TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MALAYSIA MALACCA

DEPARTMENT OF MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY

BETP3573: MATERIALS TESTING AND FRACTURE ANALYSIS

GROUP ASSIGNMENT

CHANG CHIA WEN B071410312

SITI NAJIHAH BINTI ROSLI B071410352
KEK ZI XIANG B071410232
ABDULLAH HAZIQ BIN MOHD AZMAN B071410690
SITI NURAZIRA BINTI ISMAN B071410572
AIMAN IZZATI BINTI WAN ZAIDI B071410567
 CONTENT

STUDY OF EVENT ON ENGINEERING FAILURES

CAPSIZE OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING PLATFORM

IN CRACK ISSUED, 1980
WELDING FAILURE

COLLAPSION OF HYATT REGENCY HOTEL WALKWAY

AFTER ROD SYSTEM CHANGED, 1981
SHEAR-TYPE FAILURE

COLLAPSION OF BIG DIG WALL OF CEILING

IN EPOXY BLAMED, 2006
CREEP-TYPE FAILURE

STUDY OF MATERIAL ON MATERIAL FRACTURES

ANALYSIS OF EROSION CORROSION OF REFINERY IN OVERHEAD GAS PIPES

ANALYSIS OF FATIGUE CRACK ON HEAVY CARGO TRAINS

DURING RAILWAY RAIL SERVICED

 CAPSIZE OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING PLATFORM IN CRACK, 1980

ENGINEERING FAILURE (WELD TYPE)

WHO The construction build from 1976 through 1977 by Compagnie Francaise
dEnterprises Metalliques, CFEM
WHAT The platform of Alexander Kielland suddenly capsized in storm.
WHEN 27th March 1980, 6.30pm
WHERE Ekofisk Oilfield, North Sea

1.0 Introduction

Picture 1.0: Capsized of the Alexander Kielland Platform

(Adapted from http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Alexander-L-Kielland-ulykkeng)

This event happen on 27th March 1980 at around 6.30pm, the semi-submersible oil drilling
platform with dimension of 103 x 99 meters and weight of 10105 tons was suddenly capsized
due to the natural disasters. The drilling derrick high 20 meter allow the accommodations of
348 peoples build by five 8.5 meter columns connected by horizontal and diagonal bracings
which diameters 2.6m and 2.2m. A storm with window velocities 16 to 20m/s, temperature 4 to
6 degree Celsius, and wave height of 6 to 10m in the Ekofisk Oilfield, North Sea lead to one of
its five vertical columns oil drilling platform support was broken off and separate from its body.
The reason of incident is fatigue crack had propagated from the double fillet weld to the tubular
bracing D6 cause the platform became unbalance and finally capsized. Totally 123 workers
among the 212 people were died on board in this incident.
2.0 Study of the Failure

Picture 2.0: Structure of the Platform

(Adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_L._Kielland_(platform) )

TYPE OF WELD FAILURE

Fatigure Crack At the HAZ area of the 6mm throat welded
Ductile Tearing & Overload Along the inner surface of the D6 bracings
Brittle fracture The outer surface of the D6 and others bracings
Plastic Collapse Five remaining joining of braces structure
Stress Concentration At the diagonal to the horizontal direction bracings

The incident happen after the overloading of five other bracings connected to the column D
were broken off. Since the hydrophone with diameter 325mm and thickness 26mm was mount
into the circular hole by welding, the drain of D6 bracing dad to be installed at the location
which 270mm away from the hydrophone. The main reason is occurring of welding failure on
the thickness of welded throat which around 6mm found with some fatigue crack in the heat
affected zone (HAZ). The welding defects such as incomplete penetration, root crack and slag
inclusion. The growth of crack in D6 bracing at the hydrophone support extend by ductile
tearing until take place by brittle fracture and ductile overload the remaining braces. The fatigue
crack is the only one weld defects found in the structure but extend to serious effect of failure.
The plastic collapse became the subsequent failure of the five remaining joining of braces to
the structure. Actually, the fracture surface were already formed before the D6 bracing was
painted. The careless of inspection increase the risk of platform when meet with storm. The
stress levels of the D6 bracings have relatively high as compare to the others horizontal bracing.
The damage stability also did not cover the loss of others horizontal bracings lead the ultimate
progressive failure of bracings.
3.0 Prevention of the failure

Figure 4.0 Process of the Platform Capsized

The consequences of the event of Alexander L.Kielland disasters was highlighting the
offshore organization whereby this incident had brought away 123 human life. Thus, several
prevention of the failure is important to avoid the same cases to happen repeatedly.

I. 100% of engineering inspection on welding area

II. Carry out the fatigue design before the construction
III. Grind the gas cutting area of circular hole
IV. Damage stability cover all the direction of column loss.
V. Revise the offshore design rules by adding countermeasures to reserve the buoyancy and
stability of platform

4.0 Material Testing

Figure 4.1: SLIC laboratory Test

The fatigue crack growth from start until the end became the cause of the capsized of
offshore oil drilling. According to Mehmanparasta et al. (2017), most of the fatigue crack
growth (FCG) data sets are not suitable for structural integrity assessment of offshore on steels
in air or seawater environment, which the fabrication usually involve welding technologies.
Thus, the FCG test placed in the SLIC inter-laboratory to test the fatigue growth of crack. It
will perform in three independent test centers to achieve the accuracy of results. The conduction
of the test under air and free of corrosion seawater environments.

Table 4.0: Chemical Composition of hydrophone and D6 bracing.

Table 4.2 Mechanical Properties of hydrophone and D6 bracing

According to Maier (1985), the carbon-manganese structural steel became the material used I
braces and hydrophone support. In order to confirm the properties of material within the
specification of chemical composition, related to Charpy notch toughness and in plate tensile
properties, several chemical composition analysis and mechanical testing were carried out
accordingly. The chemical composition analysis utilize the different materials with different
technique to determine the chemical quality, impurities, identity and molecular structure in
chemical confirmation. The mechanical test use the impact test and universal tensile to test one
of the part of hydrophone and bracing follow the ASTM standard. The comparison between the
mechanical properties and specification of fracture material tested result is further discuss to see
whether the specification meet the requirements. The result show that the ultimate strength in
the hydrophone thickness was 398MPa below the in-plane tensile strength (490MPa 608MPa)
for brace material. The low ductility of hydrophone with poor welding skill cause the partial
cracking for fillet welds after construction.
 Figure 4.2: Example of weld and HAZ region
Furthermore, the acoustic emission method is usable to detect how much of quality damage in
structural steel of hydrophone in offshore. It is not only restrict to fatigue crack but also can
detect various facture mechanism such as stress corrosion cracking tearing in HAZ steel
weldments. The examination showed that the fatigue crack propagated from two starting sites
of fillet weld of rthe hydrophone toward the direction of circumstance of D6 bracings. It
occupied more than 60% circumstance and beach marks formed about 60 to 100mm away from
the hydrophone. However, the others NDT method can used to obtain quantitative results such
as size, depth and exact position which Ultrasonic testing are necessary. The transducer and
instrument to show the data presentation either in A, B or C scan.

5.0 Reference
A,Almar-Naess, P. J. Haagesen, B. Lian, T. Moan, and T. Simonsen, Trans, March, 1984. ASME,
106, pp. 24-31.

Mehmanparast, Ali, Feargal Brennan, and Isaac Tavares . 2017. Fatigue Crack Growth Rates
For Offshore Wind Monopile Weldments In Air And Seawater: SLIC Inter-Laboratory Test
Results. Materials & Design 114, pp. 494-504.

Maier, Giulio, 1985. Case Histories In Offshore Engineering. Wien: Springer-Verlag.

Norwegian Public Reports, 1981. The "Alexander L. Kielland" Accident, pp.1-472.

T. W. Rettig, M. J. Felsen, 1976. Acoustic Emission Method for Monitoring Corrosion

Reactions, Corrosion, 32(4), pp.121-126.
COLLAPSION OF HYATT REGENCY HOTEL WALKWAY AFTER ROD SYSTEM
CHANGED, 1981

ENGINEERING FAILURE (SHEAR TYPE)

WHO Havens Steel Company fabricator and G.C.E Engineers
WHAT Fourth floor walkway of Hyatt Regency Hotel collapsed during party.
WHEN 17th July 1981, 7.05am
WHERE Hyatt Regency Hotel, Kansas City

1.0 Introduction

Picture 1.0: The Hyatt Regency Hotel Collapse

(Adapted from http://www.commandsafety.com/2011/07/17/the-hyatt-regency-walkway-
collapse-1981-the-begining-of-urban-heavy-rescue/)

This event happen on 17 July 1981 during a tea dance in Hyatt Regency Hotel of Kansas
City, Missouri around 7.05pm. According to Marshall and Richard (1982), the traditional tea
dance party held on their atrium lobby with total number of people attendance of estimated 300
persons. The guests gathered on the floor and some of the part-goes standing and dancing on
the suspended walkways. At the moments, fourth floor walkway from three various walkways
suspended suddenly collapsed, bringing down the second floor of walkway to crash on the
ground floor. The second level walkway held with around 40 people with more on third floor
and additional 16 to 20 people on the forth level watched the activities downstairs. The flaw of
the walkways connection and support rods became the blame of the incidents happened. It was
killing about 111 immediate died and leaving 200 more guests injured. Three additional victims
died after the evacuation in the hospitals.
2.0 Study of the failure

Figure 1.0: The reason of walkway collapsing

(Adapted from http://commandsafety.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2011/07/7-17-
2011-10-49-34-AM.jpg)

The possible failure leading in this event was the shearing failure of connection between the
walkway box beam with the support rod. The original design with one rod was changed into
two rod system resulted a new load path which introduced to a shear stress element to the fourth
level walkway box beam and design capable only with 30% of minimum withstanding forces.
The fabricator suggested the alternate plan such as separate two sets of tie rods can be used
which one connecting the fourth levels of walkway to the ceiling and the other connecting to
the second level of walkway to the fourth levels walkway. According to Texas A&M University
(2009), the original design load for the fourth levels walkway was 90kN when under new design
system the design load double up to 181kN. Marshall and Richard (1982) stated that the original
hanger rod design able to hold the load during the time of collapse. For the two rods system, the
box beams on nuts and washers under deformation within a year, the rod could no longer to
hold the load. The building code required only minimum 151k N less than the loading of two
rods system meaning that the original capacity better to have about 60% expected building codes
than actual capacity. The miscalculation on strength of beam with nobody to take the responsible.
The poor communications between the G.C.E. engineers and Havens Steel Company fabricators
resulted the change in design structure. The improper connection, inadequate building materials,
failure in quality checking all became the factors of the building collapsed.
3.0 Prevention of the failure

Figure 2.0 Comparison between the original and actual construction design

It is important to consider the strength of the rod properly so that the actual rod can withstand
the maximum loading force, especially when volume changes. The proper design is important
to avoid the stress concentration. The mechanical properties of the rod material need to be
undergoes the tensile testing to estimate the yielding stress and ultimate strength of the material.
The details of the mechanical properties able to make the precautions earlier before the incidents
happen. The root cause analysis need to make clear on the walkway collapse to advice the next
generation do not repeat the failure again. The performance of connection is also important to
strengthen the structure of the building. It is necessary to check all the load bearing connection
by considering the rotation movement. The communication between the engineers and
fabricators are important to avoid misunderstanding between the construction designs and make
a confirmation between the details of blueprints are followed with what is actually built.

4.0 Material Testing

Picture 2.0: The yielding of the third floor hanger and cross beam
The type of testing used in this incident was the visualization and length measurement. All the
destroyed shear part was been measured and it was discovered that the third floor hanger rod
and cross beam showing of yielding and the flanges been bent obviously. The distortion shown
the incident only caused by very light loading and dead load of structure. The tension testing
was carried out to the material of construction design. The hydraulic cylinder and electronic
load cell consists of ball and socket will fix between setup. Then, the specific threaded rod insert
installed for further inspections. The shear testing used to test the effect of the different number
of rod system on the box beam. The loading box beam with the hardened inserts of threaded rod
used to apply the test loads. The LVDT was positioned to measure the distance of the test anchor
to the box beam surface in the direction of loafing.

5.0 References

Department of Philosophy and Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University, 2009.

Engineering Ethics: The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse.

Marshall, Richard D, 1982. Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways
collapse.U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards.

Moncarz, P. and Taylor, R, 2000. Engineering Process Failure Hyatt Walkway Collapse,
Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 14(2) ASCE, Reston, VA.

Pfatteicher, S, 2000. The Hyatt Horror: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering,
Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 14(2). ASCE, Reston, VA.
 COLLAPSION OF BIG DIG WALL OF CEILING IN EPOXY BLAMED, 2006

ENGINEERING FAILURE (CREEP TYPE)

WHO The construction build from 1991 to 2006 by Bechtel Corporation and
Parsons Brinkerhoff.
WHAT The big concrete ceiling collapsed at the tunnel
WHEN 10th July 2016, 11.00am
WHERE Bostons Fort Point Channel Tunnel, United States.

1.0 Introduction

Picture 1.0 Big Dig Tunnel Collapse

(Adapted from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/us/11bigdig.html )
This incident happened on July 10, 2006, at 11am, in the Bostons Fort Point Channel Tunnel
connect to the Ted Willams Tunnel. This tunnel replaced Bostons deteriorating six lane
elevated CEntrak Artery into eight different lane of underground highway. It was considered as
the most complex and technologically highway project in the United States. A woman driver,
Milena del Valle, 39 drove toward Logan Airport was died and her husband injured in this
accident due to the 12 tons of concrete ceiling panels falling down from the roof of 90 connector
tunnel. The I90 underground highway were closed immediately for further investigation. It is
believed that the fast set epoxy substitution is not suitable due to the poor creep resistance over
long term loading. According to the reporter from National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), the safety issues claimed with the title of insufficient knowledge between builders and
designers of the nature of anchoring system in the adhesive form.
2.0 Study of the Failure

Picture 2.0 Failing of the anchor bolt

(Adapted from https://www.tunneltalk.com/Safety-Sep2006-Ceiling-panel-collapse-in-
Boston-Big-Dig-tunnel.php )

In simple word, the wrong glue used in this incident. The collapse of ceiling structure
simultaneously in creep type failure due to the lack of standards for adhesive testing anchoring
systems for the design tunnel and inadequate tunnel inspections. An anchoring system in this
tunnel to hold the several large type of concrete on the rood but finally failed, the selection of
epoxy deformed and crack with time, lead to the poor creep resistance became the main reason
of roof collapsed. The strength of concrete, steel and asphalt can keep for last over but fast set
epoxy is different material not for long term used. The size of concrete is 4m wide x 2m long x
150mm thick, the further revealed that more bolts in the I90 tunnels were suspect to fail as
shown in the picture 2.0. The bolts in the I90 are bigger and deeper than in the Ted Willams
tunnel, TWY. Due to the projects taken over by Massachusetts Departments of transportation,
the bolts were found more in the I90 tunnels than In TWT.

3.0 Prevention of the Failure

It is suggest the different epoxy or different anchoring system would apply based on the ceiling
design and installation by considering the creep resistance. The study on the type of epoxy not
able to neglect through the design of construction. The regular inspection or maintenance is
important to make sure the well condition of the tunnel pathway. The new concerns of the
ceiling fans used to circulate air through the tunnel system also need to weight carefully only
three tons per each to prevent overloading.
4.0 Material Testing

Picture 3.0 Creep Testing Machine

(Adapted from http://tbt-scietech.company.weiku.com/item/Creep-Testing-Rig-
15124433.html)
The creep test used in this incident to test the tendency of the epoxy after being subjected to
high levels stress such as high temperature. It is important to check the stability of the different
type of epoxy and its behavior in order to meet the requirements of designing and building.
After the understanding of creep test. The designing failure resistant system can be improved
especially the wall of ceiling under the pathway of tunnel. Normally, the material inner structure
when the high levels of stress applied on it.

Picture 3.0 Creep Behaviour of Epoxy based Adhesive Reinforced

(a)(c) SEM test (b)(d) TEM test
(Adapted from Journal of Materials in Civil Engineering, 2012)
After creepy test, the behavior of epoxy check through the scanning electron microscope (SEM)
which is a type of electron microscope that can produce the image surface with the beam
electron focusing and transmission electron microscope (TEM)is another microscopy same
function with the SEM only it based on the transmitted electrons but SEM based on the scattered
electron. According to Monika et al. (2009), if there are no phase and structure change after
creep test implied the material of the structure is stable enough at the tested temperature range.
5.0 References

Monika Kasiarova, Barbara SHollock, Aldo Boccaccini, Jan Dusza, Microstructure and Creep
Behavior of Si3N4-SiC Micronanocomposite, 2009, Journal of the American Ceramic
Society, 92(2), pp. 439-444

Zakiah Ahmad, Martin Ansell, Dave Smedley, Paridah Md Tahir, Creep Behavior of Epoxy-
Based Adhesive Reinforced with Nanoparticles for Bonded-In Timber Connection, 2012.
Journal of Materials in Civil Engineering, 24(7).
ANALYSIS OF EROSION CORROSION OF REFINERY IN OVERHEAD GAS PIPES

MATERIAL FRACTURE
WHO Build from 1966 by Continental Oil (UK) Ltd, Power-Gas Corporation
WHAT P4363 Overhead Gas Pipes
WHEN 16 April 2001, 2.20pm
WHERE Humber Refinery, England

1.0 Introduction

Picture 1.0 Close up to the explosion damage

(Adapted from https://www.icheme.org/communities/subject_groups)
This event happened on 16 April 2001 approximately 2.20pm, marks a date where an explosion
occurred at Humber Refinery, South Kilingholme in North Lincolnshire, England prior to the
internal corrosion caused by catastrophic failure of an overhead gas pipe. The pipes with the
diameter of 6-7 mm named as P4363 which carries flammable gas under high pressure, ruptured
and releases a huge cloud containing around 90% ethane/propane/butane. Investigation was
carried by The plant operator company and the competent authority under Control of Major
Hazard (COMAH). The explosion caused by the erosion corrosion and it shattered windows
more than mile away from Conoco complex at Immingham on Humber estuary. It also shut
down the whole refinery and the price of oil increased accordingly. However, that was not
people died in this incident but two people were injured.
2.0 Study of the Failure

Picture 1.0 Failed Pipe Elbow at Water Injection Point

(Adapted from https://www.icheme.org/communities/subject_groups)
The Healthy and safety Executive (HSE) stated that the major creason of the explosion of the
refinery was erosion corrosion of the gas pipe known as P4363. According to Wood et al. (2013),
the corrosion is a certain risk to the refineries because it contain the substances and processes
in high risk factors. The damage happened on downstream in close to the water injection point
that was not the original part of design. This failure reduced the wall thickness at outside do not
longer withstand the internal pressure. Although the gas pipe coated with black iron sulphide as
passivation layer but the water injection was became the reason of washing away the
protective coating. It increase the chance of gas pipe to attack by corrosive agents in gas stream.
Thus, the pipe subjected to corrosion failure in the wall area.

3.0 Prevention of the Failure

The appropriate material selection for the gas pipe used in the refinery is important to prevent
the pipe explosion. When the material need to approach high temperatures conditions, it is
necessary to reduce the flow rates of turbulence to lower the corrosion risk. The shape of the
pipe need to be considered carefully such the sizes of bends on the angle of the pipes should be
increased. The corrosion of carbon steel, steel nozzles, tie rods and more need to make
replacement or coated with stronger protective material. The injections point may wash away
the protective coating of material should be avoided. The regular inspection on the checking
the condition of pipe based on outer and inner are important to discover corrosion or leakage
for further maintenance process.
4.0 Material Testing

When corrosion occur on the pipe, it is usually localized manner rather than general corrosion
became very bad problem to bring the probability of explosion. Thus, one of the non destructive
testing used for detecting corrosion is dizzying array in cost effective and flexible toward the
complex shapes of pipes. Moreover, the others suitable inspection involve are magnetic flux
leakage Technique (MFL), acoustic emission, eddy current, visual inspection and ultrasonic
testing for ferromagnetic materials. However, the most popular inspection for corrosion
detection are visual inspection by using eyes to achieve high and effective result.

5.0 Reference.

Jones D S J. 2006. Support systems common to most refineries. Chapter 13. Handbook of
Petroleum Processing. D S J Jones and P R Pujad, eds. Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Public Report of The Fire and Explosion of the Conocophillips Humber Refinery on 16 April
2001, Healthy and Safety Executive (HSE)

Wood, Maureen Heraty, Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano, and Lorenzo Van Wijk, 2013. Corrosion-
Related Accidents In Petroleum Refineries. 1st ed. Luxembourg: Publications Office.
 ANALYSIS OF FATIGUE CRACK ON HEAVY CARGO TRAINS DURING
RAILWAY RAIL SERVICED

MATERIAL FRACTURE
WHO Y.D. Li , C.B. Liu N. Xu, X.F. Wu, W.M. Guo, J.B. Shi
WHAT Research study on the Failure of railway rail for finding root cause
WHEN October 2013
WHERE China

1.0 Introduction

Figure 1.0 Condition of welded rail during vehicle passing

(Adapted from Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis, 2013)

With the high speed and load railway development in the fast century, the type of fracture
accidents of railway often happen depends on the quality of the material. The fatigue had
become the primary reason from the steel rail. Thus, a failure railroad rail which was utilized
for significant cargo trains was explored with a specific end goal to discover its root cause. From
the figure 1.0, there many involvement of others physical stress or destroy in all direction of
surface during the vehicle pass by the railway. The study to discover the fatigue crack on the
railway is important to reduce the seriousness of the accidents to happen. The railroad rail of
the welding innovation and control the Cargo train to increase the efficiency of train service.
2.0 Study of the failure
The railway was usually subjected to cyclic loading with the typical chevron pattern were
observed. There is a little cleavage features lead by this pattern. By referring to the
transportation of railway, the traffic direction always opposite to the wheel rotation in
clockwise. The crack easy to happen on the surface of the railway if the structure material of
the railway is not strong or not suitable enough. This is because different types of the pressure
and stresses will deform the materials and give the crack formation on the railway materials.

3.0 Prevention of the failure

The failures railroad rail was brought on by over-load. The break beginning was the ferrite net
prompted by lacking welding innovation. Thus, in order to avoid comparable failures in future,
the welding process must be developed to avoid further fatigue crack. For instance, pro and post
weld heat treatments should be directed to remove the greater slag inclusions and ferrite network
along the grain boundaries. Moreover, it is of incredible significance to control the load of train.

4.0 Material Testing

There are many types of inspection can use in the inspection process of fatigue crack toward the
material surface of railway. For example, the testing involve are macroscopic inspections,
chemical analysis, SEM observations and metallographic examinations.

a) Macroscopic inspections

Figure 1: The macroscopic Inspection of the fracture surface on Chevron Pattern

 Figure 2: The macroscopic Inspection of the rail bottom
The macroscopic fracture morphology of the break railroad rail appeared in Figure. The chevron
pattern (Figure 1) shown by macroscopic inspection indicate that the crack origin was at the tips
of the pattern. The crack surface at the rail-head was sloped at 608 to the longitudinal direction
of the railroad rail. The fracture surface at the rail-head was very rough therefore, it was found
that this part may be caused by the last instant crack rather than the crack origin. There was a
cloudy fan-formed reach at the left bottom of Fig. 2. A little bright spot was seen by the cloudy
fan-molded region. As presented by the railroad organization staff, the bright spot was not
separated yet when the rail route rail failed.

b) SEM Observations

Figure 3: The microscopic Inspection of the fracture surface on Chevron Pattern

The observation of microscope inspection at the fracture surface of the rail bottom using the
SEM observations shown in Figure 3. The fatigue striations, which the typical microscopic
features of the metal fatigue were not able to observe in this fracture surface.
5.0 Reference
Cannon, D.F., and H. Pradier, 1996. Rail Rolling Contact Fatigue Research By The European
Rail Research Institute Wear 191.1-2, pp. 1-13.

Liu, Y, B Stratman and Mahadevan, S., 2006. Fatigue Crack Initiation Life Prediction Of
Railroad Wheel, International Journal of Fatigue 28.7, pp. 747-756.

Seo, Jungwon et al, 2010. Fatigue Crack Growth Behavior Of Surface Crack In Rails". Procedia
Engineering 2.1, pp. 865-872.

Li, Y.D. et al. "A Failure Study Of The Railway Rail Serviced For Heavy Cargo Trains". Case
Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1.4 (2013): 243-248.