Polytechnic University of the Philippines

College of Law
Sta. Mesa, Manila

Case Digests in Special Proceedings

Topics:
Guardianship
Trustees
Adoption

Group 3
Abellon, Maritess M.
Bayod, Siegfred Jr.
Marquez, Donna Mae G.
Reyes, Eduardo L.
Simbran, Ma. Christina
Salopagio, Arc Daniel
 Wilson Go and Peter Go
vs.
The Estate of the Late FelisaTamio De Buena Ventura
G.R. No. 211972
July 22, 2015

DOCTRINES:
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under
Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a trust without
using the word "trust" or "trustee."
Express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.
FACTS:
FelisaTamio de Buenaventura purchased from Carmen Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of land with an
area of 533 square meters, more or less. Situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City. She constructed a three-storey building thereon, called D'Lourds Building,
where she resided until her death on February 19, 1994. Felisa supposedly sold the subject
property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella), the latter's husband, Delfin Guerrero,
Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law husband.
Bella, co-petitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid P15,000.00 as consideration
therefor.
Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of
Bella, and respondent in both G.R. Nos. 211972 and 212045, began to occupy the second floor
of the D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until her death in 2007.
On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject
property was sold to Wilson and Peter by Bella, et al. for P4,500,000.00, a transaction
completely unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of Wilson and Peter.
Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the
subject property.
Here in respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis
Family, in their personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against
Bella, et al., Wilson, Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during
her lifetime, merely entrusted the subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the
purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and mortgage from the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have the title
over the subject property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested
herself of her ownership over the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence
thereon, as well as her act of leasing several units to various tenants. In fact, in a letter19 dated
September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970 letter) addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded Bella,
Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and
Delfin, Sr. to procure a loan from the GSIS. At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s
signatures appear beside their names.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there was an implied trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella,
Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.
2. Whether the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed

SC RULING:
YES, the words of Felisa letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of
transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to
merely accommodate them in securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she
was retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated her wish to have her heirs
share equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created
between Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and
beneficiaries, the execution of the September 21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature
of the trust established between them as an express one, their true intention irrefutably extant
thereon.
YES, In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining
trustee, sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the complaint
for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on October 17, 1997,54 or only a few
months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same
has prescribed.
 Spouses Armando and Lorna Trinidad
vs.
Dona Marie Glenn Imson
G.R. No. 197728
September 16, 2015

DOCTRINES:
Intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by
evidence, even circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes.
The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized
does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole Evidence
Rule.
FACTS:
On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig
City a Complaint for ejectment against herein respondent. It was alleged that they are the owners
of a condominium unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is located at AIC Gold Tower,
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City; they purchased the condominum unit from three (3)
Indian nationals who originally contracted to buy the said property from the developer, AIC
Realty Corporation (AIC), but had not fully paid for it yet; petitioners' purchase was evidenced
by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights6 dated June 13, 2002 and, later on, a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 13, 2007 in the name of petitioner Armando; at the time of petitioners'
purchase of the subject condominium unit, the same was being leased by respondent from the
original owners; the period of lease was from April 1, 2002 to March 1, 2003; petitioners
respected the contract of lease between respondent and the original owners; however, since June
2002 up to the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment, respondent neither remitted nor
consigned the monthly rentals due to petitioners for her continued use of the condominium unit;
the rental arrears amounted to a total of P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of demand to
respondent requiring that she, together with any and all persons using the said unit with her
approval, vacate the premises and pay her arrears; respondent ignored petitioners' demand letter;
petitioners tried to settle the case amicably but no agreement was reached.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, respondent countered that: she, indeed, entered
into a contract of lease with the original owners of the disputed condominium unit which was to
commence on April 1, 2002 and would end on March 1, 2003; sometime in June 2002, she
decided to purchase the unit; however, since she was then undergoing proceedings to annul her
previous marriage and thinking that her purchase of the subject property would disrupt the
property arrangements already agreed upon, she thought it best not to have the condominium unit
registered yet in her name; instead, she requested Armando Trinidad, who was her confidante, to
purchase the unit and register it under his name with the understanding that the said property
would actually be owned by respondent; Armando agreed without objection, which led to the
execution of the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights in his name; payments for the
purchase price were made by respondent through cash and checks paid to the original owners
who acknowledged said payments; aside from paying the purchase price, respondent also paid
the real property taxes due on the condominium unit as well as the association dues, water bills,
common area real estate tax, building insurance and other charges billed by the developer;
having full trust in Armando, coupled with her hectic schedule, respondent did not bother to
transfer ownership of the subject unit in her name; since April 2002 up to the time of filing her
Answer, respondent has been in open and public possession of the subject property; in 2007,
while respondent was out of the country, Armando, without respondent's knowledge, annotated
his claim on the condominium certificate of title; he also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his
favor on July 13, 2007; as a result, respondent was surprised to receive a copy of petitioners'
demand letter and complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an implied trust?
SC RULING:
YES, the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale do not embody
the true intent and agreement of the parties. To this end, respondent submitted sufficient proof to
refute the contents of the aforementioned documents and to establish the real intent of the parties,
to wit: (1) nine [9] checks drawn from the personal account of respondent, variously dated from
October 11, 2002 to June 11, 2003, each of which amounts to P416,666.67 and paid to the order
of AmarnathHinduja; (2) Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing the various payments made by
respondent to the former owners of the subject property; (3) Real Property Tax Receipts
evidencing respondent's payment of the real estate taxes due on the property; (4) Certification
issued by AIC Golden Tower Condominium acknowledging respondent's regular payment of
association dues, water bills, common area real estate tax, building insurance and other charges
billed by AIC; (5) Affidavit executed by the former owners acknowledging the supposed
agreement of the parties that the condominium unit shall be purchased in the name of Armando
with the understanding that he will hold it in behalf of respondent until the same could be placed
in her name.
The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized
does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole Evidence
Rule. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Thus, the second paragraph of
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions, to wit:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - x xx
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
An implied trust was created in respondent's favor, the first sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]here is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is
granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property." This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the
elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent,
constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged
beneficiary of a resulting trust.35 The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable
doctrine that valuable consideration, and not legal title, determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.36 They arise from the nature
or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of
another.
 Jose Norberto Ang
vs.
The Estate of Sy So
GR No. 182252
August 03, 2016

DOCTRINE:
A property cannot be legally reconveyed to one who had no right to own them in the first place.
Thus, a trustee cannot be validly appointed.

FACTS:
Sometime in the late 1930s, respondent Sy So, a Chinese citizen was married to a certain Jose
Ang. Testimonial evidence showed that, by virtue of her business, she was financially well-off
on her own.
The couple was childless, hence, on 1941 they adopted a child around 7 or 8-month old and
named Jose Norberto Ang, herein petitioner. Subsequently, respondent adopted three other
wards. The adoption was not done with formality. After the death of her husband, Sy So acquired
a property under TCT No. 73396 (the 10th Avenue Lot) and TCT 10425 (the 11th Avenue Lot) in
the name of petitioner Jose Norberto, who was then three years old, in keeping with the Chinese
tradition of registering the properties in the name of the eldest male son or ward. Between 1940
and 1950, a six-door apartment building on the 10th Avenue lot was constructed at SySos
expense. Later on, two more apartment doors were built on the property. For over 30 years,
SySo, along with petitioner and her other wards, lived there. SySo gave Jose Norberto a
photocop of TCT No. 10425 for the purpose of showing it to prospective tenants. Unbeknownst
to respondent Sy So, Jose Norberto filed Petitions for the Issuance of Second Owners Duplicate
Certificate of Title for TCT Nos. 73396 and 10425. In 1971, he sold the 11th Avenue lot, which
was covered by TCT No. 10425. On 1974, Jose Norbertos counsel demanded a monthly
payment of P500.00 as her contribution for real estate taxes on the 10th Avenue lot. On 1989,
said counsel wrote another letter to Sy So, formally demanding that she vacate the 10th Avenue
lot within a period of three months, and informing her that she would be charged P5,000.00 as
monthly rent.

On 1989, Jose Norberto filed an ejectment suit against respondent Sy So on the ground of
nonpayment of rentals on the 10th Avenue lot. The case was dismissed on 1989 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court. He filed a second ejectment case against SySo, but was dismissed by
MTC on 1997. On 1993 Sy So filed with the RTC a case for Transfer of Trusteeship from the
Defendant Jose Norberto Ang to the New Trustee, Tony Ang, with Damages. She alleged that
there was an implied trust over the properties in question. RTC ruled that there was no implied
trust citing Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which states that if the person to whom the title
is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is
implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. The CA
upheld the applicability of Article 1448 of the New Civil Code and found that laches had set in
as regards the 11th Avenue lot covered by TCT No. 10425.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid implied trust and hence, can re-appoint a trustee.
SC RULING:

Respondent Sy So would have this Court declare that she is the true owner of the real properties
in question and that as owner, she has the right to have the land titles transferred from the name
of Jose Norberto to that of Tony Ang, SySos trustee-designate. We find that she acquired the
subject parcels of land in violation of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real
property in the Philippines. Axiomatically, the properties in question cannot be legally
reconveyed to one who had no right to own them in the first place. The Solicitor General,
however, may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land covered by TCT No. 73396
to the State.
 Eugenio San Juan Geronimo
vs.
Karen Santos
G.R. No. 197099
September 28, 2015

DOCTRINE:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is
well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.

FACTS:
Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of land.
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled PagmamanasaLabasng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the spouses
and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as
their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridads sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufinos wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridads niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents household. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Dao was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informants signature. Basing
on the secondary evidence of Karens open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.
SC RULING:
No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of
the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent April 6, 1972 and the name of
the informant Emma Dao were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and
the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondents birth certificate. Finally, we also find that
the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and
her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by
Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his
legal heirs.

Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:

But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is
well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.
 Rizalito David
vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538
September 20, 2016

DOCTRINE:
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account
of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or
without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born
citizens.

FACTS:
Grace Poe is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. She was abandoned at the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was found by Edgardo Militar, who later turned her over to
Spouses Militar. She was later adopted by Spouses Poe. She ran as Senator in 2013 elections and
won. Rizalito David, a losing candidate, filed a Quo Warranto Petition, contesting that she failed
to comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens
from birth.

SC RULING:
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption Act
of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes
foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be adopted.
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth
certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their
adoption by foreigners.
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account
of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or
without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born
citizens.
 Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares
vs.
COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700
March 8, 2016

DOCTRINE:
R.A. No. 8043 x xx, R.A. No. 8552 x xx and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC x xx all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.

FACTS:
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by
Edgardo Militar. Parental care and custody over her was passed on to Spouses Militar. When she
was 5 years old, Spouses Poe adopted her. On October 15, 2015, she filled her COC for
presidency for May 2016 elections, declaring that she is a natural-born citizen. This triggered the
filing of several cases against her: petition to deny due course or cancel her COC (G.R. No.
221697) and petition to disqualify her (G.R. No. 221698-700).

ISSUE:
Whether our domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos?

SC RULING:
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil
Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child left by an unidentified mother was
sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status
of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.(Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
 Jose Ang
vs.
Estate of Sy So
G.R. No. 182252
August 03, 2016

DOCTRINE:
Petitioner had not been legally adopted by respondent and thus, there being no legal relationship
between the parties.

FACTS:
Respondent SySo, a Chinese citizen, was married to Jose Ang. The couple was childless. In
1941, a woman approached SySo and offered a seven or eight-month-old infant for adoption.
SySo immediately accepted the offer. No formal adoption papers were processed, but the child
was christened as Jose Norberto Ang (Petitioner). SySo subsequently "adopted" three other
wards: Mary Ang, Tony Ang, and Teresita Tan.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner had been legally adopted by respondent.

RULING (OF THE COURT OF APPEALS):

Petitioner had not been legally adopted by respondent and thus, there being no legal relationship
between the parties.

(The Supreme Court, however, did not rule on the legality of the adoption.)