure alarm indicators all
placed in a small cabinet. Generally, SCGF pressurizing systems do not present operational or
maintenance concerns.
b) Degradation and Failure of SCGF Accessories

SCGF accessories include cable terminations and gas supply insulators. These components may
experience gas or compound leaks from improper sealing. Typically, degradation of these
components does not represent an end-of-life concern since these components are accessible for
economical repair and rehabilitation.
c) Degradation and Failure of SCGF Pressurizing Equipment

Like SCFF and HPFF cables, failure of SCGF pressurizing equipment may result in widespread
insulation damage, effectively leading to a cables end-of-life. Generally, however, the
simplicity of SCGF pressurizing equipment allows economical inspection and maintenance,
reducing the type and level of deterioration that could lead to end-of-life concerns.
d) Other SCGF Deterioration and Failure Factors

Because of their installation in uncontrolled environments, SCGF submarine cables are subject
to considerable external damage. Damage most commonly occurs through commercial activities
such as dredging, fishing and shipping. Natural environmental conditions also result in damage.
For example, erratic bottom topography can cause impregnant migration on steep slopes. Also,
for unsupported cables, currents can cause cable movement leading to sheath fatigue, abrasion
and chafing. Further, currents and submarine landslides may cover un-embedded cables
creating potential hot spots. Similarly, these conditions may uncover an embedded cable,
exposing it to mechanical damage. Bottom materials or chemical effluents can corrode cable
armour wires, causing kinks and twists. Earthquakes and ground movement can sever cables.

e) SCGF Condition Assessment Techniques
As with SCFF and HPFF cables, it is generally impractical to assess the condition of SCGF
cables themselves. However, when SCGF cables are isolated from the system, dissipation
factor tests also may provide valuable degradation information. These low frequency and low
voltage tests offer data as effective as high voltage measurements.
In addition, one can test a cables pressurizing medium. To do so involves conducting gas
analysis and dew point measurements. Gas analysis helps to identify deterioration processes.
The presence of nitrogen gas is expected, but oxygen is not. Trends in gas analysis provide
more critical information than specific values or ratios of particular gases.
Degradation and Failure of XLPE Cable Systems

Over the last 20 years, XLPE cables have become the predominant cable system for new
installations rated up to 138 kV. Also, in North America, 15 installations rated up to 230 kV
now use these cables. These cables had some early failures, but now they are recognized as
reliable if made by a competent manufacturer with proper workmanship.
a) Degradation and Failure of XLPE Cables

Several studies have investigated long-term degradation of the polymeric insulation in these
cables. Generally, predicting the true length of dielectric life for XLPE cables is difficult.
Water penetration into the dielectric presents the greatest threat to XLPE cable longevity,
making it important that these cables have reliable moisture barriers and protection during
manufacture, transport, and installation. To prevent moisture penetration, these cables often
have water blocking systems, metallic tapes and metallic sheaths. Maintenance of radial
moisture barriers and over-sheath jackets is critical to ensure reliable long term operation of
these cables.
Some experts believe that routine monitoring of jackets is more critical for XLPE cables than
for pressurized cables. Pressurized cables have: (1) pressure systems that keep moisture out of
the cables when leaks develop, and, (2) alarm systems that alert operators of problems. XLPE
cables have no such safeguards, so undetected sheath breaches can result in water entering the
cable and causing premature failures.
b) Degradation and Failure of XLPE Joints and Terminations

Accessories cause most of the current concerns about longevity and reliability of XLPE circuits.
Most accessory problems seem to occur within a short period (e.g., sometimes within a few
days) after energization, and are attributed to design, manufacture and installation deficiencies.
Numerous concerns about long-term reliability of joints and terminations also exist. As with
other cable types, accessory degradation and failures are generally treated as repair and
maintenance issues, not end-of-life concerns.
Routine inspection and maintenance procedures generally provide adequate deterioration

detection for terminations and bonding. As discussed below, partial discharge testing also offers
a way to monitor and detect developing problems in XLPE accessories.

c) Other XLPE Degradation and Failure Factors
The following represent two other design issues of note in XLPE cable degradation:
Movement of the conductor, particularly at bends; and

Radial expansion of the dielectric causing excessive pressure at key points.
Generally, with proper design and installation, these problems do not arise. However, when
they do occur cable damage can result and shorten the installations life.
d) XLPE Condition Assessment Techniques

Partial discharge testing is one condition assessment technique practically applied to XLPE
cables and their accessories. This involves taking measurements at sheath interruptions. One
can also use high frequency CTs to measure the partial discharge activity. In addition, one can
use acoustic sensors to measure electrical discharge activity. Generally, if the cable is not 100%
lead or aluminum sheathed (e.g. tapes), one can take measurements anywhere using a clip-on
CT.
As with SCFF cables, tests on the over-sheath jacket, bonding system and cathodic protection
systems, provide useful information when the potential for thermo-mechanical joint damage
exists. Radiographic examinations also may detect developing problems.
Degradation and Failure of Mass Impregnated (MI) Cable Systems

a) Degradation and Failure of MI Cables
With proper installation and operation, well-designed MI cables have long and reliable
operating records. MI cables do not have pressurized insulation. The lack of pressurized
insulation makes MI cables susceptible to void formation and ionization under load cycling.
This limits maximum voltage and operating temperatures for these cables. Conductor
temperatures, for example, are limited to about 60C to prevent draining of the insulation
impregnant.
Water penetration into the dielectric represents the greatest end-of-life issue for MI cables.
They must, therefore, have reliable moisture barriers, and their design must limit radial moisture
penetration and longitudinal water movement should sheath failure occur.
Because MI cables have submarine applications, they receive more mechanical stress than land
cables do. While their design takes this stress into account, proper cable handling during
manufacture, transport and installation also is critical to their longevity. Long-term protection
of sheath integrity depends on maintaining armour wires and over-sheath jackets. Routinely
monitoring and repairing armour wires, jackets and sheaths helps ensure a full cable life.
b) Degradation and Failure of MI Joints and Terminations

Submarine cable joints differ from land cable joints due to the mechanical requirements
associated with installation, retrieval, and operation under high tension and water pressure.
Factors important in designing MI cable joints include: water depth, currents, bottom material
and cable handling equipment. Generally, given retrieval and repair costs for submarine cable
joints, it is desirable to minimize the number of joints in a submarine application. Usually

cables are continuous and have inaccessible joints. Given proper design, installation and
operation, submarine MI cable joints operate satisfactorily and do not present end-of-life
concerns for the cables.
c) Other MI Degradation and Failure Factors

Because of their installation in uncontrolled environments, submarine cables are subject to
considerable external damage. Damage most commonly occurs through commercial activities
such as dredging, fishing and shipping. Natural environmental conditions also result in damage.
For example, erratic bottom topography can cause impregnant migration on steep slopes. Also,
for unsupported cables, currents can cause cable movement leading to sheath fatigue, abrasion
and chafing. Further, currents and submarine landslides may cover un-embedded cables
creating potential hot spots. Similarly, these conditions may uncover an embedded cable,
exposing it to mechanical damage. Bottom materials or chemical effluents can corrode cable
armour wires, causing kinks and twists. Earthquakes and ground movement can sever cables.
Transient over voltages may damage the over-sheath jacket, causing degradation. While MI
cable designers consider most of degradation factors, they cannot predict all natural phenomena
potentially affecting these cables. Even if they could, to protect against such rare and extreme
natural events would likely result in prohibitively expensive cable designs.
d) MI Condition Assessment Techniques

MI submarine condition assessment techniques typically involve divers conducting underwater
visual inspections. Dissipation factor tests also may be conducted to assess MI cable insulation.
HVDC voltage tests and leakage current assessments are also done.

Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed cable and oil systems first required developing
end-of-life criteria for various components of this asset class. Each criterion represents a factor
The condition assessment and rating process included visual inspections and detailed reviews of
maintenance records and diagnostic test reports extracted from BCTCs asset management
information available against end-of-life criteria, condition states were rated A through E. For
this asset class, letter condition ratings have the following general meanings for various

attention;
repair.
Condition
Description
Rating
A The cable has been consistently loaded below its continuous design rating. The
cable has not been subjected to emergency loading.
B The cable has been consistently loaded below its continuous design rating. The
cable has been subjected to emergency loading within recommended time-
temperature limits.
C The cable has been consistently loaded near or at its continuous design rating.
The cable has been subjected to emergency loading within recommended time-
temperature limits.
D The cable has been consistently loaded above its continuous design rating or the
cable has been subjected to emergency loading exceeding recommended time-
temperature limits.
E The cable has been so consistently loaded above its continuous design rating or
above recommended time-temperature limits that it has become
Note: BCTC cables are seldom overloaded
Table 32.3.1 Loading History

Condition
Description
Rating
A The cable is directly buried in backfill material having stable, enhanced thermal
properties
B The cable is installed in duct bank. Ducts filled to enhance heat dissipation.
C The cable is installed in duct bank. Ducts are not filled.
D The cable is directly buried in uniform washed river sand or uncontrolled
backfill or backfill that contains rubbish or organic material.
E Cable installation is damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Note: BCTC current standard practice is C.
Table 32.3.2 Installation Method
Condition
Description
Rating
A No visible oil leakage or water ingress at terminations, reservoirs, pumps, piping,
valves, gauges, fittings or joints installed in vaults. No evidence of leakage in
buried/submarine cable or joints.
B Evidence of minor oil stains visible at terminations, reservoirs, pumps, piping,
valves, fittings or joints installed in vaults but no moisture ingress likely. No
evidence of leakage in buried/submarine cable or joints.
C Oil leakage visible at terminations, reservoirs, pumps, piping, valves, fittings or
joints installed in vaults. However rate of loss not likely to have any operational
or environmental impact and no moisture ingress likely. No evidence of leakage
in buried/submarine cable or joints.
D Oil leakage visible at terminations, reservoirs, pumps, piping, valves, fittings or
joints installed in cable vaults with a rate of loss likely to have operational or
environmental impact; or evidence of leakage in buried/submarine cable or joints.
E Oil leakage or water ingress so severe that it has caused damage/degradation
beyond repair.
Note: Oil leaks are the major cause of cable degradation in the BCTC system
Table 32.3.3 Circuit Oil Leaks/Water Ingress

Condition
Description
Ratings
A Body and sheds are not broken and are free of chips, radial cracks, flashover
burns and copper splash. Cementing rings and stem connector are secure.
Standoff insulators are sound.
B Body and sheds are not broken or cracks visible, however, minor chips are
visible. Cementing rings and stem connector are secure. Standoff insulators are
sound.
C Body and sheds are not broken, however, major chips, flashover burns and
copper splash are visible or standoff insulators are cracked or stem connector not
secure or running hot. Cementing rings are secure.
D Termination body is cracked / damaged or cementing rings not secure.
E Termination body or cementing rings are cracked / damaged beyond repair.
Table 32.3.4 Terminations
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Reservoirs, gauges, and recorders/alarms operating satisfactorily. No damage or
rust on reservoir body, weld seals, flanges, piping, fittings or gauges.
Reservoirs, gauges, and recorders / alarms operating satisfactorily. Some rust on
B reservoir body, weld seals, flanges, piping, fittings or gauges but no damage or
metal loss.
Reservoirs, gauges, or recorders / alarms not operating satisfactorily, or
E significant damage/corrosion on reservoir body, weld seals, flanges, piping,
fittings or gauges, or damage/degradation beyond repair
Table 32.3.5 Pre-Pressurized/Gravity-Fed Reservoirs, Piping, Fittings,

Gauges and Alarms

Condition
Description
Ratings
A Support structures and/or anchor bolts are tight and free from corrosion.
Concrete foundations are level and free from cracks and spalling. Ground
connections are tight, free of corrosion and made directly to steel / metal without
intervening paint or corrosion.
B Support structures and/or anchor bolts are tight but some corrosion visible
without metal loss. Concrete foundations are level but minor cracks or spalling
visible. Ground connections are tight, free of corrosion and made directly to
steel / metal without intervening paint or corrosion.
E Concrete foundations are not level or major cracks or spalling visible; or support
structures and/or anchor bolts are distorted/loose with severe corrosion and metal
loss evident; or ground connections are loose or corroded, or equipment
Table 32.3.6 Pothead Support Structures, Foundations and Grounding
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Cables and joints are well supported. No evidence of uncontrolled movement
due to thermal expansion/contraction.
B Supports show signs of corrosion but cables and joints are well supported. No
evidence of uncontrolled movement due to thermal expansion/contraction.
E Supports are corroded or cables and joints are not well supported or evidence of
uncontrolled movement due to thermal expansion/contraction, or equipment
Table 32.3.7 Cable Supports in Underground Vaults
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Insulated leads, sheath isolators and voltage limiters are clean/well coated and
show no sign of insulation deterioration.
B Sheath isolator and voltage limiters are not clean but show no sign of insulation
deterioration. Insulated leads show no sign of insulation deterioration.
E Insulated leads, sheath isolator and voltage limiters have significant insulation
deterioration or damage/degradation beyond repair
Table 32.3.8 Insulated Leads, Sheath Isolators and Voltage Limiters

Condition
Description
Ratings
A Pumps, piping, valves, fittings, filters, flow limiters, pressure switches /
transducers, gauges, and recorders/alarms operating satisfactorily. Ground
connections to equipment and enclosure are tight, free of corrosion and made
directly to steel/metal without intervening paint or corrosion. Enclosure lights,
heaters, dehumidifiers operating satisfactorily. No damage or rust on enclosure,
reservoir body, welds, seals, flanges, piping, fittings or gauges. Enclosure
concrete foundation level and free from cracks and spalling.
B Pumps, piping, valves, fittings, filters, flow limiters, pressure switches/
connections to equipment and enclosure are tight, free of corrosion and made
directly to steel/metal without intervening paint or corrosion. Enclosure lights or
heaters or dehumidifiers not operating satisfactorily. Minor damage or rust on
enclosure, reservoir body, welds, seals, flanges, piping, fittings or gauges.
Concrete foundation level but minor cracks or spalling visible.
C Pumps, piping, valves, fittings, filters, flow limiters, pressure switches/
connections to equipment and enclosure are not tight, free of corrosion or made
directly to steel/metal without intervening paint or corrosion. Substantial damage
or rust on enclosure, reservoir body, welds, seals, flanges, piping, fittings or
gauges. Concrete foundation level but major cracks or spalling visible.
D Pumps, piping, valves, fittings, filters, flow limiters, pressure switches/
transducers, gauges, and recorders/alarms not operating satisfactorily or concrete
foundation not level.
E Pumps, piping, valves, fittings, filters, flow limiters, pressure switches/
transducers, gauges, and recorders/alarms, or concrete foundation are
Table 32.3.9 Pumping Plants and Pumping Plant Enclosure
Condition
Description
Ratings
A No abnormal indication
C Definite indication of abnormal activity
D Definite indication of high levels of abnormal activity
E Very high levels of abnormal activity that require immediate attention
Table 32.3.10 Gas/Water Content and Dielectric Tests on Oil;

PD Tests on XLPE Cables

Condition
Description
Ratings
A No abnormal indication
C Definite indication of abnormal activity
D Definite indication of high levels of abnormal activity
E Very high levels of abnormal activity that require immediate attention
Table 32.3.11 Gas-In-Oil Analysis
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Values well within specifications
C Values do not meet specifications, relatively small deviation
E Values do not meet specification and cannot be brought into specified condition.
Table 32.3.12 Sheath Bonding and Cathodic Protection Tests and Tests on Outer Jacket
Condition
Description
Ratings
A Operation of all equipment in piping ladder tested satisfactorily. Valve
configuration, alarm settings and pump start-stop pressures as per design values.
Oil pressure and oil volume in reservoir or gas pressure of gas-pressurized cables
within design limits.
B Operation of all equipment in piping ladder tested satisfactorily. Valve
configuration, alarm settings and pump start-stop pressures as per design values.
Oil pressure or oil volume in reservoir or gas pressure of gas-pressurized cables
exceeds design limits by a small margin.
E Operation of any equipment in piping ladder not testing satisfactorily, or valve
configuration or alarm settings or start-stop pressures not per design values, or
oil pressure or oil volume in reservoir or gas pressure of gas-pressurized cables
below design limits, or equipment damaged/degraded beyond repair.
Table 32.3.13 Pressurizing System Testing

For purposes of formulating the Health Index, the letter condition ratings listed above also
received the following numbers shown as factors in Table 32.3.14 below:
A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1; and
E = 0.
For this asset class, the components and tests shown in the tables above were weighted based on
their importance in determining the class members end-of-life. For example, those that relate
to primary functions of the component or asset received higher weights than those that relate to
more ancillary features and functions.
The condition rating numbers listed immediately above (i.e., A = 4, B = 3, etc.) were multiplied
by the assigned weights to compute weighted scores for each component and test. The weighted
scores were totaled for each asset class member.
Totaled scores were used in calculating final Health Indices for each asset class component. For
each component, the Health Index calculation involved dividing its total condition score by its
maximum condition score, then multiplying by 100. This step normalizes scores by producing a
number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a cable in perfect condition
would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely degraded cable would have a Health
Index of 0.
substantial information. However, one need not have complete information about an asset class
to compute its Health Index. When only partial data exist it is possible to calculate a valid
Health Index if the maximum condition score for the partial data set is greater than or equal to
70% of the maximum possible condition score for a full data set (i.e., 70% Rule). For example,
using the weightings and maximum possible scores for SCFF cables in Table 32.3.14 below,
assume a cable with partial data has a maximum condition score of 91 out of the Health Index
maximum possible score of 136. That cable, therefore, has only 67% of the maximum score,
and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if the cable with partial data had a
maximum condition score of 98, it would have 72% of the Health Index maximum and a valid
Health Index.
For some components in this asset class, available data were insufficient to provide a valid
Health Index using the 70% Rule described above. In such cases, to provide BCTC with some
information about the assets health, a Health Index was calculated using a 50% cut-off (i.e.,
50% Rule). Thus, if the assets calculated condition score was greater than or equal to 50% of
the maximum possible condition score, a Health Index was computed and presented in the
results.

Table 32.3.14 through 32.3.18 show the component/test condition criteria, weightings,
condition ratings as both letters and numbers (i.e., the Factors column), plus the total possible
maximum score for each member of this asset class. Note that when a Class Failure2 is
identified, the calculated Health Index for those cables should be divided 4. This ensures that
all cables with that particular type of class failure are categorized as Very Poor.
Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
1 Loading History 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
2 Installation Method 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Leaks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
4 Terminations 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Reservoirs, Piping, Fittings, Gauges
5 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
and Alarms
Foundations, Support Structures and
6 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
Grounding
7 Cable Supports in Underground Vaults 2 A,B,E 4,3,0 8
Insulated Leads, Sheath Isolators
8 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
and Voltage Limiters
Gas/Water Content and Dielectric
9 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Tests on oil
10 Gas-in-oil Analysis 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Sheath Bonding Tests and Tests on
11 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
outer Jacket
12 Testing of Pressurizing System 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
Max Score= 136
HI = 100*Score/Max (*)
(*) All cable circuits with pervasive, recurring and inaccessible cable leaks must have their HI score divided by 4
since this represents an exceptional condition that cannot be accounted for adequately in the HI.
Table 32.3.14 Health Index Formulation SCFF Cables
2
Class Failures are failures experienced with certain models or vintages of equipment such as the failures of lead
covered cables manufactured by BICC.

Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
3 Leaks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
5 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 8
Grounding
Cable Supports in Underground
6 2 A,B,E 4,3,0 8
Vaults
Pumping Plants and Pumping Plant
7 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Enclosures
Gas/Water Content and Dielectric
8 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Tests on oil
9 Gas-in-oil Analysis 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Cathodic Protection Tests and Tests
10 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
on pipe coating condition assessment
Max Score= 120
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 32.3.15 Health Index Formulation HPFF Cables
Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
4 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
Grounding
Cable Supports in Underground
5 2 A,B,E 4,3,0 8
Vaults
Insulated Leads, Sheath Isolators
6 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
And Voltage Limiters
7 Dielectric Tests 3 A,C,E 4,2,0 12
Sheath Bonding Test and Tests on
8 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
outer Jacket
Max Score= 88
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 32.3.16 Health Index Formulation XLPE Cables

Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
3 Leaks 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Cylinders, Piping, Fittings, Gauges
5 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
and Alarms
6 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
Grounding
Sheath Bonding and Grounding Tests
7 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
and Tests on outer Jacket
Max Score= 92
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 32.3.17 Health Index Formulation SCGF Cables (Circuits 1L17 & 1L18)
Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
4 3 A,B,E 4,3,0 12
Grounding
Sheath Bonding and Grounding Tests
5 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
and Tests on outer Jacket
Max Score=56
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 32.3.18 Health Index Formulation Mass Impregnated Cables (HVDC Pole 1)
As shown in the tables above, Health Indexing for this asset class involved considering a range
of degradation information cumulatively for all components in each circuit. By providing a total
score for each circuit, this approach combines all component and criteria degradation
information into one number. Using this total overall circuit condition score, one can rank
individual circuits.
While one should not necessarily use these condition scores alone to make high cost circuit
replacement decisions, these scores can be used to establish inspection and investigation
priorities by focusing on cables with condition scores that indicate greater risk. Using these
scores as a starting place, one can then consider other strategic factors in making capital
improvement program decisions.

Table 32.3.19 was used to determine the overall condition of each cable type.
Health
Index
85-100 Very Good Normal maintenance
of a limited number of components
components
components
At end-of-life, immediately assess risk;
0-30 Very Poor Extensive serious deterioration
Table 32.3.19 Health Index Scale Underground and Submarine Cable and Oil Systems

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for the Underground and
Submarine Cables and Oil Systems in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Figures 32.4.1
through 32.4.5 summarize the results.
Health Index
Results SCFF Cable HPFF Cable XLPE Cable SCGF Cable MI Cable
Classification
Very Good 1 0 3 0 0
Good 38 2 11 3 0
Fair 14 0 1 1 2
Poor 1 0 0 0 0
Very Poor 4 0 0 0 0
Total Results 58 2 15 4 2
Percentage of
100 100 100 100 100
Total Population
Table 32.4.1 Summary of Condition Rating Results For Underground Cables

38
40
35
Number of runs of
30
SCFF Cables
25
20
14
15
10
4
5 1 1
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 32.4.1 SCFF Cable - Health Index Results
2.5
2
2
Number of runs of
HPFF Cables
1.5
0.5
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 32.4.2 HPFF Cable - Health Index Results

12 11
10
Number of runs of
XLPE Cables
4 3
2 1
0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 32.4.3 XLPE Cable - Health Index Results
3.5
3
3
Number of runs of
2.5
SCGF Cables
2
1.5
1
1
0.5
0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 32.4.4 SCGF Cable - Health Index Results

2.5
Number of runs of 2
MI Cables 2
1.5
0.5
0 0 0 0
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 32.4.5 MI Cable - Health Index Results
67.2% of SCFF Cable, 100% of HPFF Cable, 93.3% of XLPE Cable, 75% of SCGF
Cable are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements are expected in
the near term.
24.1% of SCFF Cable, 6.7% of XLPE Cable, 25% of SCGF Cable and 100% of MI
Cable are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital improvements will be
required in the next five years to prevent failure.
8.6% of SCFF Cable is in Poor or Very Poor condition or at its end-of-life.

33.0 Manholes and Duct Systems
33.1 Description
Manholes and direct buried duct installations provide access to underground transmission
facilities that require periodic inspections or maintenance. Joint bays are used temporarily to
access joints. After these temporary uses joint bays are backfilled, but their locations remain
important for access during failures.
Components of this asset class must withstand the heaviest structural loading possible at their
installation location. For example, when located in streets, manholes must withstand heavy
loads associated with traffic in the street. When located in driving lanes, manhole chimney
and collar rings must match street grading. Since manholes often experience flooding, they
commonly include drainage sumps and sump pumps.
Duct banks are typically constructed using four ducts in a two over two configuration. Ducts
are sized as required and are typically four, five or six inches in diameter.
33.2 Demographics
The BCTC-managed transmission system has 430 Manholes. Table 33.2.1 shows the count
of manholes and associated equipment grouped by type. The table also shows kilometres of
duct banks in the BCTC-managed transmission system.
Structure Type Count

Manhole 430
Manholes and Duct Systems Joint Bay 24
Duct Banks 99.1 km
Table 33.2.1 Count of Manholes and Duct Systems

Manhole degradation commonly includes corrosion of reinforcing steel, spalling of concrete,

and rusting of covers or rings. Acidic salts (i.e. sulfates or chlorides) affect corrosion rates.
Manhole systems also may experience a number of deficiencies or defects. In roadways,

defects exist when covers are not level with street surfaces. Conditions that lead to flooding,
clogged sumps, and non-functioning sump-pumps also represent major deficiencies in a
manhole system. Similarly, manhole systems with lights that do not function properly

constitute defective systems. Deteriorating ductwork associated with manholes also requires
evaluation in assessing the overall condition of a manhole system.
The ducts connecting one manhole to another cannot easily be assessed for condition without
excavating areas suspected of suffering failures. However, water ingress to a manhole that is
otherwise in sound condition is a good indicator of a failure of a portion of the ductwork.
Since there are no specific tests that can be conducted to determine duct integrity at
reasonable cost, the duct system is typically treated on an ad hoc basis and repaired or
replaced as is determined at the time of cable replacement or failure.
Computing the Health Index for BCTC-managed manholes and duct systems first required
failure.
of maintenance records extracted from BCTCs asset management system databases. In
assessing the information available against end-of-life criteria, condition states were rated A
through E. For this asset class, letter condition ratings have the following general meanings:

requires attention;
and
repair.

Condition
Description
Rating
A Walls and roof appear in good condition and free from cracks, leaks, surface
staining and deterioration. Concrete is level and free from cracks and spalling.
Rebar is in good condition.
E Concrete or rebar is damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 33.3.1 Condition of Concrete and Rebar in Manhole Roof and Walls
Condition
Description
Rating
A Chimney is free from any obstructions. No indications of wear or corrosion.
Lighting is appropriate and in good condition.
E Manhole chimney is damaged or degraded beyond repair.
Table 33.3.2 Condition of Manhole Chimney
Condition
Description
Rating
A Manhole cover as new.
B Normal signs of wear.
C Some damage or deterioration.
D Major damage or deterioration but repair possible
E Cover damaged or degraded beyond repair - cover requires replacement
Table 33.3.3 Condition of Manhole Cover
Condition
Description
Rating
A Manhole cover is level with road surface
C Manhole cover is not level with road surface, minor problem
E Manhole cover is not level with road surface, major problem
Table 33.3.4 Evenness of Manhole Cover Grade with Road Surface

Condition
Description
Rating
A Manhole flooding has never occurred
B Flooding very seldom Low risk
C Flooding occurs Some risk
D Frequent manhole flooding High risk
E Manhole continually flooded Very high risk
Table 33.3.5 Frequency of Manhole Flooding
Condition
Description
Rating
A Clean and free from signs of deterioration. Components are mechanical
sound and functional with no indications of excessive wear or looseness.
Pump and its connections are free from any indications of leaks. Pump and
its controls are fully functional. Appears as new or to have been well
maintained.
Table 33.3.6 Condition of Drainage Sumps and Sump Pumps
Condition
Description
Rating
A Appropriate availability of usable spare ducts
E No usable spare ducts available.
Table 33.3.7 Availability of Usable Spare Ducts


A = 4;
B = 3;
C = 2;
D = 1;
E = 0.
producing a number from 0-100 for each asset class member. For example, a manhole or
duct system in perfect condition would have a Health Index of 100 while a completely non-
functional manhole or duct system would have a Health Index of 0.
For example, using the weightings and maximum possible scores for manhole systems in
Table 33.3.8 below, assume a system with partial data has a maximum condition score of 47
out of the Health Index maximum possible score of 76. That system, therefore, has only 62%
of the maximum score, and would not have a valid Health Index. On the other hand, if that
system with partial data had a maximum condition score of 57, it would have 75% of the

Condition Maximum
Ratings Score
Condition of concrete and rebar in
1 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
manhole roof, and walls
2 Condition of manhole chimney 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
3 Condition of manhole cover 2 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 8
Evenness of manhole cover grade
4 2 A,C,E 4,2,0 8
with road surface
5 Frequency of manhole flooding 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
Condition of drainage sumps and
6 3 A,B,C,D,E 4,3,2,1,0 12
sump pumps when used
9 Availability of usable spare ducts 3 A,E 4,0 12
Max Score= 76
HI = 100*Score/Max
Table 33.3.8 Health Index Formulation for Manholes and Duct Systems
Table 33.3.9 was used to determine the overall condition of the manholes and duct system
asset class.
Health
Index
components
components
components
assessment
Table 33.3.9 Health Index Scale for Manholes and Duct Systems

As described above, a condition-based Health Index was derived for Manholes and Duct
Systems in the BCTC-managed transmission system. Table 33.4.1 summarizes the results,
Health Index Results Classification Number of Manholes
Very Good 28
Good 398
Fair 4
Poor 0
Very Poor 0
Total Results 430
Percentage of Total Population 100.0
Table 33.4.1 Summary of Condition Rating Results for Manholes and Duct Systems
450 398
400
Number of Manholes
350
300
250
200
150
100
50 28
0 0 4
0
0-30 30-50 50-70 70-85 85-100
Figure 33.4.1 Summary of Condition Assessment Results For Manholes and Duct
Systems

99.1% of Manholes are in Good or Very Good condition. No capital improvements

are expected in the near term.
0.9% of Manholes are in Fair condition. Increased maintenance or capital

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BCTC 2005 TSCP Exhibit B-3B

Introduction and Context

AMMA required an independent engineering company to conduct the Baseline Study.

The key objectives for the project were to:

- 1000 circuit breakers;

In addition to a clear understanding of the project objectives and scope, it is necessary

Asset Management Considerations

Asset Management Objective: Find the Balance Focus of the

As the manager of the Transmission System, it is BCTCs duty to define strategies to

3.1 High Level Asset Management Principles

Asset Life-Cycle and Processes

This means that BCTC will:

a. Look for an economic balance between maintenance and replacement to

Capital costs to buy or construct an asset. This would include

b. Apply an evergreen process for asset replacement, meaning that it will

2. In order to ensure a long-term perspective and provide for smoother revenue

Evolving Strategy and Organizational Focus

In 1999, BC Hydro introduced Reliability Centred Maintenance based on a modified

Data and Information Management

- Changes to systems and standards to document precise definitions for Health

Prioritization is a significant sub-process in the overall asset management decision

- Impact on Reliability - the key indicator for reliability is SAIDI.

- Asset Condition and Sustainability - as defined in the Baseline Study

- Financial Impact - based on Cost / Benefit Analysis.

- Societal and Consent to Operate Implications

3.3.1 Circuit Breakers

3.3.1.1 Asset Management Strategy

The Transmission System employs a variety of circuit breakers in terms of

BCTCs general strategy for circuit breakers is to refurbish rather than

BCTCs asset management strategy for circuit breakers continues to evolve

Maintenance practices for circuit breakers take into consideration individual

The asset management strategy includes replacement of breakers that have

3.3.1.3 Sustaining Capital Programs

1. Obsolescence and Unavailability of Spare Parts - Remaining

The 500kV GE type AT circuit breakers are also scheduled for

2. Environmental Issues and Reduction of Overhaul Costs - Under

3. Performance Issues - A recent string of explosive failures on the

Units are then prioritized based on:

3.3.1.5 Related OMA Initiatives

An assessment of risk and reliability issues to prioritize the replacement of

3.3.2.1 Asset Management Strategy

BCTCs asset management strategy for disconnect switches is to extend

BCTC has commissioned a more detailed assessment of issues regarding

3.3.2.2 Change from Historical Practice

3.3.2.3 Sustaining Capital Programs

3.3.2.4 Prioritization Criteria and Risk Factors

3.3.2.5 Related OMA Initiatives

3.3.3.1 Asset Management Strategy

3.3.3.2 Change from Historical Practice

3.3.3.3 Sustaining Capital Programs

3.3.3.4 Prioritization Criteria and Risk Factors

3.3.3.5 Related OMA Initiatives

3.3.4.1 Asset Management Strategy

All transformers are subjected to a Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

3.3.4.2 Change from Historical Practice

3.3.4.3 Sustaining Capital Programs

3.3.4.4 Prioritization Criteria and Risk Factors

3.3.4.5 Related OMA Initiatives

Coil Re-clamping Program. This program is intended to extend

Furan Testing. Furan analysis is another important indicator of

3.3.5.1 Asset Management Strategy

A Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) policy has been established and

3.3.5.2 Change from Historical Practice

3.3.5.3 Sustaining Capital Programs