REVERSION

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL
SANTOS CITY, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan
and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner.

Quitain Law Office for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City, Defendants", instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102
and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the name of defendant
Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No.
P-2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land
in question to the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.

The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria,
who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant
Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from
Precila Soria.

On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for
the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of
defendant Isagani Du Timbol.

On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No.
1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name
of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in
question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered
thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a
reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700
to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for
free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter;
that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol
never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding
that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted
in misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not,
the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the
patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section
38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order
of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this
Court for review.

After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the
patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent
and title thereto are null and void.

The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie
against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a
public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or
disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of
Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable
or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative
thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy
and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of
products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code).
That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by
the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani
Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in
question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p.
508, 512, this Court said:

And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent
because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may
be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack
at any time by any party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619,
Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vao vs. Insular Gov't.,
41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).

A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs. Land
Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title
under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered
under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become
the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)

The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied
upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was
involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later
registered under the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private parties
where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee
under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of
the land is the state itself which is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to
initiate such proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private
individual.

The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of
the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must
have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent
search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not
be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City; that there are no existing signs of
improvements found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses,
bushes and small trees; that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes
Chilsot; that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no
actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes
Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that
said ranch has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same,
and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has
been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.

The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining
title to the land, and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without
hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land
and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section
91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:

That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions

or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and
any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. ...

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is
procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name
although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part
of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-
80; emphasis supplied). The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become
indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the
law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).

Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du
Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A
title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance
thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-
7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088, Feb.
24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al.,
G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the
Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil
Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs.
Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de
Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-753).

Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened
under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an
action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the
remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the
complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in
Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent
court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.

Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. 80687. April 10, 1989.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
MARIANO, M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT,
JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PROTECTS

INNOCENT TRANSFEREES FOR VALUE; TITLES OBTAINED
RENDERED INDEFEASIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE. There
is noallegation in the complaint filed by the petitioner that any
one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or
that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status
as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that
pleading. Not having been disproved, that status now accords to
them the protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles
obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The
rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. Section
39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: "Sec. 39. Every
person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold
the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PIERO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 57 SCRA 386, NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The decision in Piero v.
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present proceeding
because the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by
the Pieros. The action for reversion was filed by the government
against them as the original transferees of the properties in
question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents
issued by the government pursuant to which the corresponding
certificates of title were issued under the Torrens system. The
fraud alleged by the government as a ground for the reversion
sought was imputable directly to the Pieros, who could not
plead the status of innocent purchasers for value. The difference
between them and the private respondents is that the latter
acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after
several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla
in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for
value in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
3. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT LAND NO LONGER PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN;
LAND REGISTRATION ACT, NOW CALLED "PRIVATE
REGISTRATION DECREE" GOVERNS. The land being now
registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private
respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction
over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the
Solicitor General contends as if it made any difference of
the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land
when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or
at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971
upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered
land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, now denominated the Property Registration Decree, which
applies even to the government. The pertinent provision of the
Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as follows:
Sec. 122. "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act
and shall become registered lands." This should be related to
Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus: "Sec. 12. . . .
upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest, the Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec.
122) of the Land Registration Act."
4. ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL TRANSFER OF LAND, MERELY AVOIDABLE,
NOT VOID AB-INITIO; LAND CEASES TO BE PUBLIC UPON
REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. The
petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and
void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable.
The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not
been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has
held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. (30 SCRA 301): "A
certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab
initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land
is part of the public domain, although it is not. In such case the
nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that
the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not
belong to such category. OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable
or reviewable. . . . Once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of public domain and becomes private property over which
the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction . A public
land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of
Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible
as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date
of issuance thereof."

DECISION

CRUZ, J :p

The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground

that the original sale thereof from the government was tainted
with fraud because based on a forgery and therefore void ab
initio. The present holders of the property claiming to be innocent
purchasers for value and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend
that the action cannot lie against them.
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of
78,865 square meters. 1 It was originally purchased on
installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina
Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of
Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in
1922. 2 Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria
and Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed
a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to
support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a
certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had
already made full payment 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on
Subsequently, on October 13,
September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants. 5
1971, TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was
issued by the register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal,
Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval,
Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985,
the registered owners of the land, following several transfers,
were Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under
TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under
TCT No. 80394. 7 they were named as defendants and asked to
return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of
forgery and fraud. The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal
having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January
8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated
August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No.
1280) was based. 8
In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in
the join affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in
good faith and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they
invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. 9 For her
part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the
government had no cause of action against her because there
was no allegation that she had violated the plaintiff's right, that
the government was not the real party-in-interest because the
subject land was already covered by the Torrens system, and that
in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches. 10
The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted
the motion. 11 The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists
that it has a valid cause of action and that it is not barred by
either prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is
indeed a forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed
affiants were already dead at the time they were supposed to
have signed the sworn statement, even the most cursory
examination of the document will show that the three signatures
affixed thereto were written by one and the same hand. 12 There
is no doubt about it. It is indeed difficult to understand how such
an obvious forgery could have deceived the people in the Bureau
of Lands who processed the papers of this case and made
possible the fraudulent transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null
and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make
all titles derived therefrom also ineffectual ab initio? LLjur

We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the

complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants
was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired
the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees
for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not having been
disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the
Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them
thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change
despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.

Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
 subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate.

The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are

consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the
Land Reg. Act), every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking
a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted
on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may
be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior
to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such
certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world, including the government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of
Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration
is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was
registered, the owner might rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. 16

The decision in Piero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to

the present proceeding because the lands involved in that case
had not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. They were still held by the Pieros. The action for reversion
was filed by the government against them as the original
transferees of the properties in question. They were the direct
grantees of the free patents issued by the government pursuant
to which the corresponding certificates of title were issued under
the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the government as a
ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly to the
Pieros, who could not plead the status of innocent purchasers
for value.
cdphil

The difference between them and the private respondents is that

the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in
fact after several transfers following the original sale thereof to
Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent
transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the
falsification of the joint affidavit, but that is a bare and hardly
persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would still not
prove any collusion between him and the private respondents.
The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and
heiress of Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon
her the alleged sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension
of the juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value because she is charged with
knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in
fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did not
merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable
consideration and without knowledge of its original defect. The
agreement to subdivide, 18 which she presented to show that she
had acquired the land for valuable consideration, is more
acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also
consonant with the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the
names of the private respondents, the government has no more
control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public
domain or, as the Solicitor General contends as if it made any
difference of the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to
be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina
Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the
Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As
private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property
Registration Decree, which applies even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section
122, which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands. 19

This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act,

providing thus:
Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest, the Government will
convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held
by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided in
section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land
Registration Act.

The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of

limitations because the original transfer of the land was null and
void ab initio and did not give rise to any legal right. The land
therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the
action for this reversion could be filed at any time. The answer to
that is the statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak
Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even if respondent
Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent and
the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would
not revert back to the State," precisely because it has become
private land. Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the
original transfer was null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it
is not so. It was only voidable. The land remained private as long
as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is too late to do
that now. As the Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of
Appeals. 21
A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and
void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain,
although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from
the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as
the land involved in the present case does not belong to
such category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or
reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110
Phil. 113): (1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2) although valid
and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct
proceeding therefor (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590),
not collaterally (Sorogon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259, 262;
Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184; Henderson vs.
Garrido, 90 Phil. 624, 630; Samonte vs. Sambilon, 107 Phil.
198, 200); (3) within the statutory period therefor (Sec. 38,
Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico, 33 Phil. 363; Delos
Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial
Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791;
Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs. Solis, 56
Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70
Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title would be conclusive
against the whole world, including the Government
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs.
Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason vs. Santiago, 99 Phil.
615).

And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources: 22
. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property over which
the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A
public land patent, when registered in the corresponding
 Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and
becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance
thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial
decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the date
of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the
action for the annulment of the certificate of title issued
upon the land grant can nolonger be entertained.
(Emphasis supplied)

It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private

respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal
Arguson but both were dismissed and the titles of the registered
owners were confirmed by the trial court. 23 This decision was
later sustained by this Court. 24 While this is not to say that the
present petition is barred by res judicata, as the government was
not a party in these cases, it does suggest that the issue it wants
to rake up now has long been settled. It should not be the subject
of further judicial inquiry, especially at this late hour. Litigation
must stop at some point instead of dragging on interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be
unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more
abrasive if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the
conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As in this case. cdphil
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith
and for value of the subject property and that the original
acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own
titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the
government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
(Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, [April 10, 1989], 253 PHIL
|||

732-742)
 [G.R. No. L-36507. June 14, 1974.]

ANTONIO PIERO, JR., EMMA BERNAD (assisted by

her husband Norberto Bernad) and
FORTUNATO PIERO, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE D
IRECTOR OFLANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his
capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga
del Norte, MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as
Deputy Public Lands Inspector, NICANOR ALASAAS,
EUSEBIO CAMANSI and TOMAS
SUMALPONG, respondents, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the
Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte and
MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy
Public Lands Inspector,respondents-appellants.

Porferio E. Mah for petitioners-appellees.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Francisco J.
Bautista for respondents-appellants.

DECISION

BARREDO, J : p

Appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the

Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its Civil
Case No. 1128, granting the writ of prohibition prayed for by
appellees against the appellant Director of Lands, the Provincial
Land Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials
who, by order of said director, had initiated an
investigation of alleged fraud claimed to have led to the
issuance of the Free Patents and corresponding
Certificates of Title to the said appellees.
This appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on
February 20, 1973, the decision of the trial court being based
exclusively on a stipulation of facts as follows:
"1. That Antonio Piero, Jr., and Emma Piero Bernad are
residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte; while
Fortunato Piero is presently a resident of Negros
Oriental;
2. That the identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532,
all of Pls-100, situated at Napuyan, Dapitan, Zamboanga
del Norte, are submitted (sic);
3. That Lot No. 5790, Pls - 100 is covered by Free
Patent No V-63411 issued January 30, 1957 in
favor of Antonio Piero, Jr., and Lot No. 5792 Pls-100 is
covered by Free PatentNo. V-63420 issued on January 30,
1957 in favor of Emma Piero Bernad, and that Lot 2532 is
applied for by Fortunato Piero under Homestead
Application No. V-66441 approved as of January 2, 1953,
but up to the present no Patent has as yet been issued;
4. That Lot 2532 was formerly part of PSU-111118, a
private survey, executed by Surveyor Calixto Sudiacal in
1939 for Fortunato Piero; and that by subsequent survey
executed by the ECA, Psu-111118 was subdivided into
smaller lots, one of which is now Lot 2532;
5. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63411, Original
Certificate of Title No. D-5349 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in
favor of Antonio Piero, Jr., on October 17, 1957;
6. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63420, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5312 was issued by
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, in
favor of Emma Piero on October 17, 1957;
7. That on August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands issued an
order directing the investigation of the protest of Eusebio
Camansi, against the patented
application of AntonioPiero, Jr., a copy of said order
being found on page 14 of the expediente; and that on
March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief Legal
Division directed the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, to
investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas against the
patented application of Emma Piero Bernad, a
copy of said order is also being on page 15 ofthe
expediente;
8. That as regards Lot 5790 Pls-100 the protest of Eusebio
Camansi has been given due course against the
claim of Antonio Piero, Jr., which protest has been
investigated and terminated, Antonio Piero, Jr., being
represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus Sarmiento;
9. That Nicanor Alasaas filed his protest dated February
27, 1958 and subscribed on March 11, 1958, before Notary
Public, G.R. Dalmacio, Jr., a copy is hereto attached as
Exhibit A; and that the protest of Nicanor Alasaas has
been investigated by Atty. Mariano D. Palermo,
investigator of the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog, Zamboanga
del Norte on August 30, 1959;
10. That with respect to Lot 5792 the same has already
been investigated and regarding Lot 5790 the investigation
has already been terminated but no decision has as yet
been issued;
11. That with respect to the claim of Tomas Sumalpong
against the application of Fortunato Piero an
investigation was conducted on August 21, 1959 but
neither FortunatoPiero nor counsel appeared; that when
the said case was rescheduled for October 30, 1959, Atty.
Jaime T. Hamoy counsel for Fortunato Piero filed a
motion for postponement on the ground that said counsel
had a Criminal Case to attend to in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, after
which the hearing was rescheduled for December 28,
1959; that in said hearing counsel for Fortunato Piero for
the first time attacked the authority of the investigation
on the alleged ground that under the Revised
Administrative Code only the Director of Lands and
Chief of Section of said Office can order
investigation of land conflicts; that up to the
present no resolution of that issue has as yet been made;
and that no written motion bearing on the same ground
interposed before the investigator was ever raised before
the Director of Lands;
12. That pursuant to a letter of Atty. Candido Pa.
Sumalpong as counsel for Tomas Sumalpong under
date of July 28, 1959, protesting against the above-
mentioned homestead
application of Fortunato Piero which letter was
addressed to the Director of Lands thru the Provincial
Land Officer at Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, the said
Provincial Land Officer in the first indorsement dated July
22, 1959 addressed to Deputy Public Lands Inspector,
Mariano D. Palermo, directed the investigation of the case
until the said case is terminated for disposition under the
provision of Land Administrative Order No. 13-3 that the
said first indorsement was the sole authority for the
investigationof the claim of said Tomas Sumalpong against
the homestead application of Fortunato Piero; that as
above stated the investigation of the claim of Tomas
Sumalpong was not terminated because counsel for
Fortunato Piero attacked the authority for the said
investigation;
13. That in connection with the separate petition of the
respondents, Nicanor Alasaas, Eusebio Camansi and
Tomas Sumalpong against the application of the
petitioners the same respondents were required by the
Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands in a
letter dated September 4, 1959 to file a sworn protest and
pay the protest fee within a period of thirty days from the
receipt of the said letter, otherwise the respondents claim
will be dismissed and disregarded without further notice;
that a copy of said letter is hereto attached as an integral
part of this stipulation of facts as Exhibit "B"; that there
is no showing that respondents complied with the said
letter nor is there any showing that the claim of the
respondents are already dismissed (that is as of this date);
that on December 18, 1959 the petitioners, thru counsel,
filed a motion to dismiss the alleged protest but up to the
present no resolution on said motion has ever been made;
 that as shown by this letter of September 4, 1959 which
was addressed to Antonio Mabulay, Annex "B" respondents
Tomas Sumalpong, Nicanor Alasaas and Eusebio Camansi
were not given copy of this letter, and that the
motion of counsel for the "Dismiss the Protest" (sic) does
not show that respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Eusebio
Camansi and Nicanor Alasaas were ever furnished a
copy of said motion;
14. That the Director of Lands was actually served with
summons on January 20, 1960 as shown by the
return of the City Sheriff of Manila, which return appears
on page 25of the record of this case;
15. That for all matters not covered by this
stipulation of facts parties agree to ask for a date for the
reception of evidence."

We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts

disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We reiterate
Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22, 1961, 2
SCRA 25, wherein We held that it is not only the right but the
duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any
alleged fraud in securing a free patent and the corresponding
title to a public land and to file the corresponding court action for
the reversion of the same to the State, if the facts disclosed in
the course of such investigation should so warrant.
Consequently, prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an
investigation despite the existence of a Torrens title.
Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public Land
Act leaves no other alternative to the Director of Lands. The
provision reads thus:
"SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be
considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements,
and any subsequent modification, alteration, or
change of the material facts set forth in the application
 shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the
duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and
whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are
true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained
and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such
investigation, theDirector of Lands is hereby empowered
to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts.
In every investigation made in accordance with this
section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or
fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall
be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall
refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his
authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to
give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions,
and on the basis of such presumption, an
order of cancellation may issue without further
proceedings."

Underlying this section and providing its justification is the

Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates ofthe
events herein involved, declaring that "all agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain . . . and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State . . . ." And under
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, "the scope of this
constitutional provision, according to its heading and its
language, embraces all lands of any kind ofthe public domain, its
purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy
for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the
Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands from
the State through any of the means provided for in the Public
Land Act, Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to
the reservation expressly made in above quoted Section 91 to the
effect that "the statement made in the application shall be
considered as essential conditions and parts of any . . . title . . .
issued on the basis of such application" and that "any false
statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration or
change of the material facts set forth in the application
shall ipso facto 1 produce the cancellation of the concession,
title or permit granted."
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a
Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead
patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in
repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has
been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government
can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has
been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by
the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. 2 It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed
to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an
ever existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire
into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such
title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or
any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the
corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the
public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified
persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to
an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has
been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing
such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may
be filed by the Government.
Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding
that the Court has found that the titles of appellees have been in
fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be resolved only after
the Director of Lands shall have finished his investigation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is
reversed and the writ of prohibition sought by appellees is
denied. Costs against appellees.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma, and Aquino,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes
(Piero, Jr. v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-36507, [June 14,
|||

1974], 156 PHIL 382-388)

 [G.R. No. 147379. February 27, 2002.]

HEIRS OF AMBROCIO KIONISALA, namely, ANA,

ISABEL, GRACE, JOVEN and CARMELO, all
surnamed KIONISALA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
HONORIO DACUT, namely: VISAMINDA D. OREVILLO,
VIOLETA DACUT, JOSEPHINE DACUT and
ELIZABETH DACUT, respondents.

Abundio L. Okit for petitioners.

Constantino A. Cabacungan for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of

titles, reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They
claimed absolute ownership of Lots 1015 and 1017 located in
Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon even prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title in favor of
petitioners. After petitioners filed their answer, a hearing on the
affirmative defenses was set. Thereafter, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action
of private respondents was truly for reversion, so that only the
Director of Lands could have filed the complaint, and that the
certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint
did not comply with the standard form of such undertaking. On
appeal, the appellate court reversed the order of dismissal by the
trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
The Court ruled that it was obvious that private respondents
alleged in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek the
nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title
covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties
in interest in light of their allegations that they have always been
the owners and possessors of the two parcels of land even prior
to the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners' favor,
hence, the latter could only have committed fraud in securing
them. Further, private respondents have sufficiently pleaded an
action for reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on
implied trust. In the complaint, private respondents clearly
asserted that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership
thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and certificates
of title in their names. This allegation certainly measured up to
the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for
reconveyance.
The Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals that private
respondents did not altogether dispense with the certificate of
non-forum shopping. What is involved here is a certification
several sentences short of the standard form. Verily, this Court
can only presume innocent reasons as there was no reason for
pursuing a contrary belief for the omissions of the other
standard statements therein.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; TEST

FOR SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS. The test of the sufficiency of the
facts to constitute a cause of action is whether admitting the
facts alleged the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In
answering this query, only the facts asserted in the complaint
must be taken into account without modification although with
reasonable inferences therefrom.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY STATES EITHER CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF FREE PATENTS AND
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OR FOR RECONVEYANCE; CASE AT BAR.
Applying the test to the case at bar, we rule that the complaint
does not allege an action for reversion which private respondents
would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it sufficiently
states either a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 or
alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two
pieces of realty, wherein in either case private respondents are
the real parties in interest.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF FREE
PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND ACTION FOR
REVERSION, DIFFERENTIATED. An ordinary civil action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is
not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between
them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of
the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land. Hence
in Gabila v. Barriga where the plaintiff in his complaint admits
that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of
the defendant's title because even if the title were canceled or
amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the
portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public
domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the
only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of
Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior
to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well
as the defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of
land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is
consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the
State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of
ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the
grant of title to the defendant.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NULLIFICATION OF FREE PATENTS, NOT
ESSENTIAL TO SPECIFICALLY STATE IN COMPLAINT ACTUAL
DATE WHEN COMPLAINANTS BECAME OWNERS AND
POSSESSORS OF SUBJECT LOT. It is obvious that private
respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to
seek the nullification of the free patents as well as the
certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they
are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that
they have always been the owners and possessors of the two (2)
parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the documents of
title in petitioners' favor, hence the latter could only have
committed fraud in securing them. It is not essential for private
respondents to specifically state in the complaint the actual date
when they became owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot
1017. The allegations to the effect that they were so preceding
the issuance of the free patents and the certificates of title, i.e.,
"the Department of Environment and Natural Resources not
having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being
anymore public but already private property," are unquestionably
adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the State of jurisdiction
to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If at all, the oversight
in not alleging the actual date when private respondents'
ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency in details
which does not amount to a failure to state a cause of action.
The remedy for such deficiency would not be a motion to dismiss
but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing of
appropriate responsive pleadings. CDaSAE

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONVEYANCE; ELUCIDATED. It is settled that

in reconveyance the free patent and the certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's
name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts
which admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to
recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff
was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had
illegally dispossessed him of the same.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST; CASE AT BAR. We
rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in
addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and
certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more
specifically, one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust
arises where the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly
acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that
he (or they) would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for
the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it. In the
complaint, private respondents clearly assert that they have long
been the absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession
and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were
fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when petitioners
obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names.
These allegations certainly measure up to the requisite
statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance.
7. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; COMPLAINT; EVIDENTIARY MATTER NEED
NOT BE ASSEVERATED. It is easy to see why the allegations
demanded by petitioners are unnecessary, even improper, in a
complaint. Whether petitioners are innocent purchasers for value
of the contested lots is a matter of defense that private
respondents need not anticipate in their complaint; indubitably it
lies upon petitioners' discretion to allege this fact in their answer
perhaps to bar recovery of the two pieces of realty. Moreover,
private respondents do not have to asseverate in the complaint
the documents proving their alleged sources of title. These
matters are evidentiary details which undoubtedly find noplace
in a complaint. Being matters of evidence proving the ultimate
fact of ownership averred by private respondents, the disclosure
of such evidence must await either the proceedings for discovery
or pre-trial or even the trial proper. It should also be stressed that
in pleading the ownership of a parcel of land in an action for
recovery of ownership/possession thereof, all that plaintiff is
required to state in the complaint are ". . . a disseisin and its
continuance by the defendant . . . Plaintiff was not required and
did not allege the source and kind of title under which it claimed,
and under the complaint, it was at liberty to introduce proof of
any legal title which it possessed. Conversely, the defendants
were at liberty to introduce all legally admissible evidence
tending to show that title was not in the plaintiff. Hence, they had
the right to show that the legal title was in themselves. For, if
legal title to the property were shown to be in the defendants, the
evidence of the plaintiff that title belonged to it would certainly
be met . . . It must be furthermore remembered that . . . plaintiff
is allowed to make up his complaint in an action to recover
possession of land without disclosing the title which he intends
to rely upon."cTCaEA

8. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP;

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
FREE PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND
RECONVEYANCE TANTAMOUNT TO QUIETING OF TITLE WHICH IS
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. We rule that neither the action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title of
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 nor the action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust of the same lots has prescribed. We have ruled
that "a free patent issued over private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quos nullum est, nullum
producit effectum." Moreover, private respondents' claim of open,
public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two
(2) parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of
petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also amounts
to an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. The
action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on the other
hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from 1990 and 1991
when the free patents and the certificates of title over Lot 1017
and Lot 1015, respectively, were registered. Obviously the action
had not prescribed when private respondents filed their
complaint against petitioners on 19 December 1995. At any rate,
the action for reconveyance in the case at bar is also
significantly deemed to be an action to quiet title for purposes of
determining the prescriptive period on account of private
respondents' allegations of actual possession of the disputed
lots. In such a case, the cause of action is truly imprescriptible.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94; CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
SHORT OF STANDARD FORM ACCEPTABLE. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that private respondents did not altogether
dispense with the certificate of non-forum shopping. What is
involved here is a certification several sentences short of the
standard form as it only states: "That we have not filed any case
in any court or bodies affecting the same subject matter." While
this manner of formulating the certification is indeed deplorable,
its presence in the complaint nonetheless shows the intention of
private respondents to comply with the standard form. Verily, we
can only presume innocent reasons as there is no reason for
pursuing a contrary belief for the omissions of the other
standard statements therein. In Cabardo v. Court of
Appeals where the certificate of non-forum shopping was found
deficient in details we ruled ". . . petitioner's failure to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to
inform the Court of any petition which might be filed, as required
under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked since it
does not appear that any petition related to this case has ever
been filed in any other court. On the other hand, to dismiss the
petition on this ground would be to uphold technicality over
substantial justice." For the same reason that no case related to
the complaint filed by private respondents has been filed by them
in any other court, we rule pro hac vice that the contested
certificate of non-forum shopping is substantial compliance with
the rules. Indeed to hold otherwise would only further delay the
disposition of the original dispute between petitioners and
private respondents concerning the ownership of Lot 1015 and
Lot 1017.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J : p

ONCE MORE we are faced with the erroneous application of what

are perceived to be elementary rules of pleading. The
misapprehension of the basic concepts underlying these rules
can be befuddling, but what is worse, the lost man-hours spent in
untangling the ensuing allegations of pleading errors causing
unnecessary delay in the adjudication of cases. Instead of
immediately resolving the original dispute and adjudicating the
merits of conflicting claims, which in the instant petition involves
the ownership of two (2) parcels of land with the sizable area of
187,718 square meters, the judicial process is unfortunately
wasted in the maze of unfounded claims of deficiencies in the
parties' pleadings.
On 19 December 1995 private respondents filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-312 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. This complaint
involved two (2) parcels of land known as Lot No. 1017 and
Lot No. 1015 with areas of 117,744 square meters and 69,974
square meters respectively, located in Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon.
On 7 September 1990 Lot No. 1017 was granted a free patent to
petitioners Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala under Free Patent No.
603393, and on 13 November 1991 Lot 1015 was bestowed upon
Isabel Kionisala, one of the impleaded heirs of
Ambrocio Kionisalaunder Free Patent No. 101311-91-904.
Thereafter, on 19 November 1990 Lot 1017 was registered under
the Torrens system and was issued Original Certificate of
Title No. P-19819 in petitioners' name, while on 5 December 1991
Lot No. 1015 was registered in the name of Isabel Kionisala under
Original Certificate of Title No. P-20229.
In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity of
titles and reconveyance, private respondents claimed absolute
ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title. They further
alleged in their complaint
. . . 2. That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners
and in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels of
agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows
[technical description of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017] . . . 3. That
plaintiffs became absolute and exclusive owners of the
abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance from
 their late father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the
same from a certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was
in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. In fact
Honorio Dacut has had this parcels of land rented by the
Philippine Packing Corporation for more than twenty years
(20) up to the present time; 4. That recently, plaintiff
discovered that defendants, without the knowledge and
consent of the former, fraudulently applied for patent the
said parcels of land and as a result thereof certificates of
titles had been issued to them as evidenced by certificate
of title No. P-19819 in the name of the Hrs. of
Ambrocio Kionisala and No. P-20229 in the name of
Isabel Kionisala, xerox copies of the titles hereto attached
and marked as annexes "A" and "B" and made part hereof;
5. That the patents issued to defendants are null and void,
the same having been issued fraudulently, defendants not
having been and/or in actual possession of the litigated
properties and the statement they may have made in their
application are false and without basis in fact, and, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources not
having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not
being anymore public but already private property; 6. That
in the remote possibility that said certificates of title
cannot be declared as null and void, plaintiffs, being the
absolute and exclusive owners of the parcels of land titled
by the defendants, are entitled to reconveyance . . .
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed of the Honorable Court that judgment issue: 1.
declaring certificates of title No. P-19819 and P-20229,
null and void, and in the event that this remedy is not
possible, ordering defendants to reconvey to plaintiffs the
land subject matter of this litigation . . .

The complaint was accompanied by a verification and certificate

of non-forum shopping which affirmed under oath thus
I, VISAMINDA DACUT OREVILLO, after being duly sworn,
states: That I am one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled
case; that we have caused the preparation and filing of
the same and that all allegations contained therein are
 true and correct to the best of my own knowledge; That
we have not filed any case in any court or bodies affecting
the same subject matter.

On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to the

complaint and asserted the following affirmative defenses
8. That the complaint states no cause of action; 9. That
the cause of action, if any, is barred by statute of
limitations, prescription of action or by equitable principle
of laches; 10. That . . . it is only the Director of Lands (now
DENR) through the Office of the Solicitor General that has
the authority to file annulment of Free Patent or
Homestead Patent issued by the Director of Lands or
DENR; That the complaint is not supported by certification
of non-forum shopping as required by Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court . . .

Petitioners set for hearing their affirmative defenses. After the

hearing, or on 3 December 1996 the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action of private
respondents was truly for reversion so that only the Director of
Lands could have filed the complaint, and that the certificate of
non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint did not comply
with the standard form for such undertaking. 1 On 23 December
1996 private respondents moved for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal but on 3 June 1997 the motion was denied by the
trial court.
On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of
dismissal to the Court of Appeals. On 15 February 2000 the
appellate court promulgated its assailed Decisionreversing the
order of dismissal. 2 The Court of Appeals ruled that while the allegations in the
complaint were insufficient for purposes of an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of
a certificate of title since the actual date when private respondents became owners of Lots
1015 and 1017 prior to the issuance of the corresponding free patents and certificates of title
was not specifically indicated in the complaint, nonetheless the allegations therein were
The
comprehensive enough to constitute a cause of action for reconveyance. 3
appellate court concluded: "On this score, it was reversible error
for the lower court to have dismissed the complaint . . . because
in an action for reconveyance, what is sought is the transfer of
the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one
with a better right . . . ." 4 The appellate court likewise found
substantial compliance in the certificate of non-forum
shopping 5 by citing Cabardov. Court of Appeals 6 and Kavinta v.
Court of Appeals. 7

On 7 March 2000 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the

CA Decision. On 22 January 2001 the appellate court denied the
motion for lack of merit, hence this petition for review.
At the core of the instant petition is the issue of sufficiency of
the complaint filed by private respondents. Verily, does the
complaint allege an action for reversion which private
respondents would have no right to file or institute? Or does the
complaint state a cause of action for declaration of nullity of the
free patents and certificates of title for Lot 1015 and Lot 1017, or
alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two
lots? Has the cause of action, if any, prescribed? And does the
certificate of non-forum shopping substantially comply with the
standard requirement?
First. The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a
cause of action is whether admitting the facts alleged the court
could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint. 8 In answering this query, only the
facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into account
without modification although with reasonable inferences
therefrom. 9
Applying the test to the case at bar, we rule that the complaint
does not allege an action for reversion which private respondents
would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it sufficiently
states either a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 or
alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two
pieces of realty, wherein in either case private respondents are
the real parties in interest.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents
and certificates of title is not the same as an action for
reversion. 10 The difference between them lies in the allegations
as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is
sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga 11 where the plaintiff in
his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title because even
if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land
embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment
would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was
for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief
would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of
free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of
the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance
of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the
defendant's fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully
obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land
claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not
from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever
patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently
void ab initio. 12 The real party in interest is not the State but the
plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the
parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the
defendant. In Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals 13 we
ruled
. . . from the allegations in the complaint . . . private
respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter
portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner,
openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely
since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is
private land . . . Consequently, merely on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is
apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the
 Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free
Patent. Hence, the dismissal of private respondents'
complaint was premature and trial on the merits should
have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. It
would have been entirely different if the action were
clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101
of C.A. No. 141 . . .

It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all

the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents
as well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017.
Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their
allegations that they have always been the owners and
possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the
issuance of the documents of title in petitioners' favor, hence the
latter could only have committed fraud in securing them
. . . That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners and
in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels of
agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows
[technical description of Lot 1017 and Lot 1015] . . . 3. That
plaintiffs became absolute and exclusive owners of the
abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance from
their late father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the
same from a certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was
in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the
concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years . . . 4.
That recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants,
without the knowledge and consent of the former,
fraudulently applied for patent the said parcels of land and
as a result thereof certificates of titles had been issued to
them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in the
name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala, and No. P-20229 in
the name of Isabel Kionisala . . . 5. That the patents issued
to defendants are null and void, the same having been
issued fraudulently, defendants not having been and/or in
actual possession of the litigated properties and the
statement they may have made in their application are
false and without basis in fact, and, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources not having any
 jurisdiction on the properties the same not being anymore
public but already private property . . .

It is not essential for private respondents to specifically state in

the complaint the actual date when they became owners and
possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the effect
that they were so preceding the issuance of the free patents and
the certificates of title, i.e., "the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties
the same not being anymore public but already private property,"
are unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the
State of jurisdiction to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If
at all, the oversight in not alleging the actual date when private
respondents' ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere
deficiency in details which does not amount to a failure to state a
cause of action. The remedy for such deficiency would not be a
motion to dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to
enable the filing of appropriate responsive pleadings. 14
With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance,
it is settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the
certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible.15 What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the
title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in the defendant's name. 16 All that must be alleged in the
complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true
would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land,
namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2)
that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. 17
We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in
addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and
certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more
specifically, one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust
arises where the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly
acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that
he (or they) would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for
the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it. 18 In the
complaint, private respondents clearly assert that they have long
been the absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession
and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were
fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when petitioners
obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names.
These allegations certainly measure up to the requisite
statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance.
Petitioners would nonetheless insist that private respondents
should have also alleged, in addition to "possession in the
concept of owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and
adversely for thirty (30) years at the least," the statement that
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 have not passed to an innocent purchaser
for value. Petitioners also proffer the trifling argument that
(apparently in order to render sufficient for pleading purposes the
allegations of ownership) private respondents should have
attached to their complaint the documents which would prove
the sources of their title to the disputed parcels of land.
It is easy to see why the allegations demanded by petitioners are
unnecessary, even improper, in a complaint. Whether petitioners
are innocent purchasers for value of the contested lots is a
matter of defense that private respondents need not anticipate in
their complaint; indubitably it lies upon petitioners' discretion to
allege this fact in their answer perhaps to bar recovery of the two
pieces of realty. 19 Moreover, private respondents do not have to
asseverate in the complaint the documents proving their alleged
sources of title. These matters are evidentiary details which
undoubtedly find no place in a complaint. Being matters of
evidence proving the ultimate fact of ownership averred by
private respondents, the disclosure of such evidence must await
either the proceedings for discovery or pre-trial or even the trial
proper. It should also be stressed that in pleading the ownership
of a parcel of land in an action for recovery of
ownership/possession thereof, all that plaintiff is required to
state in the complaint are

. . . a disseisin and its continuance by the defendant . . .

Plaintiff was not required and did not allege the source
 and kind of title under which it claimed, and under the
complaint, it was at liberty to introduce proof of any legal
title which it possessed. Conversely, the defendants were
at liberty to introduce all legally admissible evidence
tending to show that title was not in the plaintiff. Hence,
they had the right to show that the legal title was in
themselves. For, if legal title to the property were shown to
be in the defendants, the evidence of the plaintiff that title
belonged to it would certainly be met . . . It must be
furthermore remembered that . . . plaintiff is allowed to
make up his complaint in an action to recover possession
of land without disclosing the title which he intends to
rely upon. 20

Second. We rule that neither the action for declaration of nullity

of free patents and certificates of title of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017
nor the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust of the
same lots has prescribed. We have ruled that "a free patent
issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal
effects whatsoever. Quos nullum est, nullum producit
effectum." 21 Moreover, private respondents' claim of open,
public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two
(2) parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of
petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also amounts
to an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. 22
The action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on the other
hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from 1990 and 1991
when the free patents and the certificates of title over Lot 1017
and Lot 1015, respectively, were registered. Obviously the action
had not prescribed when private respondents filed their
complaint against petitioners on 19 December 1995. At any rate,
the action for reconveyance in the case at bar is also
significantly deemed to be an action to quiet title for purposes of
determining the prescriptive period on account of private
respondents' allegations of actual possession of the disputed
lots. 23 In such a case, the cause of action is truly
imprescriptible. 24
Third. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private
respondents did not altogether dispense with the certificate of
non-forum shopping. What is involved here is a certification
several sentences short of the standard form as it only states:
"That we have not filed any case in any court or bodies affecting
the same subject matter." While this manner of formulating the
certification is indeed deplorable, its presence in the complaint
nonetheless shows the intention of private respondents to
comply with the standard form. Verily, we can only presume
innocent reasons as there is no reason for pursuing a contrary
belief for the omissions of the other standard statements
therein. In Cabardo v. Court of Appeals 25 where the certificate of
non-forum shopping was found deficient in details we ruled
. . . petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-
forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court of
any petition which might be filed, as required
under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked since
it does not appear that any petition related to this case
has ever been filed in any other court. On the other hand,
to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold
technicality over substantial justice.

For the same reason that no case related to the complaint filed
by private respondents has been filed by them in any other court,
we rule pro hac vice that the contested certificate of non-forum
shopping is substantial compliance with the rules. Indeed to hold
otherwise would only further delay the disposition of the original
dispute between petitioners and private respondents concerning
the ownership of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. We note that their
conflicting claims could have been resolved by now if not for the
erroneous application of the elementary rules of pleading which
resulted in the premature dismissal of the complaint filed by
private respondents. This Court need not repeat the fastidious
and unfounded adherence to technicality which already stalled
for an unfortunate seven (7) years more or less the proceedings
in the trial court.
In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners' desire to dismiss
the complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 95-312
cannot be impressed with merit. By this decision, however, we
are not foreclosing the presentation of evidence during trial on
the merits that Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property
and that private respondents are not truly the owners thereof.
This and other issues on the merits must follow where the
preponderant evidence lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February
2000 reversing the Order dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs of Honorio Dacut, namely,
Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta Dacut, Josephine Dacut and
Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, namely, Ana,
Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all surnamed Kionisala,
and Isabel Kionisala is AFFIRMED with the understanding that
private respondents Heirs of Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein
may proceed on the basis of their causes of action of declaration
of nullity of free patents and certificates of titles and/or
reconveyance based on an implied trust, with claim for damages.
The proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith
within thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this Decision
without unnecessary delay. SHIETa

SO ORDERED.
(Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, [February
|||

27, 2002], 428 PHIL 249-266)

 [G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005.]

NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO,

LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G.
TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO,
FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA
A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS
REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ,
RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C.
TEMERAS, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO
M. SANTIAGO,respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957, 1 affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil
Case No. 1220, 2 dismissing petitioners' Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and

possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay
San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal
(Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment,
dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain
Ismael Favila y Rodriguez. 3
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was
part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga," which
extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas,
Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City,
Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish
title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-
in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-
Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his
"mga kapatid" on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the
aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the
Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring
around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and
work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their
predecessors. 4
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to
evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had
actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed
that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270,
all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of
respondent. 5
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondent's mother,
Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant
to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of
the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The
whole property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently
adjudicated in favor of Isabel ManahanSantiago (formerly Isabel
Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled
and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel
Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel
Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the
property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently
secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own
name. 6
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action
for declaration of nullity of respondent's certificates of title on
the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the
defects of OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1)
OCT No. 670 was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2)
Material data therein were merely handwritten and in different
penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official
Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate
the Survey Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description
of the property covered by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred
to in OCT No. 670 was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No.
670 was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No.
10248 was issued over a property other than the one described in
OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province of Rizal. 7
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing
on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to
respondent, "[t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and
patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious,
without basis in law and in fact. . . " 8
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus,
the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was
genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of
respondent's land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible,
indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole
world. 9
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v.
Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et
al., 10 respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which
petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 892,
which took effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of
Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, 11 within six months from effectivity of the
decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be
used as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens System. 12
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription.
He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title
already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which
was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the
Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent
contended, "it must be presumed that the questioned land titles
were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance
of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law." 13
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and
occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders,
squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest,
since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest. 14
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less,
threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included
as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, "Carmelino
M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al.," which respondent
instituted before the same trial court against squatters
occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July
1992, the trial court held that "there is no doubt that the plaintiff
(respondent herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case
on which the defendants have built their houses and
shanties. . . ." Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and
executory for failure of the defendants-appellants therein to file
their appellants' brief. 15
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on
the affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During
said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer
Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In
response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C.
Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a
parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the
Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the
annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other
hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings
and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court. 16
After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the
questioned Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court
read:SEcITC

After considering the testimonial and documentary

evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to grant
plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving weight
to plaintiffs (sic) lone but "expert witness", it is crystal
clear that, to quote:
1. "a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the
State
2. it is the State who must file the corresponding
case of annulment of title through the Office of
the Solicitor General, and
3. a land illegally titled in the name of private
individual, the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General should file the corresponding
case for cancellation of title." (TSN August 26,
1997).
The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic)
mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of the
plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said
testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of
action] is bound to fail. "Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony"
wrote "finis" to their case. From the record, this case was
initiated and filed by private individuals,
Nemencio Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their witness
(sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds credence to
the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is (sic)
the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who
must initiate and file a case of this nature when title to a
land is being claimed to be obtained through fraud and
allegedly spurious.
The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the
witness is not without basis. Explicit is the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case
of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
 An action for reversion has to be instituted by the
Solicitor General pursuant to Section
101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43). SEACTH

As to the documentary evidence, having gone through

with the "Deed of Assignment/s" purportedly executed by
and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and the
plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis of
plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject
parcel of land, the same does not hold water in a manner
of speaking, for being self-serving. "Assignor Ismael Favila
y Rodriguez" claimed in said Deed that he is the Attorney-
in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney
executed in his favor by his "mga kapatid" on February 23,
1965, but said Special Power of Attorney was not
presented before this Court, thus there arises a doubt as
to its existence and execution not to mention doubt on the
existence of his "mga kapatid" who as alleged executed
said Special Power Attorney (sic) in his favor.
Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the
authenticity of said "Deeds of Assignment/s", that will not
alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before this
Court. Why? Because the said "Deed of Assignment/s"
which were based on Spanish title have lost their
evidentiary value pursuant to the Presidential Decree No.
892 i.e. "DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE
SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH
TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS."
xxx xxx xxx
There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited
provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory. Suffice
it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs complied
with the said law i.e. to "apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity
of this decree (February 16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens System."
 This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs
were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this
case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said
plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before
this Court the instant complaint. . . .
Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the
declaration of nullity of defendant's title, which has
nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and
possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the
truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred
Spanish Title/s, and thus plaintiffs were never the owners
of the parcel of land subject of this case.
Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the
mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or
more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not
having been questioned by any party. Only now that it is
being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the
offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead
of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed their
fate. . . . 17

After the trial court denied petitioners' Motion for

Reconsideration in its Order, dated 20 July 1999, 18 petitioners
appealed both Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July
2002, 19 affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February
1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution,
dated 14 February 2003. 20
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review 21 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the following issues and praying for
the reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court: cDTIAC

I. Whether the lower court's dismissal of the petitioners'

complaint should be proscribed by the rules of
evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Naval's
 testimony, which was indisputably not based on
facts but conclusion of law.
II. Whether the lower court's dismissal of petitioners'
complaint should be proscribed by the rules of
evidence it being done sans ample evidence except
bare allegations of respondent.
III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles
cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system,
holds of an exception.
IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically
where petitioners are in possession of subject land,
can be subject of prescription.

In his Comment, 22 the respondent, for the most part, reiterated

the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed
petitioners' Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied
upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to
file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial
court stated no cause of action.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff
has no legal capacity to sue" 23 and "the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action" 24 are two different grounds for
a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses.
Failure to distinguish between "the lack of legal capacity to sue"
from "the lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common mistake.
The difference between the two is explained by this Court
in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 25
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the
Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that
the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal
capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the
 character or representation he claims. On the other hand,
a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The
term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with
the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former
refers to a plaintiff'sgeneral disability to sue, such as on
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications
of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first
can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the
second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof,
evidently states no cause of action. TaDIHc

In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent
is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the
petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action
because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being
the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent's contention that
only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates
of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the
ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of
action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground,
requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers, 26 this
Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an
action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to
dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on
whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts
 alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the
cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint
in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the
determination of whether or not a complaint states a
cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and noother
matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire
into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is
improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts
not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said
motion.

In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case

stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself
to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint.
It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations
in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents
referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed
hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court
evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the
Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of
petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning
the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in
favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965.
These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the
merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent
hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical,
open, continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property
against the whole world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject
Property was part of the vast tract of land called "Hacienda
Quibiga" awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of
Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and
successor-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as
Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney
executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25 February 1965, executed
Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of
petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the
Subject Property, on which their houses were erected, when they
discovered that the Subject Property was already covered by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5)
That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by
the respondent. To determine whether these allegations are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this
Court to establish first the nature of petitioners' action. acHDTA

Indeed, petitioners' Complaint filed before the trial court was

captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of respondent's
certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should
not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein
should determine the nature of the action, because even without
the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless
grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the Complaint and the evidence introduced. 27
The trial court believed that petitioners' action was ultimately
one for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain.
Based on the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case
of Nagao v. Court of Appeals, 28 it declared that the State,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is the party-in-
interest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title
illegally issued in the name of a private individual, because the
eventual effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the
property to the State.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and
calls for a far closer review of its decision in Nagao v. Court of
Appeals, 29 wherein the Court held that
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that
private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square
meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an
owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and
 adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the
lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the
public domain, private respondents had already acquired
imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended
by R.A. No. 1942. . . .
Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and
purposes, segregated from the public domain, because the
beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter."
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the
complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the
jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and
could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal
of private respondents' complaint was premature and trial
on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out
evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were
clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101
of C.A.No. 141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of
the Philippines.

In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of

Honorio Dacut, 30 the difference between an action for
declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion
was more thoroughly discussed as follows: IEAaST

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free

patents and certificates of title is not the same as an
action for reversion. The difference between them lies in
the allegations as to the character of ownership of the
 realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence,
in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in
his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title
because even if the title were canceled or amended the
ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion
affected by the amendment would revert to the public
domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and
that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be
the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot
prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of
title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake, as the
case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such
a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or
deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is
consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is
not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing
right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even
before the grant of title to the defendant. . . .

In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject

Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary,
petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of
their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession
thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds
of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their
Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of
Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the
Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one
for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather
than an action for nullity of respondent's certificates of title,
theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or
to quiet their title over the Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting
of title, provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

Respondent's certificates of title over the Subject Property

appeared valid or effective; but according to the petitioners, they
were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to
the same property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title
has been defined as follows: DCHaTc

Cloud on Title. A cloud on title is an outstanding

instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may
nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to
property. The matter complained of must have a prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on
title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal
form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or
inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the
face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by
extrinsic evidence. . . 31

Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action
was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does
arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action,
not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be
dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. 32 Petitioners failed to establish in
their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or
legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their
right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of
his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a
rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property. 33
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of
the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an
integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property
on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim
of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since
time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title
granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time
immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest. 34 If the Subject
Property was already private property before the Spanish
conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the
Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the
Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having
acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could
acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based
on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners
from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the
Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by
discontinuing the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands
recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months
from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No.
1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens system. 35 Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing
ownership over real property. DHEcCT

P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The

successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14
August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the
Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners'
Complaint that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest complied
with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do
so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of
the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create
or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and
vested. 36 By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from
accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason
therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from
accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some
other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud
on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or
registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of
land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would
never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This
would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause
confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No.
892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented
as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in
the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being
subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove
ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession; . . .

Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession

of the Subject Property, then they could still present the
Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject
Property. 37
This Court cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Actual proof of
possession only becomes necessary because, as the same
whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his
ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive
period.38 Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title,
the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the
Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual
possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility
that someone else has acquired a better title to the same
property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular
provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. An
apparently general provision may have a limited application if
read together with other provisions of the statute. 39
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted
and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole
statute. 40 Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is
to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any
probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a
deadline for the filing of applications for registration
of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system ( i.e., six months
from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the
Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. HDIaET

All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for

registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land
registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court
his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real
property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed
and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer
present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership
of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was
in his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of
the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial
court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the
application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain
inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject
Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles
from claiming ownership of the real property on some other
basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration
Decree 41 or the Public Land Act. 42 Petitioners though failed to
allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside
from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial,
which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title,
which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject
Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property,
the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal
of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was
properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view
of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already
unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of
the action.EcDSHT

Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS

the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77,
dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
(Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, [April 29, 2005], 497
|||

PHIL 269-297)
 [G.R. No. L-11651. December 27, 1958.]

TOMAS ROCO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

JUAN GIMEDA, defendant-appellee.

Ricardo V. Reyes for appellants.

Remotigue, Nacua, Remotigue & Palma and Rafael O.
Gimarino for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LIMITATION OF ACTION; ACTION BASED ON FRAUDS.

Under the law, an action based on fraud should be instituted
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 114,
Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No.
190.)
2. REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LANDS; PATENT ONCE
ISSUED; FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION; REMEDY OF PARTY
AGGRIEVED. Once a patent has already been issued, the
land covered thereby has the character of registered property
in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No.
496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party
who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an
action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Register Of
Deeds, 49 Off. Gaz, [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)

DECISION

LABRADOR, J : p

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Cebu, Hon. Jose S. Rodriguez, presiding, dismissing the
complaint upon petition of defendants, on the ground that it
fails to state a cause of action.
 The complaint makes the following allegations: that
before August 22, 1918, Espiridiona Caramihan, owned and
possessed two parcels of land known as lots Nos. 2741 and
3082 of the Barili Cadastral Survey No. 219, covered by tax
declarations Nos. 01865 and 01854; that upon the death of said
Espiridiona Caramihan on August 22, 1918, said lands were
partitioned equally among her children, who similarly
possessed and cultivated their respective shares and paid the
taxes thereon; that in the years 1925 to 1927, through
ignorance and inadvertence of the heirs, the said lots were
declared public land in a cadastral proceeding; that
Espiridiona occupied said lands openly, adversely,
continuously and publicly, planting coconut and fruit trees and
building her dwelling house thereon, and that said
improvements and house are still on said lots; that the present
plaintiffs acquired their rights to the lots by purchase from the
heirs of the original owner Esperidiona Caramihan, that on or
about December 7, 1940, JuanGimeda, defendant, filed an
application for a free patent to said lands, surreptitiously and
fraudulently, without knowledge of the owners and possessors,
and on December 7, 1940, the Director of Lands issued an order
and in accordance therewith, on September 17, 1951, the
Bureau of Lands issued patent No. 51552 in the name of
defendant JuanGimeda; that the plaintiffs and their original
predecessor-in-interest have always been in the actual,
physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said
parcels of land and defendant Juan Gimeda applied for and
obtained his patent thereto without notice to them and without
their knowledge, and secured the approval of his patent by
fraudulent statements, alleging that he was the only heir of
Espiridiona Caramihan and the only occupant of the land; and
that by such false and fraudulent statements the Bureau of
Lands approved his application and ordered the issuance of his
patent.
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint, then
amended the said answer and alleges that he is the youngest
among the children of Espiridiona Caramihan; denies the
allegations made in the complaint as to the acquisition by
false and fraudulent means of the said lands; alleges that the
complaint states no cause of action. He presents a
counterclaim for P5,000 and P10,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively, and P500 as attorney's fees. Plaintiffs
deny this counterclaim.
Later on defendant presented a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the complaint alleges no cause of action, arguing
that as the title in his favor was issued on October 17, 1951 and
action was filed on July 15, 1954, the action was filed more
than two years after the issuance of the patent, beyond the
one-year period provided by law. The authorities cited for this
defense are the case of Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David,
50 Phil., 797; Villarosa vs. Sarmiento, 46 Phil., 814;
Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 620; Sumcad vs. Judge
of the Court of First Instance, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51 Off. Gaz.,
[5] 2413.
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree
issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to
annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent
statements were made in the application for the patent
and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of
the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of
the property. The action is one based on fraud and under the
law, it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of
the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3,
paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the
patent here has already been issued, the land has the
character of registered property in accordance with the
provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by
Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been
injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for
reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds, 92
Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.).
 The order of dismissal appealed from is, therefore,
reversed and the case is returned to the court a quo for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ. concur.
(Roco v. Gimeda, G.R. No. L-11651, [December 27, 1958], 104
|||

PHIL 1011-1014)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200973. May 30, 2016.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region
IV, Manila, petitioner, vs. AMOR HACHERO and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the

July 4, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87267 and its March 6, 2012 Resolution, 2affirming
the March 29, 2006 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 48, Puerto Princesa, Palawan (RTC), which denied the
Petition for Cancellation of Free Patent, Original Certificate of
Title and Reversion filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free
Patent Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514, CAD-
1150-D (subject land) before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Palawan. The subject
land, with an area of 3.1308 hectares or 31,308 square
meters (subject land), is located in Sagrada, Busuanga,
Palawan. 4
The said application for free patent was later approved by
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) of Palawan based on the following findings:
 1) That Hachero was a natural-born Filipino citizen of the
Philippines and, therefore, qualified to acquire public
land through free patent;
2) That the land applied for had been classified as
alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to
disposition under the Public Land Law;
3) That an investigation conducted by the Land
Investigator/Inspector/Deputy Public Land Inspector
Sim A. Luto, found that the subject land had been
occupied and cultivated by Hachero himself and/or
through his predecessor-in-interest since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto;
4) That the notice for the acquisition of the land
by Hachero was published in accordance with law
and that no other person provided a better right to
the land applied for;
5) That there was no adverse claim involving the land still
pending determination before the CENRO; and
6) That the claim of Hachero was complete and there
was no record in the CENRO of any obstacle to the
issuance of the patent. 5
On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was
issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-18011 onMay 7, 1999.
After an inspection and verification were conducted by
the CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land,
covered by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as timberland
and so not susceptible of private ownership under the Free
Patent provision of the Public Land Act. 6
Consequently, on November 26, 2002, the Republic,
represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region IV, Manila,
filed the Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent No.
045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for Reversion, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3726.
Despite personal receipt of the summons and the
complaint, however, Hachero did not file any responsive
pleading within the period required by law. Upon theRepublic's
motion, the RTC declared Hachero in default. Thereafter,
the Republic was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. 7
The Republic presented its lone witness, Diosdado
Ocampo, former CENRO officer of Palawan, and formally
offered the following documents as its exhibits: a) Application
for Free Patent of Amor Hachero; b) Orders of Approval of the
Application and Issuance of Free Patent; c) Free Patent No.
045307-98-9384; d) OCT No. E-18011 issued in the name of
Amor Hachero; e) Inspection Report, dated July 24, 2000; and
f) Verification, dated July 17, 2000, both issued by one Sim
Luto. 8CAIHTE

The Ruling of the RTC

On March 29, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision in favor
of Hachero. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby resolves to deny the instant action for
cancellation of Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title and Reversion for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

The RTC explained that the free patent and title had
already been issued after Hachero was found to have complied
with all the requirements; that it was the Republicitself thru
the DENR-CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under
the operation of the Torrens System; that it could not
understand the complete turnabout made by the same office
and its officials who certified before that the subject land was
alienable and disposable and who approved Hachero's
application; that the Republic failed to show the document
which stated that the subject land was still timberland as
indicated under Project No. 2A L.C. Map No. 839, released on
December 9, 1929, despite the fact that said document was
already available at the CENRO office at the time of the
application for free patent; that the lands adjacent to the
subject land were already alienable and disposable; that the
free patent and the title itself were public documents entitled
to the presumption of regularity; and that the verification and
inspection report of one Sim Luto together with the other
CENRO officials presented by the Republic were insufficient to
defeat Hachero's patent and title. 10
The Ruling of the CA
On July 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, stating
that the verification presented by the Republic could not be
given probative value because L.C. Map No. 839, dated
December 9, 1929, which served as basis for the verification,
was not presented before the RTC. According to the CA, the
Inspection Report, standing alone, was not sufficient to
overcome the burden imposed upon the Republic and could not
serve as basis of the reversion of the subject land. The CA
doubted the subsequent findings of the land investigator that
the subject land was still timberland because he was the same
land investigator who previously evaluated the subject land
and certified that it was alienable and disposable. 11
Not in conformity, the Republic filed the subject petition
anchored on the following:
GROUNDS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S ACTION
FOR CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT NO. 045307-98-
9384 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. E-
18011 AND REVERSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE DISCHARGE OF THE OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS BY THE INVESTIGATING
PERSONNEL OF THE DENR IN THIS CASE HAS
 THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT.
II
THE PREVIOUS FACTUAL MISAPPRECIATION
COMMITTED BY THE DENR EMPLOYEES
CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BIND THE
GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN, AS IN THIS
CASE, THE MISTAKE OR ERROR REFERS TO
IMMUTABLE MATTERS SUCH AS
ALIENABILITY OF A PORTION OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN. 12
In advocacy of its cause, the Republic basically argues
that per its investigation and verification conducted in July
2000, the free patent issued to Hachero was defective and
erroneous considering that the land it covered fell within the
timberland zone. It contends that the said factual findings
carry great weight and should be accorded respect by the
courts due to the special knowledge and expertise of DENR
personnel over matters within their jurisdiction. Considering
that the DENR personnel acted in the discharge of their official
functions, the Republic asserted that they have in their favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duties. Moreover,Hachero failed to rebut the DENR's
investigation report and, for said reason, the presumption in
favor of the investigating personnel and their report has
become conclusive.
The Republic further contends that the title issued
to Hachero, which had been issued based on an erroneous
DENR finding that the land was alienable, can still be
overturned by a later report stating otherwise. Thus, the
Inspection Report, 13 dated July 24, 2000, and Verification
Report, 14 dated July 17, 2000, superseded the previous finding
that the subject land was alienable and disposable.
The Republic avers that the State is not estopped by the
mistakes of its officers and employees and that the previous
factual misappreciation committed by DENR employees cannot
bind the government. 15 DETACa

Hachero's counter-position
Hachero counters that the petition should be dismissed
on the ground that it has raised substantially factual matters.
He points out that the findings of fact of the RTC and the CA
are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal if
there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion. He calls the
attention of the Court to the fact that the officials, who
previously certified to the alienability and disposability of the
subject land but made a complete turn around by declaring
otherwise, could not have made a mistake or error. He asserts
that the main document a vital piece of data denominated as
Cadastral Map No. 839, which became the basis for the
reinspection/reinvestigation and verification by CENRO, Coron,
was released on December 9, 1929 and admittedly already in
their records when the application was approved for titling,
and yet was not presented in court as evidence.
Finally, Hachero stresses that the government cannot be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens
and that titleholders maynot be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in
the absence of his complicity in a fraud or manifest damage to
third persons.16
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
General Rule and Exceptions when
factual findings of the trial court
are affirmed by the CA
It is generally settled in jurisprudence that the findings of
fact of the trial court specially when affirmed by the CA are
final, binding and conclusive and may not be re-examined by
this Court. There are, however, several exceptions to this rule,
to wit:
 1] When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures;
2] When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
3] When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4] When the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts;
5] When the findings of facts are conflicting;
6] When in making its findings, the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7] When the findings of the CA are contrary to that of the
trial court;
8] When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
9] When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
main and reply briefs are not disputed;
10] When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and
11] When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 17
After combing through the records, the Court is of the
considered view that there is a need to review the findings of
the courts below due to the presence of some of the
enumerated exceptions mentioned above, which are 1) when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and 2)
when the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
The Republic showed clear and convincing
proof that the subject land was inalienable
and non-disposable
 Records reveal that on October 15, 1998, upon the
approval of Hachero's application by CENRO of Palawan, Free
Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued and, on May 7, 1999, the
property was subsequently registered under OCT No. E-18011.
Thereafter, in an effort to find out fake or illegal titles, the
DENR created a task force to investigate and evaluate all
issued patents and titles. An investigation conducted by a
representative of the Regional Executive Director of the
Regional Office No. IV revealed that the subject land covered
by OCT No. E-18011 was still timberland and, therefore, could
not be segregated from the public domain as timberlands were
classified as inalienable and non-disposable public lands.
Accordingly, both Sim Luto, Land Management Officer III,
and Diosdado L. Ocampo, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, prepared and signed the Inspection Report,
dated July 24, 2000, and Verification, dated July 17, 2000,
attesting to the fact the subject land fell within the timberland
zone under Project No. 2A, L.C. MapNo. 839, released on
December 9, 1929. For said reason, both recommended the
cancellation of OCT No. E-18011.
Aside from the Inspection Report and the Verification,
the Republic also adduced maps 18 prepared by the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), which
showed that the subject land was located within the periphery
of the land area classified as unclassified public forest and
beyond the alienable and disposable area. In other words, as
the maps clearly reveal, every inch of the subject land is inside
the unclassified public forest area. Evidently, these maps
presented by theRepublic, together with the Inspection Report
and the Verification, all clearly demonstrate that the subject
land is not yet subject to disposition. aDSIHc

Presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duties
applies favorably to Republic
 The Court would have wanted to study Hachero's position
on the matter, but he did not file an answer or responsive
pleading to the complaint filed by the Republicbefore the RTC.
It appears from the records, however, that he was duly served
with the summons together with a copy of the complaint. He,
apparently, opted to ignore it, in effect, waived his right to
rebut the allegations thereof at the first opportunity.
There being a controversion, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties applies
favorably to the Republic. This means that the DENR's
inspection report and the verification stating that the subject
land is still inalienable has become conclusive. The doctrine
in Bustillo vs. People, 19
. . . In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties which the records failed to rebut. The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption
and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.
[Emphasis Supplied]
and in Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., 20

In the same vein, the presumption, disputable

though it may be, that an official duty has been regularly
performed applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia
praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things are
presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was
private respondent's burden to overcome this juris
tantumpresumption. We are not persuaded that it has
been able to do so.
are both instructive.
Cancellation of title and reversion proper
where there exists a mistake or oversight in
granting free patent over inalienable land
The courts below ruled that the Inspection Report and the
Verification had no probative value because the land
classification map (L.C. Map No. 839) on which they were
based was not presented in the trial court. Likewise, the
courts below considered the subsequent findings of the land
investigator that the land still belonged to the public domain
as doubtful because the officials who previously evaluated
and verified that the subject land was alienable were the same
officials who now investigated and verified the same and found
it inalienable.
The Court holds otherwise.
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is
to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation
therefore is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. 21 In Republic v. Guerrero, 22 the Court gave a more
general statement that "this remedy of reversion can only be
availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the
land in patents or certificates of title." 23Nonetheless, the
Court recognized in Republic v. Mangotara, 24 that there were
instances when it granted reversion for reasons other than
fraud:
. . . . In Estate of the Late Jesus S.
Yujuico v. Republic (Yujuico case), reversion was defined
as an action which seeks to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.
It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed
the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to
cancel titles that were void for reasons other than
fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the
conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable
 forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant
was made through mere oversight. 25
[Emphasis Supplied]
In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for
cancellation of patent and title and for reversion was not
based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part ofHachero, his
title could still be cancelled and the subject land reverted
back to the State because the grant was made through
mistake or oversight. This could probably be the reason why,
shortly after one (1) year from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011
to Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted another
investigation and verification on the subject land. It would
appear that they suspected that a mistake was made in their
issuance of the patent as the subject land had not been
reclassified or released as alienable or disposable land. It
remained plotted within the timberland classification zone.
This time, they supported their findings with maps prepared by
the NAMRIA. The Republic also followed the proper legal
procedure for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion.
They filed a complaint in court and notified Hachero through
summons. They gaveHachero an opportunity to be heard in
court. For unknown reasons, however, he disregarded the
summons, allowed himself to be declared in default, and
forfeited his right to adduce evidence in his defense.
Prescription and estoppel
cannot lie against the State
Contrary to the observation of the courts below, there is
nothing incomprehensible or puzzling or suspicious about the
complete turnaround made by the DENR after its re-
investigation. The Court has carefully reviewed the records
and found nothing anomalous. ETHIDa

At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the statute

of limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the
State. Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's immunity
from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its
officials and agents. These well-established principles apply in
the case at bench. The Court in Republic v. Roxas elucidated:
It is true that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Act 496, otherwise known as The Land
Registration Act, or Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree,
the certificate of title issued by virtue of said patent has
the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under said
registration laws. We expounded in Ybaez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court that:
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the
one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree of
registration upon which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud
within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an
attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.
The validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be
threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the
purpose.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title
issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding, provided the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land
within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. TIADCc

There is no specific provision in the Public Land

Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration
Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year
period within which the public land patent is open to
review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529,
and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with
indefensibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent
pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal
that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section
32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court
to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly
approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under
the signature of the President of the Philippines in
accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent,
therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the
decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree
finally awards the land applied for registration to the
party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director
of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys
the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is
in consonance with the intent and spirit of the
homestead laws, i.e., conservation of a family home, and
to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation
and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the
title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would
be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has
been given by the Government thru the process of
proceedings in accordance with thePublic Land Law,
there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion
on the government's system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the
Landless" policy of the State. (Emphases ours, citations
omitted.)
Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the
aforequoted case that a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible
after one year, is subject to the proviso that "the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land
within the contemplation of the Public Land Law." As we
have ruled herein, the subject property is part of the
Matchwood Forest Reserve and is inalienable and not
subject to disposition. Being contrary to the Public Land
Law, Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No. P-5885
issued in respondent Roxas's name are void; and the
right of petitioner Republic to seek cancellation of such
void patent/title and reversion of the subject property to
the State is imprescriptible.
 We have addressed the same questions on
indefensibility of title and prescription in Mangotara,
thus:
It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that
despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree
of registration/certificate of title, the State, through the
Solicitor General, may still institute an action for
reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by
fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does
not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
registration of a patent under the Torrens system does
not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant's
already existing one. Verily, registration under the
Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
But then again, the Court had several times in the
past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the
remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to
the land is void for reasons other than having been
secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such case
is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, where the
Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted
a patent to the spouses Morandarte which included a
portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an
action for reversion 10 years after the issuance of an
OCT in the name of the spouses Morandarte. The Court
ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the
officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be
invoked against the government with regard to property
of the public domain. It has been said that the State
cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of
its officials or agents.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title
under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight,
lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain,
the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of
title alone, become the owner of the land or property
illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the
public domain is incapable of registration and its
inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
Another example is the case of Republic of the
Phils. v. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV, in which the
homestead patent issued by the State became null and
void because of the grantee's violation of the conditions
for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even
though the land subject of the patent was already
covered by an OCT and theRepublic availed itself of the
said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action
accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering that the
statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil
Case No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit
brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines as a
sovereign state and, by the express provision of Section
118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or
alienation of a homestead grant within five (5) years from
the issuance of the patent is null and void and constitute
a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State.
In Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that "the
Court below committed no error in ordering the reversion
to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein,
notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of
title based on the patent had been cancelled and another
certificate issued in the names of the grantee heirs.
Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and
possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having
violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the
Court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor,
although the property has already been brought under
the operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the
government to bring an appropriate action for
reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the
Statute of Limitations does not run against the State."
(Italics supplied). The above ruling was reiterated
in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945.
 If the Republic is able to establish after trial and
hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs
in Doa Demetria's name are void for some reason, then
the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels
of land covered by the same because indefeasibility
cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title. . . .
(Citations omitted.) AIDSTE

Neither can respondent Roxas successfully invoke

the doctrine of estoppel against petitioner Republic.
While it is true that respondent Roxas was granted
Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No. P-5885 only
after undergoing appropriate administrative proceedings,
the Government is not now estopped from questioning
the validity of said homestead patent and certificate of
title. It is, after all, hornbook law that the principle of
estoppel does not operate against the Government for
the act of its agents. And while there may be
circumstances when equitable estoppel was applied
against public authorities, i.e., when the Government did
not undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time and the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value, such are not
present in this case. More importantly, we cannot use the
equitable principle of estoppel to defeat the law. Under
the Public Land Act and Presidential Proclamation No.
678 dated February 5, 1941, the subject property is part
of the Matchwood Forest Reserve which is inalienable
and not subject to disposition. 26
[Emphases Supplied; citations omitted]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87267 and
its March 6, 2012 Resolution are REVERSED andSET ASIDE.
Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 in the
name of Amor Hachero are hereby
declared NULL and VOID and CANCELLED.
The subject land is ordered reverted to the public domain
as part of the inalienable timberland.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Hachero, G.R. No. 200973, [May 30, 2016])
 [G.R. No. 186603. April 5, 2017.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION VI,
ILOILO CITY, petitioner, vs. VALENTINA ESPINOSA,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, LEONILA CALISTON, AND SPOUSES
DIOSCORO & ESTRELLA ESCARDA, respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to

nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision 2 and
February 4, 2009 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00421. The CA
modified the May 12, 2004 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
and dismissed the reversion case filed by theRepublic of the
Philippines (State) against respondents Valentina Espinosa and
her successor-in-interest, Leonila B. Caliston, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated May 12, 2004 and Order dated July 16, 2004 are
hereby modified upholding the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 191-N and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 91117, respectively, issued in the names of
Valentina Espinosa and Leonila Caliston. The award of
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in
favor of Leonila Caliston is affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 5

On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was

issued to Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa) in Cadastral Case No.
39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980. It covered a 28,880-square
meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral Record No. 980,
Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental (property). By virtue
of the decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was
issued on October 15, 1962 in the name of Espinosa. 6 On June
17, 1976, Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston
(Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-91117 7 on June 29, 1976. 8
On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint 9 for
annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC,
Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State
claimed that the property is inalienable public land because it
fell within a timberland area indicated under Project No. 27-C,
Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified
by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986. 10
The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses
Escarda) intervened, 11 alleging that they have been occupying
the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the
State. 12 They prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease and
desist from ejecting them. 13 CAIHTE

In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not

timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she argued that
her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that
the property was classified only in 1986. 14 Caliston also
claimed that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or
personality to intervene because only the State may initiate an
action for reversion. She also alleged that the spouses Escarda
cannot claim a better right as against her because she merely
tolerated their occupancy of the property until their refusal to
vacate it. 15 As counterclaim, Caliston claimed for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
against the spouses Escarda for the baseless and malicious
complaint. 16
The RTC rendered a Decision 17 dated May 12, 2004.
Relying on LC Map No. 2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the
State and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of
the public domain, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N in
the name of Valentina Espinosa and all its
derivative titles, such as: TCT No. T-91117 in the
name of Leonila Caliston, null and void ab initio;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. 191-N and TCT N[o].
T-91117 to defendant Register of Deeds for the
Province of Negros Occidental and the latter to
cancel said titles and all their derivative titles,
if any;
3. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by the
aforesaid patent and title to the mass of the
public domain under the administration and
disposition of the Director of Forestry (now
Regional Executive Director, Region VI, Iloilo
City);
4. Declaring that defendant Leonila Caliston has
better right over the subject lot as against
intervenors Spouses Dioscoro and Estrella
Escarda; and
5. Ordering the intervenors to pay defendant Leonila
Caliston the following sums:
a) Not less than P20,000.00 for moral damages;
b) Not less than P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages;
c) Not less than P10,000.00 for attorney's fees,
plus so much appearance fees of
P2,000.00 incurred and/or paid by
answering defendant in connection with
this case; and
d) Not less than P5,000.00 for expenses of
litigation.
 SO ORDERED. 18

Caliston's motion for reconsideration 19 was denied in an

Order 20 dated July 16, 2004. On August 5, 2004, Caliston filed
a Notice of Appeal 21 with the RTC. On the other hand, the
spouses Escarda did not file a notice of appeal. Records were
then forwarded to the CA, where proceedings ensued.
There, Caliston argued that the trial court improperly
relied upon LC Map No. 2978, which was prepared long after
the property was alienated and awarded to Espinosa, her
predecessor-in-interest. The map, the admissibility and
genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used to
defeat the cadastral proceedings presumed to have been
regularly conducted. Even assuming the map can be
considered, Caliston claims that her property is situated in an
area indicated as alienable and disposable. She also reiterated
her defenses of laches and prescription. 22
For its part, the State argued that the lower court did not
err in relying upon LC Map No. 2978 though it was prepared
only in 1986. According to the State, forest lands are incapable
of private appropriation and possession, however long;
prescription does not run against the government. 23
The CA rendered a Decision 24 dated July 25, 2008
modifying the RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of OCT No.
191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names ofEspinosa and
Caliston, respectively, and affirmed the award of damages,
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation in favor of Caliston.
The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa when she was
issued OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the State failed to
prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of
evidence consisting of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the
Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986, was not
authenticated pursuant to Section 24, 25 Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the
existence of the map, but not as to its genuineness or the
truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted
in evidence, Espinosa's rights over the property, which
accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent
classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24
years. 26 The CA cited 27 the case of SAAD Agro-Industries,
Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines. 28
In a Resolution 29 dated February 4, 2009, the CA denied
the State's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue presented is whether the State has
sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable
forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral
decree and issued a title.
We deny the petition.
I
The State failed to prove that the property was classified
as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree
and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It
must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the
land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based
on a positive act of the government. 30 Since cadastral
proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate
of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the
requisite jurisdictional facts that they are entitled to the
claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is
considered. 31 As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment
which adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional
facts. 32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a
cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N,
the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be
presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 33 This
means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by
incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property in the cadastral proceedings. DETACa

This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy

to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable
lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through
an action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the
public domain. 34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations. 35 There are also instances when we granted
reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a "person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is of the public domain." 36
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General,
alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral
proceedings and in the issuance of the title inEspinosa's favor.
The argument for the State is merely that the property was
unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of
the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land
registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the
property was classified as timberland or forest land at the
time it was decreed to Espinosa. 37 To reiterate, there
is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question
is alienable and disposable land. 38 At this stage, it is
reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston
derived her title, had already established that the property is
alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded
in obtaining the OCT over it. 39 In this reversion proceeding,
the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in
the inclusion of the property inEspinosa's title because it was
of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the
burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of
an issue. 40
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of
evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986. The
records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally
offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary
evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the
presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done
orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing. 41 Due process
requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the
adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts. 42 This
gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose
the admissibility of the evidence. 43 When evidence has not
been formally offered, it should not be considered by the court
in arriving at its decision. 44 Not having been offered formally,
it was error for the trial court to have considered the survey
map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of
the property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of
the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted
in evidence, this will not help to further the State's cause. This
is because the only fact proved by the map is one already
admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in
1986. 45 This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion
that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings
conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and
disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in
1962.
II
The reclassification of the area where the property is
located in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her
successor-in-interest. 46 Apropos is the case of Sta. Monica
Industrial and Dev't Corp. v. Court of Appeals. 47 In that case,
the State offered in evidence a land classification map to
prove that at the time the land was decreed to the original
owner, it had not yet been released and still fell within the
forest zone. However, the map did not conclusively state the
actual classification of the land at the time it was adjudicated
to the original owner. We thus ruled that the State failed to
prove that the titles should be annulled
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an
action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The
petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the
proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before
the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when
the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge
Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the
inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case
rested solely on land classification maps drawn several
years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These
maps fail to conclusively establish the actual
classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to
that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said
contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908
proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval
reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land
are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier,
are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in
favor of the decree's regularity, more so when we
consider that notice of the application for registration
and the date of hearing thereof, addressed to the
Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of
Public Works and the Director of Forestry, among others,
was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor
General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes
private rights. 48
aDSIHc

We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the

doctrine that forest lands are outside the commerce of man
and unsusceptible of private appropriation. Neither are we
changing the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for reversion.
We are merely deciding on the facts as proved by the record.
To allow a reversion based on a classification made at the time
when the property was already declared private property by
virtue of a decree would be akin to expropriation of land
without due process of law. 49
At this juncture, we agree with the CA's application
of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., 50 which involved a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free
patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot was
part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted
as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This
map also became the basis of the testimonies of City
Environment and Natural Resources Office officers declaring
that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The
State, however, failed to submit either a certified true copy or
an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to
deny its admission in evidence. After proceedings, the trial
court dismissed the complaint due to the State's failure to
show that the subject lot therein is part of the timberland or
forest reserve or has been classified as such before the
issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA,
relying on the map, reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we
reinstated the trial court's decision. We held that the
photocopy of the land classification map cannot be considered
in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence
rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the Government,
are bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it

The rules of admissibility must be applied

uniformly. The same rule holds true when the
Government is one of the parties. The Government, when
it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must
submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and
privileges at every stage of the proceedings are
substantially in every respect the same as those of its
citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This is so
 because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its
claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle
and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private
parties under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by
the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted
by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the
subject lot is part of the forest reserve. 51
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted
in evidence to prove that the lot was classified as part of the
timberland or forest reserve, the classification was made long
after private interests had intervened. Not only was the lot
already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a
certificate of title were also awarded and issued years ahead
of the classification
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by
respondent is admissible in evidence, still the land in
question can hardly be considered part of the timberland
or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be
the "correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent
forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as
amended" was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation
of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was
awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, private interests have intervened before
classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not
only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the
subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded to
her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In
fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and
certificate of title was regular and in order. Orcullo
complied with the requisites for the acquisition of free
patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
 xxx xxx xxx
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in
the present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and
upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of
the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in applying
this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in
every claim or right by the Government against one of its
citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and
due process must be observed. Respondent in this case
failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or
forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the
uncontroverted status of Free Patent No. 473408 and
OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances,
respondent's insistence on the classification of the lot as
part of the forest reserve must be rejected. 52
These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries,
Inc. undoubtedly apply here. As part of fair play and due
process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of
evidence as much as every private party is. More, the State's
subsequent reclassification of the area where the property is
situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a private
citizen who acquired the land in a valid and regular proceeding
conducted 24 years earlier. ETHIDa

The result would have been different had the State proved
that the property was already classified as part of forest
land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title
was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to
discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it
the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the
alienable character of the property in the cadastral
proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a
subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence,
would amount to taking of private property without just
compensation and due process of law. 53 This, however, is not
what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due process are
paramount considerations that must still be observed. 54
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 25, 2008
Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, [April 5, 2017])