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CASE DIGESTS Issue:

LEGAL SEPARATION WON the respondent Judge committed


gross ignorance of the law when he
I solemnized a marriage between two
contracting parties who were both bound
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March by a prior existing marriage.
8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99- Held:
706-MTJ)
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, No license shall be necessary for the
petitioner, marriage of a man and a woman who
vs. have lived together as husband and wife
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, for at least five years and without any
Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent. legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the
RESOLUTION foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: person authorized by law to administer
Facts: oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the
Complainant avers that she was the qualifications of the contracting parties
lawful wife of the late David Manzano, and found no legal impediment to the
having been married to him on 21 May marriage.
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four For this provision on legal ratification of
children were born out of that marriage.2 marital cohabitation to apply, the
On 22 March 1993, however, her following requisites must concur:
husband contracted another marriage 1. The man and woman must have been
with one Luzviminda Payao before living together as husband and wife for
respondent Judge.3 When respondent at least five years before the marriage;
Judge solemnized said marriage, he 2. The parties must have no legal
knew or ought to know that the same impediment to marry each other;
was void and bigamous, as the marriage 3. The fact of absence of legal
contract clearly stated that both impediment between the parties must
contracting parties were "separated." be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, stating that they have lived together for
claims in his Comment that when he at least five years [and are without legal
officiated the marriage between impediment to marry each other]; and
Manzano and Payao he did not know that 5. The solemnizing officer must execute
Manzano was legally married. What he a sworn statement that he had
knew was that the two had been living ascertained the qualifications of the
together as husband and wife for seven parties and that he had found no legal
years already without the benefit of impediment to their marriage.6
marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.4 According to him, had he Not all of these requirements are present
known that the late Manzano was in the case at bar. It is significant to note
married, he would have advised the that in their separate affidavits executed
latter not to marry again; otherwise, he on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
(Manzano) could be charged with respondent Judge himself, David
bigamy. He then prayed that the Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit expressly stated the fact of their prior
and for being designed merely to harass existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
him. contract, it was indicated that both were
"separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to


know that a subsisting previous marriage

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is a diriment impediment, which would Facts:
make the subsequent marriage null and
void.7 The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided
Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing
The fact that Manzano and Payao had among others the legal separation
been living apart from their respective between petitioner Aida Baez and
spouses for a long time already is respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family of the latters sexual infidelity; the
Code allows spouses who have obtained dissolution of their conjugal property
a decree of legal separation to live relations and the division of the net
separately from each other, but in such conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
a case the marriage bonds are not respondents one-half share in the net
severed. Elsewise stated, legal conjugal assets in favor of the common
separation does not dissolve the children; the payment to petitioners
marriage tie, much less authorize the counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
parties to remarry. This holds true all the attorneys fees to be taken from
more when the separation is merely de petitioners share in the net assets; and
facto, as in the case at bar. the surrender by respondent of the use
and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle
Neither can respondent Judge take and the smaller residential house
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David located at Maria Luisa Estate Park
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating Subdivision to petitioner and the
that they had been cohabiting as common children within 15 days from
husband and wife for seven years. Just receipt of the decision.
like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-
least five years does not severe the tie parte motion to modify said decision,
of a subsisting previous marriage. while respondent filed a Notice of
Marital cohabitation for a long period of Appeal.
time between two individuals who are
legally capacitated to marry each other The trial court granted petitioner Aida
is merely a ground for exemption from Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify
marriage license. It could not serve as a the decision on October 1, 1996 by
justification for respondent Judge to approving the Commitment of Fees
solemnize a subsequent marriage dated December 22, 1994; obliging
vitiated by the impediment of a prior petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the
existing marriage. equivalent of 5% of the total value of
respondents ideal share in the net
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated conjugal assets; and ordering the
gross ignorance of the law when he administrator to pay petitioners counsel,
solemnized a void and bigamous Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the P100,000 as advance attorneys fees
law excuses no one" has special chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4]
application to judges,8 who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, In another motion to modify the
should be the embodiment of decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought
competence, integrity, and moral and exemplary damages, as well
independence. It is highly imperative as litigation expenses. On October 9,
that judges be conversant with the law 1996, she filed a motion for execution
and basic legal principles.9 And when the pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel
law transgressed is simple and Baez filed a consolidated written
elementary, the failure to know it opposition to the two motions, and also
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10 prayed for the reconsideration of the
II October 1, 1996 order.

AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. After several exchanges of petitions and


GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent motions, the CA rendered a decision
GR 132592 setting aside the October 1, 1996
decision and further denying the motions

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for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, the court and become final prior to or
she filed the instant case before the SC apart from the decree of legal
alleging that the CA erred in setting separation. Rather, they are mere
aside the questioned order. She further incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus,
alleged that an action for legal they may not be subject to multiple
separation is among the cases where appeals.
multiple appeals may be taken.
According to her, the filing of a record on Petitioners alternative prayers that in
appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 case we do not dismiss the appeal, we
of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in return the records to the trial court and
this case. However, since respondent require respondent to file a record on
failed to file the record on appeal within appeal, or we return the records to the
the reglementary period as provided trial court and retain only the pleadings
under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule and orders relevant to the appeal, are
50), the same should be dismissed untenable. If we grant the first, we are
effectively saying that the instant case is
Issue: one involving multiple appeals, which it
is not. If we allow the second, we are
WON multiple appeals may be allowed effectively applying by analogy, Section
in an action for legal separation? 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court, without petitioner
Held: showing support therefor in law or
jurisprudence.
NO
III
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in
special proceedings, in actions for PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
recovery of property with accounting, in G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994
actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of FACTS:
eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind allowing Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete
more than one appeal in the same case were married on April 30, 1938 and had
is to enable the rest of the case to a child. Enrico contracted a second
proceed in the event that a separate and marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion.
distinct issue is resolved by the court Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979.
and held to be final.
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on
In said case, the two issues raised by October 1979, for the Declaration of
therein petitioner that may allegedly be Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile
the subject of multiple appeals arose husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
from the same cause of action, and the Concepcion, as well as for legal
subject matter pertains to the same separation between her and Pacete,
lessor-lessee relationship between the accounting and separation of property.
parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in She averred in her complaint that she
that case would only be violative of the was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
rule against multiplicity of appeals. they had a child named Consuelo; that
The same holds true in an action for Pacete subsequently contracted a
legal separation. The issues involved in second marriage with Clarita de la
the case will necessarily relate to the Concepcion and that she learned of such
same marital relationship between the marriage only on August 1979.
parties. The effects of legal separation, Reconciliation between her and Pacete
such as entitlement to live separately, was impossible since he evidently
dissolution and liquidation of the preferred to continue living with Clarita.
absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor The defendants were each served with
children, follow from the decree of legal summons. They filed an extension within
separation.[19] They are not separate or which to file an answer, which the court
distinct matters that may be resolved by partly granted. Due to unwanted

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misunderstanding, particularly in actions for annulments of marriage or for
communication, the defendants failed to legal separation. Therefore, if the
file an answer on the date set by the defendant in an action for annulment of
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a marriage or for legal separation fails to
motion to declare the defendants in answer, the court shall order the
default, which the court forthwith prosecuting attorney to investigate
granted. The court received plaintiffs whether or not a collusion between the
evidence during the hearings held on parties exists, and if there is no c
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. CFI collusion, to intervene for the State in
granted legal separation, conjugal order to see to it that the evidence
properties half-and-half. Thus, this submitted is not fabricated.
certiorari.
IV
ISSUE:
SABALONES vs CA
WON CFI gravely abused its discretion in GR 106169
decreeing the legal separation of Enrico
Pacete (P) and PR, and held to be null Facts:
and void ab initio the marriage of P and
Clarita Concepcion Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a
diplomat was assigned in different
HELD: countries and left to his wife the
administration of some of their conjugal
Yes, The Civil Code provides that no properties for 15years. After his
decree of legal separation shall be retirement he returned to the Philippines
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts but not to his wife and children.
or by confession of judgment. In case of
non-appearance of the defendant, the After 4 years he filed an action for
court shall order the prosecuting juridical authorization to sell their
attorney to inquire whether or not property in San Juan which belongs to
collusion between parties exists. If there the conjugal partnership and would use
is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney the proceeds of the sale for his hospital
shall intervene for the State in order to and medical treatments.
take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated. Respondent (wife) opposed the
authorization and filed an action for legal
The above stated provision calling for separation. Respondent alleges that that
the intervention of the state attorneys in the house in San Juan was being
case of uncontested proceedings for occupied by her and their children and
legal separation (and of annulment of the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to
marriages, under Article 88) is to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband
emphasize that marriage is more than a never returned to them being the
mere contract. legitimate family and lived in a separate
house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article and their children.
58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must Judge Umali found that petitioner
in no case be tried before six months contracted a bigamous marriage with
shall have elapsed since the filing of the Thelma Curameng. Court granted the
petition, obviously in order to provide decree of legal separation and the
the parties a cooling-off period. In this petitioner is not entitled to share in the
interim, the court should take steps conjugal properties and he is not entitled
toward getting the parties to reconcile. to support from his respondent wife.

The significance of the above Decision of lower court was appealed


substantive provisions of the law is and was granted the writ of preliminary
further or underscored by the inclusion injunction filed by the respondent to
of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of enjoin the petitioner from interfering in
Court which provides that no defaults in the administration of their properties.

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Petitioner argues that the law provides ONG VS ONG
for joint administration of conjugal
properties and no injunctive relief can be VI
issued against the other because no
right will be violated. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H.
Issue: AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal
WON article124 is applicable as regards Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS,
to joint administration of conjugal Respondents.
properties G.R. No. 165546 February
27, 2006
Held:
Facts:
Grant for preliminary injunction is valid;
it is necessary to protect the interest of Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996.
the respondent and her children and Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H.
prevent the dissipation of the conjugal Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
assets. Injunction has not permanently death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her
installed the respondent as the claim that Pablo was likewise survived
administrator of the whole conjugal by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for
assets monthly pension was settled.

Presence of 2 requirements of valid In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn


injunction: letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac,
Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas
Existence of rights of the claim for death benefits. She alleged
respondents to a share of that Rosanna abandoned the family
the conjugal estate abode approximately more than six
There is evidence that years before, and lived with another
entrusting the estate to man, and that Pablo had no legal
the petitioner may result children with Rosanna.
to the irresponsible
disposition of assets that The SSS suspended the payment of
would cause injury to his Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension.
wife and children In an investigation, it was reported that
the deceased had no legal children with
Primary purpose of the provisional Rosanna and that Rosanna left the
remedy of injunction is to preserve the deceased six years before his death and
status quo of the subject of the action of lived with Romeo while she was still
the relations between the parties and pregnant with Jenelyn.
thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs
respecting these matters during the Rosanna was advised to refund to the
pendency of the suit. SSS the amount representing the total
death benefits released to her and
Twin requirements of valid injunction: Jenelyn. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a
Existence of a right claim/petition for the
Actual or threatened Restoration/Payment of Pensions with
violation the Social Security Commission (SSC).
Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be
Article 61: after further petition for legal the child of the deceased and Rosanna,
separation has been filed, the trial court now joined them as claimant.
shall in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple would SSC rendered a decision denying the
appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd claims for lack of merit and ordering
person to act as the administrator. Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS.
On Appeal, the CA rendered a decision
V in favor of Rosanna.

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Issue: cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.
Whether or not respondents are entitled
to the pension benefit. The obvious conclusion then is that a
wife who is already separated de facto
Held: from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the
The petition is partly meritorious. husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that
Jeylnns claim is justified by the the husband and wife were still living
photocopy of her birth certificate which together at the time of his death, it
bears the signature of Pablo. Under would be safe to presume that she was
Article 164 of the Family Code, children dependent on the husband for support,
conceived or born during the marriage of unless it is shown that she is capable of
the parents are legitimate. Impugning providing for herself.
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, benefits accruing from the death of
there is no showing that Pablo Pablo, as it was established that she is
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn his legitimate child. On the other hand,
during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns the records show that Janet was merely
status as a legitimate child can no longer "adopted" by the spouses, but there are
be contested. no legal papers to prove it; hence, she
cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
The presumption of legitimacy under Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate
Article 164, however, can not extend to wife of Pablo, she is likewise not
Janet because her date of birth was not qualified as a primary beneficiary since
substantially proven. Such presumption she failed to present any proof to show
may be availed only upon convincing that at the time of his death, she was
proof of the factual basis. Respondents still dependent on him for support even
submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged if they were already living separately.
birth certificate. However, the Court RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
cannot give said birth certificate the BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE
same probative weight as Jeylnns
because it was not verified in any way by VII
the civil register.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO JR
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears
stressing that for her to qualify as a (G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985)
primary beneficiary, she must prove that
she was "the legitimate spouse Facts:
dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen and
therefore establish two qualifying Richard Upton, an American citizen,
factors: (1) that she is the legitimate were married in Hongkong in 1972. After
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent the marriage, they resided in the
upon the member for support. Philippines and begot two children. In
1982, the parties were divorced in
Rosanna presented a copy of their Nevada, United States. Alice has re-
marriage certificate verified with the civil married in Nevada, this time to Theodore
register. But whether or not Rosanna has Van Dorn.
sufficiently established that she was still
dependent on Pablo at the time of his In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice
death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a with the RTC stating that her business in
husband and wife are obliged to support Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the
each other, but whether one is actually parties. He asks that Alice be ordered to
dependent for support upon the other is render an accounting of that business,
something that has to be shown; it and that Richard be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Alice

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moved to dismiss the case on the entitled to exercise control over conjugal
ground that the cause of action is barred assets. As he is bound by the Decision of
by previous judgment in the divorce his own country's Court, which validly
proceedings before the Nevada Court exercised jurisdiction over him, and
wherein respondent had acknowledged whose decision he does not repudiate,
that he and petitioner had "no he is estopped by his own representation
community property" as of June 11, before said Court from asserting his right
1982. The Court below denied the over the alleged conjugal property.
Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.
To maintain that, under our laws, Alice
In her petition, Alice contends that has to be considered still married to
Richard is estopped from claiming on the Richard and still subject to a wife's
alleged conjugal property because of the obligations under Article 109 of the Civil
representation he made in the divorce Code cannot be just. Alice should not be
proceedings before the American Court obliged to live together with, observe
that they had no community of property; respect and fidelity, and render support
hence, barred by prior judgment. to Richard. The latter should not
Richard avers that the Divorce Decree continue to be one of her heirs with
issued by the Nevada Court cannot possible rights to conjugal property. She
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the should not be discriminated against in
Philippines and its declared national her own country if the ends of justice are
policy; the acts and declaration of a to be served.
foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
VIII

Issue: PILAPIL vs IBAY SOMERA


GR 80116
Whether or not Richard still has the right
over the alleged conjugal properties. Facts:

Ruling: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a


Filipino citizen, and Private Respondent
There can be no question as to the Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of national, were married in Germany. The
the States of the United States. The couple lived together for some time in
decree is binding on Richard as an Malate, Manila where their only child,
American citizen. It is true that owing to Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
the nationality principle embodied in 20, 1980.
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the After about three and a half years of
policy against absolute divorces the marriage, such disharmony eventuated
same being considered contrary to our in private respondent initiating a divorce
concept of public police and morality. proceeding against petitioner in
However, aliens may obtain divorces Germany before the Schoneberg Local
abroad, which may be recognized in the Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
Philippines, provided they are valid there was failure of their marriage and
according to their national law. In this that they had been living apart since
case, the divorce in Nevada released April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other
Richard from the marriage from the hand, filed an action for legal separation,
standards of American law, under which support and separation of property.
divorce dissolves the marriage.
On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Court promulgated a decree of divorce
Richard is no longer the husband of on the ground of failure of marriage of
Alice. He would have no standing to sue the spouses. However, on June 27, 1986,
in the case below as her husband or more than five months after the

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issuance of the divorce decree, private Facts:
respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
alleging that, while still married to said (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.
respondent, petitioner "had an affair Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent
with a certain William Chia as early as Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were
1982 and with yet another man named mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". del Norte for May 2007 National and
Local Elections. Malik filed a petition for
Issue: disqualification against Mohammed on
the ground that it failed to comply with
Whether or not the complainant, a the one-year residence rule. COMELEC
foreigner, does not qualify as an disqualified Mohammad. Consequently,
offended spouse having obtained a final Norlainie filed a new certificate of
divorce decree under his national law candidacy as substitute candidate for
prior to his filing the criminal complaint. Mohammad.

Issue:

WON Norlaine is disqualified for running


Held: as mayor on the ground of failure to
comply with one-year residence.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of adultery, as well as Ruling:
four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a We note the findings of the Comelec that
sworn written complaint filed by the petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing,
offended spouse. Lanao del Norte, which is also her place
of birth; and that her domicile by
Corollary to such exclusive grant of operation of law (by virtue of marriage)
power to the offended spouse to is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec
institute the action, it necessarily follows found that Mohammad, petitioner's
that such initiator must have the status, husband, effected the change of his
capacity or legal representation to do so domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del
at the time of the filing of the criminal Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since
action. Article 344 of the Revised Penal it is presumed that the husband and wife
Code thus presupposes that the marital live together in one legal residence, then
relationship is still subsisting at the time it follows that petitioner effected the
of the institution of the criminal action change of her domicile also on
for, adultery. This is a logical November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69
consequence since the raison d'etre of of the Family Code provide:
said provision of law would be absent Art. 68. The husband and wife are
where the supposed offended party had obliged to live together, observe mutual
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged love, respect and fidelity, and render
offender at the time of the filing of the mutual help and support.
criminal case.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix
Thus, private respondent, being no the family domicile. In case of
longer the husband of petitioner, had no disagreement, the court shall decide.
legal standing to commence the adultery The court may exempt one spouse from
case under the imposture that he was living with the other if the latter should
the offended spouse at the time he filed live abroad or there are other valid and
suit. compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply
IX if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. Considering that
LIMBONA vs COMELEC petitioner failed to show that she
GR# 181097 / JUNE 25, 2008 maintained a separate residence from
her husband, and as there is no evidence

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to prove otherwise, reliance on these consolidated with another case3 filed by
provisions of the Family Code is proper Potenciano Ilusorio and his children,
and is in consonance with human Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
experience. appealing from the order giving
Thus, for failure to comply with the visitation rights to his wife, asserting
residency requirement, petitioner is that he never refused to see her.
disqualified to run for the office of mayor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the
petitioner's disqualification would not petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of
result in Malik's proclamation who came merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify
in second during the special election. the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving
visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's
motion to reconsider the decision.8
X
On September 20, 2000, we set the case
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION for preliminary conference on October
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. requiring the mandatory presence of the
ILUSORIO, petitioner, parties.
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, Issue(s):
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents. The Court laid down the issues to be
G.R. No. 139789 resolved, to wit:
x------------------------------------------------ (a) To determine the propriety of a
---------x physical and medical examination of
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. (b) Whether the same is relevant; and
ILUSORIO, petitioners, (c) If relevant, how the Court will
vs. conduct the same.9
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents. Held:
G.R. No. 139808
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall
Facts: discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she
Once again we see the sad tale of a was not compelling Potenciano to live
prominent family shattered by conflicts with her in consortium and that
on expectancy in fabled fortune. Potenciano's mental state was not an
issue. However, the very root cause of
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the entire petition is her desire to have
the matriarch who was so lovingly her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda
inseparable from her husband some cannot now deny that she wanted
years ago, filed a petition with the Court Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium. Second. One reason why Erlinda K.
Ilusorio sought custody of her husband
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals was that respondents Lin and Sylvia
promulgated its decision dismissing the were illegally restraining Potenciano
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of
detention of the subject, Potenciano property rights out of pure greed.14 She
Ilusorio. claimed that her two children were using
their sick and frail father to sign away
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia.
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire She also argued that since Potenciano
to have custody of her husband retired as director and officer of Baguio
Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was Country Club and Philippine Oversees

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Telecommunications, she would logically observe mutual love, respect and
assume his position and control. Yet, Lin fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the
and Sylvia were the ones controlling the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
corporations.15 husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce
The fact of illegal restraint has not been consortium.21
proved during the hearing at the Court
of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Obviously, there was absence of
Potenciano himself declared that he was empathy between spouses Erlinda and
not prevented by his children from Potenciano, having separated from bed
seeing anybody and that he had no and board since 1972. We defined
objection to seeing his wife and other empathy as a shared feeling between
children whom he loved. husband and wife experienced not only
Erlinda highlighted that her husband by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
suffered from various ailments. Thus, but a deep sense of spiritual
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the communion. Marital union is a two-way
mental capacity to decide for himself. process.
Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano
be brought before the Supreme Court so Marriage is definitely for two loving
that we could determine his mental adults who view the relationship with
state. "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to
We were not convinced that Potenciano togetherness, conscious of its value as a
Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to sublime social institution.22
choose whether to see his wife or not.
Again, this is a question of fact that has XI
been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
taking control of the corporation, these vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
are matters that may be threshed out in K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
a separate proceeding, irrelevant in DOE, respondents.
habeas corpus. G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA.


convince the Court why we should not ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
rely on the facts found by the Court of ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
mentioned in the decision were respondents.
erroneous and incomplete. We see no G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
reason why the High Court of the land
need go to such length. The hornbook Facts:
doctrine states that findings of fact of
the lower courts are conclusive on the The undisputed facts are as follows:
Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not
for the Court to weigh evidence all over Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of
again.18 Although there are exceptions to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this
is an exceptional instance. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age possessed of extensive property
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of valued at millions of pesos. For many
the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
and 69 of the Family Code support her Chairman of the Board and President of
position that as spouses, they Baguio Country Club.
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound
to live together and care for each other. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and
We agree. Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a
The law provides that the husband and period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
the wife are obliged to live together, separated from bed and board for

Page 10 of 47
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Held:
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country corpus extends to all cases of illegal
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the confinement or detention,[13] or by
other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It
Out of their marriage, the spouses had is available where a person continues to
six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio be unlawfully denied of one or more of
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age his constitutional freedoms, where there
52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); is denial of due process, where the
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). restraints are not merely involuntary but
On December 30, 1997, upon are unnecessary, and where a
Potencianos arrival from the United deprivation of freedom originally valid
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about has later become arbitrary.[14] It is
five (5) months in Antipolo City. The devised as a speedy and effectual
children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
that during this time, their mother gave restraint, as the best and only sufficient
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg defense of personal freedom.
instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his The essential object and purpose of the
doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
consequence, Potencianos health manner of involuntary restraint, and to
deteriorated. relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with To justify the grant of the petition, the
the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
petition[10] for guardianship over the involuntary deprivation of freedom of
person and property of Potenciano action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty
Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, must be actual and effective, not merely
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired nominal or moral.
judgment.
The evidence shows that there was no
On May 31, 1998, after attending a actual and effective detention or
corporate meeting in Baguio City, deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
Antipolo City and instead lived at issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the necessarily render him mentally
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas incapacitated. Soundness of mind does
corpus to have the custody of lawyer not hinge on age or medical condition
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that but on the capacity of the individual to
respondents[11] refused petitioners discern his actions.
demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from Being of sound mind, he is thus
returning to Antipolo City. possessed with the capacity to make
choices. In this case, the crucial choices
Issue(s): revolve on his residence and the people
he opts to see or live with. The choices
May a wife secure a writ of habeas he made may not appeal to some of his
corpus to compel her husband to live family members but these are choices
with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
no. Marital rights including coverture and He made it clear before the Court of
living in conjugal dwelling may not be Appeals that he was not prevented from
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of leaving his house or seeing people. With
habeas corpus. that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no

Page 11 of 47
reason to reverse the findings of the Facts:
Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff Ramong Ong filed a complaint
With his full mental capacity coupled for the annulment of auction sale of a
with the right of choice, Potenciano parcel of land, allegedly owned
Ilusorio may not be the subject of conjugally by the plaintiff and his former
visitation rights against his free choice. wife Teodora Ong, in favor of Francisco
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his Boix. The auction sale was made due to
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will failure of the wife to pay her loan
run against his fundamental obtained from Francisco Boix who lent
constitutional right. her money in relation to her own logging
business in Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its
authority when it awarded visitation Plaintiff argued that the subject property
rights in a petition for habeas corpus is really conjugal which the wife in the
where Erlinda never even prayed for case at bar could not legally bind, and
such right. The ruling is not consistent considering that the indebtedness was
with the finding of subjects sanity. contracted by the wife only, the levy of
the subject property not owned
When the court ordered the grant of exclusively by the wife owned jointly
visitation rights, it also emphasized that with the husband is improper.
the same shall be enforced under
penalty of contempt in case of violation Plaintiff based his argument on the fact
or refusal to comply. Such assertion of that the property was "declared, under
raw, naked power is unnecessary. Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora
B. Ong while the house erected thereon
The Court of Appeals missed the fact was declared under Tax No. 06022 in the
that the case did not involve the right of name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B.
a parent to visit a minor child but the Ong (Exhibits "B", "2-B", "2-C, "4")
right of a wife to visit a husband. In case (Decision, p. 4). It was the contention of
the husband refuses to see his wife for the plaintiff that since the surname
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so "Ong" (which is the surname of the
without threat of any penalty attached to husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by
the exercise of his right. Teodora in the aforesaid declaration,
that indicates that the subject property
No court is empowered as a judicial was acquired during the marriage. By
authority to compel a husband to live reason thereof, the property in dispute is
with his wife. Coverture cannot be presumed to be owned jointly by both
enforced by compulsion of a writ of spouses.
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other process. That is a matter Issue:
beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and womans free choice. WON the property is conjugal.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Held:


Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit. No costs. NO, it is paraphernal.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS
the petition and nullifies the decision of The mere use of the surname of the
the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives husband in the tax declaration of the
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. subject property is not sufficient proof
Ilusorio. No costs. that said property was acquired during
the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It
is undisputed that the subject parcel was
declared solely in the wife's name, but
XII the house built thereon was declared in
the name of the spouses. Under such
RAMONG ONG vs. CA circumstances, coupled with a careful
scrutiny of the records of the present

Page 12 of 47
case, We hold that the lot in question is in her concurring opinion, the rule that
paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for should govern in that case is that the
the personal debts of the wife. wife's paraphernal properties, as well as
those of their conjugal partnership, shall
The presumption that property is be liable for the obligations incurred by
conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers the wife in the course of her business
to property acquired during the (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil
marriage. When there is no showing as Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited
to when the property was acquired by a in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial
spouse, the fact that the title is in the Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised
spouse's name is an indication that the Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever
property belongs exclusively to said profits are earned by the wife from her
spouse. business go to the conjugal partnership.
It would only be just and equitable that
As correctly pointed out by the the obligations contracted by the wife in
respondent Court, the party who invokes connection with her business may also
the presumption that all property of the be chargeable not only against her
marriage belongs to the conjugal paraphernal property but also against
partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) the conjugal property of the spouses.
must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of XIII
acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation GO vs CA
of the presumption in favor of the G.R. No. 114791
conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al.
vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose FACTS:
Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same Private respondents spouses
manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married
of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that: on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The
video coverage of the wedding was
When the property is registered in the provided by petitioners at a contract
name of the a spouse only and there is price of P1,650.00. Three times
no showing as to when the property was thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim
acquired by said spouse, this is an the video tape of their wedding, which
indication that the property belongs they planned to show to their relatives in
exclusively to said spouse. And this the United States where they were to
presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil spend their honeymoon, and thrice they
Code cannot prevail when the title is in failed because the tape was apparently
the name of only one spouse and the not yet processed. When they return,
rights of innocent third parties are however, they found out that the tape
involved. had been erased by petitioners and
Furthermore, even assuming for the therefore, could no longer be delivered.
sake of argument that the property in
dispute is conjugal, the same may still Furious at its loss, private respondents
be held liable for the debts of the wife in filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint
this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil for specific performance and damages
Code, the wife may engage in business against petitioners before the Regional
although the husband may object (but Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch
subject to certain conditions). It is clear 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted
from the records that the wife was trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
engaged in the logging business with the declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy
husband's knowledge and apparently Go jointly and severally liable to
without any objection on his part. The plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C.
acts of the husband show that he gave Ong.
his implied consent to the wife's
engagement in business. According to Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners
Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then elevated the case to the Court of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,

Page 13 of 47
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Zambales. The trial court found that as
trial courts decision.Hence, this petition. early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to
divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
ISSUE: returned for good in 1972, Miguel
refused to stay with Carlina but stayed
WON the husband, petitioner Alex Go is alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
jointly and severally liable with his wife Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old
Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary Miguel contracted a second marriage
liabilities imposed with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly
HELD: purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan
No. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from Pangasinan. A house and lot in
any liability to private respondents and Binalonan, Pangasinan was also
that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee, but
to said private respondents for the this was disclaimed by the notary public
judgment award. Under Article 117 of saying that the money used to buy the
the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the property was given by Miguel. On
Family Code), the wife may exercise any October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia
profession, occupation or engage in Palang executed a deed of donation as a
business without the consent of the form of compromise agreement. The
husband. parties agreed to donate their conjugal
property to their only child, Herminia
In the instant case, SC is convinced that Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son,
it was only petitioner Nancy Go who Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and
entered into the contract with private Erlinda were convicted of concubinage
respondent. Consequently, SC rules that upon Carlinas complaint. Two years
she is solely liable to private later, Miguel died.
respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her
contracts produce effect only as daughter Herminia filed an action for
between the parties who execute them. recovery of ownership and possession of
the Riceland and house and lot both
located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The
RTC dismissed the case and ruled in
favour of Agapay. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the trial
courts decision and declared Carlina
and Herminia Palang the owners of the
properties in question.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUNSBAND AND WIFE Issue:

XIV WON the house and lot in Pangasinan is


a valid donation by Miguel to Erlinda.
AGAPAY VS PALANG
Held:
Facts:
With respect to the house and lot,
Miguel Palang contracted his first Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
July 16, 1949. A few months after the when she was only 22 years old. The
wedding, in October 1949, he left for testimony of the notary public who
work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only prepared the deed of conveyance for the
child, Herminia Palang, was born on May property reveals the falsehood of this
12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
Philippines, he stayed with his brother in that Miguel Palang provided the money

Page 14 of 47
for the purchase price and directed that the Office of the Register of Deeds on
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the May 15, 1970. In due course, the original
vendee. title was cancelled and in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
The transaction was properly a donation 84897 was issued in the name of the
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one respondents Benito and Tomasa.
which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was When the donor died, the 6 heirs left ,
made between persons guilty of adultery including Respondent Benito, executed
or concubinage at the time of the a Deed of Partition with Recognition of
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Rights on March 18, 1973 wherein they
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family distributed among only three (3) of
Code expressly provides that the them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left
prohibition against donations between by their common progenitors, excluding
spouses now applies to donations the land in question and other lots
between persons living together as disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
husband and wife without a valid earlier.
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out Disagreements arose among them.
to be better than those in legal union. Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed
a Complain for the annulment
XV of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897
against respondents Benito and Tomasa
ARCABA VS BATOCAEL before the RTC of Pangasinan on
December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged
XVI that the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title was fraudulent; that
Romana Locquiao- Valencia and the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that
Constancia L. Valencia, petitioners, the notary public who notarized the
VS document had no authority to do so,
Benito A.Locquiao, now deceased and; that the donation did not observe
and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao, the form required by law as there was no
Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of written acceptance on the document
Deeds of Pangasinan, respondents. itself or in a separate public instrument.
G.R. No. 122134 Issue:

Facts: Whether or not the donation propter


nuptias is valid?
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and
Raymunda Locquiao(donor) executed a Held:
deed of donation propter nuptias which
was written in the Ilocano dialect, Yes the donation propter nuptias is valid.
denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in
favor of their son, respondent Benito Unlike ordinary donations,
Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) donations propter nuptias or donations
and his prospective bride, respondent by reason of marriage are those made
Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed, before its celebration, in consideration of
the donees were gifted with four (4) the same and in favor of one or both of
parcels of land, including the land in the future spouses. The distinction is
question, as well as a male cow and one- crucial because the two classes of
third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house donations are not governed by exactly
of the donor parents, in consideration of the same rules, especially as regards the
the impending marriage of the donees. formal essential requisites.

Respondents- donees took their Under the Old Civil Code,


marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the donations propter nuptias must be made
fact of their marriage was inscribed at in a public
the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. They instrument in which the property don
registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with ated must be specifically

Page 15 of 47
described. However, Article 1330 of the repeated demands for accounting and
same Code provides that acceptance winding up went unheeded, prompting
is not necessary to the validity of him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of
such gifts. In other words, the a Partnership Affairs, Accounting,
celebration of the marriage between the Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
beneficiary couple, in tandem with Damages with Writ of Preliminary
compliance with the prescribed form, Attachment.
was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua,
Civil Code. and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan
solidarily liable for any and all claims of
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are Chua. RTCs judgment was upheld by the
different. Article 127 thereof provides CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and
that the form of donations propter sold at public auction Sunga-Chans
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of property in Paco, Manila, over which a
Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-
contains the Statute of Frauds requires Chan questions the levy on execution of
that the contracts mentioned thereunder the subject property on the ground that
need be in writing only to be it is an absolute community property
enforceable. However, as provided in with her husband Norberto Chan.
Article 129, express acceptance is
not necessary for the validity of Issue:
these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient. Whether the absolute community of
property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan
It is settled that only laws existing at the and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made
time of the execution of a contract are to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan
applicable thereto and not later statutes, under the judgment.
unless the latter are specifically intended
to have retroactive effect. Consequently, Held:
it is the Old Civil Code which applies in
this case since the donation propter Yes.
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the
New Civil Code took effect only on The records show that spouses Sunga-
August 30, 1950. As a consequence, Chan and Norberto were married after
applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil the effectivity of the Family Code.
Code in the determination of the validity Withal, their absolute community
of the questioned donation, it does not property may be held liable for the
matter whether or not the donees had obligations contracted by either spouse.
accepted the donation. The validity of Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code
the donation is unaffected in either case. pertinently provides: Art. 94. The
absolute community of property shall be
SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY liable for: x x x (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the
XVII marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
SUNGA CHAN vs CA the community, or by both spouses, or
GR 164401 by one spouse with the consent of the
other; (3) Debts and obligations
Facts: contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that
In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto the family may have been benefited.
Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas Absent any indication otherwise, the use
Appliance Center (Shellite). After and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-
Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, Chan of the assets of Shellite even after
Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, the business was discontinued on May
petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered
continued with the business without to have been used for her and her
Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent husband's benefit.

Page 16 of 47
senile and has a childlike mind. She told
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS defendant, Procopio that their father was
General Provisions already incapacitated and they had to
talk things over and the latter replied
XVIII that it was not yet the time to talk about
the matter.
PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS
RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, Plaintiff, then, complained to the
petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS Barangay Captain for
and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA reconciliation/mediation but no
RETUYA, respondents. settlement was reached, hence, the said
G.R. No. 143286 official issued a certification to file
action. Written demands were made by
Facts: plaintiff, through her counsel, to the
defendants, including the illegitimate
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the family asking for settlement but no
legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, settlement was reached by the parties.
having been married to the latter on Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad
October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful Retuya, testified that the parcel of land
wedlock, they begot five (5) children, covered by tax declaration marked
namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Exhibit "T" was the property bought by
Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya her father from Adriano Marababol for at
resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During the time of purchase of the property,
their marriage they acquired real defendant Pacita Villanueva had no
properties and all improvements means of livelihood.
situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant, ISSUE:
Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City which he Whether the subject properties are
inherited from his parents Esteban conjugal.
Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of HELD:
approximately eight (8) parcels of land
in Mandaue City. In 1945, defendant Petitioners claim that the subject
Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his properties are exclusive properties of
legitimate family and cohabited with Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein they claim is Pacitas exclusive property.
defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their This issue is easily resolved. The Family
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
only person who received the income of govern the property relations between
the above-mentioned properties Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the married before the effectivity of Family
time she started living in concubinage Code. Article 105 of the Family Code
with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had explicitly mandates that the Family Code
no properties of her own from which she shall apply to conjugal partnerships
could derive income. established before the Family Code
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and without prejudice to vested rights
cannot talk anymore. Natividad Retuya already acquired under the Civil Code or
knew of the physical condition of her other laws. Thus, under the Family Code,
father because they visited him at the if the properties are acquired during the
hospital. From the time defendant marriage, the presumption is that they
Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on are conjugal. The burden of proof is on
January 27, 1985 and until the present, it the party claiming that they are not
is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
Nicolas illegitimate children who has requirement that the properties must
been receiving the income of these first be proven to have been acquired
properties. Witness Natividad Retuya during the marriage before they are
went to Procopio to negotiate because at presumed conjugal. Petitioners argue
this time their father Nicolas was already

Page 17 of 47
that Eusebia failed to prove this pre- an act that is both illegal and immoral.
requisite. We disagree. What petitioners fail to grasp is that
Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot
The question of whether the subject work to the detriment of Eusebia, the
properties were acquired during the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a and Eusebia continued to exist
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate regardless of the fact that Nicolas was
courts agreed that the subject properties already living with Pacita. Hence, all
were in fact acquired during the property acquired from 7 October 1926,
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax the date of Nicolas and Eusebias
declarations covering the subject marriage, until 23 November 1996, the
properties, along with the unrebutted date of Eusebias death, are still
testimony of Eusebias witnesses, presumed conjugal. Petitioners have
establish this fact. We give due neither claimed nor proved that any of
deference to factual findings of trial the subject properties was acquired
courts, especially when affirmed by the outside or beyond this period.
appellate court. A reversal of this finding
can only occur if petitioners show Finally, petitioners reliance on Article
sufficient reason for us to doubt its 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A
correctness. Petitioners in the present reading of Article 148 readily shows that
case have not. there must be proof of "actual joint
contribution" by both the live-in partners
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is before the property becomes co-owned
conjugal or not, the answer came from by them in proportion to their
petitioners themselves. Nicolas and contribution. The presumption of
Eusebia were married on 7 October equality of contribution arises only in the
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started absence of proof of their proportionate
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 contributions, subject to the condition
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were that actual joint contribution is proven
married on 16 December 1996. first. Simply put, proof of actual
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot contribution by both parties is required,
No. 152 was purchased on 4 October otherwise there is no co-ownership and
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. no presumption of equal sharing.
152 is clearly during the marriage of Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
Nicolas and Eusebia. contribution by Pacita in the acquisition
of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed
Since the subject properties, including to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the with her own money, or that she actually
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the contributed her own money to acquire it.
presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal XIX
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the De Leon v. De Leon
subject properties are not conjugal. The GR# 185063
presumption in Article 116, which
subsists "unless the contrary is proved," Facts:
stands as an obstacle to any claim the
petitioners may have. The burden of On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon,
proving that a property is exclusive then single, and the Peoples Homesite
property of a spouse rests on the party and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
asserting it and the evidence required into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
must be clear and convincing. purchase on installment of a 191.30
Petitioners failed to meet this standard. square-meter lot situated in Fairview,
Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24,
The cohabitation of a spouse with 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in
another person, even for a long period, a civil rite officiated by the Municipal
does not sever the tie of a subsisting Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this
previous marriage. Otherwise, the law union were born Danilo and Vilma.
would be giving a stamp of approval to Following the full payment of the cost

Page 18 of 47
price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC was acquired with funds of the
executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed partnership. Only proof of acquisition
of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, during the marriage is needed to raise
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. the presumption that the property is
173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 conjugal. In fact, even when the manner
in the name of Bonifacio, "single." in which the properties were acquired
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, does not appear, the presumption will
sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, still apply, and the properties will still be
and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa considered conjugal.
(Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The
conveying Deed of Sale dated January In the case at bar, ownership over what
12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the was once a PHHC lot and covered by the
written consent and signature of Anita. PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Sell was only transferred during the
Three months later, the Tarrosas marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well
registered the Deed of Sale. They settled that a conditional sale is akin, if
secured the issuance in their names not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In
from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. both types of contract, the efficacy or
Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a obligatory force of the vendors
reconveyance suit before the RTC in obligation to transfer title is
Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita subordinated to the happening of a
and her children alleged, among other future and uncertain event, usually the
things, that fraud attended the full payment of the purchase price, so
execution of the Deed of Sale and that that if the suspensive condition does not
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show take place, the parties would stand as if
that he was still the owner of the parcel the conditional obligation had never
of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer existed. In other words, in a contract to
with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred sell ownership is retained by the seller
that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was and is not passed to the buyer until full
his exclusive property inasmuch as he payment of the price, unlike in a
was still single when he acquired it from contract of sale where title passes upon
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not delivery of the thing sold.
aware of the supposed marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time It cannot be over-emphasized that the
of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
ruled in favor of Anita and her children. consequence of the husband alienating
CA held that the Tarrosas failed to or encumbering any real property of the
overthrow the legal presumption that the conjugal partnership without the wifes
parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. consent. To a specific point, the sale of a
conjugal piece of land by the husband,
Issue: as administrator, must, as a rule, be with
the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not
WON the property in question is part of valid. So it is that in several cases we
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and ruled that the sale by the husband of
Anita. property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the
Ruling: wife is void ab initio, absent any showing
that the latter is incapacitated, under
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the civil interdiction, or like causes. The
governing provision in effect at the time nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, from the fact that sale is in
provides that all property of the contravention of the mandatory
marriage is presumed to belong to the requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
conjugal partnership unless it is proved Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
that it pertains exclusively to the consent of the wife before the husband
husband or the wife. For the may alienate or encumber any real
presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. property of the conjugal partnership, it
Court of Appeals teaches, even follows that the acts or transactions
necessary to prove that the property executed against this mandatory

Page 19 of 47
provision are void except when the law and are in actual and physical
itself authorized their validity. possession thereof up to the present,
and have made considerable
As a final consideration, the Court improvements thereon, including a
agrees with the CA that the sale of one- residential house where they presently
half of the conjugal property without reside.
liquidation of the partnership is void.
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal From 1966 (the time when the
partnership, the interest of each spouse [respondents] were able to possess the
in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a property) to 1983 (the time when the
mere expectancy, which constitutes [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had
and does not ripen into a title until it already been cancelled by the Registry
appears that there are assets in the of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a
community as a result of the liquidation span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995
and settlement.26 The interest of each (the time when the Heirs filed the
spouse is limited to the net remainder or original action) is a period of another 12
"remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) years.
resulting from the liquidation of the
affairs of the partnership after its The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed
dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisuras favor,
husband or wife to one-half of the expressly states that the former, in
conjugal assets does not vest until the consideration of the amount of
dissolution and liquidation of the P6,500.00, transfers his rights over the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution subject property to the latter. Notably,
of the marriage, when it is finally such deed was simultaneously executed
determined that, after settlement of with the SPA on February 14, 1963.
conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the Petitioners contend that the lack of
spouses or their respective heirs. consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez
(the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, deed of sale fictitious, hence null and
SR., namely: SERGIA V. HERNANDEZ void in accordance with Article 1409 of
(Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V. the Civil Code.
HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA
LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ, ISSUE:
Petitioners,
vs. Whether or not the consent of the
PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES spouse is necessary for the validity of
CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND alienation of conjugal property?
QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Respondents. HELD:
G.R. No. 146548
No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez,
FACTS: Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus,
the sale of his share in the conjugal
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a property was valid. With regard to the
piece of real property in 1958 by the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to
PHHC as part of the governments the sale involving their conjugal
housing program at the time. Title over property, the trial court found that it was
the said property was issued in 1966 in lacking because said wifes signature on
the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full the SPA was falsified. However, Sergias
payment for the property was received lack of consent to the sale did not render
by the PHHC. the transfer of her share invalid.

Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., It bears stressing that the subject matter
took possession of the said property. On herein involves conjugal property. Said
the other hand, the [respondents] took property was awarded to Domingo
possession of the said property in 1966 Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed

Page 20 of 47
SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. the transaction necessarily barred her
Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, from questioning the sale of the subject
Sr. covering the subject property was property to third persons.
issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the
property to Melanie Mingoa and the
issuance of a new title in her name
happened in 1978. Since all these events
occurred before the Family Code took
effect in 1988, the provisions of the New
Civil Code govern these transactions. We
quote the applicable provisions, to wit: XXI
Art. 165. The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal PHILIPS MATTHEWS vs BENJAMIN
partnership. and JOSELYN TAYLOR
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been GR 164584
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction Facts:
or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin
any real property of the conjugal A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
partnership without the wifes consent. If married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-
she refuses unreasonably to give her year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while
consent, the court may compel her to their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
grant the same. x x x. bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294
Art. 173. The wife may, during the square-meter lot (Boracay property)
marriage, and within ten years from the situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
transaction questioned, ask the courts Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in
for the annulment of any contract of the consideration of P129,000.00. The sale
husband entered into without her was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
consent, when such consent is required, Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the
or any act or contract of the husband latters funds, constructed
which tends to defraud her or impair her improvements thereon and eventually
interest in the conjugal partnership converted the property to a vacation and
property. Should the wife fail to exercise tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben
this right, she or her heirs, after the Bow Inn. All required permits and
dissolution of the marriage, may demand licenses for the operation of the resort
the value of property fraudulently were obtained in the name of Ginna
alienated by the husband. Celestino, Joselyns sister.

In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a
that: falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
The Family Code, which took effect on 3 Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn
August 1988, provides that any executed a Special Power of Attorney
alienation or encumbrance made by the (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
husband of the conjugal partnership the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
property without the consent of the wife sub-lease and otherwise enter into
is void. However, when the sale is made contract with third parties with respect
before the effectivity of the Family Code, to their Boracay property.
the applicable law is the Civil Code.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
that the disposition of conjugal property entered into an Agreement of Lease
without the wife's consent is not void but (Agreement) involving the Boracay
merely voidable. property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental of P12,000.00. The
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to agreement was signed by the parties
file with the courts an action for and executed before a Notary Public.
annulment of the contract during the Petitioner thereafter took possession of
marriage and within ten (10) years from

Page 21 of 47
the property and renamed the resort as We find and so hold that Benjamin has
Music Garden Resort. no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Issue(s): Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and
The marital consent of public lands in the Philippines.
respondent benjamin taylor is not Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
required in the agreement of the designated vendee in the Deed of
lease dated 20 july 1992. Sale of said property, she acquired sole
Granting arguendo that his ownership thereto. This is true even if
consent is required, benjamin we sustain Benjamins claim that he
taylor is deemed to have given provided the funds for such acquisition.
his consent when he affixed his By entering into such contract knowing
signature in the agreement of that it was illegal, no implied trust was
lease as witness in the light of the created in his favor; no reimbursement
ruling of the supreme court in the for his expenses can be allowed; and no
case of spouses pelayo vs. Melki declaration can be made that the subject
perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8, property was part of the
2005. conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has
The parcel of land subject of the no capacity or personality to question
agreement of lease is the the subsequent lease of the Boracay
exclusive property of jocelyn c. property by his wife on the theory that in
Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the so doing, he was merely exercising the
light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r. no. prerogative of a husband in respect of
74833, january 21, 1991. conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect
The courts a quo erroneously controversion of the constitutional
applied article 96 of the family prohibition. If the property were to be
code of the philippines which is a declared conjugal, this would accord the
provision referring to the absolute alien husband a substantial interest and
community of property. The right over the land, as he would then
property regime governing the have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
property relations of benjamin disposition. This is a right that the
taylor and joselyn taylor is the Constitution does not permit him to
conjugal partnership of gains have.
because they were married on 30
june 1988 which is prior to the Claiming that the Agreement was null
effectivity of the family code. and void since it was entered into by
Article 96 of the family code of Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent,
the philippines finds no Benjamin instituted an action for
application in this case. Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and
The honorable court of appeals the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that
ignored the presumption of his funds were used in the acquisition
regularity in the execution of and improvement of the Boracay
notarial documents. property, and coupled with the fact that
he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property
The honorable court of appeals required his consent.
failed to pass upon the
counterclaim of petitioner despite In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered
the fact that it was not contested into between Joselyn and petitioner
and despite the presentation of cannot be nullified on the grounds
evidence establishing said claim. advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold
its validity.
Held:

Page 22 of 47
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it and respondent as buyers do not reflect
unnecessary to address the other issues the true agreement of the parties since
raised by the petitioner. respondent did not pay a single centavo
of the purchase price and was not in fact
a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his
XXII exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the
real and absolute owner of the
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, properties; and, that petitioner acquired
vs. absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, of Absolute Sale/Assignment which
Respondent. Jambrich executed in his favor.
GR 159310
In her Answer, respondent belied the
Facts: allegation that she did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price. On the
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was contrary, she claimed that she "solely
assigned by his employer to work here in and exclusively used her own personal
the Philippines where he met respondent funds to defray and pay for the purchase
Antonietta Descallar, a separated price of the subject lots in question," and
mother of two boys, with whom he had a that Jambrich, being an alien, was
live-in relationship with. During the prohibited to acquire or own real
course of their relationship, a Deed of property in the Philippines.
Absolute Sale was issued in their favor The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a petitioner. The decision was however
house and lot where they transferred reversed by CA on appeal.
and lived together. When the deed was
presented before the Registry of Deeds ISSUE:
for registration, a Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued only in the name of WON the petitioner as the successor-in-
respondent and the registration was interest of Jambrich, who is a resident
refused on the part of Jambrich on the alien, has validly obtained the right over
ground that he was an alien and could the subject property without violating
not acquire alienable lands of the public the prohibition under the Constitution.
domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name
was erased from the deed of sale. In the HELD:
meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of
respondent. However, not long after, the YES.
couple broke up and lived separately
without settlement of their properties. As the rule now stands, the fundamental
While still in the Philippines, Jambrich law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with acquiring or holding title to private
whom he was indebted in the amount of lands, except only by way of legal
P150,000 relative to the purchases he succession or if the acquisition was
made from the latter which he was not made by a former natural-born citizen.29
able to pay. Believing that his interest in
his property with the Agro-Macro Therefore, in the instant case, the
Subdivision still exist, he sold the same transfer of land from Agro-Macro
by way of Deed of Absolute Development Corporation to Jambrich,
Sale/Assignment to petitioner. When who is an Austrian, would have been
petitioner was about to register the declared invalid if challenged, had not
deed, he discovered, however, that the Jambrich conveyed the properties to
property was already transferred in the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In
name of respondent and had already United Church Board for World Ministries
been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the
complaint for recovery of the real consistent ruling in a number of cases31
property. Petitioner alleged that the that if land is invalidly transferred to an
Deed of Absolute Sale over the alien who subsequently becomes a
properties which identified both Jambrich Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,

Page 23 of 47
the flaw in the original transaction is bidder at such public auction, a
considered cured and the title of the certificate of sheriffs sale was issued
transferee is rendered valid. Applying and, thereafter, registered with the
United Church Board for World Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996.
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.: By virtue of a power of attorney
executed by Villegas wife, Marilou C.
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the
of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the latter redeemed the property from the
properties under litigation [were] void ab HMDF.
initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral
a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these (Catral), by virtue of the same power of
properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in
citizen from him, has cured the flaw in favor of respondent.
the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid. Isaac claims that the power of attorney
executed in favor of Catral, his mother-
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in in-law, created a principal-agent
United Church Board for World relationship only between his wife,
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as
cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens principal, and Catral, as agent, and then
is intended to preserve the nations land only for the latter to administer the
for future generations of Filipinos, that properties of the former; that he never
aim is achieved by making lawful the authorized Catral to administer his
acquisition of real estate by aliens who properties, particularly, herein subject
became Filipino citizens by naturalization property; and that Catral had no
or those transfers made by aliens to authority to execute the Deed of
Filipino citizens. As the property in Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent,
dispute is already in the hands of a since from the very wordings of the
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there power of attorney, she had no special
would be no more public policy to be authority to sell or convey any specific
protected. The objective of the real property.
constitutional provision to keep our lands
in Filipino hands has been achieved. On December 19, 1996, the RTC
dismissed the Complaint and on appeal,
Exclusive Property of Each Spouse CA affirmed in toto the RTC Judgment.
XXIII Hence, this petition for review.

VILLEGAS vs LINGAN ISSUES:


GR 153839
(1) WON the wife of the petitioner
FACTS: Isaac, as successor-in-interest,
may validly redeem the property
Isaac Villegas was the registered owner in question
of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, (2) WON the petitioner husband
Cagayan. In order to secure the payment Isaac has a cause of action
of a loan from the Development Bank of against his respondent wife
the Philippines (DBP), Isaac constituted a Marilou
real estate mortgage over the said HELD:
parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said
loan and mortgage was subsequently 1. YES.
transferred by the DBP to the Home Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that
Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).When in all cases in which an extrajudicial
the Isaac failed to settle his loan, the sale is made under the special power
real estate mortgage he constituted over hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his
the property was foreclosed, the successors-in-interest or any judicial
property was sold at public auction and, creditor or judgment creditor of said
as the HMDF was itself the highest debtor, or any person having a lien on

Page 24 of 47
the property subsequent to the defendant violates the right of the
mortgage or deed of trust under which plaintiff.
the property is sold, may redeem the
same at any time within the term of one In the present case, there is no property
year from and after the date of sale; and right that exists in favor of the
such redemption shall be governed by petitioner, and, with more reason, no
the provisions of section 464 to 466, such obligation arises in behalf of the
inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, defendant, herein respondent, to respect
in so far as these are not inconsistent such right.There was no violation of a
with the provisions of this Act. legal right of the petitioner.

Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of It must be stressed that there is no
Civil Procedure provides that real allegation or proof that Marilou
property sold as provided in the last redeemed the property in behalf of the
preceding section, or any part thereof petitioner. Marilou did not act as agent
sold separately, may be redeemed in the of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
manner hereinafter provided, by the the right of redemption in her own right
following persons: xxxx a)The judgment as successor-in-interest of the petitioner.
obligor, or his successor-in-interest in Under the circumstances, should there
the whole or any part of the property; be any right violated, the aggrieved
party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The
The successor-in-interest of the property in question was the exclusive
judgment debtor referred to in the above property of Marilou by virtue of her
provision includes a person who redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid
succeeds to his property by operation of cause of action against the respondent.
law, or a person with a joint interest in
the property, or his spouse or heirs. Divested of all interest over the
property, the petitioner has ceased to be
Under the above provision, petitioner the proper party who may challenge the
could have redeemed the property from validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a
Marilou after she had redeemed it. The rule, the agency, as a contract, is
pleadings filed and the records of this binding only between the contracting
case do not show that petitioner parties, then only the parties, as well as
exercised said right. Consequently, as the third person who transacts with the
correctly held by the CA, Marilou parties themselves, may question the
acquired ownership of the subject validity of the agency or the violation of
property. All rights and title of the the terms and conditions found therein.
judgment obligor are transferred upon This rule is a corollary of the foregoing
the expiration of the right of redemption. doctrine on the rights of real parties in
And where the redemption is made interest. xxxxx Petition is denied.
under a property regime governed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, Article CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
109 of the Family Code provides that XXIV
property acquired by right of redemption
is the exclusive property of the spouses PISUEA vs HEIRS OF PETRA
redeeming the property. UNATING
GR 132803
2. NO. Facts:
A cause of action is an act or omission of
the defendant in violation of the legal Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are
right of the plaintiff. the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino
A complaint states a cause of action Villar. They claimed that the land in
when it contains three essential dispute known as Lot 1201 was
elements:(1) a right in favor of the registered in the name of Petra Unating
plaintiff by whatever means and under married to Aquilino Villar. However,
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation sometime in 1950, after the death of
of the defendant to respect such right; Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered
and (3) the act or omission of the into an oral partnership agreement for
ten years with Agustin Navarra involving

Page 25 of 47
the swampy portion of the lot in question paraphernal property of Petra Unating.
consisting of around four hectares which Concededly, properties acquired during
was converted into a fishpond with the the marriage are presumed to be
investment capital of Agustin Navarra conjugal. However, this prima facie
and the net income shall be divided presumption cannot prevail over the
equally between Aquilino Villar and his cadastral courts specific finding,
children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on reached in adversarial proceedings, that
one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the the lot was inherited by Petra Unating
other hand. from her mother.

In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of
heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina
land in question until the defendant effectively transferred to Agustin
Jessie Pisuea, son-in-law of Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title
Navarra, disturbed their possession over their two-thirds share in the
sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime disputed lot. However, they could not
in 1982, the defendant, with the have disposed of their fathers share in
company of several men, including the same property at the time, as they
policemen, forcibly took physical were not yet owners. At the most, being
possession of the said land from the the only children, they had an inchoate
heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed interest in their fathers share. When
the instant action for recovery of Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without
possession and ownership of a parcel of disposing of his one-third share in the
land against Jessie Pisuea. disputed property, Felix and Catalinas
inchoate interest in it was actualized,
On the other hand, defendant countered because succession vested in them the
that the whole land in dispute was sold title to their fathers share and,
by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to consequently, to the entire lot. Thus,
Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by that title passed to Agustin Navarra,
Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and pursuant to Article 1434 of the present
his wife purchased the said land from Civil Code, which was already in force at
the heirs of Agustin Navarra. the time of Aquilinos death in 1953.

After trial, the court a quo ruled that XXV


since the disputed lot was the conjugal
property of Spouses Petra Unating and CHING vs CA
Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix GR 124642
and Catalina Villar, to Agustin Navarra
could be considered as valid. However,
this validity pertained only to the share
of the late Petra Unating considering
that at the time of the sale, Aquilino
Villar was still alive. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the said decision.

XXVI

Ferrer vs Ferrer
Issue: GR No. 166496

W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal Facts:


property of Petra Unating hence would
be covered by the CPG. Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer,
a half- brother of Respondents. She filed
Held: a Complaint for payment of conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and
The Court ruled that the lot in dispute accounting with prayer for injunction and
can properly be considered as a damages. She alleged that before her

Page 26 of 47
marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a case the property is sold by the owner-
piece of lot, covered by Transfer spouse.
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He
applied for a loan with the SSS to build Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution
improvements thereon, including a in determining the ownership of the
residential house and a two-door improvements that are made on the
apartment building. However, it was separate property of the spouses at the
during their marriage that payment of expense of the partnership or through
the loan was made using the couples the acts or efforts of either or both
conjugal funds. From their conjugal spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
funds, petitioner posited, they improvement and any resulting increase
constructed a warehouse on the in value are more than the value of the
lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that property at the time of the improvement,
respondent Manuel occupied one door of the entire property of one of the spouses
the apartment building, as well as the shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
warehouse; however, in September subject to reimbursement of the value of
1991, he stopped paying rentals the property of the owner-spouse at the
thereon, alleging that he had acquired time of the improvement; otherwise,
ownership over the property by virtue of said property shall be retained in
a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael subject to reimbursement of the cost of
and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was the improvement. The subject property
cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued was precisely declared as the exclusive
and registered in the names of property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
respondents. 120 of the Family Code.

According to petitioner, that when What is incontrovertible is that the


Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or respondents, despite the allegations
at the time of the liquidation of the contained in the Complaint that they are
conjugal partnership, she had the right the buyers of the subject premises, are
to be reimbursed for the cost of the not petitioners spouse nor can they ever
improvements on Alfredos lot. She be deemed as the owner-spouse upon
alleged that the cost of the whom the obligation to reimburse
improvements amounted petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof owner-spouse who has the obligation to
should be reimbursed and paid by reimburse the conjugal partnership or
respondents as they are now the the spouse who expended the acts or
registered owners of Alfredos lot. efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the
Issue: obligation to respect petitioners right to
be reimbursed.
Whether or not Petitioner has the right
to be reimbursed for the cost of XXVII
improvements under Article 120 of the
Family Code? MBTC vs PASCUAL
Held: GR 163744

No. Petitioner was not able to show that Facts:


there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate Respondent Nicholson Pascual and
her right. The right of the spouse as Florencia Nevalga were married on
contemplated in Article 120 of the January 19, 1985. During the union,
Family Code to be reimbursed for the Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
cost of the improvements, the obligation and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot
to reimburse rests on the spouse upon with a three-door apartment standing
whom ownership of the entire property is thereon located in Makati City. The
vested. There is no obligation on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
part of the purchaser of the property, in covering the purchased lot (Lot no.
156283) was issued in the name of

Page 27 of 47
Florencia married to Nelson Pascual Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides
a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. that all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership,
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the unless it be prove[n] that it pertains
declaration of nullity of marriage under exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the This article does not require proof that
Quezon City RTC in 1995. In the same the property was acquired with funds of
decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the the partnership. The presumption
dissolution and liquidation of the ex- applies even when the manner in which
spouses conjugal partnership of gains, the property was acquired does not
w/c the latter failed. appear.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof
with spouses Norberto and Elvira obtains on the acquisition of the
Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan property during the existence of the
from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and marriage, then the presumption of
Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the conjugal ownership applies. Proof of
obligation, Florencia and the spouses acquisition during the marital coverture
Oliveros executed several real estate is a condition sine qua non for the
mortgages (REMs) on their properties, operation of the presumption in favor of
including one lot no. 156283. Due to the conjugal ownership. When there is no
failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros showing as to when the property was
to pay their loan obligation, MBTC acquired by the spouse, the fact that a
foreclosed the property. title is in the name of the spouse is an
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before indication that the property belongs
the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare exclusively to said spouse.
the nullity of the mortgage of the
disputed property, alleging that the
property, which is still conjugal property,
was mortgaged without his consent.

MBTC alleged that the disputed lot,


being registered in Florencias name,
was paraphernal. Florencia was declared
in default. The RTC rendered judgment XXVIII
finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed
the RTC but deleted the award moral MUOZ vs RAMIREZ
damages and attorneys fees. GR 156125
Issue:
FACTS:
Whether or not the subject property is
conjugal partnership property under Subject of the present case is a seventy-
Article 116 of the Family Code. seven (77)-square meter residential
house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio
Held: Street, Mandaluyong City (subject
property), covered by Transfer
The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the
disputed property is conjugal. Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in
the name of the petitioner. The
While Metrobank is correct in saying that residential lot in the subject property
Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of was previously covered by TCT No. 1427,
the Family Code, is the applicable legal in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married
provision since the property was to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April
acquired prior to the enactment of the 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal
Family Code, it errs in its theory that, Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No.
before conjugal ownership could be 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the
legally presumed, there must be a Government Service Insurance System
showing that the property was acquired (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing
during marriage using conjugal funds. loan, payable within twenty (20) years,

Page 28 of 47
through monthly salary deductions of because they lacked paying capacity and
P1,687.66. The respondents then were unwilling to pay the incidental
constructed a thirty-six (36)-square charges; the sale was with the implied
meter, two-story residential house on promise to repurchase within one year,
the lot. during which period (from May 1, 1992
to April 30, 1993), the respondents
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject would lease the subject property for a
property was transferred to the monthly rental of P500.00; when the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of respondents failed to repurchase the
Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, subject property within the one-year
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as period despite notice, he caused the
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated transfer of title in his name on July 14,
consideration of P602,000.00. On 1993.
September 24, 1993, the respondents
filed a complaint with the RTC for the In a Decision dated January 23, 1997,
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
claiming that there was no sale but only found that the subject property was
a mortgage transaction, and the Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property
documents transferring the title to the that was inherited from her father.
petitioners name were falsified.
The CA decided the appeal on June 25,
The respondents alleged that in April 2002. Applying the second paragraph of
1992, the petitioner granted them a Article 158 of the Civil Code and
P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA
first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the held that the subject property, originally
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property,
advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, became conjugal property when it was
and made her sign a document used as collateral for a housing loan that
purporting to be the mortgage contract; was paid through conjugal funds
the petitioner promised to give the Eliseos monthly salary deductions; the
P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda subject property, therefore, cannot be
surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS validly sold or mortgaged without
mortgage cancelled, and submits an Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he of the Family Code. Thus, the CA
waives all his rights to the subject declared void the deed of absolute sale,
property; with the P200,000.00 advance, and set aside the RTC decision.
Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel
the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in ISSUE:
May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the
petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but Whether the subject property is
returned Eliseos affidavit, unsigned; paraphernal or conjugal.
since Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the
petitioner refused to give the HELD:
P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the
mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda As a general rule, all property acquired
return the P200,000.00 advance; since during the marriage, whether the
Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 acquisition appears to have been made,
advance because it had been used to contracted or registered in the name of
pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept one or both spouses, is presumed to be
the title; and in 1993, they discovered conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in
the petitioners name, cancelling TCT In the present case, clear evidence that
No.1427 in their name. Erlinda inherited the residential lot from
her father has sufficiently rebutted this
The petitioner countered that there was presumption of conjugal ownership.
a valid contract of sale. He alleged that Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the
the respondents sold the subject Family Code, properties acquired by
property to him after he refused their gratuitous title by either spouse, during
offer to mortgage the subject property the marriage, shall be excluded from the

Page 29 of 47
community property and be the reimbursement of the cost of the
exclusive property of each spouse. The improvement.
residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas
exclusive paraphernal property. In the present case, we find that Eliseo
paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
The court held that they cannot through monthly salary deductions. From
subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo
on Article 158 of the Civil Code and paid about P60,755.76, not the entire
Calimlim-Canullas. amount of the GSIS housing loan plus
interest, since the petitioner advanced
As the respondents were married during the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to
the effectivity of the Civil Code, its cancel the mortgage in 1992.
provisions on conjugal partnership of Considering the P136,500.00 amount of
gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
governed their property relations. reasonable to assume that the value of
However, with the enactment of the the residential lot is considerably more
Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil than the P60,755.76 amount paid by
Code provisions on conjugal partnership Eliseo through monthly salary
of gains, including Article 158, have deductions.
been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Thus, the subject property remained the
Article 105 of the Family Code states: exclusive paraphernal property of
x x x x Erlinda at the time she contracted with
the petitioner; the written consent of
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Eliseo to the transaction was not
Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains signatures in the special power of
already established between spouses attorney and affidavit were forgeries was
before the effectivity of this Code, immaterial.
without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the XIX
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. Thus, in determining the Imami v. MBTC
nature of the subject property, we refer GR # 187023/Nov. 17, 2010
to the provisions of the Family Code, and
not the Civil Code, except with respect Facts:
to rights then already vested.
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani
Article 120 of the Family Code, which (petitioner) signed a Continuing
supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, Suretyship Agreement in favor of
provides the solution in determining the respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P.
ownership of the improvements that are Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo,
made on the separate property of the Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr.,
spouses, at the expense of the and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As
partnership or through the acts or efforts sureties, they bound themselves to pay
of either or both spouses. Under this Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
provision, when the cost of the Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
improvement and any resulting increase not exceeding Six Million Pesos
in value are more than the value of the (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained
property at the time of the loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45,
improvement, the entire property of one respectively. The loans were evidenced
of the spouses shall belong to the by promissory notes signed by Cesar and
conjugal partnership, subject to Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
reimbursement of the value of the payment of its loans. Metrobank made
property of the owner-spouse at the time several demands for payment upon
of the improvement; otherwise, said CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted
property shall be retained in ownership Metrobank to file a collection suit against
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to CPDTI and its sureties, including herein
petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of

Page 30 of 47
Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
the RTC a motion for execution, which a loan from Ayala Investment and
was granted on December 7, 1999. A Development Corporation (AIDC). As
writ of execution was issued against added security for the credit line
CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of
levied on a property covering a lot PBM, executed security agreements
registered in the name of petitioner. making himself jointly and severally
Petitioner argued that the subject answerable with PBM's indebtedness to
property belongs to the conjugal AIDC.
partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be filed a case for sum of money against
subject of levy on execution or public PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the
auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for court rendered judgment ordering PBM
the nullification of the levy on execution and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally
and the auction sale, as well as the pay AIDC the principal amount of
certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending
appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the
Issue: lower court issued a writ of execution
and the Deputy Sheriff caused the
WON or not the property in question is issuance and service upon spouses
conjugal. Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three
(3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses
Ruling: Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin
the auction sale alleging that the
All property of the marriage is presumed judgment cannot be enforced against
to be conjugal. However, for this the conjugal partnership levied on the
presumption to apply, the party who ground that, among others, the subject
invokes it must first prove that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
property was acquired during the the said conjugal partnership.
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the
the operation of the presumption in conjugal partnership of gains of spouses
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, Ching is not liable for the payment of the
the time when the property was debts secured by the husband Alfredo
acquired is material. Similarly, the Ching.
certificate of title could not support
petitioners assertion. As aptly ruled by Issue:
the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina Whether the conjugal partnership should
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no not be made liable for the surety
proof that the property was acquired agreement entered into by the husband
during the spouses coverture. in favor of his employer.
Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well Held:
settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already Yes.If the husband himself is the
existing. principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services
CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS to be used in or for his own business or
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP his own profession, that contract falls
XXX within the term ". . . obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership."
AYALA INVEST AND DEVT CORP. vs Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It
CA is enough that the benefit to the family
GR 118305 is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the
Facts: contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or

Page 31 of 47
services to be rendered to the business property, who acknowledged receipt
or profession of the husband. thereof.1 The amount was in full
payment of the property.
On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or When petitioner inquired from the
entity, and the husband acted only as a spouses in July 1991 as to the status of
surety or guarantor, that contract the amount he loaned to them, the latter
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as acknowledged their obligation but
falling within the context of "obligations pleaded that they were not yet in a
for the benefit of the conjugal position to make a definite settlement of
partnership." The contract of loan or the same.2Thereafter, respondent
services is clearly for the benefit of the expressed violent resistance to
principal debtor and not for the surety or petitioners inquiries on the amount to
his family. No presumption can be the extent of making various death
inferred that, when a husband enters threats against petitioner.3
into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a
benefit of the conjugal partnership." formal demand for the payment of the
Proof must be presented to establish amount of US$25,000.00 but the
benefit redounding to the conjugal spouses failed to comply with their
partnership. obligation.4Thus, on October 13, 1994,
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family petitioner filed a complaint for collection
Code is emphatic that the payment of of a sum of money and damages against
personal debts contracted by the respondent and his wife before the
husband or the wife before or during the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
marriage shall not be charged to the Branch 172, docketed as Civil Case No.
conjugal partnership except to the 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner
extent that they redounded to the asked for the payment of the
benefit of the family. Here, the property US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its
in dispute also involves the family home. equivalent in Philippine currency plus
The loan is a corporate loan not a legal interest from date of extra-judicial
personal one. Signing as a surety is demand.5Petitioner likewise claimed
certainly not an exercise of an industry moral and exemplary damages,
or profession nor an act of attorneys fees and costs of suit from
administration for the benefit of the respondent.6
family.
XXXI As they were separated in fact for more
than a year prior to the filing of the
HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, complaint, respondent and his wife filed
vs. separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-
MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent. Abelardo admitted securing a loan
GR 146504 together with her husband, from
petitioner.7She claimed, however, that
Facts: said loan was payable on a staggered
basis so she was surprised when
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed petitioner demanded immediate
on October 13, 1994 that in October payment of the full amount.8
1989, respondent and his wife Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached In his separate Answer, respondent
him and requested him to advance the admitted receiving the amount of
amount of US$25,000.00 for the US$25,000.00 but claimed that:
purchase of a house and lot located at
#19952 Chestnut Street, Executive a. Defendant (respondent)
Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro xxx revived that otherwise
Manila. To enable and assist the spouses dormant construction firm
conduct their married life independently H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION
and on their own, petitioner, in October of herein plaintiff which
31, 1989, issued a check in the name of suffered tremendous setback
a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the

Page 32 of 47
after the assassination of income on contracts obtained
Senator Benigno Aquino; by defendant;
b. Working day and night and
almost beyond human Respondent denied having made death
endurance, defendant threats to petitioner and by way of
devoted all his efforts and compulsory counterclaim, he asked for
skill, used all his business moral damages from petitioner for
and personal connection to causing the alienation of his wifes love
be able to revive the and affection, attorneys fees and costs
construction business of of suit.10
plaintiff;
c. Little-by-little, starting with On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial
small construction business, Court rendered a decision in favor of
defendant was able to obtain petitioner.
various construction jobs
using the name H.L. CARLOS Issue:
CONSTRUCTION and the
income derived therefrom The court of appeals erred in
were deposited in the name finding insufficient evidence to
of such firm of plaintiff, prove that the amount of
d. Defendant xxx was made us$25,000.00 was a loan
to believe that the earnings obtained by private respondent
derived from such and his wife from petitioner.
construction will be for him
and his family since he was The court of appeals erred in
the one working to secure holding that the us$25,000.00
the contract and its was given as private
completion, he was allowed respondents share in the profits
to use the facilities of the of H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc.
plaintiff; and that the filing of the
e. The plaintiff seeing the complaint is a hoax.
progress brought about by
defendant xxx to his The court of appeals erred in
company proposed a profit nullifying the award of damages
sharing scheme to the effect for lack of proof thereof.
that all projects amounting to
more than P10 million shall Held:
be for the account of plaintiff;
lower amount shall be for Early in time, it must be noted that
defendants account but still payment of personal debts contracted by
using H.L. CARLOS the husband or the wife before or during
CONSTRUCTION. the marriage shall not be charged to the
f. But, to clear account on conjugal partnership except insofar as
previous construction they redounded to the benefit of the
contracts that brought family. The defendants never denied
income to H.L.CARLOS that the check of US$25,000.00 was
CONSTRUCTION, out of which used to purchase the subject house and
defendant derived his lot. They do not deny that the same
income, plaintiff gave the served as their conjugal home, thus
amount of US$25,000.00 to benefiting the family. On the same
defendant to square off principle, acknowledgment of the loan
account and to start the made by the defendant-wife binds the
arrangement in paragraph (e) conjugal partnership since its proceeds
supra; redounded to the benefit of the family.
g. That, the said Hence, defendant-husband and
US$25,000.00 was never defendant-wife are jointly and severally
intended as loan of liable in the payment of the loan.
defendant. It was his share of

Page 33 of 47
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a the plaintiff in his personal capacity.
defense that the amount of US Hence, compensation cannot take place.
$25,000.00 was received as his share in
the income or profits of the corporation The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in
and not as a loan. Firstly, defendant- finding that respondents liability was
husband does not appear to be a not proved by preponderance of
stockholder nor an employee nor an evidence. On the contrary, the evidence
agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos adduced by petitioner sufficiently
Construction, Inc. Since he is not a established his claim that the
stockholder, he has no right to US$25,000.00 he advanced to
participate in the income or profits respondent and his wife was a loan.
thereof. In the same manner that as he
is not an employee nor an agent of H. L. The loan is the liability of the conjugal
Carlos Construction, Inc., he has no right partnership pursuant to Article 121 of
to receive any salary or commission the Family Code:
therefrom. Secondly, the amount Article 121. The conjugal partnership
advanced for the purchase of the house shall be liable for:
and lot came from the personal account xxx
of the plaintiff. If, indeed, it was to be (2) All debts and obligations contracted
construed as defendant-husbands share during the marriage by the designated
in the profits of the corporation, the administrator-spouse for the benefit of
checks should come from the the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
corporations account and not from the both spouses or by one of them with the
plaintiffs personal account, considering consent of the other;
that the corporation has a personality (3) Debts and obligations contracted by
separate and distinct from that of its either spouse without the consent of the
stockholders and officers. other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited;
Even granting that the checks amount to If the conjugal partnership is insufficient
US $3,000.000.00 given by the plaintiff to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
to the defendant-spouses was their spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
share in the profits of the corporation, unpaid balance with their separate
still there is no sufficient evidence to properties.
establish that the US $25,000.00 is to be Xxx
treated similarly. Defendant-husband in
invoking the defense of compensation While respondent did not and refused to
argued that if indeed they were indebted sign the acknowledgment executed and
to the plaintiff, the latter could have signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
applied their share in the proceeds or redounded to the benefit of the family
income of the corporation to the because it was used to purchase the
concurrent amount of the alleged loan, house and lot which became the
instead of giving the amount of conjugal home of respondent and his
P3,000,000.00 to them. This argument is family. Hence, notwithstanding the
untenable. Article 1278 of the Civil Code alleged lack of consent of respondent,
provides that compensation shall take under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he
place when two persons, in their own shall be solidarily liable for such loan
right, are debtors and creditors of each together with his wife.
other. As its indicates, compensation is a
sort of balancing between two We also find sufficient basis for the
obligations. In the instant case, the award of damages to petitioner, contrary
plaintiff and the defendant-husband are to the findings of the Court of Appeals
not debtors and creditors of each other. that petitioner is not entitled thereto.
Even granting that the defendant-
husbands claim to the profits of the XXXII
corporation is justified, still
compensation cannot extinguish his loan SBTC vs MAR TIERRA CORP.
obligation to the plaintiff because under GR 143382
such assumption, the defendant is
dealing with the corporation and not with Facts:

Page 34 of 47
NO.
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation,
through its president, Wilfrido C. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all
credit accommodation with petitioner debts and obligations contracted by the
Security Bank and Trust Company husband for the benefit of the conjugal
(SBTC). Petitioner approved the partnership." But when are debts and
application and entered into a credit line obligations contracted by the husband
agreement with respondent corporation. alone considered for the benefit of and
It was secured by an indemnity therefore chargeable against the
agreement executed by individual conjugal partnership? Is a surety
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel agreement or an accommodation
J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound contract entered into by the husband in
themselves jointly and severally with favor of his employer within the
respondent corporation for the payment contemplation of the said provision?
of the loan. The respondent corporation We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon
finally availed of its credit line and Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in
received P9M. Out of that amount, it was acting as a guarantor or surety for
able to pay about P4M while the another, the husband does not act for
remaining balance remained outstanding the benefit of the conjugal partnership
as the corporation suffered business as the benefit is clearly intended for a
reversals and eventually ceased third party.
operating. To enforce its claim against
the corporation on the remaining In Ayala Investment and Development
balance of the loan, petitioner filed a Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we
complaint for a sum of money with a ruled that, if the husband himself is the
prayer for preliminary attachment principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
against respondent corporation and direct recipient of the money and
individual respondents in the Regional services to be used in or for his own
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC business or profession, the transaction
rendered a decision holding respondent falls within the term "obligations for the
corporation and individual respondent benefit of the conjugal partnership." In
Martinez jointly and severally liable to other words, where the husband
petitioner for the remaining balance of contracts an obligation on behalf of the
the loan including interest and attorneys family business, there is a legal
fee. It, however, found that the presumption that such obligation
obligation contracted by individual redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
respondent Martinez did not redound to partnership. [11]
the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on On the other hand, if the money or
the conjugal house and lot of the services are given to another person or
spouses Martinez. entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
petitioner appealed to the CA but the for the benefit of the conjugal
appellate court affirmed the trial courts partnership. [12] It is for the benefit of
decision in toto. Petitioner sought the principal debtor and not for the
reconsideration but it was denied. surety or his family. No presumption is
Hence, this petition. raised that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation
ISSUE: agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be
WON the conjugal partnership may be presented to establish the benefit
held liable for an indemnity agreement redounding to the conjugal partnership.
entered into by the husband to [13] In the absence of any showing of
accommodate a third party? benefit received by it, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable on an
HELD: indemnity agreement executed by the

Page 35 of 47
husband to accommodate a third party. petitioners to put up a sheriffs
[14] indemnity bond. The auction sale
proceeded with petitioners as the
In this case, the principal contract, the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
credit line agreement between petitioner issued in favor of petitioners.
and respondent corporation, was solely
for the benefit of the latter. The Almost a year later on 2 February 1994,
accessory contract (the indemnity Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda
agreement) under which individual Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of
respondent Martinez assumed the certificate of sale and damages with
obligation of a surety for respondent preliminary injunction against petitioners
corporation was similarly for the latters and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as
benefit. Petitioner had the burden of plaintiff therein, alleged that the
proving that the conjugal partnership of defendants, now petitioners, connived
the spouses Martinez benefited from the and directly levied upon and execute his
transaction. It failed to discharge that real property without exhausting the
burden. personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no
To hold the conjugal partnership liable proper publication and posting of the
for an obligation pertaining to the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent
husband alone defeats the objective of claimed that his property which was
the Civil Code to protect the solidarity valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a
and well being of the family as a unit. very low price of P51,685.00, whereas
[15] The underlying concern of the law is the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol
the conservation of the conjugal was only P40,000.00. The case was
partnership. [16] Hence, it limits the assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of
liability of the conjugal partnership only Imus, Cavite.
to debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the In response, petitioners filed a motion to
conjugal partnership. dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on
XXXIII the basis of a valid writ of execution.
Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners
BUADO vs CA claimed that respondent should have
GR 145222 filed the case with Branch 19 where the
judgment originated and which issued
Facts: the order of execution, writ of execution,
notice of levy and notice of sheriffs sale.
Spouses Buado filed a complaint for RTC dismissed respondents complaint
damages against Erlinda Nicol with and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction
Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court over the case. On appeal, the Court of
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, which originated Appeals reversed the trial court and held
from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on
from the criminal offense of slander filed the complaint filed by appellant. Hence,
against her by petitioners. RTC rendered the instant petition attributing grave
a decision ordering Erlinda to pay abuse of discretion on the part of the
damages. It became final and executory Court of Appeals.
and later on issued a a writ of execution.
Finding Erlinda Nicols personal Issue:
properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a WON the obligation of the wife arising
notice of levy on real property on from her criminal liability is chargeable
execution addressed to the Register of to the conjugal partnership
Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of
sheriffs sale was issued. Two (2) days Held:
before the public auction sale on 28
January 1993, an affidavit of third-party No.There is no dispute that contested
claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was property is conjugal in nature. Article
received by the deputy sheriff prompting 122 of the Family Code explicitly

Page 36 of 47
provides that payment of personal debts a motion to dismiss the same on the
contracted by the husband or the wife ground of lack of cause of action.
before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership Issue:
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. W/N a husband, as the administrator of
Unlike in the system of absolute the conjugal partnership, may legally
community where liabilities incurred by enter into a contract of lease involving
either spouse by reason of a crime or conjugal real property without the
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute knowledge and consent of the wife.
community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property Held:
of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art.
of conjugal partnership of gains. The 165. The husband is the administrator of
conjugal partnership of gains has no the conjugal partnership," in view of the
duty to make advance payments for the fact that the husband is principally
liability of the debtor-spouse. responsible for the support of the wife
and the rest of the family. If the conjugal
Parenthetically, by no stretch of partnership does not have enough
imagination can it be concluded that the assets, it is the husband's capital that is
civil obligation arising from the crime of responsible for such support, not the
slander committed by Erlinda redounded paraphernal property. Responsibility
to the benefit of the conjugal should carry authority with it.
partnership.
The husband is not an ordinary
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be administrator, for while a mere
held liable for the personal obligation administrator has no right to dispose of,
contracted by one spouse, unless some sell, or otherwise alienate the property
advantage or benefit is shown to have being administered, the husband can do
accrued to the conjugal partnership. so in certain cases allowed by law. He is
not required by law to render an
ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL accounting. Acts done under
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY administration do not need the prior
XXXIV consent of the wife.

ROXAS vs. CA However, administration does not


GR 92245 include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal
Facts: assets unhampered, he cannot alienate
or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus,
Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife
Antonio Roxas, but are living separately. has been declared a non-compos mentis
Melania found out that Antonio had or a spendthrift, or is under civil
entered into a contract of lease with interdiction or is confined in a
defendant Antonio M. Cayetano leprosarium, the husband cannot
sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a alienate or encumber any real property
portion of their conjugal lot situated in of the conjugal partnership the wife's
Quezon City without her previous consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
knowledge, much less her marital give her consent, the court may compel
consent. Apparently, she was to put up a her to grant the same." This rule
flea market in the lot and has already prevents abuse on the part of the
filed for a Mayors permit but the same husband, and guarantees the rights of
was denied on renewal because the wife, who is partly responsible for
Cayetano also applied for the same the acquisition of the property,
permit and was earlier granted. She then particularly the real property. Contracts
filed a complaint for annulment of the entered into by the husband in violation
contract of lease entered into without of this prohibition are voidable and
her consent against Cayetano, who filed subject to annulment at the instance of

Page 37 of 47
the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil respondent spouses that the contracts to
Code) sell had already been duly perfected and
Normas refusal to sign the same would
XXXV unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma
refused to sign the contracts prompting
GUIANG vs CA petitioner to file a complaint for specific
GR 125172 performance and damages against
respondent spouses before the Regional
XXXVI Trial Court.

JADER MANALO vs CAMAISA Issue:


GR 147978
Whether or not there is a perfected
Facts: contract to sell of the conjugal property?

Petitioner made a definite offer to buy Held:


the properties to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the There is no perfected sale.
knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent Norma Camaisa . After some The properties subject of the contracts in
bargaining, petitioner this case were conjugal; hence, for the
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase contracts to sell to be effective, the
price of the property to be paid on consent of both husband and wife must
installment basis. Such agreement was a concur.
handwritten by petitioner and signed
by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed The law requires that the disposition of a
out the conjugal nature of the conjugal property by the husband as
properties, Edilberto assured her of his administrator in appropriate cases
wifes conformity and consent to the requires the written consent of the wife,
sale. otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,

The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
were thereafter prepared by Art. 124. The administration and
petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
formal signing of the typewritten property shall belong to both spouses
Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed jointly. In case of disagreement, the
the contracts, petitioner delivered to husbands decision shall prevail, subject
him two checks. The contracts were to recourse to the court by the wife for a
given to Edilberto for the formal affixing proper remedy, which must be availed of
of his wifes signature. within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
The following day, petitioner received a
call from respondent Norma In the event that one spouse is
(wife), requesting a meeting to clarify incapacitated or otherwise unable to
some provisions of the contracts. During participate in the administration of the
the meeting, handwritten notations were conjugal properties, the other spouse
made on the contracts to sell, so they may assume sole powers of
arranged to incorporate the notations administration. These powers do not
and to meet again for the formal signing include the powers of disposition or
of the contracts. encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written
When petitioner met again with consent of the other spouse. In the
respondent spouses for the formal absence of such authority or consent the
affixing of Normas signature, she was disposition or encumbrance shall be
surprised when respondent spouses void. However, the transaction shall be
informed her that they were backing out construed as a continuing offer on the
of the agreement because they needed part of the consenting spouse and the
spot cash for the full amount of the third person, and may be perfected as a
consideration. Petitioner reminded binding contract upon the acceptance by

Page 38 of 47
the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by Issue:
either or both offerors. (Underscoring
ours.) (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive
property of Florentino or a conjugal
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly property of respondents?
did not give her written consent to the (2) Was its sale by Florentino without
sale. Even granting that respondent Elisera's consent valid?
Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject Ruling:
properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for Anent the first issue, petitioners'
its validity. Significantly, petitioner contention that the lot belongs
herself admits that Norma refused to exclusively to Florentino because of his
sign the contracts to sell. Respondent separation in fact from his wife, Elisera,
Norma may have been aware of the at the time of sale dissolved their
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal property relations, is bereft of merit.
properties. However, being merely Respondents' separation in fact neither
aware of a transaction is not consent. affected the conjugal nature of the lot
nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.
XXXVII Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the
separation in fact between husband and
UY vs CA wife without judicial approval shall not
GR 10955 affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature. Anent the
XXXVIII second issue, the sale by Florentino
without Elisera's consent is not,
VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG however, void ab initio. In Vda. de
GR 159889 Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda
v. Villaranda, we held that without the
Facts: wife's consent, the husband's alienation
or encumbrance of conjugal property
Respondents Florentino and Elisera prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
Chiong were married sometime in on August 3, 1988 is not void, but
January 1960 but have been separated merely voidable.
in fact since 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at Applying Article 166, the consent of both
Poblacion, Dipolog City. Sometime in Elisera and Florentino is necessary for
1985, Florentino sold the one-half the sale of a conjugal property to be
western portion of the lot to petitioners valid. In this case, the requisite consent
for P8,000, payable in installments. of Elisera was not obtained when
Thereafter, Florentino allowed Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985
petitioners to occupy the lot and build a and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale
store, a shop, and a house thereon. on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the
Shortly after their last installment contract entered by Florentino is
payment on December 13, 1986,[5] annullable at Elisera's instance, during
petitioners demanded from respondents the marriage and within ten years from
the execution of a deed of sale in their the transaction questioned, conformably
favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera
a deed of sale. On May 13, 1992, timely questioned the sale when she
Florentino executed the questioned filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991,
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of perfectly within ten years from the date
petitioners. On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in of sale and execution of the deed.
its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of
absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and XXXIX
ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and
remove all improvements therein. The DELA CRUZ vs SEGOVIA
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's GR 149801
decision.

Page 39 of 47
Facts: Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or
Jose Consuegra, in his lifetime married as such putative heir she has an interest
twice, to Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937 in the husbands share in the property
and on May 1, 1957, to Basilia Berdim, here in dispute quoting Trial Courts
while the 1st marriage was still decision. And with respect to the right of
subsisting. He fathered 2 children (both the second wife, this Court observed that
already dead) from Rosario and 7 from although the second marriage can be
Basilia. When he died on Sept 26,1965, presumed to be void ab initio as it was
the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance celebrated while the first marriage was
policy were paid to Basilia and their still subsisting, still there is need for
children being the beneficiaries stated in judicial declaration of such nullity. And
the policy. Rosario on the other hand inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
filed a claim over the retirement formed by the second marriage was
insurance policy proceeds claiming to be dissolved before judicial declaration of
Joses only legal heir. Basilia also filed a its nullity the only just and equitable
similar claim asserting that. as solution is to recognize the right of the
beneficiaries named in the life insurance 2nd wife to her share of in the property
policy, the retirement insurance policy acquired by her and her husband and
likewise belong to them. GSIS ruled that consider the other half as pertaining to
Rosario and Basilia are both Joses wives, the conjugal partnership of the first
therefore the proceeds must be given to marriage.
them, 1/2 portion each. Dissatisfied,
Basilia filed a petition for mandamus XL
with preliminary injunction to CFI praying
that she and her children be declared as RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE
the exclusive beneficiaries of the said GR 160708
retirement insurance proceeds. Trial
Court, quoting Lao vs Dee held that Facts:
When 2 women innocently and in good
faith are legally united in holy Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille
matrimony to the same man, they and and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and
their children, born of said wedlock, will wife. They have four children, who are
be regarded as legitimate children and also parties to the instant case and are
each family be entitled to of the represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
estate. Basilia appealed. Hence this
case. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-
square meter parcel of land
Issue: denominated as Lot 7, located at
Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision,
To whom should this retirement Matina, Davao City, and covered by
insurance benefits be paid, when no Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
beneficiary was designated. 88674 in their names. Said lot is
Held: adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and
To both wives. GSIS intended that the which is registered solely in his name
life and retirement insurance be under TCT No. T-26471.
separate and distinct therefore,
beneficiary of one insurance is not Through their joint efforts and the
automatically the beneficiary of the proceeds of a loan from the
other. Since the defendants first Development Bank of the Philippines
marriage has not been dissolved or (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7
declared void, the conjugal partnership and Pedros lot. The house was finished
established by that marriage has not in the early 1980s but the spouses
ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or continuously made improvements,
relinquished her status as putative heir including a poultry house and an annex.
of her husband under the NCC, she is
entitled to share in his estate upon his In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began
death should she survive him. to neglect his family. Mary Ann was

Page 40 of 47
forced to sell or mortgage their The court of appeals erred when
movables to support the family and the it ruled that petitioners
studies of her children. By himself, patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo
Pedro offered to sell the house and the ravina are not innocent
two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia purchasers for value, the same
and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected being contrary to law and
and notified the petitioners of her evidence.
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary The court of appeals erred when
Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed it ruled that petitioners
of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo
on the said deed that Mary Ann did not ravina are liable for damages, the
sign on top of her name. same being contrary to law and
evidence.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was
outside the house and the four children Held:
were in school, Pedro together with
armed members of the Civilian Armed Article 160 of the New Civil Code
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and provides, All property of the marriage is
acting in connivance with petitioners presumed to belong to the conjugal
began transferring all their belongings partnership, unless it be proved that it
from the house to an apartment. pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid
Villa Abrille came home, they were There is no issue with regard to the lot
stopped from entering it. They waited covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was
outside the gate until evening under the an exclusive property of Pedro, having
rain. They sought help from the Talomo been acquired by him before his
Police Station, but police authorities marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot
refused to intervene, saying that it was a covered by TCT No. T-88674 was
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that acquired in 1982 during the marriage of
the incident caused stress, tension and Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was
anxiety to her children, so much so that adduced to show that the subject
one flunked at school. Thus, property was acquired through exchange
respondents Mary Ann and her children or barter. The presumption of the
filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, conjugal nature of the property subsists
Specific Performance, Damages and in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
Attorneys Fees with Preliminary convincing evidence to overcome said
Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and presumption or to prove that the subject
herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
RTC of Davao City. Petitioners bare assertion would not
During the trial, Pedro declared that the suffice to overcome the presumption
house was built with his own money. that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during
Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is
they bought the house and lot from conjugal. Likewise, the house built
Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner thereon is conjugal property, having
Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles been constructed through the joint
when they bought the property. efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct
Issue: the house.

The court of appeals erred when Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of


it declared x x x the sale of lot conjugal property concluded after the
covered by tct no. 88674 in favor effectivity of the Family Code on August
of spouses ravina, together with 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of
the house thereon, as null and the same Code that now treats such a
void since it is clearly contrary to disposition to be void if done (a) without
law and evidence. the consent of both the husband and the
. wife, or (b) in case of one spouses

Page 41 of 47
inability, the authority of the court. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed
Article 124 of the Family Code, the the action for annulment of sale within
governing law at the time the assailed five (5) years from the date of sale and
sale was contracted, is explicit: execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to
ART. 124. The administration and the conjugal house and lot and does not
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership include the lot covered by TCT No. T-
property shall belong to both spouses 26471, a property exclusively belonging
jointly. In case of disagreement, the to Pedro and which he can dispose of
husbands decision shall prevail, subject freely without Mary Anns consent.
to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy which must be availed of On the second assignment of error,
within five years from the date of the petitioners contend that they are buyers
contract implementing such decision. in good faith. Accordingly, they need not
inquire whether the lot was purchased
In the event that one spouse is by money exclusively belonging to Pedro
incapacitated or otherwise unable to or of the common fund of the spouses
participate in the administration of the and may rely on the certificates of title.
conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of The contention is bereft of merit. As
administration. These powers do not correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a
include the powers of disposition or purchaser in good faith is one who buys
encumbrance which must have the the property of another without notice
authority of the court or the written that some other person has a right to, or
consent of the other spouse. In the interest in, such property and pays a full
absence of such authority or and fair price for the same at the time of
consent, the disposition or such purchase, or before he has notice
encumbrance shall be void. of the claim or interest of some other
However, the transaction shall be person in the property. To establish his
construed as a continuing offer on the status as a buyer for value in good faith,
part of the consenting spouse and the a person dealing with land registered in
third person, and may be perfected as a the name of and occupied by the seller
binding contract upon the acceptance by need only show that he relied on the
the other spouse or authorization by the face of the sellers certificate of title.
court before the offer is withdrawn by But for a person dealing with land
either or both offerors. (Emphasis registered in the name of and occupied
supplied.) by the seller whose capacity to sell is
The particular provision in the New Civil restricted, such as by Articles 166 and
Code giving the wife ten (10) years to 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of
annul the alienation or encumbrance the Family Code, he must show that he
was not carried over to the Family Code. inquired into the latters capacity to sell
It is thus clear that alienation or in order to establish himself as a buyer
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership for value in good faith.
property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void. In the present case, the property is
registered in the name of Pedro and his
Hence, just like the rule in absolute wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
community of property, if the husband, knowledge that during the time of the
without knowledge and consent of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary
wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity
void. If the sale was with the knowledge did not appear in the deed. Even
but without the approval of the wife, assuming that petitioners believed in
thereby resulting in a disagreement, good faith that the subject property is
such sale is annullable at the instance of the exclusive property of Pedro, they
the wife who is given five (5) years from were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of
the date the contract implementing the her objection to the sale and yet they
decision of the husband to institute the still proceeded to purchase the property
case. without Mary Anns written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the

Page 42 of 47
ones in actual, visible and public The respondents then were not allowed
possession of the property at the time to enter their rightful home or family
the transaction was being made. Thus, abode despite their impassioned pleas.
at the time of sale, petitioners knew that
Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the Firmly established in our civil law is the
subject properties and yet they failed to doctrine that: Every person must, in the
obtain her conformity to the deed of exercise of his rights and in the
sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now performance of his duties, act with
invoke the protection accorded to justice, give everyone his due, and
purchasers in good faith. observe honesty and good faith. When
a right is exercised in a manner that
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, does not conform with such norms and
the restoration of what has been given is results in damages to another, a legal
proper. The relationship between the wrong is thereby committed for which
parties in any contract even if the wrong doer must be held
subsequently annulled must always be responsible. Similarly, any person who
characterized and punctuated by good willfully causes loss or injury to another
faith and fair dealing. Hence, in in a manner that is contrary to morals,
consonance with justice and equity and good customs or public policy shall
the salutary principle of non-enrichment compensate the latter for the damages
at anothers expense, we sustain the caused. It is patent in this case that
appellate courts order directing Pedro to petitioners alleged acts fall short of
return to petitioner spouses the value of these established civil law standards.
the consideration for the lot covered by
TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

However, this court rules that petitioners


cannot claim reimbursements for
improvements they introduced after
their good faith had ceased. As correctly
found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Patrocinia Ravina made improvements
and renovations on the house and lot at LI
the time when the complaint against
them was filed. Ravina continued AGGABAO vs PARULAN
introducing improvements during the GR 165803
pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is Facts:
applicable. It provides that, (h)e who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a
land of another, loses what is built, sale of two parcels of land with their
planted or sown without right to improvements considered as conjugal
indemnity. property by presenting a special power
of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly
On the last issue, petitioners claim that executed by respondent husband
the decision awarding damages to Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma.
respondents is not supported by the Elena was made in favor of the spouses
evidence on record. vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted
in good faith and paid the full purchase
The claim is erroneous to say the least. price, despite the showing by the
The manner by which respondent and husband that his signature on the SPA
her children were removed from the had been forged and that the SPA had
family home deserves our been executed during his absence from
condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while the country and while he and Ma. Elena
respondent was out and her children have been estranged from one another.
were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting When Dionisio learned about the alleged
in connivance with the petitioners sale, he filed for an action for the
surreptitiously transferred all their declaration of the nullity of the
personal belongings to another place. deed of absolute sale executed by

Page 43 of 47
Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his Article 124. The administration and
favor and declared that the SPA was enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
forged. The decision of the RTC was property shall belong to both spouses
affirmed by the CA. Hence the present jointly.
case filed by petitioners imputing error
to the CA for not applying the ordinary In case of disagreement, the husbands
prudent mans standard in determining decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
their status as buyers in good faith. The to the court by the wife for proper
petitioners submit that Article 173 of the remedy, which must be availed of within
Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family five years from the date of the contract
Code, governed the property relations of implementing such decision.
the respondents because they had been
married prior to the effectivity of the In the event that one spouse is
Family Code; and that the second incapacitated or otherwise unable to
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family participate in the administration of the
Code should not apply because the other conjugal properties, the other spouse
spouse held the administration over the may assume sole powers of
conjugal property. They argue that administration. These powers do not
notwithstanding his absence from the include disposition or encumbrance
country Dionisio still held the without authority of the court or the
administration of the conjugal property written consent of the other spouse. In
by virtue of his execution of the SPA in the absence of such authority or
favor of his brother; and that even consent, the disposition or encumbrance
assuming that Article 124 of the Family shall be void. However, the transaction
Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified shall be construed as a continuing offer
the sale through Atty. Parulans counter- on the part of the consenting spouse and
offer during the March 25, 1991 the third person, and may be perfected
meeting. as a binding contract upon the
ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code acceptance by the other spouse or
and Article 124 of the Family Code authorization by the court before the
should apply to the sale of the conjugal offer is withdrawn by either or both
property executed without the consent offerors.
of Dionisio.
Thirdly, according to Article 256[29] of
Held: the Family Code, the provisions of the
Family Code may apply retroactively
NO provided no vested rights are impaired.
In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court
To start with, Article 254[27] the Family rejected the petitioners argument that
Code has expressly repealed several the Family Code did not apply because
titles under the Civil Code, among them the acquisition of the contested property
the entire Title VI in which the provisions had occurred prior to the effectivity of
on the property relations between the Family Code, and pointed out that
husband and wife, Article 173 included, Article 256 provided that the Family
are found. Code could apply retroactively if the
application would not prejudice vested or
Secondly, the sale was made on March acquired rights existing before the
18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
effectivity of the Family Code. The however, the petitioners did not show
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article any vested right in the property acquired
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted
that any alienation or encumbrance their situation from the retroactive
of conjugal property made during application of the Family Code.
the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Fourthly, the petitioners failed to
Family Code.[28] substantiate their contention that
Dionisio, while holding the

Page 44 of 47
administration over the property, had Dissolution of the Conjugal
delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, Partnership Regime
the administration of the property,
considering that they did not present in LII
court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan
the authority for the administration. PARTOSA JO vs CA
GR 82606
Nonetheless, we stress that the
power of administration does not Facts:
include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of The herein private respondent, Jose Jo,
strict ownership. As such, an admits to having cohabited with three
authority to dispose cannot proceed women and fathered fifteen children.
from an authority to administer, and The first of these women, Prima Partosa-
vice versa, for the two powers may Jo, claims to be his legal wife whom he
only be exercised by an agent by begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other
following the provisions on agency women and their respective offspring are
of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to not parties of this case. In 1980, Prima
Article 1878). filed a complaint against Jose for judicial
separation of conjugal property. The RTC
Specifically, the apparent authority of rendered a decision and in the
Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, dispositive portion it stated support but
was limited to the sale of the property in not the separation of conjugal
question, and did not include or extend properties. On appeal, The petitioner
to the power to administer the property. contends that the respondent court has
[31] misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191
of the Civil Code. She submits that the
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that agreement between her and the private
Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer respondent was for her to temporarily
during the March 25, 1991 meeting live with her parents during the initial
ratified the sale merits no consideration. period of her pregnancy and for him to
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, visit and support her. They never agreed
the transaction executed sans the to separate permanently. And even if
written consent of Dionisio or the proper they did, this arrangement was
court order was void; hence, ratification repudiated and ended in 1942, when she
did not occur, for a void contract could returned to him at Dumaguete City and
not be ratified.[32] he refused to accept her.

On the other hand, we agree with Issue:


Dionisio that the void sale was a
continuing offer from the petitioners and WON the refusal of the husband to
Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accept his wife constitutes abandonment
accepting or rejecting before the offer which is a ground for the dissolution of
was withdrawn by either or both Ma. their property regime.
Elena and the petitioners. The last
sentence of the second paragraph of Ruling:
Article 124 of the Family Code makes
this clear, stating that in the absence of The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of
the other spouses consent, the the Civil Code, which reads:
transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the Art. 178. The separation in fact
consenting spouse and the third person, between husband and wife without
and may be perfected as a binding judicial approval, shall not affect the
contract upon the acceptance by the conjugal partnership, except that:
other spouse or upon authorization by xxx xxx xxx
the court before the offer is withdrawn (3) If the husband has abandoned
by either or both offerors. the wife without just cause for at least
one year, she may petition the court for
a receivership, or administration by her

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of the conjugal partnership property or Sublessees failed to pay entire second
separation of property. installment, leaving a balance of
P50,600.00 w/c they failed to pay
Abandonment implies a departure by despite Alipios demands. Thus, he filed
one spouse with the avowed intent never a case against said sublessees asking for
to return, followed by prolonged absence payment of the balance or rescission of
without just cause, and without in the the contract should they fail to pay the
meantime providing in the least for one's balance.
family although able to do so. There
must be absolute cessation of marital Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal
relations, duties and rights, with the of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of
intention of perpetual separation. 6 This the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that
idea is clearly expressed in the above- such was applicable since her husband
quoted provision, which states that "a and co-sublessee passed away prior
spouse is deemed to have abandoned tothe filing of this action. Said rule has
the other when he or she has left the been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20,1997
conjugal dwelling without any intention Rules of Civil Procedure.
of returning." The Trial court denied Alipios petition
because she was a party to the contract
The record shows that as early as 1942, & should be independently impleaded
the private respondent had already together w/the Manuel sps. Death of her
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied husband merely resulted in his exclusion
admission to their conjugal home in from the case. Petitioner & Manuels were
Dumaguete City when she returned from ordered to pay balance and P10k attys
Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not fees and costs of suit.
accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of On appeal, the CA dismissed the case
resuming their conjugal relationship. and held that the rule invoked is not
applicable. The action for recovery of a
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the sum of money does not survive the
determination by this Court of the action death of the defendant, thus the
for support in 1988, the private remaining defendants cannot avoid the
respondent refused to give financial action by claiming thatsuch death totally
support to the petitioner. The physical extinguished their obligation. When the
separation of the parties, coupled with action is solidary, creditor may bring his
the refusal by the private respondent to action against any of the debtors
give support to the petitioner, sufficed to obligated insolidum. Alipios liability is
constitute abandonment as a ground for independent of & separate from her
the judicial separation of their conjugal husbands.(Climaco vs. Siy Uy, Imperial
property. vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de
Agcaoili)
LIII
Issue:
ALIPIO vs CA
GR 134100 W/N a creditor can sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in anordinary
Facts: proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeableagainst the conjugal
Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 partnership.
hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on Held:
Sep. 12, 1990. In June 19, 1987 til the
end of the lease period, Jaring subleased NO. Proper remedy would be to file
the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps aclaim in the settlement of the
Manuel. The stipulated rent is decedents estate or if none has
P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of beencommenced, he can file a petition
P300k and P185,600.00. The second either for the issuance of letters of
installment due on June 30, 1989. administration or for the allowance of
will, depending on whether

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itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by
lumping claim against Alipios with those
against the Manuels.

CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the


obligation of the Alipios is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership since
it was contracted by the spouses for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
When petitioners spouse died, their CPG
was dissolved & debts chargeable
against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in
accordance w/ Rule 73, Sec.2 w/c
provides that the community property
will be inventoried, administered, &
liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.

In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that


no complaint for collection of
indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can
be brought against the surviving spouse.
Claim must be made in the proceedings
for the liquidation & settlement of the
CPG. Surviving spouses powers of
administration ceases & is passed on to
court-appointed administrator. This was
affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where
Court held that lack of liquidation
proceedings does not mean that the CPG
continues. Creditor may apply for letters
of admin in his capacity as a principal
creditor.

Note that for marriages governed by


CPG, obligations entered into by sps are
chargeable against their CPG & the
partnership is primarily bound for the
repayments. Theyll be impleaded as
representatives of the CPG and concept
of joint/solidary liability does not apply.
At best, it will not be solidary but joint.

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