wii IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JOSEPHAT MUA, | Plaintiff — Appellant, on v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY/PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; VERJEANA M. JACOBS, Individually and as Board Chairperson of Prince George's Public Schools; DR.WILLIAM R. HITE, JR., Individually and as superintendent; ROGER C.THOMAS, Esquire; SYNTHIA J. SHILLING; MONICA GOLDSON, Individually and as Associates superintendent of Prince George's Public Schools; PIERRE DICKSON, Individually and as agent of the Board of Education of Prince George's County; DR. KEVIN MAXWELL, Individually and as superintendent of Prince George's Public Schools; DR. ALVIN L. CRAWLEY, Individually and as superintendent; ROBERT J. GASKIN, Individually and Chief Human Resources of Prince George's Public Schools; DR. LILLIAN M. LOWERY; ARDRA O'NEAL; ABBEY HAIRSTON, FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME) and ACE-AFSCME LOCAL, 2250, Defendants — Appellees ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Josephat Mua Pro se 2332 London Bridge Drive Silver Spring Md, 20906 Tel: 301-919-4939 Friday, March 17", 2017QUESTIONS PRESENTED . Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange could not enforced? . Whether the Plaintiff must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court's decision is reviewed by this court de novo. United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir.1993), . Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange could not enforced? . Whether the Maryland and state personnel working under color of law can assist unlicensed debt collector to garnish wages and confiscate personal property of an employee in an organized scheme and stay out of the case, which violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives owners of their property without affording constitutionally adequate notice due to discrimination. . Did the lower court err as a matter of law in raising the issue of piece meal splitting in the absence of the issue being raised by the Defendants? . Did the lower court err as a matter of law by precluded from litigation persons who were not parties to the original suit without a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit? . Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by some Defendants could be held on separately? . What Test Should Courts use to Determine Whether an Employee’s Opposition to particular Actions Constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate title VII? ). Whether Federal court can ignore willful violation of MR.MUA’s Leave Under The FMLA?ii 10.Whether Federal court can deny consolidation and dismiss cases when Defendants are working together to defeat justice? 11.What Test should courts use to determine whether an employee's opposition to particular actions constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate Title VII? 12.The District Court’s Decision Undermines the Title Vii Requirement That Employees Report Harassment At The First Opportunity 13.Whether it was proper for the lower court to dismiss the action after significant misconduct by the Appellees working with the state agencies under color of law to violate rights guaranteed by the U.S Constitution? 14.Whether Federal court can ignore Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act’ involving the state which permits an employee to bring an action in state or federal court against an employer who allegedly has violated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")? 15.Whether the U.S District Court can ignore the duty of fair representation and dismiss the case when administrative appeals are pending in the state court? 16.Whether Federal court can ignore instances of misconduct involving lawyers in this case and dismiss a case after proffer of evidence of retaliatory animus and tampering with the state proceedings to cover up illegal activity? 17. Whether the Court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 and finding that there was no organized scheme only for the U.S Attorney to announce investigations concerning public in Maryland? 18.Whether the Federal court can ignore the law and the evidence and issue a flawed opinion without considering all the facts surrounding the case which is prejudicial to the Petitioners? 19. Whether third party retaliation was a motivating factor by the appellees after Petitioner Mr. Mua sued the unions and the state agencies in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al (Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503? 20. Whether the U.S District Court can ignore malicious activities of the STATE AGENCIES, Prince George’s County and Defendants in this casewho are directly liable for retaliation, under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because of their own misconduct? 21.Did the trial court abuse it’s by permitting Appellee AFSCME International to file a response out of time without leave of court and denial of default judgement in a related Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02334-PJM? 22.Whether the District Court erred in granting Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and limiting presentation of evidence when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute? 23. Whether it's proper for the Union Defendants in this case to conspire with the state to conceal Motion to remove in order to avoid liability in Federal court as part of organized scheme?iv TABLE OF CONTENTS: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. APPENDIX... APPENDIX A... i OPINIONS BELOW... JURISDICTION... RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS... STATEMENT OF THE CASE..... REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.... Issue I. Continuous Violation of Title VI and Title VII after the Appellees joined forces with others including the state of Maryland to advance the discriminatiot A. CAUSES AND OPERATING FACTS COURT OVERLOOKED... B. Creating Change in Maryland... C. Federal Cases and various conflicts:.. Issue Il. U.S Attomey - Department of Education conflict.... Issue III: Whether the Plaintiff must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court's decision is reviewed by this court de novo. United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir.1993) A. Proceedings In The District Court.. B. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES... C. — Standard of Review .....v D. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petitioners claims.. ARGUMENT ONE.. ‘The lower court erred in shielding the appellees after they engaged in organized scheme in violation of the First Amendment.. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LAWYER SANCTIONS... B. LAWYER CONDUCT... ARGUMENT 2... Petitioners established a prima facie case for retaliation... A. Petitioners demonstrated that the Appellees reason for ganging up to terminate their car insurance was false, and that discrimination was the real reason... ARGUMENT 3: Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange could not enforced?. el ARGUMENT 4: Whether the Maryland and state personnel working under color of law can assist unlicensed debt collector to garnish wages and confiscate personal property of an employee in an organized scheme and stay out of the case, which violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives owners of their property without affording constitutionally adequate notice due to. discrimination. . wel ARGUMENT 5: Did the lower court err as a matter of law in raising the issue of piece meal splitting in the absence of the issue being raised by the Defendants?. 16 ARGUMENT 6: Did the lower court err as a matter of law by precluded from litigation persons who were not parties to the original suit without a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit 7 ARGUMENT 7: Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by some Defendants could be held on separately?. 1vi ARGUMENT 8: What Test Should Courts use to Determine Whether an Employee's Opposition to particular Actions Constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate title VII2.. ARGUMENT 9: Whether Federal court can ignore willful violation of MR.MUA’s Leave Under The FMLA? 20 ARGUMENT 10: Whether Federal court can deny consolidation and dismiss cases when Defendants are working together to defeat justice?. ARGUMENT 11: What Test should courts use to determine whether an employee’s opposition to particular actions constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate Title VII 24 ARGUMENT 12: The District Court’s Decision Undermines the Title Vii Requirement That Employees Report Harassment At The First Opportunity. ARGUMENT 13: Whether it was proper for the lower court to dismiss the action after significant misconduct by the Appellees working with the state agencies under color of law to violate rights guaranteed by the U.S Constitution?. ARGUMENT 14: Whether Federal court can ignore Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act’ involving the state which permits an employee to bring an action in state or federal court agai agreement ("CB. ARGUMENT 15: Whether the U.S District Court can ignore the duty of fair representation and dismiss the case when administrative appeals are pending in the state court? .. 30 A. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION. ARGUMENT 16: Whether Federal court can ignore instances of misconduct involving lawyers in this case and dismiss a case after proffer of evidence of retaliatory animus and tampering with the state proceedings to cover up illegal activity?.. 32 ARGUMENT 17: Whether the Court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 and finding that there was no organized scheme only for the U.S Attorney to announce investigations concerning public in Maryland?.. A. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's claims. ARGUMENT 18: Whether the Federal court can ignore the law and the evidence an a flawed opinion without considering all the facts surrounding the case which is prejudicial to the Petitioners?.. 34vii ARGUMENT 19: Whether third party retaliation was a motivating factor by the appellees after Petitioner Mr. Mua sued the unions and the state agencies in Federal Case No. 8:14- ‘ev-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al (Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503)?. ARGUMENT 20: Whether the U.S District Court can ignore malicious activities of the STATE AGENCIES, Prince George’s County and Defendants in this case who are directly liable for retaliation, under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because of their own misconduct 36 ARGUMENT 21: Did the trial court abuse it’s by permitting Appellee AFSCME International to file a response out of time without leave of court and denial of default judgement in a related Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02334-PJM?. ARGUMENT 22: Whether the District Court erred in granting Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and limiting presentation of evidence when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute’ ARGUMENT 23: Whether it’s proper for the Union Defendants in this case to conspire with the state to conceal Motion to remove in order to avoid liability in Federal court as. part of organized scheme’ A. Prejudice .... CONCLUSION..viii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 1:16-cv-01435-ELH Mua et al v. State of Maryland et al... . 1:16-cv-03247-ELH Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al 327 F.3d at 321... 454 U.S. 892 (1981, 459 U.S. 212, 215, 230 & n.19 (1983). 459 U.S. 1218 (1983)... 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). 8:11-cv-01198-PJM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's County.... 8:14-cv-02334-PJM Mua v. The O'Neal Firm, LLP et al and now Appeal No. 16- 1506 37,38 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua et al v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange et 5,35 4-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et 5,12,22,23,24,35 -cv-00060-PJM California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Mua et al. 5-cv-02249-PJM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's Count 8:16-cv-03267-ELH Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al. Prince George's County Public Schools et al.... ‘Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011).. Administrative Policy 4170. (J. (4th Cir. 1999) Albemarle Paper Co. v. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44. al 8: al 8: 8: Anne Arundel 0701SP026102012. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796, Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 799 (6 . Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551, 102 S. Ct. 700 (1982). Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S, 212, 216 & n.5 (1983, Boyer-Liberto, 2013 WL 141303. Brice v. Starr, 93 Wash. Soi, 161 Pac.ix Bridge v.Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 641 (2008) (quoting 2 1964{(c)... Bridgeport v. Scott Co. 94 Conn. 461, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) 354... Buchanan v. N.LR.. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. Carrington v. Crocker, supré Clayton y. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. Conkle v. Laughlin... Cote v. Eagle Stores, In 97 F.2d 388 (1979). . White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).. Davis v. Immediate Med. Serv., Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d 10, 14-15, 1997- Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641-646 , Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters... DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3rd 409, 417 (4° Cir, 2015). 12 Dresher at 293... Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1983....29 EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th Cir.2005). Ellenbogen v. Rider Maint, Corp., 794 F.2d 768, 769 (2d Cir. 1 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)... Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Inv. Co.,. Fenner v. Kinney, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-749, 2003-Ohio-989 Fernandez v. U.S., 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991). Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981 Ford Motor Co. v . Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).. Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F. 34 243, 246 (4" Cir. 2015). Fowler v. Coleman (Dec. 28, 1999), 10th Dist. No. Garcia v. Zenith elec . Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (ih Cir. 1995, Garrett v. Hewlett- Packard Company, 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002, Green v. Branson, 108 F.. ( . au Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1519; of: Texaco, Inc v. Ponsoldi, 999 F.2d 794, 797 o Cir. 1991)...x Gullickson Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 910th Cir. 1996... Haddad v. English (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 598, 603. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct, 594 (1972 Hardwicke Etter Co. v. Durant, 77 Okla. 202, 187 Pac. 484. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Harris v, Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993 Helsey v. Am. Mineral Prod'n. C Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 355 (1964). Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir.2002). iog Atl. 162; Kalm v. Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 Atl. 16: Jeffries v. State of Kan., 147 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998). Johnson v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 309 F. App'x 675, 685 (4th Cir. 2009 Johnson v. Prineville, IOI Or. ii9, 196 Pac. 821... Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp.,458 F.3d 332, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2006)... Kalm v, Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 Atl. 165. Kolstad v. Am, Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546, (1999). Laughlin v.Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1998, Martin v, Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4 Cir, 1995) Martin v. Rose supra... Matheny v. Preston Hotel Co., 140 Tenn. 41, 203 S. W. 32 Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, I nc., 525 U.S, 33. 44. 119 S. Ct. 292 (1998). 3 Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir. 1995). Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md, 226, 235, 228 A.2d 254 (1967. Miller at 215; Davis at 15. . Mua y. Board of Education of Prince George's County/Prince George's County Public Schools et al, No. 8:2015cv02249 - Document 30 (D. Md. 2016); Mua v. Prince George’s County Public Schools California et al. Case No. CALI1-36992.; Munguia v. Unified School Dist. No. 328, 125 F.3d 1353, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997).. Neal, 48 Md. App. at 358-59, 427 A.2d 1033 Ohio-6060, 119, citing Ramage v. Cent. Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97, 102, 1992-Ohio-109....xi Ohio Valley Radiology Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 121 Pakas v. Hollingshead. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) Peist v. Richmond, 97 Vt. 97, 122 Atl, 420; 29 YALA L. J. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2003)... Prince George's County Circuit Court Case CAL11-36992, Mua v. Board of Education for Prince George’s County et al.... Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 660 & n.2 (1965) (Black, J. dissenting Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 777-789 (4th Cir, 1998) Secor v. Sturgis.. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982. Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985). . Stanley v. American Federation of State and Mun. Employees Local No. 553, 165 Ma. App. 1, 15, 884 a.2d 724, (2005). 31 Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944 Strickland v. Washington supre Suders, 542 U.S. at 145.... Suki v. Blume (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 289, 290. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101-04 (1962). Tidwell, Major Issues in the Duty of Fair Representation Cases Since 197: Det. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1985)... Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P. Ullmann v. Duffus, 10th Dist. No. O5AP-299, 2005. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61 (1981). United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 398 (4th Cir.2006, United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir.1993). United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1995, United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Ci U.S. 1066, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993). United States v. Throckmorton. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, No. 12-484 (June 24, 10, 34 13,1517 71, 183-84 (1967). Vahdati ‘ana. v Scott R. Roberts & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., 1xii Vineseck v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 136 Minn. 96, I6i N. W. 494. Williams-Abbott Electric Co. v. Model Electric Co.. Williams v. Sea-Land Corp., 844 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1988, Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2005). Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 451-52, 455 (9th Cir. 1987). RULES OTHER AUTHORITIES 18 USC. § 1951(b\2). 18 U.S.C. § 1961. 42 USC. §2000(e) U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1503 Josephat Mua y, Attorney General, Maryland . 8 U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1506 Josephat Mua v. The O'Neal Law Firm, LLP. U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1509 Josephat Mua v. Board of Education of PG Co. 8xiii Appendix: APPENDIX A Opinion of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Decided on September 16, 2016 ... vA AB Opinion of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Decided on June 21°, 2016 .. Ad AB Mandate of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated October 26", 2016... AT -AB Order denying petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc dated October 18", 2016 »A9-A10 Stay of Mandate dated September 29", 2016... we A11-A12 Judgement Order September 16", 2016, .. A13-14 Order denying Motions to Exceed the length limitations for informal opening brief... . ALS Mandate of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated August 10”, 2016. = A18- AID Judgement Order September 16", 2016, ... .A2L Memorandum opinion of the U.S District Court dated March 31, 2016...A22 -AS3 U.S District Court order of March 31", 2016... oe AS4 U.S District Court order For Reconsideration dated October 05, 2015 ........+. ASS U.S District Court order of Dismissal of entire case Dated August 31°, 2015..A56 US District Court order of Dismissal of parties to the case Dated August os", pbs eee AST-AS9 Maryland Court of Special Appeals order conceming administrative appeal issued on December 8", 2016 which ignored significant evidence of discrimination and prejudice after key witnesses passed away..... ..A60- A6Sxiv Proposed ruling from the Maryland Office of Administrative appeals which Rescinded decision to terminate Petitioner Mr. Mua and led to current ongoing conspiracy to change the ruling and escape liability A66-A74 Maryland Court of Special Appeals opinion in which the court declined to enforce collective bargain agreements despite significant evidence of lack of representation -AT5-A83 Dissenting opinion in State of Maryland Public Schoo! labor Relations .-A84-A88Pro Se Litigant’s pleadings are to be constructed liberally and held to less stringent standards than Formal Pleadings drafted by lawyers. If the Court can reasonably read Pleadings to state a valid claim on which litigation could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion, legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction or litigant’s unfamiliarity with Pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551, 102 S. Ct. 700 (1982). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92S. Ct. 594 (1972); See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997); Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995); Fernandez v. U.S, 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991) Now Comes Petitioner Josephat Mua herein, pro se, and request that this court issue a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denying to review respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgement below. OPINIONS BEL‘ On March 30", 2016, the U.S District Court issued an opinion finding no error. (Pet. App2?- App53) and order (Pet. App54). The First opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit was issued on June 21°, 2016 (Pet.APP4-APP6) and ordered Petitioner to challenge District orders in Appeal No. 16-1509. On September 16”, 2016, the U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit issued opinion (Pet. App1-App3) and judgement (Pet App13-App14).. ‘The opinion was affirmed on October 18, 2016 denying rehearing en banc. (App9-App10). On October 26", 2016, the court issued mandate. (Pet. App7-App8). Mandate to stay was issued on September 29", 2016 (Pet. App] 1-App!2). On September 16”, 2016, the Court denied Motion to Exceed page limit (Pet. App15). In earlier appeal an offshoot of this case Appeal # 15-2363, the court issued mandate in that case on August 10", 2016. (Pet. App16-App17). Order denying. rehearing for Appeal 15-2363 was issued on August 2, 2016. (Pet. App18-App19) and the judgement was issued on June 21, 2016. (Pet App20-App21). The order for the District court dismissing the entire case initially was issued on August 31", 2015. The memorandum declining to issue summons was issued on August 5", 2015. (Pet. App57-App59).The opinions of both courts are reported widely and appear on various websites on the internet. (Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's County/Prince George's County Public Schools et al, No. 8:2015cv02249 - Document 30 (D. Md. 2016); Petitioner Exhausted administrative remedies and in order to assist this honorable court, he has attached opinion of the court of special Appeals for ‘Maryland (Pet. APP60- App65); (Pet A75-A83); Petitioner has also attached the opinion of the ‘Maryland office for Administrative hearings (OAH) (Pet. App66-APP74) and dissenting opinion from a board Member in Maryland Public School Labor Relations Board. (Pet. AppA84-A88). JURISDICTION The United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit denied petitioner's timely Appeal on September 16"", 2016 (Pet. App1-App3) and denied Motion for reconsideration on October 18". 2016 without any written opinion. (App9-App10}. On March 31. 2016. the district court issued a Final Order of Judgment (Pet. App22- App53) and order (Pet. App54) from which there was a timely appeal already noted on April 28th. 2016. On January 4. 2017. Petitioner Mr, Mua filed 1tan Application (164664) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from from January 16. 2017 to March 17, 2017. On Jan 2017 Application (164664) was granted by the Chief Justice extending the time to file until March 17. 2017. This Petition is timely filed and the {jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and Supreme Court Rules 10(a), (b). (c). The case is related to appeals No. 16-7278. Application (16A665) Josephat Mua V. The O'Neal Law Firm, LLP et al: Application No. 164662 Josephat Mua. v, Brian Frosh. Attorney General of Maryland, et al. pending before this court. The Appeal is also related to appeal No, 16-2263 and 16-2264 currently pending in the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the U.S District Court Federal case No. 1:16-cv-01435-ELH Mua et al v. State of Mary land et al ‘This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this cause under Title 28, United States Code, § 1291, which provides for an appeal from a final order of the of a district court and U.S Court of Appeals tor Fourth Circuit, and asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this case presents federal questions arising under Title VI and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20004, et seq, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq, as amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ‘The National Origin Discrimination Act under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq, as amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq.is reprinted; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) under 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part “... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without Due Process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law ...”. ‘The Maryland State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct provide in pertinent part “.... a lawyer shall not reveal information acquired during the professional relationship with a client unless the client gives informed consent... STATEMENT OF THE CASE On or around July 30", 2015, Petitioner Mr. Mua filed his lawsuit against Appellees Board of Education of Prince George’s County, Verjeana M. Jacobs, Dr. William R. Hite Jr, Roger C. ‘Thomas, Synthia J. Shilling, Monica Goldson, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Association of Classified Employees American Federation of State, County, Municipal Employees (ACE-AFSCME Local 2250), Mr. Pierre Dickson, Dr. Kevin Maxwell, Dr. Alvin L. Crawley, Dr. Lilian M. Lowery, Ardra O'Neal, and Abbey Hairston. Petitioner Mr. Mua had requested the court to consolidate the Presented case with the original suit which has been stayed but the Federal court declined. (See Federal Case 8:1 1-cv- 01198-PJM ECF DKT # 99 Filed 09/17/12 Page 1 of 6 and Federal Case 8:11-cv-01198-PIM 2ECF DKT# 99-4 Filed 09/17/12 Page | of 42) Due to conspiracy involving the Appellees in this ‘case, important evidence appeared to have been ignored which could have resolved the Federal litigation. For Example, the courts below failed to consider documents presented in Federal Case 8:1 1-cv-01198-PJM ECF DKT# 99-3 Filed 09/17/12 Page 1 of 93. The document rebutted the false allegations labelled against the Petitioner Mr. Mua. The lower court also failed to consolidate this case with the other cases currently pending before this court in which related issues where presented to the court. Petitioner, Mr. Mua, was employed by the Appellee, Board of Education for Prince George’s County ("PGCPS"), for close to ten years. On June 18", 2010, Mr. Mua was discharged from his, employment by PGCPS, Mr. Mua filed this 2" lawsuit asserting forty-seven claims making allegations of continuous discrimination and retaliation under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 among other claims: (See U.S District Court Record at ECF Dkt #1 86-657 (1) National origin Discrimination (2) Retaliation (3) Hostile Work Environment (4) Unlawful Discrimination based on Retaliation (5) Retaliation — Whistleblower protection Act (6) Breach of contract (7) Breach of contract inter alia. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (District Court Record ECF Dkt #1 page 4-4) ‘On August 5, 2015, the district court filed a memorandum and order (District Court Record ECF Dkt #2) granting summary judgment in favor of all claims against the Board of Education and Board Defendants Verjeana Jacobs, Dr. William R. Hite Jr, Roger C. Thomas, Synthia J. Shilling, Monica Goldson, Pierre Dickson, Dr. Kevin Maxwell, Dr. Alvin L. Crawley, Dr. Lilian M, Lowery, and Abbey Hairston. The order further dismissed Ardra O'Neal as a Defendant without prejudice. Finally, the order dismissed all claims against AFSCME and AFSCME Local 2250 without prejudice and gave Plaintiff Mr. Mua thirty (30) days of the date of Memorandum order to file an amended complaint. Mr. Mua filed an amended complaint within thirty (30) days mandated by the order. (District Court Record ECF Dit # 4 Filed 09/02/15 Page 1 of 20). That unknown to Mr. Mua the Federal court had dismissed the entire case before the 30 days were up on 08/31/15 (See District Court Record ECF Dkt # 3). On September 14”, 2015, Mr. Mua filed a timely Motion for reconsideration to preserve his rights (See District Court Record ECF Dkt #5). After not hearing from the court, Mr. Mua then filed notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. Rule App. Pro. 4(a) (1). (See District Court Record ECF Dkt #6 Filed 09/23/15). On October 5", 2015, the District Court ordered the Motion for reconsideration is GRANTED-IN-PART in that the case is, REOPENED. The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is considered timely filed. The Memorandum Order dated August 5, 2015 (ECF No. 2) is REAFFIRMED, dismissing without prejudice all claims in the Original Complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff SHALL within ten (10) days submit proof of proper service on Defendants...” See District Court Record ECF Dkt #9. On November 3°, 2015, The Defendant AFSCME International and ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 filed their Motion to dismiss. On November 4", 2015, the Record was transmitted to the US Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit. In this appeal, Mr. Mua secks appeal claims he has been 3forced to abandon due to 20-page limit of an amended complaint by the U.S District Court. Plaintiff also seeks to enforce his rights after the Maryland state officers conspired to defeat justice by concealing Motion to remove case to Federal court in Circuit Court Case No. CALI]- 36992. On March 31", 2016, The U.S District Court issued an order on Motion to dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Memorandum Opinion. The U.S District Court then dismissed the case with prejudice. (See U.S District Court Record ECF DKT #30 and ECF DKT#31) Finally, Plaintiff Mr. Mua requested the court to stay the order pending an appeal but was denied (See District Court record ECF DKT #33). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mua filed notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. Rule App. Pro. 4(a)(1). (See District Court Record ECF Dkt #34 Filed (04/28/2016).On 05/03/2016, this Court ordered the Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to USCA for Fourth Circuit. In this appeal, Mr. Mua seeks appeal claims which have been dismissed with prejudice in his amended complaint by the U.S District Court. Additionally, this case involves abuse of process, fraud, and misconduct, organized scheme in violation of “The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 inter alia by the Appellees in an effort to defeat justice. The case involves public interest issues after Mr. Mua reported widespread public corruption within the Prince George's County System. "(A]buse of process (is) the intentional use of legal process for an improper purpose incompatible with the lawful function of the process by one with an ulterior motive in doing so, and with resulting damages.” Respondent Counsel Mr. Joel Seledee engaged in abuse of process in conspiracy to defraud while working closely with the office of the Attomey general, Defendant Prince George’s County, and other coconspirators in Maryland. The Appellees in this case worked closely with the Petitioners Mr. Mua’s unions which had contract to provide insurance coverage for its members. Appellee initiated a case in state court in conspiracy to defeat justice while cases addressing the same issues was in progress in Federal Court. Petitioner Mr. Mua had a contract with California Casualty Indemnity Exchange to be reimbursed for car rental expenses. Thus, in order to advance the conspiracy to defeat justice, Respondents and other conspirators engaged in a deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of the Petitioner Mr. Mua. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT Issue I. Continuous Violation of Title VI and Title VII after the Appellees joined forces with others including the state of Maryland to advance the discrimination. A. CAUSES AND OPERATING FACTS COURT OVERLOOKED. Petitioner Mr. Mua engaged in a protected activity in good faith and worked closely with National Endowment for democracy (NED) in downtown Washington DC to bring about positive change around the world. Petitioner Mr. Mua led a social media following of more than 100,000 followers to bring about social justice. Petitioner Mr. Mua had other cases which were 4pending before the Federal court when he filed this case in Federal court due to continuous violation of Title VI and Title VII after appellees in this case joined forces with others including the state of Maryland agents. The reason for suing in federal court in the First case was due to violations of Title VII and Title VI in the first case filed on May 5, 2011. (See 8:11-cv-01198- PIM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's County) Since that time, there has been a continuing discrimination and retaliation involving the Appellees and State personnel in both state and Federal court. The appellees in this case have a relationship with appellant's Unions and his employer Board of Education for Prince George’s County. The Federal court ignored evidence of organized scheme despite overwhelming evidence involving two states with another case pending in the Washington DC Superior court after it was transferred to Federal court in Maryland (See THE O'NEAL FIRM, LLP, et al. Vs. MUA, JOSEPHAT Case No. 2013 SC3 004261: Washington DC). The decision to appeal this case is not taken lightly, especially concerning misconduct involving highly connected individuals within Maryland and it involves a Federal Judge Peter Messitte whom Petitioners have requested him to recuse himself. There appears to be a conflict of interest on several levels involving the federal court and Petitioner Mr. Mua and his family should not be retaliated against because Petitioner Mr. Mua was engaged in protected activity on behalf of American citizens. in Maryland During His tenure in Prince George’s County, Petitioner Mr. Mua was engaged in a protected activity on behalf of the union members. Petitioner Mr. Mua wrote widely and engaged with the lawmakers to make the county a better place. Petitioner Mr. Mua wrote articles based on information forwarded to him by the union members and collaborated with the local media. As a result of the advocacy, Prince George’s County went through a transformation which is ongoing. The only problem now has been the retaliation part which has caused damages to him and his family by the Appellees in the cases Petitioners filed in the U.S District Court on December 8", 2014. Petitioner Mr. Mua won his administrative on November 26", 2012 (Pet. App66-APP74) and due to retaliation and corruption in Maryland system, his classification was changed and his documents concealed with the appeal court in Prince George’s County. This is against the state and federal law. On May 25", 2016, February 23, 2017 among other dates, the County lawyer ‘Shani Whisonant Esq has changed the facts and is now misleading the state court of special appeals and Court of Appeals for Maryland. In this case on several occasions including May 23” 2016, the appellees retaliated after Petitioner Mr. Mua wrote an opinion. At the same time Federal Judge Peter Messitte dismissed this case while other cases tied to this case were pending at the same time which overwhelmed Petitioner Mr. Mua. The dismissal of this case in particular was done with the view to shield the misconduct of the Union officials, State officials and attomeys who engaged in discrimination, failed to represent and engaged in organized scheme which is an ongoing illegal activity and a threat to public life in Maryland. This case and the cases currently in the U.S Supreme Court are tied. C. Federal Cases and various conflicts:1. Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Mua etal 2. Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua et al v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al 3. Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-02249-PJM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's County/Prince George's County Public Schools et al Federal Case No. 8:11-cv-01198-PJM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's Cow Federal Case No, 1:16-y-O1435-ELH Mua et av. State of Maryland etal Federal Case No. 1:16-cv-03247-ELH Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange etal Federal Case No. 8:16-cv-03267-ELH Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange etal The above cases are tied and they all involve violations of title VII and title VI because of the interconnection with the employer and the Unions. There are clear acts of retaliation in each one of them with the state of Maryland and it’s agencies engaging in undermining of justice after Petitioner Mr. Mua filed several grievances with the state and Federal Authorities. The Federal court failed to intervene and consolidate the actions which was not good for justice. The opinion issued by the U.S District Federal court was misleading and shields the Appellees in a clear case of unfaimess and discrimination. ‘On September 11, 2012, Appellee Synthia Joy Shillings who also goes by Synthia Joy Kucner working closely with Appellees in this case filed malicious and false claims in Anne Arundel County District Court Mua v. Synthia Joy Kecner case No. 0701SP026102012. The case was in retaliation for Petitioner Mr. Mua’s protected as a reporter and also for filing Prince George's County Circuit Court Case CAL11-36992, Mua v. Board of Education for Prince George’s County et al. Without reviewing all the evidence, the State District court affirmed. Petitioner Mr. ‘Mua appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. 02C12172741. During the proceedings, Appellee Shillings confessed to Petitioner Mr. Mua and also to the attorney Gary H. Gerstenfield who handled the case that Appellee Shillings had made things up. Among false allegation appellee Shillings made were that Petitioner Mr. Mua had followed Appellee Shillings in the malls and also into her home. After being confronted for filing malicious claims, Appellee Shillings agreed to have the case dropped and sealed. Further, Appellees in this case conspired to cause damages to the petitioner much more with others in this petition by making up malicious allegations against Mr. Mua. Later in Annapolis Appellee Synthia Shillings who was the chief of Human Resources stated he did not know who terminated Petitioner Mr. Mua and there was nothing wrong with his performance. ‘There was concerted effort to cause maximum damages to Mr. Mua. On February 22”, 2016, the California Casualty Indemnity Exchange under Marsden & Seledee filed a Motion to gamish wages of my wife Francoise Vandenplas and it was granted ex-parte after the case was transferred from Prince George's County. The Montgomery County order to gamish wages of NO wo eePetitioner's wife (Ms. Francoise Vandenplas) happened a week before Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued their order on February 29", 2016 (U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Docket #: 15-2048 ECF 47 and ECF 48. How did the Appellees in that case with ties to this case know the outcome of the case in advance to gamish wages of Ms. Vandenplas? They must have known this in advance to harass Petitioner's wife (Ms. Francoise Vandenplas) who had nothing to do with the check in question because the contract to rent a car was done with Petitioner Mr. Mua with appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange who has ties with the Union appellees in this case. The garnishment is unjustly because the insurance company engaged in discrimination and breach of contract together with the Union inter alia. Because the opinion issued by U.S District Federal court affected this case filed on July 30", 2015, Petitioner Mr. Mua moved to to Reopen Federal Case No. 8:11-cv-01198-PIM on December 15", 2015 in order to consolidate the issues in the interest of justice. However, the Judge denied the Motion on April 12", 2016. (See Federal Case No. 8:11-cv-01198-PJM ECF DKT 126). Since the denial to reopen the case, the state of Maryland has continued to cause damages to Petitioner Mr. Mua in a malicious manner by filing misleading opinions in the state cases and administrative appeal. ‘The reason for these irregular activities is due to a conflict involving U.S Federal District Court Federal Judge Peter Messitte who is a faculty member at American University law school with attorney Michael Artz of the union in this litigation (Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-02249-PJM). ‘The Appellees in this case, led by union appellees acting in retaliation, and the California Casualty Indemnity Exchange (insurance company) in Current U.S Supreme case No. 16-7278 with ties to the unions engaged in discrimination against Mr. Mua and his wife. From the very beginning of this case, Federal Judge Messitte did things intentionally or unintentionally which undermined justice. For example; (a.)On August 5", 2015, the Federal court failed to issue summons to all the Appellees after Petitioner was issued the right to sue letters by EEOC. (b.) On August 31", 2015, the Federal court issued an order dismissing the entire case before the 30 days ordered by the court were over. (See U.S District Court Record Case 8:15-cv-02249- PJM Document 3 Filed 08/31/15) (c.)On September 14", 2015, Petitioner filed Motion for reconsideration timely and the Federal court failed to act timely which cost Petitioner Mr. Mua to file an appeal at $ 505.00, receipt number 8463702124, Money petitioner could have saved had the Court acted in the best interest. (d.)On September 23", 2015, Petitioner Mr. Mua filed an appeal and the Federal court went on to frustrate the appeal by issuing misleading opinion when the case was still on Appeal in the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, (e.)On October 5", 2015, The Court issued an ORDER granting in part in that the case is REOPENED 5 Motion for Reconsideration. The Amended Complaint (ECF No.4) is considered timely filed. The Memorandum Order dated August 5, 2015 (ECF No.2) is REAFFIRMED, dismissing without prejudice all claims in the Original Complaint (ECF No.1). Plaintiff SHALL within ten (10) days submit proof of proper service on Defendants American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") and Association of Classified Employees, American Federal of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME Local 2250"). (Citation Omitted ECF DKT #9). However, the Federal court failed to mail the summons with the order despite issuing a short notice for service of process. (£) On October 8, 2015, Petitioner Mr. Mua approached the court respectfully for summons. After Deputy Clerk conferred with the Chambers, summons were then issued later that day. (g.) On December 7, 2015, Mr. Artz, Michael Esq. who teaches a class with Hon. Judge ‘Messitte at American University law School, capriciously filed a response out of time and without leave of court nor entering his appearance. (h.)On December 10", 2015, Mr. Artz, Michael Esq finally entered his appearance and then filed a response without conferring with the Petitioner. ECF DKT #22 and 23. (i.) On December 14", 2015, U.S Court of Appeals issued an order "DENYING" the motion for ex parte injunctive relief. Gi.) On December 30", 2015, Petitioner Mr. Mua filed a MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND/ OR SANCTION and gave reasons why the Attorney for the Appellees should be disqualified after engaging in Misconduct and then using a case in which he undermined with the state of Maryland actors to have the case dismissed only to use it in this case. (See ECF DKT 28.) (k.)On January 07, 2016, the Federal court issued a PAPERLESS ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant AFSCME Intemational Reply and for Sanctions; PAPERLESS ORDER DENYING 27 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration or Immediate Hearing; AND PAPERLESS ORDER DENYING 28 Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify and/or Sanction. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 1/6/2016 (See ECF DKT #29) (1.) On 03/31/2016, the Federal court issued a misleading MEMORANDUM OPINION See ECF DKT # 30 and ECF DKT 31 DISMISSING Plaintiff's Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE and finding as MOOT 28 Plaintiff's Notice of Motion to Consolidate Motions. (m.) On April, 14", 2016, Petitioner Mr. Mua filed MOTION to Stay of Memorandum but ‘was denied in a suspicious manner through a paperless order ECF DKT #33 (n.) On April 28, 2016, Petitioner Mr. Mua was asked to file another appeal on the same case. (0.)On June 21%, 2016, The U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit dismissed Appeal Case No.: 15-2363 and ordered Mr. Mua may challenge the district court's orders in Appeal No. 16- 1509. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There were other illegalities in the other cases as shown in the brief U.S Supreme Court Case No. 16-7278. Other cases dismissed by U.S Federal District Court in suspicious manner now on Appeal in the U.S Supreme Court include the following, U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1509 Josephat Mua v. Board of Education of PG Co. U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1506 Josephat Mua v. The O'Neal Law Firm, LLP; U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit Federal Appeal Case 16-1503 Josephat Mua v. AttorneyGeneral, Maryland and this case. The U.S Federal District Court appeared to be interfering with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit and has been interfering with some of the Motions which Petitioner has filed in that court which has led to Bureaucratic incompetence. DISTRICT COURT UPDATE.PAPERLESS ORDER DENYING [32] Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay of ‘Memorandum and Order Filed on March 31, 2016. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 4/13/2016. [15-2363] (JB). ‘Once an appeal has been docketed, the U.S District court is supposed to respect the appellate proceedings but not in this case. Issue II. U.S Attorney - Department of Education conflict. During the winter of 2010, Petitioner Mr. Mua provided critical information to the Department of Education office of the inspector General concerning widespread corruption in prince George" s County Public schools. At the time, Petitioner Mr. Mua made the reports, Mr. James Fisher worked as an attorney for the U.S Department of Education in Washington DC. Due to undue influence, Mr. James Fisher resigned from the U.S Department of Education and joined the Thatcher Law firm as an attomey for Prince George’s County Public Schools. He engaged in serious misconduct within the state court system including tampering with U.S mail and concealment of evidence. Mr. James Fisher now works with the Federal government as a union lawyer but remains an attorney in my Federal case (8:11-cv-01198-PIM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince George's County) at which point he has been a major influence to defeat Justice using his extensive networks. The Thatcher law firm received millions of dollars in “no bid contract” by the local board. The money which Petitioner suspects has been used over the years to buy off lawyers to the detriment of the community and employees who sued the county system. Petitioner Mr. Mua humbly requests this court use its supervisory power to get justice in this situation. What is happening to the Petitioner is unconstitutional and a violation of rights. To cover up their illegal schemes and violation of rights, the Appellees in this case engaged in malicious scheme to derail justice. This way, their illegal activities continues. There should be no two sets of laws. Petitioner Mr. Mua request this case be reversed and cases in federal court be transferred to a neutral judge who does not have close ties to Montgomery County, Prince George's County and Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. In other words, a Judge who has never worked in the courts in those jurisdictions because of various conflicts of interest in progress. The dispute involving significant violation of Petitioners rights arose from the Maryland state courts in those areas. As Supreme Court, can imagine, Petitioners expected that U.S District Federal court ‘would recognize the meaningful value and importance of full discussion in resolving discrimination complaints and preserving good relations. Petitioner Mr. Mua also understand that from time to time there may be misunderstandings and questions concerning rules, policies, and personnel issues. But clearly this is not the issue here, the issue is policy, laws and procedures are being ignored and the court which is supposed to cure these wrongs is now turning against the Petitioner in a suspicious manner. Federal law is supposed to be the law of the land which 9gives employees a way to have complaints addressed rapidly, fairly, and without fear of reprisal ‘but not in Petitioner cases because of discrimination and retaliation fueled by organized scheme in Maryland which is ongoing. Issue III: Whether the Plaintiff must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court's decision is reviewed by this court de novo. United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir.1993). ‘The District court erred by finding that Petitioner did not state a claim and it lacked jurisdiction of this case when there was enough evidence to show that the District court could review the issues involving retaliation and discrimination. The court also erred by dismissing the case when so many issues had not been resolved and when in fact there was enough evidence to establish venue in the U.S District of Maryland with pending issues tied to the case including the Appeal affecting California casualty Indemnity Exchange (See Appeal 16-1584). The California Casualty Indemnity Exchange and the Union appellees and others have ties to this case. Appellee Raouf Abdullah used to call Mr. Mua a slave trader and he kept his personal property in retaliation after he reported him to the court. It was error as a matter of law to overlook this evidence, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. A.) Proceedings In The District Court ‘The Federal District Court erred in its findings that there was no bad faith, breach of contract, violation of rights, fraud committed by the Appellees and the state actors working under color of, law in Mua v. Prince George's County Public Schools California et al. Case No. CALI1-36992.; and not only does their finding conflict with established precedent case law, but it also conflicts with itself from one Judgement to the next. Itis clear from the record that the Appellees counsel Mr. Mark J Murphy, Mr. Michael Artz, Abbey Hairston, Chief Counsel Nicholas Serrano Esq conduct clearly falls outside of prevailing professional norms and standards (Martin v. Rose, 525 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1975) ). The Petitioner Mr. Mua contends that the errors are so prejudicial as to meet the requirements under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) as Per Se Error. Failing this, one may still use it to meet the first prong on the Strickland Test (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). In failing to address this matter the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the U.S Federal court clearly abused its discretion involving unreasonable application of Federal Law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States. Black Law Dictionary (7th Edition) defines “wrong-doing” as a violation of the law ice. crime, When appellee CCIE engaged in violating the rights of the Petitioners by using the court system to collect debt using in violation of Federal law, they made the judgement which they got to be void. B,) ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES C.) Standard of Review 10The court of appeals reviews de novo the district court’s evaluation of judicial concems, such as the interrelationship of certified claims and remaining claims, and the possibility of piecemeal review. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (mixed question of law and fact); see also AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The district court’s Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to determine if it will lead to ‘piecemeal appeals’ and for ‘clear unreasonableness’ on the issue of equities.”); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that judicial concerns are reviewed de novo). The court of appeals reviews for abuse of discretion the district court’s assessment of equitable factors, such as prejudice and delay. See Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1519; cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797 (9" Cir. 1991) (citing Gregorian for the single proposition that the court reviews a Rule 54(b) certification for abuse of discretion). D.) The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petitioner’s claims. On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sole obligation of the party who did not prevailed at trial is to show that there is “substantial” evidence that supports the verdict. Martin v. Cavalier Horel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4"" Cir. 1995) Circumstantial evidence ccan defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 777-789 (4"" Cir, 1998). In this case, Petitioner Mr. Mua has enough direct and circumstantial evidence to prevail on trial. ARGUMENT ONE: The lower court erred in shielding the appellees after they engaged in organized scheme in violation of the First Amendment. A.) STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LAWYER SANCTIONS, ‘The American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (the "ABA Standards") that the proper standard of proof for violations of the relevant rules of professional conduct is “clear and convincing evidence." See ABA Standards § 1.3. The panoply of available sanctions for attorney misconduct includes disbarment, suspension, fine, public reprimand, and private reprimand. Id. §§ 2.2 — 2.10. When such misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court is obliged in formulating the appropriate discipline to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the "potential or actual injury” resulting from the misconduct. Id. § 3.0. Turning to the merits of the claims against each Defendant in this case. the court should examine them in ascending order of seriousness. First. starting with the conduct of Appellee Board of Education for Prince Georges County’ in misleading the Federal court to stay the matter and then paying off attorneys hired by the Petitioner to interfere with the proceedings on 1Various forums to the detriment of the petitioner, Other violations involve breach of contract. interference with grievances in arbitration, violation of Title VI and Title VII by all the appellees. The debt collectors Marsden & Seledee and Appellee O’Neal Law Firm in Supreme Court Application (164665) did not have a license to collect debt in Maryland. The Appellees worked in organized manner with the state of Maryland and other conspirators to portray Petitioner Mr. Mua and his family in bad light through discrimination, breached contracts. confiscated their personal property and garnishment of wages in retaliation. B.) LAWYER CONDUCT ‘That a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving fraud and misrepresentation{s). Appellees Mr. Roger Thomas, Ms. Verjeana Jacobs, Counsels for Appellees Mr. Mark J Murphy, Mr. Michael Artz, Abbey Hairston, Chief Counsel Nicholas Serrano Esq misled the court and concealed Motion to Remove with the help of the State of Maryland actors working under color of law. Appellees further tortiously interfered with O'Neal Firm who acted as unlicensed Debt collector and changed from her role to sabotage the claims. The O'Neal Firm conspired with Appellee Lilian Lowery, Abbey Hairston, Appellee Board of Education for Prince George’s County and other Appellees in this action. Appellees AFSCME International and ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 mislead the court to get a favorable opinion to the detriment of the Petitioner. The breach of contracts, the change of contract after the case was dismissed, the delays in concluding, the administrative appeals were designed in a way by the appellees to escape justice. This court has power to review the issues and reverse the judgement of the U.S Federal District Court in Greenbelt Maryland because it was fraudulent. ARGUMENT 2 Petitioner Mr. Mua established a prima facie case for retaliation. The Supreme Court expanded the scope of retaliation in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."”). To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show: 1) they engaged in protected activity; 2) the defendant took action that would be “materially adverse to a reasonable employee or {job applicant”; and, 3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action. Petitioner Mr. Mua established a prima facie claim for retaliation and discrimination. First, Mr. Mua engaged in protected activity by filing union grievances long before filing a 2lawsuit against the appellees in this action. The Fourth Circuit has adopted an expansive view ‘of what constitutes oppositional conduct. DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3rd 409, 417 (4% Cir. 2015). Listed below are some of the National Origin discrimination complaints Mr. Mua filed with the Board and the state of Maryland: See status report Federal Case Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attorney General el al. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM ECF #3 Filed 11/18/14 and Exhibits; See also Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attorney General el al Federal Case 8:14-cv-02070- PJM ECF #32-1 Filed 04/20/15 Page, See Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attorney General el al Federal Case 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Document 32 Filed 04/20/15 Page 1 of 1; See Exhibits attached to District court record ECF#28. According to the Fourth Circuit, the “but for” causation standard has been met because this is a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim. Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F. 3d 243, 246 (4% Cir. 2015) (“Nasser does not alter the legal standard for adjudicating a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim.”) A. Petitioner Mr. Mua demonstrated that the Appellees reason for ganging up to terminate his Employment was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. Mr. Mua demonstrated that the Appellee Board of Education for Prince George’s County nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was false, and that retaliation was the real reason after Petitioner Mr. Mua published an opinion touching on the union officials who were engaged in discrimination. Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina- Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011). There was never any discovery in this case and the Appellees AFSCME International, ACE-AFSCME Local 2250, Board of Education for Prince George’s County et al in addition to other conspirators took advantage of the situation to cover up their own misconduct. After a careful review Petitioner Mr. Mua uncovered Appellee O'Neal Law Firm and Marsden & Seledee LLC did not have a license to colllect debts in ‘Maryland which is a violation of law. ARGUMENT 3: Did the lower court err as a matter of law in which contracts containing several promises by Appellees could not enforced? Appellee ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 promised to reimburse legal fees expenses but later refused to do so and then disowned the contract in the middle of the case in conspiracy to cover up their illegal agenda. Appellees Dr. Kevin Maxwell and Dr. Alvin L. Crawley promised to reinstate Petitioner after he won his appeal in the Maryland Office of Administrative hearings at Hunt Valley and petitioner met in person each one of them. However, the appellees working in conspiracy changed their position with a malicious intent after becoming CEO and superintendents of schools. The question seems to turn upon the character af the breach viewed in the light of the intent of the parties in making the contract. Separate actions cannot be instituted on the various promises: where divisible they may be sued on separately. (See Secor + BSturgis, note 1/0 supra: Willianss-Abbort Electric Ce. v. Model Electric Co. 134 hi. 668, HN. W. ISL 13 LAN, 8.1529 with note: Pakas v. Hollingshead, 84 N.Y, 211, 77.N. E40. 3b. RAIN. S.p iod2s Conkle v. Laughlin. 83 Pa, Super Ct. 468: Helsey v. Ani. Mineral Prod'n. Co. 118 Wash, 591. 204 Pac. i9o: Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Inv, Co.. 30 Utah 364, x67 Pac 835.) The testis the intent of the parties and how they regarded the promises. A method of determining such intention, where. as is usually the case, itis not definitely expressed. is to determine "the apportionability of the consideration.” i.e. whether the consideration seems to lave been given as a whole for all the promises, and hence they are indivisible. or whether a part of the consideration applies to each separate promise so that they were viewed separately by the parties. ‘See Brideport v. Scott Co. 94 Conn, 46], iag Ail. 162: Kalm v. Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 Atl. 165: Peist vy. Richmond. 97 Vt. 97, 122 Ail. 420: 29 YAL4 L. J. 296.1, In this case. Petitioner Mr. Mua was authorized to engage counsel by the Appellee ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 to be reimbursed later and there was an agreement. There was also another agreement between Appellee Dr. Kevin Maxwell and Dr. Alvin L. Crawley working closely with the Prince George's County Executive Rushern Baker Ill. The contracts in question was only addressed to Petitioner Mr. Mua. The appellees engaged in bad faith by failing to honor their part of the deal \with malicious intentions to cause damages to petitioner Mr. Mua. This honorable court should reverse and remand so that discovery could occur. ARGUMENT 4. Whether the Maryland and state personnel working under color of law can assist unlicensed debt collector to garnish wages and confiscate personal property of an ‘employee in an organized scheme and stay out of the case, which violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives owners of their property without affording constitutionally adequate notice due to discrimination. (1.) Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 42(a) provides for consolidation of cases involving common questions of law or fact: When actions involving common questions of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning the proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. “The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961— 1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to ‘{aJny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation’ of the Act's criminal prohibitions.” Bridge v.Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 641 (2008) (quoting § 1964(c)). Specifically, § 1964 provides, in part: 4(©) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee... 18 U.S.C. § 1961 specifically provides: As used in this chapter— (1) “racketeering activity” means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than cone year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (Citation omittated). . ..(Footnote and punctuation in original). ‘The Hobbs Act defines extortion, in relevant part, as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, ... under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). This Court has held that a public official violates that statute when he “obtain{s] a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992). Rather than dismiss the Petitioner Mr. Mua’s cases, this court can order consolidation as Petitioner had requested and let the case proceed. (See quotation from Secor v. Sturges, given above, shows, if the plaintiff avoids the rule against splitting and is held to have two distinct causes of action, it isin general entirely at his option whether to join them or not. The only exception seems to be one coming from the common law, that the court on motion of the defendant may at its discretion order two or more suits consolidated in one, as separate counts therein-in order to avoid undue hardship upon the defendant. This court reviews a state and U.S District court's grant of dismissal de novo to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Garrett v. Hewlett- Packard Company, 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002), In considering whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, "the court does not weigh the evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." (See Gullickson Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 910th Cir. 1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty 15Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). See also Munguia v. Unified School Dist. No. 328, 125 F.3d 1353, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997), In analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,” and "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The nonmoving party must be given "wide berth to prove a factual controversy exists." Jeffries v. State of Kan., 147 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, both the U.S district court and the State court erroneously ignored the evidence and failed to weighed the evidence and the record in the light most favorable to the Petitioner Mr. Mua. As discussed in detail below, a reasonable jury, when faced with the evidence presented here, could return a verdict for Petitioners on their discrimination claims, violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq, as amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq., violation of title VII and new theories. ARGUMENT S: Did the lower court err as a matter of law in raising the issue of piece meal splitting in the absence of the issue being raised by the Defendants? Since the rule against splitting is largely for the protection of the defendant it may be waived by him or her, and is waived if he or she fails to raise the objection in the action. (See Currington v Crocker, supra: Vineseck v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 136 Minn, 96, I6i NW. 494: Hardwicke Enter Co. v. Durant, 77 Ok. 202, 187 Pac, 484: Johnson v. Prineville, 101 Or. ii9, 196 Pat 821: Matheny v. Preston Hotel Co., H4o Tenn, 41. 203 S. W. 327: Brice «. Starr, 93 Wash, Soi 161 Pac. 347, reversing go Wash, 369. 156 Pac. 12. See as to partial assignments, Clark and Hutchins. "The Real Party in Iiterest.” 34 YALE L. J. 259, 266: as to fraud or mistake as a ALL. R. 530, 534. ground of waiver. In this case, Defendants did not have a chance to raise the issue, The proper procedure should have been to have the parties get served with the process, and then only them after stating their positions should that occur. The court erred by dismissing the entire case and reconsidering tater in the middle of heavy litigation before everything could be heard. In this regard. the lower court abused its discretion and was the error of law. This court should vacate and remand, ARGUMENT 6: Did the lower court err as a matter of law by precluded from litigation persons who were not parties to the original suit without a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit? Single or Divisible Contracts. Both Unions AFSCME Local 2250 and AFSCME International had a different contract with Plaintiff Mr. Mua. Ms. Ardra O”Neal also had a contract with Mr. Mua beside the Board of Education, Defendunt Lilian Lowery working under color of law conspired with the Defendants to derail justice and then resigned after Appellant filed a suit ugainst her in federal court, Due to violations of these contracts, Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit 16such proactive opposition is unprotected because the court below dismissed the case prematurely without issuing summons or review evidence concerning each Defendant in this case. Plaintiff filed numerous grievances with the union, the administration and Maryland state agents. The Federal court was made aware of the harassing activities which continued until the filing of this suit with new Defendants. While it may be objectively reasonable to believe the harassing acts, if continued, will become “severe” or “pervasive” or both, it may not be objectively reasonable to believe they are already “severe” or “pervasive.” In this case, Appellant was already going through severe acts of retaliation as shown in the complaint. So applied, the objectively reasonable test contravenes the objectives of Title VII in that it discourages employees from making reports of workplace harassment and increases the risk that a complaint will be dismissed if the underlying conduct does not already meet the “severe” or “pervasive” test. Manifestly, the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011), as well as to protect persons engaging in reasonable activities opposing discrimination. Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1998). And, significantly, itis also an object of Title VII to motivate “employers to detect and deter Title VII violations.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546, (1999) (citations omitted). But, certainly, employees will not seek to deter workplace discrimination if their laudable vigilance can get them fired. To avoid a “Catch-22,” it follows that, in a workplace harassment case, the “objectively reasonable” test should be met by an objectively reasonable belief the harassing conduct, if continued, would become severe or pervasive. Otherwise, employees who report harassing conduct before it has become severe or pervasive, as required by the Supreme Court, could be fired with impunity as happened in this case. ‘Applying these principles to this case, itis clear calling an African of Kenyan Origin employee a “Zamuda” , “Felix Bemba”, “Loud African” on numerous occasion is offensive and wwas severe, pervasive and both as shown by evidence: there can be no disagreement that being called a “Zamuda” , “Felix Bemba”, “Loud African” on numerous occasion is harassing conduct which, became severe and pervasive. Therefore, when Mr. Mua complained, his proactive ‘opposition to harassment should have been protected. Moreover, in applying the objectively reasonable test, Courts should not require that a “reasonable” employee exhibit technical knowledge of the legal elements of a cause of action. The Peters Court explained that the proper inquiry is “(1) whether [Plaintiff] subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that the [Defendant] had engaged in a practice violative of § 601, and (2) whether this belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts”. 327 F.3d at 321 (quotations and citations omitted). Finding a belief to be “reasonable” should not mean that an objectively reasonable juror would have believed the action to be discriminatory, nor should it mean that an objectively reasonable lawyer or judge would believe the conduct was actionable. Unlike jurors, lawyers and judges, the average person does not know the elements of a cause of action for racial harassment. In this, case are many direct evidence, circumstantial evidence and many witnesses who can attest to 19what Plaintiff Mr. Mua went through. The correct inquiry should be whether the average person would consider the complainant's belief to be reasonable, rational, and facially tenable, without professional knowledge of underlying legal principles. Here, that inquiry should be whether a reasonable person would have considered Mr. Mua’s complaint to be sensible, sound and not irrational based on the facts of the case. Comparable legal concepts are applied in a comparable manner. For instance, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Here, the lower court should have issued summons and conducted an examination based on the complaint below in addition to asked whether a reasonable person (perhaps, even a reasonable employee like Mr. Mua) would have thought that being called “Zamuda” , “Felix Bemba”, “Loud African” by a supervisor on many occasions constitutes National discrimination. ‘The interpretation of the objectively reasonable test advanced here more effectively “balances the purpose of [Title VII] to protect persons engaging in reasonable activities opposing discrimination, against Congress’ desire not to prevent employers from legitimately disciplining their employees.” Laughlin 149 F.3d at 257. An appropriately proactive employee cannot be protected when the employee may be fired with impunity because the underlying conduct was not yet “severe” or “pervasive”, or because the employee is charged with technical knowledge of the legal standard necessary to prove discrimination. Rather, the intent of Title VII is best served when the “objectively reasonable” test is met by an objectively reasonable belief the harassing ‘conduct was severe and pervasive, as judged from the perspective of an average person without legal training in addition to various witnessed, transcripts from the administrative appeal, union grievances filed on behalf of the Plaintiff Mr. Mua and many other direct evidence demonstrating discrimination at the hands of his supervisors. As such it was error as a matter of law to overlook claims under title VII and protected activity in retaliation against the employee for his opposition as such the lower court abused its discretion and was the error of law. The Court should reverse and remand. ARGUMENT 9: Whether Federal court can ignore willful violation of MR.MUA’s Leave Under The FMLA? A civil complaint for a violation of the FMLA must be filed within two years of the “last, event constituting the alleged violation,” or within three years if the violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)1)-(2). A violation is willful if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the law. In this case, Appellant brought the claim of FMLA leave within three years and the Appellees worked together to violate his rights. Elaine Rankins was PGCPS coordinator of compensation and benefits, and she oversaw the FMLA program for IT Technicians in 2008-2010. Ms. Shilling worked in PGCPS HR department, and she assisted Elain Rankins together with others. Mr. Mua with FMLA-related 20Baker and the Maryland State officials in order to defraud the Prince George's county school system. On June 1, 2013, County Executive Mr. Rusher Baker appointed Dr. Segun Eubanks (his brother-in-law) to become the next Board of Education chairperson in Prince George's County. Since that time, he has influenced the appointment of close friends to top management jobs within the school system without proper oversight including State of Maryland officials who include Demetria T. Tobias Esq. State Superintendent Lilian Lowery, Dr. Charlene Dukes are also involved in expungement of critical data in collaboration with other conspirators. Among. those areas of concer has been the legal department in which Mr. Mua complained about before the current fiasco involving Thatcher Law firm. Over $18 million dollars of reserve funds for children have been used to pay these close friends who are politically connected to them. See District Court Record Federal case 8:14-cv-02070 ECF 1 $56 — 116. Among the politically connected senior employees is Deputy Superintendent of Schools Dr. Monique Whittington Davis who is married to Delegate Dereck Eugene Davis who is a close friend of Prince George’s County Executive Mr. Rushern Baker. As stated above, on June, 26th 2013, Dr. Charlene Dukes a close friend of County Executive Mr. Rushern Baker and the President of The Maryland State Board of Education who served as his Education liaison and transition of the county at the beckoning of Mr. Baker conspired to reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge Brian Zlotnick and issued a diverse opinion in retaliation after Mr. Mua disclosed conflicts of interests involving her. State officials then posted untrue statements on their website without investigations in order to prejudice and defame Mr. Mua. On June, 27th 2013, Mr. Christian Rhodes -Education Policy Advisor for the Office of the County Executive invited Mr. Mua to come meet with the new CEO, Mr. Mua met with the new CEO on three different occasions and ‘was promised reinstatement. Mr. Mua also met with Mr. Baker on three occasions and took pictures with him. Mr. Baker promised Mr. Mua that everything will be sorted out and that he would be re reinstated. However, these promises never occurred. Mr. Mua also shared his complaint in Federal Case No. 8:11-CV-1198-PJM - Mua vs. Board of Education for PG County and Prince George’s County Circuit court case No. CAL11-36992 with the Maryland State Department of Education, Maryland office of the Attorney General and the county Executive during the Appeal process and on various dates including July 2013. He mentioned conflicts created specifically by Thatcher Law firm within the schools. Mr. Mua had hoped problems within the county schools were going to be fixed. Shortly thereafter, his complaint in Prince George’s Circuit Court was dismissed in a fraudulent and capricious manner. In July 2013, Maryland State officials in both agencies interfered with the Prince George's County Circuit court by committing several willful tortious acts. There is a casual connection with the judge handling the case at the time and when his sister was promoted to be Associate Superintendent of schools in Philadelphia school District and when he was given Mr. Mua’s case. On July 10th, 2013, Mr. Mua met with Prince George's County Executive Rusher L. Baker, III and the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Prince George's County Public Schools, Dr. Kevin Maxwell and Board of Education Chairman Dr. Segun Eubanks. They all assured him of support rehire. During this meeting, the county Executive Mr. Rushern Baker also 23asked Mr. Mua to do something illegal involving his opponents which Mr. Mua declined to support a politician's campaign. These issues will be disclosed at trial. On July 12th, 2013, Mr. Mua’s second amended complaint in Prince George's County Circuit Court Case No. CAL11-36992 was dismissed by The Honorable Michael R. Pearson without a proper hearing in conspiracy, fraud and retaliation involving Delegate C.T. Wilson, County Executive Rusher Baker, Dr. Hite and others. A copy of the complaint had been given to State Attorney Office to investigate the issues by Mr. Jeremy Robbins. A copy had also been given to county Executive Baker. Mr. Mua had also complained to Delegate C.T .Wilson and met several times with him in person to address the issues each time promising they will look into them. After the 2nd complaint was dismissed, Delegate C.T.Wilson who was in the court room and who spoke with Judge Pearson met Mr. Mua in presence of others in the halls of the court and Delegate C.T. Wilson told Mr. Mua that, corruption in Prince George’s County was worse than Chicago. See District Court record 8:14-cv-02070 ECF | {70 - 116. Violation of Duty of fair representation ECF Dktl {116. The counsels hired by the Plaintiff failed to disclose to the court and show evidence that Plaintiff Mr. Mua was engaged in a protected activity. District Court record 8:14-cv-02070 ECF Dkt 1969. Plaintiff's Exhibits documents shows various entries presented to the attorney Defendants in this case. If Plaintiff is given an opportunity to present his case, he will show multiple entries showing the complaints he made and which were presented to his employer. There is a causal connection to the diverse action based on his protected activities which was beneficial to the county. After the first case was stayed, other Defendants joined in to derail justice. At first Mr, Mua had an agreement with the county official that he was going to be reinstated. See District Court record 8:14-cv-02070 ECF 1 $69. However, this turned out to be false after his attorneys were compromised. Defendant Abbey Hairston, Defendant Lilian Lowery, Defendant Ardra O’Neal engaged in a variety of illegal activities of which Ardra O’Neal of the Defendant O’Neal firm and other attomey Defendants were in breach of contract after they engaged in falsifying the record, change of transcripts in conjunction with the union officials and Defendant BDR in this, case. All cases had similar issue with falsification of transcripts. By overlooking the Motion to ‘consolidate, this was an error of law. As such it the U.S District Court abused its discretion and was the error of law. The Court should reverse and remand, ARGUMENT 11: What Test should courts use to determine whether an employee's opposition to particular actions constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate Title VII? Itis well established courts apply the “objectively reasonable” test to determine whether an employee's opposition to actions constitutes protected conduct such that retaliation against the employee for his opposition would violate 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (“Title VII"). Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp..458 F.3d 332, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th Cir.2005))(“The plain meaning of [Title VI1] provides 24final state court judgment, valid on its face, is attacked in a federal court on the ground of fraud as Petitioners presented in this case. The purpose of this comment is to identify the fraudulent conduct for which a federal court will grant relief from a final state court judgment and to ascertain the scope of the relief which may be granted. In United States v. Throckmorton the Supreme Court laid down the general rule for ‘granting relief from prior final judgments on the ground of fraud. The Court there was concerned with an attempt to avoid the effect of a final judgment on the ground that the judgment had been based in part on a forged document which had been admitted as evidence. In denying relief, the Court acknowledged that extrinsic or collateral fraud which prevented a losing party from fully presenting his case so that no real contest occurred would be sufficient to set aside a prior judgment, but held that fraud as to any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed would be insufficient to support the attacking action. On various forums both in state and federal court, Petitioners have been unable to present their case due to extrinsic or collateral fraud which has prevented the Petitioners in this case from fully presenting their case due to the Appellees misconduct backed up by agents of the state working under color of law. In this case, an application of the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction is very clear. The court should find that, the fraud charged has prevented the Petitioners in this case from making a full and fair defense of their claims in the lower courts. The U.S Federal District court, Montgomery county District court, Montgomery County Circuit Court relied on fraudulent conduct of Appellees. That, fraudulent conduct of Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange and Appellee Marsden & Seledee prevented the Petitioners from fairly and fully presenting their claims or defenses is extrinsic fraud. The Supreme Court of the United States, must show its utter impartiality and hold that false evidence, tampering of transcripts, change of, official stamped documents to insert a different date while prejudicing the Petitioners is a ground for reversal. This court should vacate the judgement of the lower court in the interest of justice. ARGUMENT 14: Whether Federal court can ignore Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act" involving the state which permits an employee to bring an action in state or federal court against an employer who allegedly has violated a collective bargaining ‘agreement ("CBA")? Appellant Mr. Mua brought a Hybrid case involving state, county government and the union defendants and others engaged in misconduct to cover up illegal activity. In count 11 of the Original complaint (See U.S District Court Record ECF DKT 19190-232; 268-278; 289-310; Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act’ permits an employee to bring an action in state or federal court against an employer who allegedly has violated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1967) (courts are not preempted by National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101-04 (1962) (state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, but states must follow federal law). Because most CBAs give the employee's labor union exclusive 27power to challenge the employer's conduct, See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 US. 212, 216 & n.5 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3, 185 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 660 & n.2 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Tidwell, Major Issues in the Duty of Fair Representation Cases Since 1977, 62 U. Det. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1985) ("Under most collective bargaining agreements, unions have the exclusive right to process, settle, and arbitrate grievances."). Courts generally refuse to entertain individual employee claims on the ground that such claims usurp union power. See Republic Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 653 ("employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf”). Courts, however, will hear the employee's case if the union has abused this power by unfairly refusing to represent the employee. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967) (union did not "breach its duty of Jair representation, and thereby open up a suit by the employee for breach of contract"); Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 207 (Sth Cir. Unit B 1982) (union cannot refuse to pursue grievance merely because employee sought to consult with private attorney); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (Sth Cir. Unit B Jan.) (union cannot consider employee's non-union status in decision not to provide assistance of staff attorney), cer denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). or by representing the employee inadequately. Courts have read section 301 to provide a mechanism called a “hybrid” section 301/duty of fair representation action for such situations. See DelCostello v, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983); Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc., 820 F.2d 799, 799 (6th Cir. 1987). Under the hybrid action, the employee sues the ‘employer for violating the CBA and sues the union for breaching its duty of fair representation. A hybrid action arises when the employee brings both claims simultaneously. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. While the Labor Management Relations Act only expressly grants federal Jurisdiction for claims under the CBA, the Supreme Court has held that § 301 implicitly includes jurisdiction for duty of fair representation claims against the union because of the intricate relationship that exists between the two claims. See id.; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1967). ‘When an employer has discharged an employee in what the employee believes to be a violation of the CBA, the employee initially relies upon his union to represent him, since most CBAs give the union the exclusive power to challenge the employer. If the union refuses to represent him, or does so inadequately, the employee may challenge the union under its constitution, The union constitution, which governs union-member relations, may require union members to challenge the union through an internal appeals process. This challenge usually entails an appeal to the local union, then to the international union, and, if necessary, to a public review board comprised of impartial non-union members. See, e.8., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 682-83 (1981). More likely, however, the employee commences a hybrid action, primarily in the hope of receiving reinstatement and lost wages. See, e.g., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 690 (1981); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61 (1981); Ellenbogen v. Rider Maint. Corp., 794 F.2d 768, 769 (2d Cir. 1986). To succeed, the employee must prove the union's breach of its duty of fair representation before the court will review the employer's 28conduct under the CBA. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (unions have a duty not to act arbitrarily, discriminatority, or in bad faith), See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 USS. 554, 567 (1976); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186; Cote v. Eagle Stores, Inc., 688 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir, 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218 (1983); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981). If, after proving the union's breach, the employee also proves that the employer violated the CBA, the court will order the employer to reinstate the employee and pay damages consisting of lost wages through the date on which the dispute would have been resolved had the union fulfilled its duty. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 215, 230 & n.19 (1983). For the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, the court will order the union to pay as damages that portion of lost wages attributable to the period running from the end of the employer's liability to the resolution of the hybrid action," plus the attorney's fees incurred by the employee in his suit against the employer. See infra note 70. The American rule against recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing litigant in the absence of statutory or contractual authorization, see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), would normally preclude an employee's claim for attorney's fees incurred in his suit against the union. Thus, when the employee proves both a breach of the duty of fair representation and a violation of the CBA, the employee receives full compensation. See, e.g., Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 451-52, 455 (9th Cir. 1987) (employee collected wrongfully-denied sick leave benefits from employer and attorney's fees from union) Courts currently disagree, however, on whether to allow recovery of attomey's fees for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation in the absence of a CBA. violation by an employer. Compare Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing recovery of attorney's fees in the absence of CBA violation by employer) ‘Those that allow such recovery recognize that the union's breach causes distinct harm to the employee, regardless of the outcome of his claim against the employer, and argue that damages should be apportioned according to liability. Courts that deny such recovery hold that the employee's two claims are inextricably interdependent; to prevail against either the employer or the union, the employee must prove both a breach of the union's duty of fair representation and a violation of the CBA. In this case, appellant exceeded that prove by showing that, the Union denied him fair representation by claiming he was not a member of the union despite paying dues to the union. Section 6-407(b) Fair Representation - (1) An employee organization designated as an exclusive representative shall represent all employees in the unit fairly and without discrimination, whether cr not the employees are members of the employee organization. Section 6-409. Interference with employees prohibited. A public school employer and employee organization may not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce, or discriminate against any public school employee because of the exercise of his rights under Sections 6-402 and 6-403 of, this subtitle (ie. the right of a public school employee to join or refuse to join or participate in the activities of a labor union. 29By overlooking the evidence and the law concerning the Hybrid section, this was an error of law. As such it the U.S District Court abused its discretion and was the error of law. The Court should reverse and remand. ARGUMENT 15: Whether the U.S District Court can ignore the duty of fair representation and dismiss the case when administrative appeals are pending in the state court? A. THEDUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION ‘The U.S District Dismissed this case when administrative appeals addressing the same issues ‘were pending in the state court and without considering all issues affecting the Appellant Mr. ‘Mua due to lack of fair representation facilitated by retaliation and National origin discrimination by appellee unions. Among other things and in a discriminatory manner, Appellee unions told the Appellant that he was not a member of the union despite deducting dues from his pay check over the years. The Supreme Court's early definitions of the duty of fair representation imposed cn the bargaining agent the responsibility of representing the interests of all employees "fairly, impartially and in good faith" (Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), The NLRB's first definition in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962) assured employees of the right "To be free from unfair or invidious treatment by their bargaining agent.” The Supreme Court's Vaca v, Sipes decision, (386 U.S. 1710 (1967) posited a violation when a union's “conduct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," but it also provided a wide area of union discretion, subject to the requirement of good faith. Thus, said the Court, “though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion, we do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration." Later cases specified a wide range of reasonableness which must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents. (Ford Motor Co, v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). ‘The inquiry in every fair representation case must be whether the union's acts or omissions show “hostile discrimination,” based on “irrelevant and invidious" considerations, or whether they show good faith within a "wide range of reasonableness" granted bargaining agents. The bargaining agent's latitude in contract administration was specifically addressed in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 355 (1964), where the Supreme Court affirmed that a union does not breach its uty of fair representation so long as it acts "honestly, in good faith, and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination.” The United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which includes Maryland, has reiterated the principles cited above. In the case of Buchanan v. N.L.R.B., 597 F.2d 388 (1979), the Court stated: “The duty to avoid arbitrary conduct does not require a union to take every employee grievance to arbitration, and it has considerable discretion in sifting out grievances which it regards as lacking merit." While most of the case law on the duty of fair representation is found on the federal level, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the duty of fair representation includes the following requirements. “(1) to serve the interests of all members without hostility or 30discrimination toward any, (2) to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and (3) to avoid arbitrary conduct." Stanley v. American Federation of State and Mun. Employees Local No, 553, 165 Md. App. 1, 15, 884 a.2d 724, (2005) (citing: Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177, 87 S. Ct. 903), accord Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33. 44. 119 S. Ct, 292 (1998). And most importantly and bearing on the current case before the U.S Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit, the Stanley court case made clear that a union is not necessarily in breach of the duty of fair representation if it opts to not process a particular grievance. The Stanley court stated: ‘" [A] union is accorded considerable discretion in the handling and settling of grievance." “Neal, 48 Md, App. at 358, 427 A.2d 1033. A union does not necessarily breach its duty when it declines to take a member's grievance to arbitration. See, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92, 875. Ct. 903; accord Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md. 226, 235, 228 A.2d 254 (1967). Indeed, "an employee has no absolute right to insist that his grievance be pressed through any particular state of the contractual grievance procedure. A union may screen grievances and press only those that it concludes will justify the expense and time involved in terms of benefitting the membership at large." (Emphasis added) Neal, 48 Md. App. at 358-59, 427 A.2d 1033. Additionally, the law is clear that a union need not process an employee's grievance if the chances for success are slight. See Williams v. Sea-Land Corp., 844 F.2d 17 (Ist Cir. 1988). “the union must provide ‘some minimal investigation of employee grievances,’ but the thoroughness of this investigation depends on the particular case, and ‘only an egregious disregard for union members’ rights constitutes a breach of the union's duty." Garcia v. Zenith elec . Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (ih Cir. 1995). A review of the above cases in conjunction with the evidence submitted by the Appellant Mr. Mua should have convinced the lower court that ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 and AFSCME, International, and its representatives, Damon Felton, Charles Clark and others familiar with the situation, did violate Title 6, Section 6-407(b) of the Education Article's duty of fair representation and they engaged in a discriminatory conduct. The record evidence herein indicates that ACE-AFSCME Local 2250 and AFSCME International acted in bad faith in fulfilling its statutory obligation of fairly representing Appellant Mr. Mua. As noted previously, the inquiry in every fair representation case must be whether the union's acts or omissions show hostile discrimination, based on irrelevant and invidious considerations, or whether they show g00d faith within a wide range of reasonableness granted bargaining agents. (See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 355 (1964). ‘That, Section 7114(a)(1) Duty of Fair Representation states the following; (a)(1) A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents and is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the unit. An exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 31‘The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir.1995). This Court reviews the district court's evidentiary ruling with substantial deference and will not disturb that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1066, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). “By definition, a court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 398 (4th Cir.2006) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the district court makes an error of law in deciding an evidentiary question, that error is “by definition an abuse of discretion.” See Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 28] F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir.2002). A. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's claims. ‘On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sole obligation of the party who did not prevail at trial is to show that there is “substantial” evidence that supports the verdict. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F:3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) Circumstantial evidence can defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 777-789 (4th Cir. 1998). In this case, Plaintiff Mr. Mua has enough direct and circumstantial evidence to prevail on trial. Therefore, lower court committed reversible error. Plaintiff Mr. Mua presented enough evidence concerning retaliation, discrimination, organized scheme, fraud and showed a pattern of misconduct by the defendants in this case. (See District Court Record ECF DKT #5, 20, 25, 27,28, and exhibits.) It was error as a matter of law to overlook this evidence, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. ARGUMENT 18: Whether the Federal court can ignore the law and the evidence and issue a flawed opinion without considering all the facts surrounding the case which is prejudicial to the Petitioners? ‘The U.S Federal District court was presented with overwhelming evidence concerning the misconduct of the Appellees including evidence on how the state assisted the appellee after they changed concealed Motion to Remove in Federal court. The opinion of the U.S District court (Pet. App22- App33) is silent on fraud allegations and other violations of other law committed by the appellees. And presented to the Federal court. After the state court engaged in denial of due process rights, discrimination and interference of documents presented in court, petitioner Mr. Mua removed the State Case CAL36992 in the interest of justice because the Federal court was already handling violation of title VII in cases already in Federal court. (See Federal Case No. 1:16-cv-01435-ELH Mua et al v. State of Maryland et al). Instead of the Federal court adjudicating the claims, the Federal denied the removal and is silent on the order to dismiss. The ‘Supreme court has held that a state court could not properly deny removal of a proceeding from a state court to a federal court if the general nature of the proceeding for which removal was sought was one of which the federal courts could rightfully take cognizance. The Court regarded an action to set aside a judgment in which the losing party had been fraudulently prevented from asserting a valid defense as being in the general nature of a proceeding of which a federal court could rightfully take cognizance under its equity power. Due to these violations, this court shouldvacate the judgement of the lower courts in the interest of justice and remand the case for trial under a different Federal judge in the interest of justice. ARGUMENT 19: Whether third party retaliation was a motivating factor by the appellees after Petitioner Mr. Mua sued the unions and the state agencies in Federal Case No. 8:14- cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al (Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503)? Petitioner Mr. Mua sued his employer and the unions with ties to the Appellee California Casulty Indemnity Exchange (CCIE) for lack of fair representation. Since May 5", 2011, Petitioner Mr. Mua brought claims for lack of fair representation. Since filing a case against the office of the attorney general, in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al (Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503), the Appellees in the U.S Supreme Court Case No. 16-7278 retaliated shortly thereafter by initiating the original suit. Petitioner Mrs. Vandenplas who is Caucasian and of European origin had nothing to do with the check issued to Petitioner Mr. Mua and her name was not in it. (See Case 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Document 16-2 — Filed 02-23-15). She is a very disciplined administrator who has been dragged in this, litigation by the Appellees on purpose. The garnishment of wages was done with malicious intention and to destroy her character. Petitioners requested the state and Federal court to deposit, supersedeas bond which is allowed in this type of cases but was denied. Appellees without warning interfered with Petitioner Mrs. Vandenlas and failed to put into consideration that, she was not listed as a recipient of the check issued to Petitioner Mr. Mua after he negotiated a contract with the appellee California casualty Indemnity Exchange. Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court expanded the scope of retaliation liability for employers under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, In overruling precedents in a number of circuits (including the Eighth), the Court held that an employee who has not engaged in any protected activity has a valid cause of action for retaliation if the employer took adverse action against him because of his connection to another employee who had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The future scope of this type of "third party retaliation clai unsettled, but is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent expansion of Title VU retaliation liability. In this case, Petitioner Mr. Mua was suing the unions which had contractual ties with the appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP., both Eric Thompson and his fiancée, Miriam Regalado, were employed by North American Stainless ("NAS"). Regalado filed an EEOC charge alleging sex discrimination against NAS. ‘Thompson admitted that he did not engage in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of his fiancée. But three weeks after Regalado filed her charge, NAS fired Thompson. The same thing is applicable in this case concerning the harassment currently in progress against Petitioner Francoise Vandenplas. Due to these violations, this court should vacate the judgement of the lower courts in the interest of justice and remand for trial under a new judge. ARGUMENT 20: Whether the U.S District Court can ignore malicious activities of the STATE AGENCIES, Prince George’s County and Defendants in this case who are directly liable for retaliation, under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because of their own misconduct? 35In this issue, Appellant Mr. Mua's first would like to point out that, the trial court made errors and contends the U.S Federal District court severely erred when it denied Appellant Mr. ‘Mua's motion for default judgment, in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02334-PJM Mua v. The O'Neal Firm, LLP et al and now Appeal No. 16-1506 pending in this court. Further the trial court erred when it allowed Appellee AFSCME International to file a reply (See District Court Record ECF Dkt # 23 without leave of court. Appellant Mr. Mua premises his argument on two points: (1) Appellee AFSCME International did not first request leave of court to file their reply or his answer out of rule; and (2) Appellee AFSCME Intemational provided no explanation for their delay in filing an answer. Relying on Suki v. Blume (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 289, 290. Appellant filed a Motion to strike (See District Court Record ECF DKT #26). The trial court did not give a chance for the Appellees to file a response in both for Motion to strike ECF DKT #26; Motion for Reconsideration ECF DKT #27 and Motion for Sanctions ECF DKT #28. ‘The court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for default judgment in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02334-PJM Mua v. The O'Neal Firm, LLP et al. A default judgment is a judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to timely plead in response to an affirmative pleading. See Civ.R. 55. Only when the defendant "fails to contest the opposing party's allegations" by either pleading or otherwise defending does a default arise. Ohio Valley Radiology Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn, (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 121. Generally, default judgments are disfavored. Suki at 290, Granting a default judgment, analogous to granting a dismissal, is a harsh remedy that should be imposed only when the actions of the defaulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith. Haddad v. English (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 598, 603. Instead, when possible, cases should be decided on their merits rather than on procedural grounds. Fowler v. Coleman (Dec. 28, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 99AP- 319. To militate against the harshness of a default judgment, Civil Court Rules permits a court to grant a moving party additional time to file a pleading or response, provided the requirements set forth in the rule are ‘met. In this case, the court abused its discretion by not allowing the Appellees to file an answer and then issued a flawed opinion without giving the weight for both sides it deserved. By Allowing Appellee AFSCME International to file an answer or a reply out of rule without moving for leave to file and showing excusable neglect. (See District Court Record ECF DKT #21) and then three days later filing Motion for leave to appear was an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 214; Davis v. Immediate Med. Serv., Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d 10, 14-15, 1997-Ohio-363. Though a court may endeavor to quickly "reach the merits of a controversy, the integrity of procedural rules is dependent upon consistent enforcement because the only fair and reasonable alternative thereto is complete abandonment.” Miller at 215; Davis at 15; see also Fenner v. Kinney, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-749, 2003-Ohio-989 (determining that where the appellant sent a letter to the court in place of a formal answer, that letter, even if it be deemed an answer, was not timely filed, and “an untimely filed answer does not prevent an entry of default judgment"). ‘Therefore, it was error as a matter of law to overlook the rules and not allow the Appellees to file their responses and also allow the Motion for default judgement in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02334-PJM which is connected to this one, as such the lower court abused its. discretion and the error of law. ARGUMENT 22: Whether the District Court erred in granting Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and limiting presentation of evidence when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute? 37Appropriately viewing Appellant's complaint as a claim for legal malpractice against the lawyers and the unions appellees, the trial court determined Appellees’ motion for summary judgment was well-taken. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in so concluding, as his evidence contradicts Appellee's affidavit and supports Appellant's legal malpractice and lack of fair representation complaint. ‘An appellate court's review of summary judgment is conducted under a de novo standard. (See United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is proper only when the parties moving for summary judgment demonstrate: (1) no ‘genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is, adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Pursuant to Federal Rules of. i procedure, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. The moving party, however, cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the moving party must specifically point to evidence of a type listed in Federal Civ. R. 56 (C), affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support their claim. Once that moving party discharges its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears the burden of offering specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Dresher at 293. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations and denials in the pleadings but instead must point to or submit some evidentiary material that demonstrates a genuine dispute over a material fact. Id; Civ.R. 56(E). Appellant did point out that there were issues of material facts in genuine dispute. As shown in the entries of the docket in the U.S District court To prevail on a claim for lack of fair representation, legal malpractice based upon negligent representation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the attomey owed a duty or obligation to the plaintiff; (2) the attorney breached that obligation and failed to conform to the requisite standard; and (3) the conduct complained of is causally connected to the resulting damage or loss. Vahila at syllabus. If a plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the foregoing elements, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. ‘Because a licensed attorney in a legal malpractice action may testify to whether the applicable standard of care has been met, independent expert testimony on that issue is not required, Vahdati’bana v. Scott R. Roberts & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., 10th Dist. No, O7AP-581, 2008-Ohio-1219, $31, citing Roselle v. Nims, 10th Dist. No. O2AP- 423, 2003-Ohio-630. With their motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an an ‘opinion from court of special appeals which was fraudulently acquired after the state engaged in misconduct and the attorneys in the case did in fact commit legal malpractice which created an issue of genuine facts. Well-established legal principle dictates that where the alleged negligence involves the exercise of professional skill and judgment, expert testimony is required to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and resulting damages. Ullmann v. Duffus, 10th Dist. No. OSAP-299, 2005- ‘Ohio-6060, 19, citing Ramage v. Cent. Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 64 Ohio St.34 97, 102, 1992-Ohio-109. In this case, the district court did not even schedule a hearing and it allowed the case to move forward in the midst of heavy litigation to the detriment of the Appellant. Appellant thus was required to present expert legal testimony to identify how 38Appellees breached the requisite standard in representing Appellant, as well as any causal connection between the alleged breach and resulting damages. The Court failed to consider the evidence in the case which had been transferred from Washington DC superior court in which the court had set a trial before an order was granted to transfer the case to U.S District court in Greenbelt Maryland. The trial court also failed to consider the evidence from the Circuit court of Prince George's County case CAL 11-36992 in which Motion to remove case to Federal court ‘was concealed through misconduct and white collar violations by the state of Maryland. Lastly, the U.S District court erred by limiting the number of documents which could be filed in the lower court. (see District Court Record ECF DKT #2 Filed 08/05/15 Page 2 of 3. The order stated in part..... Pending further order of the Court, Plaintiff Mua SHALL file no exhibits, no briefs exceeding 50 pages in length, and no affidavits in this action, unless his briefs and affidavits and exhibits, taken together, are less than 50 pages in total.) As a result, Appellant was not able to present his case properly due to limitation of evidence some of the exhibits had over ‘50 pages involving breach of contract, discrimination inter alia. Therefore, it was error as a matter of law to grant Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and limiting presentation of evidence when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. This court should vacate and remand, ARGUMENT 23: Whether it’s proper for the Union Defendants in this case conspire with the state to conceal Motion to remove in order to avoid liability in Federal court as part of organized scheme? Appellant Mr. Mua presented evidence that the Appellees in this case engaged in ‘organized scheme to hide motion to remove in a case pending in the Circuit Court of prince George’s county. The Appellees used that case CAL 11-36992 in order to create doctrine of res judicata in this case after engaging in willful misconduct with the state institution. The appellee cannot dispute these facts and there is a clear evidence showing evidence in genuine dispute which a jury could interpret and return verdict in the favor of the Appellant. Therefore, it was error as a matter of law to grant Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. This court should vacate and remand. A.) Prejudice ~ Having established that there was a breach of contract, discrimination in termination provisions, violation of fair debt collection practices, violation of union rules because the insurance had a contract with the union membership to keep confidential agreements. One must now examine the impact of this professional error. Once the appellee Counsel placed the information in the public domain, the bell could not be unrung, so what choice did the Petitioners have but to defend their actions. Lying under oath was not an option, and neither was trying to avoid corroborating it for fear of appearing “evasive”. The Petitioner Mr. Mua and his family has been on trial for their lives, literally, and needed the jury to believe their testimony, This was the crucial pivoting point for the whole case, however the court below failed to assist the petitioners. The appellees attorneys committed serious errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the appellee attomeys had spoken the truth and did the Tight thing. Should this fail to meet the Cronic standard it would meet the second prong Tequirement under Strickland v. Washington supra. 39oC c Appellees breached the requisite standard in representing Appellant, as well as any causal connection between the alleged breach and resulting damages. The Court failed to consider the evidence in the case which had been transferred from Washington DC superior court in which the court had set a trial before an order was granted to transfer the case to U.S District court in Greenbelt Maryland. The trial court also failed to consider the evidence from the Circuit court of Prince George’s County case CAL 11-36992 in which Motion to remove case to Federal court was concealed through misconduct and white collar violations by the state of Maryland. Lastly, the U.S District court erred by limiting the number of documents which could be filed in the lower court. (see District Court Record ECF DKT #2 Filed 08/05/15 Page 2 of 3. The order stated in part..... Pending further order of the Court, Plaintiff Mua SHALL file no exhibits, no briefs exceeding 50 pages in length, and no affidavits in this action, unless his briefs and affidavits and exhibits, taken together, are less than 50 pages in total.) As a result, Appellant was not able to present his case properly due to limitation of evidence some of the exhibits had over 50 pages involving breach of contract, discrimination inter alia, ‘Therefore, it was error as a matter of law to grant Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and limiting presentation of evidence when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. This court should vacate and remand. ARGUMENT 23: Whether it’s proper for the Union Defendants in this case conspire with the state to conceal Motion to remove in order to avoid liability in Federal court as part of organized scheme? Appellant Mr. Mua presented evidence that the Appellees in this case engaged in organized scheme to hide motion to remove in a case pending in the Circuit Court of prince George’s county. The Appellees used that case CAL 11-36992 in order to create doctrine of res judicata in this case after engaging in willful misconduct with the state institution. The appellee cannot dispute these facts and there is a clear evidence showing evidence in genuine dispute which a jury could interpret and return verdict in the favor of the Appellant. ‘Therefore, it was error as a matter of law to grant Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when there were issues and evidence in genuine dispute, as such the lower court abused its discretion and the error of law. This court should vacate and remand. A.) Prejudice — Having established that there was a breach of contract, discrimination in termination provisions, violation of fair debt collection practices, violation of union rules because the insurance had a contract with the union membership to keep confidential agreements. One must now examine the impact of this professional error. Once the appellee Counsel placed the information in the public domain, the bell could not be unrung, so what choice did the Petitioners have but to defend their actions. Lying under oath was not an option, and neither was trying to avoid corroborating it for fear of appearing “evasive”. The Petitioner Mr. Mua and his family has been on trial for their lives, literally, and needed the jury to believe their testimony. This was the crucial pivoting point for the whole case, however the court below failed to assist the petitioners. The appellees attorneys committed serious errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the appellee attorneys had spoken the truth and did the right thing. Should this fail to meet the Cronic standard it would meet the second prong requirement under Strickland v. Washington supra. 39a. c A divided U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be established using a “but-for” causation standard, rejecting an ‘employee's argument that the lower “motivating factor” causation test applied. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, No. 12-484 (June 24, 2013). CONCLUSION ‘As a matter of first impression definitive guidance is required from this Court to set the standard for the waiver of Attorney-Union Client Privilege (S. Ct. Rule 10(c)). Furthermore, this guidance is required to resolve conflicts between the circuit courts and within the Maryland Court of Appeals because and within the Fourth Circuit itself (S. Ct. Rule 10(a), 10(b)).. Attomey-Union Client Privilege, while not a Constitutional right, is still a comerstone of American Jurisprudence. Without the guarantee of this protection from outside intrusion, the judicial system cannot possibly function. Likewise, without the confidence in their unions attomey to honor this privilege, the judicial system will similarly cease to function. Recognizing that there may be specific instances where it is in a defendant's interest to allow counsel to disclose privileged information to the courts and outside parties, this decision must remain with the defendant and not counsel for the appellee. Furthermore, any such agreements must not only be transparent but specific in terms of intent, scope, and clear and unequivocal language, such that any and all persons, with or without legal taining, would draw the boundaries of any waiver identically each and every time, regardless whether it is at point of drafting or upon later review. As such, this Court needs to establish a Bright-Line Rule for the waiver of Attomey- Union Client Privilege be it partial or total. As this is a matter with the potential to affect every Attomey- Union Client relationship in the land itis a matter which falls squarely within the purview of this court. Furthermore, the Federal District Court's ruling which not only contradicted State and Federal Law and precedent but itself as well, violated the Petitioner's rights to Equal Treatment and Due Process under the law as guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore should not be allowed to stand as it involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal Law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit failure to correct these errors makes it a matter for this Court. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioners Josephat Mua respectfully request this honorable Court vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial under a new Judge in the interest of justice. phat Mua Pro se 2332 London Bridge Drive Silver Spring Md, 20906CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE THEREBY CERTIFY that on this Friday, March 17", 2017 a copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Petition for a writ of Certiorari, served a true and accurate copy of the forgoing Brief upon the Appellees through the U.S Postal service mail at the following; Mr. Mark James Murphy Esq, Judith E. Rivlin Esq. Ms. Lauren Powell Esq. Mr. Michael Artz Esq. McDermott MOONEY, GREEN, ‘American Federation of State, SAINDON, MURPHY & WELCH, PC County, and Municipal Employee 1920 L Street, NW Suite 400 1101 17th St NW Ste 900 Washington, DC 20036 ‘Washingtop, DC 20036 Josephat Mua, a