1

The Struggle in Iliomar
Resistance in rural East Timor

Iliomar
Sub-District

Ernest Chamberlain – 2017
2

Preface

Over 400 Iliomar people died violently or disappeared during the 24 years of
Indonesian occupation – Resistance fighters, clandestine members, supporters and villagers
- about 10 percent of the adult population of this remote Sub-District. Up to 100 Indonesian
soldiers and paramilitaries also died in clashes in Iliomar. Material losses were also
significant, with the World Food Program estimating that 90-95 percent of Iliomar’s
infrastructure – public buildings and utilities, was destroyed by the Indonesian security
forces during their withdrawal in September 1999.
This 149,500-word work relates the struggle of the people of Iliomar against the
excesses of Indonesian rule in the period 1975-1999. Important events affecting the
Resistance movement that took place outside Iliomar Sub-District are also covered in some
detail. For background, the earlier Portuguese and World War II periods are also related.
While the monograph concludes with the United Nations-managed independence process
of 2001-2002, some updating data has been included. The first edition of this monograph
was published in 2003 - followed by a Bahasa Indonesia version and subsequent English
versions in 2004 and 2008 that benefited from data in the CAVR Chega Final Report and
liaison with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, particularly in confirming casualties. This
2017 edition has incorporated new material – including on the World War II Japanese
occupation of Iliomar, the 1983 ceasefire, and both Indonesian and Resistance casualties.
I served as a United Nations Volunteer in East Timor, in several appointments, from
mid-1999 to mid-2002 - principally in Iliomar, and later as a ministerial policy advisor in
2004-2005 and with the United Nations Inquiry Commission in 2006. In discussions with
the Iliomar villagers and former Resistance cadre – both “Klandestin” and Falintil, I
became aware of the numerous human rights abuses inflicted on the people of Iliomar
during the Indonesian occupation. I also interviewed several East Timorese who had served
in the Indonesian administration and in ABRI/TNI paramilitary elements.
As yet, there is no comprehensive written history of the Indonesian occupation of
Iliomar – the Resistance kept very few written accounts, and local administrative records
were almost completely destroyed in the Indonesian withdrawal and the violence of
September 1999. Accordingly, the events in Iliomar related in this work are based
principally on about 120 interviews conducted in Iliomar and Lospalos in 2001, 2002,
2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008. While the important contribution of all interviewees is
acknowledged, for confidentiality their personal details have not always been included in
the work – but are recorded separately. In November 2002, October 2003, and in 2005,
2006, and 2008 drafts of the monograph were checked with focus groups of Iliomar
notables in Iliomar. Since 2006, the Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia Timor has also been a
very useful source for research.
Readers may find this monograph somewhat esoteric in its coverage of but one of
the now 65 sub-districts of Timor-Leste. However, the people of Iliomar were keen to have
their struggle recorded and, importantly, to reverently memorialise those killed and
missing. Extensive footnotes have been included to facilitate further research.

Ernie Chamberlain
2017
3

Published in Australia in 2017 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Copyright  Ernest Chamberlain 2017 email - chamber@pipeline.com.au

This monograph is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private
study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be
reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.

Earlier English-language editions of this monograph were published in May 2003, June
2004, and July and October 2008 (ISBN 9780980562309). An Indonesian-language
edition (Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste (ISBN 0-
9750350-1-0) was published in April 2004.
The author has also published the following books on Timor:
Faltering Steps – Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s, 2005
(ISBN 09750035029);
Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010
(ISBN 9780980562323)
Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, 2007 and 2009
(ISBN 9780980562316); and
Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s,
2007, 2008, and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330).

National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry

Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944 –.

The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor.

Bibliography.

ISBN 9780980562309.

1. Iliomar (East Timor) – History – Autonomy and independence movements.
2. Iliomar (East Timor) – Politics and government – 20th century.
3. Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste. I. Title.

Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to
obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have
been inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party
contact the publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be
made at the earliest opportunity.
4

The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor

Table of Contents

Page

Preface

Iliomar – A Profile 7

Early Portuguese Rule 14

World War II 37

The Re-Occupation of Timor 44

Post-War Portuguese Rule 46

Indonesian Invasion and Occupation 60

The 1976 “Muapepeh Purge” Killings 68

ABRI’s Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign 1977-78 76

Encirclement at Matabean 79

Return to Iliomar 82

Fretilin and Falintil Losses 84

Killings of “Klandestin” in Iliomar 87

ABRI Organisation – and Low Levels Entities:
Rukun Tetangga (RT), Rukun Warga (RW), and Ratih 89

Fretilin Reorganises – The CRRN 90

Koramil 03 and “Operation Security” 91

The ABRI View of the Resistance: 1981-82 94

Exile to Ataúro and Aileu 95

“Keluarga Berencana”: Family Planning 96

The Ceasefire – 1983 98

The “Hansip” Killings 108
5

Falintil – The Attempted Putsch of 1984 112

Indonesian Administration Consolidated 113

1985 – The Falintil Attack on Iliomar 114

ABRI and Falintil Deployments and Activity 117

The Falintil Ambush at Ossohira Spring – 21 November 1986 119

Broadening Resistance Support – The Founding of the CNRM 122

The Early 1990s: The Resistance Expands & ABRI’s “Militerisasi” 124

The Decline of the Armed Struggle and the
Growth of the “Klandestin/Clandestina” 127

Elections in Iliomar - 1997, 1998 134

Continuing Violence and Abuses 134

The Organisation of the Resistance:
The CNRT, the Armed and “Klandestin” Wings 135

The Militias 142

Religion and the Church in Iliomar 144

The Rapid Growth of Falintil : 1998-1999 145

1999 – Choice and Consequence in Iliomar 146

Violence and Destruction in Iliomar – September 1999 153

2000 – Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Begins 158

2001 – “Timorization” and the Constituent Assembly Election
of 30 August 160

2002 - The Presidential Election and Independence 162

Reconciliation and Recovery 163

“To Resist is to Win !” 164

--------------------------------------
6

Annexes:

A. Maps :
Distrito de Lautém;
Lautém District – Time and Distance Chart;
Lautém District – Village Boundaries;
Iliomar Sub-District (Map No. 2507-41) 1:25,000 - Extract.

B. Iliomar: Rainfall, Humidity and River Flow Data.

C. Iliomar: Statistics and Notes on Administration.

D. Elomar – WWII Map (Australian Army);

Elomar – Sketch Map: Japanese WWII Garrison.

E. Indonesian Security Forces and Pro-Integration Elements in
Lospalos and Iliomar.

F. Iliomar Falintil and Clandestina/Klandestin.

G. Klandestin in Iliomar – 1997 (An ABRI Listing).

H. “Sketch Map” – Iliomar Destruction, September 1999.

I. Iliomar - Summary of Known Casualties 1975-1999.

J. Lere Anan Timor – Biographical Data.

K. Abílio Quintão Pinto – Biographical Data.

----------------------------------------

Bibliography
7

ILIOMAR – A PROFILE

Location

Iliomar1, one of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste’s (República Democrática
de Timor-Leste - RDTL) 65 Sub-Districts, is located in the southeast of the island – about
46 kilometres by road from the Lautém District capital of Los Palos (also sometimes
“Lospalos”) – which is itself about 215 kilometres by road east from Dili.2

With an area of about 292.3 square kilometres, Iliomar is bounded in the east by
Los Palos Sub-District, in the north by Luro Sub-District, in the northwest by Baguia Sub-
District of Baucau District, in the west by Uato-Carabau (also as “Uato Carbau” and “Watu
Carbau”) Sub-District of Viqueque District, and in the south by the Timor Sea. Iliomar’s
coastline is 28.33 kilometres. Several maps illustrating the above are included at Annex A.

Environment

Iliomar is heavily wooded and quite mountainous - with the major features astride
the main road from Iliomar to Los Palos eg Gunung (Mount) Acadiroloho 728m, Gunung
Naunili 876m, Gunung Punaramato 861m, and Gunung Darabu 638m. The rivers in the
Sub-District flow south into the Timor Sea – from east to west: Sungai (River) Namaluto,

1
“Iliomar” means “house of stone” in the Makalero language – a large rock on Iliomar Hill is in the shape of
a traditional Dagada-style house. Occasionally, Iliomar is confused with Tilomar – a sub-district near the
West Timor border in Cova Lima district. The spellings of place names throughout this monograph accord
with Pinto, A. P., Sobre A Fixaçao Do Número De Sucos Em Território Nacional – Diploma Ministerial No
6/2003, Dili 29 July 2003, with common alternatives shown in brackets.
2
See maps at Annex A. “Los Palos/Lospalos” is a corruption of “Lohoasupala” - a term in the local
Fataluku language for the area. Its meaning is “the garden with the flea-infested fence” – Hull, G., The
Placenames of East Timor, Instituto Nacional de Linguística, Dili. Los Palos is rendered as “Lossi-Pala” in Boletim
Official do Governo do Districto Autonomo de Timor (BOdT), No.27, 3 July 1909, p.1.
8

Sungai Veira/Vieira, Sungai Miaira, Sungai Massoco, Sungai Lihulo (with its tributaries,
Sungai Paifakaver and Sungai Tahmatu), Sungai Cocolai/ Mauma’a, and Sungai Irabere
(which borders Viqueque District to the west and is the only perennial flow).3 Forest areas
include the Naunili forest in the north of the Sub-District, areas to the east towards the
border with Loré region, and the Irabere forest to the west bordering Uato-Carabau Sub-
District. Types of trees include teak (tectona grandis), mahogany (mahoni swetenia
macropila), bamboo, acacias, kenari (canarium amboinense), mataria (pterocarpus
indicus), rupi malai, malahu, amacu, porea akam, tamarind, Ceylon oak (scheichera
oleosa), casuarina pines, and eucalypts.
Estuarine crocodiles (crocodylus porosus) can be found at the mouths of rivers,
principally in the west – but are considered “sacred” and are not hunted.4 Other major fauna
include rusa deer (cervus timorensis), common grey monkey (macacus cynomolgus), turtle,
wild pig, the possum-like cuscus (phalanger), and the palm civet cat (paradoxurus
hermaphroditus) – all of which are hunted. A recent report also suggests that the very rare
tiger cat (felis megalotis) may still exist in the Iliomar/Uato-Carabau border area.5 There
are also bats – including large fruit bats, snakes, a large lizard (varanus timorensis), and the
smaller toqué lizard (platydactilus gottutus).6
The southern coast of East Timor is classified generally as an “Udic” agroclimatic
zone ie, permanently moist for up to four months of the year. In Lautém District, the
climate is hot and humid, with average daily temperatures 24-30 Celsius. There are two
rainy periods: April-June inclusive and November-January inclusive – with annual rainfall
of about 1,500 mm. Monthly rainfall and humidity data is detailed at Annex B. Iliomar lies
within the most malarial of all East Timor’s districts ie, Lautém District, and dengue and
cholera are also common diseases.

The People

Almost all of Iliomar’s population of 7,477 (in 2015)7 lives in the six villages
(“suco”) of the Sub-District: Iliomar I, Iliomar II (Iradarate), Tirilolo, Cainliu, Fuat, and
Ailebere. These villages are comprised of 25 sub-villages (or “aldeia”, or “kampung”) –
see Annex C for a comparative list of administrative terms, the 2001 Survey of Sucos in
Timor Lorosa’e8, detailed population figures, personalities, health, and other statistical
data.
The people – the Makalero9, are of Malayo-Melanesian origin, and their native
language, Makalero - a Trans-New Guinean/Papuan/non-Austronesian language, is the

3
See Annex B for Iliomar Rainfall, Humidity and River Flow Data.
4
The crocodile is prominent in Timor’s creation legend. On 21 December 2003, a man fromTirilolo village
was reportedly killed by a crocodile while fishing in the Irabere River.
5
“Felix megalotis, a tiger cat, said to be peculiar to Timor, where it exists only in the interior. Its nearest
allies are in Java.” – Wallace, A.R., The Malay Archipelago, Chapter 14. Alfred Russel Wallace, the British
explorer and naturalist, visited Portuguese Timor for three and a half months in 1861.
6
For technical detail on geology, environment, population, fauna and resources – see Monk, K.A., The
Ecology of Nusa Tengarra and Maluku, Periplus Editions (HK) Ltd, Singapore, 1997. For birds, see BirdLife
International, Red Data Book , 2003. http://www.rdb.or.id/country.php?op=find&id=24
7
Census 2015 (count date – 2015): 7,477 - 3,615 males and 3862 females (1,488 households). Census 2004
(count date - 11 July 2004): 6,598 - 3,101 males and 3,417 females (1606 houselholds).
8
The Survey of Sucos in Timor Lorosa’e (SSTL) was undertaken in early 2001 by ETTA, the Asian
Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program. For recent
comprehensive detail on all physical and demographic aspects of East Timor see also Pedersen J. and
Arnberg M. (ed), 1 November 1999.
9
Sometimes as “Makalere” or “Maceler”. Makalero means “the people who never tire” – see Fernandes, D.,
“Lero Iliomar ih nia dialeto rasik”, Lero Nian Huno Ulun, Vol I - 2007, Iliomar, 2007, p.3.
9

unique “mother tongue” spoken throughout Iliomar Sub-District – including in the border
area sub-villages of Larimi and Dirimuni.10 The Fataluku language11 is dominant in
neighbouring Los Palos Sub-District; Makassae (with similarities to Makalero) is spoken in
Luro and Baucau Sub-Districts to the north and northwest12; and Nau-eti (of the
Kawaimina linguistic group) is spoken in eastern Viqueque to the west. Many of the
villagers in Viqueque’s eastern Uato-Carabau Sub-District immediately west of the Irabere
River speak both Nau-eti and Makalero. While in Luro Sub-District to Iliomar’s north,
while Makassae is the dominant local language, the people of Upper Luro (Luro, Baricafa
and Cotamuto villages) speak Sa’ane - a dialect that includes both Makalero and Makassae
elements.13
Relations between the Makalero people and the Fataluku people are sometimes
strained as the Makalero believe they are discriminated against by the more numerous
Fataluku who occupy the area of the District capital, Los Palos and dominate local public
administration. There are sizeable communities of Makalero-speakers in the villages of
Sawarica and Natura in Los Palos.Relations with the Makassae-speaking people to the
north and northwest and the Naueti to the west are more cordial.14 Ethnically and culturally,
the Iliomar population is very homogeneous – during electoral registration in 2001, very
few adults were noted as having been born outside Lautém District, and only one voter was
noted as having been born outside Timor.15 As with other East Timorese, almost all the
people of Iliomar have Portuguese-style baptismal names eg João Luís da Costa, with only
a very small number using Timorese names. Resistance fighters and members of the

10
On language see Hull, G., “The Languages of East Timor 1772-1997 …” noting p.4 which classifies
Makalero as a dialect within Makassae; and Valentim, J., “Fataluku Language in Lautem”, Dili, 15 August
2001. See also Himmelmann N. and Hajek J., “A Report … Lautém (East Timor)”, Sydney, 2001 which
briefly mentions the Makalero language. The map at p. 4 of Fox, J.J. & Soares, D.B. (eds), Out Of The Ashes
…, 2000 incorrectly shows Iliomar as “Naumic”-speaking. “Naumic” (ie “Nau-eti/Midic”) is a term for
languages spoken in eastern Viqueque – see Correa, A.A., 1944. About 80 percent of Iliomar’s population is
competent in Tetum (also as “Tetun”), about 65 percent in Bahasa Indonesia, and less than 5 percent in
Portuguese (but increasing) - author’s 2003 estimates. Timor-Leste’s 2002 Constitution declaresTetum and
Portuguese as “official languages” (para 13) and Indonesian and English as “working languages … for as
long as regarded as necessary” (para 159). In early 2007, Juliette Huber began a PhD thesis on the Makalero
language at Leiden University, Netherlands – and completed five months fieldwork in Iliomar in 2007. See:
Huber, J., A grammar of Makalero: A Papuan language of East Timor, LOT – Trans 10, Utrecht – The
Netherlands, 2011 (673 pages) – p.16 : “The bulk of the Makalero vocabulary is non-Austronesian … this is
the main reason for its classification as a Papuan language.”
11
Fataluku – a non-Austronesian language, and Makalero are reportedly related – see the Fataluku Language
Project: http://www.fataluku.com/
12
In September 2002, a very minor border dispute arose in the area of Dirimuni sub-village on Iliomar’s
northern border between the neighbouring Iliomar and Luro Sub-District peoples, with Iliomar claiming
encroachment into their Sub-District. The dispute was settled with the assistance of the UN civilian police
and a “sumpah perbatasan” (border oath) enacted between the disputing parties.
13
See Simpson, R & Wei Sun (eds), Profile of Lautém District – March 2002. Correa, A.A. , 1944, p.110 also
notes the “Sa-Ano” language in Luro Sub-District.
14
On 22 September 2003, a meeting and market area (“mini-mercado”) was inaugurated in a field in the
remote border area at Dirinu on the eastern edge of the Modomau Plain (west of Larimi, just inside Iliomar
Sub-District) by the Sub-District Administrators of Iliomar, Watu-Carbau and Baguia to consolidate and
further develop relations between their peoples.
15
According to Indonesian documents, there were no transmigrants in Lautém District – see 20 Tahun
Membangun Timor Timur, 1996, pp.284-285. However, a 1997 ABRI report (Suseno, Situasi Dan Kondisi:
Daerah Pos Desa Illiomar (JUATA), Iliomar, November 1997, p.1) noted the Iliomar inhabitants included
“newcomers” - “Bugis, Javanese, and Balinese”, probably “spontaneous” – ie non-official migrants. For a
discussion of transmigration to Timor see Aditjondro, G.J., 4 October 1995; November 1996; and
Menyongsong Matahari …, 2000, pp. 57-74. The one “outsider” noted living in Iliomar by the author during
the 2001 electoral registration process was a male born in Roti (Indonesia), married to a local Iliomar woman.
10

clandestine underground also have code-names ie, nom de guerre – almost all in a
Timorese language eg from Iliomar: Lere Anan Timur (Tito Cristovão da Costa), Serasa
(Orlando Jerónimo), Abut Mesak (Abílio Quintão Pinto).
The most widely used identification document during the Indonesian occupation
period was the Karta Tanda Penduduk – KTP (Citizen’s Identity Card) - which was
replaced by the “civil registration card”, initially issued by UNTAET16, in early 2001 and
by the kartu eleitoral issued in 2007.

Society

Iliomar society, although “modernised” during the Portuguese and Indonesian
periods, still retains important traditional social relationships ie, a “raja” family line is
acknowledged; a customary (“adat”17) leader settles many disputes (in 2004, the village
head of Iliomar II, Felipe Pinto); and clan (“warga”) and kinship relationships are strong –
of the 42 clans in the Sub-District (listed in Annex C), the strongest and most influential is
the “Uae-Falun” (or “Iliomar”), followed by the Lorasa, and Dirimuni. Makalero society is
patriarchal, with a bride-price (“betis”/ “balarque”) paid to the bride’s family.18
In Los Palos town, several Iliomar families live in groups in the two sub-villages of
Natura and Savarika, forming small Makalero communities. Several hundred people from
Iliomar live in Dili – principally in the Becora area.19 A number of Iliomar youth attending
senior high school and university also live in a large boarding house (“losmen”) in Jalan
Katedral, Vila Verde.20
Education in the Sub-District comprises a Junior High School (SMPK) within
Iliomar Town21 with about 240 students (2002); and seven primary schools (Iliomar I – 375
students, Tirilolo - 325, Cainliu - 183, Iradarate - 202, Caidabu - 140, Bubutau - 35, and
Larimi - 83) with a total population of about 1,350 students.
The people are engaged almost wholly in subsistence agriculture - growing rice,
corn, and vegetables.22 Iliomar has extensive coconut farms, and copra was an important
cash crop23, but has yet to be fully re-established after the violence and disruption of

16
UNTAET- UN Transitional Authority in East Timor: 29 October 1999-19 May 2002.
17
Iliomar’s customary law – “adat”, is reviewed in: Sumardjono, M. S. W. Dr, Report on Research Into Adat
Land Law of East Timor, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, February 1995. The article cites a “Manuel
Verissimo” - a luirai in Los Palos, as the authority on the adat law of “Iliomar (Los Palos)”. However, the
author (Chamberlain) has discussed the article with Iliomar leaders and elders, and they considered much of
the article was incorrect – in particular its description of adat land law.
18
For a comprehensive description of “wife-giving” and “wife-taking” practices in Makassae society (mid-
1970s study) see Forman, S., “Descent, Alliance and Exchange Ideology …”, in The Flow of Life …, 1980.
19
During the serious Loromuno (West) versus Lorosa’e (Eastern) unrest and violence in early 2006, most
Iliomar families in Dili were forced to leave their homes and move to “internal displacement” camps in Dili
and Metinaro – or return to Lautém District. Many remained in the camps until late 2008.
20
The losmen was burnt out by Loromuno youth gangs during the “East v West” violence of early 2006 and
only re-occupied in late October 2008.
21
“Iliomar Town” (“Kota”/Town, or the Bahasa administrative term: “Kecamatan”) is a term commonly
used for the area of the Iliomar Sub-District administrative offices and the adjacent areas of Iliomar I, Fuat,
and Ailebere villages.
22
Before the conflict of 1999, annual per capita consumption of milled rice in East Timor was about 50 kg
and that of maize, 139 kg. However, this was not a preference for maize, but due to insufficient availability of
rice. By late 2001, annual per capita consumption of rice was estimated at 95 kg – of which about 40 percent
was imported. For a history of Timorese agriculture, see Fox, J. J., “Drawing from the past …”, October
2002.
23
Coconut production grew significantly in East Timor from 19,009 hectares under production in 1977 to
48,203 hectares in 1983 – Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor, Zed Books,
London, 1984., p.107. However, by 1994 only 47,780 hectares were under cultivation, having peaked at
11

September 1999. Only 526.5 hectares of arable land are cultivated (2002 figures), and
considerable agricultural land is idle. Rice is planted in January and harvested in
April/May; and on the southern coast at Irabere, a second crop is possible - planted in
April/May for harvest in August/ September. Corn (maize) is planted in January for the
April harvest, and in June for the August harvest. Rats are a major crop pest for both corn
and rice, and the brown beetle (oryctos rhinocerosus) can attack young coconut plants.
Other crops cultivated include “kemiri” (candle nut - an oil seed from a tree)24, the areca
nut (pinang), and the lontar palm (borassus sundaicus). Despite a long coastline, very little
fishing is undertaken due to the rough seas breaking onto coral reefs close to shore25.
Livestock includes water buffalo, cattle – principally the antelope-like Bali cattle (bos
javanicus) that were derived from the wild banteng (bos sundaicus), horses – the Timor
pony (equus caballus asiaticus - up to about 13 hands in height), pigs, goats, and chicken.
Buffalo are not usually kept in the villages, but in the fringe areas and jungle and are tended
by herdsmen. Doves are also raised for food in family dovecotes.
Women weave traditional cloth – “tais” which is worn as skirts, dresses and cloaks.
Almost all men carry a machete – “katana”; and the principal recreation of male villagers is
“adu ayam” (cock-fighting), with the main matches on Thursday and Sunday afternoons
drawing large attendances and involving spirited gambling. Older women chew betel nut
(“sirih”). Locally-made palm wine (tuak, from the lontar palm) is served at significant
social events such as weddings and mourning ceremonies, but public drunkenness is quite
uncommon. While there is very little crime, domestic violence against women remains a
problem.26 Football (soccer), volleyball and basketball are popular with youth – a concrete
basketball court was built in Iliomar Town in early 2002. Dogs are kept by most
households, and some are used occasionally for hunting. Domestic cats are rare and are
more highly prized. Most of the houses in the villages are still thatched in the “Amarasi”
style27, but with increasing numbers of metal-roofed houses in the Iliomar Town area. Very
few villagers now live in traditional “stilt” houses (ie, “uma Lautém”/“Dagada” style), but
several can be found – including “sacred” houses (“uma lulik”), often near village or sub-
village meeting halls (“uma laku”/“balai kampung”).
A Sub-District market operates on Thursday and Sunday mornings in Iliomar Town
centred on a purpose-built open market building – refurbished in 2003 and 2007. The
principal items sold are vegetables – eg corn, cassava, sweet potato; fruit; areca/betel;
tobacco; and “paun” (bread rolls). Iliomar has two shops (in Iliomar Town) and several
kiosks that sell a range of essential items and basic foodstuffs. Until destroyed in 1999, a
KUD (“Koporasi Unit Desa” – Village Cooperative Shop) and the “Toko Cina” (Chinese
Shop – which also managed the copra trade28) were the principal commercial activities in
Iliomar.

55,092 hectares in 1992. In late 2003, a local merchant in Iliomar purchased copra from growers at 10 cents
per kilo. Iliomar agricultural information and statistics are at Annex C.
24
Oil from candle nut – aleurites moluccana, is used as a spice in cooking, and for soap, candles, lamps, and
as an ingredient in shampoo and other cosmetics.
25
The Timor Sea off the southern coast is referred to in Tetum as “Taci-Mane” ie the “man-sea”, while the
more sheltered and placid waters off the northern coast are called “Tace-Feto” ie the “woman-sea”.
26
Disputes over land tenure/ownership are not uncommon. On the night of 30 March 2002, a safe (containing
about USD 13,000 for CEP road-work wages) was stolen from the Iliomar Sub-District police station – the
safe was recovered, damaged but unopened, on Hilomar Hill 1.5 km west of Ailebere on 31 March.
27
Roofed with coconut palms and covered with waterproof sago stems (“tali hitam”), and with walls of sago
stalks (“bebak”). Such houses average about 10 square metres with an external kitchen area. Traditional
Iliomar/Makalero houses are described, including dimensions in Fernandes, D., “Uma Tradisional Lero
Iliomar”, Lero Nian Huno Ulun, Vol I - 2007, Iliomar, 2007, p.4.
28
The Toko Cina (Chinese Shop) was owned by Fernando Lay, whose family had operated commercially in
Iliomar since 1963 when Fernando’s father, Fu Chen, established a “cantina” (small shop). The Lay family,
12

Infrastructure

The 46 kilometre Los Palos-Iliomar road (Link A08-03) was sealed in 1985-86, but
began to fall into disrepair in the early 1990s. In late 2000 and in mid-2001, heavy rains
destroyed several large sections of the road, and direct vehicle movement was not possible
for several months29. The Los Palos-Iliomar road was repaired and upgraded in 2005-2006,
but the 46 km journey by four-wheel vehicle takes about 1 hour 30 minutes. The heavy
rains of late 2000/mid-2001 also destroyed two large bridges over the Paifakaver and
Tahmatu tributaries of the Lihulo River limiting vehicle access westward to Tirilolo. A
Portuguese-era road from Iliomar II/Iradarate eastwards along the coast through Loré to
Los Palos (about 53 kilometres) has not been trafficable for several years due to collapsed
bridges over several rivers and streams. The road westward along the south coast from
Iliomar through to Uato-Carabau is driveable, but for several years had been dependent on
fording the Lihulo River (its bridge was damaged badly and unusable in late 2001), the
Cocolai/Mauma’a River (no bridge) and the Irabere River on the Uato-Carabau/Iliomar
border. A bridge over the Irabere was begun in the mid-1990s by Indonesian engineers –
but while the concrete supports were completed, the project was abandoned in mid-1999. In
October 2007, a major project to bridge the Irabere (220m span) was commenced – with
smaller bridges eastward in Iliomar to cross the Cocolai/Mauma’a (120m span) and the
Lihulo (45m span). The bridges were completed in October 2008 – together with bridges to
west over the Wekain River (Uato-Carabau) and the Bebui River (Uatolari). The bridge
over the Irabere is located several kilometres upstream (ie north) from the incomplete
Indonesian-era bridge and former fording site, and the coast road has been diverted inland
through the Dirinu area.
A mini-bus (microlet) and truck service carries passengers to/from Los Palos
several times a day, with a one-way trip priced at USD 3 (2008) – plus USD 1 for the
carriage of a 50 kg bag of rice (the bus trip from Los Palos to Dili was USD 16 return -
2008). There are few privately-owned vehicles in Iliomar: only two trucks and five motor
cycles (in 2003) – ie about the same number as in 1997. There is only one government-
owned vehicle in the Sub-District, the Administrator’s motor cycle. The football field in
Iliomar Town adjacent to the Iliomar Primary School functions occasionally as a helicopter
landing zone – used solely by the United Nations mid-1999-2002.30 In 2002, a postal box
was set up at the Iliomar Sub-District office and another near the landing zone, but this
service was only used briefly – and, as at October 2008, a postal service to Iliomar had yet
to be established.
According to Human Rights Watch reports in 2000 and 200231, there was “no
evidence of the use of anti-personnel mines” in East Timor, and the country was considered
as “apparently not affected” by land mines, but “there have been problems with unexploded
ordnance”. In mid-2004, the Timor-Leste Government reported that Falintil had no mines
to use against Indonesian forces during the Struggle, and the Government was “peremptory
in affirming that both the Timorese and Indonesian sides did not use any kind of mines

of Chinese Kek (Hakka) ethnicity, had come to East Timor from Macao several generations earlier – see
footnotes 114 and 138 for the Lay clan’s early activities in Lautém.
29
Republic of Korea (ROK) 3rd Battalion repaired a 497 metre section north of Caidabu in the period 24
November 2000-14 April 2001. The ROK battalions successively deployed to Lautém were Special Forces.
30
The other helicopter landing zone (LZ) occasionally used by the UN was at Iliomar II (S 08.44.30 E
126.51.51). Other listed temporary LZ were at Cainliu (S 08.41.30 E 126.49.38); Boropai, west of Tirilolo
(GR BK 575 386); and Iliomar I sub-village, Iradarate (GR BK 646 336).
31
Human Rights Watch, Landmine Monitor Report 2000 – Indonesia; and Landmine Monitor Report 2002 –
East Timor.
13

during more than 24 years of conflict. UN military observers also reiterated that the
presence of any kind of mines in the territory of Timor-Leste was never found or reported.
Further, it has been reported that ‘no mine-kind artifact was ever used or stockpiled by the
Portuguese before the Indonesian invasion … Accordingly, this country is free from the
danger of anti-personnel landmines”.32 However, while no incidents have been reported,
there may be some small risk of unexploded military ordnance eg mortar rounds, rockets,
bombs or grenades in remote jungle areas of Iliomar Sub-District – including items dating
back to WWII33
Destroyed in the September 1999 post-referendum violence, the electricity
generation station was re-established in May 2002 with two 50 KVA diesel-powered
generators by a Japanese aid agency. However, as neither poles nor power lines had been
provided for reticulation, connection to houses only commenced in August 2003. In
October 2003, 110 households were connected, with plans to service the Iliomar Town area
(Ailebere north to the Junior High School) and subsequently Cainliu village. However, the
power supply has been intermittent due to fuel shortages and repairs to the generators.
From 2000, power for the the Sub-District and police offices – collocated until October
2008, was provided by two smaller generators.
The Sub-District Health Centre (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat - Puskesmas) -
destroyed by the withdrawing Indonesian troops in September 1999, was rebuilt in mid-
2002. Two Health Sub-Centres were not damaged (in Tirilolo and Iliomar II villages), but
were not equipped or manned (late 2003). The several small Indonesian-era Village Health
Posts (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu - Posyandu) are inactive.
Until the post-referendum destruction in September 1999, a telephone service
operated from the Sub-District office to Los Palos. A UN-installed and sponsored radio and
radio-telephone link operated from the Sub-District/Police offices (2001- late 2003), and
international telephone calls were possible – but with frequent “outages”. The Iliomar Sub-
District office is linked into the Government telephone service – ie 331 2210 Extension
7178. There is no mobile phone reception in the Iliomar Sub-District (as at October 2008) –
reception is only available within a 10 kilometre radius of Los Palos Town. The six large
private “parabola” TV antennae in Iliomar were destroyed in September 1999 and the 10
public televisions removed – and, although systems were provided to village chiefs by the
UN in 2001, none were operating in November 2003 due to the lack of electrical power.
Radio reception from Los Palos ie, Radio Timor Leste (RTL) 97.1 Mhz FM and Radio
Comunidade Los Palos (RCL) 100.1 Mhz FM), is very weak and intermittent in Iliomar
due to the masking effect of the mountainous terrain.

Administration

From Independence in May 2002, Iliomar has been administered by a resident
official of the Timor-Leste Government ie, the Sub-District Administrator34, from the UN-

32
Human Rights Watch, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Timor-Leste, 28 February 2005 – citing the RDTL
Government’s “Transparency Report” (Form A) dated 22 June 2004. However, several former ABRI soldiers
at the Seroja Veterans Home in Bekasi (Jakarta) claim to have been severely injured by land mines in the
mid-late 1970s during operations in the Liquiçá and Aileu areas – Sujayanto, G., Intisari, November 1999.
Also Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.5, para 7.5 includes a claim that civilians were injured by an
ABRI mine in Aileu. INTERFET troops reportedly found “landmine casings” at the Indonesian military
airfield at Baucau in early October 1999: AFP, “Peacekeepers Find Napalm Bombs”, 7 October 1999.
33
In 2000, UN Peace Keeping Force (PKF) soldiers were killed and injured by unexploded munitions at
Cristo Rei beach immediately east of Dili, the site of a former military firing range. In October 2002, an
unexploded mortar shell was found and disarmed in Viqueque District.
34
Abílio Quintão Pinto since early 2003.
14

refurbished former Indonesian government offices in Iliomar Town. The Sub-District
police office, manned by 14 National Police of Timor Leste, was collocated within this
Sub-District administrative building until late October 2008 when the Administrator and
his staff moved to occupy the refurbished Portuguese-era building directly opposite.
Lautém District was the first District to assume complete security and law
enforcement responsibility from the United Nations – with the East Timor Defence Force
assuming military responsibilities on 23 July 2002 and the National Police assuming full
police functions on 3 April 2003.
In Iliomar, elections for the positions of village chief (six) and sub-village chief
(25) were held in March 2005 – together with elections for Concelhos do Sucos (Village
Councils). Elections scheduled for 2008 were deferred by the Government. Statistics and
detailed notes on administration can be found at Annex C.

EARLY PORTUGUESE RULE

The earliest foreign traders to Timor were Chinese, Indian, Javanese and
Makassarese whose principal interest was acquiring the aromatic sandalwood (santalum
album) used for incense sticks, fans, perfumes, fine furniture, and coffins.35 A Chinese
annal of 1436, the Hsing-ch’a Shêng-lan, related the 12 ports in Kih-ri Ti-mun (Timor)
from which their traders acquired sandalwood.36 Another Chinese account of 1618, the
Tung Hsi Yang Kau, also described the Island, noting that the Timorese did not have family
names, and had neither a writing system nor calendar.37
European explorers and traders began visiting the southeast coast of Timor from
the early 1500s.38 A Dutch sailing chart39 of circa 1695 – see below, shows an area on the
coast west of the present-day Iliomar II village as “Liyoma”.

35
See Ormeling, F.J., The Timor Problem, 1955 for detail on the sandalwood trade, principally in western
Timor.
36
Groeneveldt, W.P., Historical Notes … from Chinese Sources, 1877, p.116.
37
Ibid. See also Kwartanada, D., Middlemen Minority in an Isolated Outpost, 2002,
http://www.wiaps.waseda.ac.jp/user/goto/pro/didi.pdf.
38
See Fox, J.J. & Soares D.B. (eds), Out Of The Ashes …, 2000, pp.6-7 including Duarte Barbosa’s account
written in 1518.
39
De Graaff, I., Kaart van Timor …, National Archive, Amsterdam, c. 1695. This map also shows the
“Hooglandt” (“Highlands”) in northern Lautém ie the Lautém plateau.
15

Sandalwood trading was also noted a little further west on the Viqueque coast in
1703.40 Reportedly, the earliest known European presence in Lautém District was a small
Portuguese trading fort near Loré 1 on the south coast (22 kilometres south of Los Palos)
dating probably from the mid-1700s.41
While little historical detail is available, the tribes of Iliomar were animist42 when
first contacted by the Portuguese in the 1800s. The Makalero people had traditionally been
ruled by local rajas (kings) and chieftains (“liurais”) through a system of tribes and clans.
Beneath “liurai” were “suco” (ethnic groups) ruling several “povoação” (hamlets)43.
However, the Makalero cultural organisation was not as hierarchical as that of the Tetun or
Fataluku-speaking peoples. The Makalero system of formal leadership consisted only of a
village chieftain, termed “d’ai” (equivalent to liurai), and a deputy, termed “baino”.
According to Iliomar elders, the Makalero people moved eastwards through the
Viqueque area into southern Iliomar several centuries ago, settling on the southern coast in
the area of Samaliu (about 10 kilometres east of the Irabere River) centred on an area that
they call “Alfanik” – a site on the southern coast shown on World War II-era maps as
Elomar about 8 kilometres west of present-day Iliomar II village.44 An early leader, Metaili,
reportedly won a war against a fellow Makalero sub-group, the “Beuliu”45, in the Irabere
area and established the borders of a new Makalero kingdom.
The elders relate that Portuguese and Dutch vessels anchored off the Irabere area in
southwest Iliomar and traded with the villagers - probably in the anchorage area off Elomar
– see Annex D46, about one kilometre east of the Cocolai River. “Liyoma” on the Dutch
sailing chart of 1695 (on the previous page) possibly represents Elomar.
In the early 18th century, to establish alliances, the Portuguese granted honorific
military ranks to traditional Timorese rulers: liurais were colonels; their deputies,
lieutenant colonels; suco chiefs were majors or captains; and some povoação heads were
granted lieutenant or second lieutenant rank.47 Later, the rank of brigadier was also
introduced, but this system of ranks was not introduced to the Iliomar region until
considerably later – probably in the very late 19th century or very early 20th century.
It is unclear which early Timorese kingdom (“reino”) covered the area of the
Makalero people in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. As noted earlier, the Dutch sailing
chart of 1695 shows “Liyoma” (Elomar ? ) - and slightly further west along the southern
40
Matos, A.T., Timor Português – 1515-1769, 1974, p.154.
41
Simpson, R. & Wei Sun (eds), Profile of Lautém District – March 2002.
42
Missionaries first visited Iliomar in 1933, and burial practices were “Christian-ised” from that time – see
Fernandes, D., “Ceremonia Tradisional Hakoi Mate”, Lero Nian Huno Ulun, Vol I - 2007, Iliomar, 2007,
p.5.
43
Saldanha, J.M. de Sousa, The Political Economy of East Timor Development, Pustaka Sinar Harapan,
Jakarta, 1994, pp.43-46.
44
Jones, S., Report of the Track from Uato Carabau to Ilomar via the Anchorage of Tiro-Liu, 11 September
1942 - provides a brief description of Elomar (Australian War Memorial AWM 54, 571/4/19). Note: the
“Jones’ reports” consider Tiro-Liu and Elomar as one location. Terrain Study No 50: Area Study of
Portuguese Timor, 1943 notes “seven native huts” at Elomar and provides a small scale map of the area (Map
28, compiled 7 October 1942) – included in this monograph as Annex D. Elomar was described as five
kilometres west of Cape Oca Ona, a four-five fathom anchorage, with two pillars on a bearing of 026 degrees.
The Wai River was 6.5 kilometres to the west of Elomar.
45
See later discussion of “Bualio”, “Bualui”, “Bualeu” and “Barliu” at footnotes 60, 64, 68, 73, 97, 98 and
107.
46
As noted above, the Elomar anchorage is shown at Annex D – an Australian World War II (WWII) sketch
map. During the pre-WW II Portuguese administration, the entrance to the anchorage was marked by two
white stone pillars on the shore and had a depth of 8-9 metres. Elomar was an active village up to, and during,
WW II. During the War, a Japanese platoon-sized military encampment was established at Elomar.
47
Saldanha, J.M., The Political Economy …, 1994, p.46.
16

coast: “Mayloo”, “Loolockon”, “Iridu”, “Lidroes” (?), and “Mataruaf”. A listing of reinos
in 1701 included the following reinos on eastern end of the island: Fatoro, Sarão and
Matafurra.48 In 1726, the Portuguese listed their trading interests with the reinos in the
eastern part of Timor, naming Sarau, Mattarufa, Faturó, Bibiluto, Viqueque, and Vimasse
(sic).49 A Portuguese listing of principal reinos in 1733 included Saráo, Faturó, Vemasse,
Lalea, Maturufa, Bibiluto, Luca and Viqueque as reinos on the eastern part of the Island
trading with the then Portuguese centre at Lifáo (in present-day Oecusse).50 A Dutch report
of 1756 on Timor listed 16 dependencies of the “grand kingdom of Belo” in now Timor-
Leste, but none can, with certainty, be ascribed to the area of Iliomar – although the
kingdom of “Laymea”, while not specifically located, might possibly be a reference to
Elomar.51

Dutch Map - 179852

In 1815, a listing by the Governor’s Secretariat in Dili of 55 “Reinos e Reis” – with
military ranks of the reis, included: Sarau (Colonel D. Álvaro Dovtel), Faturó (Colonel D.
Balthezar da Rosa), Viqueque (Brigadier D. António da Costa), and Bibiluto (D. Isabel da
Carvalho da Silva). Matarufa/Maturufa was not listed.53 In November 1818, the French
explorer, Louis de Freycinet visited Timor (principally Kupang and Dili) and related that

48
Morais, A. Faria de, Subsidios para a história de Timor, Tipografia Rangel, Bastorá, 1934.
49
Castro, A. de (Governor 1859-1863), As possessões Portuguezas na Oceania, 1867, p. 202.
50
Ibid – in “Documento B” at pp.227-228. Pressured by the Topasses, the Portuguese moved their capital
from Lifáo/Lifau to Dili in 1769.
51
The “Contract of Paravicini” by Johannes Andreas Paravicini in Stapel, F.W., Corps diplomaticum:
Neerlando-Indicum, pp. 88-89; see also Fox, J.J. & Soares D.B. (eds), Out Of The Ashes …, 2000, pp. 12-13.
52
Laurie, R. & Whittle J., A New Chart of the Eastern Straits, or the Straits to the East of Java (cartographic
material): with a part of the Banda Sea, 12 October 1798. Map RM 1426.
53
Loureiro, M.J. Gomes, Memorias dos estabelecimentos portuguezas a l’este do Cabo da Boa Esperança,
Na Typographia De Filippe Nery, Lisboa, 1835, pp. 234-235.
17

the “Province of Bellos” (Belu) covering eastern Timor included 56 reinos (kingdoms).
East of present-day Baucau, these reinos were listed as Venilale, Viqueque, Louka (sic),
Laga, Bibilouto (south of present-day Laga), Fataro (sic - in the area of present-day Baguia)
and Saro (sic) on the northern coast in the area of present-day Lautém village.54 On the
northern coast, the Portuguese began building a fort at Lautém in 1851 – initially in
response to a major attack by Buginese pirates in the Sama (in the Daudere/Afabulo) area
of Lautém in 1847-4855, and as a permanent presence during the subsequent Portuguese
military action against the reinos of Sarau and Faturó in 1851.56
In 1862, the Portuguese administratively divided Portuguese Timor into 11 districts
– each encompassing a number of reinos. The “4th District” comprised three reinos: Faturó,
Sarau, and Matarufa; and the “5th District” comprised: Bibiluto, Viqueque, Luca, Lacluta
and Dilor, and Bibico-Barique.57 In 1865, an article noted that, outside Dili, there were
tranqueiras (forts) at “Manatuto, Batugadé, Matarrufa and Lautém in the reino of Sarão”.58
An 1867 Portuguese listing of 49 reinos in Portuguese Timor included Vemasse, Venilale,
Viqueque, Luca, Laga, Bibiluto, Faturó, and Sarau in the eastern half of Portuguese Timor
and noted the reinos within the “4tth” “District of Lautém” as Faturó, Sarau, and Matarufa.59
That Portuguese document also included a map (see the following page) showing the reino
of Faturó centred south of present-day Laivai, Sarau on the coast in the vicinity of present-
day Serelau, Matarufa in the area of present-day Luro, and Vessoro and Bibiluto on the
coast south of present-day Viqueque town. The map also indicates “lesser” reinos of
Cararel in the location of present-day Cacaven village, Bualeu east of Loré, and Loiquero
near Tutuala.60
After a revolt by the reino of Vemasse in 1867 was suppressed by the Portuguese,
the independent reinos of Faturó and Sarau were noted as pledging allegiance to the
Portuguese.61
In mid-March 1874, D. Bernardo Cardoso – the king of the reino of Bibiluco with
the rank of colonel, took a formal oath of vassalage before the Governor in Dili.62 In late
54
Freycinet, L. de, Voyage autour du monde …, Paris, 1827, pp. 553-554. The author of this monograph has
extrapolated the reino locations above from Freycinet’s listing of the latitudes and longitudes of those
kingdoms – and corrected for magnetic declination.
55
Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, Livros do Oriente, Macau, 1999, p. 56.
56
For a scientific analysis of the causes of insurgencies (18 th-21st centuries) see Dexter, P., Historical
Analysis of Population Reactions to Stimuli – A Case Study of East Timor, DSTO-TR-1553, 2004 – available
on the Internet.
57
Oliveira, L., Timor na História de Portugal - Volume II, Agência Geral Do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1950, pp.58-
63. The Cabeça do Distrito of the 4th District was “Lautém”. These divisions were formally promulgated on 4
April 1863. Oliveira’s source is probably Governor Affonso de Castro’s 1867 publication cited in the footnote
below. Note that Ministry of State Administration, Final Report – Timor-Leste Local Government Options
Study, Dili, 2003, p.38 claims ten districts were formed.
58
D’Oliveira, J.B., Um Desembarque em Timor (1865), Annaes do Club Militar Naval, Vol XXXIII, No 7-8,
Julho-Agosto -1903, p.389.
59
Castro, A. de, As possessões Portuguezas na Oceania, 1867, p. 314, p. 457 – note Matarufa is not included
in the 49 reinos listed at p. 314 (possibly replaced by Bibico), but Matarufa is included in the reinos listed in
the table at p. 457 as within the 4th District of Lautém. The 5th District of Vequeque (sic) contained the reinos
of Bibiluto; Vequeque (sic); Luca; Laculuta, Dilor; and Bibissuco, Barique. Apart from minor spelling
differences, these listings of the 4th and 5th Districts are as in Timor na História de Portugal, 1950 at footnote
57 above. For the 1867 listing of reinos on the Internet, see also
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Rotunda/2209/East_Timor.html#(3) and
http://www.fitini.net/udttimor/tim-rein.html
60
A similar, but less detailed map – “Reinos (chieftaincies) in Timor in the late nineteenth century”, can be
found at p.55 (figure 40) in Durand, F. B., East Timor: A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific –
A Geo-historical Atlas, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2006. This map also indicates the population sizes of
the reinos. See also maps in Durand, F.B., History of Timor-Leste, 2016, Silkworm, Chiang Mai, pp.41-86.
61
Castro, A. de, As possessões …, 1867; or Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, p.86.
18

1882, a visiting Scottish anthropologist noted that Dagada was spoken in Lalea, Faturó and
Sarau – and Meadik was spoken in Faturó, Luga (Laga ?) and Sarau.63

A. de Castro map of 1867

In 1884, the capital of Bibiluto was noted as at Barique and its subordinate sucos
were Macuco and Belete with further jurisdiction over Hilomar (on the coast with a “port”
and “good conditions”) and Bualio.64 Hilomar (possibly Elomar) and Bualio may have
been Makalero inhabited areas. Bibiluto had a population of 8,044 with 1,338 head of
livestock – and an active volcano, Raisute65, was noted about one kilometre from the coast.
The people of Bibiluto spoke three dialects: Tetu, Lacale and Safene-olo. In the previous
year, 1883, a report66 had briefly described the most eastern reinos of Faturó, Sarau and
Matarufa noting that “three quarters of the people do not recognise the authority of the
régulos or the government, but live in complete independence and are always engaged in
wars and disorder with each other. Their dialects are Dagadá and Meadique.” While Sarau
and Faturó paid annual tribute (finta), “Matarufa did not pay and lived in complete
disobedience.”
There was very little permanent Portuguese presence outside Dili until the late
1880s with the Portuguese continuing to rule through the major local chiefs. In the east, the
Portuguese undertook military action in the reino of Lautém against Faturó and Sarau in

62
Boletim da Provincia de Macau e Timor, XX (21):83, 23 May 1874 – similar oaths were taken by D.
Bernado Cardoso in 1877 and 1881 (as recorded in subsequent Boletims).
63
Forbes, H.O., “On some of the Tribes of the Island of Timor”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol XIII, London, 1884, p.405.
64
Vaquinhas, J. dos Santos, “Timor”, O Macaense, III (126):119, XV, Macau, 11 September 1884. A
separate Reino de Barique was noted. Hilomar comprised two sucos: Bunacouce and Alebere (cf present-day
Ailebere ?).
65
“Raissut”, an “old volcano” is shown about a kilometre north of the coast and about 500 metres east of the
Cuha River on the map – Viqueque, SC-52 A-III-SE, Folha No. 24, 1:50,000, 1968.
66
Vaquinhas, J. dos Santos, “Timor”, 15 October 1883, Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa,
Lisboa, 4 (7), p.321. This report also includes a reino of Luca on the south coast – which included the
village of Vessoro, where the dialectos were “tetu, naubete, macassae, nau-ete e medique” – pp.318-319.
19

188967. In describing Lautém, one report noted it was “bounded by Sarau on the north
coast, Matarufo in the interior, and Cararol and Bualeu on the southern coast”.68 From
1894, the Portuguese reportedly established a country-wide “military command system as
part of a pacification campaign against a popular uprising. Timor was divided into a
number of military command areas which comprised a set of military posts as the lowest
level of Portuguese’s colonial administrative structure.”69 Instructions for the
commandantes militares were promulgated by Governor Celestino da Silva in late March
1896.70 Commanders were enjoined to report any prospective barlaques (marriage
alliances) between chiefly families that might have “rebellious” or political consequences –
and to “search for all means to transform the headquarters location of the military
command into a commercial centre, establish regular markets … and to use all means at
their disposal to develop agriculture, particularly the cultivation of coffee”.
At the turn of the century, in the traditional ruling structures, Iliomar may have been
subordinate to the reino of Matarufa (centred in the Luro area to the north) – which by
1903, as “Matarufo”, was noted as “within the district and military command of Vimace” -
with a population of 3,600, no longer a rebel and obediently paying its finta.71 or perhaps
more likely, the Makalero people located on the southern coast in the Elomar/Samaliu area
were the most easterly group subordinate to the reino of Bibiluto to the west (centred south
of present-day Viqueque town) - which itself was subordinate to the reino of Viqueque of
the province of Bellos and “parte do districto e commando de Viqueque”.72 The
Portuguese “Diccionario” published in 1903 also noted “Ellamar” (Elomar), “Hillomar”
(west of present-day Ailebere ?) and “Bualio”73 as all “jurisdicção do reino de Bibiluto na
contra costa” ie, “under the jurisdiction of the kingdom of Bibiluto on the south coast”.74
A reino of Virutalo has also been noted as located to the north of the Makalero’s area of
Elomar/Samaliu – ie, “closer” than either the reinos of Matarufa or Bibiluto – see the
following map75 , but Virutalo does not appear to have been mentioned in any texts.

67
Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre: le Crocodile et Les Portugais (1847-1913), Orgeval, France, 1996, Table B
IV, the Portuguese force in the 6-30 November 1889 campaign comprised 27 Portuguese regulars, 150 (?)
moradores (local troops), and 1,450 Timorese auxiliaries. Most Portuguese forces were similarly structured ie
Portuguese-led, but predominantly indigenous troops. The 1889 campaign is described in “Guerra de Lautém
– 1889”, pp.232-250 in Oliveira, L., Timor na História de Portugal - Volume II, Agência Geral Do Ultramar,
Lisboa, 1950; and in Almeida, Bello de, Meio Seculo de Lutas no Ultramar, Sociedade de Geografia de
Lisboa, 1937, pp.255-256 that lists the composition of the force and the principal participants – including
the “Comandante” Reino (Alferes) Jaime Henrique de Sá Viana, “secretário do Govêrno do Distrito”.
68
…, “Guerra de Lautem”, O Independente, XI (47):1-2, Macau, 5 December 1889, p.3.
69
Ministry of State Administration, Final Report …, 2003, p.38.
70
Revista Militar, No 4, Anno L, Lisboa, 28 February 1898.
71
Dores, R. das, Apontamentos para um Diccionario Chorographico De Timor, 1903, p.47.
72
Dores, R. das, Apontamentos…, 1903 – this work also refers to a reino of “Makoloco” under the
jurisdiction of Viqueque (a military command) - p.44; and lists the reino of Lautém as having jurisdiction
over the districts (districto) of Tutuloro and Sarau – p.40, while Vemace (Vemasse – also a military
command) had jurisdiction over the districts of Laga, Fatumartó, Vinilali, Sarau, Faturó and Matarufo - p.65.
73
See “Bualio” mentioned in 1884 – footnote 64, and “Bualeu” mentioned in 1889 at footnote 68 – see also
earlier footnotes 45 and 60 and later footnotes 97 and 98. “Bualui” was reported in 1911 as being on the
coast immediately east of the Irabere River (see footnote 107); and a “Bualeu” is shown on some maps (eg
see above) as located farther east along the coast, east of Loré.
74
Dores, R. das, Apontamentos…, 1903, p.29, p.34, p.21.
75
Carta da Provincia de Timor (Esboço), 1:1,000,000, Ministerio das Colonias, Paris, 1927 – shown above
(data appears to be early 1900s as Iliomar is not shown as a Posto ). Virutalo is also similarly located on a
map in Correia, A. P., Timor de lés a lés, Lisbon, 1944 – see the following map.
20

Carta da Provincia de Timor (Esboço) - 1927.

The reino of Virutalo is also included on a later, less detailed map76 – see below.
That map also shows a reino of “Laraluta” in the foothills west of Virutalo. In 1903, the
reino of Bibiluto was formally declared “extincto” by Government decree and its area
placed under the reino of Viqueque.77

Correia, A. P., Timor de lés a lés, Lisbon

76
Correia, A. P., Timor de lés a lés, Lisbon, 1944.
77
Boletim Official – Districto do Autonomo de Timor, (BO…dT ), IV Anno, No 10, Portaria No.31, Dili, 7
March 1903, pp.68-69.
21

According to Iliomar elders, in the very late 1800s, the Portuguese had established a
District centre, or “Posto”, in the Uato-Carabau area at Tualo on the southern coast78,
reportedly with a Timorese named Carsiliu - a relative of the Makalero leader Metaili, as
the Chefe de Posto. According to the elders, in about 1894 two Makalero leaders, Brigadier
Nokameta79 (son of Metaili) and Colonel Rabimeta moved the Makalero people from the
Beuliu area of Samaliu on the southern coast to the northeast and respectively established
the villages of Iliomar I and Iliomar II.
In the period August to October 1902, Portuguese forces directed by José Celestino
da Silva (Governor 1894-1908) - and led by Captain Islas dos Santos e Silva, conducted
extensive operations against the reinos in present-day Lautém District. Landing at Lautém
and Com, Portuguese columns attacked Com and Loiquero on the northern coast and then
moved southward through the area of Tailôro (unlocated) razing scores of villages. In mid-
September, Cainliu and Iliomar fell, and on 30 September the retiring Portuguese forces
burned villages in Maina, Baduro, Souro, and Cacaven.80 A Portuguese posto was
established at Fuiloro and a small outpost established at Ponta da Ilha.
In October 1904, the Portuguese established a posto in Iliomar: “que por ser o
comando mais remoto, não prendera tanto a atenção dos governos”81 (“to provide
command in a very remote area, far from the attention of the government”). According to
the Iliomar elders, in the early 1900s, the Portuguese had wished to move their posto from
the Tualo area of Uato-Carabau north-eastwards to the area of present-day Iliomar Town,
but this was opposed by Nokameta. Eventually, according to the elders, the Portuguese
were allowed to establish their posto in Iliomar about two kilometres to the south of the
present-day Iliomar Town – ie, on the western slopes of Iliomar Hill at the Kota Omar fort
site (“Lubulari” in the Makalero language – in present-day Ailebere village) with Batista as
the Chefe de Posto. The Kota Omar fort was probably constructed at about this time as
Portuguese maps show a posto militar in its approximate location as among “creado por
Celestino da Silva”.82
In February 1906, a portaria (ordinance) defined the boundaries between the
military commands of Baucau and Viqueque. The ordinance concluded by directing that
“Fatu Lia and Illomar ((sic)) were established independent of any indigenous reinos and
were under the jurisdiction of the Baucau military command”.83
In September 1906, a Decree was promulgated to replace the finta (tribute) system
with an imposto de capitação (head tax) levied on male head of families and to be collected
with effect from 1 January 1909.84 This tax was intended to force greater involvement by
villagers in cash-cropping - and thereby increase Government revenues.

78
For Tualo, see maps at page 19 (1911) and page 31 (1943).
79
In the early 1990s, a large equine statue of “Brigadir Jeneral Nokameto” was erected in Iliomar Town by
ABRI (Brawijaya Division) – and later disfigured by the TNI during their withdrawal in September 1999 (see
photograph at page 137).
80
Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre …, 1996, pp. 212-213.
81
Duarte, T. (Governor 1926-1928), Ocupação e Colonização Branca de Timor, Porto, 1944, p.44. See also
BO..dT, No.49, 3 December 1904, Declaração, p.245: “Para os devidos effeitos se declara que se acta
estabelicido desde 15 d’outubro findo, o commando militar subalterno de Iliomar e desde 4 do corrente o de
Loi-Kero.”, Dili, 26 November 1904.
82
Duarte, T., Ocupação e Colonização …, 1944,- and see maps in Duarte, T., Timor (Ante-Câmara do
Inferno ?!), Familição, Lisboa, 1930; and Duarte, T., 1944, p.17 also shows a “posto militar” near Iliomar
established by Celestino da Silva (Governor 1894-1908).
83
BO…dT, No.7, 12 February 1907, p.43.
84
BO…dT, No.44, Decree dated 13 September 1906, 3 November 1906 – for implementation see BO…dT, No.26,
27 June 1908 (see also footnotes 89 and 90). Régulos and chefes de suco received a percentage of the tax as the
“direct” collectors. For a history of the finta and imposto to the mid-1920s, see Lencastre, J. G. de, Aspectos
da administração de Timor, September 1929, pp.32-54 in Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, No.54,
22

In 1908, Governor Celestino da Silva divided the Colony into 15 military
commands – comandos militares.85 A few years later, the British Consul-General in
Batavia (ie, now Jakarta) described the system as follows:
“The country is divided up into thirteen military commands, each under a
commissioned officer and comprising in each case three or four military posts each
under a non-commissioned officer. These posts consist of solidly built stone houses
surrounded by a stone rampart. To each commissioned officer in charge of a
command are attached about ten African soldiers; a non-commissioned officer in
charge of a post has with him three or four Africans.”86

In 1908, several revolts broke out in northern, central and eastern Lautém. Captain
José Carrazedo de Sousa Caldas Vianna e Andrade, the Military Commander of Lautém,
led a successful campaign of punitive expeditions against Tutuala and Muapitine and
quelled the resistance. In 1909, moving to the south coast, his forces “suppressed” the
people of Vero, Lopolo and Loré after several short skirmishes. “Only in Iliomar was it
unnecessary to use force – as the people of that region, accompanied by their chiefs, came
forward and took the oath of submission.”87 This series of short campaigns “completed the
general occupation of the whole of the Military Command” … - “Lautém, even after the
departure of Captain Carrazedo, never suffered another rebellion by the indigenous people
who – while living on the margins of civilization …, respected and still respect the
sovereignty of Portugal”.88
In January 1909, regulations for the “vigorous” collection of the head tax were
promulgated – with collection schedules covering the concelhos of Dilly, Aipello, Liquiça
and Maubara; and the military commands of Batugadé, Manatuto, Baucau, Central West,
Viqueque, Manufahi and Allas. However, a complementary Portaria specifically exempted
collection from the reinos of Manatuto and Iliomar.89 The reasons for such specific
exemption were not stated. In Iliomar’s case, a concession may have been made for the
remoteness of the reino and its relatively recent administration by the Portuguese
authorities – or perhaps Iliomar’s “loyalty” during the recent “war” in the Ponta da Ilha
area northeast of Iliomar (see footnote 88). In March 1909, the number of head tax
contribuintes was promulgated for each concelho and commando militar – and, additional
to the January schedule above, included the military commands of Central North, Central
South and the previously exempt Manatuto.90 These head tax regulations only covered the
commandos militares as far east as, and inclusive of, Baucau and Viqueque – ie Lautém
was not included. Payment was to be in Dutch florins for contribuintes in the military
commands of Aipello, Liquiça, Maubara and Central West – and in Mexican patacas in the

Lisbon, December 1929. Lencastre notes that in 1734 Governor Monís de Macedo attempted to replace the
finta with a head tax – but without success. It was only “in 1906 when the military occupation was carried out
in its entirety that an individual tax could be established” – p.217 (English). The head tax was initially one
pataca, rising to two patacas in 1912. For a discussion of the head tax, see Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese
Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850-1912, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of New South
Wales, Sydney, 1994, pp.102-106.
85
Felgas, H.A.E. capitão, Timor Português, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1956, p.272.
86
British Consulate-General, Despatch No.20, Batavia, 21 February 1921 (NAA: A981, TIM P 15).
87
Oliveira, A. de, Subsídios Para a História de Timor, Lautém – December 1938, O Mundo Português, VII
(81), Lisbon, September 1940, p.404. Note however footnote 82 for the earlier September 1902 attack on
Cainliu and Iliomar.
88
Ibid., pp.404-405.
89
BO…dT, No.1, 2 January 1909, pp.1-2 – the regulations in Portaria 3 defined “indigenas” and promulgated a
collection schedule; Portaria 2 exempted collection from the reinos of Manatuto and Iliomar.
90
BO…dT, No. 11 Supplemento, 15 March 1909 - and BO…dT, No.12, 20 March 1909, p.66. Total contribuintes
for Portuguese Timor numbered 56,892.
23

concelho of Dili and the other military commands. While cash payments were preferred, to
facilitate non-cash payments of the head tax, an official list of the prices of agricultural
products was also promulgated as such could also be accepted as payment.91
In March 1909, the first of the monthly reports for each of the commando militares
appeared in the Boletim Official – with Iliomar mentioned in Lautém’s first report (for
April 1909): “Indigenous Politics: The command has subdued the indigenous people who
were in full armed rebellion in the Ponta da Ilha area on the south coast – while the others
were only disobedient. … They are becoming increasingly friendly. The reinos of Tutu-alo,
Mua pitine, Lore and Iliomar ((sic)) have each elected a deserving regulo who is supportive
of the military command for restocking and reorganising the aldeias. The local authority
has been assisted in the opening of roads and the construction of reductos and small
forts.”92
In 1909, Captain José de Andrade “wrote that rice-growing was relatively unknown
in the region, and that he was training some of the chiefs in the sucos of Loree (sic) and
Mua Pitine how to set up ricefields.”93
In April 1909, Portuguese records indicate that the four reinos of Tutuala, Loré,
Muapitine/Maupitine, and Iliomar were formally acknowledged, and military posts and
Chinese trading posts were established in those locations.94 In May, a report by the Lautém
military commander noted the appointment of “Noco-Meta” as the régulo of Illomar (sic).
While agriculture was advanced in the northern part of the Lautém military command, the
south had yet to be developed – but “subalterns from the military command were
instructing the people of Iliomar in cultivation”, and the building of the house of the
“commandante” in Iliomar was progressing.95 In June, the Lautém military commander
noted that weaving and clay pottery items were being produced in Iliomar.96
On 17 June 1909, a formal decree noted that the Concelho of Lautém comprised the
reinos of Sama, Faturó, Sarau, Ilomar (sic), and the juridições of Laivai and Barliu.
Subordinate military posts were listed as at Laivai and Iliomar – with another “4 ainda não

91
BO…dT, No.13, Portaria 40, 27 March 1909, p.69 – established a “pricing commission”. See BO…dT, No.19,
Portaria 55, 8 May 1909, p. 95 for promulgated cash payment currencies by region; and pp.95-96 detailed prices
for coffee, sandalwood, beeswax, copra, buffalo and deer horns and hides, rice - with husks, corn and beans. For
monetary exchange rates and weights/measures see Boletim de Comercio, Agricultura e Fomento da Provincia de
Timor, No. 3, 15 January 1913 eg “O dinheiro corrente em Timor é a pataca, ou dolar mexicano, dividido em
avos, e valeado 450 réis em moeda portugueza, e o florim holandêz (fl.), dividido em cents, e correspondendo a
400 réis em moeda portugueza.”.
92
BO…dT, No.20, 15 May 1909, p.71 – by Captain José Carrezado de Sousa Caldas Vianna e Andrade, O
Commandante Militar de Lautem. The monthly reports from the commandos militares comprised “standard”
sections ie Politica indigena, Agricultura, Comercio, Industria, Obras publicas, Instruc ção publica, Justiça,
Estado sanitario, Outras informa ções. In June, Captain José de Andrade was formally commended in the Boletim
Official by Governor Eduardo Augusto Marques for his “submission and occupation” of the Ponta da Ilha area on
the southern coast of Lautém and the establishment of postos militares in Tuto-Ala, Mua Pitine and Lore - BO…dT,
No. 27, Portaria No.85, 3 July 1909, p.102. The Portaria also noted the involvement in the campaign of the
“segunda linha do regimento de moradores de Baucau”.
93
Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation …, Sydney, 1994, op.cit., p.241 citing “Boletim de Timor,
Various reports from Lautém Command in the first five months of 1909.”
94
Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre …, 1996, p.217 – also recounts that an Australian oil prospector visited
Iliomar in June 1909 – possibly A. J. Staughton. As noted above, the Portuguese fort in Iliomar (Kota Omar),
on the hill at Ailebere village, may date from this period (see also footnote 82).
95
BO…dT, No.27, 3 July 1909 - Commando Militar de Lautém, Informações, 31 May 1909, pp.108-109. The
report also noted that the reinos of Lautém “had contributed 507 rifles and 1,534.67 patacas towards their imposto
(tax). The same reinos had also donated to the Command: 47 buffaloes, 18 horses and seven pigs” – part of which
was distributed to the “arraiaes” (local indigenous forces) who had taken part in the “operations”. In Iliomar,
accommodation for “transiting authorities” was completed in September 1909.
96
BO…dT, No.29, 17 July 1909, p.122.
24

fixados” (yet to be sited).97 On 30 June 1909, a Government Portaria listed the reinos of
the Lautém military command as “Sama, Faturó, Sarau, Loiquero, Tuto-Ala and Mua-
Pitine” and noted that “the reino of Ilomar – with its villages of Bualiu and Ilomar” was
under the military command of Baucau (as was Loré).98 A Portaria of the same date,
reported that, following a proposal by the military commander of Lautém, “Illomar and
Loré would be under the provisional jurisdiction of the Lautém military command – and
“the régulo of Illomar was the chief Noco-Meta”.99
Under a Portuguese government decree of 7 July 1909, the Portuguese recognised
the juridicial systems of the local Timorese kingdoms, then numbering 77 in 11 boroughs –
with each kingdom (luruhan) ruled by a liurai given colonel rank and suco chiefs ranked as
majors.100
On 9 December 1909 - following consideration of its organisational, economic and
financial development, Portuguese Timor was redesignated from an “Autonomous District”
to a “Province”.101 The Province of Timor thus became equal to “Cabo Verde, Guiné, S.
Thomé e Principe, e Macau”.
In January 1910, a revised schedule for the head tax was promulgated that now
included the commando militar of Lautém ie the reinos of Saráu, Sama, Faturó, Tutu Alla,
Iliomar, Loré, Loiquero, Soran, and Mua Pitine with a total of 6,040 contribuintes.102 The
reino of Ilomar (sic) was listed with 764 contribuintes. In January 1911, Iliomar had 957
contribuintes – 14 percent of Lautém’s total of 6,782.103
In his monthly report for May 1911104, the Lautém military commander – First
Sergeant Cypriano Pereira, reported that imports into the Command were valued at “3:
195.820 réis” and exports at “5:532.070 réis”. Imports comprised: coffee, sugar, butter,
green tea, black tea, wine, beer, Balibó tobacco, black cloth, white cloth, pottery and
trinkets – while exports comprised: copra, buffalo and deer hides, buffalo and deer horns,
shells, bees wax, sandalwood and sandalwood roots. He also noted that the roads to link
“Fui Loro” and “Illomar” had almost been completed.
In his report for September 1911105, the recently-appointed Lautém military
commander – Alferes José Garcia reported that harvests within the Command were poor
due to drought - and that the rice crop in Iliomar had been lost completely due to the lack of

97
Decreto de 17 Junho de 1909, Tabella 1 in Montalvão, J.C. e Silva, A Mão D’Obra em Timor, A Editora,
Lisboa, 1910. The reino of Bibiluto was listed within the Concelho of Baucau – Matarufa was not listed.
98
BO…dT, No.27, Portaria No.82, 3 July 1909, p.101. The sucos (villages) of each reino were listed totalling 43
within Lautém; two within the reino of Iliomar; and three within the reino of Loré. This suco data indicates the
boundaries of the reinos.
99
BO…dT, No.27, Portaria No.83, 3 July 1909, p.102.
100
Sousa, I.C. de, “The Portuguese Colonization …” , 12 October 2001, p. 191 in Lusotopie 2001.
101
Boletim Official do Governo da Provincia de Timor (BOdT), Suplemento Ao No. 7, 14 February 1910 – the
Boletim Official was appropriately retitled.
102
BO…dT, No.5, 29 January 1910, p.25 - the 10 concelho/military commands comprised 73 reinos with a total
of 98,920 contribuintes (including non-reino Dili: 616) – compared with a total of 56,892 in January 1909 (but
which had not included Lautém – see footnote 89). Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre …, 1996, p.242 – Table D1
reproduces this data with contribuintes as “families”. Baucau is listed as a military command with 14
subordinate reinos including Viqueque and Vessoro. Matarufa, Laraluta, Virutalo, nor Bibiluto are listed
among the reinos in the BO…dT/table.
103
BOdT, No.4, 28 January 1911, p.28 – the Province contribuintes numbered 107,775 – with revised figures for
“Okusse” in March, this was increased to 110,461.
104
BOdT, No.25, 24 June 1911, p.184. The real (plural – réis) was the Portuguese currency from about 1380 until
replaced by the escudo in 1911 - ie with the fall of the monarchy. In mid-1911, as with other commandos militares,
licences were issued in Lautém for gambling concessions for “jogos de Gallo ((cock-fighting/betting)) , Clú -Clú, e
Carta Chinezas”.
105
BOdT, No.44, 4 November 1911, p.355. Earlier in August, the export from Lautém of an “Ilomar” brand of
tobacco was noted - BOdT, No.34, 26 August 1911, p.291.
25

rain. His report included an additional section titled “Diversos assumptos”. He “urged that
two schools be opened – one at centre of the military command ((Lautém)) and the other at
Illomar” and that the houses for the régulos at each of the postos be completed – with the
exception of Ponta da Ilha where a “model” house for the régulo had been completed by
the posto commander and which was the envy of the residents of Lautém “centre”. Alferes
Garcia noted that the development of agriculture had been “delayed”, and a long-term
effort was needed in the postos to “achieve the necessary improvements and capture the
sympathy of the people”. He noted that “the reino of Iliomar has the natural conditions to
be one of the richest reinos – but, in terrible contrast, it is difficult to exploit what truly
exists. Investigating the causes which brought the people to this state of misery , I learned
that it was due in part to having limited the areas of cultivation due to faith in the
production of coconut trees, the scarcity of rain – for which they underutilise the lowlands;
and in part to the unscrupulous process by which business has been conducted there, and
moreover, the failure to comply with the directions of the posto commander, which had
promoted their own interests rather than the interests of the indigenas and the State. Alferes
Garcia concluded his report by advising that he “had taken other measures to develop the
indigenous people in agricultural work, and to force those who were reluctant to engage in
such work – and to identify other commercial opportunities”. A few weeks later, Alferes
Garcia licenced a third-class commerciante to be established and operate in Iliomar.106
In October 1911, an Australian oil prospector, A.J. Staughton, operating from
Vessoro District to the west, discovered gas seep in an area immediately east of the Irabere
River ie, within present-day Iliomar Sub-District – this area of 499 hectares (see the
following map) was designated the “Bualui Concession”, but never developed.107
Staughton noted that the Timorese “kingdom” west of the Irabere River was called “Irabin”
and that a “Commandant” was located at the Tualo post. The Governor of Portuguese
Timor visited Staughton and his party and viewed the “oil concessions”.

106
BOdT, No.51, 23 December 1911, p.402. The report also noted that no schools had been established in Lautém.
107
Timor Oil Limited, Petroleum Oil: The History of Oil Exploration …, Sydney, 30 June 1932 – see p.14
(NAA: A1067, IC46/33/3/13/1). Also spelt as “Builo”. The two adjacent “Irabin concessions” to the west
were also not developed - but in the early 1920s, a well was sunk on the southern coast at Aliambata in
Uatolari District. The Bualiu concession was “manifested” on 20 October 1911 and noted as within the
“Comando de Lautém”. On 13 February 1913, the Bualiu petroleum concession appears to have been passed
to João Gonçalves (with its area noted as “Iliomar”) – but it was also noted that “he was unable to pursue its
conditions to the end for it was found to be situated within Concession No 4 belonging to Mr Staughton, now
deceased - Castel Branco, J. E. de, Província de Timor: Informações relativas aos jazigos de petróleo e à
agricultura, Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Lisboa, 1915, pp.192-193. In December 1934, Staughton’s
concessions ie the 499-hectare Builo concession and five in the reino of Vessoro were listed in BOdT No.52,
9 December 1934, p.392 as liable for mining tax – eg 554 patacas for Builo; and again in 1935.
26

The concessions were promulgated in the Boletim Official with the concession
within Iliomar being described as: “located within the reino of Builo of the Lautém
Military Command and having the following boundaries – the mountains to the north, the
sea to the south, the Me Aei River to the east, and the Irabere River to the west”.108
In March 1912, the Lautém Military Command published a listing of head tax
contribuintes for the Command “totalling 7,530 – comprising the reinos of Sarau: 1,849;
Sama: 1,522; Faturó: 810; Illomar: 1,069; Lore: 454; Mua-Pitine: 342; Loiquero: 347;
Tuto-Alla: 384; and Fui-Loro: 753.”109
According to Iliomar village elders interviewed in 2004, in 1912 a Portuguese force
attempting to suppress a rebellion marched from Same and Viqueque eastwards into
Iliomar towards Los Palos – but was forced to withdraw when blocked by Iliomar forces at
the Lihulo River crossing near Ossohira. The date suggests that this event may have been
associated with the 1911-1912 “Great Rebellion” against Portuguese rule led by the régulo
of Manufahi, Dom Boaventura da Costa Soto Maior, which - although centred in Manufahi,
spread across other areas of the country.110 However, the region of the Military Command

108
BOdT No.45, 11 November 1911, p.361. Builo – or similar spellings, had not been included as a discrete
reino in any of the items in the Boletim Official - see footnotes 98, 99, 102 and 103.
109
BOdT No.13, 30 March 1912, p.68 – “Quadro numerico do arrolamento feito em 1911-1912”, 12
December 1911. In late 1911, the Lautém Military Commander had dismissed the régulos of Sama and Faturo
for “incompetence” – BOdT No 45, 11 November 1911, p.360 and No.50, 16 November 1911, p.390. The
number of head tax contribuintes in Iliomar for 1913 was 820 – in a Lautém total of 6,938 - BOdT No.11, 15
March 1913, p.73.
110
The rebellion had simmered from 1895 – see Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, pp. 94-102.
Casualties in the suppression of the revolt in 1910-12 were reportedly: 3,424 East Timorese killed and 12,567
wounded; 289 Portuguese killed and 600 wounded – see Pinto, C. and Jardine, M., East Timor’s Unfinished
Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance – A Testimony, South End Press, Boston, 1997, p.6. See also
Taylor, J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.11; Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre …, 1996, pp.254-301; and
Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation …, Sydney, 1994, op.cit., pp.232-275. Dom Boaventura was
reportedly captured near Betano in October 1912 – Jolliffe, Cover-up, 2001, p.42 – and as Coronel-Régulo
Dom Boaventura was formally dismissed from his positions in BOdT No.29, Portaria 214, 19 July 1913,
pp.196-197. He reportedly died in prison on Ataúro or in Aipelo (on the coast road east of Liquiçá) in July
27

of Lautém reportedly “was not drawn into the revolt” and “and there are no records of
chiefs of this region sending auxiliaries to support the rebels and the main reason for this
would appear to be the absence of kin and clan networks between this eastern region and
the central and western reinos which spearheaded the rebellion. Another main reason
would appear to be that this distant Command was the least effective in implementing
collection of the head tax and refusal to pay the tax prior to 1912 went unpenalised.”111 In
a contemporary report of late October 1912, the Lautém Military Commander – Alferes
José Garcia, asserted that there were no documents that “proved involvement in the
rebellion by the indigenas of this Command … on the contrary, information from
knowledgeable sources would soon be sent to His Excellency the Governor that would
leave no doubt on the existence of evidence that the spirit of the revolt was denounced ((ie
by the people of Lautém)). If someone has documents to the contrary, then they should be
presented for the sake of truth.”112 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the reported engagement
at the Lihulo River - as related above by the Iliomar elders, occurred in 1912. However, the
engagement may perhaps be related to an earlier Portuguese military foray – possibly
during the campaign of 1908 noted earlier. On balance, however, it is unlikely that such an
event occurred.
Following the suppression of the rebellion of Dom Boaventura, the Portuguese
attempted to reduce the power of the traditional rulers, the régulos and luirai – particularly
in the western and central regions, by abolishing their reinos and replacing these with a
larger number of smaller administrative units ie, sucos (villages or village “clusters”).
Increasingly from late 1912, non-Timorese purchased or were granted commercial
licences or concessions of land for agriculture in the countryside, including in Lautém –
and these were regularly published in the Boletim Official. A listing of such concessions
was published in April 1913 that also showed the predominance of Chinese in
commerce.113 In 1914, the number of Chinese commercial enterprises in Lautém increased
considerably – principally managed by the Lay clan.114
Iliomar was remote from the “Commando Militar” headquarters in Lautém. In April
1914, the Lautém Commandante – when reporting on his “frequencies of visits”, noted that
travel to Iliomar from Fuiloro via Loré took 10 and a half hours.115
According to Iliomar elders, in 1915, Nokameta’s elder brother - Laimeta,
established Cainliu village116; and in 1917, Sorumaha established Ailebere village adjacent
to the Kota Omar fort.
In a March 1918 report, the acting military commander of Lautém listed seven
third-class comerciantes (merchants), seven third-class caixeiros (cashiers) and 31
matrozes (retail workers) in Iliomar.117 In mid-April 1918, the military commander of
Lautém - Alferes (Second Lieutenant) João de Almeida e Silva, visited Iliomar for three

1913 – Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, p.99. However, L.E. Madjiah claims Boaventura died
in Kefamenanu (West Timor) as an Indonesian citizen in 1969 – see “East Timor: Return of the Last
Paradise”, The Jakarta Post, 1999.
111
Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation …, Sydney, 1994, p.241-243. On the reported “refusal” by
Iliomar to pay tax, note footnotes 89 and 90 regarding exemption for 1909. Iliomar was listed for the head
tax in January 1910, see footnote 102.
112
BodT No.46, 16 November 1912, p.260.
113
BodT No.17, 26 April 1913, p.115. No indigenous land however appears to have yet been alienated in
Iliomar at this time.
114
BOdT No.1, 3 January 1914, pp.2-3.
115
BOdT No.19, 9 May 1914, p.126 – by Captain Júlio Garces de Lencastre.
116
Note that Pélissier cites a Portuguese attack on Cainliu in mid-September 1902 – see footnote 80.
117
Baptista, J.A. Sargento, Informações relativas a Março e Abril de 1918, Lautém, 31 March 1918 - in
Boletim de Comercio, Agricultura e Fomento da Provincia de Timor (BCAFPT), Year 7, No 2, April 1918,
pp.114.
28

days. In the absence of the Iliomar Posto chief in Dili, he was accompanied by “the three
principal chiefs ((of Iliomar)) Noco Nuta, Rabi Nuta and Lai Nuta – all brothers”, and
reported seeing “two dozen well-developed palm trees”.118 Alferes Almeida e Silva
discussed the cultivation of coconut trees, coffee and other agricultural crops. He also
visited the “mountain of Nauvile located an hour and a half from the Posto” where, to his
surprise, there was a small plantation of coffee119 that had been undertaken by the chiefs
((of ?)) Lai Meta, Rabi Meta and Ali Bere” – which reminded him of Manufahi. Alferes
Almeida e Silva told the chiefs that the Nauvile site ((probably Mount Naunili, north of
Cainliu village)) would be registered as soon as the line of ((geographic)) points had been
established from Baucau to the East – as one was planned for “Nauvile Mountain”. He
noted that there were no communal indigenous properties to be registered – and that “the
climate of Iliomar is magnificent for Europeans.” In his August 1918 report, Alferes
Almeida e Silva noted that a small amount of “neli” (a term for rice with its husk intact)
was cultivated in Iliomar.
In May 1920, the Portuguese administration enacted a wide-ranging Regulamento
that included provisions for the management of “indigenous authorities” (Capítulo III) and
the payment of the imposto do capitação (head tax – Capítulo IV).120 The head tax was set
at 2.5 patacas121per annum for every male over 18 years – and four percent of the tax
collected was paid to the “indigenous chiefs”.
In July 1920, the military command of Lautém was divided into two commands:
“Lautém North” and “Lautém South” following “consideration of the relative
backwardness of the people, and given the need for more intensive civilizing action to raise
the level of the population”.122 Lautém South, centred on Iliomar, was placed under the
command of Alferes (infantaria) António Jerónimo Arnao Taveira Paixão Metello – while
Lautém North was headed by a captain.123
In February 1921, the Boletim Official detailed the annual imposto do capitação
(head tax) to be paid by each of the reinos and jurisdições – totalling 121, plus Dili.124 The
total “contributors” for Portuguese Timor were 128,610 – with 3,041 in Lautém South of
whom 1,783 were in “Yliomar”. Lautém South was noted as comprising: “Yliomar –
1,783; Lore – 698; Mua Pitine – 235; Vero – 51; and Tutuala – 274”.
Records in 1923 detail the imposto do capitação (head tax) paid by each of the
reinos. The total for Portuguese Timor was 135,034 – with Lautém contributing 10,245, of
which 2,227 was provided by the reino of Iliomar.125 In 1924, a motorable road was

118
Almeida, J. de, Alferes, Informações relativas a Março e Abril de 1918, Lautém, 30 April 1918 – in
Boletim de Comercio, Agricultura e Fomento da Provincia de Timor (BCAFPT), Year 7, No 2, April 1918,
pp.114-115.
119
In an earlier report of 16 March 1916, Captain J.G. de Lencastre – the Lautém Military Commander, had
reviewed coffee planting in Lautém and noted: “ novas viveiros – Ilomar – 30,000 pés de café ” of “café
Arabica”- Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, Vol. 54, Lisboa, December 1929, p.46.
120
BOdT, No.19, 8 May 1920, pp.111-121 – Regulamento das Circunscrições Civis da Provincia de Timor, 1
May 1920. The Regulation detailed several exceptions to the liability to pay the head tax.
121
In 1894, the Portuguese introduced a local currency - the pataca, which was replaced by the escudo on 1
January 1959. During the 1942-45 Japanese occupation, the Japanese military gulden/rupiah was also used.
122
BOdT, No 20, 24 July 1920, p.200. However noted as “Lautém Military Command” again in BOdT No 37,
Portaria No. 247-A, 14 September 1921, p.307 on the change of military commanders
123
Metello, A. Alferes, Timor – “Fantasma do Oriente”, Biblioteca de Accao Nacionalista, Lusitania Editora,
Lisboa, 1923. Metello wrote of the dancing and drumming of the Iliomar villagers, and complained that he
lived in a miserable palm shack with bamboo floors, rats etc.
124
BOdT, No.9, 26 February 1921, p.79. Lautém North had 6.755 contribuintes for 1921..
125
BOdT, No.7, 17 February 1923, p.55. The figures above represent males over 18 years liable for the tax.
For 1925, the first presentation of the “imposto do capitação e de barlaque” for Lautém was 27,820 patacas –
no figure for Iliomar was included : BOdT, No.2, 9 January 1926, p.19. The second presentation, noted as
29

completed from Beaço (south of Viqueque) 45 kilometres eastward along the coast to the
“petroleum concession of Vessoro and the border (ie, baliza) at Iliomar.126
In 1926, livestock holdings in Iliomar were quite strong: buffalo – 3,607 (37% of
Lautém Military Command numbers); horses – 1,719 (28% of Lautém numbers); pigs –
1,748 (17% of Lautém) and goats – 2,253 (41% of Lautém numbers).127 Coconut palms
(coqueiros) were also numerous – with 10,002 in production and a further 9,221 not yet in
production (18% of the trees in Lautém).128 No coffee was noted as being grown in
Lautém.
A survey published in October 1927 noted the population of the freguêsia (parish)
of Iliomar as comprising: 4,975 Timorese (2,829 males, 2,146 females) – in 1,138 families
(19% of the Lautém total). While there were no “white” Portuguese in the Iliomar Posto,
the survey noted one male of mixed race (mixta) and a Chinese (amarela) couple. 129
Lautém’s principal export in 1927 was copra (ie, coconut “meat”) – 3,411 piculs valued at
23,609 patacas (46% of the total value of Lautém products).130 In 1927, livestock holdings
in Iliomar had declined from those recorded in 1926 ie: buffalo – 2,801 (cf 3,607 in 1926);
horses – 1,258 (cf 1,719); pigs – 2,364 (cf 1,748) and goats – 1,771 (cf 2,253).131 Numbers
of coconut palms (coqueiros) had increased – with 12,265 in production and a further
11,992 not yet in production.132
The annual rainfall for Iliomar in 1927 was recorded as 4,184mm – the second
highest annual rainfall recorded in any Portuguese colony to that date.133
A 1928 map of eastern Portuguese Timor (see the following page)134 shows a
second-class road linking Lautém, Fuiloro, Loré, Iliomar and westward along the coast
towards Viqueque (ie, there was no road directly linking Fuiloro/Los Palos with Iliomar).
This “coastal” route from Fuiloro to Iliomar via Loré was about 61 kilometres. The map
also shows a “secondary” telephone line from Lautém to Luro, Iliomar, and Watu Carbau
(Uato-Carabau).

“incomplete” was 22,991 patacas : BOdT, No.3, 17 January 1926. For 1929-1930 in Lautém, there were
9,697 payers of the imposto do capitação (103,105 in the Province) and 454 payers of the imposto de
barlaque (1,566 in the Province) - BOdT, No.51, 21 December 1929.
126
Viega, D., As Estradas em Timor, Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, 2 (16), Lisboa, October 1926.
127
BOdT, No.34, 20 August 1927, Apenso – figures as at 31 December 1926. No cattle (bovino) were noted
in Lautém.
128
Ibid. To the west, while no coconut trees were in production in Uato-Carabau or Uatolari, 6,152 trees were
noted as “not yet in production”. No coffee was recorded in these areas.
129
Duarte, T., Timor (Ante-Câmara …), 1930, p,114. The population of the Concelho of Lautém was 26,546
including 11 Branca (whites), 73 Chinese, 1 Negro and 2 Mixta.. Timorese were listed by race as
“Oceânica”. See also BOdT, No.42, Apenso, 15 October 1927 and BOdT, No.42, 20 October 1928.
130
BOdT, No.53, 31 December 1927, Apenso, p.4.
131
BOdT, No.34, 25 August 1928, Apenso – figures as at 31 December 1927. No cattle (bovino) were noted
in Lautém. These figures are also in Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, Vol. 54, 1929, p.128.
132
Ibid. No coffee was noted as under cultivation in Lautém – the only circunscrição/military command in
which coffee was not grown. Figures are as at 31 December 1927. In Uato-Carabau and Uatolari, a total of
1,826 coconut trees were in production and 4,328 not yet in production.
133
Lencastre, J.G. de, “Climatogia e Nozologia de Timor”, Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, Vol. 71,
1931, p.76.
134
Duarte, T., Colonia Portuguêza de Timor, Kelly and Walsh, Hong Kong, 1928.
30

A map published in 1929 – see below 135, showed almost all the Lautém area as a
Região de coqueiros” (“coconut growing region”) and the coastal area of Iliomar as a
“Região da cultura da borracha” (“region of rubber cultivation”).

In the late 1920s, the Portuguese administration began replacing its regional
military structure “with a new civil structure with real service provision responsibilities –
the circunscrição civil – Baucau, Manatuto and Liquiça were the first” (by 1929).136

135
Lencastre, J.G. de, “Aspectos da Administração de Timor”, September 1929, pp.40-41 in Boletim da
Agência Geral das Colónias, Vol. 54, December 1929. It is very unlikely that rubber was grown in Lautém –
see also footnote 165 that shows rubber-growing on the south coast to the west of Iliomar. Agricultural
statistics for 1928 show no rubber grown in Iliomar or elsewhere in Lautém. Rather, rubber-growing was
centred on Barique, but with rubber also grown in Viqueque and small amounts in Lacluta, Uato-Carabau,
and Uatolari to the west of Iliomar - Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, Vol. 54, December 1929, p.117.
However, later statistics for agricultural products in 1948 indicated that rubber was only grown in the Ermera
Circunscrição (BOdT, No.11, 12 March 1949, p.102).
31

In 1931, the Lautém Military Command comprised 412 povoações with a total
population of 26,906.137 In 1932, the Lautém authority138 submitted a supplementary
budget for 1931-32 that included funds for three “new schools” – one each for the postos of
Fuiloro, Luro and Iliomar. The funds were to cover three teachers – ie, “3 professores de
letras 1” at a salary of 10 patacas monthly each, from March 1932; and 100 patacas for
teaching material.139 In late 1932, the Governor issued a comprehensive Circular to the
Circunscrições Civis and the military commands that sought detailed information on
Timorese society – customs, morés, and history.140 In December 1932, military service
regulations for the Province were promulgated that detailed the obligations for service by
both Europeans and Timorese.141
In 1933, the Colony “comprised the Concelho de Dili; the Circunscrições of
Liquiçá, Manatuto and Baucau; and the Comandos Militares of Motaél, Hato-Lia, Cova-
Lima, Bobonáro, Suro, Manufai, Viqueque, Lautém, and Okussi”. A portaria was
published in March to regulate the circunscrições, designate subordinate postos in three
classes, establish a Corpo de Polícia within each circunscrição, define the authorities of
local régulos and chefes, and revise the imposto do capitação (head tax).142
In 1934, the Portuguese formally instituted a new civilian administrative structure –
replacing the comandos militares (see footnote 70) with circunscrições civis comprising
several postos administrativos - and with the postos divided into sucos.143 In the 2nd Class
Circunscrição of Lautém, Uato-Carabau was incorporated into the new Iliomar Posto – ie,
the Iliomar Posto comprised:

- the reino of Iliomar (comprising the sucos of “Iliomar, Leorai, Bui-Liu,
Cai-Liu, Fuate, Legro, Ai-Lebere, and Lua-Nira”); and
- the reino of Uato-Carabau (comprising the sucos of “Irabim, Uani-Uma,
Babatata, Bubo-Ha, Afaloicai, Suco-Loi-Ulo, and Osso-Huna”).

“So the liurais lost their absolute and their official power. Their position was now replaced
through the Portuguese administration on the posto level. In some cases the postos covered
the former area of a kingdom, in others they differed. The chefe de posto worked straight
down to the chefe do suco. These chefe’s had to be literate, speak Portuguese and pass on
orders from the government to the people. The chefe do suco was now also called liurai in
some areas. … the liurais lost their official powers and the chefe do suco became the direct

136
Ministry of State Administration, Final Report …, 2002, p.38.
137
BOdT, No.50, 16 December 1933, p.267. The racial composition in Lautém was 18 whites, 25 “mixta”, 1
negro, 46 Chinese and 26,816 “Oceânica” ie Timorese.
138
The Lautém Urban Authority (Comissão Urbana de Lautém) – comprised: Lieutenant (retired) Eurico da
Silva Corrêa de Lemos (President), vogais (members) Lay Fong-Jung and Leong-Asseng, and Pedro
Fernandes Xavier (Secretary). The Comissão was replaced by the Junta Local in late 1934 with a similar
composition ie with the Administrator of the Lautém Circunscrição as President of the Junta Local.
139
BOdT, No.23, 11 June 1932, p.82.
140
BOdT, No.48 – Suplemento, 28 November 1932 – the “questionário” is at pp.1-4.
141
BOdT, No.51 – Suplemento, 19 December 1932, pp.1-26.
142
BOdT, No.10 – Suplemento, Portaria No.6, 17 March 1933. The head tax was set at five patacas annually
– with 4% to be distributed to local chefes indígenas, 1.5% to the administradores and 1% to chefes de
postos.
143
BOdT, No.4. 27 January 1934 - Diploma Legislativo No.1, pp.18-29. The Viqueque military command –
less Uato-Carabau, was incorporated into the Circunscrição of Baucau. António Policarpo de Sousa Santos
was appointed the Administrator of the Lautém Circunscrição (until November 1934 when he was replaced
by Carlos Drumond Menezes de Jesus).
32

link to the government. The official power was handed over in an adequate way from the
liurai to the chefe do suco but this ‘loss of power’ did not happen on the informal level.”144
Until the mid-1930s, the Chefe de Posto positions were “previously held
exclusively by a sergeant or corporal of the Portuguese Army” but the positions were
progressively being “filled by young civilian officials who have graduated from the
Colonial School in Lisbon”145 – this reflects the change noted above from comandos
militares to postos.
For the first nine months of 1934, the monthly births, deaths and marriages for each
posto were published in the Provincial Boletim. In the period January-September inclusive,
the following figures were recorded for Iliomar: 76 births, 99 deaths and 21 marriages.
In late 1935, the government changed the name of the Baucau Circunscrição to São
Domingos, and in June 1936 most major towns were also given Portuguese names.146
Roads were classified – with the road Lautém-Fuiloro-Loré (port) as Class 1; Loré (port)-
Aliambata-Viqueque as Class 2; and the roads to Luro and Iliomar as Class 3.147
In the mid-late 1930s, the population of the Iliomar Posto was 10,077 –
representing about 2.1 percent of the total population of Portuguese Timor then estimated
at 472,264, as shown in the following map.148 As noted earlier, the Iliomar Posto included
the present-day sub-district of Uato-Carabau, and the Posto’s population therefore included
speakers of the Makassae, Naueti and Makalero languages – with Makalero shown as
“Maceler” (partly obscured) on the map.

144
Ospina, S. and Hohe, T., Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local
Governance Project – Final Report, Dili, 2000.
145
Lambert, E.T., Report on Portuguese Timor, Batavia, 18 December 1937, p.17/37 (NAA: A981, TIM P4
Part 2). Lambert, a British Consul from Batavia travelled widely and wrote a comprehensive report on his
November-December 1937 visit. The March-April 1941 visit report by British Consul-General (Taiwan),
C.H. Archer, also provides a useful description of Portuguese Timor in the immediate pre-war period – see
Bibliography and Lee.R., “Portuguese Timor …”, 1999 below. An article by Hudson Fysh (Managing
Director QANTAS), “Australia’s Unknown Neighbour: Portuguese Timor” in the Australian magazine,
Walkabout, May 1941 also provides a view on administration and society in Portuguese Timor before WWII
(NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, pp.78-88). Fysh’s article draws on his earlier classified report, “Report on
Japanese Penetration into Portuguese Timor”, 24 January 1941 (NAA: TIM D 1, Part 2, pp.91-97).
146
Felgas, H.A.E. capitão, Timor Português, 1956, pp.348-350 and BOdT, No.25, 20 June 1936 - Baucau
town was named Vila Salazar (27 May 1936); Venilale: Vila Viçosa; Baaguia: Baguía; Laivai: Nova Ancora;
Lautém: Vila Nova Malaca; Fuiloro: Vila de Avis; Com: Nova Nazaré; Tutuala: Nova Sagres; Loré:
Silvicolas; Uato-Carabau/Watu Carbau: Nova Bemfica; Uatolari: Leça. In 1935, the population of the Lautém
Circunscrição was 35,318; including 20 “whites”, 17 mixta, and 80 Chinese – BOdT, No.14, 3 April 1937,
p.109.
147
BOdT , No.25, 20 June 1936, Diploma Legislativo No. 36, pp.144-146.
148
Instituto de Ciências Sociais (Arquivo de História Social) da Universidade de Lisboa, Colónia Portuguesa
de Timor (Album Álvaro Fontoura), Repartição dos Varias Dialectos por Postos Administrativos, Lisboa, 28
November 2002. Note the manuscript correction ie “over-writing” of an unreadable script in white to
“Maceler”. The complete map can be found at
http://www.ics.ul.pt/ahsocial/fontoura/album/pag_inteiras/3.htm
33

In 1936, the Portuguese authorities renamed several towns abandoning their
indigenous titles:
Baucau town was renamed Vila Salazar (27 May 1936); Aileu: Vila General
Carmona; Atabai: Atalaia; Atsabe: Nova Ourém; Baaguia: Baguía; Batugadé: Caxias do
Extremo; Bazar-Tete: Vila Eduardo Marques; Bobonaro: Vila Armindo Monteiro; Com:
Nova Nazaré; Fuiloro: Vila de Avis; Laivai: Nova Ancora; Lautém: Vila Nova Malaca;
Loré: Silvicolas; Maubesse: Mindelo; Ossú: Belas; Pante-Makassar: Vila Taveiro; Same:
Vila Filomeno de Câmara; Tibar: Nova Algés; Tutuala: Nova Sagres; Uato-Carabau/Watu
Carbau: Nova Bemfica; Uatolari: Leça; Venilale: Vila Viçosa.149 However, the changes
were not “popularized”, and by the early 1950s had reverted to their earlier titles.150
In 1936, a Dutch businessman – Aart Hofman, obtained a concession to mine a
manganese deposit in Iliomar at “Betó” (an area of 4,446 hectares).151 An expedition by the
Allied Mining Corporation along the south coast surveyed “Irabin District” in the mid-
1930s, and visited Iliomar.152

149
BOdT, No. 21/25, Diploma Legislativo 85/90, 27 May/20 June 1936, p.1/pp.142-143.
150
Felgas, H.A.E. capitão, Timor Português, 1956, pp.348-350.
151
BOdT, No.41, 9 October 1936, p.277 - and BOdT No.33, 14 August 1937, p.330; No.37, 14 September
1940, p.417 for mining tax aspects; and Diploma Legislativo 216 - BOdT, No.29, 19 July 1941.
152
The visit report included a 1:200,000 map of the south coast (p.45) and photographs – including of the
Posto de Iliomar (p.105) from the south. Wittouck, S.F., Exploration of Portuguese Timor, Allied Mining
Corporation, 1937.
34

On 10 October 1937, the Chefe de Posto of Iliomar, João Braz – first corporal
(artillery)153, officially welcomed the connection of the Estação Telegráfica to Iliomar –
and its operator (“guardo-fios”), António Alves.154
In about 1937, a Portuguese visitor to the Posto of Iliomar took photographs of the
villagers – see below, including each of the three ethno-linguistic groups. The photograph
of the Makalero couple was titled as “Maceler”.155

153
BOdT, No.52, 25 December 1937, p.486. João Braz – born Montalvão (Portugal) was noted as an official
at a Regional Exposition in Lautém on 18 October 1934 – and appears to have been the inaugural
administrative head of the Iliomar Posto when formed in 1934.
154
António Alves (b. 12/3/1919). The telegraph was similarly connected at Luro on 3 October 1937 – in the
presence of the Portuguese Chefe de Posto and the indigenous Chefe de Posto Auxiliar - Carlos da Costa
Hornay, who had been appointed earlier in 1937 - BOdT, No.52, 25 December 1937, p.486.
155
The photographs – together with photographs of every ethno-linguistic group in Portuguese Timor, can be
found in the Album Álvaro Fontoura - cited immediately above in its section on “Tipos característicos
segundo algumas línguas indígenas”. Major Álvaro Eugenio Neves da Fontoura was Governor of Portuguese
Timor from 11 September 1937 to 1940.
35

In late May 1938, very heavy rains destroyed the road from Vila Aviz (Fuiloro)
south to Loré – isolating Iliomar for several weeks. In July 1938, the acting Chefe de Posto
at Iliomar, Corporal João Braz – together with six other “artillery corporals”, was formally
detached from the list of military personnel in the Colony (for legal reasons) and appointed
an “aspirante administrativos interino” as the encarregado da chefia of the Posto at
Iliomar.156

João Braz - encarregado da chefia Posto Iliomar157

For 1938, Government records noted 3,383 villagers in Iliomar as liable for the
head tax – ie, as “contribuentes”, and six liable for the professional tax. For 1939, 3,321
were liable for the head tax, and “24” liable for the professional tax.158
From 1940, Lautém was one of Portuguese Timor’s six “circunscrições”
(circumscriptions) with its capital on the north coast at Vila Nova Malaca (present-day
Lautém village).159 To the west, Lautém was bordered by São Domingos – modern-day

156
BOdT, No.29, Portaria 656, 16 July 1938, p.286 – also notes that there were 21 postos in the Province,
and that the military wage of a military chefe was only 75% of the civilian chefe salary. See also BOdT,
No.26, 1 July 1939, p.404. “1. cabo da artilharia” João Braz was reconfirmed in the position of
Encarregado/Chefe at Iliomar in July 1941 – BOdT, No.28, 12 July 1941, p.196. “Braz” is occasionally
rendered as “Brás”.
157
This photograph was provided to the author on 18 July 2009 by the grandson of João Braz – Ruben João
Braz de Carvalho, the Administrator of the District of Dili.
158
At 30 November 1939, 1,080 had paid their 1938 head tax (36.8% of head tax in Lautém was outstanding),
and all six had paid their professional tax (10% was outstanding in Lautém). No tax had been paid for 1939 -
BOdT, No.51, 23 December 1939, p.690 & p.695. The estimated “24” liable for the 1939 head tax appears to
be an error – ie the number for Fuiloro, with Iliomar being later adjusted to “six”. At 31 March 1940, 1,031
had still to pay their 1938 head tax, while 221 had paid their 1939 head tax; all six had paid their 1938 and
1939 professional tax - BOdT, No.20, 18 May 1940, p.249 & p.254. In 1940, the head tax was five patacas.
159
See Lee, R., “Portuguese Timor …”, 1999, p.77 citing the C.H. Archer Report of 3 May 1941. Dili was a
“Concelho” and the six regional circumscriptions were: Fronteira, Suro, Manatuto, São Domingos, Lautém,
and Oe-cusse. Lee’s September 2000 article - “Crisis in a Backwater – 1941 in Portuguese Timor”
extensively citing the Archer Report can be found on the Internet – see Bibliography.
36

Baucau, and Viqueque Districts. Lautém comprised the “postos” of Laivai, Fuiloro, Loré,
Uato-Carabau (also as Watu Carbau), Tutuala, and Iliomar.

Colónia de Timor – Divisão Administrava (1941) 160

The Lautém Circunscrição was governed by an “ajunta local” comprising the
Portuguese Administrator, a Chinese businessman who coordinated commercial aspects,
and an approved elected adviser.161 At this time, the Posto of Iliomar, was reported as being
administered by a Portuguese “Chefe de Posto” – although sometimes by a “trustworthy
native” as the “Auxiliary Chefe de Posto”162. Many of the Chefes de Posto in Portuguese
Timor held the rank of “civil sergeant/corporal”), and they were assisted by about ten local
police led by a “cabo” (corporal) and also by volunteers, called “moradores”163.
In late 1941, a Viqueque-based oil exploration group travelled eastward along the
south coast, past Ilomar [sic], and through to the area of Lore. Approaching Ilomar the
group “had to leave the coastal plain and climb a thousand feet to get around a limestone
fatu (raised rocky area, differing in contour from the surrounding landscape) that extends
from Iliomar right to the sea. We had expected to reach Ilomar military post that day, and
had climbed high into the hills expecting at every turn to see it. When we finally located it,
we saw that to reach it we still had a river to cross and a mountain to climb. … Deciding
not to visit the inhospitably located Ilomar, we descended next morning to the coast.”164

160
Fontoura, A. da, O Trabalho dos Indígenas de Timor, Agência Geral dos Colónias, Lisboa, 1942 – by the
former Governor of Portuguese Timor. It also includes a map of the “Projected Administrative Divisions”.
Both maps also appear in De Castro, G.P., Timor – subsidos para a sua história, Agência Geral das Colónias,
Lisboa, 1944.
161
Lee, R., “Portuguese Timor …”, 1999, p.80 citing the Archer Report. Archer also noted that there were 11
times as many European civil servants in Portuguese Timor as there were in Dutch Timor.
162
See Terrain Study No 50, Area Study of Portuguese Timor, 27 February 1943: p.67.
163
Moradores were “native troops enlisted by the kingdoms (“reinos”) and equipped by the chiefs (“chefes”)
- Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, p.33, footnote 1. Earlier, moradores were a “second-line”
local militia force, but by 1940 appear to have been relegated to a lesser support function – eg assisting as
local police, distributing mail etc. For a history of “Second-Line” (Segunda Linha) militia, see Sales Grade,
E.A., “Timor: O Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha”, Revista Militar, 26 (4-5), February 1974, Lisboa, pp.198-
215.
164
St. Clair, S, “Timor – a Key to the Indies”, The National Geographic Magazine, Vol. LXXXIV, No.3,
September 1943, p.378.
37

A map published in 1944 (see below) shows Iliomar as an area with “Palmeiras
mais importantes” (important palm trees) – ie, copra-producing. Rubber-growing
(borracha) is also indicated to the west at Uato-Carabau, Uatolari and Beaço.165

Timor - Coffee, Rubber, Copra : Correia, A. P., Timor de lés a lés, Lisbon

WORLD WAR II

In anticipation of a Japanese occupation of Portuguese Timor, a combined Dutch
and Australian force from Kupang – initially about 450-strong, conducted a “protective
occupation”, landing at Dili on 19 December 1941.166 Subsequently, Japanese forces
landed at Dili on 20 February 1942 and gradually extended their control eastwards.167

165
Correia, A. P., Timor de lés a lés, Lisbon, 1944, p.464 – this map is attributed to H. Felgas – connect with
footnote 135 ie the 1929 map that indicated rubber-growing on the Iliomar coast.
166
For an official commentary on the “protective occupation” and the preceding fear of Japanese influence,
see Conference of Australian and New Zealand Ministers on Pacific Affairs, Pacific Conference Papers,
Section 1 - No 3, “Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, January 1944 (NAA: M2319, 4). See also Frei, H.P.,
“Japan’s reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor: 1 January 1942 – 20 February 1942”, Australian
Historical Studies, Vol 27 Issue 107, Melbourne, October 1996, pp.281-302. In 1941, the Governor of
Portuguese Timor - Captain Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, estimated the Portuguese population as
about 300, including “slightly under 100 deportados” – with the majority of the Portuguese population
living in Dili and “with a staff of 10 or 11 European officals” in each of the six circunscrições - L.H.Q. (Aust)
M.I., Descriptive Report on Timor, Brisbane, 28 May 1942 (NAA: A981, TIM P 23, p.17).
167
Earlier on 8 February 1942, two Japanese fighter aircraft had attacked Dili. The major Dutch/Australian
force in West Timor was also attacked on 20 February – and by 23 February had been defeated. The principal
Japanese formation occupying Timor was the Japanese 48th Division headquartered in Kupang with its 47th
Infantry Regiment (arrived as a replacement in period August-November 1942) and the 2nd Formosan/
Taiwanese Infantry Regiment operating in Portuguese Timor. According to Australian records, Japanese
troop strength in Timor reportedly peaked at about 48,000, was 22,000 in February 1944 - but declined to less
than 8,000 by mid-1945. For a comprehensive bibliographic publication, see Goto, Ken’ichi (Forum
Organizer), Materials on East Timor during World War II, The Forum for Historical Documents on East
Timor during the Japanese Occupation Period, Ryukei Shyosha, Tokyo, 2008. For a general description of
38

During the War, both the Japanese and Australian forces recruited local Timorese
auxiliaries – and there were several “uprisings” against the Portugues administration
including in Fronteira, Maubisse, and Aileu.168
Australian commandos fighting the Japanese operated briefly in Iliomar, but almost
all the Australian military activity in Portuguese Timor occurred further west.169
An Australian military report (“Terrain Study”) noted that the telephone was
connected to Iliomar, and that the Portuguese government buildings comprised district
offices, a rest house, doctor’s house, hospital and store.170 The principal route to Iliomar
was from Lautém on the northern coast, through Fuiloro, Los Palos and Loré and then
along the southern coast. A track and the telephone line connected Iliomar northwards with
Luro (Track 48) and on to Lautém (Tracks 48 and 48a) – with Track 46 from Luro to
Fuiloro and Los Palos. Another track led westwards Iliomar along the southern coast
through Elomar to Uato-Carabau – see Annex D, and Iliomar was also linked to Uato-
Carabau by telephone line.
From August 1942, H Detachment of the Australian 2/2 Independent Company
(commandos) under Lieutenant C. Doig operated eastward from its base at Ossú (north of
Viqueque Town) on reconnaissance missions and also trained Timorese elements to resist
the Japanese. A separate smaller Australian group, “Z Special Unit’s” “Lizard II” party171 -
averaging seven Australians and led by a Captain172, was tasked with information-gathering
and encouraging resistance by Portuguese elements and Timorese against the Japanese
occupation. On 2 September 1942, the Lizard II Party landed at Beaço (about 18 km south
of Viqueque Town) and began operations in the eastern end of the Island with local
“partisans”. Its activities at times “overlapped” with those of the 2/2 Australian
Independent Company – and that sub-unit’s replacement, the 2/4 Independent Company.

Japanese operations see Colonel Tatsuichi Kaida’s report: “Personal Opinion … on Japanese Military
Operations”, 25 January 1946.
168
For detail on the Australian operations in Portuguese Timor – including the operations of Z Special Force,
see: Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations in East Timor during World War II,
Point Lonsdale – Australia, 2010. Annex G of that publication – “Native Uprisings and Assistance to
Australian Forces” includes the December 1942 “McCabe Attitudes Map”.
169
H Detachment of Sparrow Force (2/2 Independent Company), commanded by Lieutenant C. Doig,
operated sporadically into Lautém District from a base initially at Viqueque and later (from late August) at
Ossú Rua (about 90 km northwest of Iliomar) - see Wray, C.C.H., 1987, p.142 ; and Doig, C.D., 1986,
pp.139-149. For a summary of Sparrow/Lancer Force provided to the Australian Prime Minister and War
Cabinet - see Headquarters Northern Territory Force, Report of the Operations of Lancer Force in Portuguese
Timor, Darwin, 1 March 1943 (NAA: MP729/6, 74/401/124). After the withdrawal of the Independent
Companies (2/2 in December 1942; 2/4 in January 1943), “S Force” (briefly) and “Z Special Unit” (SRD -
Services Reconnaissance Department) commandos (including Portuguese and Timorese personnel) operated
into eastern Portuguese Timor but with little success – see NAA: A3269, D6/A for “Operation Lizard”. For
“Operation Adder” which landed near Loré (Cape Ile Hoi) on 21 August 1944 for reconnaissance of the
Fuiloro airfield (active from 11 December 1942) see Courtney, 1993, p.220 ; and NAA: A3269, D29/A and
D29/B. All SRD operations are related in Powell, A., War by Stealth, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, 1996 - with Operation Adder covered at pp.140-141.
170
See Terrain Study No 50: Area Study of Portuguese Timor, 1943, p.69 - the Study also includes maps,
sketches and air photographs.
171
Lizard Force, directed by the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD), was the first Australian
“special operation” in the South West Pacific area and operated in eastern Portuguese Timor in the period 2
September 1942-11 February 1943 - see SRD, The Official History … Vol II, Operations, 8 March 1946
(NAA: A3269, O8/A). See also Powell, A., War by Stealth, 1996. The activities of Lieutenant F. Holland’s
Lizard team in the Mount Legumau and Matebian areas are also related in Stone, P. (ed), El Tigre: Frank
Holland M.B.E. …, Ocean Enterprises, Yarrom, 1999.
172
Initially by Captain I.S. Wylie until his evacuation on 23 October 1942 when Capt D.K. Broadhurst took
command.
39

On 17 August 1942, Japanese aircraft bombed the Iliomar Town area.173 Many
postos throughout Portuguese Timor were bombed at the time in a campaign to intimidate
the chefes and villagers from supporting the Australian forces.174 Three bombs exploded
southeast of the Posto building in Iliomar: one on the present-day soccer field, and two
near the present-day Iliomar Primary School; while another exploded near the house of the
present-day Sub-District Administrator Abílio Pinto. There were no casualties in the attack.
In mid-late 1942, according to Iliomar elders, a local notable - Agusto Seixas
Miranda,175 reportedly guided eight Australian soldiers, presumably of H Detachment 2/2
Independent Company, through Iliomar, Loré, and Fuiloro to Tutuala where the Australians

173
Jones, S., Report of theTrack from Uato Carabau to Ilomar via the Anchorage of Tiro-Liu, 11 September
1942 (AWM 54, 571/4/19).
174
Ibid, the postos at Uato-Carabau and Fuiloro were also bombed on 17 August. Following the air attack on
the Fuiloro Posto in August, the Chefe moved to “Loes Fala” (Los Palos) with his Timorese wife and re-
established the Posto, including the telephone link, in Los Palos.
175
The father of Gaspar Seixas Miranda, Agusto was a local traditional leader – ie a regedor, who became
village chief of Iliomar II in 1964.
40

reportedly met a submarine.176 One week later, three (or five) Australians visited Iliomar
for discussions with the Chefe de Posto, João Braz (Portuguese, first corporal – artillery) -
chefe of both the Uato-Carabau and Iliomar Postos – see footnotes 150 and153) and were
then guided by Agusto Seixas Miranda to Jaco Island to again meet with a submarine – but
on this journey they travelled via Luro and to the north of Los Palos to avoid Japanese
troops and hostile locals. This may have been the patrol led by Sergeant A. Coupland in
August - or, more likely, the patrol led by Corporal S. Jones in mid-September 1942 which
reconnoitred the tracks from Uatolari (also as “Watu Lari” and also known as “Leça”) to
Tiro-liu (Elomar) – see Annex D; from Watu-Carbau to Iliomar; from Iliomar to Luro; and
from Iliomar to Vai-Lai-Vai (Silvicola) and Daenamo/ Loré.177 When visiting Iliomar on
13 September, Corporal Jones noted that the “people were friendly”, but that the Chefe de
Posto was “absent, residing at Watu Carbau” and that the “telephone boy was in charge”.
He noted that the “once well-formed horse track” north to Luro (36 kilometres) “was now
in disrepair”.
At about this time, Pedro Jerónimo of Iliomar (Ailebere) – a traditional leader,
established a liaison system to the Australians and Portuguese in the Ossú area (north of the
Viqueque Posto) through Dirinu (west of Larimi). Several Iliomar leaders also attended
“flag loyalty” ceremonies conducted at Uaibobo near Ossú by Sergeant António Martins178,
a Portuguese Army senior NCO.
According to an Australian military report, Japanese troops occupied Lautém in
force in November 1942 and in the period 15-17 November incited the local Timorese in
killing the Portuguese Administrator of the Lautém Circunsrição - Secretário Manuel
Arroio Estansilau de Barros, his wife (D. Maria das Dores Barros) and two Portuguese
civilian deportados (António Teixeira, Mário Gonçalves).179 A Portuguese history relates
the killing of Barros and his wife on 17 November 1942.180

176
This may have been the party led by Sergeant Freeman that reportedly travelled via Com to Kisar island
(AWM 54, 571/4/19).
177
Jones, S., Reconnaissance Report on the Track from Iliomar to Luro, 13 September 1942. Australian War
Memorial file AWM 54 571/4/19 - “Sparrow Force – Reconnaissance Reports of the South Coast of
Portuguese Timor”, contains the route reconnaissance reports mentioned in the passages above -including
sketch maps (Viqueque town, Betano, Aliambata, Beaço, Laga, Dia-name, Luro – but the sketch map of
Iliomar is missing from the file). The “Jones’ reports” consider Tiro-Liu and Elomar as one location. The
name of Tirilolo – a povoação of Cainliu village that became a discrete village itself in 1971, may have been
taken from “Tiro-Liu” – as the people of Tirilolo still retain an association with the Tiro-Liu/Elomar area.
178
António Lourenço da Costa Martins – sometimes incorrectly as “Martines” – see also footnote 194.
179
Manuel Barros was noted as a Secretário de Circunsrição in March 1936 – BOdT, No.11, 14 March 1936;
and on 9 July 1936 was appointed to the position of the acting Administrador de Circunsrição - BOdT,
No.26, 18 July 1936, until 22 January 1937 when he was transferred to the appointment of Secretário de
Circunsrição of Manatuto – BOdT, No.5, 30 January 1937 (Vírgilio Castilho Duarte was appointed Lautém
Administrador). Barros was appointed acting (Servindo de) Administrador de Circunsrição de Lautém in
November 1939 - BOdT , No.46, 18 November 1939, p.632. Carvalho, J., Vida e Morte em Timor – durante a
Segunda Guerra Mundial, Livraria Portugal, Lisboa, 1972 - provides detail on the deaths of Portuguese
during the Japanese occupation. A third deportado (Raúl Dias Monteiro) may also have been killed at Fuiloro
at this time (but see also footnote 195). Duarte, a Timorese collaborator, reportedly replaced Barros.
Following an earlier Japanese-instigated massacre of Portuguese officials - including the Portuguese military
commander – Capitain Freire da Costa, and his wife by Timorese at Aileu on 1 October 1942 (see Callinan,
B.J. Major, Report …, 3 November 1942; Brito, F.G. de, Tata-mai-lau: Timor contra o Japão1941-45,
Iniciativas Editoriais, Lisbon, 1977), the Portuguese recognised the Japanese occupation and accepted their
edict in late October for “protective concentration”. The Japanese reportedly often used natives - recruited
principally from West Timor and termed “colunas negras” (“black columns”), to harass the Portuguese and
Australians. A black column was reportedly involved in the Aileu massacre related above. Portuguese
officials and civilians were then moved to “internment” areas on the north coast west of Dili at Liquiça,
Maubara – and the nearby hill village of Bazar Tete, and in Oecusse – see Liberato, A.O., Os Japoneses
Estiveram Em Timor II – A Zona De Concentração, Empresa Nacional da Publicade, Lisboa, 1951, pp.153-
41

At about this time, according to Iliomar elders, the Iliomar Chefe de Posto, João
Braz, directed the Iliomar leaders to travel to Vailao (near Ossú in present-day northern
Viqueque) to meet with a senior Portuguese officer, “Lieutenant Colonel Ruas”. Ruas
reportedly ordered the leaders to support the Australians and the “free” Portuguese forces
against the Japanese - and the Iliomar leaders returned to Iliomar to prepare their weapons.
On their return, they convened a meeting at Ailebere, but this broke up prematurely when
news arrived that a Japanese force, with Timorese levies, was advancing along the coast
from Loré into Iliomar. The villagers fled into the forest and the Chefe de Posto moved to
Uato-Carabau181. The Japanese - with locally-recruited Timorese from Los Palos, Tutuala
and Loré seized control of the Iradarate area on Iliomar’s south coast, the principal corn
and rice growing region of Iliomar. The Iliomar leaders reportedly called for assistance
from the Australians and the Portuguese, but were initially rebuffed. Subsequently, led by
João Hornay (of Cainliu), the Iliomar leaders were called to Ossú Rua (in present-day
northern Viqueque) where Liurai Sicometa and a Portuguese soldier issued then with 10
rifles – as noted earlier, Ossú Rua was also the headquarters of Lieutenant C.Doig’s H Det
of 2/2 Independent Company. The weapons were distributed with two rifles for Iliomar I
village, three for Iliomar II, two for Cainliu, two for Ailebere, and one for Fuat. Corporal
Horta, a Portuguese soldier, reportedly returned with the leaders to Iliomar to “legalize” the
transfer of the weapons. However, on return to Iliomar, when news came of an impending
Japanese attack on Baguia, nine of the rifles were recovered from the Iliomar group and
taken to Baguia – leaving one rifle with João Hornay of Cainliu. Soon after, on hearing that
an allied submarine would be landing weapons for the Australians at Aliambata on the
coast southeast of Viqueque town, the Iliomar leaders travelled there to seek replacement
rifles. However, after waiting for two nights without any contact, they returned to Iliomar.
Subsequently, as the Japanese attack on Baguia did not eventuate, the Iliomar group were
called back to Ossú Rua and re-issued with their nine rifles.182
In November 1942, Lizard Force’s Lieutenant J.E. Grimson183 – known locally as
the “Tiger”, led patrols into Iliomar and Loré; and a Portuguese force led by Sergeant
Martins with eight Portuguese soldiers, up to 80 Timorese, a handful of Chinese soldiers
and assisted by Matos e Silva (Chefe de Posto of Quelicai/Laga)184 “covered Baguia, Watu
Kerbau (sic), Loré, Elomar, Aliambata, and Watu Lari. Small detachments were maintained
in the areas of Baguia, Watu Kerbau and Tualo and intelligence reconnaissances made

208. In March 1945, a Japanese report noted 777 Portuguese and “half-castes” interned – together with 245 of
their “Timorese employees” (including 58 Portuguese/half castes in Dili) – Butai Unit Headquarters, Timor
Island Military Topographical Book, p.32 (AWM 54, 929/1/1). A Portuguese administrator – José Duarte
Santa, has written that 521 Portuguese (287 male and 234 female) were interned in the “campos de
concentração de Liquiça e de Maubara” - Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra
Mundial 1941-1945, Notícias Editorial, Lisboa, 1997, p.164. According to the first post-WWII Australian
Consul in Dili, “all pre-war records of the Portuguese Government in Timor have been destroyed by the
Japanese” – Australian Consulate, Letter No 8, Dili, 18 May 1946 (NAA: A1067, IC46/33/3/13/1).
180
Carvalho, J. dos Santos, Vida e Morte em Timor – Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Livraria Portugal,
Lisboa, 1972, p.129.
181
In 1942, João Braz/Brás was the Encarregado/Chefe of both the Uato-Carabau and Iliomar Postos.
182
This may relate to the 100 rifles landed at Aliambata on 13 October 1942 for distribution by Lizard Force.
183
Grimson, and Sergeant E.H. Gregg, were later killed in a clash with Japanese troops near the south coast at
Waiyara, west of Loré, on 22 August 1944 when leading a Z Special Unit (SRD) reconnaissance mission,
Operation Adder. Two Portuguese SRD personnel were also killed: José Z. Rebello, José Carvalho; and a
Timorese SRD operative, A. Fernandes (NAA: A3269, D29/A and D29/B).
184
Augusto Leal Matos e Silva – a Portuguese civil servant, had served as the Chefe de Posto at Maubisse,
Remexio, Laclubar, and Laga.
42

Eastwards to Loré and Westwards to Beaço. Large numbers of friendly natives were
maintained as a screen to the East of the main body”.185
In late December 1942, the Japanese Army’s 2nd Formosan/Taiwanese Infantry
Regiment (FIR) arrived in Lautém – having disembarked in Dili on 7 December.186 The 2
FIR headquarters was located in Lautém (Vila Nova Malaca), its 2nd Battalion in Vila Aviz
(Fuiloro) and its 3rd Battalion at Com – totalling about 2,200 troops. Support units included
a tank battalion, artillery, logistic units and the 1,800-strong 7th Air Division (an Army
formation).187 In Lautém, the Japanese established a major airfield on the northern coast at
Lautém (7,000 feet) to east of Lautém town and another a few kilometres along the coast to
the east at Cape Chater (6,200 feet, 5,000 feet) with a capacity also for flying boats. Inland
from Lautém on the plateau at Fuiloro, near the then Portuguese Posto, the Japanese also
constructed a main airfield (5,000 feet – dry weather only) ie the present-day airstrip near
Raça (Rasa), north of Los Palos town. An emergency landing strip was also constructed on
the southern coast west of Loré at Daename/Saenamo, and a radar station was also
established on a hill behind Loré. Allied aircraft regularly attacked the Japanese airstrips
and installations in Lautém District.
In mid-January 1943, Japanese forces advanced westwards through Iliomar despite
a small Portuguese screening force at Elomar and seriously threatened the Australian
Operation Lizard force – which disbanded its native auxiliaries on 20 January 1943.188
Probably in very late 1942 or early 1943, a combined force of Timorese from
Iliomar (1,000 men led by João Hornay, Agusto Seixas Miranda and Pedro Jerónimo) and
Uato-Carabau (600 men led by Coon) moved into southern Loré to attack Japanese
positions near the coast at Dai-name/Saenamo – about eight kilometres west of Loré. The
attacking Iliomar/Uato-Carabau force had been told that the Japanese were only armed with
wooden spears - and were therefore surprised when they encountered barbed wire, trenches
and machine guns.189 Seven men from Iliomar were killed in the attack, and many later
died of wounds - and the Uato-Carabau leader was also killed. Soon after, a Japanese
officer led a large force of Timorese levies from Los Palos, Tutuala and Loré in a
retaliatory attack into Iliomar, advancing through Hedan and Fuat. Several Iliomar men
were killed and captured in the fighting in the Iliomar Town area - which the Japanese
force then controlled for about two days. Subsequently, peace talks were arranged at Acara
sub-village - but these failed due to mutual suspicions. Eventually following three days of
peace negotiations with the Iliomar chiefs on the southern coast, the Japanese-led force
withdrew – taking with them a number of buffaloes as reparations.
A Lizard Force report to Australian Army Headquarters related that the “Jap
instigated natives attacking Iliomar natives who defend themselves and ask our protection.
If unaided, we lose their confidence and no confidence spreads”.190 A later Australian “Z
185
Captain D.K. Broadhurst, Lizard Force Summary Report, 8 March 1943 (NAA: A3269, D6/A, p.85).
186
2 FIR’s 750-strong 1st Battalion did not deploy to Lautém but was located in Kupang. East District Corps
(Lautém) was under the command of Colonel Tanaka Toru with a HQ 48 Infantry Group element at Lautém.
187
Detailed data, including unit nomenclatures, has been provided by Takahashi Shigehito – email to author,
18 February 2008. Army aircraft from the 7th Air Division participated in attacks on northern Australia in
June 1943. Total Japanese troops in East District (Lautém) as at February 1944 reportedly numbered 6,955.
By August 1945, total Japanese military strength on the island of Timor was about 8,000 – with 5,000
planned for withdrawal to Sumbawa due to food shortages in Timor – SRD Report 368, 31 August
1945(NAA: A3269, H1).
188
Broadhurst, D.K., Lizard III Report, 8 March 1943 (NAA: A3269, D/6A, p.91).
189
In his December 1946 report, the Australian Consul in Dili noted that the Japanese defensive works at the
Point Loré beach-head were “the best defensive works I have seen in Timor. The earth and wire works were
extensive” – Eaton, C., Consul, Despatch No. 16, p.3, 4 December 1946 (NAA: A 377/1/3 Part I, p.77).
Eaton, as a RAAF Group Captain, had flown bombing missions to Timor during WWII – including to Loré.
190
Australian Army HQ letter 1537-9, 12 December 1942 (NAA: A3269, D6/A, p.47).
43

Special Unit” field report of December 1942 noted “the Japs in Lautém have turned the
natives loose there, but sometimes Jap-led. These natives have raided Baguia and Iliomar –
pillaging, rustling and killing. The natives must either flee or defend themselves. This they
have been doing, but the matter which vexes us most is that they appeal to us to aid them. If
we fail them, we are damned for ever, yet the help we can give can only be niggling and of
no permanence and is only likely to incite the Japs to make a show themselves. We are
trying to give them help without exposing ourselves as the source. This pillaging is
certainly a weapon in our hands if we can use it, but it is going to be very difficult. Failing
substantial help from us, the natives may turn to the Japs for protection. At the moment,
with power on their side, the Japs play native against native in the hope – and they may –
that they may get them all and expose us as feeble. Lautém should have been developed by
us. The Japs have a free hand there.”191
According to Iliomar elders, later in early 1943, a Japanese force – including
vehicles, and with a large number of levies from Los Palos, Loré and Tutuala, entered
Iliomar from Loré and again occupied southern Iliomar. All local youth were mobilised as
paid labour, and the motorable coastal road was extended westwards into Uato-Carabau.
The Japanese declared that they were not attacking Iliomar, but rather only seeking out
Australian and Portuguese soldiers. The Japanese force established an encampment on the
southern coast at Elomar – Elomar was about 8 kilometres west of present-day Iliomar II
village (see the map at Annex D).

Elomar – Japanese military encampment 192

191
Captain D.M. Broadhurst, Project 24 - Report from 152 received 2 January 1943 (NAA: A3269, D6/A,
p.31). For a report on the Japanese-led attack by Lautém “natives” on Baguia, see also File D6/A, p.133.
192
In 1979, a Japanese WWII military veteran - Shōgorō Nishimura, published a 78-page Japanese-language
monograph – Eromaru monogatari (Elomar story).This map - and translated extracts from the monograph,
were passed to the author by a Japanese historian – Takahashi Shigehito in January 2009. For a larger copy of
the map – with a legend, see Annex D.
44

All five Iliomar village chiefs were arrested by the Japanese and tortured for
information at Alfanik/Samaliu (ie, Elomar) – including João Hornay. João Hornay193 and
Agusto Seixas Miranda were also put on trial, but released after four days following the
surrender to the Japanese of the 10 rifles.
By this time, the Australian forces and the “free” Portuguese were only operating to
the west in present-day southern Viqueque District. The Australian Lizard II group was
withdrawn from Timor on 10 February 1943, but a “Portuguese” Lizard force - totalling
about 60 with a small number of Portuguese and led by Sergeant Martins, remained active
in the Viqueque area and westward until evacuated to Australia on 3 August 1943.194
João Braz195, the Iliomar/Uato-Carabau Chefe de Posto - and his deputy, José Pinto,
were reportedly captured by Japanese troops near Boropai or Samakeo (west of present-day
Tirilolo village). José Pinto was shot and killed, and João Braz was taken to Elomar by the
Japanese, then to Lautém and Com – but his subsequent fate is unknown to Iliomar
villagers.196 According to the “Eromaru monogatari”, Antonio Caisara (?) – a village chief,
was also killed by the Japanese military. The “monogatari” also mentions “local chiefs”:
Joao of Cainliu, Manu Bei of Fuat, Pedro of Permel (?), Lihimata (?) of Sigonda (?) and
Mau Dori (?) of Rikul (?).

THE RE-OCCUPATION OF TIMOR

Portugal’s President Salazar told the British Government on 23 June 1943 that
Portugal wished to collaborate in any operations with the object of “reconquering or re-
occupying Timor.”197 In late November 1944, the British Government formally agreed “to

193
Post-War, the “liurai of Iliomar, João Hornai” was formally commended by the Governor for his defence
of the Portuguese and their interests during the Japanese occupation – see the following footnote 215.
194
For a detailed summary of subsequent Australian “special operations” in Timor see: Services
Reconnaissance Department (SRD), The Official History … Vol II, Operations, 8 March 1946 (NAA: A3269,
O8/A, pp. 10-42). Sergeant 2nd Class António Lourenço da Costa Martins was subsequently detained in
December 1943 by Australian authorities in Darwin and subsequently interned in South Australia until his
repatriation to Portugal in November 1945.
195
The wife of João Braz - Maria dos Santos Braz (b. Fatu Loda) was evacuated to Australia from the south
coast and resided at Bob’s Farm – Newcastle (up to 5 January 1944 – NAA file: A373, 3685C, p.155); then
departed Newcastle on SS Angola for Dili on 27 November 1945 aged 34 with her children: Maria da Graca -
13, Joao Batista - 11, Tereza -9, Antonio - 7, and Joaquina - 5 (all mestico); and Francisco (baby - relative) –
NAA File: A367, C63656, p.14. Sra Braz died in Dili in 1952 and is buried beside her husband João Braz.
196
These events were recounted to the author in Iliomar in 2003 by Iliomar elders. João Braz is also noted as
being shot and killed in Uato-Carabau “in August 1945” - Carvalho, J., Vida e Morte em Timor …, 1972,
p.129; but p.203 records João Braz and a deportado (Raúl Dias Monteiro) as killed in Iliomar (see also
footnote 179 for Monteiro being killed at Fuiloro). An Australian military SRD report stated: “Braz – he is a
corporal, chief of the Post, beloved by the natives. I hope he is still alive and will be able to manage the
people of Huato-Lari (sic)” (NAA: A3269, D27/A). Later Australian military reports record João Braz/Brás
as killed by the Japanese for his support of the Australian troops. Matos e Silva (Augusto Leal de Matos e
Silva) - Chefe de Posto of Laga/Quelicai, and Adriano Corte Real - Chefe de Posto of Uatolari also supported
the Australians and both were killed by the Japanese – see “List of Portuguese Subjects Who Assisted the
Allied Forces During the Japanese During the Japanese Occupation of Timor” (NAA: A1838, 377/3/3/6 Part
1). Matos e Silva served with the Australian SRD Lizard and Lagarto parties – see NAA: A3269, 08/A and
07/A. Interviews of two survivors of the Lagarto party (Patrício de Luz - Portuguese, Lieutenant Jim Ellwood
- Australian) are in Turner, M., Telling – East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992, New South Wales
University Press, Kensington, 1992.
197
Salazar, A. de O. Dr, President of the Council, Semi-Official Statement, Lisbon, 29 September 1945
(NAA: 377/3/1, Part 1, pp.215-223). This Statement on Portuguese policy during World War II was released
to the media on 7 October – see The Times, London, 9 October 1945 and “Portugal Explains Why She Did
45

the participation of Portugal in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the
Japanese from Portuguese Timor in order that the territory may be restored to full
Portuguese sovereignty. It recognizes that such participation can be effected in direct and
indirect form.”198
In mid-March 1945 the British – responding to a Portuguese proposal, requested
that Australia host a Portuguese “training cadre” and an eventual “Portuguese
Expeditionary Force” of about 4,000 troops for military operations to recover Portuguese
Timor from the Japanese.199 The Australian military undertook detailed studies on the
hosting of the proposed Portuguese force – including costings, and considered two
locations for the necessary training bases (Sellheim and Rockhampton in Queensland).200
However, following consideration of the proposal’s “practicability” by the Australian
Defence Committee, the Australian War Cabinet determined: “In regard to the proposal
that 4,000 Portuguese troops should be received, trained and maintained in Australia to
participate in the liberation of Timor, War Cabinet was averse to undertaking a further
commitment to provide requirements for this force, having regard to existing commitments
on Australian resources.”201
Subsequently, the British advised Australia on 10 August 1945 that the Portuguese
Government sought to send two naval sloops to Australia to participate in any operations
against Portuguese Timor or in any “general surrender”. The Australian Government was
reluctant to accept any Portuguese participation in surrender ceremonies in Timor as
Portugal had not been a belligerent in the conflict.202 On 5 September, the Portuguese
Governor - Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, took “control” of the remaining 150 Japanese
troops in Portuguese Timor.203 However, the surrender of all Japanese military in Timor -
ie in both the Dutch and Portuguese halves, was taken by an Allied officer (Australian
Brigadier L.G.H. Dyke) in Kupang on 11 September. His party then travelled to Dili in five
naval vessels on 23 September, and Brigadier Dyke formally advised Governor Carvalho of

Not Fight”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 8 October 1945 (NAA: A2937, 268). Earlier in July 1943,
the Australian High Commission in London reported that: “Whenever the United Nations had a plan for
liberating the archipelago, he ((Salazar)) would wish Portugal to participate in the operation to oust the
Japanese from Portuguese Timor.” Evatt, H.V., Australian High Commission – London, Aide-Memoire EC
28, 1 July 1943, reporting Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar (NAA: A5954, 2253/1 p.3). Australian Prime
Minister Curtin then stated that Australia was “glad to be associated” with “general assurances” of Portuguese
post-war sovereignty over Portuguese Timor and noted “with satisfaction the proposal that Portuguese troops
be associated with United Nations forces which will ultimately undertake the liberation of Timor” – Cable
O.18024/51, Canberra, 3 July 1943 (NAA: A5954, 2253/1, p.236). The foregoing Australian position was
formally advised to the Portuguese Government vide British Embassy – Lisbon, Q.41/1/9 No.16, 14
September 1943 (NAA: A5954, 2253/1, p.214).
198
Salazar, A. de O. Dr, Note to British Ambassador, Lisbon, 28 November 1944 – repeating the content of
British Ambassador’s note of the same date, and accepting such as an agreement (NAA: A1838, 377/3/3/3;
A5954 2253/1. p. 84 and pp.5-6). “Direct participation” would be by “Portuguese forces. Portugal’s “indirect
form” of participation ie the granting of “concessions” in the Azores for the use of US and British aircraft,
was also noted.
199
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Cable 72, London, 13 March 1945 (NAA: A1838, 377/3/3/3).
200
Joint Administrative Planning Sub-Committee, JAPSC/16/45, 14 May 1945 (NAA: A1838, 377/3/3/3) –
“Portugal has not been at war with the Japanese and has no claim to accept or participate in acceptance of
surrender. We are however willing that the Governor should be present at the surrender formalities as
representing Portuguese civil authorities”.
201
War Cabinet Minute 4223 – Review of the Direct War Effort, Canberra, 31 May1945 – advised to the
Dominions Office, London vide Telegram 158, 16 June 1945 (NAA: A2937, 268 – p.17).
202
Australian Government, Telegram 269 (to the Dominions Office, London), Canberra, 3 September 1945
(NAA: A2937, 268).
203
Emperor Hirohito had earlier made an initial broadcast accepting surrender on 15 August and issued a
surrender rescript to Japanese troops on 17 August 1945.
46

the surrender arrangements completed in Kupang and assumed control of the Japanese
military in Portuguese Timor.204

POST-WAR PORTUGUESE RULE

The 1940s

After the War, Acting Governor Óscar Freira de Vasconcelos Ruas205 directed the
re-establishment of the town of Dili - ie as “Nova Dili”, at Cutulau on the hills to the south
at a height of 800 metres above-sea-level (ASL). Governor Ruas cited Dili’s
“completamente destruida” during the War - and the need for a more healthy locality
(“local salubre”).206 Most of the commercial infrastructure and activities however, were to
remain in the "old" Dili by the bay.
In 1946, for security and strategic reasons, the re-established Portuguese
administration moved the capital of Lautém District from Vila Nova Malaca (Lautém) on
the northern coast to the centrally-located town of Los Palos (La Pala) on the central
plateau – “a more central and healthier location.”207 The visiting Australian Consul noted
that the Administrator of the Lautém Circumscription (ie, District) - Olimpio Augusto
Gonçalves, was “an energetic man, but his manner in dealing with the natives seemed to
me most severe. He drives them considerably and without doubt the natives of the district
are frightened of him.”208
A small number of Indonesian sources209 refer to a “Los Palos Rebellion 1945-
1949” These sources also claim that the Portuguese authorities put down the “Rebellion”
and perpetrated a “Los Palos Massacre” – but no detail is offered on these alleged events.
Undoubtedly, some retribution was taken in the Los Palos area by the Portuguese on their
return to power for, as noted earlier, on 15 November 1942, the Portuguese Administrator
204
A detailed description of events can be found in Forsyth, W.D. (political advisor to Brigadier L.G.H.
Dyke), “Timor – II: The World of Dr. Evatt”, New Guinea, Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia,
May/June 1975, pp. 31-37 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2, pp.82-88). The two Portuguese naval sloops
(Gonçalves Zarco, Bartolomeu Dias) arrived in Dili on 27 September and a troop transport vessel (SS
Angola) arrived on 29 September.
205
Governor Óscar Freire Vasconcelos Ruas was appointed on 23 June 1946.
206
BOdT, No.4, Portaria 1:177 (signed 5 April 1946), 25 January 1947, pp.23-24. The Portaria cited Decreto
No.35:048 of 22 October 1945 and included a short history of earlier attempts to relocate Dili due to
problems of sanitation – and the “80 percent incidence of paludismo ((malaria)) among workers”. However,
during the 1950s, the plan faltered - and central Dili remained at its 1769 location. “Delli” had been cited in
Joseph Conrad’s 1915 novel “Victory: An Island Tale” (Chapter 2) as: “that highly pestilential place” and “a
god-forsaken spot”. “Nova Dili” was to be in the hills about 16km by road from the port. In late December
1941, malaria was “rife” among Australian troops in the Dili area – until they were moved to the higher
altitude of Railaco – Wray, C.C.H., Timor 1942, pp.31-32; AWM54, 571/3/3 Part 4; MP508/1, 211/776/101.
207
“BOdT, Sup 13, 1 April 1947 – including Decree 35:751 and Portaria 1:160, p.118. The circunscrição of
São Domingos was divided into Baucau and Viqueque (20 February 1946).
208
Eaton, C., Australian Consul - Dili, Despatch No 16, p.2, 4 December 1946 – NAA File 377/1/3 Part I,
p.76.
209
Soekanto, Integrasi – Kebulatan Tekad Rakyat Timor Timur (Integration - The Determined Will of the
People of East Timor), Yayasan Parakesit, Jakarta, 1976, p.75 – this publication, which includes an
introduction by Lieutenant General Yoga Soegomo, the Head of the Indonesian State Intelligence
Coordination Agency ie Bakin, claims the “Rebellion” was inspired by Indonesia’s proclamation of
independence and its participants sought integration with Indonesia – p.79. The claims of a “Los Palos
Rebellion 1945-1949” and a “Massacre” are repeated in Rusdie, H., Suratama K. & Soares, A.J.O.,
Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Timor Loro Sa’e, 1997 at p.20 and p.27; and a “Lospalos rebellion” is also
mentioned briefly at p.37 in Cruz, F.X. Lopes da, Kesaksian – Aku dan Timor Timur (A Testimony – East
Timor and I), Yayasan Tunas Harapan Timor Lorosae, 1999, Jakarta.
47

of the Lautém Circunscrição, Manuel de Barros, his wife, and two Portuguese civilians had
been killed by Timorese collaborators incited by the Japanese military.210 Discussions with
elders in Los Palos in 2008 did not corroborate Indonesian claims of a “rebellion” or
“massacre” in the area in the period 1945-1949.211
The first post-war Chefe de Posto of the 1st Class Posto of Iliomar was Jorge
Dargent Pereira Caldas212 - and António Lopes was noted as the ajudante de enfermeiro
auxiliar in the Ambulância de Iliomar.
Also in 1946, the Portuguese Government increased the yearly head tax from the
pre-war rate of six patacas and one month’s work without wages, to 14-16 patacas
(depending on the District). The Timorese were disgruntled by this rise, but the
Government now paid three patacas per month for Government work and provided food.213
In late 1946, the Portuguese Government affected an administrative re-organisation with
Dili declared as a “conselho” and the country comprising 9 “circunscrições” and 50 postos.
Lautém was re-organised with four postos: with Iliomar and Luro as first class postos, and
Lautém and Tutuala as second-class postos.214
In 1947, in a report to the Portuguese Minister for Colonies, the Governor - Manuel
de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, formally commended the “liurai of Iliomar, João Hornai”
for his defence of Portuguese and their interests during the Japanese occupation, including
against “black columns”.215 The Governor noted that: “Despite all the efforts of Japanese to
get my hands on them, the national flags of all the villages of his kingdom were preserved
and presented to the Portuguese on reoccupation. The heads of the villages from Uato-
Carbau ... Fernandes and José Lino Ferreira ... defended and helped in everything that they
could for the Head of Posto João Brás and other Europeans."
The Chefe de Posto in Iliomar in 1947 was Rui Serrão da Veiga Teixeira Lopes.216
In early January 1948, he was replaced temporarily by Aspirante José Vitor Pacheco da
Costa Sequeira (b. 7/4/1925).217 In early 1948, the “south coast” road begun a few years
210
Duarte - a Timorese collaborator, reportedly replaced Barros. The Australian Consul reported that a
“Portuguese half-caste” who was “responsible for Timorese collaboration in the Lautem area … received a
sentence of 10 years – the evidence available did not allow for a heavier sentence”: see Australian Consulate
– Dili, Memo 12/1/1, 8 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1 Part 1). According to a Portuguese official –
José Duarte Santa, “178 Portuguese died of both sexes and all ages, including 14 in the concentration camps
at Liquiça and Maubara.” - Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses …, op.cit., p.164.
211
Advice from Justino Valentim – former CNRT official and local historian/linguist, Los Palos, 27-30
October 2008.
212
BOdT, No.4, 16 November 1946, p.22. “Post-war”, editions of the BOdT recommenced in late October
1946. João Pina – ie João Ferreira de Pina, may have acted as the Chefe de Posto before the appointment of
Caldas - Carvalho, M., Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, Lisboa, 1947, p.659.
213
These head taxes applied to males over 16 years – but there were several exempt categories. The head tax
regulations are detailed in Eaton, C., Consul, Despatch No 2, pp. 7-10, 26 February 1947 (NAA: A1838,
377/1/3 Part I, pp.40-53).
214
Ministry of the Colonies, Decree 35:751, Lisbon, 18 July 1946 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1, pp.142-165). Los
Palos and Loré were subsequently established as Postos, with Loré being disestablished in 1976. In June
1951, by amendment to the Portuguese Constitution, Portuguese Timor’s status was changed from a colony to
an overseas province ie an integral part of metropolitan Portugal. In December 1960, the United Nations
General Assembly declared Portugal’s overseas provinces to be “non-self-governing territories” – 15th
Session, Agenda Item 38, Resolution A/HES/1542 (W) of 21 December 1960 (NAA: A4359, 2211/5/19).
215
Carvalho, M., Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, Lisboa, 1947, p.726. Pedro Jerónimo is also cited
at p.728 as among the “dedicados auxiliaries”assisting the “luirai de Iliomar, João Hornai”.
216
Replaced temporarily by José Victor Pacheco da Costa Sequeira in January 1948 – BOdT, No.2, 10
January 1948, p.25. Sequeira also occupied the position awaiting Fernando Paraizo Guerreiro (b. 24/10/1917)
- BOdT, No.12, 20 March 1948.
217
BOdT, No.2, 10 January 1948, p.25. Frederico José Hoppfer Rego had been nominated as the new
administrator of Iliomar, but was posted to Hato Lia (Ermera) - BOdT, No.5, 2 February 1948, p.46. It is
unclear whether Rego served in Iliomar.
48

earlier by the Japanese from Los Palos through Lore to Iliomar was formally inaugurated
by the Portuguese administration – although very few motorised vehicles were to use the
route in its early years.218 The fare to travel by boat from Dili to “Iliomar, Tualo or
Aliambata” was 12 patacas.219 In March 1948, Aspirante José Sequeira continued as the
Chefe de Posto of Iliomar220 and was confirmed in the position in December.221
In March 1949, Carlos Alberto Monteiro Leite (b. 16/10/1922) was appointed Chefe
de Posto.222 However, he was transferred to Tutuala a few weeks later, and José Vitor
Pacheco da Costa Sequeira returned from Same to be the Chefe at Iliomar.223 Iliomar was
one of four postos in the Lautém Circumscription in 1949 – Iliomar and Luro were first-
class postos, while Lautém and Tutuala were second-class postos. The Boletim noted that
there were 12 postos sanitários in the four eastern circunscrições (Manatuto, Baucau,
Viqueque and Lautém) – including one at Iliomar.224 The Iliomar Posto operated as one of
the 39 estações telefónicas (3rd Class) in the Colony – almost all posto locations.225 For the
Presidential election in February 1949, the following traditional leaders were appointed as
delegates to organise the polls in the Iliomar Posto: João Hornai, Pedro Jerónimo.226 In
August, Coli-Mau – a cipaio (local paramilitary policeman) serving at the Iliomar Posto,
was formally commended by the Governor for his role in capturing several of a group of
criminals operating in the area of the Los Palos-Iliomar road.227 In late 1949, the Chefe de
Posto - José Vitor Pacheco da Costa Sequeira was transferred from Iliomar to Baucau.

The 1950s

On 1 January 1950, Gil Germano Gonçalves Ferreira was noted as the Chefe de
Posto at Iliomar.228 He was replaced on 19 May 1950, by António Ernesto Pires Antunes
(b. 3/2/1927) from Atsabe.229 In November 1950, in preparation for the 1950 population
census, António Jerónimo was appointed “ajudante de recenseador” and Manuel da Costa
was appointed “intérprete” for the Posto de Iliomar.230 In late November 1950, António

218
Articles by Landman, J.R. & Plant H.T., “Notes on Portuguese Timor I & II”, in the Australian magazine,
South Pacific, 1948 also provide descriptions of administration and society in the mid-late 1940s (NAA:
A1838, 376/1/1).
219
BOdT, No.3, 17 January 1948 – Portaria No.1:336, pp.29-30 details passenger fares and freight costs. In
March 1953, the vessel schedule no longer included Iliomar - only Loré and Aliambata with fares of 12 and
13 patacas respectively.
220
BOdT, No.12, 20 March 1948, p.118 - apparently filling a vacancy allotted to Fernando Paraizo Guerreiro
(b. 24/10/1917).
221
BOdT, No.8, 19 February 1949, p. 70 – from 23 December 1948 on the return to Portugal of Fernando
Paraizo Guerreiro -.Anuário do Império Colonial Português, 15a Edição, Empresa Nacional de Publicidade,
1949, p.371.
222
BOdT, No.15, 9 April 1949, p.135. Leite was disciplined for inappropriate political activity in Ainaro
(BOdT, No.40, 1 October 1949, pp.351-352), but “re-admitted” in late 1951 and appointed the Chefe at
Tutuala (BOdT, No.25, 21 June 1951, p.461; BOdT, No.37, 15 September 1951).
223
BOdT, No.21, 21 May, 1949, p.177.
224
BOdT, No.15, Portaria No.1:465 , 9 April 1949, p.135. Examinations were conducted for aspirante entry
and promotion to administration positions ie administrador, secretário, chefe, encarregado. Subjects varied -
but included ethnography, indigenous politics and indigenous languages - BOdT, No.40, Portaria No.1:522, 1
October 1949, pp.348-351.
225
BOdT, No.32, 6 August 1949, p.270.
226
BOdT, No.3, 15 January 1949, Portaria No. 1:435, p.16.
227
BOdT, No.35, 27 August 1949, p.294 – Coli-mau was wounded in the chest by an “azagaia” (spear) in his
confrontation with the criminal group.
228
BOdT, No.1, 7 January 1950, p.4. He may have been appointed some months earlier.
229
BOdT, No. 23, 12 June 1950, p.187.
230
BOdT, No.45, 11 November 1950, p.405. The Census was conducted on 15 December 1950.
49

Antunes was appointed to replace the secretary of the Lautém Circunscrição.231 The
following year, António Antunes was himself replaced as Chefe de Posto at Iliomar by
Jorge Lopes de Rocha Vieira (b. 15/10/1918) in August 1951.232 In November 1951, a
revision of several postos resulted in Iliomar, Baguia, Mape, Same and Fatu-Berliu being
re-designated from 1st Class postos to 2nd Class postos – and Tutuala and Uato-Carabau
were reclassified as 3rd Class.233 In 1952, Eduardo António Vaz de Quina Pinto Crisóstomo
(b. 10/10/1923) was appointed Encarregado de Posto 234 at Iliomar followed in March
1953 by António de Oliveira Leite.235 In November 1954, Leite was transferred to Lautém
and replaced by Filomeno da Cruz Miranda Branco (b. 7/12/1917).236
In 1954, Portuguese Timor was divided into three regions for military
administration: West, Central, and East. Iliomar fell within the Região Leste (Eastern
Region) ie, “Celestino da Silva” covering the Circunscrições of Manatuto, Baucau, Lautém
and Viqueque. The headquarters of the Região Leste was located at Soibada.237
In mid-1955, the Government introduced legislation to impose a “domiciliary tax”
to be paid by all males between the ages of 18 to 60 years.238 This was set at 25 patacas per
annum. An urban land tax (predial urbana)239 and a rural land tax – in the form of an ad-
valorem tax on exported agricultural produce240 , were also introduced at this time. In
September, the prices of locally produced goods were regulated – with prices varying
between Dili and three designated “Zona” in the countryside. Lautém was included in
Zone B – with the exception of Iliomar which was included in the “cheaper” Zone C. 241 On
2 January 1960, with the implementation of the “monetary reform” ie, the currency in
Portuguese Timor was changed from patacas to escudos, and the domiciliary tax rate was
promulgated as 160 escudos per annum.242

231
BOdT, No.6, 10 February 1951, p.120. He may have remained concurrently Chefe at Iliomar.
232
BOdT, No.35, 1 September 1951, p.627.
233
BOdT, No.47, Portaria No.1:730, 24 November 1951, p.770. Luro remained a 1st Class posto. For the
1952 financial year, the monthly salaries of public servants were budgeted as: Encarregado de Posto 2nd
Class (eg Iliomar): 400 patacas; 2nd Corporal sipaio: 23 patacas; and sipaio: 20 patacas - BOdT, No.52 –
Suplemento, 31 December 1951, p.958.
234
BOdT, No.52, 31 December 1952, p.793; BOdT, No.2, 31 January 1953, p.30. 1st Class Postos were
headed by a Chefe de Posto while 2nd and 3rd Class Postos were administered by an Encarregado do Posto.
235
BOdT, No.13, 28 March 1953, p.252.
236
BOdT, No.48, 27 November 1954, p.647. Filomeno da Cruz Miranda Branco – b. 17/12/1910, joined the
public service on 20 September 1945. Filomeno Branco had previously served as Encarregado at Luro in
1949 and in 1952-54. He appears to have been temporarily replaced in Iliomar by João Maria in the period
May-August 1956 when Branco returned to the “Metropole” (ie Portugal) – probably for leave. In the period
April-May 1958, Branco temporarily replaced João Maria at Laga - BOdT, No.16, 19 April 1958, p.240. In
March 1959, Branco was confirmed as an Encarregado de Posto 2nd class – and continued at Iliomar vide
BOdT, No.14, 4 April 1959, p.224.
237
BOdT, No.21, Portaria No.2 036, 21 May 1954, p.280. In 1954, the organisations and establishments of
Portuguese overseas military forces were promulgated in Decreto-Lei 39 541 in BOdT, No.20, 20 May 1954 -
with Timor at pp.231, 239, 246, 248, and 256.
238
Diploma Legislativo No.470, 27 June 1955 (BOdT. Suplemento, No.26, 27 June 1955, pp.539-547) –
because of “economic conditions”, the tax in the Bobonaro and Oe-cusse Circunscrições was less ie 20 and
15 patacas respectively. The domiciliary tax was promulgated by the Lautém Administrator vide BOdT,
No.28, 9 July 1955, p.21; and effective from August 1955.
239
Diploma Legislativo No.471, 27 June 1955 (BOdT. Suplemento, No.26, 27 June 1955, pp.547-571).
240
Diploma Legislativo No.472, 27 June 1955 (BOdT. Suplemento, No.26, 27 June 1955, pp.572-573) – to
take effect from 1 January 1956.
241
BOdT. No.37, 10 September 1955. pp. 746-747. For example, “neli branco” (white rice) was .22 of a
pataca per kilogram in Iliomar - and .24 of a pataca in Los Palos or Luro; and .39 of a pataca in commercial
establishments in Dili.
242
BOdT. No.48, Diploma Legislativo No.563, 28 November 1959, pp. 780-781 (following an initial Decree
dated 6 December 1957). Concessional rates continued for Bobonaro and Oe-cusse. The official exchange
50

In 1959, the administrative divisions of Portuguese Timor were revised, and the
boundaries of the Circunscrições and Postos were promulgated. The Posto of Iliomar
boundaries were: “North – from the confluence of the Tumi-Rau and Beri-Moto streams to
Chirimuni (with the Posto of Luro); South – the Timor Sea from the mouth of the Irabere
River to the mouth of the Namaluto River; West – Chirimuni and Lua-Ira and following the
course of the Namaluto River to its mouth on the Timor Sea (with the “Central Posto”);
East – the course of the Irabere River from a location called Lala-Lá to its mouth on the
Timor Sea”.243

The 1959 “Viqueque Rebellion”

In early June 1959, indignant at Portuguese oppression and injustices, a rebellion
arose against the Portuguese authorities. In Dili, the plan was compromised and the
ringleaders were arrested in early June, taken to Lisbon, and later exiled to Angola and
Mozambique. However, in the Postos of Viqueque, Uatolari and Uato-Carabau (all in
Viqueque Circunscrição) and Baguia (in Baucau Circunscrição), the rebels attacked
Portuguese government offices.244 In the countryside, the rebels were supported by a small
group of Indonesian exiles from the Permesta Rebellion245 - who had fled from Kupang in
March 1958 and been granted political asylum in Portuguese Timor. Several of the
Indonesians collaborated with dissident Timorese and raided the offices of the Viqueque
Circunscrição on 7 June and seized the Postos of Uatolari and Uato-Carabau. On 11 June,
a rebel attack on the Baguia Posto was repelled by the Portuguese and, within two weeks,
the “Viqueque Rebellion” had been put down. The uprising was reportedly “apparently
fomented by the Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub, who organised and presided over secret
meetings in Dili of certain disgruntled elements of the population … It seems certain that
the Consul was not acting under instructions from Jakarta.”246 The Timorese leaders of the
Rebellion were Luís da Costa Rego and João Pereira da Silva (in Dili) - and Amaro de
Araújo, José Manuel Duarte247, António Metan and Fernando Pinto (all in the Viqueque
Circunscrição) – and the rebels in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições were mainly
Naueti-speakers. The five Indonesians involved in the Viqueque uprising were Gerson
Pello, Jeremias Pello, Albert Ndun, Jezkial Fola – and Jobert Moniaga who was killed.
Further to the east, the Viqueque rebels also reportedly had urged youth in Iliomar
to participate in the uprising - but they declined. In putting down the uprising, the

rate was fixed at 6.25 escudos for one pataca. The “novo regime monetario” took effect from 2 January 1960
– Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No 415-416, January 1960, p.538.
243
Diploma Legislativo No.555 – BOdT, No.22, 5 June 1959, p.381. The borders of Uato-Carabau are at
p.393.
244
For a comprehensive description of the “1959 Viqueque Rebellion” see Chamberlain, E. P., Rebellion, Defeat and
Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, Point Lonsdale – Australia, 2007; or Chamberlain, E. P., Faltering Steps:
Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s, Point Lonsdale – Australia, 2008, 2010..
245
Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta – Total Struggle) was a separatist movement based principally in Sulawesi
(March 1957 – September 1961). The 14-strong Permesta group fled from the Kupang area in March 1958,
were granted asylum by the Portuguese authorities, and were settled in Baucau town . In late December 1958,
five were subsequently re-settled further south in Viqueque following a dispute among the Indonesians.
246
Department of External Affairs, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor (Brief by J.A. Benson), Canberra, May
1964 - NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3.
247
In November 1992, José Manuel Duarte – then a member of the Provincial Parliament (DPRD-I) in Dili
and uncle of the then East Timor Governor Abílio Osório Soares, claimed 545 of the rebels were killed (68
exiled) – see Sampaio A., 10 January 1996. From the mid-1990s - when repatriating returning rebels who had
been exiled (ie, to Angola, Mozambique and Portugal), the Indonesian Government regularly claimed that the
Rebellion sought integration with Indonesia – see Chamberlain, E.P., Faltering Steps …, 2008; and CNRM
Media Release, 3 July 1995.
51

Portuguese mobilised Makassae-speaking local auxiliaries (araiais) - principally from the
Ossú area to the north of Viqueque Town, in their two-week campaign against the rebels.
The Administrator of the Lautém Circunscrição, José Esteval C. de Serra Frazão, raised a
force of 400-500 local militia – principally Fataluku-speakers but including men from
Iliomar, to advance into Uato-Carabau and attack the rebels. The Iliomar element of the
Lautém force was reportedly led by João Hornay (Cainliu), Agusto Seixas Miranda
(Iliomar II) and Pedro Jerónimo (Ailebere). It is unclear whether the force from Iliomar
was accompanied by the Encarregado do Posto of Iliomar - Filomeno da Cruz Miranda
Branco248. Although the rebels in Uato-Carabau surrendered, Administrator Frazão
summarily executed João Mariano, a local police corporal – witnessed by Iliomar’s João
Hornay; and “Sipayo” (Thomas Cabo Sipaio) was also shot and killed in Uato-Carabau.
The Lautém force also seized property and cattle from Uato-Carabau before withdrawing
eastward.249 Following a visit to the Viqueque Circunscrição, the Australian Consul in Dili
commented on “killings by the Army or the officially-encouraged Lautém tribesmen” -
noting that the Government “gave a free hand to the Lautém people to move into the Uato-
Carabau area under Army protection and kill as many of their enemies as they could find;
some dozens of Uato-Carabau people are reported to have died.”250

The 1960s

In the 1960s, there was only one ethnic Portuguese official in Iliomar – the
Encarregado de Posto251. Other public servants included: the Timorese ajudante
enfermeiro auxiliar at the posto sanitário, a telefonista, and a Timorese police detachment
comprising one segundo-cabo sipai and three sipais.252 There was also a primary school –
termed a posto escolar.253 No military were stationed in the Iliomar Posto – rather, the
military, termed “tropas” by Iliomar villagers, were located in Los Palos town. In Iliomar,
traditional rulers remained village chiefs (then five “chefe de suco” – although the term
used in official documents tended to be “chefe do grupo de povoações”), and their principal
administrative tasks were to register the population (“arrolamentos”), conduct the annual

248
See footnote 236. Filomeno da Cruz Miranda Branco (born 17/12/1910) was the Encarregado from 1954.
He was replaced by Francisco Augusto Nobre Júnior (from Suai) – BOdT, No.31, 1 August 1959, p.511.
Filomeno Branco was a long-serving Encarregado at Iliomar – for example, in the period December 1958 to
December 1960, there appear to have been six different Encarregados at Tutuala.
249
G.C. Gunn, Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, p.145 notes that the raising of a militia by the Portuguese in
the Los Palos area exacerbated ethnic tensions among the East Timorese. An Indonesian article claims that in
1959 “a further large resistance movement was also reported in Los Palos” – Madjiah, L.E., “East Timor:
Return of the Last Paradise”, 1999.
250
Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo143/60 - “Tour of the Viqueque Area”, 20 August 1960 (NAA: A1838,
3038/2/1) – the Australian Consul accompanied the Portuguese Governor on a visit to the area.
251
The annual salary of an Encarregado de Posto Second-Class comprised a base salary of 18,000 escudos
plus a “complementary” component of 10,800 escudos – totalling 28,800 escudos (1962). The qualifications
for the position of Encarregado were promulgated in BOdT, No.45, Portaria 2817, 11 November 1961.
252
In mid-1961, their annual wages were: segundo-cabo : 3,900 escudos ; each sipai : 3,000 escudos. The
sipai system was phased out in 1962-64 by employing replacement guardas auxiliares following Decreto
No.44 058, 23 November 1961 – BOdT, No.51, 23 December 1961, p.740 which removed 52 sipais positions
and approved 75 guardas auxiliares under the Corpo Polícia de Segurança Pública de Timor – see also
footnote 268.
253
In January 1970, Felix dos Santos was noted as the “monitor escola” – BOdT, No.7, 14 February 1970,
p.189. In January 1975, all postos escolares were re-titled escolas primarias – BOdT, No.3, 18 January 1975,
p.29.
52

census, and to collect taxes.254 A small number of Chinese traders established commercial
activities in Iliomar : Kuan Ki Pio (from November 1957), and Li Fu Teheng (from
September 1960).255
In November 1960, in preparation for a Province-wide census, Leonardo de Araújo
– the ajudante enfermeiro auxiliar, was appointed the assistant census-taker in Iliomar, and
João Hornay – a traditional leader, was appointed as the interpreter.256
In late March 1961, Francisco Augusto Nobre Júnior (b. 29/4/1930) – who had been
appointed the Encarregado at Iliomar in August 1959 (from Suai)257 was replaced by
Aspirante Agusto César da Costa Mousinho (b. 28/8/1936).258 In mid-1961, the
Government divided the Province into seven zones with fixed prices for commercial
transactions on local produce – with Iliomar and Tutuala included in Zone G.259 In late
1961, Lautém became one of Portuguese Timor’s nine “Concelhos” (Councils).260
Several officials served as the Encarregado de Posto in Iliomar in 1962 ie: Agusto
César da Costa Mousinho – to February 1962; Tito dos Anjos (b. 17/7/1940) – to August
1962; and Anacleto Francisco Xavier Ribeiro.261
In January 1963, the Portuguese Government formally acknowledged the
“dedication and meritorious conduct” of a large number of Timorese during WWII –
including: “Agusto Seixas, chefe de suco and João Hornay, chefe de suco – of Iliomar.262
With a change of administrative title nomenclatures in January 1963, Anacleto Ribeiro’s
appointment as Iliomar’s Encarregado de Posto was described as “terceiro-escriturário”
ie, “third clerk”.263 In June 1963, he was replaced by Fernando Domingos de Almeida e
Sousa (b. 20/4/1932), a primeiro-escriturário.264
In August 1963, the Government published passenger and freight charges for all the
“principal ports and anchorages” in Portuguese Timor – totalling 24 locations. Iliomar was
included – at a distance of 162 nautical miles from Dili. The passenger fare from Dili to
Iliomar was 103.60 escudos.265

254
Pedersen, J. and Arneberg, M., 1999, p.116; Saldanha, J.M., The Political Economy …, 1994, p.65 notes
the pre-WWII head tax on males over 15 years was six patacas, rising to 30 patacas in 1975 (pataca = six
escudos). This debt could also be worked off with corvée labour on road works.
255
In January 1963, the commercial activities of Chinese traders were listed in the Boletim - for Iliomar, see
BOdT, No.2, 12 January 1963, p.31.
256
BOdT, No. 48, 26 November 1960, p.633. Leonardo de Araújo (b. 2/8/1924) was the ajudante enfermeiro
at the Iliomar posto sanitário – appointed in December 1956 vide BOdT, No. 48, 8 December 1956, p.980.
257
BOdT, No.31, 1 August 1959, p.511.
258
BOdT, No.13, 1 April 1961, p.176.
259
BOdT, No.28, 15 July 1961, p.384 – this revoked the 1950s three-zone system, see footnotes 238, 242.
260
The nine Concelhos were Dili, Viqueque, Manatuto, Suro, Baucau, Lautém, Ermera, Bobonaro and Cova
Lima – leaving Oecusse as the only Circunscrição. The Postos within the Concelhos were planned to become
Freguesias (parishes), but this change was not implemented broadly – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo
175/61, 12 October 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1). For freguesias, see also footnote 267.
261
See BOdT, No.6, 10 February 1962, p.162; No.32, 11 August 1962, p.650; No.34, 25 August 1962, p.685;
No.35, 1 September 1962, p.705.
262
BOdT, No.1, 5 January 1963, p.8.
263
Following Decree 44 651 – see BOdT, No.46, 17 November 1962 – ie “aspirantes” became “terceiro-
escriturários” (third-class clerks). Anacleto Ribeiro’s appointment title was promulgated in BOdT, No.3, 19
January 1963, p.41. Salaries were promulgated in the 1963 Provincial Budget – the annual total salary for a
terceiro-escriturário was 28,800 escudos.
264
BOdT, No.23, 8 June 1963 p.516. He was transferred – perhaps only nominally, to Nitibe (Oecusse) in
July 1964 – and may have served in Iliomar until February 1967 (see BOdT, No.6, 11 February 1967, p.82).
265
BOdT, No.32, Portaria 3 142, 10 August 1963, pp.726-727. Locations on the south coast comprised: Jaco,
Loré, Iliomar, Tutuala (sic), Aliambata, Beaço, Luca, Alas, Betano, and Suai. “Tutuala” – “5 nautical miles
west of Iliomar”, was probably intended to be “Tualo” ie to service Uato-Carabau. Neither Luca nor Alas are
on the coast. Vessels very rarely visited locations on the south coast – only the N/M O Arbiru - which
occasionally serviced Suai; and the small barcaça (barge/ferry) Lóis that sometimes called at Loré and Suai.
53

In late November 1963, Lisbon issued Decree 45 378 promulgating the “Politico-
Administrative Statutes for the Province of Timor”.266 This provided for nine Concelhos
and one Circunscrição (ie, the under-developed Oe-Cusse area) – with Concelhos to be
established at Liquiça and Ainaro at the Governor’s discretion. As proposed in 1961,
Postos were to be divided into freguesias (parishes) where possible – and Dili was divided
into bairros (neighbourhoods).267 The “basic” units remained the povoações. Subsequently
the administrative divisions were further formalised with 58 “postos administrativos” in the
Province – with the Concelho de Lautém comprised the first-class posto of Luro, second-
class postos at Iliomar and Lautém, and the third-class posto of Tutuala.
Also in late December 1963, a Corpo de Polícia Rural was established.268 This was
a development of the Corpo Polícia de Segurança Pública de Timor (PdSPdT) created
several years earlier that employed guardas auxiliares.269 The new Corpo de Polícia Rural
was under the management of the PdSPdT and initially employed 16 guardas auxiliares
1st-Class and 52 guardas auxiliares 2nd-Class.
An election for the Legislative Council was held in March 1964.270 In Iliomar, João
Hornay and Pedro Jerónimo were each acknowledged as a regedor (ie, a local regent) – and
together with the Iliomar administrator, served as the local electoral commission. The
following were noted as having voting rights in Iliomar: “Pedro Jerónimo (Leilor), Luís da
Costa (Iliomar), Agusto Seixas Miranda (Ossoira), Francisco Ferreira (Uataomar), João
Hornay (Maluira), and João Hornay (Afara)”.271
The Governor visited Iliomar in March 1965 (reported in A Voz de Timor, 4 April
1965) and chose a site for a posto de soccoros (an aid station - identical to one in Luro) to
be finished that year. A residence for an indigenous nurse was included. The Governor also
directed that the problem of “abastecimento (supply) de agua” be studied – and that repairs
to the secretariat and residence of posto chief be undertaken.272
In the 1960s and 1970s, no regular Portuguese troops were stationed in Iliomar.
Rather, a local company of reservists – “Segunda Linha” (ie, “Second Line”), about 60-
strong, engaged in occasional military duties in Iliomar. Their weapons, numbering 14,
were kept in a government storehouse in the Iliomar Posto buildings and guarded by the
few local paramilitary police termed “sipai/sipaio” (or cipaio). In mid-October 1966, the
Australian Consul in Dili made a “visit to Los Palos and surrounding areas”: including
from Los Palos to Loré then to Iliomar (“40 miles” – 65 kilometres); then Iliomar to Los
Palos, via Luro (“36 miles” – 58 kilometres). He described Iliomar as follows:

266
Decreto No.45 378, 22 November 1963 - BOdT, No.49 - Suplemento, 7 December 1963, pp.1034-1039.
267
In December 1964, both Dili and Baucau were deemed to have sufficient populations to be declared
freguesias - ie as the Freguesia de Santo António de Motael and the Freguesia de Santo António de Baucau –
BOdT, No.52 Suplemento I, 26 December 1964, p.1159.
268
Diploma Legislativo No. 643, 21 December 1963 – BOdT, No.51, 21 December 1963, pp.1075-1076. The
total annual salary for a guarda auxiliar was 7,200 escudos (2nd-Class) and 8,040 escudos (1st-Class). In
December, a large number of serving guardas auxiliares submitted baptismal certificates to register their
“Portuguese-style” names – with some electing a Portuguese first name, but retaining their Timorese name as
a surname eg “Manuel Mau Buti” – BOdT, No. 28 December 1963, pp.1101-1105 has 20 such Portarias.
269
This saw the demise of the sipais system which was last formally budgeted within the Administrative
Service for the 1961 financial year – BOdT, No.52, Suplemento 1, 31 December 1960. Sipais appear to have
been finally phased out in the early 1970s – with the establishment of the Polícia Municipal (BOdT, No.52,
Suplemento, 31 December 1974).
270
Decreto No. 45 408, 6 December 1963 – BOdT, No.52, 28 December 1963.
271
BOdT, No.4, 25 January 1964, p.141 and p.145. The electoral franchise was very restricted – only 10,000
electors in the Province had voting rights. For comment see Australian Consulate – Dili, SAV.1, 31 March
1964 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3).
272
Boletim Geral do Ultramar 41 (479), May 1965, p.285.
54

“Iliomar is the administrative centre of the sub-district and consists of a Post and
residence, a number of ancient, typical Portuguese structures, and a village with
school and medical post. It possesses good visibility over the south coast for many
miles, especially towards the East. A small detachment of Second-line troops
possessing a total of twenty-one old rifles, is located in the village. It was
interesting to note that these rifles, together with several boxes of ammunition, were
kept in an unlocked room, in an unlocked rack, in an unattended building; no
security precautions were considered necessary.”

Of the road from Iliomar through Luro to Los Palos:

“This is the old road, recently re-opened. We, in fact, were only the second vehicle
along it since the last war. It follows the mountain ridges, is more direct than
through Lore and would be passable, except during very wet conditions. It is
however, quite rough and mountainous. The mountain scenery is quite outstanding.
This road passes through some very good grazing country and numerous herds of
cattle, in good condition were seen. Horses were also plentiful.” 273

In February 1967, João Olivio Sequeira de Araújo (b. 13/4/1933) - a primeiro-
escriturário (first clerk), was appointed as the administrator in Iliomar.274 In late October
1967, in preparation for the Legislative Council elections in December for the period 1968-
1971, a list of those with voting rights was published. In Iliomar, these comprised: “Pedro
Jerónimo (Leilor/Ailebere), Luís da Costa (Iliomar/Iliomar I), Agusto Seixas Miranda
(Ossoira/Iliomar 2), Francisco Ferreira (Uataomar/Fuate), and João Ornai (Maluira/
Cainliu).275 In October 1968, José Nunes Lopes was appointed the administrator in
Iliomar.276 Following his release to serve his obligatory military service in January 1969 277,
he was replaced by Rui Manuel de Morais e Silva.
On 17 June 1969 in Iliomar, João Hornay – the chefe de grupo do povoações de
Cainliu, died at his home.278 In late July 1969, Agapito Álvaro Maria Borges (b.18/8/1939)
was appointed administrator in Iliomar.279

The early 1970s

Following deliberation in the Conselho Legislativo, in mid-1970 the authorities
promulgated a Diploma Legislativo on the functioning of traditional authorities in the
Province.280 Its articles provided for freguesias (parishes) to be divided into regedorias

273
Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 223, 2 November 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). The Consul
travelled to Iliomar via Loré (“40 miles”) - ie on the “coast road”, and returned to Los Palos via Luro: “36
miles” – “an old road, recently re-opened. We, in fact, were only the second vehicle along it since the last
war”.
274
BOdT, No.6, 11 February 1967, p.83. It is possible that he replaced Fernando Domingos de Almeida e
Sousa – see p.82 of that BOdT.
275
BOdT, No.42, Suplemento 2, 26 October 1967, p.708.
276
BOdT, No.46, 2 November 1968, p.890.
277
BOdT, No.4, 25 January 1969, p.56.
278
BOdT, No.29, 19 July 1969, p.638.
279
BOdT, No.31, 2 August 1969, p.683.
280
BOdT, No.26, 27 June 1970, pp.603-607 – Diploma Legislativo 822, 27 June 1970. For a later exposition –
see Diploma Legislativo 3/75 – BOdT, No.21, 24 May 75 ie detailing povoações (minimum of 50 persons),
sucos (minimum of 250 persons), regulados, and jurisdições.
55

(regencies) which were further sub-divided into “grupos do povoações (‘sucos’) e
povoações” – and for election to appointments. In March 1971, José Manuel de Oliveira
Frade (b. 24/7/1941) was appointed administrator of Iliomar.281
In the early 1970s, the Iliomar Segunda Linha element was commanded by Agusto
Seixas Miranda. In 1971, Manuel Sarmento of Cainliu established the village of Tirilolo
(ie, the sixth village of Iliomar) to the west of the Paifakaver River – and this was formally
promulgated on 27 September 1973.282
In compliance with a Government directive, in January 1972 a Chinese merchant –
Li Fu Tcheng, was granted a licence to continue retail trading in Iliomar.283 In early 1972,
Agapito Álvaro Maria Borges returned to Iliomar as the administrator284, and was replaced
in August 1972 by André da Costa.285 On 3 August 1972, Marcelino da Costa - the chefe de
povoação of Vatamatar in the “suco” of Iliomar I, died.286 On 22 April 1973, Augusto
Seixas Miranda – “chefe de grupo de povoações de Iliomar”, was reported in the Boletim
Oficial de Timor as having died at his home.287
In August 1973, a revised domiciliary tax was promulgated that required
contributions of 230 escudos annually from males aged 18 to 60 years. As with the
previous tax, regedores and chefes de grupo de povoações were paid a scaled fee for the
collection of the tax.288 At the same time, a revised head tax on domestic animals – taxa do
gado, was also imposed.289

Decolonization

Following the 25 April 1974 “Revolução dos Cravos” (Carnation Revolution) coup
in Lisbon and the consequent May 1974 political liberalization in Portuguese Timor,
several Iliomar people travelled to Dili to participate in political activity including Duarte
Ximenes Pinto and Gabriel de Anunciação of Iliomar II. Branches of three political parties
– officially only associações, were formed in Iliomar290:
ASDT (Associação Social Democrata Timorense)291 for the “masses” led by Duarte
Ximenes Pinto (Iliomar II) as the Iliomar Zone “delegado” - with Mateus Ximenes
(Iliomar I) and Afonso Barreto (Iliomar II) as deputies, and Gabriel de Anunciacão and
Oscar Ferreira (Iliomar II) as members;

281
BOdT, No.15, 10 April 1971, p.356.
282
However, the Tirilolo village report (2 June 2003 – to the CAVR) credits António Preto, Matias Coelho
and Jorge Barros for establishing the village and suggests that Governor Alves Aldeia presided over the
ceremony. Previously, Tirilolo had been a povoação of Cainliu village.
283
BOdT, No.5, 29 January 1972, p.74. Such registration was in compliance with Diploma Legislativo 857 of
15 May 1971.
284
BOdT, No.26, 24 June 1972, p.623.
285
BOdT, No.34, 19 August 1972, p.806.
286
BOdT, No.41, 7 October 1972, p.934.
287
BOdT, No.19, 12 May 1973, p.429.
288
BOdT, No.34, Suplemento 1, 25 August 1973 – Decreto Provincial 15/73, 31 July 1973. There were four
classes of regedorias and six classes of chefes de grupo de povoações.
289
Ibid, Suplemento 2, Decreto Provincial 16/73.
290
The Portuguese Junta’s representative, Major A. Metello - as the President of the Committee for the Self-
Determination of Timor, issued a declaration on 19 June 1974 that formally promulgated the manifestos of
the three political associations: UDT, ASDT, and Apodeti. Metello departured Timor in September 1974 after
conflicts with Acting Governor Herdade – see Bibliography under Metello, A.C. M.M. The Union of the
Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D) – a Pan-Malay, Jakarta-based organisation, issued a statement in late May
1974 but drew little attention (see Chamberlain, E.P., Faltering Steps …, 2010, pp.118-165).
291
ASDT, founded in Dili on 20 May, was succeeded by Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste
Independente) formed on 11 September 1974. The ASDT leaders in Ailebere village were noted as: Pedro
Jerónimo, Julião Jerónimo and Francisco Serpa Rosa; and in Fuat, Francisco Ferreira (see footnote 271).
56

UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union)292 for the
“elite” (village chiefs, civil servants and their families) led by Anacleto Moniz/Madeira (of
Maliana/Tirilolo - now deceased) with Gaspar Seixas Miranda (Iliomar I) and Benedito
Amaral (Iliomar I) as deputies; and
Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense – Timorese Popular
Democratic Association)293 led by Dinis de Castro (Tirilolo).
In Iliomar, there was much animated political discussion in the streets, markets,
and schools – but no violence, as such would be punished by the Government officials or
traditional rulers. To promote harmony, a “Promotion of Democracy Committee” was
established with Gaspar Seixas Miranda as President, Tomás Pinto (Lesa Mau) as Vice
President, and Martinho Hornay and Duarte Ximenes Pinto as members. Local officials in
Iliomar estimated that over 75 percent of the population supported ASDT/Fretilin, followed
by UDT – but support for the pro-Indonesian Apodeti in Iliomar was reportedly minimal.
However, in an unusual development, in late 1974 – and soon after the formation of the
political groups in Iliomar, a number of Indonesian naval vessels reportedly demonstrated
off the southern coast from Uato-Carabau to Loré, but no incidents were reported. In
December 1974, the death of Luís da Costa - chefe de grupo de povoação of Iliomar was
announced in the Boletim Oficial de Timor.294
In November 1974, the principal Portuguese forces in Timor comprised four
Comandos de Sector headquarters (Dili, Baucau, Maubisse, and Bobonaro); cavalry
squadrons at Bobonaro and Atabae; Unidades Metropolitan companies at Ossu (infantry ),
Maubisse (artillery), and Dili (military police); light infantry (caçadores) companies at
Ermera, Oecusse, Baucau, Laclubar, Los Palos, and Caicola/Dili; and 52 “2nd Line”
companies.295
In late 1974, according to a Portuguese official, “the people of Lautém came to us
and presented a project of organization of the municipal administration … a Timor
proposition … the commission who came was comprised of delegates of the three parties
… we studied the proposition and went to Lautém in January” 1975.296 Official Portuguese
records also indicate that the initiative for this “Timorization” and democratisation came
from a “self-constituted Commission to Promote the Reorganisation of the Municipality of
Lautém … the Fatalukus, an ethnic group considered by some to be an elite, thus

292
UDT was formed on 11 May 1974, and founders included Mário Carrascalão (later an Indonesian-
appointed Governor 1982-1992), Francisco Lopes da Cruz, and João Carrascalão.
293
Apodeti was founded on 27 May 1974 with Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo as Chairman (East Timor’s first
Governor after the integration into Indonesia) and Fernando Osório Soares as Secretary General. The
guidance of Indonesian intelligence in the formation of Apodeti is related in Subroto, H., Perjalanan Seorang
Wartawan Perang, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1998, p.270 (ie by Kupang-based Bakin agent Luis Taolin
) and in “Saya yang Pertama Masuk Tim-Tim” (I Was the First into East Timor), Tempo, 20, XXVII, Jakarta,
22 February 1999, pp.26-29 (by Colonel Aloysius Sugianto/Soegyanto, the executive officer of Opsus).
Sugianto relates his 1974-75 visits to Portuguese Timor as a “pedagang” (businessman). Sugianto’s visits to
Dili from mid-1974 are also related in See also Conboy, K., Intel: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service,
Jakarta, 2004, pp.88-90.
294
BOdT, No.52, 28 December 1974, p.961. The report was dated 18 December 1974.
295
Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-
1999 ((The Armed Resistance Struggle of the Timorese against the Occupation)), Tribuna da História,
Lisboa, 2014, p.43.
296
Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2002, p.207 quoting Portuguese Army
Lieutenant, Sousa (A.M.) Real. Governor Lemos Pires’ account of the electoral process in Lautém is related
in Pires, M.L., Descolonização de Timor – Missão impossível ?, Círculo de Leitores – Lda, Lisboa,, 1991,
pp.84-88.
57

anticipated that Dili politics might dominate the decolonisation process”.297 Accordingly,
Lautém District was selected as a “pilot project” by the Portuguese administration, and
local elections were conducted in the first two weeks of March 1975 for village chiefs with
the aim “to decolonise the district political and administrative structure by involving the
people and to educate the people in democracy”.298 According to Governor Lieutenant
Colonel Mário Lemos Pires, “Lautém had been chosen for the trial run because its people
on the whole were cleverer than people in other areas.”299
Prior to elections, a Promotional Commission (Comissão Promotora) was selected
in Iliomar comprising: Gaspar Seixas Miranda (President), Tomás Pinto (Vice President),
Martinho Hornay (member), and Duarte Ximenes Pinto (member). Portuguese Army Major
Francisco Mota300 was present in Iliomar for the election and formation of the Commission.
An Australian Embassy official from Jakarta, Allan Taylor, witnessed the voting in Iliomar
on 2 March that was overseen by a Portuguese political officer from Dili, 28 year-old
Lieutenant Sousa Real, who was responsible for supervising the electoral process.301
Fretilin and UDT representatives assisted with the process, but the party favouring
integration with Indonesia, Apodeti, had earlier refused to participate. In Iliomar, the
elections were held for the village chiefs of Iliomar I and of Fuat, with Carlos Correia and
Tomás Pinto da Costa respectively elected as village chiefs. These were not party elections
and the issues were local – and, according to Allan Taylor’s memo to Canberra, “at Iliomar
… no party influence was noticeable”. He also noted: “in the election in Iliomar, however,
there was no evidence of abuse” and continued “in Iliomar at least there was no doubting
the enthusiasm of the Portuguese in this experimental election system. An enormous
obstacle to their success however, is the backwardness of the people, particularly the lack
of skilled manpower”.302 However, the experiment in Lautém was limited to two elections
– “we tried two elections but stopped them because the people had not been taught so well.
Now we teach the people”.303

297
Real, A.M., “Administrative Reform (Annex 3.15 of the Governor’s Report)”, pp. 9-11 in Timor
Newsletter, Vol II, No 1, September 1982.
298
Way, W. (ed), Australian and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, 2000, pp.
216-218 provides A.R. Taylor’s 7 March 1975 memo to Canberra – “Portuguese Timor – Preparing for
Democracy”. See also Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, pp. 42-43, 45; and Ramos-Horta, J.,
Funu …, 1987, pp.49-50.
299
Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo (A.R. Taylor), 3 March 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 4).
300
Major Francisco Fernandes da Mota and Major Silvério Henrique da Costa Jónatas had been sent from
Lisbon by the Armed Forces Movement to “manage” the decolonization of PortugueseTimor - see BOdT,
No.13, 28 March 1975, p.210.
301
Hill, H.M., FRETILIN 1974-1978 …, 2002, pp. 102-106 relates the election process in two other villages
in Lautém District – including in the Fuiloro sub-village of Chau Luturo witnessed by Australian journalist
Michael Richardson. For Michael Richardson’s account of voting in Chau Luturo see “… as grass roots
democracy comes to Timor ”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1975 (NAA: A1209, 1975/346 and
A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 8) and Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, pp. 207-208.
302
Taylor, A.R., “Portuguese Timor – Preparing for Democracy”, 7 March 1975. See also Australian
Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 359, 7 March 1975 that describes a plan to re-establish the postos in Lautém as
five regedorias encompassing 30 sucos totalling 142 villages (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 7). Allan
Taylor’s visit and report are briefly mentioned in Jolliffe, J., Balibo, Scribe Publications, Carlton North, 2009,
p.68. On 24 March 1975, Taylor met with the Portuguese Army Commander Magalhaes – and Major
Barrento (who spoke English) was present: The “Commander interrupted to say if the Indonesian Army
entered Portuguese Timor, the Portuguese Army would stand aside and seek to mediate between it and the
Timorese. Portugal was not in Timor to fight”. NAA: M3865 95.
303
Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, p.207 quoting Lieutenant A.M. Real on 10 April 1975 – with a
description of the military-led “training groups” that began “working in the mountains to teach politics to the
people” from 23 March 1975.
58

In May 1975, the Government formally promulgated a decree on the “functions of
rural authorities” that acknowledged the “traditional division of the territory of Timor into
Povoações, Sucos, Regulados, and Jurisdições” and detailed the modalities for the election
of chefes de suco and chefes de povoação.304 The decree also provided for the remuneration
of office holders – by receiving percentages of the domiciliary tax and the taxa do gado.305
On 17 July 1975, a Decree Law 7/75 on the “Decolonization of Timor” was
promulgated in Lisbon. This provided for the election of a People’s Assembly in
Portuguese Timor on 17 October 1976 – with a decision on the future “political and
administrative status” of Portuguese Timor to be made before late October 1978.306
Subsequent more comprehensive local elections were held in July 1975 for village
chiefs and town officials in Lautém District – with “well balanced” representation between
Fretilin and UDT candidates, and a sole Apodeti member elected.307 In early August in
Iliomar, the village and sub-village chiefs met as an electoral college and elected the first
Local Executive Commission – comprising a President and two members. According to the
Portuguese record, this “singular ceremony presided over by the head of the Political
Affairs Office (Major Francisco Mota) who could not hide his emotion at the swearing in
of the first Timorese chosen by his countrymen to determine their destinies.”308
Subsequently on 10 August 1975 in Los Palos, the Portuguese Governor, Lieutenant
Colonel Lemos Pires swore in the first Regional Municipal Council (Regional Executive
Committee) of Lautém.309 Across the country, “the colonial officials (chefes de posto and
administradores de concelho) – who along with the traditional chiefs were the base of
UDT’s support, were either removed or voted out of office”.310 No violence was reported
during these elections in Lautém, but one report suggested that votes in the mountain areas
seemed to favour UDT. 311
On 11 August 1975, the UDT staged a coup and seized power in Dili.312 In Lautém,
the UDT coup was facilitated by the Timorese members of the Portuguese military (ie,
“Tropas”) who were predominantly pro-UDT. Captain Vasco Lino da Silva, the
commander of the Portuguese 14th Infantry Company (ie, “Caçadores”) in Los Palos (and
brother-in-law of the UDT leadership’s Carrascalão brothers) led his pro-UDT troops to
Dili to support the UDT coup:
“When the UDT armed movement broke out in the district of Lautém, Captain Lino
da Silva, a Portuguese officer and commander of 14th Rifle Company (Companhia
304
BOdT, No.21, 24 May 1975 - Diploma Legislativo No. 3/75, pp. 353-359. A povoação was defined as
comprising at least 50 people – and a suco as at least 250 people. A regulado or a jurisdição were
“traditional territorial divisions comprising one or more sucos traditionally subordinate to a Régulo or Chefe
de Jurisdição”. Povoações and sucos were sub-divisions of the sub-regiões.
305
Ibid, Article 3: chefes de povoação received 10%; chefes de suco - 5%; and régulos or chefes de jurisdição
– 1.5%.
306
See http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka=descolonizacao02 .
307
Magalhaes A.B. de, “A Non-Autonomous Territory …”, 28 April 1990, p.2.
308
Real, A.M., “Administrative Reform …”, p.11 in Timor Newsletter, Vol II, No 1, September 1982.
309
Magalhaes A.B. de, “A Non-Autonomous Territory …”, 28 April 1990, p.2.
310
Ramos-Horta, J., Funu …, 1987, p.49.
311
Real, A.M. (see footnote 308 above) notes that inter-party cooperation in Lautém District “was open and
fruitful”. See alsoTaylor, J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.42; and Jolliffe, J., Cover-up, 2001, p.49.
Hill, H.M., FRETILIN 1974-1978 …, 2002, p.104 indicates that in the March 1975 series of elections “90 per
cent of the newly elected liurais were Fretilin members or supporters.” Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn,
2002 discusses the elections at pp.205-212 and concludes that: “The whole thrust of the administration effort
was towards eroding the influence of the more conservative tribal chiefs. This meant an erosion of the UDT’s
power base. The party to benefit was Fretilin” – p.211.
312
The objectives of the UDT’s “Operação Sakonar” are detailed in Pires, M.L., Descolonização …, 1991,
op.cit., pp.193-195 eg: “Objectivo Final – Erradicação total de comunismo e libertação nacional unidade de
todos os timorenses a [sic] independência total.”
59

de Caçadores 14) came to sub-district of Moro and placed the Segunda Linha
commander, Edmundo da Conceição Silva, under house arrest. He also confiscated
150 firearms belonging to Segunda Linha, which he took to Dili and handed over to
UDT. … In addition, UDT supporters arrested a number of Fretilin members and
detained them in the military barracks at 14th Rifle Company. Prisoners held there
did not suffer ill-treatment and were fed. … According to José Conceição, a number
of Fretilin leaders in the district of Lautém, such as Afonso Savio, Felipe Dias
Quintas and others, were taken to Baucau and detained at the Pousada.”313

However, after the call for a “General Armed Insurrection” by the Fretilin Central
Committee on 15 August at Talitu (Dili), the troops of the Portuguese military training
centre in Aileu rallied to Fretilin on 17 August - and by 20 August, Fretilin had taken
power in Dili.314 The Portuguese Governor - Lieutenant Colonel Mário Lemos Pires, and
his Administration withdrew to the island of Ataúro on 27 August.315 MAC forces
withdrew westward to Batugadé, and Fretilin forces seized Baucau (4 September) and
Liquiça (7 September) by “negotiation” - with the surrender of numbers of UDT troops.316
All UDT officials in Iliomar were arrested by the local Fretilin cadre and escorted to
Los Palos where they were detained and questioned – although reportedly not mistreated.317
The people of both Baucau and Los Palos were reportedly “mainly Fretilin supporters, and
UDT had only gained the upper hand there because the Timorese unit in each centre had
come out in support of the UDT”.318 After two weeks, the detained UDT in Los Palos were
released, but almost all fled immediately into the jungle. Subsequently, some joined armed
Resistance units and fought against the Indonesian military.319
Fretilin continued its political and social programs in Iliomar with the following
Zone320 structure:
Tomás Pinto (codename - Lesa Mau) - Fuat (Secretary);
Duarte Ximenes Pinto – Iliomar II (Deputy);
Tito dos Santos Cristovão (Lere)321 - Cainliu (member);

313
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4., para 108-109.
314
This is cited as the “political basis” for the founding of Falintil on 20 August - see Gusmão, X., “Message
to the Nation … Falintil Day”, 20 August 2003. The troops of the 10 th Infantry Company at Maubisse also
rallied to Fretilin on 17 August 1975.
315
For a description of Portugal’s predominately local military forces in Portuguese Timor in 1975 – see
Conboy, K.., Kopassus, 2003, pp.209-210; and Subroto H., Operasi Udara Di Timor Timur, Pustaka Sinar
Harapan, Jakarta,, 2005, pp.19-22. Major Francisco Mota – Chief of Cabinet for Political Affairs, and Major
Silvério Henrique Jónatas – arrived in Darwin on 17 August 1975. Governor Pires and the Portuguese
Administration departed Ataúro for Portugal on 8 December 1975 – leaving a small detachment temporarily
on Ataúro under a Timorese alferes (second lieutenant), David Ximenes. In Darwin, the departed Portuguese
military commander - Major António Eduardo Queiroz de Martins Barrento, reportedly commented on 9
December that Portugal’s “overseas empire is now Macau and Lieutenant Ximenes” (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1
Part 14).
316
According to Jolliffe, “full scale fighting erupted throughout the territory, leaving 1500-2000 people dead
in five weeks.” – Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.76-77.
317
See Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 159-162 for detention of UDT members by Fretilin in
Lautém District. A list of 21 members of Apodeti (6) and UDT (15) detained in Lospalos by Fretilin is at
NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 21 as “Daftar Nama Orang-Orang Apodeti, U.D.T. Yang Ditawan Fretilin
di Los Palos”.
318
As reported in an Australian government cablegram dated 4 September 1975 citing Major Francisco Mota
– see Way, W. (ed), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 384.
319
Andreas, a former village chief, became a Falintil company commander in 1987 – he died in the jungle in
1992.
320
The codename for the Iliomar Zone was “Maujer” (ie Mauser). This changed to “Traktor” in the early
1980s.
60

Oscar Ferreira – Iliomar II (member);
Gabriel de Anunciacão – Iliomar I (member);
Pedro Jerónimo – Ailebere (member); and
Roberto Jerónimo – Ailebere (member).

INDONESIAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION

In late 1975, Fretilin had divided East Timor into nine military sectors, with the
Lautém District sector led by Adão Amaral.322 Falintil (Forças Armadas de Libertação
Nacional de Timor Leste) had been formed on 20 August - and its strength reportedly
comprised a “a hard professional core” of 2,500 regulars, 7,000 second-line reservists,
10,000 with previous military training, and villagers who had received rudimentary training
since October – “It was a ‘people’s army’.”323 Their capability was enhanced by a shipment
of NATO weapons received by the Portuguese earlier in 1975324. In the Districts, these
forces were commonly referred to as “Tropas Fretilin” or “Milisi Fretilin” - although
Falintil had been officially formed on 20 August 1975 as noted above325. Their troops in
Lautém reportedly numbered about 150 – including “milisi” from Iliomar, and were led by
José dos Santos with his brother, Pedro Sanches, as the deputy.
Indonesia’s destabilization operation against Portuguese Timor, Operasi Komodo,
had established it headquarters in Atambua (West Timor)326 in August 1974 and began

321
Lere Anan Timor (Tito Cristovão/Cristobal da Costa, of Cainliu, Iliomar – also known as “Tito Ililawa”)
was born in Caidalavarin sub-village, Cainliu on 3 February 1952. In the early 1970s, he was a soldier in the
local Portuguese regular forces (and in 1975 a driver for Portuguese paratroop detachment) - before returning
to Iliomar in August 1975. In the late 1970s, he was the Fretilin Iliomar Zone Secretary and subsequently the
Falintil Central Region Commander 1987-1994. He was the commander of Region I/Ponte Leste in the period
1994-1999 and became the first Chief of Staff of the East Timor Defence Forces in February 2001. See
Annex J for further biographical data.
322
The sectors were Dili, Aileu, Atabae, Liquiça, Bobonaro, Manatuto, Viqueque, Baucau, and Lautém – see
Madjiah, L.E., “East Timor: Indonesia’s Military Involvement”, 1999, p.6.
323
Dunn, J., A People Betrayed, 1996, p.258 and Dunn, J., East Timor: a rough ride …, 2003, p.251. A
2003 “census” of Falintil (by veterans’ organisation CAAC-CAVF) indicated that in 1976 Falintil fighters
numbered 14,652 – see Jolliffe, J., “Bid to coax Timor rebels ..”, The Age, Melbourne, 11 November 2003.
324
The new rifle was the G-3 semi-automatic first introduce in Portugal in 1961. For detail of Falintil
weaponry in 1975 see Subroto H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, pp. 19-22 and debriefs of Portuguese Major F.
Dentinho in Darwin – HQ Darwin Cable O.JA2461, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 9), and
Major Francisco Mota in Lisbon – Australian Embassy Lisbon, Cable LB281, 4 September 1975 (NAA:
A1838, 3038/2/1, Part 9).
325
Fretilin Central Committee member, Rogério Tiago Lobato, was appointed Falintil commander – with
Fernando de Almeida do Carmo as his deputy. Lobato had been a junior officer (alferes – second-lieutenant)
and Carmo - a senior sergeant, in the Portuguese armed forces. Lobato also became Defence Minister - see
Hill, H.M., FRETILIN 1974-1978, 2002, pp. 149-150. Several subsequently senior Falintil commanders had
served in the Portuguese military in the early 1970s including Xanana Gusmão, Lere Anan Timor (see
footnote 321), Paulino Gama (Mauk Moruk), Aquiles Freitas Soares, António Manuel Gomes da Costa
(Mau/Ma’ Huno), and Vírgilio dos Anjos (Ular).
326
The establishment and early activities of Flamboyan are related in Subroto H., Operasi Udara …, 2005,
pp.36-41 – see also Subroto H., “Operasi Flamboyan”, Majalah Konstan Online. According to Subroto,
Captain Yunus Yosfiah’s “Tim Susi/Nanggala 2” arrived in Kupang on 19 April 1975 and was tasked with
infiltration into Portuguese Timor and the establishment of guerrilla bases. For detail, see Conboy, K.,
Kopassus, 2003, pp.206-208. See also Conboy, K., Intel …, op.cit., 2004 for activity by Indonesia’s State
Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin) in Operations Komodo and Flamboyan – pp.89-95; and Bakin’s
almost exclusion from operations in East Timor in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of ABRI/TNI’s intelligence
agency BAIS/BIA (Strategic Intelligence Agency/Armed Forces Intelligence Agency) – p.155, p.199. José
Ramos-Horta has related that, in April 1975, he was informed by an Indonesian journalist that in December
61

training Apodeti recruits there in late 1974.327 In February 1975, the training operations at
Atambua were taken over by a group of Kopassandha328 (special forces) officers led by
Colonel Dading Kalbuadi – this accelerated phase of Komodo was called Operasi
Flamboyan/Poinciana.
At about mid-year, intelligence operations increased and a “handful” of
Kopassandha personnel entered Portuguese Timor disguised as traders to collect
information.329 At the end of August 1975, “volunteer” Indonesian Army special forces
troops – with Apodeti porters, conducted covert operations into East Timor from
Indonesian West Timor (ie, Operasi Flamboyan/Poinciana) - including minor harassment
attacks against Atsabe, Atabae and the outskirts of Fatu Besi (see map on front cover –
Atabae, a major Fretilin base, was 45 kilometres northeast of Batugadé; Fatu Besi is east-
northeast of Atabae, ie south of Dili).330
With the withdrawal westward to the border area of UDT forces in late August
1975 – and soon after into Indonesian Timor, UDT declared its support for integration with
Indonesia, and its forces came under Indonesian command ie, together with Apodeti
elements.331 In early September 1975, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta reported that
Indonesian military activities in Portuguese Timor were still Opsus-directed “covert”
operations - and that President Soeharto “had steadfastly adhered to his decision not to use
force despite pressure from many of his senior advisors”, refused “to agree to Indonesian
armed intervention in Portuguese Timor”, and was “refusing to be drawn into intervening
militarily in Portuguese Timor and risking international approbrium [sic]”.332 A senior

1974 “100 Indonesian commandos were sent to West Timor as part of the first phase of a campaign to
destabilize East Timor.” - Ramos-Horta, J., Funu …, p.65.
327
In November 1974, Tomás Gonçalves - the son of Apodeti principal and liurai of Atsabe, Guilherme
Maria Gonçalves, was joined in Atambua by about 110 Apodeti members and training began – see
Statements by Tomás Gonçalves, 17 December 2003 in CAVR, “Internal Political Conflict 1974-1976 –
CAVR National Public Hearing 15-18 December 2003” – Appendix 2 in CAVR Update December 2003-
January 2004, Dili.
328
Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha – special forces) was re-titled “Kopassus” on 26 December
1986. See Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, for a history of Indonesia’s Special Forces to 1993 including detail
on Operation Flamboyan - pp.199-235 and Seroja - pp.237-253. The Kopassandha team at Atambua was
designated Nanggala 2, with Nanggala 3 and 4 arriving in October 1975.
329
See footnote 293 for earlier intelligence collecting visits to Dili by Colonel Sugianto. These Kopassandha
operatives included Lieutenant Untung Suroso and Lieutenant Stevanus Gatot Purwanto – see Conboy, K.,
Kopassus, 2003, p.207 (Suroso); and “Kami Saat Itu Serba Salah”, Tempo Magazine, No.15/X, Jakarta, 8-
14 December 2009 (Stevanus Gatot Purwanto as “Aseng”). Lieutenant Kiki Syahnakri headed ABRI’s
Atapupu Sub-District Command – and relates cross-border activities including those of Major Toni
Soemardjo of Bakin (aka Anton Papilaya) and several Kopassandha teams. He also relates: the retreat of
UDT forces – commanded by Lopes da Cruz, from Motaain across the border into Indonesian territory; and
the move of Portuguese Major Visoco and 23 Portuguese Army personnel from Bobonaro to Suai and into
Indonesian territory through Kotabot. - Syahnakri, K., Lieutenant General (Retd), Timor Timur: The Untold
Story, Kompas, Jakarta. 2013, Chapter 1.
330
Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, pp.212-216 describes these operations in detail. For the organisation and
activities of ABRI “volunteers” and partisans – see also Pinch, D. Magistrate (Coroner), Inquest into the
Death of Brian Ray Peters, Sydney, 16 November 2007; and Ball, D. and McDonald. H., Death in Balibo –
Lies in Canberra, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, pp.50-64.
331
The UDT’s “Lopes da Cruz faction” reportedly passed a written commitment to Indonesia on 1 September
– Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA1615, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13):
“As we are heading the Anti-Communist Movement of 11 August , we are sure that we chose the right way
when we gave up our goal of independence and decided to aim for integration into Indonesia.” - Telegram
from the President of the UDT to the President of Portugal, Batugadé, 20 September 1975 (and forwarded to
the United Nations).
332
Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA1615, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13,
pp.281-288). The Ambassador also noted that: “We now have from Lim Bian Kie (Murtopo’s Private
Secretary) and Tjan (CSIS) a detailed account of Indonesia’s planning in this respect” – ie of “a continuation
62

Australian Embassy official was also told by the Embassy’s Indonesian interlocutors that
“there would be no outright military intervention. Indonesia was now looking to the UDT
to bring about integration. On 1 September, they had received from the UDT President,
Lopes da Cruz, a statement supporting integration with Indonesia and asking for Indonesian
assistance. This statement would not be published now, but would be kept until an
appropriate occasion arose. Such an occasion would be a declaration of independence by
FRETILIN.”333
Further Indonesian covert operations were followed on 18 September with small
raids attempted against Suai, Tilomar, Bobonaro and Maliana.334 At about this time, an
Indonesian soldier, Corporal Weli, from a regular ABRI infantry battalion - Yonif 317, was
captured by Fretilin forces in the Bobonaro area and subsequently imprisoned in Dili.335
“Indonesia also sought to gain Portugal’s agreement for it to intervene either
unilaterally or under joint arrangements to restore order. Failure to get agreement, the
spread of Fretilin control and concern that Fretilin would proclaim victory as a national
independence movement led to direct Indonesian military involvement in October.
President Soeharto ordered that it be covert.”336 However, as the Flamboyan Kopassandha
troops and the partisans would be unable to dislodge Fretilin positions in the border area
and establish enclaves within Portuguese Timor, regular ABRI troops who had deployed to
Indonesian Timor in late September joined the operation.337

and extension of Indonesia’s covert activities” ie reporting 2 September discussions with Lim and Tjan
(NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp. 324-326 – see below). Subsequently, an Australian Embassy official
remarked in a manuscript note to a 10 September 1975 cable from Canberra that “Indonesian having confided
her most secret plans and aims to Australia would justifiably feel double-crossed by us.” – ie relative to
“regional endorsement” (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp.55-61.
333
Australian Embassy – Djakarta (A.R. Taylor), Record of Conversation (Harry Tjan & Lim Bian Kie) 2
September 1975 (NAA: file A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp. 324-326). However, the Australian Embassy
later reported the ABRI operational plans to Canberra in detail (see: NAA file A10463. 801/13/11/1 Part 13 -
cable O.JA1615 of 3 September 1975 at p.249 and cable O.JA2432 of 15 October 1975 at p.415).
334
In early September 1975, Harry Tjan Silalahi (of CSIS) noted to an Australian Embassy official in Jakarta
that “the OPSUS ((Special Operations)) plan was being implemented, some of the refugees would be replaced
with armed ‘volunteers’ who will provide backbone for the UDT and other anti-Fretilin groups”: Australian
Embassy – Jakarta, Cable CH263843, 6 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13). These
Flamboyan operations are described in Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.36-41– including
Kopassandha Captain Sutiyoso’s recall from a planned landing on the coast south of Viqueque in south-
central Portuguese Timor (see also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., p.226).
335
The capture of an Indonesian corporal at Bobonaro in September 1975 (assumed to be Weli) is described
by Alexandrino at pp.87-99 in Turner, M., Telling – East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992, New
South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992. J.S. Dunn interviewed Corporal Weli in the prison at
Taibessi (Dili) - Dunn, J.S., The Timor Affair – From Civil War to Invasion by Indonesia, Legislative
Research Service, Parliament of Australia, 27 February 1976, p.11 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1).
Corporal Weli (as “Sergeant Welly”) was summarily executed in Dili by a Fretilin cadre, Raúl Isaac, on 8
December 1975 – author’s research at CAVR, Balide (Dili), 2 July 2007. Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003,
op.cit., also notes two Kopassandha sergeants missing-in-action in September – Said, p.216; and Suparman,
p.220.
336
Jockel, G.A., Chairman, Assessment of the Timorese Situation, National Intelligence Committee (NIC),
Canberra, 27 January 1976, p.2.
337
The ABRI force - Komando Tugas Gabungan (Kogasgab - Combined Task Force) had been approved on
31 August – for detail see Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.41-50; Conboy, K., Kopassus,
2003, op.cit., pp.223-226; and Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Sejarah TNI … Jilid IV, 2000, op.cit., p.145.
The Australian Embassy – Jakarta was informed by Harry Tjan Silalahi that “up to 3800 Indonesian soldiers
from Java would be put into Portuguese Timor gradually. Atsabe would be their base. The king of Atsabe
((Guilherme Gonçalves)) would be the figure-head of the anti-Fretilin side.” This was a “significant
escalation of Indonesian involvement”: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA2161, 30 September 1975
(NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 14). Detail of the Indonesian advance – ie “the stepped up operation” to
begin on 15 October, was subsequently advised by Tjan to his Australian Embassy interlocutors: Australian
63

In early October 1975, an ABRI Combined Task Force with armour, naval and air
support, launched Flamboyan Phase II - with anti-Fretilin East Timorese troops under
ABRI command, and advanced into Portuguese Timor through Batugadé (7 October),
Balibo (16 October)338, Maliana (16 October), Atabae (28 November)339, and Cailaco (4
December). These Indonesian military operations were supported by armed anti-Fretilin
Timorese “partisans”340 – principally from Apodeti and UDT, with nominal elements from
two minor parties Trabalhista (ie Labour)341 and KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain –
Fighters for Timorese Unity).342 A notable from Iliomar II - Francisco Ruas Hornay343, led

Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA2432, 15 October 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 15, p.415). This
information described ABRI’s planned advances to begin on 15 October from Batugadé to Balibo-Maliana-
Atsabe (with a force of 3,800 to be deployed against Atsabe), then towards Dili through Ermera; and through
Suai to Same-Maubisse-Aileu and Dili; with an amphibious landing at Maubara, then moving through
Liquiça to Dili. Subsequently, in Tjan’s absence, Sujarti of CSIS advised the Australian Embassy on 5
December that Dili would be attacked after President Ford left Jakarta – “as early as the night of 6 Dec 75,
but there were also logistic problems” – Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA3508, 5 December 1975
(NAA: A10463, 801/13//11/1 Part 17). In a submission to the Minister, a senior Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs official discussed whether it was in “Australia’s interests” for their Embassy in Jakarta to
continue to receive “very sensitive information” - “in particular from Mr Harry Tjan and General Moerdani
about Indonesian military plans for involvement”, lest “the Indonesians put the ((Australian)) Government in
a position of conniving with them in their military intervention in the territory.” – Submission – Canberra, 27
October 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2 Part 2 – Way, W. (ed), 2000, pp.516-517. For charges of “the
connivance ((conivência)) of the Australian government … contributing decisively to the invasion of the
former Portuguese colony” – see Fernandes, M.S., “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos”, 2007, op.cit.,
pp.90-91, pp.162-164.
338
For detail on the killing by ABRI of the five foreign journalists at Balibo on 16 October 1975, see Pinch,
D. Magistrate (Coroner), Inquest into the Death of Brian Ray Peters, Sydney, 16 November 2007; and
Jolliffe, J., Balibo, Scribe Publications, Carlton North, 2009.
339
See Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit.,; Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit.; and Kamah,
M.S., Seroja: pengalaman …, 1997, op.cit. – Indonesian journalists who accompanied ABRI
Flamboyan/Seroja forces and “partisan” elements. The ABRI attack on Atabae was preceded by four weeks
of consolidation - due to heavy Fretilin resistance, difficult terrain, wet season rains, logistic shortfalls and the
need for ABRI infantry reinforcements and additional combat support – see also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003,
op.cit., pp.231-233.
340
Indonesia attempted to maintain a pretence of no involvement by ABRI elements – for example: “Maliana
and Bobonaro Fall to Apodeti and MAC”, Berita Yudha (an Army daily newspaper), Jakarta, 17 October
1975, p.1. MAC (Movimento Anti-Comunista ) was a coalition of UDT (footnote 292), KOTA (see footnote
342) and Trabalhista (see the following footnote). For a description of ABRI volunteers – “Sukarelawan”,
and “Os Partisans”, see Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., pp.112-117.
341
The Trabalhista party was formed on 17 September 1974 by Paulo Freitas da Silva and Alpidio Abrão
Martins.
342
KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain – Fighters for Timorese Unity), was founded by José Martins (ie José
Celestino da Silva Martins ie “José Martins III”, born 29 September 1941) and Leão Pedro dos Reis Amaral
in November 1974. It emerged from the earlier Associação Popular Monarquica Timorese (APMT)
reportedly founded by Tomás Dias Ximenes on 8 November 1974 – see also “He Wants to be King of Timor
– Tomás Maria Ferreira Dias Ximenes”, Indonesia Times, 17 January 1975 (A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 5).
Notes on the founding of APMT/KOTA can be found in Chrystello, C.J., East Timor: The Secret File 1973-
1975, eBooksBrasil, 2000, including its founding “premises” with signatories at pp.119-120 and its later
manifesto at pp.127-128. Chrystello suggests the visit to Timor by the one-time claimant to the Portuguese
throne, Dom Duarte Nuno de Bragança, may have contributed to the formation of the APMT in late 1974. See
also Soekanto, Integrasi … , 1976, pp.445-447 (including the activities of Ximenes and Martins in Lisbon in
April 1975); and the KOTA manifesto at Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Memo 260, 6 June 1975 (NAA:
A1838, 3038/2/2). José Martins declared that his father, “the former Liurai of Ermera” was “forced to
abandon Timor because of his non-acceptance of the colonial regime …” – UN Security Council, S/N 1865,
16 December 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 2; 3038/2/2 Part 2). José Celestino da Silva Martins,
after several decades of residence in Portugal, reportedly returned to reside in Portuguese Timor in the period
1959-61 – returned to Portugal and claimed to have been “arrested by the PIDE in 1964 in relation to a
liberation movement for the independence of Timor” (UN Security Council, S/N 1865 – see above). In a later
64

a Falintil force defending part of the western border area, and several ex-members of the
former Portuguese Segunda Linha Companhia 92 in Iliomar also took part in the
fighting.344 Two soldiers from Iliomar, Fernando Madeira (Lihina/Iliomar II) and
Hermengildo (Caidabu/ Iliomar II), were captured by the Indonesian forces and taken to
Atambua – but later released.345 Also in October, Alarico Jerónimo (20 years – Leilor sub-
village/Ailebere) who was serving with Companhia de Escuatrão 5 was killed in clash with
Indonesian troops in the Bobonaro area.
On 28 November 1975, Fretilin unilaterally declared independence in Dili – as the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, with Francisco Xavier do Amaral as its first
President. On 29 November, the enclave of Oecusse was occupied by an Indonesian
military force without resistance, and its administration reportedly taken over by a
Timorese “fifth column” under Indonesian control.346 On 30 November, the four opposing
political parties – UDT, Apodeti, Trabalhista and KOTA, signed the “Balibo
Declaration”347 announcing East Timor’s integration with Indonesia.

statement in mid-1994, José Ma.rtins claimed that in 1962 he was a “political prisoner of the Portuguese
colonial power” (Statement by José Martins III, United Nations Decolonization Committee, New York, 13
July 1994). He first came to Australian notice when he called at the Australian Embassy in Lisbon on 11
November 1974 - Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Record of Conversation, 11 November 1974 (NAA: A1838,
935/17/3 Part 3; 3038/10/13/1 Part 1; 3038/2/2 Part 2) when he proposed a “Fourth Solution” whereby Timor
would become an Australian “protectorate” or be granted “federated status” with Australia. The movements
and activities of José Martins are difficult to confirm. A very critical Indonesian analysis of José Martins can
be found at Soekanto, Integrasi … , 1976, op.cit., pp.444-452. This alleges that José Martins did not arrive in
Portuguese Timor until after 4 July 1975 – although the Indonesian Consul, E.M. Tomodok, relates meeting
José Martins in Dili on 31 May 1975 - Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir ..., op.cit., 1994, p.226. Jolliffe has
written: “Martins returned to Timor in June 1975 to form the monarchist party Kota” – Jolliffe, J., Balibo,
2009, op.cit., p.148. José Martins returned to Timor in mid-1975 – and has been incorrectly reported as a
member of the Apodeti party in 1974, ie being confused with João Martins Corbafo (see footnotes 526 and
961). Martins was a signatory to the “Balibo Declaration” – but, in early 1976, publicly denounced the
Indonesian occupation at a United Nations meeting in New York. In the early 1990s, estranged from the
Timorese resistance movement, José Martins founded the Timor Liberation Organisation. He died on 21
August 1996 during a visit to Jakarta to participate in Indonesian National Day activities.
343
Francisco Ruas Hornay, born in Acara/Akara sub-village (Iliomar II) in 1938, was an adopted son of João
Hornay (of Cainliu – see footnote 193). He served for three years in the Portuguese regular military - ie
Tropas, with the cavalry unit at Bobonaro in the late 1960s where he met his wife. Following his Tropas
service, he became a member of the Portuguese police (Polícia Segurança Pública) serving in Dili, Balibo
and Oecusse. In March 1967, he was promoted from guarda auxiliar 2nd class to guarda auxiliar 1st class in
the Corpo de Polícia Rural (BOdT, No.10, 11 March 1967, p.158). In mid-1975, he was promoted to
Auxiliary Guard 2nd class from 1st Class in the Police and Security Corps – vide BoDT No.24, 14 June 1975,
p.425.
344
Including Lieutenant Domingos Pinto, Sergeant Júlio Ximenes, Sergeant Afonso Viana, and Corporals
Zacarias Madeira, António Lino, Agapito Pinto, Pedro dos Santos, and Cou-dai. Nine village militia from
Fuat also fought at Batugadé and Atabae: Horacio de Carvalho, Joaquim Henriques, Paulo Madeira, João de
Oliveira, Adelino de Carvalho, Salvador Pinto, Gabriel Pinto, A. Lourdes, and Alberto Lourdes – one of the
foregoing was captured by UDT forces.
345
They were probably among the five Fretilin from Lospalos captured by the Movimento Anti-Comunista
(MAC) near Batugadé and taken to Atambua - Carrascalão, M. V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, Mau Huran
Printing, Timor-Leste, 2006, pp.112-113.
346
João Martins Corbafo, a member of the Apodeti Presidium, reportedly raised the Indonesian flag in Pante
Makassar (Oecusse) ie “pengibar bendera Merah Putih pertama” – “Pejuang Integrasi Sosialasikan
Otonomi Timtim Kepada Masyarakat”, Antara, Dili, 19 November 1998. However, for detail on events –
including the flag-raising on 7 December involving the Administrator – Jaime dos Remedios de Oliveira, and
José Valente – “Tropaz” Commander) - see Subroto H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, pp.173-180.
347
The “Balibo Declaration” was almost certainly drafted and signed in Bali (at the Penida View Hotel) and
later in Atambua – not Balibo - see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 278 and Santoso, A., Jejak
Jejak Darah – Tragedi dan Pengkhianatan di Timor Timur, Stichting Inham, Amsterdam/Yogyakarta, 1996.
65

ABRI’s advance eastward into Portuguese Timor had been slowed by Fretilin
resistance and heavy wet season rains – and the flooded Loes River north of Atabae was a
major obstacle. The Fretilin declaration of 28 November now precipitated a more
immediate Indonesian military drive on Dili.
On Sunday 7 December 1975, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) launched
Operation Seroja/Lotus with Indonesian airborne and amphibious troops seizing Dili.348

Dili – 7 December 1975 ABRI armour (BTR-50PKs) enters Dili

Indonesian parachute and air-landed forces seized Baucau on 10/11 December 1975
- supported by an amphibius landing farther to the east at Laga. Falintil forces led by
Sabika Besi Kulit and Olo Kassa withdrew southward through Venilale to Viqueque.349

Analyses of the document and its background can be found in several articles by Akihisa Matsuno. Signed
copies of the Declaration can be found on NAA: A10463, 80113/11/1 Part 16.
348
For detail, see Madjiah, L.E., “Indonesia’s Military Involvement”; 1999, pp.6-7, 9-12; Adrian, B., “Sky
Assault on Dili”, Angkasa, No 5, February 1999; Subroto H., Saksi Mata …, 1996 and Operasi Udara …,
2005; and Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003 and Conboy,.K., Elite, 2008, pp.24-34. The leading elements of
ABRI’s amphibious force departed from Tailaco – immediately south of the Loes River, on 6 December – see
Kamah, M.S., Seroja: pengalaman …, op.cit., 1997 (Kamah accompanied the force). The Fretilin leadership
withdrew southwards to Aileu, Maubisse, and Same – Xanana Gusmão then moved northeast to the Manatuto
area – Gusmão, 2000, pp.39-41. According to Dunn, J., 1996, p.258 and Dunn J., 2003, p.251- Falintil’s
strength comprised a “hard professional core of some 2,500 regular troops”; 7,000 second-line reservists;
10,000 with previous military training, and villagers who had received rudimentary training since October
1975 – “It was a people’s army”. The Fretilin leadership withdrew southwards from Dili to Aileu, Maubisse,
and Same – Xanana Gusmão then moved northeast to the Manatuto area – Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To
Resist …, 2000, pp.39-41. the Portuguese administration and forces – about 100 strong, had earlier
withdrawn to the island of Ataúro on 27/28 August. Two modern Portuguese corvettes were off Dili on 6-8
December supporting the Portuguese administration on Ataúro – F487 NRP João Roby and F488 NRP Afonso
Cerqueira (the first corvette had arrived on 1 October; and the corvette NRP F489 Oliveira e Carmo had also
earlier been operating in Portuguese Timor waters). The two corvettes noted the approaching ABRI aircraft
and naval vessels before dawn on 7 December 1975 but did not engage the Indonesian forces - Pires, M.L.,
Descolonização …, 1991, op.cit., p.345. Mário Viegas Carrascalão (UDT leader and later East Timor
Governor 1982-1992) has speculated that had the two Portuguese vessels moved into the harbour at Dili, the
Indonesian airborne and amphibious operation against Dili would have been aborted - and “pages of
Portuguese history would have been written in gold” and many thousands of lives saved - Carrascalão, M.V.,
Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., p.132. For the seizure of Baucau and early ABRI Seroja operations in the
Baucau-Viqueque areas - see Ahmadi, A. (ed), Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat -Terbaik Bagi ABRI,
Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 345-370. Operation Seroja continued until November
1979.
349
For the seizure of Baucau and early ABRI Seroja operations in the Baucau-Viqueque areas - see Ahmadi,
A. (ed), Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat -Terbaik Bagi ABRI, Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara,
Jakarta, 1999, pp. 345-370. Venilale was seized by ABRI on 24 January 1976. Operation Seroja continued
until November 1979.
66

On 17 December, under Indonesian management, a Provisional Government of East
Timor (PGET) comprising elements of Apodeti, UDT, Trabalhista and KOTA was
established in Dili – led by Apodeti’s Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo.350
However, Falintil resistance and the heavy rains of the wet season delayed further
ABRI advances, and Indonesian operations only regained momentum in late-January 1976
when, according to an Australian report: “on 27 January the Indonesians began a drive to
gain control of the southern coastal region, Fretilin’s main remaining stronghold …. At its
peak, Fretilin military strength may have comprised some 2,000 former Timorese regular
troops and perhaps 5,000 with experience as reservists. Its present strength is unlikely to
exceed 5,000 men with some military training; the Indonesian’s estimate is 1,700. While
Fretilin acquired most of the well stocked armouries left behind by the Portuguese, we
believe that formed resistance could not be sustained beyond the next few months without
external support.”351 In late January 1976, an Australian national-level intelligence
assessment estimated ABRI strength in East Timor as “over 20,000 plus 2,000 Timorese”
auxiliaries – with about “100,000 Timorese in Indonesian-held areas”.352
In late January 1976, Fretilin requested that the United Nations’ Special
Representative for East Timor, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi353 visit areas under Fretilin
control - including Suai and Los Palos/Com. To frustrate such visits, ABRI launched
several pre-emptive operations against areas that might be visited by Guicciardi.
Early on 3 February 1976, ABRI launched attacks into Lautém District. Six
Hercules (C-130) aircraft dropped 400 parachutists of 502 Airborne Infantry Battalion
(batalyon infanteri - Yonif 502 Linud) to the north of Los Palos town near the village of
Raça (the site of the Japanese WWII “Fuiloro” airstrip354), and the adjacent areas of Titilari
and the nearby road junction to Com.355 A platoon of Yonif 502 “jumped early” and

350
In February 1976, the PGET abolished the political parties established in Portuguese Timor in 1974 ie
Apodeti, UDT, Trabalhista, KOTA, and Fretilin.
351
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, East Timor (Attachment A to Ministerial Brief – 22 pages),
Canberra, 30 January 1976 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2).
352
National Intelligence Committee (NIC), Assessment of the Timor Situation, Canberra, 27 January 1976
(NAA: 1838, 3038/1/1 Part 3, folio 161) – the assessment included a map showing the extent of the “area
under Indonesian control” ie the northern coastal area to Atabae and inland eastward to Maliana; the Dili area
south to Aileu; the northern coast from Laga and Baucau town (inclusive) westward to Metinaro; and the road
south from Baucau to about half-way to Viqueque town. Connect with the earlier assessments of
Fretilin/Falintil by Dunn, J., A People Betrayed, 1996 at footnote 323; and the February 1976 report by the
Timor Information Service at footnote 361.
353
Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi had visited East Timor in the period 20-22 January (Dili, Ataúro, Manatuto,
and Baucau) – but was unable to visit Fretilin-controlled areas. He returned to Jakarta on 23 January 1976
before travelling to Darwin on 1 February. His initial report, dated 29 February 1976, was tabled at the United
Nations on 12 March 1976 – as an annex to United Nations Security Council, S/12011 (NAA: A1838,
801/13/11/1 Part 21; 3038/9/1 Part 1; 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1).
354
The grassed/earth Fuiloro airstrip (995m x 50m – extendable to 2,300m, suitable for DC-3 type aircraft)
had been used by light aircraft during the post-WWII period.
355
As noted above, the operation was “rushed” as Indonesia wished to secure the area due to a prospective
second visit to Timor of UN envoy, Winspeare Guicciardi. Yonif 502 was in Dili preparing to embark and
return its base in Singosari (East Java) when it was given the Los Palos mission – and its headquarter element
had already departed by sea. Yonif 502 was moved to Penfui airfield (Kupang) and 400 personnel embarked
on six C-130Bs for the Los Palos parachute assault - accompanied by a Cessna 402 light observation aircraft.
For detail see Subroto H., Operasi Udara Di Timor Timur, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2005, pp.184-187.
The Jakarta daily newspaper, The Indonesia Times, reported on 1 February 1976 that the “PGET forces have
liberated the towns of Suai, Zumalai, Ainaro, Betano, Same, Beaço, Uatolari, Los Palos,Tutuala, Lautem,
Matudo (sic), Maibesse, Turiscai, Baquai (sic) and Iliomar without any resistance.” – cited in Dunn, J., East
Timor: a rough ride …, 2003, p.256. On 3 February 1976, an Indonesian Antara newsagency report (“Fretilin
Lies Exposed”) claimed that towns, including Iliomar, had been “liberated without resistance by PGET
forces”.
67

landed on Nuri Hill suffering a large number of injuries, including broken bones. Yonif 502
engaged in a “pertempuran sengit” (“bitter fight”) with local Fretilin forces as the Fretilin
fighters withdrew to the south to block the road to Los Palos town.356 On the same day (3
February), beginning at 0900 hrs, troops of ABRI’s 2nd Marine Battalion (commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Suparmo) disembarked from five Indonesian naval vessels on the
northern coast near Lautém village - together with their armoured vehicles (BTR-50PK
armoured personnel carriers and T-76 light amphibious tanks). The Marines advanced
southwards towards Los Palos and linked up with the airborne troops of Yonif 502 on 4
February south of the Raça airfield. The intelligence chief of ABRI’s Operasi Seroja,
Colonel Dading Kalbuadi357, also arrived in the area by Bolkow helicopter on 4 February to
observe the operation. With armoured and air support358, the ABRI forces seized the
military base on the northern outskirts of Los Palos on 5 February – ie the former base of
Companhia dos Caçadores 14, and entered Los Palos Town. During the ABRI advance,
almost the whole population withdrew from the town – with only a small number of
Chinese shopkeepers reportedly remaining to protect their property. After about a week
however, the people returned to the ABRI-occupied town which was administered by
Major Warsito, the commander of ABRI’s Yonif 502.359 Unlike the killings by ABRI of
ethnic Chinese in Dili, the Chinese population in Los Palos were reportedly not mistreated.
On 13 February 1976, the PGET invited the UN Special Representative, Winspeare
Guicciardi (see footnote 353) to visit Lautém – an area “under its territorial jurisdiction”.
Having returned from the fighting on the border area at Balibo - and at Atsabe in
company with Aquiles Freitas, Francisco Ruas Hornay held a traditional oath ceremony in
Iliomar at which the people pledged to oppose the Indonesian invaders. Subsequently,
while patrolling in the Sarakanadan area south of Los Palos with a Los Palos-based Falintil
unit, Manuel Seixas (Iliomar I) was killed in a clash with ABRI. At this time, the Fretilin
Tropas in Iliomar reportedly comprised the “017 Company” - commanded by Venâncio
Savio (Mau Lorasa) with Celestino Jerónimo of Ailebere as deputy; and platoons led by
Orlando Jerónimo (Serasa)360, Caetano Gonçalves, Eugenio Xavier, and Carlos Ximenes.
On the southern coast southwest of Iliomar, ABRI Marines later occupied Uatolari (33
kilometres southwest of Iliomar) in Viqueque District and threatened Uato-Carabau (18
kilometres southwest of Iliomar) on the Viqueque/Iliomar border.361 Elements of the
company-strength Iliomar Falintil unit moved towards the Irabere River to block any ABRI
advance eastwards into Iliomar. Serasa’s platoon patrolled along the eastern side of the
Irabere River from the south coast north to Rohime (near Baguia). However, no ABRI
landings were made, and there was no contact with the Indonesian forces.

356
Subroto H., Operasi Udara …, pp.183-186. Yonif 502’s “A Company seized tens of G-3 rifles, a light
(section) machine gun and a Spandau machine gun (MG 34)”.
357
Colonel Kalbuadi, the Commander of Kopassandha Group II, had earlier commanded ABRI’s Operasi
Flamboyan – see also later footnotes 449 and 535.
358
The air support comprised a World War II-vintage B-26B Invader bomber for close air support and two
civilian Puma helicopters for logistic support and medical evacuation.
359
Ahmadi, A. (ed), Feisal Tanjung …, 1999, p. 368. Claudio Vieira was installed in 1976 as the first
“Bupati” – ie administrator, of Lautém.
360
Serasa (Orlando Jerónimo - born 15 May 1953 in Iliomar I), served in the Portuguese regular forces at
Taibessi in Dili from 1974 - until expelled for political activity on 20 June 1975.
361
The areas of Indonesian control and continuing fighting in late February 1976 are depicted in the map
“Position of Indonesian invasion forces” in Timor Information Service, No 8, 1 March 1976.
68

THE 1976 “MUAPEPEH PURGE” KILLINGS 362

In the period 15 May to 2 June 1976, Fretilin’s Supreme Council of the Resistance
(Central Committee) held its second plenary session in Soibada363 and revised its political
organisation and military strategy to emphasise a protracted “people’s war” and guerrilla
struggle with the establishment of Fretilin zonas libertadas (liberated zones) and bases de
apoio (support/logistic bases).364 The meeting divided the country into six sectors365 -
including the Eastern Sector/Region (Ponte Leste) that encompassed Lautém District and
parts of Baucau and Viqueque Districts, under Juvenal Inácio dos Reis (the Fretilin
Minister for Finance - nom de guerre: Sera Key)366 as the Region’s Political Commissar.367
Iliomar was a “key resistance base” area – and included a number of villagers from the
Uato-Carabau and Los Palos areas who had also concentrated in the Iliomar Zone.368
However, a serious internal dispute soon arose among the Fretilin national
leadership on the strategy for opposing the Indonesian occupation.369 President Francisco
Amaral argued that “we should send the population to surrender. Only those men who were
strong and could fight the war would stay with the Central Committee … there began a rift
within Fretilin”.370 He also suggested negotiations with the Indonesians, but was over-
ruled.

362
A briefer description of this incident can be found in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 362-
365 and Chapter 7.4, pp.67-68 (based principally on the 2003 “Iliomar II village report” – see Bibliography).
363
In the central mountains area between Dili and Baucau – about 80 km directly southeast of Dili – see
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.42. This meeting was preceded by the first plenary session
of the Fretilin Central Committee in Barique (Manatuto), northwest of Viqueque, in April 1976 – see Chega !,
CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 78; Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.41; and Niner, S.,
Xanana - Leader of the Struggle for an Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North
Melbourne, 2009, pp.30-32. Subsequently, Marxism was adopted as the Fretilin party’s official ideology at
the Laline Conference (Viqueque) in the period March-May 1977 – Chega !, CAVR Final Report Part 5, p.16
- footnote. See footnote 481 for the change in the Party’s name to Partido Marxista Leninista Fretilin
(PMLF) in March 1981.
364
For an explanation by Xanana Gusmão of the “rationale” for bases de apoio see Chega !, CAVR Final
Report, Chapter 7.3, para 91. Previously, these bases were termed “zona reta guarda” (“retreat zones”).
365
From west to east: Fronteira Norte (Ermera, Liquiça and some parts of Bobonaro - under Hélio Sanches
Pina – ie Mau Kruma), Fronteira Sul (Cova Lima and some parts of Bobonaro – Carlos César Correia Lebre
– ie César Mau Laka), Centro Norte (Manatuto, Aileu and Dili - João Bosco Soares), Centro Sul (Manufahi
and Ainaro - Hamis Bin Umar Bassarewan – ie Hata), Centro Leste (Baucau and Viqueque - Vicente Manuel
dos Reis – ie Bie Ki Sah’e) and Ponte Leste (Lautém - Juvenal Inácio dos Reis – ie Sera Key). The
administrative and military structures are detailed in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 16-25 – ie
from sector down to região, zona, suco and aldeia. At each level, military commanders deferred to the
civilian political administrators – ie in accord with the principle that “politics commands the gun” (“politica
comanda fuzil”). The largest military unit was the companhia – with one to four in each zona supported by
Forca Auto Defesa (Fade) militia.
366
Also known as Juvenal Maria de Fátima Inácio (b. 2/3/1948) who had served as a civil servant in
PortugueseTimor from 25 January 1969 – noted as a (segundo-oficial) in the Public Works and Transport and
in the Finance Service in 1974 and 1975.
367
Initially, Ponte Leste only encompassed principally Lautém District but, following the Fretilin meeting at
Aikarus (Remexio) in mid-1977, the areas of Baucau and Viqueque Districts east of the main north-south
road were included in Ponte Leste.
368
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.3 lists “Some Key Resistance Bases” (totalling 29) at Table 4,
p.27 that includes Iliomar.
369
This ideological and strategic dispute – between “Marxist” and “nationalist” factions, had its beginnings in
the earlier first meeting of the Fretilin Central Committee at Barique – Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter
5, para 69-87.
370
Amaral’s statement to the CAVR National Public Hearing – see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter
7.3, para 110.
69

In response, the Fretilin Central Committee began a purge of “reactionary” elements
– principally Aquiles Frietas Soares371 and his supporters in Baucau District. At this time,
Iliomar apparently fell outside the area of Fretilin/Falintil’s “Unit Two” (“Unidade 2”) –
covering eastern Baucau and Viqueque with its headquarters in Matabean under Xanana
Gusmão372 as the political representative. Iliomar is likely to have been included within
“Unit One” – which included the Lautém District areas of Luro, Loré, Moro, Tutuala and
Los Palos.
Beginning in about February 1976 - according to the Iliomar I village report,
disagreements arose in Iliomar between a Falintil Group (Grupo) - led by Francisco Ruas
Hornay373 of Iliomar II, and the Fretilin Iliomar Zone (codenamed “Mauser”) Committee
led by Tomás Pinto (ie, Lesa Mau of Fuat village), the Zone Secretary.

The Hornay group – that included local leaders: Oscar Ferreira (Iliomar II) and
Dinis de Castro (Tirilolo), opposed the Fretilin Central Committee’s decision to evacuate
people into the countryside from the towns and villages into zonas libertadas – the policy

371
Aquiles was the son of a prestigious chief of Leti Mumu (Quelicai, Baucau) – Cosme Freitas Soares, who
served with the Australian SRD/Z Special Unit (Operation COBRA) against the Japanese in 1944 and died
while a prisoner of the Japanese (NAA: A3269, O8/A and V17). Aquiles Freitas formerly served as a
Portuguese soldier (primeiro-sargento - senior sergeant). As a Fretilin military leader, he had led the defence
of Atabae against the ABRI advance in October-November 1975 - and, in early 1976, served as the deputy
commander of the Baucau Region under Kilik Wae Gae and as a semi-autnomous zone commander (Bero-
Quero – Quelicai, Baucau) at Uaibitai. He was denounced as a “reacção”, arrested in December 1976, and
executed in Venilale (Lobito) in January 1977 – see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 72-75;
Chapter 7.2, para 353-369; Chapter 7.4, pp .63-64. Through Adelino Carvalho of Uatolari and Fernando
Sousa of Uato-Carabau, Aquiles reportedly had branches into Iliomar - see also Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed),
To Resist …, 2000, p.50; Gama, P., “Daftar Kejahatan Perang Yg Dilakukan Fretilin 1975” (“List of War
Crimes Committed by Fretilin in 1975’) – 13 July 2001, p.1 in “Timtim Adili Pro Integrasi Salah Satunya
Anggota Kopassus”, Solidaritas Tanpa Batas, 12 July 2001; and Ramos-Horta, Funu …, 1987, p.97.
372
José Alexandre Gusmão – ie later also known as Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, served as a junior civil
servant in the Administrative Service in Dili in the period January 1966-July 1974 (completing his obligatory
military service from mid-1969 to mid-1971). From mid-1976 to early 1977, Xanana Gusmão was the Vice-
Secretary of the Viqueque Zone – immediately west of Iliomar where, inexperienced, he “was really
struggling” – Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.45. For Xanana’s explanation of his adoption
of the pseudonym “Xanana” in the early 1970s, see Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …, 2002, p.110.
373
See footnote 343 - Francisco Ruas Hornay of Akara sub-village, Iliomar II, had been a member of the
Portuguese regular military force ie Tropas in the late 1960s. He subsequently left the Tropas and joined the
Portuguese police force (Corpo do Polícia de Segurança Pública de Timor) serving in Dili, Balibo and
Oecusse. In May 1975, he was promoted from guarda auxiliar 1st-class to guarda 2nd-class – vide BOdT, No.
24, 31 May 1975, p. 425. In late 1975, he led a Falintil force defending the western border and fought against
Indonesian/anti-Fretilin forces at Balibo, Bobonaro and Atabae. Hornay was a close associate of the Falintil
commander, Aquiles Freitas Soares/Belo – see footnote 371.
70

that was intended to deny the Indonesian invaders a “constituency” and to facilitate a
guerrilla war by Fretilin/Falintil in the countryside.374 Francisco Hornay severely criticized
the Fretilin leadership – particularly the Fretilin Minister for Finance, Juvenal Inácio dos
Reis (Sera Key)375 and his principal assistant, Fernando Tzai376.
An important element in the dispute was Hornay’s antipathy towards the Iliomar
Fretilin Secretary, Tomás Pinto. Hornay reportedly believed that the position should be
held by a respected liurai (traditional leader)377. According to Lere Anan Timor378:
“They didn’t want Tomás Pinto to be the Zona Secretary, because they wanted a
‘blue-blood’. He (Francisco Hornay) wanted me to be the Zona Secretary, because I
was a ‘blue-blood’. We opposed him because of the Struggle, because we opposed
exploitation … Tomás Pinto and I made a report to the Regional Committee and
Sera Key, the Political Commissar of Ponta Leste. On the basis of that report, they
denounced Hornay’s action as reactionary and part of the national reaction led by
Francisco Xavier do Amaral.”379

In June 1976, the Falintil military commander in Iliomar, Afonso Henriques,
ordered the arrest of Francisco Hornay - as one of Hornay’s followers, Mateus Oliveira,
had displayed indiscipline by shooting at a coconut at Laihara (Cacaven village - 23
kilometres by road northeast of Iliomar Town) when returning to Iliomar from Los
Palos.380 Hornay and his key followers were forced to participate in a self-criticism meeting
at Akara sub-village (Iliomar II) presided over by Sera Key.381 According to Lere: “They
held a meeting. No one was allowed to carry arms. (Hornay) stuck to his opinion, and said
that Tomás could not be Secretary. In the debate, Hornay was blamed, and they took a
unanimous decision. The political commissar, who commanded a platoon, ordered the
troops to strip them (Hornay’s men) of their weapons. The result was that almost an entire

374
Francisco Ruas Hornay’s principal subordinates were Oscar Ferreira (village chief of Iliomar II) and Dinis
de Castro (Tirilolo). The Cainliu village report (1 July 2003) to the CAVR describes the conflict as between a
right-wing anti-Fretilin “reactionary” group (ie, Hornay) and a left-wing Fretilin group.
375
Sera Key (Juvenal Juvenal Inácio) was captured by ABRI troops on 31 March 1979 near Bibileu village
(Viqueque). Ill, he was being escorted by a Falintil group led by Taur Matan Ruak. After capture, Sera Key
was reportedly taken to Los Palos and killed – see also footnote 616. However, note that according to Taur
Matan Ruak, Sera Key was killed in Uatolari - Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, footnote p.118.
Taur Matan Ruak was also captured but reportedly escaped 23 days later.
376
Fernando Tzai (also as “Cay”, “Txai”, “Txay” and Commandante Jaid) – born in Chai sub-village (Loré I)
was a Fretilin “adjunto politico” closely associated with Sera Key. Fernando was killed in an ABRI ambush
at Atelari (between Luro and Laga) in 1981 (or in September 1980 according to F-FDTL Lieutenant Colonel
Aluc Descartes (João Miranda b. 8/3/51) – discussion with author on 4 April 2005). Tzai/Cay is sometimes
confused with a Falintil commander, Falo Chai (Fernando Teles) of Los Palos who was killed in a clash with
ABRI in 1985 – see footnotes 499, 525, 561 and 629.
377
Fretilin saw liurai authority as “feudalism and tried to eliminate it” – Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 5, para 55.
378
At the time, Lere was the Fretilin Vice Secretary of the Iliomar Zone. Lere’s remarks above are cited from
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 76-77 which are based on Lere’s interview recorded by the
Tuba Rai Metin program. Lere’s version is subjective – other sources deny that Francisco Hornay supported
Lere as Zone Secretary.
379
This is an early reference to President Amaral as a “reactionary” – Amaral was not arrested until 14
September 1977. For information on Amaral, including his capture by ABRI, see also footnotes 370, 412 and
449.
380
Chega !, CAVR Final Report Chapter 7.4, para 247 (p.67).
381
Akara/Acara was located about two km south of Iliomar Town on the road to the current-day Iliomar II
village – ie, the area of GR 612352 – see Annex A, Iliomar map, 1:25,000.
71

company was disarmed. The Commissar’s troops arrested around five or six people and
took them to Belta Trés382 where the Commissariat was, and detained them”383.
At Belta Trés, Hornay and his close supporters spent 14 days undertaking re-
indoctrination and study (justivo correctivo) of the Central Committee’s political line.384
However, Francisco Hornay and his followers did not change their views – “they still
continued being reactionary”385. On return from Belta Trés, Hornay organised military
training for former Portuguese military reservist (Segunda Linha) members and the youth
at Larisoru Mumu (about two kilometres southeast of Iliomar Town)386 – with Domingos
Pinto also assisting with the training. However, tensions arose during the training involving
two members from Iliomar I, António and Fernando. The Fretilin Ponte Leste (Eastern
Zone) Central Committee sent two cadres, Felix and Gaitano, to the area to resolve the
difficulties – and terminated the training due to its “negative effects”.
The Fretilin Central Committee (Orgão Diretivo) issued a directive that the local
people must be concentrated (“acampamento”) in order that they could all be indoctrinated
with “Fretilin Political Education”. However, Francisco Ruas Hornay, did not agree with
the directive. The Iliomar Zone Committee set up a place to carry out political
indoctrination at Istasi (Fuat village area, northeast of Bubutau)387 but, reluctant to enter the
villages, two Fretilin youth organisation (OPJT) members, António Esteves and Domingos
da Silva, were appointed to direct the training program. Following a meeting of the Central
Committee, Francisco Ruas Hornay was invited to participate in a meeting at Istasi.
However, he did not attend as he had heard rumours that he would be arrested. So, he only
directed 45 representatives of his people to attend the meeting - led by Celestino Baretto of
Akara (Iliomar II) and Bernardo Soares of Lihina (Iliomar II). Apart from not participating
in the meeting at Istasi/Saelarin, Francisco also prevented villagers from Iliomar II and
Tirilolo villages attending. Consequently, only the villagers of Iliomar I, Cainliu, Ailebere
and Fuat attended. Despite the limited attendance, the political training went ahead. From
the training, a decision was made to collect military-type goods and materiel from the
population for use as directed by the Operational (Fighting) Command - and Domingos
Pinto was appointed the coordinator to collect (“recolhamento”) the material in Iliomar.
In October 1976, aware that the Fretilin leadership planned to arrest him, Francisco
Hornay felt threatened and a consequent need to be armed. However, as his group now had
no weapons, Hornay and some of his group travelled to Uaibitae/Quelicai (in Baucau
District - about 55 kilometres directly northwest of Iliomar Town) to seek assistance from
Aquiles Freitas 388. Hornay returned from Quelicai with a G-3 rifle, grenades and other
combat materiel provided by Aquiles Freitas. Although armed with the G-3, he still lacked
sufficient ammunition - so Hornay sent 12 of his men to get ammunition from the
storehouse at Uaritir/Uasofa (about three kilometres directly southeast of Iliomar Town,
near Mount Denofai) where a militia element from Iliomar was stationed. After the
ammunition was collected, the population of four of the Iliomar villages (Iliomar I, Fuat,
Ailebere and Cainliu) reportedly became “anxious and afraid”. Still wary, Francisco
Hornay next sent his two messengers (Celestino Barreto and Afonso Barreto) to meet with
the leaders of the Iliomar community – such as Jeremias dos Reis and Grigorio Pinto, to
382
Belta Trés was the site of Fretilin’s Ponte Leste Commissariat, located at Irara village southwest of Los
Palos (between Cacaven village in the west and Ililapa village in the east).
383
Statement by Lere Anan Timor, Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 76.
384
According to Lere Anan Timor, “five or six” of the Hornay group were detained at Belta Trés “for
between one and seven months” – Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 76.
385
Lere Anan Timor – Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 5, para 76.
386
At approximately GR 614353 – ie east of the Akara aldeia (sub-village)
387
In the area of Mount Kelele – Istasi and Saelarin are adjacent.
388
See footnote 371 for notes on Aquiles Freitas.
72

resolve the conflict. However, Celestino and Afonso were unable to meet with the leaders
as planned and were immediately captured by the commander of the Falintil element,
Celestinho, and were handed over to members of the Forças de Auto-Defesa da Arma
Branca (FADE – the Fretilin militia force) including Henrique Pereira (of Iliomar I) who
took them to Borutau (Fuat) and imprisoned them. Apart from capturing these two, three
others were also captured and imprisoned at Borutau: Gabriel de Anunciacão, João Xavier
and Afonso Pinto Miranda. As his first negotiating initiative had not been successful,
Francisco sent his two younger brothers, Angelo Pinto and Silvino Ximenes, to support
Celestino Barreto and Afonso Barreto in an effort to convince the leaders to resolve the
conflict. However, the situation deteriorated further, particularly at Larisoru-Mumu.
Unsuccessful, Francisco Hornay’s two brothers returned and angrily attempted to have
Francisco personally go and resolve the situation. A day later, Francisco Hornay
mobilized his followers and went to Larisoru-Mumu. On arrival however, they were
immediately fired upon from the Larisoru barricades (“barreira”) by Serafin Jerónimo (of
Ailebere village, Iliomar). Francisco Hornay returned fire and captured two of the Larisoru
“barreira” personnel – António and Fernando from Iliomar I (Iliomar and Caentau sub-
villages).
Following this clash, the people of Iliomar II feared for their safety and fled
westward to Mount Paitah near the Lihulo River. Francisco Hornay then ordered 30 of his
followers to go to Quelicai under the leadership of his older brother, Duarte Ximenes Pinto.
Their intention was to seek further support from Aquiles Freitas.
However, the situation continued to deteriorate, and the Iliomar Zone Committee
ordered the villagers of Iliomar I, Ailebere, Fuat, Cainliu and Tirilolo to gather in the
Iliomar I and Cainliu areas. A week later, led by the Political Commissar Juvenal Inácio
(Sera Key) and Political Ajudante (Assistant) Fernando Tzai, the Fretilin force attacked
Hornay’s headquarters at Larikua about 2.5 kilometres directly south-southwest of Iliomar
Town. 389 The people of Iliomar II reportedly became the victims of clashes at
Larikua/Kikilua with the Sera Key forces during which a Falintil member, Luís, was
wounded and a Sera Key civilian follower, José Vatalata, was also wounded. After two
days, Sera Key’s group mobilized its forces, and the people and surrounded the barreira at
Mount Paitah. However, Francisco Hornay and 49 members of his group, with one G-3
rifle, escaped initially to the Ilipora-Pora area390 and then westward via Sirimana and
Tirilolo to Kulaldera/Kulaldere (a sub-village of Irabin Leterea) in neighbouring Uato-
Carabau Sub-District.
Hornay’s supporters remaining at Mount Paitah surrendered to Sera Key and
Fernando Tzai. The men who surrendered were taken from Mount Paitah and interrogated
and tortured at Caentau/Saburikalo (immediately west of the Iliomar I village). Those
Iliomar II men tortured were: Mário Coluna (Lihina sub-village); João Babtista (sic)
(Lihina); Filomeno Babtista (sic) (Lihina); Miguel Soares (Lihina); Adolfo Pinto (Lihina);
Francisco da Costa (Akara sub-village); Adelino Pinto (Akara); Jerimias da Costa (Akara)
and João Baptista (“Punalai” – of Madarira sub-village). However, these abuses were
apparently not in accord with the orders of the Fretilin “Superior Directorate” – but rather
those detained were tortured reportedly because of the individual interests of their captors
and for revenge. Soon after, Orlando da Costa, who had witnessed these events, went and
reported the incidents to the Fretilin leader Fernando Tzai – warning that if Tzai did not go
and intervene, then it was likely that the prisoners would all be killed. Others from the

389
Larikua was located on the lower western slopes of Mount Punapan, ie east of the Iliomar-Uato Carabau
road – in the vicinity of GR 591340.
390
Ilipora-Pora/Ilibora-Bora was located on the northern slopes of Mount Punapan, ie south of the Iliomar-
Uato Carabau road – in the vicinity of GR 598345.
73

families captured at Mount Paitah were also tortured with a spear at Saburikalo by a Falintil
member, Wasi Lawan - those tortured were: Celestino Pinto (Madarira), Nokolai (a
woman) of Madarira; and Manusoru, Nouili and Dolilai from Ailebere.
After two weeks, the Ponte Leste Command directed Fernando Tzai and the whole
population of the four pro-Fretilin villages to go to Uato-Carabau and attack the barreira at
Kulaldera (Uato-Carabau) and capture the Francisco Ruas Hornay group for trial by the
Political Commissariat. However, while they were not initially successful in capturing the
Hornay group, on 13 November they captured Paulo Hornay who was later killed at Ira Fok
(between Ailebere village and Larimi sub-village) by Comrade Mateus Oliveira (Iliomar I),
the Commandante of the FADE.
Soon after, a force led by Commandante Fernando Tzai, Tito Cristovão da Costa
(Lere Anan Timor) and Tomás Pinto (Lesa Mau) entered Kulaldera and captured about 80
members of the Hornay group – two from Iliomar I; five from Ailebere; seven from
Cainliu391; 15 from Tirilolo392 and 50 from Iliomar II village including the village chief and
Fretilin member, Oscar Ferreira.393 The prisoners were bound and led back to the Tailoi-
Caentau area (about two kilometres northeast of Iliomar Town) by Fernando Tzai’s men.
Francisco Hornay’s 11 year-old son, Constantino Hornay, was among those captured at
Kulaldera. He related: “We were captured at dawn and taken back to Iliomar. There, we
were tied up in a place called Sailari and put into a pig-pen … after that we were
investigated. First the leaders, and then the little people. So, they interrogated me at the
end, after about four or five days. They kept us tied up, and each day we received one meal.
They tied us with rope from sugar palm and sago palm trees – our hands were tied behind
our backs at three levels: first at our palms, second at our elbows, and third at our arms –
then we were hung from a tree. Our feet were in bamboo stocks. In turn, we were
interrogated by the Falintil operational commander, Domingos Pinto. He interrogated me
that morning. Senior Falintil commanders, Commandante Lere and Commandante Jaid,
also interrogated me. After that I was released on condition that I work in the kitchen, draw
water … look for firewood and look after the buffalo. My uncle, together with some other

391
The Iliomar II village report to the CAVR (the most detailed) cites seven from Cainliu – but the Cainliu
village report lists 15 Cainliu villagers captured at Kulaldera: Marcos Pinto – 32 years (later killed at
Muapepeh), Paulo Hornay – 31 (killed at Irafok), Felix da Costa - 36, Armindo Nunes - 38, Monteiro da
Costa - 50, Florindo da Costa – 31, Calisto da Costa – 33, João Baptista - 25, Miguel Monteiro - 20, Varu-
Dai -18, Lino da Costa – 27, Maria da Costa - 40, Rita da Costa - 46, Felismina da Costa – 35, Filomena da
Costa - 32. The Cainliu report states that Felix da Costa and Armindo Nunes were imprisoned for one year at
“Darana”, Los Palos.
392
Tirilolo: Dinis de Castro, Manuel Sarmento, José António, Jermias da Costa (Tirilolo), Mateus do Rego,
Julião Teles, Manuel Coreia (sic), Jaime da Costa, Mateus Baptista, Valente Madeira, Raúl Baptista, Américo
Baptista, Dominggos Baptista, Thomas da Costa. Others captured soon after and tortured were Alfredo Pires,
Afonso Teles, Vicente Coelho, Ernesto Hornay, Francisco da Costa, Sebastiao Cardoso, Boaventura Beirao,
Igildo Ximenes, Jermias da Costa (Etevata).
393
Other Iliomar II villagers captured at Kulaldera were Angelo Pinto, António Soares, Felipe Pinto, Camilio
Pinto, Martinho Pinto, Adolfo Pinto Ximenes, António Ferreira, Gil Ferreira, Salvador Soares, António Pinto
(“metan” = black), Gaspar Nunes, Felipe Nunes, Celestino Hornai, Camilio Pinto, Inácio Carvaliho (sic),
Nouvatu, Amadeo, Zacarias Madeira, Castilo Soares, Edmundo Soares, Gaspar Ximenes, José Aguas, Nuno
Bastos, Libertino Bastos, Luís Soares, Humberto da Silva, Francisco Pinto, Bernardo Soares, Armando
Soares, Júlio Ximenes, Silvino Ximenes, Roberto Ximenes, Américo dos Santos Martins (from Balibo),
Gaspar Ximenes, Constantinho Hornai Nunes, António Ximenes, Carlos Monteiro, Paulo Pinto (from
Rebolar), Gaspar da Costa Loi, Manecas de Carvailho (sic), Joaquim da Costa, Domingos da Costa, António
da Silva.
74

people, were killed by Fretilin – led by Commandante Lere and Jaid, on around 16
November 1976.”394
At Tailoi/Caentau, Oscar Ferreira, the Iliomar II village chief, and others were
bound and hauled up into the rafters of houses and suffered greatly. The Political
Commissar, Fernando Tzai heard the cries of the victims and reportedly told the Fretilin
Zone leaders395 that, as the guilty would be executed, it was unnecessary to impose any
further suffering. Accordingly, they were taken down, tied up and imprisoned in a large
building. The victims were given a meal and later taken to the Sailarin/Kaenur area
(northeast of Bubutau) to be “processed” by the Ponte Leste (Eastern Zone) Political
Commissariat in accord with its orders and regulations. Here, they were placed in pig-pens
to await interrogation.396
At this time, the Ponte Leste Political Commissariat reportedly comprised:
Fernando Tzai, Raúl, Luciano, Tito, and Aleixo da Costa; and the Iliomar Zone (Mauser)
leaders were Albino Lourdes, Tito Cristovão da Costa (Lere Anan Timor), Tomás Pinto
(Lesa Mau) and Gaspar Seixas Miranda.
In the interrogations, the Fretilin leaders sought information on the “ideas and
plans” of Francisco Ruas Hornay. On 17 November 1976, it was decided to execute eight
of the prisoners, and they were taken eastward to the Kakimatar/Fifirasan area in adjacent
Loré Sub-District where they were killed with machetes. The eight comprised:
 António de Oliveira397 - from Iliomar I village; and
 seven from Iliomar II village: Oscar Ferreira, Angelo Pinto,
António Soares, Silvino Ximenes, Júlio Ximenes, Libertino
Bastos, and Bernardo Soares398.

Others convicted as “guilty” were sent for “correction” to Cacaven village for two
months and some to other locations.400 Those convicted of less serious offences401 were
399

394
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 248 and Chapter 7.8, para 241 – Constantino Hornay (also
as “Ornai”). “Commandante Jaid” was Fernando Tzai – author’s discussions with Constantino Hornay, Dili,
11 April 2007, 26 June 2007.
395
The Fretilin political leaders present were: Tito Cristovão da Costa (Lere Anan Timor), Tomás Pinto (Lesa
Mau), Martinho da Costa; and military representatives Commandante Albino Lourdes, Commandante
Domingos Pinto, Commandante Celestinho Jerónimo, and Commandante Luís Nunes (from Los Palos).
396
Orlando da Silva Correia Belo (Fernando So) described conditions in these rudimentary Fretilin prisons in
1976: “in Iliomar, we were divided into three groups. Each pig-pen had nine people. Our food was similar to
Belta Trés and Loré. We ate sago, tips of palm leaves, maize and cassava” – Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.4, para 284. Subsequently, Fretilin established a Renal (Rehabilitação Nacional) at Marabia in
Iliomar commanded by Lere Anan Timor until replaced by Orlando Silva Correia Belo in July/August 1977.
The Marabia Renal was reportedly located in northern Iliomar towards the Mount Legumau area. For detail
on Fretilin detention centers and Renal, see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 264-271 and 283-
285 ie, in Lautém: Belta Trés (Irara, Fuiloro), Besi Manas (Luro) and Renal Marabia (Iliomar).
397
The Iliomar I report notes that António was killed at “Firfirasan/Fuat”; and the Fuat Report also refers to
the area of these killings as at “Fifirasan”. These killings are noted in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter
7.2, para 365.
398
The Tirilolo village report states that Igildo Ximenes (of Tirilolo sub-village) was also investigated,
tortured and executed.
399
From Tirilolo, those imprisoned at “Charano” in Cacaven were: Mateus do Rego, Julião Teles, Jaime da
Costa, Jeremias da Costa (Tirilolo), and Manuel Coreia (sic). The Tirilolo village report states their
imprisonment was for “+/- one year”.
400
From Cainliu, Felix da Costa and Armindo Nunes were each sentenced to one year’s detention in Darana,
Los Palos; Monteiro da Costa and Florindo da Costa were sentenced to three months at Caidawa-Ira; Calista
da Costa, João Baptista, and Miguel Monteiro were temporarily detained at Sailarin (Fuat); and Varu-Dai,
Lino da Costa, Maria da Costa, Rita da Costa, Felismina da Costa and Filomena da Costa were detained for a
short period. The Fuat report states that seven Fuat villagers were involved: Fernando Jerónimo – 40 years,
Rumutau sub-village; Lai Luan (?) – 60, Rumutau; José Soares – 59, Rumutau; Sour-Alex (?) – 66,
75

sentenced to salt-making and cutting down sago trees and making sago flour - as directed
by the Political Commissariat; while children and those adjudged as innocent were released
but with local restrictions on their freedom.
Following the execution of the eight Hornay supporters in the Kakimatar/Fifirasan
area (related above), six more were captured at Uaibitai in the Quelicai (Baucau) area402:
 Francisco Ruas Hornay
 Duarte Ximenes Pinto
 José Nunes
 Dinis de Castro (Tatalalarin/Tirilolo)
 Manuel Sarmento (Tirilolo/Tirilolo)
 Marcos Pinto (Cainliu)

They were not interrogated, but executed immediately on arrival at Muapepeh (north-east
of Iliomar Town) on 24 November 1976 403. Before his execution, Francisco Hornay
declared:
“We make war – and we die. Also, we engage in politics – and we die. However,
there is a principle – we must gain independence. It is clear that sooner or later, we
will be independent – even though we will have gone to the other world. The war
will be long. You will have difficulties and you will suffer. Do not be angry with
other people. Go ahead with your war, and we will be with you.”404

However, before dawn on the day of the executions, Manuel Sarmento (Tirilolo)
broke free, seized a Mauser rifle and escaped. He fled north to the Osoliu area of Luro Sub-
District where, after an exchange of fire, he was captured by a Falintil group. Manuel was
taken initially to Cacaven village and then to the Kaenur area of Fuat and killed at Sailarin
about one week later (another report suggests that Manuel Sarmento was taken to the
Fretilin headquarters at Lobito or Ossú in neighbouring Viqueque District and executed).

Rumutau; Ile Dali (?) – 59, Rumutau; Francisco Soares – 20, Rumutau; and António Lopes – 46, Acadirilo.
All the foregoing Fuat villagers were reportedly imprisoned at Borutau (Fuat) and one suffered serious
injuries.
401
From Tirilolo, seven (or eight ? – as two are named Mateus Baptista ?) villagers were released
conditionally ie they were required to report regularly to authorities: José António, Valente Madeira, Mateus
Baptista, Raúl Baptista, Américo Baptista, Dominggos Baptista, Jermias da Costa (Etevata)
402
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 365 relates that “Francisco Hornay and his followers”
were captured in “Uatu-Carabau” – presumably referring to the capture of the 80 at Kulaldera – see above.
Para 77 of Chapter 5 of Chega !, CAVR Final Report states “Francisco Hornay and two others were then
captured in Baguia (Baucau)” – citing Xanana Gusmão in Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist is to Win !,
Richmond, 2000. Gusmão relates that three Iliomar Fretilin leaders associated with Aquiles Freitas, including
Francisco Hornay, were arrested in Baguia as traitors, and returned to Iliomar (through Uato-Carabau) for
judgement by local Fretilin cadre. In his book, Xanana Xanana Gusmão relates that he: “contacted the
Secretary of the Iliomar Zone (today a Commander) ((ie Lere)) and insisted the three should not be ill-treated
…”; and he directed that the three disgraced Fretilin cadre returned to Iliomar were not to be
harmed. - Gusmão, J. A. “Xanana”, Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Patria, Edicoes Colibri, Lisboa, 1994.
However, the detailed Iliomar II village report specifically notes that Hornay was captured later in the
Quelicai area ie “6 husi Quelecai kaer no haruka mai mak: 1. Francisci ((sic)) Ruas Hornai …” - and the
capture of the group at “Quelicai” is also related in Chega !,CAVR Final Report at Chapter 7.4, p.68.
403
In 2008, as part of the Falintil pension allocation process, Francisco Ruas Hornay (codename – “Hirus
Matan Mean”) was noted as a “Grade 3” Falintil Section Commander who was killed for “political motives”
on 18 August 1976 – Combatentes da Libertação Nacional, Edital No.110/IV/2008, Dili, 5 April 2008.
404
Iliomar II village report (in Tetum): “Ita halo funu Ita sei mate, nune mos Ita halo politica ita sei mate,
maybe principo ida katak alcanca independencia ne mos claru katak lalais ka kleur ita sei Ukun Rasik An,
meski ami liu ona ba mundo seluk. Funu sei naruk, imi sei terus, no imi sei susar, tan ne’e lalika laran moras
no hanoin at ba ema. Halo imi nia funu ami sei ajuda imi.”
76

Francisco Hornay’s young son, Constantino, described the killings of his father’s
group by a “rival Fretilin group” as “just like cutting down bananas”.405
Following the Francisco Hornay incident, Fretilin re-organised several of the
villages. Cainliu village was divided into four sub-villages (aldeia): Kae-kae, headed by
Armindo Monteiro; Kui-kui by José da Gama; Rusafuik by Ildefonso da Costa; and Tuba-
rai by José da Costa. Tirololo village was divided into two aldeia: Railakan, headed by
Thomas Ribeiro; and Fohoraimean led by Abel Soares with Dinis de Castro as deputy. Fuat
village was re-organised as five aldeia: Ramahana, headed by Luís da Costa; Borutau by
Miguel Pinto; Ofotuab by Adão Amaral; Nanakuru by Dinis Pinto; and Hamalobe by
Domingos da Costa.

ABRI’s ENCIRCLEMENT AND ANNIHILATION CAMPAIGN 1977-78

In 1976, Falintil forces in western Lautém District406 established base areas at
Cacaven and further west in the Irabere sector at Komumata – manned by Iliomar
elements.407 In a clash with ABRI in the Irabere area, three Iliomar Falintil were reportedly
killed: Afonso da Costa (Tirilolo) and one fighter from Fuat and one from Ailebere. A
further Tirilolo Falintil, José da Costa, was also reportedly injured in a mine incident.
Towards the end of 1976, the Fretilin Minister for Finance and Commissar for
Ponte Leste Sector, Juvenal Inácio dos Reis (Sera Key) ordered that the population should
move from the towns and villages into the remote “Red Zones” (as distinct from the
Indonesian-controlled “White Zones”) in order to deny a constituency to the Indonesian
occupiers. At this time, in the Lautém region, Indonesian troops occupied only the towns of
Lautém, Los Palos, and Com – and villages along the roads joining these towns. In this
region, movement to the Red Zones was directed by the Fretilin Secretary, Afonso Savio.
In the first phase, the people of the Los Palos area withdrew to four “Zona”: Com, on the
northern coast; Belta Trés/Tiga (in the area of Tutuala and Loré ?); Luro to the northwest;
and to Iliomar.408 At the beginning of 1977, the villagers of Iliomar I began to concentrate
in the area of Fuat village and came under the control of the Zone Committee and the
Falintil Command. According to the then village chief of Fuat:

“In Iliomar, we did not experience anything (of the war) until 9 February 1977,
when we started to hear mortar fire and the sound of cannons from ships. We
became frightened and worried and … we evacuated to the forest around Fuat and
to other places near our houses”.409

Soon after, another internal dispute arose within Fretilin, and the Iliomar Zone
Secretary Benedito Savio was detained and re-educated in Pailafo (Luro Sub-District)
together with Carlos Ximenes, Afonso Pinto, and Martinho Hornay. From Fuat village,
Dinis Madeira (the“political assistant”) and Duarte Madeira (the “village delegate”) were

405
CAVR Update: February-July 2004, p.5. Statement by Constantinho (sic) X. Hornai, The Update reports
the date of the killings as 25 November 1976. http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/cavrUpdate-FebJul04-
en.pdf.
406
By Government Regulation of 30 July 1976, Indonesia had gazetted: “Lautem as a second-grade regency
(“kabupaten”) with the capital as Lospalos – covering the sub-districts of Lospalos, Luro, Iliomar, Lautem,
Tutala [sic].”
407
Tirilolo village report, p.2.
408
Chega !, CAVR Final Report lists 29 “resistance bases”, including Iliomar, Matebian and Mehara in the
Ponte Leste Sector – Chapter 7.3, p.27, Table 4 “Some Key Resistance Bases”.
409
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.3, para 79.
77

arrested and imprisoned in the Fretilin Renal (Rehabilitação Nacional)410 at Besi Manas at
Luro.
In mid-1977, Xanana Gusmão was assigned to the Fretilin/Falintil Unit One as the
political representative and established his headquarters in the jungle southeast of Los
Palos. ABRI began an 18-month offensive in September 1977 with their operations in the
first phase concentrated in the west (Bobonaro, Liquiça, Suai) and subsequently in the
central Aileu and Same areas411. During this period, internal dissension within Fretilin
climaxed with the arrest of President Francisco Amaral for “high treason” on 14 September
1977412 and the killing of many of his supporters – including Eastern Region leaders Adão
Amaral and José dos Santos.413 In October, Nicolau Lobato was appointed President, Mau
Lear (António Duarte Carvarino) as Vice President and Prime Minister, and Vicente dos
Reis (Bie Ki Sah’e) as National Political Commissar.
In Iliomar in November 1977, the Fretilin authorities arrested Modesto de Jesus
Madeira Sanches in Haksolok sub-village – together with his father - Salvador Almeida,
and Adelino Freitas; and they were imprisoned in the Besi Manas Renal at Luro.414 Soon
after, Horacio de Conceição (Irara, Los Palos) was arrested in Iliomar together with João
Vienas, Alcino Soares, Cristovão Lopes, Julião Cacavei, Mário Amaral, Felix da
Conceição and Bernadino – all were also interrogated and imprisoned in the Besi Manas
Renal at Luro.415
In August 2003, President Xanana Gusmão commented:
“In 1977, the wrong policy of ‘arms for the defence of ideology’ instigated the
assassination of several senior commanders of Falintil, including those who were
considered traitors of the Motherland, but in fact, were good commanders and
nationalists.”416
In Lautém District, the people’s Fretilin-directed journey to the Matabean Mountain
concentration zone (also as “Matebian”, “Matebean” ie, “Mountain of the Spirits” – see the
following map) from the Los Palos region took more than a year as the people generally
moved in sub-village groups, staying in some areas for several months. Some of their
movement was from the Los Palos town area, through Maupitine (11 kilometres to the east)
and then via Luro, to the Matabean Zone – but most of the movement was initially to the

410
For detail on Fretilin detention centres and Renal, see Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 264-
271 - and 283-285 for facilities in Lautém eg Belta Tres (Irara – Fuiloro), Besi Manas (Luro) and Renal
Marabia (Iliomar).
411
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, pp. 28-29.
412
In a speech on the day of Amaral’s arrest, Nicolau Lobato claimed Amaral’s group had boycotted Fretilin
programmes, started to set up a feudal administration, encouraged regionalism, and disrupted the central
sector which had then become vulnerable to ABRI attacks – Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War…,
1984, p.65. See also Hill, H.M., FRETILIN 1974-1978, 2002, pp.178-179 who cites Amaral’s arrest as on 7
September. Amaral’s arrest, detention and torture by Fretilin are related in Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.4, pp.68-69.
413
Gama, P., “Daftar Kejahatan …”, 2001, p.1; Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.51;
Gusmão, X., Timor Leste …, 1994, pp. 34-35 cites “reacção” and “tração” – “reactionaries” and “traitors”.
Niner, S., “A Long Journey of Resistance …”, 2000, p.13 notes that the trials, torturing and killing of cadre
are a “chapter” … “little spoken about” in Resistance circles. However, see Gamma, P., email of 13 July 2001
ie “Daftar Kejahatan Perang Yg Dilakukan Fretilin 1975” (“List of War Crimes Committed by Fretilin in
1975”).
414
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4. According to Modesto, they were arrested because relatives had
earlier been arrested as reactionaries connected with the Amaral affair ie Pedro Sanches, Gil Sanches, Adão
Savio and Bendito Savio. Subsequently, Modesto is recorded as the “logistics chief of Iliomar” and the
“Fretilin Iliomar Zone commander” – see footnotes 231, 247 and 281 to Chega !,CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.4.
415
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 287.
416
Gusmão, X., “Message to the Nation … Falintil Day”, 20 August 2003.
78

south through Loré (22 kilometres southeast of Los Palos), then westward through
Dirimuni, Caidabu and Luro to Matabean. Xanana Gusmão’s autobiography notes that he
“supervised a march of his people from the far east of the Island along the Legumau Range,
taking the old road constructed by the Japanese in World War II connecting Luro and
Baguia”.417
In 1977, the Iliomar populace began moving, indirectly, to the Matabean Mountain
zone –– “we hid for several months in Fuat then moved to Luro. We moved into the forest
because we were afraid of the Indonesian military. No one forced us”.418 Many of the
Iliomar villagers moved northward to Caidabu sub-village and many died from illness,
disease and a lack of medicines (Iliomar I village records detail 21 deaths).
Iliomar Falintil elements continued to guard the western approaches into Iliomar
along the Irabere River, and Luís Sarmento (Fuat village) was killed in a clash with ABRI
forces.
In the period June-September 1978, the Iliomar villagers moved through the Luro,
Ilimutu and Mount Legumau areas and, as Baguia was occupied by ABRI advance
elements, entered the Matabean Zone travelling through Lavatere, Siri Afa, and Nalidole
(Laga). The Iliomar villagers (about 6,000) had been the last in the Eastern Region to begin
their indirect journey to the Matabean Zone (a route of about 75 kilometres, although only
30 kilometres northwest of Iliomar Town in a direct line) – with only the very old or ill
remaining in Iliomar. By the time of their arrival in early September 1978, several tens of
thousands of villagers and townspeople from the districts of Baucau, Viqueque and Lautém
had concentrated in the Fretilin Zona at Matabean, together with Fretilin leaders and
several thousand Falintil fighters.419 Within the Matabean Zone, the Iliomar villagers
moved several times – eg from Matabean Feto (Hai Koni) to Matabean Mane.

417
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.55. He also notes that the people of the Maupitine area
under Mau Velis (Martinho Pereira) refused to join the movement to the west and elected to remain in the
“occupied” zone – Gusmão, 2000, p.53.
418
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.3, para 79. Villagers from the Baucau area had moved to Matebian
as early as February 1976. Chapter 7.3, para 80-82 notes that Fretilin also “had to force” some villagers to
evacuate to “liberated zones”.
419
About 60,000 villagers initially gathered in the Natarbora Plain area under Vicente Sah’e (Vicente dos
Reis - Fretilin Minister for Labour and Welfare) and Mau Lear (António Duarte Carvarino – Fretilin Minister
for Justice), and about 20,000 at Matabean under Xanana Gusmão - Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The
War…, 1984, p.33. However, according to Sukasah, M., Timor Timur: Dulu & Sekarang, Solidamor, Jakarta,
1998, p.15 – a total of 160,000 people were gathered at Matabean. At his trial, Xanana Gusmão declared that
130,000 had gathered in Matabean – see Gusmão, X.., Travesty of Justice, 1996, p.20.
79

ENCIRCLEMENT AT MATABEAN

In September 1978, ABRI began its “encirclement and annihilation” operations
against the Fretilin zonas libertadas (liberated zones) and bases de apoio (support/logistic
bases) southeast of Baucau – the Matabean Mountains; and west of Viqueque – the
Natarbora Plain.420
Xanana Gusmão, the Eastern Region/Região I Commander, had become the
political “Adjunto” (Secretary) to the commander in Matabean, with Falintil commanders
Olo Kasa (Lino Monteiro), Kilik Wae Gae (Reinaldo Correia Freitas Belo) and Mauk
Muruk/Moruk (Paulino Gama)421. The defence of the Matabean Zone was initially based on
the static defence of six areas containing both civilians and Falintil troops. Falintil were
organised into units of varying roles and standards: “sector” troops were the first line of
defence; followed by the better trained and equipped “intervenção” (intervention) forces;
then the “brigada choque” (shock brigade); and finally the elite “vermelha” (red) forces to
protect the leadership, important installations and equipment.422 Headquarters and staff

420
The ABRI offensive began in mid-1978 with attacks against Fretilin’s zonas libertadas and bases de apoio
in the western regions ie the Fronteira Sul and Fronteira Norte sectors, before concentrating against
Natarbora and Matabean. Following the fall of Matabean in late November, ABRI forces recommenced
operations in the west including against Fretilin/Falintil remnants in the mountains of Cailaco (Bobonaro).
421
In the early 1980s, Kilik Wae Gae and Mauk Muruk, who represented the Marxist-Leninist wing of
Fretilin, were purged - see footnote 604.
422
This interpretation of the Falintil organisation at Matabean is based upon the author’s discussions in the
period 2001-2005 with several former senior Falintil commanders. Note that Chega !,CAVR Final Report,
Part 5, para 30 and footnote to p.8 indicates that choque and intervenção had the same tasks - and that the
terms were interchangeable.
80

personnel were grouped in “kapase” units.423 In Matabean, the main Fretilin/Falintil
headquarters - the “Commissariat”, was initially established at Uada Bora – and, after
Uada Bora was taken by ABRI, at Uai Bitai.424 The Falintil fighters in Iliomar also moved
to Matabean, with Serasa’s platoon dispersed to in-depth positions above Baguia in the
areas of Buitoi and Layah behind the Intervenção forward elements.
ABRI’s major encircling operation against the Zona Matabean employed several
thousand ground, air and naval forces. Infantry and marines launched ground attacks with
artillery, mortar and air support.425 The Indonesian air force aircraft, principally US-made
OV-10F Bronco aircraft (propeller-driven)426 and T-33A-10 Shooting Star (jet) aircraft,
used cannons, machine guns and bombs against Fretilin and civilian concentrations.427
Napalm was reportedly also used by Indonesian bombing aircraft428, and there are claims of
423
Earlier, in an interview in Europe in January 1977, the Fretilin Defence Minister, Rogério Tiago Lobato
had described Fretilin forces as comprising four types: regular, regional, guerrillas, and self-defence forces -
see Timor Information Service, No 18/19, April 1977.
424
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.56.
425
ABRI figures show combat deaths in calendar year 1978 totalled 379 – most in the 37 infantry battalions
active in East Timor in that year. In 1978, ABRI suffered its highest number of combat deaths in the Timor
conflict – ie, cf 147 in 1975; 351 in 1976; 242 in 1977; and 379 in 1978. For ABRI combat deaths in Operasi
Seroja see the Center for Indonesian Military History and Tradition - TNI website: Seroja, Data Pejuang
Timor Timur - http://www.sejarahtni.mil.id/index.php?cid=1756 . The website includes number, rank, name
and unit of those killed for the years 1975 to 1999 inclusive – categorised as Army, Marines, Air Force and
Police. In 2005, the Indonesian Army History declared TNI/ABRI losses (“Kerugian”) totalled 2,277
comprising Army: 1,931; Navy: 155; Air Force: 24; and Police 167. “Non-TNI and Non-Police” loses were
noted as 1,527 – for a “Grand Total” of 3,804. - Sutetyo, H.R. Brigadier-Jenderal, Sejarah TNI AD: 1974-
2004, Dinas Pembinaan Mental Angkatan Darat, Jakarta, 2005, p.124 – but a sentence p.113 stated: ‘TNI,
Police, and partisans lost 3,315 killed and 2,338 wounded/incapacitated – 60% of whom were Army troops.”
More recent analysis was disseminated in Van Klinken, G., “Indonesian casualties in East Timor 1975-1999”,
7 December 2011. That analysis examined “updating” casualty data on the Monumen Seroja Memorial – and
related material that had reportedly been directed by General Endriartono Sutarto (Armed Forces
Commander, 2002-2006). This new “2006 data” records 3,329 ABRI/TNI personnel killed - comprising
Army: 2,970; Navy/Marines: 153; Air Force: 31; Police: 162. Unsur Pendukung (Support/ Auxiliary
elements) were listed as 1,607 killed – for a final total of 4,923.
426
For OV-10F operations, see Tim Unit OV-10, Perjalanan Panjang Pengabdian OV-10 Bronco (OV-10
Bronco – A Long Tour of Duty), Malang, East Java, and Subroto H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, pp.212-223.
427
For a description by Xanana Gusmão of the fighting in Matabean, see Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …, 2002,
pp. 114-116. Despite some reports (eg see Sebastian, L.C., Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military
Force, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2006, p.133), US-made A-4E Skyhawk aircraft were
not used in East Timor at this time. The A-4Es were delivered from Israel to Jakarta in May 1980 and first
employed in East Timor in November 1987 – Poerwoko, D. Air Marshal, Menari di angkasa: Anak kampung
menjadi penerbang tempur, Kata Hasta Pustaka, Jakarta, 2007. British Aerospace Hawk aircraft (20 Mk 53
Hawks were supplied to Indonesia beginning in September 1980); and, according to Ramos-Horta, Hawks
were first used in East Timor in August 1983. It appears that the ex-Australian F-86 Sabre aircraft (23 CA-27
Mk52) acquired by ABRI in 1973 were not used in East Timor. Neither the T-33A-10 nor the F-86 Sabre
were available in December 1975 to support the invasion as they had yet to be armed. For use of the B-26B
Invader aircraft, see footnotes 358, 428. Further detail is in Subroto H., “Air Power in East Timor in 1975-
1979 in Retrospect” in Angkasa, No. 10, July 2000; Budiardjo C., “Hawk Aircraft Are Being Used In East
Timor”, Tapol, 14 November 1994; and Subroto H., Operasi Udara …, 2005. See also Turner, M., Telling –
East Timor …, 1992 including pp.112-116 for a description of ABRI attacks and Resistance activities in
Matebian. For the use of ex-Australian military aircraft by ABRI/TNI, see Chamberlain, E.P., Faltering Steps,
op.cit., 2010, footnote 888.
428
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.5, para 137-140 cites the use of napalm by ABRI aircraft.
Following discussion with ABRI General Moerdani, Australian Ambassador Woolcott repoted: “On the
allegation in the reports that the Indonesians would start using napalm because they could not win the war
otherwise, Moerdani said this was false. The actual war was in fact over. The current phase was one of
consolidation and relatively low-level guerrilla activity. In any case, Indonesia did not intend to use it and did
not have any. … He had been surprised at the attitude we had adopted in September about the possible
deployment of Sabres to East Timor.” – Australian Embassy Jakarta, Cable O.JA10390, 14 December 1976.
81

the use of chemical defoliants and biological agents.429 The villagers and Fretilin called the
attacking OV-10F aircraft “Sakunar” (“Scorpion”) due to their high black tails. Propaganda
leaflets were also dropped, and appeals to surrender were broadcast from a C-47 Dakota
transport aircraft. ABRI naval vessels positioned off the north coast at Laga also heavily
shelled the Matabean area.
The people of Iliomar did not build houses in their allocated area at Matabean
430
Feto , but lived in caves, rudimentary shelters, and in the open. The area became very
crowded, and there was little food or water available.431 The villagers, concentrated in the
area of Matabean Feto and in the area of Matabean Mane a few kilometres to the northeast,
suffered heavy casualties432 in the ABRI attacks – as did Fretilin cadres and Falintil
fighters. ABRI also suffered heavy losses, particularly among infantry battalions 326, 328,
and marine units.433 During the clashes, Falintil captured two marines, but later reportedly
handed them over unharmed.434 However, ABRI operations became more successful as
they concentrated their forces, in turn, against each of the six Fretilin base areas.
Disagreements between senior Resistance leaders in Matabean – principally
between Sera Key and Kilik Wae Gae, also weakened the defence. Returning from a
mission to the west of Matabean, Xanana Gusmão commented that “there was a total lack
of control” at Matabean, and “the commanders of the companies were the only ones
responsible for a determined resistance”.435 Belatedly, Fretilin/Falintil attempted to move
from their positional-based defence to a mobile strategy – planning for a mobile force of

In 2006, the Indonesian Armed Forces Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto denied that napalm was used: “The
charge is baseless” - Gatra, No 10, Jakarta, 23 January 2006. Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p.276 notes that
ABRI’s OV-10F aircraft were armed with “Opalm” - a Soviet-made napalm procured by ABRI for its 1962
West Irian campaign. Tim Unit OV-10, Perjalanan Panjang …, see footnote 426 above, shows “Napalm
Opalm” as an OV-10F capability at p.57. An AFP report of 7 October 1999 - “Peacekeepers Find Napalm
Bombs”, related that Philippine Interfet troops found four napalm bombs in a concrete shelter at the former
Indonesian air base at Baucau. Subroto H., Operasi Udara … 2005, pp.88-93, pp.200-203 and p.263 descibes
napalm bombing attacks by B-26B Invader aircraft at Piaco (near Lebos, about 40 km southwest of Bobonaro
town) and the manufacture of napalm bomb containers and their pre-operational testing in Java (including a
photograph).
429
The first allegations of ABRI use of chemical weapons were contained in radio messages from the Fretilin
Minister for Internal Affairs and Security, Alarico Fernandes – see Messages 26, 28, 29 in Timor Information
Service, No 6, 15 January 1976. See also Gama, P., “The War in the Hills - 1975-85: A Fretilin Commander
Remembers”, pp.97-105 in Carey, P. and Bentley, G.C. (eds), East Timor at the Crossroads, 1995, p.100;
Turner, M., Telling – East Timor …, 1992, p.114; Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War…, 1984, pp.
35-36; and Aditjondro, 1994, p.65. As noted, claims of ABRI’s use of chemical weapons/agents are also
made in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.5, para 131-134.
430
“Feto” means “woman” in Tetum – Matabean Feto/Fetu is located about four km southwest of the
2,373m Matabean Mane (“mane” = “man”).
431
Xanana Gusmão noted “I regretted moving all those people to Matebian where it was impossible to cater
for them. Matebian was literally full and problems arose everywhere between the recent arrivals and
residents” – Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.55.
432
The records of Iliomar I (Village Report, Da Costa, J. L., 30 May 2003) detail 21 deaths to ABRI attacks
and 20 deaths due to lack of food and medicine; while the records of Iliomar II (Village Report, Pinto, F., 3
July 2003) show eight villagers killed during ABRI bombardments. In Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter
7.3, p.44, the then deputy village chief of Cainliu relates that “dozens” people from Larimi sub-village were
killed by ABRI naval gunfire from vessels anchored off Laga on the north coast.
433
For a first-hand account of fighting in Matabean in November 1978 by an ABRI platoon commander
(Yonif 721) see Fahlevi, M., “Merebut Sasaran 6 Matebian Mane”, Senakatha, Jakarta, 30 December 2004.
Then Lieutenant Fahlevi noted that the soldiers of his ABRI battalion was not as well-armed as Falintil – ie
with PINDAD SP1 and Garand rifles against the more modern NATO G3 rifles of Falintil.
434
Gama, P., “The War in the Hills - 1975-85: A Fretilin Commander Remembers”, pp.97-105 in Carey, P.
and Bentley, G.C. (eds), East Timor at the Crossroads, 1995, p.99.
435
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.56.
82

11,000 supported by small guerrilla groups. However, their bases fell before the
reorganisation could be implemented.
In late November 1978, unable to withstand further attacks, Fretilin ordered their
forces to disperse - and for the civilians to surrender and return to their villages. According
to Xanana Gusmão, the Fretilin Central Committee directed that “the elderly, those over
56, and those aged below 18 could surrender”.436 The Matabean base fell on 22 November
1978, and Gusmão moved eastwards with one company into the Ponte Leste (Eastern)
region - initially to the Iliomar area and then, together with Kilik Wae Gae (Reinaldo
Correia Freitas Belo) and Fernando Tzai, to the Tutuala/Mount Paixou area - while others
moved to the central region to “strengthen the national base”.437 On 7 December, Xanana’s
group had moved eastward and was in Mehara (31 kilometres east of Los Palos) where it
broke into smaller groups to evade ABRI and prepare for local guerrilla warfare.
Other Fretilin leaders also escaped into the jungle from Matabean including
President Nicolau Lobato, Mau Huno/Ma’ Huno/Hunu Bulerek Karataianu (António
Manuel Gomes da Costa-Manecas), Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak (José Amancio da Costa), and
Bere Malai/Malay Laka/Latxa – and military leaders: Mauk Muruk (Paulino Gama), Olo
Gari/Ologari (Adelino Sarmento), Nelo, Taur Matan Ruak (José Maria Vasconcelos),
Konis Santana, David Alex, and Freddy.438
A group including Lere Anan Timor, Serasa (Orlando Jerónimo), Mau Nana
(Cornélio Ximenes), Aluc Descartes/Deskart (João Miranda), Renan Selak (Faustino dos
Santos), Falo Chai (Fernando Teles), Latu Asa and Koro Asu (Armando Nolasco)
withdrew from Matabean to Mount Builo (Ossú area), then eastwards to “Tasilou” near the
coast in the Lore/Iliomar border area.439 The Iliomar Fretilin Secretary, ie Tomás Pinto of
Fuat – who was later killed in a clash with ABRI in the Viqueque area in 1987, also
escaped from the Matabean encirclement. The defeat of the Resistance at Matabean was a
significant watershed in the struggle and saw the end of the period of Fretilin’s “zonas
libertadas” and “bases de apoio”.

RETURN TO ILIOMAR

On 20 November, Afonso Pinto (Iliomar I) and Afonso Barreto (Iliomar II)
surrendered to ABRI at Baguia. Soon after, the Iliomar villagers descended from Matabean,
and ABRI initially concentrated them in the area of Baguia. However, a number (18) of
Iliomar’s senior leaders (“tokoh tokoh masyarakat”) were taken away by ABRI and
executed on Mount Matabean – including Abel, Adelino Ximenes (40 years), Júlio Lebre
(30), Aparicio Nunes (31), António da Silva, António dos Reis (30), Gregorio Pinto (61)440,
José Felix (Falintil) and Artur Ramos (50, Falintil). Many other leaders were imprisoned

436
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 4, para 93; and Chapter 7.5, para 219.
437
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.57. Xanana Gusmão had been appointed the commander
of the Eastern Region – Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.5, para 219. While this paragraph also states
that “Falintil moved towards the Central Region to continue fighting”, other information indicates most
Fretilin/Falintil principals withdrew to the east and southeast.
438
Gama, P., in Carey and Bentley (eds), 1995, p.101. Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, pp.57-
58.
439
Discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant Colonel Mau Nana (ACOPS J2), and Senior Sergeant Serasa, Dili,
10 October 2004 – during the Matebean operations, Mau Nana was second-in-command of 07 Intervention
Company under Lemorai.
440
Gregorio Pinto was the father of Abílio Quintão Pinto - Iliomar CNRM/CNRT Zone Secretary 1994-1999.
83

and interrogated in Baguia441 – and at least two were executed there: Serafin and Celestino
(probably Celestino Jerónimo of Ailebere village).
On 27 or 28 November 1978, the villagers and most of the prisoners were directed
to return to Iliomar, arriving in late November/early December. When the villagers reached
Iliomar, there were no ABRI troops in the Sub-District. However, soon after, a group of
Hansip442 (Pertahanan Sipil – “Civil Defence” ie, locally-recruited East Timorese military
auxiliaries), from Uato-Carabau led by Carlos and including: Lalera, Afonso, José, Zikito,
and Pedro Cailao arrived to guard the area. The former prisoners at Baguia – together with
about a dozen more443, were imprisoned in an old former Portuguese building (beside the
present-day soccer field/Iliomar primary school) and tortured by the Uato-Carabau Hansip
for 12 days (assisted by an Ailebere villager, Alfredo and Américo Lino of Iliomar II). On
28 December, the resident ABRI battalion arrived – Yonif 328, and established a major
post atop Baitomar Hill on the western edge of Iliomar Town. The ABRI commander was
Lieutenant Samsul Andi/Arifin (Sundanese ie, from West Java), and their conduct was
reportedly not particularly harsh during their three-month tour-of-duty in Iliomar 444, and
the prisoners were released. The Uato-Carabau Hansip were replaced by Hansip from Los
Palos led by Gabriel Monteiro - and one of the Hansip, Orlando Marques445, was appointed
as the first Iliomar Sub-District chief (ie, Camat). However, the people were not allowed to
return to their villages outside the area of Iliomar Town – rather, under ABRI’s strategic
settlement plan446 (Bahasa: “daerah pemukiman”), the villagers were forced to re-establish
their villages adjacent to the Town. The villagers of Iliomar II – who had previously lived
mostly in the area of Kampung Lama about three kilometres south of Iliomar Town, were
relocated in an area north of Ailebere village and south of Iliomar I (ie, immediately south
of the present Lapangan Merdeka football field/primary school). All Fuat villagers, who
had previously lived in the Bubutau area north of Maluhira, were concentrated adjacent to
the northern edge of Iliomar I. Villagers from Cainliu, including its distant Larimi sub-
village, were forced to re-establish themselves in the area of the present-day junior high
441
Including from Iliomar I: Jermias dos Reis, Júlio Hornay, Carlos Correia, Mateus Ximenes, Martinho
Hornay, Gaspar Seixas, António Amaral, Caetano Gonçalves, Domingos Hornay, Raimundo Pinto, Mateus
Pinto, Celestino da Costa, Joaquim Sanches, Armindo Ferreira, José Sanches, Mateus Pinto da Costa,
Armindo de Sousa, António Esteves, Benedito Amaral, Francisco Pinto and Arthur Ramos. From Iliomar II:
Domingos Pinto, Agapito Pinto and Pedro Pinto were reportedly imprisoned at Baguia for two weeks. From
Cainliu: Domingos Savio, Gabriel Fernandes, Martinho Hornay, José da Costa (Mau Wani – younger
brother of Lere Anan Timor), Silvester de Jesus, Agusto da Cruz, and Faustino Barbosa. One source also lists
Tomás Madeira. From Ailebere village: Celestino Jerónimo was executed by ABRI; and Américo Jerónimo
and Francisco Serpa Rosa were reportedly imprisoned at Baguia for about 26 days. From Tirilolo: António
Barreto, António da Silva, Abel Soares, Duarte Amaral, Francisco Dias. ABRI’s Yonif 328 was reportedly
involved in the detention and abuses against Iliomar villagers at Baguia – Tirilolo village report, p.3.
442
For notes on ABRI/TNI forces and paramilitaries – see Annex E. In 1982, Hansip members received a
regular monthly payment of 33kg of rice and 11,500 rupiah – as related in an ABRI instruction, Document 6
in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War…, 1984, p.223.
443
From Iliomar I: Gaspar Pinto, José Madeira, Justino Hornay, Paul da Costa, Justino Seixas, and Filomeno
Gama; from Ailebere: Zereneu Jerónimo (Leilor sub-village) and Fernando da Costa (former Falintil of
Heitali sub-village); from Iliomar II: Ricardo Pinto, Munifetil and António Oliveira; from Tirilolo:
Raimondo Monteiro.
444
Among themselves, Iliomar people referred to Indonesians as “javanes” (Javanese), but face-to-face were
required by the Indonesians to address all Indonesians as “Bapak” - an honorific for “father/master”.
445
Orlando Marques, of Raça village (Los Palos) had been captured by ABRI in the Los Palos area in
February 1976 soon after the ABRI airborne assault. According to Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2,
p.87 – Orlando was later arrested in Tutuala in June 1979, taken to the Yonif 745 base at Trisula (Los Palos)
and “disappeared”.
446
Also referred to as “kansele/men”, “perokilan”, “konsir”, “consolomento”, or “campos de concentração”.
In 1984, many resettlement areas were “upgraded” to “desa binaan pangkal perlawanan” (“guided villages as
bases for resistance”) – see Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.158.
84

school and church, with the villagers from Caidabu sub-village also resettled nearby.
Tirilolo villagers were resettled near the church. The former Chinese shop owned by the
Lay family - “Cantina/Toko Cina”, a collection of buildings beside the main road, was used
by ABRI as a military headquarters and a prison in which up to 30 suspected Fretilin cadre
and supporters were detained.
In the resettlement area of Iliomar Town, the villagers were only permitted to farm
within 500 metres of their new village limits - with any further movement requiring
approval and the issue of a travel permit (“surat jalan”). These restrictive measures -
termed “karantina” (quarantine), were intended to isolate the populace from Falintil
elements in the jungle and to restrict the supply of food and information to the Resistance.
Unable to access their traditional gardens and fields, the villagers suffered considerable
hunger and hardship. Francisco Soares Pinto of Cainliu village related:
“Because of these orders from the TNI, people could not move at all. It was
strictly forbidden to go out of the camp to look for food, so people began to
experience extreme hunger at the Iliomar posto. We had just come down from
Matebian, so we had no food with us and had not had the chance to make rice
fields. So there was no food at all in the posto. In order to survive, everyone began
eating all the coconuts that were around the camp – the young fruits, but also the
old dry ones, and even the very small unripe ones.
After a while, because of thousands of people had been eating the coconuts,
the trees stopped fruiting altogether. Then we began to eat the roots and leaves of
wild trees and many people became sick. Every day, 2-3 people died from hunger,
sometimes 40-50 died in a single week. To survive, people ate the kind of food pigs
eat. They cut down banana trees, peeled off the outer layers and cooked the inner
shoots. This caused many people to become sick with cholera and beri-beri
(vomiting and diarrhoea). After eating the banana trees, about 5-10 people died
every day. So I guess that more than 200 people died from hunger during that
period because every day you hear people chatting to each other, saying someone
over here is dead, over there someone else is dead.”447

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted an emergency
feeding program in Iliomar from 1979 to 1981 – and this was continued by UNICEF from
mid-1982, but suspended in July 1983.448 Iliomar villagers particularly remember 1981 and
1982 as years of severe hardship and hunger.

FRETILIN AND FALINTIL LOSSES

In the period, 1978-79, Fretilin suffered significant losses at the national level.
Before the Fretilin defeat at Matabean, their former President Amaral had been captured by
ABRI in August 1978 near the Dilor River southwest of Viqueque.449 On 3 December
447
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.9, para 59. Pinto’s statements are also reported in the CAVR
Public Hearing – “Forced Displacement and Famine”, Dili, 28-29 July 2003.
448
Ramos-Horta, Funu …, 1987, p.196. Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War…, 1984, p.94 quotes a
comprehensive Fretilin report on conditions: “in Luro … starvation is the constant companion of people here
who have no staple food at all … All that can be said of conditions in the Iliomar camp is that they are just as
bad as in Luro”.
449
Some Fretilin and CNRT reports state that Amaral was captured near Remexio. However, Subroto H.,
Saksi Mata …, 1996, pp. 208-210 claims Amaral was captured near the mouth of the Dilor River southwest
of Viqueque. In a declaration on 17 December 2003, Amaral also stated that he was captured near the Dilor
River. Amaral was “detained” in Bali (as a domestic “factotum” in the home of ABRI Brigadier Dading
85

1978, Alarico Jorge Fernandes (the Fretilin Minister for Home Affairs, Security and
Information)450 and three other Central Committee members surrendered; on 31 December,
Fretilin President Nicolau dos Reis Lobato was killed in a clash with ABRI near
Maubisse451; and in early February 1979, Mau Lear (António Duarte Carvarino – the
Fretilin Vice President), and Vicente Sahe/Sah’e (Vicente dos Reis – the Fretilin Prime
Minister and ideologist) were killed.452
On withdrawing from Matabean with a small party, Xanana Gusmão had traversed
Iliomar and regrouped Falintil elements in the forests of Loré immediately east of Iliomar -
but three Falintil companies were destroyed by ABRI attacks. Several senior commanders
surrendered, and Xanana wrote: “Confusion reigned and my spirit was shaken ! More than
shaken, just about beaten”.453 He noted: “our dispersion was imposed by the enemy and
was not a strategic plan, but a simple reaction to enemy assaults”.454 In Febuary 1979, the
Ponte Leste Sector was divided into three sub-regions: Bivake, Luar, and Talismana – with
guerilla companies led respectively led by Ologari Aswain, Mauk Moruk, and Sakinere –
and a “concentrated battalion” under Kilik in Talismana.455

Kalbuadi – the 1975 Operation Flamboyan commander, including tending Kalbuadi’s horses). In 1983,
Kalbuadi (promoted to Major General as Aslog ABRI) and Amaral moved to Jakarta. Amaral returned to East
Timor on 4 February 2000, was rehabilitated by Fretilin in May 2000, and was the unsuccessful candidate in
the 14 April 2002 Presidential Election. Lieutenant General (retired) Dading Kalbuadi died, aged 68, on 10
October 1999.
450
Alarico Jorge Fernandes (b.11/6/1941) had been a junior civil servant in the period November 1962 to
1974. On surrendering, he took with him Fretilin’s principal external radio communications and later
participated in ABRI’s “Skylight” campaign to induce further Falintil surrenders. Alarico was subsequently
exiled by the Indonesians to Sumba Island (about 350 km west of Kupang).
451
Lt Prabowo Subianto – later to become President Soeharto’s son-in-law, commanded the ABRI
Kopassandha element (Nanggala 28) that, together with elements of Yonif 744 (1/B Company) commanded
by Major Yunus Yosfiah, clashed with Nicolau Lobato’s group near the village of Dare Mulo - see Subroto
H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, pp.21-24 for detail. ABRI sources suggest Lobato’s body was identified at the
site by radio operator Private Second Class Guterres. However, Lobato - wounded in the stomach and leg,
was reportedly captured and died in an ABRI helicopter enroute to hospital – his wife was also reportedly
killed in the clash: Ramos-Horta, Funu …, 1987, p.157. A later report suggests Lobato was wounded in the
leg, and then suicided by shooting himself in the head rather than being taken prisoner – Murdoch, L., The
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 2001. Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p. 274 relates that Lobato was shot
in the stomach at Caicasa, near Soibada, and bled to death. Conboy also notes that a week later, the Falintil
deputy commander, Guido Soares, was killed by Lieutenant Prabowo’s Nanggala 28 team. Kiki Syahnakri
has written that Nicolau Lobato was shot by Johanis Maudobe – a Timorese soldier in 744 Battalion. -
Syahnakri, K., Lieutenant General (Retd), Timor Timur: The Untold Story, op.cit., 2013, p.75.
452
See Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.97. Subroto H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, p.212 claims
Vincente Sah’e was killed in the Natarbora area of southern Manufahi District on 8 October 1978 and Mau
Lear was fatally wounded near Venilale on 10 October 1978. In October 2007, it was rumoured that Sah’e
had not been killed and would re-appear in Dili on 27 October 2007. His brother, Marito dos Reis, revealed
that Sah’e was wounded in an ABRI ambush near Fatuberliu (Alas), escaped - but died of a leg wound in late
January 1979 near Dotic village. His remains were recovered by his family in 2002.
453
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.59.
454
Ibid, p.63. In 2003, President Gusmão stated that “after the great defeat suffered in 1978, Falintil forces
were reduced to a few hundred men and weapons” – Gusmão, X., “Message to the Nation … Falintil Day”,
20 August 2003.
455
Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-
1999, op.cit., 2014, p.142 including a sketch map of the three sub-regions. The deputy commander of the
“Forcas Contrenadas” battalion commanded by Kilik was Bere Malai Laka - with companies commanded by
Latoassa (1st Company), David Alex Daitula (2nd), Kaluwai (3rd), and Kalisa (4th).
86

On 10 January 1979, a Falintil fighter, Júlio Madeira (21 years, Heitali sub-
village/Iliomar) was killed by Iliomar Hansip456 at Dana Bere/Naunili (north of Caenliu
village).
Following their victories at Matabean and Natarbora, ABRI turned its attention
back to the west. On 16 February 1979, the last of the bases de apoio at Fatubessi (Ermera)
fell to ABRI.457
In March 1979, a small group of political and military commanders met under
Xanana in the forests of eastern Iliomar and began discussions on a new Resistance
organisation and strategy, including “the structural bases for an organised resistance based
on an intimate bond between the guerrillas and the people of the temporarily occupied
towns”. 458
Throughout 1979, Falintil suffered further heavy losses459, and there was little
contact between the villagers and the Resistance forces in the jungle. Xanana later
summarised the difficulties of that period as follows:

“1979 marked the year of strategic defeat. The Honored Nicolau Lobato was
slain on the battlefield, dozens of the Fretilin Central Committee members
were killed or assassinated, another large number of Fretilin Central
Committee members surrendered, taking with them 90% of the guerrilla
fighters and weapons”.460

In Iliomar, in 1979, Falintil killed a local collaborator – Francisco Ferreira/Fereira,
the village chief of Fuat. Francisco had gone to the Buidala area with five men to destroy a
Falintil corn crop when the group was captured by Falintil and brought to Korufira on the
outskirts of Fuat. They were told that they could not be allowed to return to the village and
continue to oppress the villages, and were taken to A’hasan where Francisco and three
others were executed.461 A Cainliu villager, Domingos Ximenes (32 years) was also killed
in a clash with Falintil in the Buildala area during an ABRI-directed crop-destruction
operation. Also in 1979, about 50 Cainliu villagers were forcibly recruited by ABRI as
“Tenaga Bantuan Operasi” (TBO – “Operational Support Manpower”)462 principally for

456
The Hansip element comprised: Domingos Pinto (Iliomar II), Adão Fernandes Cabral (Tirilolo), Valente
Madeira (Tirilolo) and José Madeira (Iliomar I).
457
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 92. Filomeno Paixão de Jesus (“Meno”) - the Fretilin/Falintil
commander of the Fronteira Norte Sector, surrendered with a large number of fighters at Caisoru (Liquiça)
on 6-7 February 1979 to ABRI’s Yonif 512. His replacement, Hélio Pina (Mau Krama), was killed in March
1979 – author’s discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Filomeno Paixão, Dili, 4 April 2005.
458
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.64 – also notes discussing the death of Nicolau Lobato.
According to Paulino Gama in Carey and Bentley (eds), 1995, p.101 – the meeting took place at Laivai, on
the coast northeast of Matabean. After the meeting, Xanana travelled to the west hoping to contact any
remaining Fretilin Central Committee members and left the Eastern Sector under Mau/Ma’ Huno - with Kilik
and Bere Malay Laka in charge of the armed elements.
459
According to census figures for Falintil compiled in 2003 by the Commissions for Veterans and Falintil
Ex-Combatants (CAAC-CAVF), Falintil strength had been reduced from 14,652 fighters in 1976 to 1,043 in
1979 – see Jolliffe, J., “Bid to Coax Timor rebels …”, The Age, Melbourne, 11 November 2003. According
to the CAAC-CAVF in 2008, 12,960 Falintil combatants died in the period 1975-1979: World Bank - Report,
Defining Heroes: Key Lessons from the Creation of Veterans’ Policy in Timor-Leste, Dili, 19 August 2008,
para 55.
460
Gusmão, K.R.X., “ET: Xanana Message to the Resistance”, Cipinang (Jakarta), 7 December 1993.
http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1994/01/19/0000.html
461
Fuat village report, p.3; and Chega ! CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 446, 473.
462
For detail on TBO service, see Chega ! CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.5, para 142-174 and Budiardjo C.
and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984 - ABRI Document 6, Instruction Manual No JUKNIS/06/ IV/1982,
Babinsa/TPD Activity in Developing and Phasing Out Trained People’s Resistance Forces, 10 September
87

portering and manual labour tasks. Four of the Cainliu TBO were reported killed: António
Pereira (55 years), Lupu Rasa (58 years) and Lava Ili (55 years) at Porumaularin; and Tome
(42 years) at Daramutu.463
According to an Indonesian source464, in December 1979, a Fretilin conference was
convened at Mount Laleno (about 20 kilometres northwest of Los Palos Town) to re-
organise the Resistance structure in the Los Palos region. The region was reportedly
divided into five military areas: Sakalo, Foti Oim, Tubarai, Aina and Laleno. The Laleno
military area, commanded by Renato de Olvera (sic), was located “south of the main road
from Lautém to Trisula and extended to the north of the Los Palos-Iliomar road”. The Aina
military area – under “Namihala (Political Assistant)” encompassed from the Namaluto
River eastward to Iliomar. “Falucai” was appointed as the “commander of the military
company for the whole of Los Palos, Lautém Regency”; Adelino Freitas was appointed
Political Assistant for that region; and Filipe dos Santos was appointed “Supreme Military
Commander for the Los Palos region, Lautém Regency.”

KILLINGS OF “KLANDESTIN” IN ILIOMAR

In 1979, an ABRI Kopassandha element (forerunner to Kopassus) was
headquartered in the “Cantina” shop buildings in Iliomar town – also referred to as “Toko
Cina”. At this time, fearing interrogation, several Iliomar I villagers fled to the forest
including Mateus Ximenes (Iliomar), Armando da Costa (Osso-Ira), Luís Pinto (Caentau),
Rosalina Madeira (Caentau), Amelia Ximenes (Iliomar), Felismina Pinto (Caentau), Bere-
Mau (Caentau) and Osório Jerónimo (Iliomar). Also, in 1979, 169 Fuat villagers fled into
the forest led by Duarte Madeira, Carveiro (sic) and José Marques. Mid-year, the
Kopassandha ordered a group of male villagers to patrol in the Kaidawaira area (Fuat)
where several were shot and killed by elements of ABRI’s Battalion 126 (possibly “Asam
Satu” - ie Yonif 126 Kalu Cakti, North Sumatra). Battalion 126 also reportedly killed three
villagers in the area of Caidabu, and a further villager was killed in the same area by
elements of Battalion 700.
In 1980, the Iliomar “Komando” (ie, Kopassandha detachment) completed a list of
all Iliomar families considered “suspect” and conducted a five-month series of compulsory
indoctrination lectures. Later in 1980, Iliomar Hansip troops combined with Los Palos
Hansip and a group of Iliomar villagers to attack a Falintil corn-growing area in the Mount
Morulai/Buidala area (Fuat). Falintil counter-attacked, and an Iliomar I villager - Domingos
Bareto, was shot and killed by Falintil and two Tirilolo villagers were wounded: Eugenio
Xavier and Dominggas Cabral. Soon after, two Tirilolo villagers were detained by ABRI
and disappeared: Angelo Da Silva and Francisco Amaral – and Rui Nunes of Tirilolo fled
to the forest and joined Falintil. At this time, ABRI had established movement restrictions
requiring a “surat jalan” (ie, a pass) for inter-village movement and forbidding meetings of
more than two persons.

1982, p.226. From mid-2008, the original JUKNIS series of ABRI documents (ie in Bahasa) cited in
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, could be found on the website of the Arkivu ho Muzeu
Rezistensia, Dili, as Document 06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 – Bakau Timtim, Baurah”).
463
Cainliu village report, p.5.
464
Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara Tindak Pidana Umum, José Alexandre Gusmao (alias
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, alias Xanana Gusmao), Kejaksaan Negeri Dili, Dili, 25 January 1993, pp.4-5.
88

Also in early 1980, two cadre members of the Resistance’s clandestine underground
(ie, “Klandestin/Clandestina”465) were killed in Iliomar: Francisco Amaral and Olimpia da
Costa. Francisco Amaral of Tirilolo village was killed on Iliomar Hill by the local Hansip,
and his body thrown into a cave on Iliomar Hill. On 7 March 1980, Olimpia da Costa was
killed.
Olimpia da Costa (born 2 July 1958)466 of Heitali sub-village/Ailebere was a
Klandestin member supplying information and supplies to Falintil in the jungle.467
In mid-February 1980468, she was detained by Hansip469 and taken to the Kopassandha
headquarters in Iliomar Town for questioning – then located in the Toko Cina buildings
beside the main road. The local Kopassandha team, code-named Nanggala “2” (Nanggala
is a mythical weapon in Javanese wayang plays) and led by Lieutenant Sambroni, was
reportedly joined by a Kopassandha major (believed to be Sulawesi-born, aged about 28
years) from Los Palos for the interrogation of Olimpia. Other members of Kopassandha
involved included Sergeant Charles and Sergeant Edi. During the questioning, Olimpia was
tortured and raped. Afterwards, she was stripped to the waist and, wearing only a very short
nylon shift, was paraded on foot through the six villages (then concentrated in Iliomar
Town area). Two of her senior male relatives held her hands (José da Gama, of Titiraven
sub-village, Cainliu; and António de Jesus, of Caidalavarin sub-village,
Cainliu), and at each village she was forced to warn villagers of the penalties for resistance
to the Indonesian occupation and supporting Fretilin/Falintil.

Olimpia da Costa

465
“Klandestin/Clandestina” was the common term used by Iliomar villagers for the Fretilin/CRRN/CNRM/
CNRT underground cadre. ABRI/TNI reporting also used the term “Klandestin” – see footnotes 502, 694,
738, and Annex G.
466
In 2008, as part of the Falintil pension allocation process, Olimpia was noted as a “Grade 3” “Activist of
the Zone Committee” (born 15 April 1958) killed on 29 February 1980 – Combatentes da Libertação
Nacional, Edital No.110/IV/2008, Dili, 5 April 2008. The Ailebere village report shows Olimpia as aged 18
years in March 1976.
467
Olimpia was a member of a three-woman courier and support cell comprising Olimpia, Balbina da
Conceição of Iliomar II (nom de guerre - “Waru Lahaluha”), and Hilda Madeira. The cell had been formed in
Matabean in 1978.
468
Iliomar sources - including a “participant” and several eye-witnesses, were unclear on the exact date - one
knowledgeable source stated February 1980, another 12 March 1980.
469
According to the Ailebere village report, the Hansip members involved were: Jaime da Costa, Adão
Fernandes Cabral, Filomeno da Gama, Valente Madeira, José Madeira and Carlos da Costa.
89

Later that evening, she escaped from Toko Cina, but was recaptured at her parent’s
home in Caentau sub-village of Iliomar I by the local Hansip paramilitaries – she had tried
to gather clothing before fleeing into the jungle. Returned to the Toko Cina, she was beaten
- then dressed in an army camouflage fatigue uniform and handed over to an ABRI unit -
believed to be Brimob (ie, Brigada Mobil) paramilitary field police470 occupying the post
at Manulor (near Ossohira sub-village south of Iliomar Town). That evening at the Manulor
post, she was bayoneted in the throat and died. Her body was not buried, but left outside
the post and covered with coconut palms and banana leaves. When her family queried her
fate, they were told that she had “gone to study in Java” – a common euphemism for
having been killed.471 Her family and villagers were too afraid to approach the post and
recover the body for burial. In 2000, the former Falintil Commander of the Eastern Region,
Lere Anan Timor472, directed that the remains of civilians killed by ABRI/TNI be
recovered. Olimpia’s family searched the area of the Manulor post and recovered her skull
which they interred subsequently. In Iliomar, the East Timorese Women’s Association –
OMT (Organisação da Mulheres Timorense), commemorates Olimpia’s death on
International Women’s Day, 8 March, each year.
Other killings documented in Iliomar in 1980 included:
Ailebere villagers - Sebastiao Madeira Pinto (20 years, Heitali sub-village/Ailebere)
– killed in the forest by ABRI’s Yonif 126 at Veru Codo; Kiki Lay (65 years, male,
Heitali sub-village/Ailebere) – killed by ABRI in the Lubu Rara area; Dominggos
da Costa (four years, Heitali sub-village/Ailebere) killed by ABRI at Vani Abat;
Bara Soru (32 years, male, Leilor sub-village/Ailebere) killed by ABRI in the
Heidaun area (Fuat); and Cou Vatu (55 years, female, Leilor sub-village/Ailebere)
killed by ABRI in the Borutau area (Fuat).473
Cainliu villagers – killed as suspected Klandestin: Alarico Jerónimo (27 years),
Bruno da Costa (15 years) killed at Dapu-mana by Hansip, and Isabel Pinto (20
years) killed at Daman Fuat; and António Rodrigues (35 years, Ratih) killed by
ABRI Yonif 126 at Caidava-Ira.

ABRI ORGANISATION – AND LOW LEVEL ENTITIES:
RUKUN TETANGGA (RT), RUKUN WARGA (RW) AND RATIH

With the formal end of Operasi Seroja in late 1979, Komando Resort Militer
(Korem – Sub-Regional Military Command) 164 was established in Dili ostensibly to
manage security in the Province – matching the ABRI “territorial” system throughout
Indonesia with subordinate Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim - thirteen) at the Regency
(Kabupaten)474 level and Komando Rayon Militer (Koramil - 61) at the District

470
Other Iliomar sources reported that the ABRI unit was “Marinir” or “Yonif 320”.
471
Aditjondro, G.J., Menyongsong Matahari Terbit Di Puncak Ramelau, Yayasan HAK dan FORTILOS,
Jakarta, 2000, pp-52-53 provides a listing of such ABRI/TNI euphemisms.
472
Lere Anan Timor is the nom de guerre of Tito da Costa (of Caidalavarin, Cainliu village, Iliomar Sub-
District), also known as Tito Ililawa. In February 2001, he was appointed Colonel, Chief of Staff of the East
Timor Defence Force - ETDF which became Falintil-Forças Defesa Timor-Leste (F-FDTL).
473
As detailed in the Ailebere village report, p.10.
474
“Kabupaten” – commonly translated as “Regency”, was the Indonesian administrative term that replaced
the Portuguese “Concelho” – and which is now “District/Distrito”.
90

(Kecamatan) level. This structure was implemented to portray a “fiction of normalcy” 475 as
the Kolakops headquarters remained responsible for security operations throughout East
Timor.
In 1980, the Indonesian administration in Iliomar introduced a low-level security
control and monitoring system within the sub-villages: “Rukun Tetangga” (RT –
“neighbourhood association”) which grouped several families; and “Rukun Warga” (RW-
“ward association”) which grouped several RTs.476 RT and RW chairmen were responsible
for the movements and activities of villagers in their groups. The system also provided a
more formal reference structure of numbered houses within each sub-village that was
useful to the Indonesian military and officials unfamiliar with the area. However, in
Iliomar, this RT/RW mechanism was only in effect for a few years, falling into disuse in
about 1985. In Iliomar in 1980, as there were only six local Hansip, about 100 armed and
uniformed Mambae-speaking paramilitary Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih – Trained Populace)
from Aileu District south of Dili were deployed and stationed in the villages of Iliomar for
about one year. The villagers had little trouble with the Aileu Ratih, and they were
generally well-regarded. The Aileu Ratih were subsequently replaced by local Ratih who
served for several years until replaced by the expanded Iliomar Hansip organisation. The
Ratih were not paid, but received rations when operating away from their home village.477

FRETILIN REORGANISES – THE CRRN

In 1980, while Falintil avoided decisive combat with ABRI, several Falintil attacks
worried ABRI and were cited by ABRI intelligence as Fretilin showing “signs of their
existence” in “the months prior to the UN General Assembly” meeting ie, “the attack on the
Marabia TVRI television station in Dili on 10 June 1980478; the attack on Baguia on 21
August 1980; the attack on Baucau on 25 December 1980; and the planned attack on the
village of Mulia on 20 June 1980”.479
In the period 1-8 March 1981, Fretilin convened the “First National Conference for
the Reorganization of the Country” at Maubai, Lacluta village (near Mount Aitana, about
35 kilometres northwest of Viqueque)480 in order to overhaul its organisational and political
structure. Fretilin declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist party – Partido Marxista Leninista
Fretilin (PMLF), and Lere Anan Timor was one of nine new Central Committee members

475
Kammen, D, “Notes on the Transformation …”, Indonesia, 67, April 1999, pp. 61-62 notes the “auxiliary”
role of Korem 164, commanded by a Colonel, to Kolakops – commanded by a Brigadier. Korem 164 was
formed on 26 March 1979 with Colonel Adolf Sahala Rajagukuk as the first commander ie Danrem 164.
476
The RT/RW system – with houses displaying a numbered sign eg RT01/RW04, was introduced into Java
by the Japanese in WWII and is still maintained throughout most of Indonesia today as a public security
management mechanism.
477
For information on Ratih service in the early 1980s see Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …,
1984, pp. 224-225 and pp. 238-244 for relevant passages in captured ABRI documents dated July and
September 1982.
478
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, p.96 notes that the attack at Marabia was conducted by Falintil
elements from the north central region, independent of the surviving eastern-based group.
479
Instruction Manual No JUKNIS/05/I/1982, System of Security in Towns and Resettlement Areas, 10
September 1982 by Major Williem Da Costa, Head of the Korem 164 Intelligence Section - as Document 2 in
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, p.183. In January 2001, Williem Da Costa (born
Kupang, 1949), as a Major General, was appointed Commander Kodam (Military Region) IX /Udayana,
which covered West Timor – reposted to Bandung, Java in July 2002 to command the Army Staff College.
480
Xanana had spent most of 1980 west of Matabean, principally in the Viqueque area – Gusmão, X. (Niner,
S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, pp. 64-67. Xanana also states that the Conference was held at Laline - and another
source has stated that the “3-5 March 1981” meeting was held in Buafuh village, Alas.
91

inducted. 481 According to Xanana Gusmão, “in 1981 we still held on to the ‘ideological
orientation’ which were (sic) passed on to us by the experts and the leaders … we
transitioned to the phase of guerrilla warfare”.482 Militarily, Falintil units were now to be
more mobile, and the clandestine organisation in population centres and inside the
resettlement camps would support the armed resistance. The Resistance movement was to
be led by the Conselho Revolucionária Resistência Nacional (CRRN – the National
Council of Revolutionary Resistance) and “Committees for Regional Resistance
(Comissões Regionais de Resistência) were to operate in the districts; and below them at
the sub-district level would be National Resistance Centres (Centros Resistência Nacional -
Cernac); and at the village level, Nuclei of the People’s Resistance (Núcleos de Resistência
Popular - Nureps). These structures operated unevenly throughout the country”.483 Nureps
were to be set up to maintain links between the Resistance in the jungle and the local
clandestine network.484 According to Xanana Gusmão”: “Abílio Araújo … was elected by
us in March 1981 as the President of FRETILIN and, according to the Statute of the Party,
also became the President of RDTL”.485 Xanana Gusmão was elected as the National
Political Commissar, President of the CRRN, and Commander in Chief of Falintil.486

KORAMIL 03 AND “OPERATION SECURITY”

As noted above, an ABRI Koramil headquarters (Komando Rayon Militer –
military sub-district), commanded by a lieutenant, had been established in Iliomar with the

481
“During a meeting of the Central Committee of Fretilin in Laline in May 1977, the Marxist-Leninist
ideology was adopted. I myself participated as a member of the Central Committee. Some friends who
participated as members of the Central Committee are still alive today, namely Abel Ximenes, Lari Sina,
Filomeno Paixão, Feliciano de Fátima, and Má Huno.” - Gusmão, X., President of the Republic’s Message to
Fretilin, Dili, 22 June 2006 – see also: Saraswati, W. (Interview with Xanana), September 1999: In May
1977, Marxism was declared as the party philosophy, and Fretilin was formally established as a Marxist-
Leninist party by Xanana in March 1981 at the first National Conference ie as the Party Marxist-Leninist
Fretilin (PMLF). The 51-page declaration – in Portuguese, of the March 1981 “First National Conference” in
the “Nakroma Military Region, was signed on 8 March 1981 by Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak (the Conference
Secretary), and relates that Marxist-Leninism wsa formally included in Fretilin’s title wef 0700hrs on 3
March 1981 (a copy of the declaration was passed to the author by John Waddingham – CHART, on 9
September 2009). See also: Kammen, D., “A Tape Recorder and a Wink?, Transcript of the May 29, 1983,
Meeting Between Mário Carrascalão and Xanana Gusmão”, Indonesia, 87, April 2009, pp.73-102; and
Chega ! CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 99-100, 110. The declaration on Marxist-Leninism led to internal
dissension and, in 1984, Marxist-Leninism was rejected – see Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 117
relating the removal of “Marxist Leninist” from the Fretilin party title in April 1984. See also the following
sections on the “National Unity Policy” and “Putsch”.
482
Gusmão, X., President of the Republic’s Message to Fretilin, Dili, 22 June 2006.
483
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 101 – Lere Anan Timor is listed as a member of the CRRN at
p.28, footnote * and Part 3, p.96 footnote.
484
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.68, Note 101. Nurep was the CRRN/CNRM/CNRT term
for the Resistance leadership in a village, with “Celkom” equating to the sub-village leadership. Although
these terms were used in several Sub-Districts including Baucau, Viqueque and Ermera - the terms were not
commonly used in Iliomar.
485
Gusmão, X., President of the Republic’s Message to Fretilin, Dili, 22 June 2006.
486
Gusmao’s description of his assumption of the leadership roles is related in Niner, S., Xanana - Leader of
the Struggle …, 2009, op.cit., pp.72-76. He describes his “close collaborators” at this time as “Mau Hudo
and Mau Huno … along with those already loyal to him like Holy Naxta, Ko’o Susu, Konis Santana, Taur
Matan Ruak and David Alex. However another faction of military leaders coalesced around Kilik ((ie Kilik
Wai Gai)) and … there were strategic issues on which they did not agree.”
92

responsibility for local military administration and security – including police.487 This
headquarters, Koramil 2903 (sometimes abbreviated to “03”), commanded Hansip troops
and Babinsa (Badan Bintara Desa – ABRI village sergeants) in Iliomar. Iliomar’s Koramil
2903 was subordinate to Kodim (Komando District Militer) 1629 in Los Palos - the
military administrative headquarters for the Lautém Kabupaten.
According to a 1981 ABRI instruction488, the Babinsa was required to maintain data
on the village, including:
a. sketch map of the old village (ie pre-upheaval);
b. sketch map of the present village;
c. village security system;
d. genealogy of the chieftain;
e. list of village government officials;
f. list of catechists; and
g. list of other community figures.

The Babinsa was also directed that: “Every single activity of the population must be
known exactly, in the following ways:
a. Appoint reliable people as Katuas ((“Elders” – in Tetum)) to help
neighbourhood chiefs (heads of rukun tetangga). Arrange it in such a way that
each Katuas has responsibility for 10-15 families. Each Katuas must be able to
know exactly the activities of the families under his guidance; for example,
when they go into their fields, go to collect wood, get permission to go to
another village, to tend herds, go to market, and so on.
b. Appoint an “informer” in each of these groups of 10-15 families led by one
katuas. This informer should be able to follow, secretly, all the activities of
these 10-15 families.
c. Every time anyone goes out of the village, he/she must have a travel pass (surat
jalan), and every person who comes into the village from another village must
report.
d. Inspection posts must be set up to keep a check on everyone who enters or
leaves the village.
e. Maintain an element of surprise by holding extraordinary role-calls, or by
having check-ups on the population by the katuas to check whether anyone has
left the village without permission or whether anyone has arrived from another
village without reporting.
f. Take other actions, in according to the circumstances in each village, for the
purpose of intensifying control over the population. For instance, house-to-
house visits, and patrols inside the village to prevent illegal meetings from
taking place there.”489

In mid-1981, ABRI launched a country-wide “Operasi Keamanan/Kikis”
(Operation Security) which used large numbers of forcibly-recruited villagers in a “pagar

487
The organisation and roles of the Koramil are well-described in Sebastian, L.C., Realpolitik Ideology:
Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2006, pp.91-96.
488
Ibid, p.94 citing ABRI Instruction Manual No JUKNIS/01/XI/81, 15 November 1981. Also repeated in
JUKNIS/01-A/IV/1982, The Village as the Focal Point of Attention …, 10 September 1982 – p.212 in
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984. The original Bahasa of the 1982 document can be
found on the website of the Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili - within Document 06449.046.
489
Ibid, p.95. Also repeated in JUKNIS/04-B/IV/1982, How to Protect the Community from the Influence of
GPK Propaganda, 10 September 1982 – p.218-219 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984.
93

betis” (“fence of legs”) strategy in military sweeps against Falintil in the jungle. The first
phase began with a sweep from Tutuala at the eastern end of the island westwards to a
north-south line Com/Raça/Los Palos/Iliomar – followed in July 1981 with a sweep
eastward from the line Venilale/Ossú/Viqueque towards Matabean and a southwestwards
sweep towards Viqueque on the south coast.490 All of Iliomar’s able male villagers were
forced to participate in ABRI’s country-wide “Operasi Kikis” sweeping operations.491 This
dislocation of villagers disrupted planting and harvesting, resulted in severe food shortages,
and put further pressure on Falintil.
Pressure also increased against the Klandestin in Iliomar in 1981. In 1981, Namipua
of Fuat village was arrested as a suspected Klandestin and beaten to death at the Koramil
headquarters in the Toko Cina building. The Koramil commander (ie Danramil) was
reportedly Lieutenant Untung or – according to the Ailebere village report, “Hanifai”. At
about this time, ABRI raised a special Hansip element in Iliomar – termed Tim Siluman
(Siguranca Sipil Masyarakat), led by José Madeira492 and Adão Cabral, to operate actively
against Falintil and the Klandestin. Soon after its formation, the Tim Siluman personnel
shot and killed a Falintil fighter, Duarte Madeira of Fuat, and also obtained a large number
of secret documents from a Klandestin member (Dinis Madeira of Fuat). ABRI and Hansip
then arrested 11 Klandestin in Iliomar I: Caetano Gonçalves (Caentau), José Valenti
(Caentau), Armindo Perreira (Caentau), Luís da Costa (Caentau), Ricardo de Arauju
(Caentau), Carlos Correia (Iliomar), Celestino da Costa (Caentau), António Madeira
(Caentau), José Fracao (Caentau), Mateus Pinto (Vatamatar), and Benedito de Sousa
(Iliomar). All were tortured for information. Later in 1981 in the Iliomar II area, two
Hansip were killed and one wounded in Falintil ambushes: Afonso Pinto was killed at
Iraamuh, José Valente was killed at Rorok, and Nuno Bastos was wounded at Iraamuh. An
Iliomar II villager, Boaventura da Costa was also wounded in a Falintil ambush at Rorok.
In 1981, Lere Anan Timor’s wife, Elsa Pinto, died of illness. Her nine-month old
child, Aluc, was taken into care by Indonesian officials, and soon after was moved to Java
and adopted – the child’s subsequent whereabouts remain unknown. In June 1981, ABRI
shot and killed a Tirilolo villager, Isabel da Costa, at Raanur.
ABRI also attempted unconventional means to isolate and defeat the local Iliomar
Resistance. According to the Cainliu village report: “the TNI commander forced the village
notables to hold traditional ceremonies in which Falintil members were expelled from their
clans through the use of incantations, their (sacred) rocks were removed from the rumah
adat (customary house) so that they would die immediately if shot by TNI, and magic was
invoked to tire them so that the Falintil fighters could be captured or shot and killed.”493

490
See Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 367-376. Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p.298 notes 30,000
villagers and 12 ABRI battalions were involved in the twelve-month Operation Kikis – and cites its full title
as “Saber Kikis Baratayudha”. Captain Syahnakri served as the 2ic of 744 Battalion in 1981 and describes
Kikis II operations in the Aitana area. - Syahnakri, K., Lieutenant General (Retd), Timor Timur: The Untold
Story, op.cit., 2013, pp.71-85
491
The Ailebere village report notes that ABRI mobilized all villagers from 17 to 50 years to participate in
Operasi Kikis from May-August 1981 – totalling 450 persons. The Tirilolo village report, p.4, states that the
villagers’ participation lasted “about 41 days”.
492
The Ailebere village report however shows Jaime da Costa as the Siluman Commander. Siluman is
“Phantom” in Bahasa Indonesia.
493
Cainliu village report, p.7.
94

THE ABRI VIEW OF THE RESISTANCE : 1981-82

An ABRI intelligence document494 noted that the “GPK” (“Gerombolan/Gerakan
Pengacau Keamanan” – “Security Disturbing Elements” – the Indonesian euphemism for
Fretilin/Falintil), divided East Timor organisationally into three military regions495:

- An eastern region: “Funu Sei Nafatin” (in Tetum: “The Struggle Continues”)
covering the regions of Baucau, Viqueque and Los Palos – east of the Baucau-
Viqueque road;
- A central region: “Nakroman” (“Light”) – the region of Manatuto – ie west of
the Baucau-Viqueque road to a line Dili to Betano; and
- “Haksolok” (“Joy”) – the western, or border, region – west of a line Dili to
Betano.

This ABRI assessment is clarified by the late 2005 CAVR Final Report, Chega !.
That Report included Manatuto in the Funu Sei Nafatin (eastern) Region; lists the Central
Nakroman Region, led by Fera Lafaek, as encompassing Dili, Aileu, Same, Ermera and
Liquiça; and the Fronteira (border) Region, under Venâncio Ferreira, comprising Suai,
Ainaro and Maliana.496

The ABRI document described the organisation of the eastern Funu Sei Nafatin Region as:

Funu Sei Nafatin Region
Region Commander: Marcur (Rubileki) – of Ualili497
Political Commissar: Tito Ililawa (Lere Anan Timur) - of Iliomar

Nafatin Sub-Region (SR) Funuk Sub-Region (SR)
(west of Matabean) (east of Matabean)

Company II, Red Brigade Company I, Red Brigade
Commander: David Alex498 Commander: Falo Chai (Iliomar)499

494
Instruction Manual, The Way for Babinsa or Village GuidanceTeams to Expose GPK Support Networks, -
as Document 1 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, pp. 176-182 and, for the original in
Bahasa, see website of the Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili, as Document 06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 –
Bakau Timtim, Baurah”).
495
This ABRI-source information is confirmed by Chega!,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 390. However, a
former senior Falintil commander commented to the author in November 2002 that in 1981 Xanana divided
the Province into two operational areas – West and East, with the road Baucau to Viqueque as the border. He
also noted that in 1981, Kilik Wae Gae was Falintil Chief of Staff (COFS) with Mauk Muruk as Deputy; and
in 1983 (?), Xanana was COFS with two Deputies – Taur Matan Ruak (West) and Mau Huno (East).
496
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 105.
497
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 105 shows Funu Sei Nafatin commanded by Koro Asu and
Lemorai.
498
David Alex Daitula (David da Costa) died of wounds on 25 June 1997 following a clash with ABRI in
Watume sub-village, Caibada village – about three kilometres northwest of Baucau. In 1995, he was Falintil
Commander Region II – and in 1997 was reported by ABRI as Commander of Region I.
499
Falo Chai (occasionally as “Falu Taxai” - Fernando Teles, born Los Palos) was killed in a clash with
Indonesian forces led by the Chairman of the Lautém Parliament (DPRD II) Luís Monteiro Leite in 1985 –
Leite was Chairman 1982-87.
95

(The Red Brigade Commander, Mauk Muruk, was located in the Funuk SR;
while Company III, under Kalisa and Ologari often operated in the Nafatin SR.)

According to the ABRI report, each of the Sub-Regions was further divided into
districts – called “Cernak” (“Centro de Resistência Nacional”) or “Celula”.500 Each
Cernak/Celula element, operating in the jungle and with its “OC” (“Orgão Coordinator”)
cell, coordinated several Nureps - ie the bodies that organised and guided the villages and
resettlement areas. Nureps were managed by a local control group of 3-6 persons, termed
the “Orgão Directivo” (OD). The ABRI report also noted that in most districts of the
Funuk Sub-Region the Cernak/Celula had been “exposed /broken up” (“telah dibongkar”)
– this included Celula 114 which encompassed Los Palos and Iliomar. Auxiliary Falintil
elements that operated clandestinely within villages and resettlement areas were termed
“Miplin” (“Milicia Popular de Libertação Nacional” – People’s Militia for National
Liberation)501. However, in Iliomar, many of the foregoing Resistance structures and
organisations were not formed, and the underground elements continued to be called by the
generic term “Klandestin”.502
In a subsequent ABRI report in 1982 503, “GPK areas of operation” within Lautém
District were noted as the area from Mount Paichau (height 925m – about 22 kilometres
east of Los Palos) south to the coast (the Falo Chai/Taxai group); the Daudere village area
on the northern coast and the hinterland (the Mauk Muruk group); and with “small,
unorganized groups operating … in the regions of Home and Souro” (about 20 kilometres
northwest of Los Palos town). Also within Lautém District, the ABRI report noted the area
of Koaliu (sometimes spelt as “Kooliu”) village near Mount Paichau as a site for meetings
– “on such an occasion, there is a very sizeable concentration of forces in one place”. More
generally, the report noted that “it is in the eastern sector that people’s support is the most
militant and most difficult to expose. This is because of the very strong, close family ties
and also because it has been possible for the GPK to consolidate its political leadership in
this region for several years … the GPK has consciously chosen the eastern region as its
hinterland and reserve base”.504

EXILE TO ATAÚRO AND AILEU

In 1981-82, in order to isolate Falintil from its supporters and the Klandestin cadre
in the villages, 24 Iliomar families were exiled (“diungsikan”) by ABRI to Ataúro Island
(an arid, mountainous and infertile island – 144 sq km, 22 kilometres north of Dili, also

500
Connect with the earlier Chega !,CAVR Final Report’s explanation at the preceding footnote 483 and also
footnote 502 below.
501
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 147-148, citing Taur Matan Ruak, notes that Miplin were
unarmed: “there were no arms to give them … we used (the militia) to motivate the population to remain
alert”.
502
In May 1995, ABRI Army Commander (Kasad) - General R. Hartono, met with senior commanders in Dili
and directed ABRI to record (ie “inventarisasi”) the numbers of Klandestin – see “Kasad Perintahkan
Klandestin di Timtim Segera Didata”, (Kasad Orders Klandestin in East Timor be Recorded Immediately),
Suara Pembaruan, Jakarta, 4 May 1995. For data on the organisation of the Klandestin/Clandestina, see
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5.6, Clandestine Liberation Movement.
503
“Instructions for Territorial Intelligence …”, Document 3 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War
…, 1984, p.196. The report also describes the areas of operations in neighbouring Baucau and Viqueque
districts (Alex, Olo Gari, Kalisa groups) and the Kilik and Mau/Ma’ Huno groups operating further west.
504
Ibid, p.201.
96

known as Pulau Kambing).505 All of these families from Iliomar had relatives serving with
Falintil in the jungle. In particular, Iliomar I village was regarded as having a large number
of “traitors” - ie “kepala dua” (ie, “two-faces”). From Iliomar I, the exiled families
included the family of Joana Pinto (Iliomar) – 8 persons, Francisco Hornay (Iliomar) - 9
persons, Francisco dos Santos (Vatamatar) - 4 persons, Domingos Fernandes (Osso-Ira) – 5
persons, José Esteves (Ara Ara) – 6 persons, Manuel da Costa (Caentau) - 3 persons, and
Nou Doli (Caentau) – 5 persons. Those exiled from Iliomar II included the family of João
de Deus (Acara sub-village) – 11 persons506 as a son, Orlando Jerónimo (Serasa), was a
local Falintil fighter; and the families of Lino de Deus, Mateus Alegria (Caidabu), and
Hermenegildo Martins.
Later in 1982, a further group of Iliomar I villagers were exiled to Ataúro: the
family of Amelia Ximenes (Iliomar sub-village) – 2 persons, José Fracao (Caentau) – 4
persons, António Miranda (Caentau) – 3 persons, António de Fati (Vatamatar) – 2 persons,
and Benedito de Sousa (Iliomar) – 1 person. Three female family members of a Tirilolo
Falintil fighter, Rui Nunes, were also exiled to Ataúro: Isabel Nunes, Maria Nunes and
Justina Nunes. These groups were escorted by several Hansip - but at Kudaluan Hill
(Cainliu), they were blocked and attacked by Falintil. In the engagement, Hansip member,
Orlando Jerónimo, was shot and killed by Falintil and two Tirilolo villagers were seriously
wounded: Eduardo Coelho and Jaime Quintas. Lere Anan Timor’s family – including his
mother, Sabu Ili (Caidalavarin sub-village/Cainliu), was also exiled to Ataúro at about this
time - together with several other Cainliu families including that of Falintil fighters Nicolao
and Silvester da Cruz, Mateus Ximenes and Manuel da Costa.
Many of the families were exiled for fifteen months, but subsequently several were
moved to Maliana (near the western border of the Province) where they were exiled for a
further four years before being allowed to return to Iliomar in 1986. In a second phase,
about 10 Klandestin cadre were arrested and jailed in Aileu – including Cainliu Hansip
members: Idelfonso da Cruz (35 years), Orlando Barbaros (25 years), João Marques (22
years) and José da Costa (25 years). One of those exiled to Aileu in 1982, Caetano
Gonçalves of Iliomar I, had been a Falintil platoon commander in Iliomar 1975-78 and
subsequently a local Klandestin leader.507
In 1982, a Ratih element from Aileu clashed with a Falintil group at Naisolopu near
Maluhira sub-village (Cainliu). ABRI arbitrarily arrested a number of Cainliu and Tirilolo
villagers, and ABRI Yonif 320/Hansip killed Martinho da Cruz (35 years, Cainliu) at
Titiraven and Joachim Ferreira (Cainliu) - a suspected Klandestin, at Vata-Ira. The ABRI
tactical commander in Iliomar (ie, Komandan Taktis - Kotis, the commander of Battalion

505
Ataúro had also been used earlier as prison/penal settlement by the Portuguese – including for Chinese
prisoners from Macau. The Indonesian program of exile is described in Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten
War, 1991, pp.104-106; Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, pp. 64-65, pp.136-138; and
the ABRI Instruction Manual at para III 4., Document 1 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …,
1984, p.180. José Ramos-Horta states “Ataúro’s original population of 5,000 swelled to 9,000” – Ramos-
Horta J., Funu …, 1987, p.196. Saldanha, J.M., The Political Economy …, 1994, p.121 relates 4,500 people
exiled to Ataúro. During a visit by an Australian parliamentary delegation to Ataúro on 31 July 1983, ICRC
representatives stated that there were 2,031 “detainees” on the island – down from 4,000 a year previously -
Morrison, W.L., Official Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation, No. 154/1983, Canberra, 1983,
Appendix 26, pp.177-179. For statements by exiles, see Centre for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR), Public Hearing – 28-29 June 2003 (Internet).
506
Including Tito de Deus (the brother of Iliomar Falintil fighter, Serasa) who subsequently became the
Klandestin Vice Secretary in Iliomar from the mid-1990s.
507
Caetano Gonçalves (b. 5/9/1942; nom de guerre – “Luru Asu”) died in Aileu in 1985 - reportedly after
interrogations and beatings by ABRI. In the 2008 Falintil pension listing, he is listed as a “soldier”, level “G-
3” - who died of illness in prison on 8 May 1985 – see Combatentes da Libertação Nacional, Edital
No.110/IV/2008, Dili, 5 April 2008.
97

320)508, summoned Mateus Pinto (Iliomar I) to the ABRI base atop Baitomar Hill for
questioning. Mateus, a member of the Klandestin organisation, refused to disclose any
information - but was ordered by the ABRI commander to seek out the local Falintil
commander in the jungle, Lere Anan Timor, and kill him. Soon after, however, Mateus fled
into jungle, and Carlos Correia (village chief of Iliomar I) and António Jerónimo (village
secretary) were accused of being Klandestin members and questioned over supporting the
escape of Mateus Pinto. Also in 1982, a TBO, Domingos de Jesus, was brought from the
Los Palos area to the ABRI Yonif 320 post at Baitomar Hill immediately west of Iliomar
Town and interrogated. Soon after he was taken to Hama-Um by ABRI troops and killed.

“KELUARGA BERENCANA” : FAMILY PLANNING

In the 1980s, the Indonesian administration introduced its national family planning
program, “Keluarga Berencana” (KB) to East Timor. In 1985, Bishop Carlos Belo – then
Apostolic Administrator, denounced the KB program as a “forced birth control program”
stating: “With so many dead, we have no population problem here”.509 In March 1985, he
promulgated a pastoral letter - in part devoted to a summary of Roman Catholic teaching on
birth control as set out in Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae encyclical, and declared “all
contraceptives are morally illicit”.510
Critics of the KB program have alleged coercive and covert sterilization of women
and also cited the program’s “disturbing high reliance on injectable contraceptives” –
principally Depo Provera, which at 62 percent was “double that of the next nearest
province, Irian Jaya”.511 However, for 1991, the Indonesian Government declared that KB
acceptance for married women in East Timor was 25.1 percent – much lower than the
national average of 49.7 percent.512 Some Western reports also noted that the total fertility
rate in the Province appears to have had a very slow downward trend – from 4.7 in 1990 to
4.6 in 1997, which contrasts with the Indonesian rate of 2.85 in 1994.513
In Lautém District, the KB “akseptor” (acceptor) rate in 1997 was reported as 13.79
percent. In Iliomar, Indonesian statistics for 1997/98 recorded a total of 373 acceptors
including 324 by injection (87 percent) and 39 by piIl (10 percent)514. This represents an
estimated 12 percent of Iliomar’s eligible couples (see also figures at Annex C). Iliomar’s
visiting priest opposed the KB program – rather promoting the “rhythm/temperature-based”
method. However, many couples reportedly became KB acceptors, persuaded by
Indonesian proselytising and material inducements eg money, rice, and chickens.

508
The Koramil 03 commander was reportedly Lieutenant Untung (but this information needs to be
confirmed).
509
Kohen, A.S., From the Place of the Dead: Bishop Belo and the Struggle for East Timor, Lion Publishing,
Oxford, 1999, p.164. See also Smythe, P., “The Role of the Church …”, Sydney, 1999, p.104.
510
“The Church in East Timor – The Church and Indonesia’s birth control programme”, p.1 in Timor Link,
No 3, October 1985. See also Aditjondro, G.J., Menyongsong Matahari …, 2000, pp.110-122 and p.239 that
notes Bishop Belo’s critical pastoral letter of May 1986 which was supported by Governor Mário
Carrascalão.
511
Sissons, M., From One Day to Another: Violations of Women’s Reproductive and Sexual Rights in East
Timor, Yale University, 23 June 1997.
512
Brahmana, R., Buku 20 Tahun Timor Timur Membangun (The Book of 20 Years of the Development of
East Timor), Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia – Propinisi Timor Timur/Samsul Bakri, Jakarta, 1996, p.9.
513
Pedersen, J. and Arneberg, M. (eds), 1999, p.56 – Chapter 4 provides considerable detail on fertility and
contraception. Similar fertility rate data is also cited in the Parliament of Australia, Senate Report of 7
December 2000, p.16 ie East Timor fertility at 4.4 percent in 1997, compared with Indonesia at 2.7 percent.
514
-----, Kabupaten Lautem Dalam Angka, 1998, Table 4.56 p.130 – see further figures at Annex C.
98

THE CEASEFIRE – 1983

By 1983, the Resistance was in disarray. In March 1981, Xanana Gusmão had been
elected CRRN chairman (as related earlier) and, while contact with ABRI was avoided,
harassment by ABRI forces and heavy Falintil casualties continued - particularly during
ABRI’s continuing Operasi Keamanan (Security). Xanana had spent most of 1982 in the
forests of Lautém District, meeting briefly in September with the Apostolic Administrator
of the Dili Archdiocese, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes.515 Monsignor Martinho was
reportedly sympathetic to the Resistance, but urged moderation and warned against the
excesses of communism.516 He reportedly urged “national unity between UDT and Fretilin
… at first, Xanana Gusmão rejected the idea, but slowly it became more acceptable until in
1983 the PMLF Central Committee affirmed National Unity (Unidade Nacional ) as its
official policy.”517
In late 1982, Colonel Purwanto518 - the newly-appointed Korem 164 commander,
through a Kopassandha officer (Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto519) made contact with a
senior Fretilin leader of the Funu Sei Nafatin (Eastern) Region, José da Conceição (Jony).
520
This contact was initially through the former Camat (Sub-District Administrator) of

515
Lennox, R., The Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The Life of Martinho Da Costa Lopes, Pluto, Annandale,
2000, p.188. Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, a Timorese (b.1918), had been appointed Apostolic
Administrator ie “ acting bishop” in 1981 – he was replaced by Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo on 12 May
1983 ie Bishop Belo from 19 June 1988. Monsignor Martinho (Dom Martinho) died on 27 February 1991.
The meeting is also related in Niner, S., Xanana - Leader of the Struggle …, 2009, op.cit., pp.82-83.
516
Jolliffe, J., “Former East Timor Church Leader Dies”,The Guardian, London, 1 March 1991.
517
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 115 – also notes that their meeting occurred at Mehara.
518
Colonel Purwanto, an artillery officer, was appointed Danrem 164 in about September 1982. He is
sometimes confused with the Kopassandha officer Major Stevanus/Stefanus Gato Purwanto (Nanggala 52)
who acted as the principal ABRI liaison officer for the ceasefire negotiations – see the following footnote.
Colonel Purwanto’s approach to Falintil was reportedly directed by the Indonesian Minister of Defence,
General Yusuf. The official history of Kodam IX/Udayana states “in 1982, the Commander of Korem
164/Wiradharma, in his capacity as ‘Harian Laksusda Nusra’ (Routine Special Executive for the Lesser
Sundas), made kontak damai (peaceful contact) with the GPK with the objective of making them ‘aware’ and
‘attracting’ their followers” - Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) – Kodam IX/Udayana, 42
Tahun Pengabdian Kodam IX Udayana (42 Years of Service by Military Region IX, Udayana), Kodam
IX/Udayana, Denpasar, 27 Mei (May) 1999, p.65. The author is yet to access an ABRI account of the
ceasefire ie Kodam XVI/Udayana - Korem 164/WD, Analisa Kontak Damai 11 Desember 1982 - 4 Juni
1983 (An Analysis of the Ceasefire – 11 December 1982 to 4 June 1983), Dili, 1983. For Gatot Purwanto’s
later career see also footnote 544.
519
Lieutenant Stevanus Gatot Purwanto had served in Portuguese Timor in August-November 1975 as the
operations officer of the Kopassandha Tim Susi – including during the attack on Balibo on 16 October 1975.
He later served in Timor in the Kopassandha Nanggala 13 in late 1976. In December 2009, as a retired
Colonel, Stevanus Gatot Purwanto related his involvement in the ceasefire negotiations – see Tempo,
“Balibo: the Film and the Reality”, No.15/X , Jakarta, 8-14 December 2009. In 1991, as a Lieutenant Colonel,
Gatot Purwanto was appointed Asintel, Korem 164/Kolakops – and, following the ABRI Honour Council
investigation into the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991, he was “honourably dismissed” from
ABRI in February 1992. In a 1998 interview, Gatot Purwanto described how he had deceived Xanana
Gusmao in 1983 and prevented a meeting between Gusmao and a visiting Australian parliamentary
delegation. According to Purwanto, he “quietly sabotaged it” as probably “it would cause difficulties for
Indonesia. Thus their visit concluded – and Xanana was angry.” – Gatra, “Sengketa di Timor Timur Memang
Kejam”, 47/IV, Jakarta, 10 October 1998. For the Australian parliamentary delegation – see footnotes 519
and 537.
520
José da Conceição (Jony - born Irahara, Los Palos) was the Assistant Commisar of the Eastern Region. At
the end of the ceasefire, he did not return to the jungle but assisted ABRI against Falintil and the Klandestin
movement. He is regarded by Fretilin/Falintil as a traitor and currently (2008) lives in West (Indonesian)
Timor. The participation of Victor da Costa in visits to Jakarta has yet to be confirmed. Mau Velis (Martinho
Pereira/Orlando José Maria – Maupitine/Mehara village) may also have participated in the visits to Jakarta.
99

Moro (Lautém) and the raja/régulo of Los Palos, Veríssimo/Viríssimo Dias Quintas521 –
meeting José da Conceição and the local Falintil leader, Lari Mau (Justo Bernadino)522.
Major Gatot Purwanto first met with Lari Mau at Pupura/Rasira523, southwest of Los Palos
town, to discuss possibilities for a cessation of hostilities – Lari Mau was escorted by a
dozen Falintil fighters and the ABRI contingent reportedly included armoured vehicles.
According to Governor Mário Carrascalão, these early meetings were also facilitated by
principals of the Apodeti party – in particular Daniel Baptista, the Bupati of Viqueque
(Administrador Interino de Conselho de Viqueque) and a Timorese ABRI intelligence
operative, Labut Melo.524 In late 1982/early 1983, Major Gatot Purwanto held further
meetings with José da Conceição – and, with Xanana Gusmão’s agreement, Major Gatot
Purwanto escorted José da Conceição and two other Falintil: Victor da Costa (interpreter)
and Falo Chai (ie, Fernando Teles, a senior Falintil field commander - see footnote 499) to
Jakarta for an orientation/confidence-building visit.525
The previous Resistance policy of “negotiations – no and never” (“negociação –
não & nunca”)526 was abandoned, and Xanana Gusmão directed Falintil’s Talisman Sub-
Region (of the Funu Sei Nafatin Region) to prepare future meeting venues. On 24
December 1982, Xanana Gusmão wrote to Governor Carrascalão527 – but negotiations of
substance were only conducted with ABRI officers.
Soon after, in the first months of 1983, Xanana Gusmão responded to the
Indonesian initiatives by agreeing to a ceasefire – or period of “kontak damai/cessar-fogo”
(Bahasa: “peaceful contact”528/Portuguese: “ceasefire”) with ABRI. Xanana Gusmão’s
aims were to gain some respite for Falintil, to re-establish contact with the few Klandestin
cadre still active in the villages and towns, and to publicise the Resistance movement
internationally. A ceasefire would also provide the opportunity to promote the recently-
launched “National Unity Policy” of the Resistance in which the role of all nationalists,

521
The sequence of meetings and some detail is based on the author’s discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant
Bersama Klaletek Bahafou (Mário Baptista) in Dili on 27 July 2005. Bersama served as an aide to Falintil
Comandante Saudoso (Konis Santana) in the period 1983-1986. Viríssimo/Veríssimo Dias Quintas/Quintão
was killed by pro-integration militia in Los Palos on 27 August 1999 – see footnote 760. Carrascalão, M.V.,
Timor – Antes do Futuro, Mau Huran Printing, Timor-Leste, 2006, p.183 refers to facilitation by “the Liurai
of Los Palos and friend of Xanana Gusmão, Filipe Dias Quintas”.
522
Lari Mau, a 24-year Falintil veteran of Ira Lafai village (Los Palos), was serving as a senior sergeant in the
F-FDTL in 2006.
523
Another F-FDTL source indicated the initial meeting occurred near Wailana sub-village about 20
kilometres south of Los Palos – and that later meetings also took place in Home and Moro villages north of
Los Palos. Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 409 notes meetings at “Pupuru” and “Pasikenu” –
occurring weekly by February 1983.
524
Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006, p.177 – these Apodeti contacts with Falintil were
managed by ABRI Captain Azis (an engineer officer serving in the intelligence service).
525
Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, pp. 298-299 based on interviews in mid-1999 - including with Stefanus
Gatot Purwanto, notes that in early 1983 Major Gatot Purwanto escorted a Fretilin leader to Jakarta for a
“five-day sightseeing trip” – but does not provide a name. Lowry, R. (email to author, 17 May 2003)
confirmed that José da Conceição was accompanied to Jakarta by Falintil commander Falo Chai (Fernando
Teles). Up to three visits may have been made to Jakarta.
526
The principle of “no negotiations” had been declared by Fretilin’s Supreme Command of the Struggle in
April 1977.
527
Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006, pp.179-180 includes Governor Carrascalão’s reply to
Xanana Gusmão dated 2 February 1983.
528
The Indonesian side used the term “kontak damai” – avoiding the Bahasa term for “ceasefire” ie “gencatan
senjata”.
100

including the emerging student movement, was now recognised. ABRI was also reportedly
war-weary and accepted the proposal – but did not want such to be made public.529
In Lautém, on 6 and 10 January 1983 substantive meetings were reportedly held at
“Tcharu” southwest of Los Palos to negotiate conditions for a ceasefire – which, on the
Resistance side, included political, military and nurep elements ie, “Foti Oin”.530 In
Iliomar, a meeting was held in Ailebere village in early January 1983 between Falintil and
the Tripida (ie comprising Indonesian authorities, their Timorese appointees and Hansip)531
to discuss a local ceasefire.532 At this meeting, Falintil attendees comprised: Venâncio
Savio with an armed party of 12, Falintil political officer Amilcar Rodrigues, Serasa
(Orlando Jerónimo), Nami Hala (Roberto Jerónimo), Ernesto Pinto, Rui Nunes and
António. The Tripida party reportedly included: Zé Roberto Seixas Miranda Jerónimo (the
Iliomar Camat since February 1982), the Koramil 03 commander (Harifai) and the local
ABRI Kopassus team leader (Umar). Seven village notables also attended – including
Ailebere village chief, Américo Jerónimo.
At the “Province” level, initial formal ceasefire negotiations were held in late
March 1983.533 Preliminary discussions were held at Falintil’s Gattot encampment
(Acampamento de Gattot - Bibileu, Viqueque) involving Xanana Gusmão,Veríssimo Dias
Quintas (régulo of Los Palos), Father Eligio Locatelli (Italian Roman Catholic/Salesian
priest – Fatumaca, Baucau), Aleixo Ximenes (the Indonesian administration’s deputy for
Baucau) and Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto (Kopassandha, ABRI). Soon after, on 20
March, more senior Indonesian officers met with the Falintil leadership in the same vicinity
at Buburaque/Bubu Rake/ (Liaruka village) in northwestern Viqueque District (about 12
kilometres southwest of Venilale) - participants included Xanana, Veríssimo Dias Quintas,
Bere Malai Laka and ABRI officers: Major Williem da Costa, Major Stevanus Gatot
Purwanto, and Captain Dayun.534 Colonel Purwanto reportedly flew from Dili to Bali on
21 March for discussions with the ABRI Kodam commander.535

529
See Taylor, J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, pp.136-137 for Fretilin’s letter of proposals passed to
Colonel Purwanto. The ceasefire however was admitted in the Jakarta press on 10 June 1983 - Chega
!,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 418.
530
Author’s discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant Bersama (Mário Baptista), Tasi Tolu, 27 July 2005.
531
Tripida – in Bahasa: Tri Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leadership Triumvirate) comprising Camat,
Dandim,and Kapolsek (Sub-district administrator, military commander and police commander).
532
As related in the Ailebere village report to the CAVR – the initial meeting took place on 1 January, and the
second meeting on 3 January 1983.
533
The exact dates, sequence and locations of the March 1983 meetings are not fully clear - but the following
descriptions are based on a combination of text reports and an analysis of photographs of the meetings.
534
A tape recording of this meeting was reportedly carried to Portugal by the outgoing Apostolic
Administrator, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes– for a summary see Jolliffe, J. (ed), Timor Newsletter,
Vol II, No 3, October 1983, pp. 8-9. Frederico da Costa, brother of Victor da Costa, was reportedly present as
interpreter – and is mentioned in Governor Carrascalão’s account - Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do
Futuro, 2006, p.182. Frederico was killed in a clash with ABRI in 1988. Chega ! CAVR Final Report, Part 3,
para 410 relates that Falintil attendees also included José da Conceição and Okan ie Okan Onobú. Conboy,
K., Kopassus, 2003, p. 299 reports three meetings in the Ossú area with Xanana earlier in March, followed
by the Major Purwanto/Xanana meeting on 21 March – with a separate Carrascalão/Xanana meeting two days
later on 23 March 1983.
535
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 410. Kodam XVI Udayana was commanded by Major General
Dading Kalbuadi (see also footnotes 357 and 449) until May 1983 when replaced by Major General Soetarto.
Kodam XVI was retitled Kodam IX /Udayana on 9 April 1985.
101

On 23 March 1983, Colonel Purwanto met with Xanana Gusmão at Buburaque –
see the following photograph. Participants included (left to right): Berliku, Veríssimo Dias
Quintas, Colonel Purwanto, Xanana Gusmão, Bere Malai Laka (partially obscured). ABRI
Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto is not shown. ABRI Major Iswanto also reportedly
attended.536

During the meeting, Colonel Purwanto summoned Governor Mário Carrascalão
from Dili to participate. 537 Mário Carrascalão flew from Dili and met with Xanana
Gusmão at Lari Guto (Ossú de Cima village – about 9 kilometres southwest of Venilale), ie

536
Major Iswanto – an ABRI “Tetum-speaking field commander, affected Falintil surrenders in 1979 and
1980 and offered amnesties. Xanana Gusmão described Iswanto as “cunning and murderous” - Niner, S.,
Xanana - Leader of the Struggle …, 2009, op.cit., p.60 – see also p.47, p.91. Iswanto’s contact with Falintil is
also mentioned briefly in Chega ! CAVR Final Report.
537
Governor Carrascalão first publicly admitted to his discussions with Xanana in an article in The Jakarta
Post of 10, 11 July 1983 – Saldanha, J.M., The Political Economy …, 1994, p.120; Singh, B., East Timor:
Myths And Realities, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 1995, p.127. See also
Carrascalão’s remarks to an Australian parliamentary delegation on 28 July 1983 – Morrison, W.L., Official
Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation, No. 154/1983, Canberra, 1983, pp.151-152; and “Mário
hakerek istoria Larigutu …”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 31 August 2005. Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei
Liong, The War …, 1984, p.72 notes Fretilin rejected an Indonesian proposal that Carrascalão be the principal
representative of the Indonesian side. Governor Carrascalão relates his one-hour meeting with Xanana
Gusmão on 23 March in Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006, pp.177-193.
102

nearby but not at the Buburaque venue.538 Mário Carrascalão has related that Colonel
Purwanto “asked me to go to Larigutu ((sic)), because he had run out of arguments in his
debate with Xanana. So they prepared a helicopter … The meeting with Xanana lasted
forty five minutes … I sat next to Xanana, in front of us was a Fretilin flag.”539

Governor Mário Carrascalão, Xanana Gusmão, Bere Malai Laka - Lariguto

A few days later, the East Timor-wide ceasefire agreement was concluded.
Subsequently, the first of several local agreements was signed in Moro (in Lautém - a sub-
village of Parlamento north of Los Palos) by the Fretilin Eastern Region (Ponte Leste)
political commissar with the Los Palos-based military district commander (ie, Dandim
1629 - an ABRI lieutenant colonel).

538
Colonel Purwanto participated – but does not appear in photographs. Attendees included: Veríssimo/
Viríssimo Dias Quintão, Bere Malai Laka, Fera Lafaek, Okan Onobú, Lava Koli Mau, Mau Buti, and ABRI
Major Stevanus Gatot Purwantot These meetings are covered in the pamphlet “Fretilin Conquers the Right to
Dialogue” published by Fretilin in 1983 that reports the meetings on 21 and 23 March at “Lari Gutu” in the
Fretilin “military region of Nakroma”. The pamphlet included a colour photograph of Colonel Purwanto and
Xanana Gusmão at “Lari Guto” on the front cover – but this is more likely a photograph taken earlier at
Buburaque.
539
Anderson, B., Djati, A. & Kammen, D.; “Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, Indonesia, 76, Cornell
University, Ithaca, October 2003, p.6. Later, at the end of May 1983, Carrascalão met with Xanana for about
18 hours at Ariana – also related in the “Interview” article. Carrascalão has also stated that the meeting took
place on 28 May 1983 – “Mario Viegas Carrascalao: ‘Saya Bukan Pengkhianat’ ” (I am not a Traitor),
Tempo, Jakarta, 17 September 2001. Detail of the late May 1983 Meeting is in: Kammen, D., “A Tape
Recorder and a Wink?, op.cit., April 2009, pp.73-102.
103

March 1983 – Mau Huno, Bere Malai Laka, Lere Anan Timor
- Falintil “Gatott” camp (Bibileu area, Viqueque)540

In mid-April 1983, General Moerdani – as ABRI Commander, briefly visited East
Timor and met with Governor Mário Carrascalão at Baucau airport on 13 April. Moerdani
reportedly told Carrascalão that Brigadier Soetarto (Kodam Udayana Commander) and
Colonel Purwanto – with any necessary assistance from Governor Carrascalão, would
continue with the peace discussions for a further three months and resolve matters
peacefully.541 However, on Moerdani’s departure, Colonel Purwanto confided to
Carrascalão that Moerdani’s visit had “killed his career”. Eight days after the meeting at the
airport in Baucau (ie on 21 April 1983), Colonel Purwanto reportedly told Governor
Carrascalão: "What I feared most is already happening. The peace process is already being
sabotaged by Captain Prabowo Subianto, son in law of President Soeharto. He was in
Craras542. He came to Timor from Jakarta and left without giving me notice or advising of

540
In March 1983, Mau/Ma’ Huno was Political Commissar of the Central Region (Haksolok); Bere Malai
Laka was Secretary of the Department for Information, Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Region
(Nakroma); and Lere Anan Timor was Political Commissar and Regional Secretary of the Eastern Region
(Funu Sei Nafatin).
541
Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006, pp.195-198.
542
“Craras” – also as “Kraras” is an area about 10 kilometres northwest of Viqueque Town. Prabowo
Subianto – see footnote 451, is cited as being involved in the Kraras Massacre (see footnotes 565 and 566).
The Viqueque District Camat in 1998 (Martinho) claiming that the bodies of the ABRI engineers at Bibileu
were mutilated (“penises cut off and placed in their mouths”) and that “a massacre almost took place” (ie by
ABRI and supporters), “but Prabowo prevented it". As related in Van Klinken, G., “Prabowo and Human
Rights”, Indonesia Magazine, April 2014: “The fact that Prabowo has not been identified by any living
eyewitnesses as having been participating in killing does not mean he was not coordinating it from nearby.”
In response to an article by Aboeprijadi Santoso – “Whatever happened in Kraras, Timor Leste, Pak'
Prabowo?” in the Jakarta Post, 20 December 2013, Prabowo responded in the Jakarta Post on 27
December 2013 in “Letter to the Editor – Prabowo Clarifies”: “For the record, I insist I was nowhere
near the site of the 'Kraras Massacre' that occurred in Viqueque district on Aug. 8, 1983.”
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/27/letter-editor-prabowo-clarifies.html Note however, that
Lieutenant General (Retired) Prabowo Subianto confused the date of the Kraras killings in early-mid
September 1983 with the attack on the ABRI Zipur 3 (Engineer) detachment on 8 August 1983 at
Bibileu led by the Falintil group led by Ular Rihik (see footnotes 556-564).
104

the reasons that brought him here. No civil or military personnel are authorized to enter this
territory without my knowledge. He’s up to something."
During the 1983 ceasefire period, Falintil increased its contact with the remaining
Klandestin in the villages and towns543 and made progress in suborning and recruiting
Hansip members as Klandestin cadre and sympathisers. According to Kopassu Major
Stevanus Gatot Purwanto, ABRI troops met with Falintil in the towns and villages – “we
say hello when we passed each other in the street”.544 According to one writer, armed
Falintil were allowed to visit villages, ABRI helicopters took priests into the mountains to
say mass for the guerrillas, and “there were even football games between the Indonesian
army and guerrilla teams”.545 In Iliomar, there were no ABRI versus Falintil soccer
matches, but guerrillas and soldiers did mix at parties and dances in the Sub-District –
some arranged by the Camat, Zé Roberto Seixas Miranda, and others by the Koramil
commander, Lieutenant Rifai. Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, the Apostolic
Administrator for East Timor, related that “in June, as part of the ceasefire agreement,
Indonesian helicopters were taking food and medicines to guerrillas in the mountains and
bringing their sick and wounded into Dili hospital” – adding that “the people were very
happy with the respite from the war and for the first time in years were able to plant decent
crops”.546 On 29 July, a small Australian parliamentary delegation made a very brief visit
to Iliomar by helicopter and spoke with the UNICEF staff at the food distribution centre. 547
In June 1983, a courier (“estafeta”)548 and Iliomar Klandestin member - Abílio
Quintão Pinto549, travelled from Dili to Lari Guto (via the Catholic training school at
Fatumaca550 south of Baucau) and met with Xanana and his staff for three nights to receive
instructions on the implementation of the ceasefire in Iliomar Sub-District. Abílio Pinto
also brought a new Portuguese-style camouflage uniform for Xanana.551. Before departing
Lari Guto for Dili one week later (again via Fatumaca), Abílio Pinto was instructed by
David Alex552 to take a message back to the Falintil headquarters in Iliomar advising that
they must be prepared for an end to the ceasefire and ready to return to the jungle with little
543
For the formation and activities of Klandestin/Clandestina in Dili, the Central Region and Baucau from
1983, see Pinto C., and Jardine, M., East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle, 1997, pp.95-104. The earlier “Arma
Branca” - Fretilin’s civilian auxiliaries, and “estafeta” (messengers) are also described at p.51. In 1986,
“there was no centralised network for all the different underground groups. Each had its own connections,
with David Alex, with Mau Hodu, with Xanana Gusmão, or other guerrilla fighters in the jungle” – p.98.
544
As related to Gatra journalist, Genot Widjoseno – see Lubis, “It Was A Ruthless Dispute …”, Gatra,
47/IV, 10 October 1998. As noted earlier, as a Lieutenant Colonel, Gatot Purwanto was “honourably
dismissed” from ABRI in February 1992 following the deliberations of the ABRI Honour Council which
investigated the 12 November 1991 “Santa Cruz Massacre” – Purwanto was the intelligence chief in East
Timor in 1991 (ie Asintel Kolakops).
545
Jolliffe, J., Coverup, 2001, p.342. F-FDTL Lieutenant Colonel Aluc Descartes participated in soccer
games with ABRI personnel in Los Palos – discussions with the author, Dili, 4 April 2005.
546
Jolliffe, J. (ed), Timor Newsletter, Vol II, No 3, October 1983, p.6.
547
Morrison, W.L., Official Report …, 154/1983, Canberra, 1983, pp. 47-48. The Delegation noted that “the
population seemed scarce, and the people did not gather together in curiosity to observe the Delegation”.
548
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 5, p.29, footnote + notes that couriers were initially termed “ligacões”,
then “vias de canais” from about 1981 – with the term “estafeta” used from 1986. Couriers carried “mail,
intelligence and goods.”
549
Iliomar CNRM/CNRT Secretary to mid-2001, Iliomar Sub-District Administrator 2003-2008 – see
biographical summary at Annex K.
550
In mid-2003, Xanana Gusmão acknowledged that Father Eligio Locatelli of Fatumaca had played a role in
facilitating the cease-fire and supporting the Resistance – see The Age, Melbourne, 12 July 2003.
551
In meetings with the Indonesians, Xanana did not want to wear an ABRI-pattern camouflage field
uniform, so a Portuguese field uniform was acquired in Dili and “re-tailored” by Maria Branca.
552
David Alex Daitula (David da Costa) was the Falintil Commander of Region II in 1995 – and in 1997 was
reported by ABRI as Commander Region I. He died of wounds on 25 June 1997 following a clash with ABRI
in Watume sub-village, Caibada village – about three kilometres northwest of Baucau.
105

notice. On his return to Iliomar a week later, Abílio passed this message to the senior
Falintil commander in the area, Venâncio Savio, who commanded Falintil military forces
in the Ponte Leste region from his headquarters at Saelarin near Fuat village, and also to
Carlos Correia, the Iliomar Zone Secretary and village chief of Iliomar I. Abílio Pinto then
returned to his studies in Dili.
However, the Fretilin/Falintil leadership soon became concerned that the ceasefire
was becoming more advantageous to the Indonesian military that the Resistance - as
Resistance fighters and supporters became increasingly less committed to the Struggle.
Gusmão also feared an Indonesian military offensive following the Resistance’s rejection
of a late June ultimatum by General Moerdani that Falintil forces surrender.553
Accordingly, Xanana Gusmão ordered a limited “levantamento armada/parcial”
(“armed/limited uprising”) or “pre-emptive attack” against the Indonesian occupation in
Viqueque and Lautém Districts.554 Gusmão later related:
“We had to take the initiative and fixed the 17 August as the date to mark the end of
the ceasefire. From the East to the Centre people were prepared to join the uprising.
This action meant that we broke the ceasefire, but strategically the Indonesians had
already broken it by threatening us. … Tactically we broke the ceasefire but
strategically they broke it.”555

The attacks (were planned to occur in the Viqueque area (in the villages of Bilileo
and Bua Nurak/Ossú) and in Lautém (in the villages of Mehara, Baduru, Serelau, Laikara
and Leuro). In Viqueque District, Ular Rihik (Vírgilio dos Anjos – b. 14/5/1953, d.
6/1/2010) - a former Falintil fighter then commanding an ABRI paramilitary unit556,
received an order from Xanana Gusmão557 to attack a group of ABRI combat engineers (3

553
Niner, S., Xanana – Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly Publishing,
North Melbourne, 2009, pp.98-100.
554
Baptista, M. (F-FDTL Lieutenant Bersama), Falintil History (Draft), December 2005 - and author’s
discussions with ex-Falintil senior F-FDTL commanders in Timor-Leste in 2004/2005. A Portuguese account
relates: “FALINTIL prepared a general drive, counting on the participation of many ((Timorese)) ratih and
hansip members who, during the ceasefire, had been attracted to the cause and integrated in the MIPLIN. …
the three ratih companies were led by Virgílio dos Anjos,(Ular Rihik), Domingos Raul (Falur Rate Laek), and
Domingos Pinto.” - Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na resistência à
ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit., 2014, p.179. Several sources - including the then Governor Mário Carrascalão,
contend however that the attack was precipitated by the rape of a Timorese woman by Indonesian security
force personnel eg see Anderson, B.; Djati, A. & Kammen, D.; “Interview with Mário Carrascalão”,
Indonesia, Issue 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, pp. 9-10. The CAVR Final Report report also
states members of the ABRI Zipur detachment had “molested” (melecehkan) a local woman and “this
prompted a combined Falintil/Hansip attack” - Chapter 3.16, p.105, para 425.
555
Ibid, p.100.
556
A Falintil fighter, Ular Rihik had surrendered to ABRI in March 1979 to ABRI’s 202 Battalion in the
Mount Bibileu area and joined the Ratih forces in 1981. Ular Rihik’s unit was the special “Titus” platoon of
the Railakan Ratih company commanded by Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raúl) – a former Falintil fighter who
had surrendered to ABRI in 1980. Concurrently, Ular was also secretly the commander of the Falintil
“Miplin” battalion, and Falur was commander of its 2nd Company (author’s discussions with Falur in Dili, 8
April 2005). 19 of Ular’s men were involved in the attack. Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …,
1984, p. 140 suggests there were 86 Ratih deserters involved. Ular had surrendered to ABRI in 1979. He
became Falintil Commander Region IV 1998-1999 - and as Major Ular was the F-FDTL Chief of Personnel
in the period 2001-2008. Ular’s father, Celestino dos Anjos, had served with the Australian military’s “Z
Special Unit” in Portuguese Timor during World War II – and was the only Timorese to be decorated ie
awarded the Loyal Service Medallion.
557
According to Ular Rihik, Xanana Gusmão’s order for the “levantamento” was passed from Mau Hodu
(José Amancio da Costa – see footnote 671) to Lu’ Olo (Francisco Guterres - who became Fretilin Secretary
in 1999 and President of the National Parliament until mid-2007) – and then to Ular who received the order in
Bibileo on 1 August (author’s discussions with Major Ular Rihik, Dili, 3 August 2005). Ular also later cited
106

Zipur) in Bibileo village about 15 kilometres northwest of Viqueque town558. Ular’s unit
attacked on 8 August 1983 reportedly killing 16 ABRI engineers and a psychological
warfare major.559 Deceived by a local celebration, the Indonesian soldiers did not have
access to their weapons – and the two posts were overrun in ten minutes.560 The other
attacks against Indonesian positions were planned for 8 August in Viqueque District
including: an attack on Viqueque Town and Nareka at 1700 hrs, and at Ossú Lakimata/Bua
Nurak by Falur’s (Domingos Raúl – b. 9/7/1955) Ratih element, and Uaibobo at 1800
hrs.561 However, of those planned attacks, only the attack against Uaibobo led by António
Sagata (Sukarno) took place. Ular and his deserting Ratih paramilitaries joined Falintil’s 4th
Company commanded by Fera Lafaek (António da Silva de Carvalho) and subsequently
operated in the Waimori/Venilale/ Manatuto area. On 10 August, Falur defected to Falintil
with his Ratih company (second in command Roque Soares Baptista – Sai La Fila562) –
comprising 96 personnel with 79 weapons, and joined Falintil’s 3rd Company led by Rosas
Ko’o Susu (Ko’or Suu) Henriques563, and the group moved to the Aitana/Baucau area.
The attack on the ABRI engineers at Bibileu by Ular’s group was included in the
1993 criminal indictment by the Indonesians against Xanana Gusmão – who had been
captured in Dili on 20 November 1992, as follows:
“In August 1983, an attack on a combat engineer unit in the village of Klaras (sic)
was led by Ologari, Mau Kalo, David Alex, Taur Matan Ruak, Vera Lafaek, Mau
Hudu and Kilik that resulted in a section of the combat engineer battalion being
killed, 17 SP-1 rifles seized and an armed platoon of Hansip captured.”564

Other influences precipitating an end to the ceasefire reportedly included General
Moerdani’s 8 August announcement of forthcoming “clean-up” operations and Falintil’s 10
August attack on the military section of Dili airport – but these “post-date” Ular’s attack on

receiving Gusmão’s “letter” on 1 August – and advice that the levantamento was to begin on 8 August – see
Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview: Comandante Ular Rihik/Virgílio dos Anjos, Dili, 16
October 2009, p.21.
558
This “old” Bibileo village is about five kilometres further north than the present-day Bibileo village.
559
As related in Jornal das FDTL, 1 December 2001 - also reported as 16 ABRI engineers killed in The New
York Times of 19 July 1985. Falur Rate Laek states 16 ABRI engineers were killed – and an “intelligence
major” (discussion with author, Dili, 8 April 2005). The ABRI/TNI Monumen Operasi Seroja memorial at
Cilangkap (Jakarta) lists the names of 17 ABRI personnel of 3 Zipur who died in combat in East Timor in
1983 (this represented 19.7 percent of declared ABRI casualties for 1983). The F-FDTL “Jornal” item also
indicates Indonesian reprisals began on 7 September 1983. Ular Rihik described the attack in a letter to
Captain (Retd) A.D. Stevenson dated 2 March 1984 - Arkivu ho Muzeu, Dili (Document 05002.004.02); and
in interviews with: Jill Jolliffe – see Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.307-323; and in mid-October 2009
with Zelda Grimshaw – see Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview …, 16 October 2009, op.cit.,
pp.21-23.
560
Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview …, 16 October 2009, op.cit., p.22. According to Ular
Rihik, there were no Timorese casualties.
561
Author’s discussions with Domingos Raúl - nom de guerre “Falur Rate Laek”, Dili, 8 April 2005 and
Dignazito Mesak Ximenes Belo (“Mau Mesak Buanurak”), Baucau, 23 October 2008. According to Falur, at
the time, the Falintil structure was: 1 Company (Los Palos) led by Falo Chai; 2nd Company (Matabean) -
David Alex; 3 Company (Viqueque) - Rosas Ko’or Suu; 4 Company (Baucau area) - Fera Lafaek; 5 Company
(Same area), - Comandante Mer; and 6 Company (western border area) -Venâncio Ferraz (Feras).
562
Discussions with Roque Soares Baptista – Falintil nom de guerre “Sai La Fila”, Dili, 27 June and 2 July
2007. Roque Baptista, of Caraubalo village (Viqueque) was Adjunto Politico of Região II in 1999.
563
José Rojas/Rosas (Ko’o Susu) Henriques was killed by ABRI on 6 March of 6 August 1987. His widow is
Bi Lou Mali (Domingas Alves da Silva) – a senior leader of the Fretilin women’s group (OPMT) and a
member of the Fretilin Central Committee. In 2016, she was a member of the Superior Council of Defence
and Security.
564
Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara …, 25 January 1993, para 9.1, pp.6-7.
107

the ABRI Zipur element at Bibileo on 8 August. Apparently in reprisal, in late August or
September, ABRI killed 200-300 villagers in the Kraras area565 – which became known as
the “village of widows”, and the massacre was widely reported.566
In Iliomar, the ceasefire was broken on Sunday 8 August 1983 when Hansip
members killed two Falintil during a “kontak damai” (peaceful contact) meeting at
Hamabere (on Dirilofor Hill, just north of Caentau sub-village). Four Hansip (José
Madeira, Adão Cabral, Mateus Baros, Julião Teles) met with the two Falintil (Venâncio
Savio, previously of Cacaven village – the leader; and Amilcar/Amilgar Rodrigues,
previously of Vatamatar sub-village) at a buffalo pen at Hamabere at about 1400 hrs. The
two Falintil proposed that the Iliomar Hansip join in an attack on ABRI in Iliomar on the
following evening - to be led by the local Falintil commander Armando Nolasco (nom de
guerre “Koro Asu”).567 Fearful of repercussions if such an attack was undertaken, the
Hansip leader, José Madeira568 – reportedly without higher direction, shot and killed
Venâncio; and Julião Teles shot and killed Amilcar. After their bodies were brought to the
Koramil 03 headquarters, the villagers were summoned to the headquarters and a series of
arrests began – including the arrest of all six village heads in Iliomar.569
The Resistance undertook other actions across Lautém District on 9 August - with
the largest occurred at Mehara village, 30 kilometres east of Los Palos. The “raja” of
Mehara, Miguel dos Santos, led all the villagers into the forest – reportedly taking with
them 78 Hansip weapons and also weapons from the police - including a Brimob machine
gun. These events were followed by large-scale ABRI reprisals in the Mehara area,
principally by ABRI’s Yonif 641, Yonif 100 and Kopassus troops.570 In Leuro village, 10
565
Kraras is an area about 10 kilometres southwest of Viqueque town, not a specific location – sometimes
spelt “Craras” (Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006 – see footnote 542).
566
In 2008, the Timor-Leste Parliament established 17 September as a national holiday to commemorate the
“Kraras Massacre” – Radio and Televizasaun Timor-Leste, 16 September 2008. For accounts of Kraras, see:
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, p.140; Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991,
p.102, 142, 147; and in Lubis, B., “It Was A Ruthless Dispute …”, Gatra, 47/IV of 10 October 1998. Jolliffe,
J., Coverup, 2001, op.cit., pp. 286-301 and Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.307-323 provide
comprehensive accounts of the Kraras massacres and cite the killings of 181 unarmed civilians as occurring at
several sites - principally: Be-Lui (7 September) and Tahu Bein (12 September). The then Governor of East
Timor, Mário Carrascalão provides detail on the killings in Anderson, B. ; Djati, A. & Kammen, D.,
“Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, Indonesia, 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, pp. 9-10; and
Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, 2006, pp.226-235. Ular (see footnote 556) related the attack on
the ABRI engineers on 8 August 1983 and the subsequent Indonesian reprisals in a letter (dated 2 March
1984) to the retired Australian Army officer, Captain A. D. Stevenson – who had been his father’s Z Special
Unit commander in World War II. In that letter, Ular referred to the death of an ABRI Major “Sukiarjo” on 8
August – and the actions of Falur on 11 August 1983 (see Document 05002.004.002, Arkivu ho Muzeu
Rezistensia, Dili.). At the time of writing in March 1984, Ular described his Falintil position as the “2ic of A
Company of the 4th Unit of the 2nd Red Brigade”.
567
According to Ular Rihik, the levantamento was to being with a Falintil attack at Iliomar at 3pm on 8
August 1983 – “But on the 7th someone betrayed them to the Indonesians, and the Indonesians attacked them
first. The messenger contacted the wrong person, and he informed the Indonesians.” - Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar,
R. – translator), Interview …, 16 October 2009, op.cit., p.21.
568
José Madeira was also an Indonesian public servant (pegawai negeri sipil – PNS) at this time. Adão
Fernandes Cabral became an Indonesian public servant - and was subsequently murdered - by persons
unknown, in Luro on 11 September 1995 while serving as the head of Luro Sub-District (ie Camat). Cabral
had opposed the building of a mosque in Luro and had vigorously defended his stance against the local
military and police authorities. Julião Teles was killed at Tirilolo village during the Falintil attack on Iliomar
on 8 January 1985. Mateus Barros lived in Dili (2004), and José Madeira lived in Iliomar I until his death by
disease in June 2002.
569
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 544 notes that all the village chiefs had been in contact
with Fretilin/Falintil during the ceasefire period.
570
See Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 542, 551-554, Table 22 (p.179). Ten (or 33) Hansip
from Mehara reportedly defected to Falintil on 8 August 1983.
108

kilometres south-west of Los Palos, the ABRI Babinsa were disarmed by a group led by
Rangkabian (Fernando) - a local Falintil platoon commander, and three weapons were
taken into the jungle; and in Laleno village, about 20 kilometres north-west of Los Palos,
where over 30 weapons were seized from Hansip and taken into the jungle by villagers. In
Serelau, Laikara and Baduru villages (in Moro Sub-District about 15 kilometres northwest
of Los Palos) Raja Edmundo reportedly also led villagers who joined Falintil in the forest.
Many Iliomar people believe that the killings of the two Falintil at Hamabere in
Iliomar on 8 August caused the breakdown of the Province-wide ceasefire. However, as
noted above, the Iliomar incident was only part of a broader Resistance plan to abandon the
ceasefire - ie levantamento armada/parcial, with attacks across both Viqueque and Lautém
Districts.571
With the failure of the ceasefire572, “command and control” of ABRI units in East
Timor by Korem 164 was returned to ABRI Headquarters in Jakarta who formed
Koopskam (Komando Operasi Keamanan – Security Operations Command) to manage
operations in the Province.573 Subsequently, ABRI’s Operasi Persatuan (Operation Unity)
- launched in August 1983, resulted in further Falintil casualties and surrenders574. Falintil
surrenders were usually negotiated beforehand through village heads or family members.
However, many of the ABRI promises of rewards were not met and, following a “grace”
period, the Falintil returnees were often discriminated against and abused.575

THE “HANSIP KILLINGS”

In Iliomar, by late 1983, the local Falintil unit led by Serasa (Orlando Jerónimo)
had been reduced to only seven members. Following the breakdown of the ceasefire, ABRI
moved against Klandestin cadre in the Iliomar’s resettlement area, and 25-30 suspected
Klandestin were imprisoned in the small jail (termed “Comarca” in Tetum) at the Iliomar
571
Some sources contend however that ABRI “unilaterally” broke the ceasefire and/or conducted “bad faith”
violations of the ceasefire - while others suggest that Ular’s attack on the Zipur 3 camp at Bibileu was
precipitated by ABRI molestation of local women – see the preceding footnote 554,
572
An ABRI/TNI perspective on the failure of the 1983 Ceasefire is related in Syahnakri, K., Lieutenant
General (Retd), Timor Timur: The Untold Story, Kompas, Jakarta. 2013 - The Failed Dialogue (Dialog yang
Gagal), pp.110-115. For Major General Kiki Syahnakri as the TNI martial law administrator in East Timor in
1999, see also footnote 725.
573
Koopskam was replaced by Kolakops (Komando Pelaksana Operasi – Operations Implementation
Command) in October 1989 with regional command and control returned by Jakarta to Kodam IX/Udayana in
Bali – see footnotes 651 and 652.
574
An “amnesty” was first announced by President Soeharto on 17 August 1977. Villagers colloquially
termed surrendering by Falintil as “turun” - ie Bahasa “to come down”. Those who surrendered were pressed
for information about Falintil, and ABRI officers have commented that many readily assisted the Indonesian
security forces – see also ABRI Instruction “System of Security …”, Document 2 in Budiardjo C. and Liem
Soei Liong, The War…, 1984, p.195 noting Falintil “motives prove to be very shallow because once they are
captured and given the chance to live, the very same day they will start opposing the GPK or their comrades
still in the bush”. Kopassus claimed to be able to “turn” a Falintil prisoner in three hours – see Conboy, K.,
Kopassus, 2003, p. 310. Apart from Alarico Fernandes, several other prominent Fretilin cadre surrendered
and assisted ABRI eg Lari Sina (Abel Freitas Ximenes) and Olo Kasa (Lino Monteiro) in early 1979 – see
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.59.
575
ABRI instructions for the interrogation of Resistance members who had surrendered or had been captured
were detailed in Prosudur Tetap (Standing Procedures) PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982 issued by Korem 164 (Dili)
in July 1982. These instructions directed that interrogators were not to use violence or threats – “except in
certain situations where the subject under interrogation has difficulty telling the truth (being evasive)”, p.5. If
violence was used, care was to be taken that such remained secret ie out-of-sight, no photographs etc. This
PROTAP, in Bahasa, can be found at website of the Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili, within Document
06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 – Bakau Timtim, Baurah”).
109

Primary School – although classes continued. Those imprisoned – included Zé Roberto
Seixas Miranda (the Camat/Sub-District Chief), Américo Jerónimo (Village Chief,
Ailebere)576, Fernando da Costa (a public servant), and Gaspar Pinto (Iliomar II).577 The
Toko Cina building was also used by ABRI as a shorter term, and harsher, prison and
interrogation centre.578
ABRI began a concerted campaign to eliminate the Klandestin in Iliomar –
particularly among Hansip members, using “Indonesia-loyal” Hansip members as their
action arm. On 9 September, Hansip member Filomeno da Gama (34 years), who
reportedly worked in the Camat’s office, was shot and killed near the Iliomar Primary
School by a fellow Hansip on the orders of their Hansip platoon commander579. On 3
October, an Iliomar Hansip member, Lourenço Marques, who had fled to the forest,
returned to Iliomar. He was arrested and, under torture, reportedly admitted the names of
other Hansip who had assisted Falintil. In the period 10-13 October, 15 of the Iliomar
Hansip/Ratih were arrested:580

On 10 October: Marcos Fernandes, Manuel Victor, Joaquim Fernandes, Joaquim
Manuel, José da Costa, Domingo Cunha, Telu-Lara, Januario Monteiro and
Leopoldo Fernandes.
On 13 October: António de Oliveira, Pedro dos Santos, Mário Pinto, Orlando
Mendes, José Eurico and António da Silva.

On 27 October, Zé Roberto Seixas Miranda, Américo Jerónimo and Fernando da
Costa were transferred from the prison in the Iliomar Primary School to Dili and
subsequently tried in Dili as Klandestin members. Roberto was charged with assisting
Falintil before the ceasefire, plotting to kill the Hansip commander and his deputy, and
acting as a conduit to Falintil after the ceasefire.581 Roberto received a sentence of 12
years, while Américo and Fernando each received seven years. Gaspar da Costa Pinto of
Iliomar II was also subsequently arrested, and after a trial was sentenced to six years jail in
Cipinang (Jakarta). These were the only trials noted of Iliomar Klandestin – held due to
their important positions ie, Roberto had been the Iliomar Camat (1982-83) and Américo
Jerónimo was the village chief of Ailebere. Roberto Seixas Miranda was also well-known

576
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, footnote to p.153 notes that Américo da Sousa Jerónimo, a Fretilin member,
was detained on 17 October 1983.
577
Chrystello, C. J., Timor Leste: Historiografia dum Repórter – Vol 2 (1983-1992), eBooksBrásil, Açores,
October 2005, pp. 111-112 also notes the imprisonment of Fernando da Costa (26 years) sentenced to seven
years; José Roberto Seixas (36 years), 12 years; and Américo Sousa Jerónimo (36 years), seven years.
578
A listing of Iliomar villagers reportedly arrested – numbering 76 and beginning in “November”, is
included in Gusmão, K.R.X. (O Comandante-em-Chefe das Falintil), Mensagem de Saudação, HQ CRRN –
Timor-Leste, Fretilin – Representação Externa - Lisboa, 2 January 1985, pp.26-29 – this includes “Roberto
Madeira (37) – Camat” and “Américo Jerónimo (32)”. This listing however, is probably excessive as it does
not conform to Iliomar village reports submitted to the CAVR.
579
By Domingos Pinto on the orders of his Hansip commander - José Madeira. Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.4, para 480 relates that Filomeno da Gama was tortured for information on the Hansip Klandestin
before being killed. Iliomar elders also suggested that the killing of Filomeno had been ordered by Hansip
member Adão Cabral, and that the death of Filomeno allowed Jaime de Costa to become the Iliomar Camat.
580
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 481 and footnote to p.149 lists those arrested. Para 478
indicates that those arrested were taken to the Lautém ABRI Kodim 1629 for investigation.
581
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.6, para 43, 68 and 86. The footnote at p.8 also notes that the
following - who attended meetings with Roberto and Falintil, were “killed or disappeared”: Francisco Serpa
Rosa, Manuel Jerónimo, Manuel da Costa and Filomeno da Gama.
110

to Governor Mário Carrascalão, to the Apostolic Administrator in Dili, and to the
International Red Cross.582
On 28 October, Francisco Serpa Rosa (Leilor sub-village chief) was arrested –
followed by the arrests of Fernando da Costa on 31 October583 and Manuel da Costa on 3
November. These villagers from Ailebere had been intermediaries between the authorities
and Falintil during the ceasefire period. They were taken to the Koramil headquarters and
tortured by Hansip (Adão Fernandes Cabral, Valente Madeira, José Madeira Magno).
Afterwards, Francisco Serpa Rosa and Manuel da Costa were taken to the Yonif 315 base
at Hilari (Caenliu) and killed.
In November 1983, Hansip members Carlos da Costa (45 years, Ara Ara sub-
village), Luís Lopes (30, Iliomar) and Ernesto Madeira (31, Ara Ara) were killed by Hansip
at Dirilofo on the road from Iliomar I to Iradarate - again, on the orders of the Hansip
platoon commander, José Madeira.584 On 3 December, Belmonte Jerónimo (45 years), the
deputy chief of Iliomar sub-village, was killed as a suspected Klandestin – he was
bludgeoned to death by three women detainees at ABRI direction in the presence of the
Koramil commander.585 On 4 December, Joachim dos Santos (25, Ossohira sub-village)
was killed by Hansip in Tirilolo village, and Fernando dos Santos (20, Ossohira sub-
village) was killed by Hansip in Vatamatar sub-village of Ailebere.
On 5 December, Gabriel da Costa and five friends attended a flag-raising ceremony
at the Iliomar Sub-District headquarters. Soon after they were arrested – accused of “being
two-faced and opposing the Indonesian Government”, and imprisoned in the Iliomar
primary school Comarca.586 A week later, on 12 December, all the village and sub-village
heads were invited to a meeting at the primary school – and 20 people were arrested,
imprisoned and interrogated.587
On 9 December 1983, Marcelino Hornay (24 years, Cainliu village) was killed. On
14 December, Paulo Fernandes (39 years, Cainliu) and his wife Margarida Fernandes (35
years) were killed as suspected Klandestin by Hansip on the northern edge of Titiraven
sub-village at Suamutur. Margarida was stripped and tortured - then family members were
forced to beat both Paulo and Maragrida to death. During these two killings, the Hansip
members were overwatched by troops from the Iliomar-based ABRI territorial unit.588 On
22 December, Hansip members killed fellow Hansip Martinho Monteiro (26 years, Cainliu)
and Humberto da Cruz (45 years, Cainliu) at Cainalor (Cainliu village) – and, on the same

582
Roberto Seixas Miranda served over eight years in Cipinang prison in Jakarta – and now lives in Portugal.
Chega !, CAVR Final Report relates that, in Dili, he was not passed by ABRI into police custody for trial
until 23 March 1984 – see Chapter 7.2, footnote 601 and Chapter 7.6, footnote to p.8, para 68. Américo
Jerónimo was also imprisoned in Cipinang, and later in Dili. He was released from Dili’s Becora prison on 17
August 1989, and was re-elected village chief of Ailebere in 2000.
583
Note that Fernando da Costa is also reported as having been arrested earlier and transferred to Dili on 27
October 1983.
584
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 480 indicates that Erminio Pinto was also arrested at about
this time.
585
The killing of Belmonte Jerónimo is related by one of the detained women in Chega !,CAVR Report,
Chapter 7.2, para 546.
586
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 494 – indicates that the Iliomar representative to the
Lautém DPRD II (regional parliament) - Afonso Pinto, was involved in these arrests.
587
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 495 relates that nine of these detainees were reportedly
killed on 22 December – see the following paragraphs; and the remainder were imprisoned for a further three
months after which they were required to report daily to the Koramil.
588
The killing of Paulo and Margarida are related in the Cainliu village report p.9 (repeated in Chega !,
CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 548) which also notes that their seven month-old daughter, Carsolita,
subsequently died from lack of milk.
111

day, killed Américo Cipriano (28 years, Cainliu)589 and Venâncio da Costa (25 years,
Cainliu). Américo and Venâncio were initially attacked on the road just north of the
present-day Junior High School, taken to the Koramil headquarters for questioning – then
returned to the scene of the original attack and killed.590
Also on 22 December 1983, four suspected Klandestin: Carlos Correia (35 years) -
village chief of Iliomar I; Joachim Sanches (54) - a catechist and sub-village chief of Ara
Ara; José Anunciação (40, Iliomar); and António Jerónimo (35, Ossohira – a member of
the village staff) were taken from the prison to Caentau sub-village of Iliomar I where
relatives were forced to beat them to death – under the supervision of Hansip at the
direction of the Iliomar-based Kopassandha. The four had been imprisoned in the Toko
Cina for several weeks – Carlos Correia was the Fretilin Secretary of Iliomar Zone (a
position not filled after his death until the return of Abílio Quintão Pinto from Dili in
1988). Lieutenant Darmuhadi was the senior member of the Kopassandha Chandrasa591
team in Iliomar, but was not present at the Caentau killing site – but Hansip platoon
commander José Madeira was present.592 The killings at Caentau – and similar killings at
Maupitine593 east of Los Palos, were cited by Bishop Carlos Belo in an 18 February 1984
letter to his predecessor Monsignor Martinho Lopes:

“in Maupitini (Los Palos) and Iliomar, popular judgements were held, that is: those
accused of contact with those people in the bush were murdered in front of the
assembled people, with daggers, knives and sticks, by their own families … And
the Indonesians laugh contentedly, rubbing their hands, saying they are not to blame
…”.594

Following the Caentau killings, 15 villagers of Iliomar I were arrested and tortured:
Matias da Costa, Dinis Lopes, Herminio Pinto, Domingos Pinto, and Mateus dos Santos
from Iliomar sub-village; Justino Amaral, Ricardo de Araújo, Gabriel da Costa, António
Gonçalves, and António Ferreira from Caentau; Francisco Rosa and José da Costa from
Osso-Ira; and Luís da Costa, António Amaral and Humberto da Costa from Ara Ara.
Subsequently, the families of those arrested were also abused including Amelia da Costa,
Odete Ximenes, Amelia Ximenes, Berta da Costa, Luciana Hornay, Amelia Correia, Júlio
Monteiro, Leopoldo da Costa and Domingas Lourdes of Iliomar sub-village; Felisberta
Madeira, Fernando de Sousa, Raúl José, Joanina de Sousa, Rosalina Monteiro of Ara Ara;
Maria Jerónimo, Lucinda Jerónimo, Melina da Costa, Balbina da Costa, Maria de Fatima,
and Fernando de Sousa of Ossohira; Florinda da Costa, Olinda Amaral, Adelina Pinto and

589
According to the Cainliu village report, p.9, three ABRI soldiers forced the villagers to disinter Américo
Cipriano’s body, remove the heart, then cook the heart and eat it.
590
Additionally, according to the Cainliu village report p.8, nine Cainliu villagers were sentenced to one-year
imprisonment by Koramil 03: Igino Amaral (31 years), Lourenço Amaral (32 years), Celestino Vieira (30
years), Sebastiao da Costa (38 years), Fernando Incarnacao (40 years), Libario da Costa (39 years), Rosalina
Monteiro (25 years), Veronica Ferreira (35 years) and Berta de Jesus (30 years) – with a further 15 villagers
sentenced to “village restrictions”.
591
In March 1983, the codename of Kopassandha teams changed from Nanggala to Chandrasa (also as
Candraca/Candrasa) - both names of mythical weapons in Hindu epics ie: Nanggala = spear; Chandrasa =
axe) – Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p.300. The codename reverted to Nanggala in the 1990s; and Tribuana
(“three worlds”) teams were later added.
592
Apolonario Anunciação - brother of José Anunciação, was a witness to this incident - as was Afonso Pinto
who subsequently became “Iliomar’s” DPRD II member in Los Palos.
593
Five village principals were killed publicly in Maupitine village (11 kilometres east of Los Palos) on 25
November 1983 – see Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, p.183-184. These are probably the
“Maupitili” killings of August 1983 noted in Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.103.
594
As reported in Timor Newsletter, Vol II, No 4, August 1984, p.7.
112

Berta Pinto of Caentau; and Juliana da Costa and José Pinto of Vatamatar. Also in Iliomar
in late 1983, Claudio Ferreira (28, Ara Ara sub-village) was arrested as a suspected
Klandestin, taken from Iliomar in an ABRI helicopter, and was not seen again.595

FALINTIL - THE ATTEMPTED PUTSCH OF 1984

According to Xanana Gusmão, following the end of the ceasefire in August 1983,
Falintil’s military initiative declined with “a complete lack of operations” by it companies,
and the Resistance suffered further heavy losses of fighters – attributed to the
“irresponsibility and inaptitude (sic)” of the Falintil General Staff then located in the
Central Region.596
An Indonesian source597 contends that in April 1984, Xanana Gusmão re-organised
the Falintil “military sectors” and appointed: Kilik, Ologari and Mauk Moruk as company
commanders; Lere as a unit commander; Mau Hudo (sic) as Political Assistant and Mau
Huno as Military Assistant. According to that document, Falintil was re-organised into
seven companies: I Company - led by “Falucai”, Los Palos/Lautém Regency; II Company
– David Alex, southeast of Baucau; III Company – Calisa, southwest of Baucau; IV
Company – Vera Lafaek, Manututo Regency; V Company – Besi Taur, Manufahi Regency;
VI Company – Ferras, Ainaro Regency; VII Company – Sala, Leadership Security and
Logistics. Falintil records indicate that the April 1984 re-organisation resulted in four
battalion-equivalent “Unidade” numbered I to IV (each with two subordinate companies)
and two “autonomous” companies ie in “Ponta Leste” and “Fronteira”.598
In early 1984, several senior officers of the Falintil General Staff reportedly
attempted to incite their troops to “revolt against the Superior Command of the Struggle”,
ie Xanana Gusmão’s leadership - but this was unsuccessful.599 This “attempted coup” by
the leading “party hardliners” was reportedly led by Kilik Wae Gae (Reinaldo Correia
Freitas Belo), Mauk Moruk (Paulino Gama) and Ologari (Adelino Sarmento) who opposed
Gusmão’s more moderate and inclusive nationalist platform - ie the “National Unity
Policy”, and the removal of “Marxist-Leninism” from the political policy and the title of
the Fretilin party. Xanana Gusmão claims however that “the dispute was not really about
politics or ideology”, but his decision to change the military strategy.600

595
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, Table 21 provides a listing of 28 “Individuals executed in
Iliomar, 1983-1984, as reported to CAVR”. The CAVR list includes seven men from Iliomar I village killed
in 1983: Amilcar dos Santos (34 years), Ernesto dos Santos (35), Mateus Pinto (48), Alfredo Pinto (51), João
Ruas (30), Raimundo Pinto (56) and António da Costa (34) – who are not included in the Iliomar I village
report.
596
Gusmão, X., “Message to the Nation … Falintil Day”, 20 August 2003.
597
Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara Tindak Pidana Umum, José Alexandre Gusmao (alias
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, alias Xanana Gusmao), Kejaksaan Negeri Dili, Dili, 25 January 1993, pp.9-8.
The accuracy of the detail in this Indonesian report is uncertain as its primary sources are believed to be
surrendered/captured Falintil personnel.
598
See the organograam and map at pp.184-185 in Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta
armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit., 2014.
599
See Niner, S., Xanana - Leader of the Struggle for an Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly
Publishing, North Melbourne, 2009, pp.104-107. Xanana Gusmão has referred to this recalcitrant group as the
“CC Hudi Laran” (“Banana Field Central Committee”) “which refused to accept the political changes which,
in our view, better suited our Resistance movement.” – Gusmão, X., President of the Republic’s Message to
Fretilin, Dili, 22 June 2006.
600
See Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 396 and Part 5, para 119-124. Fretilin had been retitled Party
Marxist-Lenist Fretilin in March 1981
113

Falur601, a Falintil unit commander, reportedly disarmed the bodyguards of the Kilik
Wae Gae, Mauk Muruk and Ologari.602 Soon after, according to Xanana Gusmão, they
were removed from their positions: “Mauk Moruk603 - who was the Deputy Chief of Staff
and First Commander of the Brigade, removed himself and surrendered with weapons and
ammunitions. Olo Gari - the Second Commander of the Brigade, was reportedly asked to
remain active in Falintil, but he declined the invitation and withdrew from the Organização
until, a later time, when he was ill, he went to reside in the villages, and Kilik - who was
previously the Chief of Staff, ((was)) killed in one of the combats between the guerrillas
and the enemy.” 604
The attempted coup - and the aftermath, particularly the death of Kilik Wae Gae,
remain sensitive issues.605

INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION CONSOLIDATED

From 1983 until 1989, although some minor support continued to be provided to
Falintil by villagers, the Klandestin/Clandestina movement in Iliomar had no active
organisation and was of limited effectiveness. By the mid-1980s, the Indonesian
government and military structure in Iliomar had been consolidated, and the Indonesian
national identity card - the “KTP” (“Kartu Tanda Penduduk”), was issued to all East
Timorese over 16 years. The civil administration in Iliomar comprised a Sub-District Chief

601
Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raúl) – see footnotes 554, 556, 559, 561 and 566, was subsequently a Falintil
Region Commander and served as the commander of the F-FDTL’s First Battalion (1 BIL) in the period
2001-2007 (replaced by Major Mau Buti).
602
Author’s discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant Colonel Falur Rate Laek, 8 April 2005.
603
Mauk Muruk Ran Nakali Lemori Teki Timor (also as Mauk Morok Ran Nakaly Lemoray Teky – ie
Paulino Gama) surrendered to ABRI on 24 January 1985. In October 1985, Mauk Moruk – under ABRI
direction, spoke to the assembled Iliomar villagers on the Iliomar soccer field in support of the Indonesian
occupation – claiming that Falintil was “finished” and that further resistance was futile. He was imprisoned
for four years in Jakarta, before reportedly “escaping” via Thailand to Europe in 1990, and now lives in
Holland – see Gama, P. in Carey, P. and Bentley G. (eds), 1995, p.103. Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do
Futuro, 2006, pp.254-256 also discusses Mauk Moruk. Mauk Moruk has also written critically of Fretilin
excesses in the mid-late 1970s eg Paulino Gama’s email: “List of Fretilin War Crimes” ie Gama, P., “Daftar
Kejahatan …”, 13 July 2001. Cornélio Gama (“Elle 7/Sette”) is Paulino’s brother – see footnote 754.
604
Gusmão, X., “Message to the Nation … Falintil Day”, 20 August 2003. According to a recent Portuguese
account, Kilik was killed in “Unidade II” (ie south-west of Baucau) during an Indonesian attack. - Lousada,
A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit.,
2014, p.185. In the early 1980s, Kilik Wae Gae (Reinaldo Correia Frietas Belo) and Mauk Moruk (Paulino
Gama), who represented the Marxist-Leninist wing of Fretilin, were purged - see Paulino Gama, “The War in
the Hills - 1975-85: A Fretilin Commander Remembers”, pp.97-105 in Carey, P. and Bentley, G.C. (eds),
East Timor at the Crossroads, 1995. Also, see Paulino Gama’s (Mauk Muruk) email of 13 July 2001 - “Daftar
Kejahatan …” which cites the ordering of the execution of Kilik Wae Gae (also as “Waigae”) - the Falintil
Chief of Staff, in Vemasse on 24 September 1984 by Xanana Gusmão and other Falintil leaders. Kilik’s
widow, Ilda Maria da Conceição (nome de guerre, Wairahe), was a Falintil/OMT leader, captured by ABRI in
1986 and imprisoned for two years in the Flamboyant hotel complex in Baucau. In 2001-6, she was the Vice-
Minister for Internal Administration. Olo Gari/Ologari Aswain (Adelino Sarmento) - reportedly ill, became
an “isolado” in the Waiule area of Venilale, and surrendered to ABRI in the Baucau area in the mid-1980s.
Ologari became a principal in the CPD-RDTL political group in 1999 – and a vocal critic of the Timor-Leste
Government’s defence and veterans’ policies. ((Mau Hodu reportedly may have revealed the “plot” to
Xanana Gusmão)). Mauk Moruk returned to Timor-Leste from The Netherlands in 2013, and continued to
challenge Xanana Gusmao’s role in the “1984 Putsch” – publicly debating Gusmao on 11 November 2013.
Mau Moruk formed a political paramilitary movement – the Maubere Revolutionary Movement, and was
killed in a clash with security forces on 8 August 2015.
605
Vitorino Borges, “Figura: Bi-Soi: Xanana Libertador, Laos Asasinadu”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 15
September 2007. Bi-Soi was the nickname of Maria Rosa da Câmara – a Falintil klandestin and guerilla.
114

(“Camat” – see a listing at Annex C) and a number of public servants – almost all East
Timorese, occupying a “Kecamatan” (Sub-District) office in Iliomar Town.
Military management, ie including police, was undertaken by the Sub-District
military headquarters – ie, the Koramil 2903 office which directly controlled a Hansip
company of two Hansip platoons, and a Babinsa (Badan Bintara Desa – ABRI village
sergeant) for each of the six villages in the Sub-District. The largest military unit stationed
in Iliomar was a company of the Los Palos-headquartered ABRI territorial infantry
battalion (termed “BTT” – “batalyon teritorial”) that served a tour in East Timor of nine-
twelve months (a list of BTTs known to have served in Iliomar is at Annex E). In Iliomar,
the BTT sub-unit – of about company strength, was headquartered in the former Portuguese
administrative buildings in Iliomar Town and had up to 10 outposts across the Sub-District.
For major operations in the Sub-District, the BTT was joined by other units from Los
Palos, including elements of the territorial “organik” “Timorese” battalion, Yonif 745 (see
Annex E for notes on Yonif 745) - and occasionally also by ABRI elements from other
Districts. Significant multi-unit ABRI operations were directed by the ABRI Sektor A
Headquarters located at Baucau (Cakung) airfield - 6 ½ kilometres west of Baucau Town,
which commanded all major field operations in the eastern half of the Province. A
Kopassandha Nanggala/Chandraca detachment of up to 8 soldiers was also based in
Iliomar and conducted intelligence gathering, including interrogations, and other covert
activities. From 1986, Kopassandha/Kopassus detachments in Lautém were increasingly
assisted by locally-recruited “partisans”, mostly ex-Falintil, in a unit known as “Tim Alfa”
(Team Alpha)606. In Iliomar, 8-10 local Team Alpha members assisted Kopassandha/
Kopassus in intelligence gathering and also participated in field operations. The Indonesian
police presence in Iliomar - with a strength of about 20, was centred on the Police Sector
(Polsek) headquarters opposite the Junior High School. About half of these police were
locally-recruited Kamra (Keamanan Rakyat) security auxiliaries who wore police
uniforms, but were unarmed; and a Bimpolda corporal or sergeant for each village. The
Bimpolda (“Bimbingan Masyarakat Polisi Daerah” – “Regional Police for People’s
Guidance/ Development”) did not live in the villages, but in the Polsek accommodation.
Separate from the civil police, a detachment of the more heavily-armed paramilitary
Brimob field police was also based in Iliomar Town with barracks near the Sub-District
(Kecamatan) administrative headquarters building.
In Iliomar in the mid-1980s, of Serasa’s seven-man Falintil unit, all were killed in
clashes with ABRI - except for Serasa who joined Lere’s unit. Lere’s unit then comprised:
Lere, Serasa, António, José Pinto, Victorino, Armindo, and Casmiro. In 1984, Lere moved
westward to the Viqueque area to command Falintil’s Central Region.

1985 – THE FALINTIL ATTACK ON ILIOMAR

1984 was a year of considerable hardship for the villagers of Iliomar, particularly
due to serious food shortages. The villagers of Tirilolo and Cainliu had been allowed to
return from the Iliomar Town resettlement area to their original village locations in 1981;
and the people of Larimi sub-village had been moved from the central resettlement area to
an area adjacent to Liufalun sub-village of Cainliu in 1982. However, access to many of
their traditional fields was still restricted by the Indonesian security forces. Consequently,

606
Founded in 1986 by Lieutenant Colonel Luhut Panjaitan’s Task Force (Satgas/Dampak) 86, the Los Palos-
based Team Alpha initially comprised about 20 East Timorese and a cadre of up to nine Kopassandha/
Kopassus. Team Alfa was reportedly named after its first East Timorese commander, Alfonso - see Conboy,
K., Kopassus, 2003, pp. 310-312.
115

some villagers fled and lived in the jungle – and António Bouvida (56 years, Iliomar I) and
António da Silva, Iliomar II (Hansip) were killed at Sirimana in a Falintil ambush. In 1984,
ABRI reportedly also killed a Tirilolo villager - Mateus Gomes, at Natura in Los Palos
Town.
In 1984, the Klandestin movement in Iliomar was inactive, and there was very little
contact with Falintil in the jungle – and little food or other supplies could be spared by the
villagers for the Falintil fighters. Accordingly, in January 1985, Falintil decided to attack
Iliomar to harass ABRI - and also to re-awaken the Resistance spirit and support of the
villagers. According to Iliomar village elders, Lere Anan Timor – then a commander in the
Central Region, did not agree with the tactics of the attack – principally the plans for
Falintil’s approach and withdrawal, and declined to participate. However, at that time, Lere
was operating farther west as the commander of Falintil’s Central Region.607
At about 2200 hrs on 8 January 1985, a large Falintil force led by Mau Huno
(António Manuel Gomes da Costa-Manecas)608, reportedly comprising fighters from four
companies: from Baguia, Tutuala, Uatolari, and Iliomar - with the Iliomar company led by
Armando Nolasco (“Koro Asu”)609 – attacked Iliomar. The following map extract 610

The Falintil Attack on Iliomar – 8 January 1985

607
Lere Anan Timor (Colonel, F-FDTL Chief of Staff – 2001-2008) advised that Mau/Ma’ Huno commanded
the attack – in discussions with author at HQ F-FDTL, Tasi Tolu, 4 August 2005. Lere also stated that he was
not involved as, at that time, he commanded Falintil’s Central Region - and Iliomar was outside his “region of
responsibility”.
608
Some Iliomar elders contend that Mauk Moruk (Paulino Gama, see footnote 603) - ie not Mau/Ma’ Huno,
led the Falintil attack on Iliomar on 8 January 1985. Others believe that Xanana Gusmão was also in the
Iliomar area at the time of the attack.
609
“Koro Asu” - born in Loré, was regarded as one of the most successful Falintil commanders in the Lautém
area – he was killed in a clash with ABRI near Loré in 1987.
610
Extract from “Mapa Referente A Parte Oriental Da Sub-Região “Talisma” – see footnote 620.
116

shows three “campos de concentração” ie, from the south to north: “46 – Iliomar I, II,
Ailebere”; “47 -Tirilolo”; “48 - Cainliu, Fuat”. Outlying ABRI positions – ie Yonif 312,
are shown as: “W - Camp Tirololo”; “V - Camp Maluhira”; “X - Camp Iliomar”; and “Z –
Camp Ailebere”. The Falintil force approached from the south – and the lines of the Falintil
attack on Iliomar from the north, west and southwest the north are indicated – as well as
ABRI/Hansip local defences and those areas temporarily occupied by Falintil.
About 50 houses were burnt in the villages of Iliomar I, Ailebere, Cainliu and
Tirilolo – many accidentally. In the Iliomar I sub-village of Vatamatar, seven un-armed
villagers were killed in the fighting: António Morau (45 years, Ossohira sub-village),
Tomás Preto (33, Vatamatar), Francisco Ruas (40, Vatarmatar), António da Costa (43,
Ossohira), Rosa dos Santos Pinto (23, Vatamatar), Luciana de Deus/Veronica da Costa
Seixas (54, Ossohira), and António da Costa (37, Vatamatar). During a firefight in the area
of Lubu-Lari, near Kota Omar (Ailebere), a Falintil fighter, Teofilo, was also reportedly
killed. In Ailebere, four villagers were killed by Falintil gunfire: José Raimundo
(nightwatchman – Heitali sub-village), Afonso Pinto (Lalumato), Kiki Manu (female –
Marafal) and Marta Jerónimo (female – Marafal) – and Luís Hornay (Heitali) was wounded
and crippled. In Cainliu, west of Titiraven sub-village at about 2200 hrs, four village
guards (“supporting ABRI”) were killed by Falintil on the track from Caidalavarin sub-
village: Daniel da Costa (40 years, Titiraven/Cainliu), António da Costa (20 years,
Cainliu), Calisto da Costa (42 years, Cainliu), and Venâncio/Inacio da Cruz (50 years,
Maluhira/Cainliu)611. In Tirilolo, Julião Teles – a Hansip member involved in the “kontak
damai” killings of two Falintil fighters on 8 August 1983, was fatally wounded – probably
by an ABRI mortar round fired from their Baitomar Hill position in support of the ABRI
post in Tirilolo. Two other Hansip were killed in Tirilolo: Raúl Amaral and Abel da Costa
– as well as five villagers: Filipe Camilho, Arthur Ramos, Mateus da Silva, Igino Perreira
and Lucia da Gama. Two Tirililo villagers were wounded: Mateus Ximenes and António
Lebre. Three Iliomar II villagers were killed in the attack: Frederico da Costa (Boquila
sub-village) – by Falintil fire; and two Hansip, Francisco Pinto (Lihina) and Francisco Suto
Maior (Boquila) by ABRI fire. Two Iliomar II villagers were also wounded in the fighting:
Abel Barreto (Acara) and José Reis (Madarira). In summary, at least 20 villagers and five
Hansip were killed during the Falintil attack on Iliomar on 8 January 1985.
Domestic animals were also killed in the attack, houses were burnt, and possessions
stolen. In Tirilolo village, the venerated statue of the Virgin Mary in the village chapel was
destroyed. Following the attack, ABRI and Hansip arrested and interrogated large numbers
of villagers with relatives serving with Falintil.612 Zeferino Hornay (Lalumata sub-village,
Ailebere) was detained by ABRI’s Yonif 301 in Iliomar and disappeared – presumed
killed.613
During the attack on Iliomar, the Camat (Sub-District Head), Jaime da Costa, was
absent in adjacent Uato-Carabau (Viqueque District) – where he had gone to receive 20
trucks of food supplies for Iliomar. Governor Mário Carascalao has noted that his “bitterest
memory was when famine hit the district of Iliomar in 1985”.614

611
The Cainliu village report however indicates that the four were killed by Falintil “because they assisted
the TNI by manning guard posts”, p.10.
612
The Ailebere village report lists 13 villagers arrested and tortured – and also cites Jaime da Costa, Afonso
Pinto, Adão Fernandes Cabral and José Madeira as assisting ABRI. From Tirilolo, João Teles was arrested.
613
Zeferino’s disappearance is related in the Ailebere village report and also in Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.2, para 597.
614
“Carrascalão Cites Purwanto”, The Jakarta Post, 15 July 1992, p.2.
117

The Falintil attack on Iliomar was also included in the 1993 criminal indictment615
against Xanana Gusmão (who was captured by ABRI forces in Dili on 20 November 1992)
as follows:
“- the attack on Iliomar on 8 January 1985 led by Mau Hudo ((sic)), David Alex,
Faluk Sae and Aluk, resulting in a number of civilians being killed, two SP-1 rifles
and one L.E. ((Lee Enfield)) rifle being seized and several houses burnt.”

ABRI AND FALINTIL DEPLOYMENTS AND ACTIVITY

Following a reorganisation in 1985, Falintil strength in western Lautém comprised a
“battalion” under command of Taur Matan Ruak616 with “A Company” under Koro Asu
and “B Company” under João Miranda. Falintil “bases classicos” in the 1983-1985 period
in the Iliomar area are shown on the map below.617 The earlier-related Falintil attack on
Iliomar (8 January 1985) is shown in the bottom left of the map – with a base area of B
Company/1st Unit (ie, “III”) to the north-west of Iliomar, and base areas of A Company/1st
Unit (ie, “II”) shown north and northeast of Iliomar.

Falintil base areas – Iliomar

615
Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara …, 25 January 1993, para 12.1, p.10.
616
Several years earlier, Taur Matan Ruak (José Maria Vasconcelos) and his group were surrounded by ABRI
at Mount Bibileo (Viqueque) and surrendered (31 March 1979). Taur Matan Ruak was taken to Ossú, but
escaped 23 days later. Ruak’s group had been escorting Fretilin Minister Sera Key (Juvenal Inácio) who was
comatose at the time of capture. He was reportedly taken to Los Palos by ABRI and killed – see Ramelau, J.,
Os Nomes da Resistência. Note also footnote 375 – Taur Matan Ruak believed Sera Key was killed by ABRI
in Uatolari. As a Brigadier, Taur Matan Ruak was appointed Commander, East Timor Defence Forces
(ETDF) in February 2001 and currently (2008) commands the F-FDTL.
617
Falintil’s Talisma (ie Lautém) map – see footnote 620, shows the bases and operations of Falintil
elements in Lautém in the 1983-1985 period ie 1st Autonomous Company and 1st Unit (“Unidade” –
comprising A and B companies).
118

An ABRI intelligence map of March 1985 indicated a Falintil base area a few
kilometres east of Iliomar Town astride the Namaluto River and another west of the Los
Palos-Loré road. A Falintil map of late 1985 showed the Indonesian troops stationed in
Iliomar Town equipped with artillery, with further artillery located to the north of Iliomar
in Luro Town.618
On 20 December 1985, Falintil forces (“A” Company, 1st Unit) attacked an ABRI
position at Mount Hirino/Alapupul (about 25 kilometres by road north of Iliomar) occupied
by a company of the 1st Marine Battalion. According to Falintil records, there were
reportedly 20 ABRI casualties (killed and wounded) and several weapons and other
equipment were seized.619

Falintil attack on the ABRI position at Alapupul – 20 December 1985 (poor copy)

The “Talisma” Map – captured by Falintin at Alapupul – 20 December 1985 620
618
A composite map with comment was printed in Timor Link, Number 6, June 1986, pp. 1-2. The “artillery”
in Iliomar may have been an ABRI mortar located in their post atop Baitomar Hill west of Iliomar Town.
619
This Falintil attack was later recorded on the Falintil map “Mapa Referente … Talisma”- see footnote 620
below. The author (Chamberlain) attended a “commemorative re-enactment” of the attack at Alapupul on 19
November 2004 following the F-FDTL Commander’s Conference at the F-FDTL 1st Battalion base in Los
Palos. ABRI records show 13 personnel of the 1st Marine Battalion (Yonif 1/Kormar) were killed in East
Timor in 1985.
620
“Mapa Referente A Parte Oriental Da Sub-Região “Talisma”. This map was captured by Falintil during
an attack on an ABRI position (1St Marine Battalion) at Alapupul (about 25 km by road north of Iliomar) on
119

Subsequently in 1986, Falintil attacked the village of Cainliu – a woman, Iri-Lai (40
years), was killed in the night-time attack and villagers’ goods were looted. The Cainliu
Hansip platoon did not fire on the Falintil attackers; and their commander, Julião Soares,
was subsequently questioned at the Koramil headquarters. Also in 1986, Falintil attacked
the settlement at Lari Soru (Iradarate area), and an Iliomar I villager, Joanina Cunha, was
shot and wounded. Hansip resisted the attack, and two Falintil were killed in the fighting
(António da Costa, 30 years, of Caentau; and Manu Soru of Ailebere). On 10 April 1986,
Falintil killed Francisco Jerónimo, a security guard (ronda loron) of Lalumato sub-village,
Ailebere.621 Also in 1986, a Caidabu villager (Iliomar II) - Faustino Pinto, was killed by
ABRI, and a further three villagers tortured at Alapupul on the northern Iliomar border. In
September 1986, a sub-village chief of Fuat village - Martinho Madeira, was arrested and
taken to Baucau. When he was subsequently returned to Iliomar, he was taken into the
forest and shot and killed by Indonesian military personnel.622

THE FALINTIL AMBUSH AT OSSOHIRA SPRING – 21 NOVEMBER 1986623

Beginning in 1986, the Indonesian administration began improving and sealing the
road from Los Palos into Iliomar and to the southwest into Viqueque. Indonesian private
companies using East Timorese labour constructed most of the road, but some of the
roadworks were undertaken by ABRI combat engineers (ie, zeni tempur - “Zipur”) -
principally 3 Zipur Battalion from Bandung and 9 Zipur Battalion.
At about 0900 hrs on 21 November 1986, a group of ABRI engineers were
ambushed by Falintil about two kilometres north of Maluhira sub-village/Cainliu (about
five kilometres north of Iliomar Town – see Iliomar map at Annex A). The engineers (9
Zipur – 9 Combat Engineer Battalion)624, had departed from their base camp beside the
Paifakaver River near Tirilolo village in a Unimog truck and were travelling northeast to
Los Palos on the main road. The group numbered 35: 34 ABRI and one unarmed East
Timorese “auxiliary” member of the “Tenaga Bantuan Operasi” (TBO – “Operational
Support Force”).625 The Falintil force of about 30, led by Koro Asu, comprised fighters
from the platoons of Koro Asu and Renan Selak (also “Rena Selak” – nom de guerre of
Faustino dos Santos), together with about eight youths aged 12-13 years who acted as
porters. The Falintil group had earlier departed from their base at Hedan in the Buidala
region, several kilometres to the east in the area of the Namalutu River.

20 December 1985 – and is a composite of several 1:50,000-scale map sheets. The map was subsequently
annotated by Falintil to record its bases and operations – and also ABRI dispositions, in Falintil’s Talisma
region (ie Lautém) in the period August 1983 to December 1985. The composite map was signed by Kay
Rala Xanana Gusmão as President of the CRRN and Falintil Commander on 2 January 1986. The original
map is held in the Arkivu Ho Muzeu Rezistensia Timor in Dili.
621
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 738 records that Falintil killed two (unnamed) Hansip in
Iliomar in the period 1985-1986.
622
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, p.197.
623
Some sources – including Falintil participants, have stated a range of dates for the ambush eg 21
September, 21 December. However F-FDTL LTCOL Aluc Descartes, the Falintil Região I commander in
late 1986 who despatched the ambush group, advised that the ambush occurred on 21 November 1986
(discussion with author, Dili, 4 April 2005). Chrystello, C. J., Timor Leste: Historiografia …, October 2005,
p.112 briefly cites the ambush on 21 November 1986 and notes 34 “AR-15” rifles seized by Falintil.
624
One Iliomar elder claimed the vehicle also contained “a few members of Yonif 327” – but this is unlikely.
625
For detail on TBO service, see Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984 - ABRI Document 6,
Instruction Manual No JUKNIS/06/ IV/1982, Babinsa/TPD Activity in Developing and Phasing Out Trained
People’s Resistance Forces, 10 September 1982, p.226.
120

As the ABRI vehicle began the climb up the south-eastern slope of Mount
Acadiroloho and approached the Ossohira Spring (GR 620400) about 200 metres north of
the turn-off to Bubutau, Falintil sprung the ambush. Falintil fighters were positioned on
each side of the road – principally on the steeply-wooded slope to the east of the road, but
also with “cut-off” elements in the ravine to the west of the road. The Falintil group’s one
machine gun - manned by Vicente Lourdes626 (of Bubutau), began the firing that lasted for
about 12 minutes - during which Falintil also used three grenades. The Falintil fighters
then moved forward and killed the wounded. 34 in the ABRI vehicle were killed – one
wounded soldier, whom the Falintil had believed was dead, later recovered.627 Falintil
seized 34 weapons - M16 and M15 rifles, ammunition, backpacks, uniforms, and boots. As
the Falintil group departed, they fired at a nearby ABRI post. On their return to the Falintil
base, and anticipating a punitive ABRI follow-up operation, the weapons and equipment
were shared out, and the force dispersed into smaller groups.628 Subsequently, the Falintil
base at Hedan was renamed “34” in Tetum to commemorate the ambush (“emboscada” – in
Portuguese) of 21 November 1986 at Ossohira Spring.629 Indonesian troops recovered the
bodies of the slain ABRI to Iliomar Town, and the bodies were then flown by helicopter to
Dili for burial.630
In response to the ambush, ABRI launched a large follow-up operation in the jungle
areas and also moved strongly against the Klandestin in Iliomar Sub-District. In Tirilolo,
ABRI tortured and killed a Klandestin member, Pedro Coreia (sic), suspected of being a
spy. Pedro was castrated and his throat cut – his body was found by villagers four days
later at Utaira. North of Maluhira at Mount Naunili, Júlio Madeira (30 years, Cainliu) was
shot in the eye – but survived; and Tiborsio (20 years) was wounded seriously in the chest
by soldiers from the Los Palos-based Yonif 745, but recovered.
From Cainliu, twelve were arrested by ABRI: Domingos Rodrigues (32 years,
Wanra), Macedo Hornay (18 years, TBO), Francisco Pinto (32 years, village secretary),
Armindo Monteiro (48 years), António da Cruz (30 years), Feliciano Pereira (Hansip),

626
Vicente Lourdes, aged 40 years, surrendered to ABRI Yonif 612/MD at Bubutau on 18 January 1996 –
note also his involvement in the harassment of Governor Abílio Soares on 26 September 1995 at Namane.
627
Indonesian soldiers killed in clashes in Lautém District were not usually buried in the “Heroe’s Cemetery”
(“Taman Makam Pahlawan - TMP”) on the northern outskirts of Los Palos – which was almost solely for
East Timorese, but in the ABRI cemetery in Dili (“Taman Makam Pahlawan Seroja”). According to the
Truth and Friendship Commission in June 2007, there were 12 TMP in Timor-Leste with a total of 1,124
graves.
628
During interviews in 2002, one Falintil participant in the ambush stated that Xanana was in the base camp
when they returned - while another stated that Xanana was at Mount Paitxau (also as “Paichau” and “Gunung
Poitchou”), about 22 kilometres east of Los Palos town.
629
Falintil fighter Silvestre Maurubi was reportedly a principal planner of the ambush. However, according to
two sources interviewed by the author, the ambush was spontaneous. Rather, Nolasco, Renan and Falo Chai
had gone to Baguia to meet with Mauk Muruk and, on returning, saw the Zipur 9 vehicle and hurriedly set the
ambush – this is discounted however, as Mauk Moruk had surrendered to ABRI earlier on 24 January 1985
and Falo Chai was reportedly killed earlier ie in 1985.
630
There are no headstones/graves in the main ABRI cemetery (Taman Makam Pahlawan Seroja) in Dili for
these Zipur 9 casualties (checked by author in 2004 and 2005). The Operasi Seroja memorial in Jakarta lists
the names of 34 ABRI personnel of Zipur 9 who died in combat in East Timor in 1986 – comprising Captain
Sigit, First Lieutenant Heriyanto, Second Lieutenant Mulyanto, six sergeants, 22 corporals and three privates.
These 34 members of Zipur 9 represent 24.6 percent of ABRI’s 138 declared killed-in-action (KIA) in 1986.
For an analysis of ABRI/TNI casualties, see Van Klinken, G., “Indonesian Casualties in East Timor 1975-
1999: Analysis of an Official List”, Indonesia, Vol 80, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2005, pp. 109-122.
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 738 records 30 ABRI killed in this Falintil ambush and
shows the date as “1987” – repeating the incorrect date in the Cainliu village report. A recent analysis is: Van
Klinken, G., “Indonesian casualties in East Timor 1975-1999”, 7 December 2011.
121

Jorge Castilho (39 years), Jaime Amaral (35 years), Júlio Ricardo (42 years), Júlio Madeira
(45 years) João Nunes (40 years), António Boumpeo (36 years) – as well as Manuel from
Tirilolo. Several Hansip members from Fuat were also arrested: Luís Camoes, Luís da
Costa, António da Costa. All those listed above were interrogated and tortured by
Kopassus in Los Palos, and six were subsequently imprisoned in Balide (Dili).631 On their
return from prison in Dili, all the Hansip except Domingos (who had confessed under
torture to meeting with Falintil), returned to Hansip duties and later became Milsas
members (an explanation of Milsas – ie ABRI auxiliaries, follows).
According to one account: “De imediato o comandante militar indonésio da zona
“Zipur-9”mandou concentrar a população de Iliomar, e distribuindo baionetas mandou
apunhalar 17 homens fortes para vingar os 35 soldados”.632 A Fretilin “Press Release” in
mid-July 1987 - signed by Xanana Gusmão on 19 May 1987, reported that 17 male
villagers had bayonetted to death by Indonesian soldiers as a reprisal.633
The November 1986 Falintil ambush at Ossohira Spring was one of the last of
Falintil’s major actions against the Indonesian military.634 Citing a Fretilin document, a
brief report on this action appeared in a mid-1987 Catholic newsletter published in Sydney
as follows :

“On November 16 in Iliomar (Los Palos district) the guerrillas were said to have
killed 36 Indonesians, capturing all their weapons. Reports said 26 people were held
in reprisal of whom 10 were executed and 16 ran away … A report written later
than this said that further reprisals were taken against civilians in the area. Also on
November 16, at 6pm, 25 Indonesian bodies arrived in Dili by helicopter; the lights
of the town were blacked out as they were buried, at 7pm.”635

The ambush at Ossohira was also included in the 1993 criminal indictment636
against Xanana Gusmão (captured by Indonesian forces in Dili on 20 November 1992) –
see below:

631
From Cainliu: Domingos Rodrigues, Macedo Hornay, Francisco Pinto, Armindo Monteiro, António da
Cruz; from Fuat: Luís Camoes, Luís da Costa, and António da Costa - imprisoned for about two months.
632
Chrystello, C. J., Timor Leste: Historiografia …, October 2005, p.112
633
Fretilin Press Release, “17 Hommes Timoriens Assassines a Iliomar par les Troupes Bataillon Zipur 9”,
Lisbon, 16 July 1987. The report noted that Jamie da Costa – aged 27, the “Camat/Chefe de Posto” of
Iliomar; and Martinho Hornay – aged 36, the “Raja” of Iliomar were among the 17 killed.
634
Probably the largest Falintil ambush occurred on 15 April 1976 in the Aitutu Mountains – when 52
soldiers of ABRI’s 405 Infantry Battalion were killed in the ambush of a truck convoy. - ”Demi Timor Timur:
Batalyon 405 Persembahkan 52 Prajurit”, 3 April 2012. On 31 May 1997, Falintil ambushed an ABRI truck
near Quelicai, about 40 kilometres southeast of Baucau, killing 16 police (almost all Brimob) and one soldier.
635
“Military Situation”, p.2 in Timor Link, Number 10, July 1987 – note the differing dates for the ambush ie
21 September and 16 November.
636
Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara …, 25 January 1993, para 12.2, p.24. Interestingly, the
ambush was not included in the primary indictment against Xanana Gusmão but only in the “Subsidiary”
indictment – and the indictment did not specifically mention the ABRI casualties.
122

Translation: 12.2. In November 1986, conducted an ambush on an ABRI unit between
Iliomar and Los Palos (Lautém Regency) led by Koro Osu resulting in 36 M-16 rifles and
ammunition being seized and an ABRI unit vehicle destroyed.

BROADENING RESISTANCE SUPPORT - THE FOUNDING OF THE CNRM

In April 1986, Xanana Gusmão met secretly with Apostolic Administrator
Monsignor Carlos Belo at the Roman Catholic technical college at Fatumaca, south of
Baucau. Belo pressed that attacking civilian targets was unjustified and reportedly advised
Xanana to pursue a political rather than an armed struggle – “Please change your
strategy”.637 Xanana considered that Belo was under great political and psychological
pressures638, and there was little ground for agreement between the two men.
From early 1987, Falintil entered a period of crisis, and suffered heavy casualties as
ABRI operations became more effective – which included using Kopassus troops disguised
as Falintil.639 In March 1987, Jaime da Costa – 27 years (son of Luís da Costa and
Estetânia) of Tirilolo, and Martinho Hornay – 36 (son of Salvador Hornay and Aida) of
Maluhira were reportedly killed by ABRI.640 In 1987, two TBO from Tirilolo village:
Bernardo Soares and Miguel Santalin were shot and killed by ABRI troops. During this
period, the Hansip troops in Iliomar were retitled “Wanra” (Perlawanan Rakyat – People’s
Resistance) and remained armed.641 Province-wide, Falintil was reduced to about 500.
In December 1987, at a meeting at Mount Aitana in the Central Region, Xanana
Gusmão, as leader of the Resistance, detached Falintil from Fretilin, and declared Falintil
as a national liberation army not linked to, or dominated by, any political party. According
to Lere Anan Timor, “Falintil left Fretilin with a message from Commander Xanana on 7
December 1987”.642 The other principal leaders at the meeting were Mau Huno (also as
“Ma’ Hunu”) Belere Karataiano and Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak. This “ideological
turnaround” - first outlined publicly in Xanana’s speech of 7 December 1987 643 later

637
Kohen, From the Place of the Dead …, 1999, pp.158-159.
638
See Gusmão’s 20 May 1986 address “A History That Beats in the Maubere Soul” in Gusmão, X. (Niner, S.
ed), To Resist …, 2000, p.125, his views at p.139, and Niner, S., Xanana - Leader …, 2009, op.cit., p.109.
Bishop Belo had earlier criticised Fretilin in an interview in late 1984, published in “The Age” newspaper
(Melbourne) – citing the guerrillas who, like ABRI, “terrorise people, burn houses, steal and take food, …” –
see Jolliffe, J. (ed), Timor Newsletter, Vol II, No 4, August 1984, p.7.
639
Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p. 310. During 1986-87, Xanana Gusmão’s camp was at Mount Alapupul ,
north east of Iliomar beside the road to Los Palos – ie before making a “permanent” move of his camp to the
Centre Region in 1988 - Niner, S., Xanana - Leader …, 2009, op.cit., p.111, p.114.
640
Chrystello, C. J., Timor Leste: Historiografia …, October 2005, pp.111-112
641
Not all Hansip in East Timor were re-titled - with both Hansip (unarmed) and Wanra (armed) continuing
to operate in other Sub-Districts, including in the late 1990s.
642
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 127. However, in mid-2006, President Gusmão stated that he
resigned from the Fretilin Central Committee in 1986 - “in December 1986, I created the CNRM, and I
abandoned Fretilin because as the Commander of the Asswain Falintil (Falintil Fighters) I (had the
responsibility to) remove Falintil from a (single) Party’s influence.” – Gusmão, X., President of the
Republic’s Message to Fretilin, Dili, 22 June 2006. A comprehensive description of the external and internal
development of the Resistance can be found in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 7.1.5, pp. 76-93.
643
Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist …, 2000, pp. 129-136 – at a meeting at Aitana (Lacluta). In his
critique, Xanana Gusmão declared that “right from the very beginning, the Fretilin Directorate displayed a
notable political infantilism … We were in truth, lulled by a fanciful revolutionary process dubbed
‘Mauberism’. This political infantilism and thoughtless adventurism has driven the movement since
1974…allowed no measure of disagreement … This senseless radicalism paid no attention to our concrete
conditions and limitations. It made us intolerably overbearing and led us to put many compatriots on the same
123

became officially termed the “Readjustmento Estrutural do Resistência”- the
“Reorganisation of the Structure of the Resistance”.

Xanana Gusmão, Mau Huno, Mau Hodu – Aitana, c.1989

Lere Anan Timor, then a political commissar, noted that explaining the separation
“was a big problem … many commanders did not want to accept it. They did not want
Falintil to separate from Fretilin, didn’t want the Marxist-Leninist Party abolished. But
slowly, as the situation developed, they (finally) accepted the reasons”.644 Falintil
continued to be directed by Xanana who had resigned from the Fretilin party.
Placing greater emphasis on the political and diplomatic struggle, in late 1988
Xanana formed the National Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) to broaden support
for the Resistance - ie replacing the CRRN, with himself as its leader - ie the “Responsável
Principal”.645 Within East Timor, the CNRM Executive Committee comprised three
Falintil field commanders, five Klandestin leaders, and three other Fretilin members. This
non-partisanship (“apartidarismo”) also involved recognition of the role of all nationalists -
such as students and political parties like UDT, in the struggle for self-determination
(“ukun rasik an”).
In 1988, Iliomar II villagers were resettled on the southern coast in the Iradarate
area by ABRI in an attempt to restrict east-west movement by Falintil in that area and to
provide information on the movements of Falintil fighters. In July 1988, Abílio Quintão
Pinto returned to Iliomar from Dili to teach at the Catholic Junior high school and began to
rebuild the Klandestin organisation. In 1989, he became the “Ketua Trixa”646 (Trixa
Chairman), a small Klandestin support group that provided information and supplies to the
few Falintil in the Iliomar area. Also, at this time, Fernando Lay returned to Iliomar, re-
occupied the Toko Cina buildings and restarted commercial activity including copra
trading. That year, a youth from Iliomar I, António Monteiro was arrested by ABRI as a

footing as the criminal aggressor.” – pp.131-132. See also Niner, S., Xanana - Leader …, 2009, op.cit.,
pp.115-118.
644
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 127.
645
In a November 1998 interview, Xanana Gusmão stated: “Sejak 1987 atau 1988 kita sudah tahu bahwa
tidak mungkin kita mampu mengusir ABRI dari Timor dengan senjata” - ie “from 1987 or 1988 we knew that
it wasn’t possible for us to drive ABRI out of Timor by arms” – see Pareanom, Y.A., Tempo, Jakarta,
November 1998. In 1998, ABRI estimated Falintil remnants as “less than 244” with “around 217 weapons” -
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, para 50.
646
The “Trixa” codeword meant “suffering”.
124

suspected Klandestin, but was released by the Koramil 3 commander, Lieutenant Syran,
and later employed by the Koramil as a TBO.
In 1989, with an improved security situation, the Indonesian administration in
Iliomar allowed the Caidabu villagers to return to the original location of Caidabu sub-
village about 11 kilometres north of Iliomar Town647. That year, a military attaché from the
US Embassy in Jakarta briefly visited Iliomar and commented that the people were
“sullen”, and that it was the “poorest part of a rather poor region”.648 In 1989, Falintil
entered the Binaan settlement in Iradarate, wounding Manuel (of Iliomar sub-village) and
taking his possessions; and Yonif 320 soldiers shot dead a Cainliu villager, José da Costa
(33 years).
In 1990, three Iliomar I youths (Advento Jerónimo and Carciliano de Oliveira of
Iliomar, and Francisco de Oliveira of Caentau) were arrested by Koramil 03 on suspicion of
being Klandestin. Carciliano was later freed, but Advento and Francisco were taken to the
Kodim 1629 headquarters in Los Palos and interrogated. Francisco attempted to hang
himself but was taken to the Los Palos Health Centre and recovered. Advento was released
after intervention by a Los Palos priest, Father Walter Wanwowe. In Iliomar on 7 March
1990, Mouzinho Jerónimo (31 years) of Ailebere village was killed by a Milsas member,
Adelino Pinto (Iliomar II).

THE EARLY 1990s : THE RESISTANCE EXPANDS –
AND ABRI’s “MILITERISASI”

In the late 1980s, Falintil strength had declined to less than 100 active fighters in
the jungle and a revised strategy was needed.649 In June 1990, the political deputy of the
CNRM, Mau Hodu met with several Klandestin leaders near Baucau to plan for a unified
underground movement. Subsequently in July 1990, an Executive Committee of the
Clandestine Front (Comité Executivo da CNRM na Frente Clandestina) was formed at a
meeting in Dili, electing Constâncio Pinto as its Secretary.650 This was intended to advance
the revised strategy adopted by the CNRM to gain independence through diplomatic
channels rather than armed struggle. However, in the countryside, most zone Klandestin
organisations retained their direct relationship in support of local Falintil commanders.
From 1989 to 1993, ABRI field combat operations in East Timor were managed by
Kolakops (Komando Pelaksana Operasi – Operations Implementation Command –
commanded by a brigadier-general)651 while “territorial” operations and management were

647
East Timor was “opened” in 1989 following President Soeharto’s declaration of 27 December 1988.
648
Lieutentant Colonel H. W. Maynard (USAF) also commented that the “police chief begged for a helicopter
ride out” – see ---, East Timor Colloquy …, 1991, p.174, p.181.
649
See Xanana Gusmão’s address to the Falintil Transition Ceremony, Aileu, 1 February 2001 – “we were
reduced to less than 100 men”. This statement is also cited in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 5, p.39 –
endnotes 163 and 164.
650
Donaciano Gomes and José Manuel were elected vice secretaries – Pinto, C. and Jardine, M., East Timor’s
Unfinished Struggle, 1997, p.124. Constâncio Pinto - nom de guerre “Terus” (“suffering” in Tetum), was
arrested on 25 January 1991, released on 1 February 1991, and fled East Timor on 16 May 1992. Donaciano
Gomes – as Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Klamar Fuik, was the commander of the F-FDTL Maritime Component
(ie Navy) in 2008.
651
Its predecessors were Kodahankam (1976-1984) and Koopskam (1984-1989 – initially staffed by 1
Infantry Division, then from July 1988 by 2 Infantry Division). Following the disbandment of Kolakops on 30
April 1993, the Sector A and Sector B Headquarters were retained, and operations were controlled by the
Korem 164 Commander - with probable “guidance” from Kopassus Group 3 Headquarters in Batujajar, West
Java – see: ----, Tapol Bulletin 154/5, November 1999; Kammen, D., “Notes on the Transformation …”,
Indonesia, 67, April 1999, pp. 71-74; and Van Klinken, G & Bourchier, D., “The Key Suspects”, Canberra,
125

the responsibility of the Korem 164 commander, a colonel. Kolakops directed the
operations through three major field headquarters: Sektor A based at Baucau (Cakung)
airfield (covering three districts including Lautém), Sektor B in Ainaro/Same (covering
nine districts), and Sektor C in Dili.652 In 1991, Sektor A controlled major security
operations, including the Kodim and Koramil troops, in Baucau, Viqueque and Lautém
Districts – together with five ABRI “strike battalions” (“Yonif Pemukul”).653 Major
operations into Iliomar, principally into the eastern areas of the Sub-District, usually
involved a mixture of ABRI forces: “strike” battalions654, territorial battalions – including
the organic Yonif 745, Brimob, and paramilitary elements.
In 1991, within Sektor A’s area of operations, ABRI assessed guerrilla strength in
Falintil’s Eastern Region (Ponte Leste) as 67 with 45 weapons, operating in eight groups –
plus 39 “cell members”.655 ABRI also attempted to classify the Province in terms of
“daerah rawan” – “troublesome regions”, citing the Los Palos region at the eastern end of
the Province as “Category IV” – with about 60 percent of the population “pro-Indonesia”,
22.5 percent as “potensial”, 0.5 percent as Falintil “aktifis”, and about 2 percent as
Resistance supporters.656 The ABRI analysis also noted several routes bordering areas of
Falintil operations as “rawan” (“troublesome”). Within Lautém District, these included the
main coastal road from Baucau to Los Palos, and the road from Los Palos to Iliomar.657
Klandestin troublespots listed within ABRI’s Sektor A were Iliomar, Los Palos, Mehara,
and Maluro.
Following the November 1991 “Santa Cruz Massacre”658, the replacement
Kolakops commander, Brigadier General Theo Syafei, adopted a tougher “security

2002, pp. 134-135. See TNI Watch!, 23 March 2000 for implied Korem 164 dissatisfaction with Kopassus
“interference”. The official ABRI history of Kodam IX Udayana shows Kodahankam replaced by Korem 164
on 12 October 1978 and operational control passed to Kogasgab under Kodam IX/Udayana on 2 November
1978 – see ABRI, 42 Tahun …, 1999, p.61.
652
For Kolakops organisation see also Ahmadi, A. (ed), Feisal Tanjung …, 1999, p.470 and Kammen, D,
“Notes on theTransformation …”, Indonesia, 67, April 1999. Sector C (Dili) appears to have been disbanded
in 1992 – when, during Operasi Tuntas, Sector B Headquarters was located in Dili.
653
Warouw, R. S. Brigadir Jenderal, Plan for Operation “Halo Kapaz”, 30 August 1991. The operation began
in August 1991 and was planned to run until November with the aim of ensuring a satisfactory security
situation for the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation in late 1991.
654
From the mid-1990s, the battalions - often composite, were termed “Rajawali” (Eagle), and independent
Pursuit/Hunter Companies (“Kompi Pemburu”) were also formed. ABRI troops wore “Rajawali” and
“Pemburu” shoulder flashes on their field uniforms.
655
Warouw, R. S. Brigadir Jenderal, Plan for Operation “Halo Kapaz”, 30 August 1991, Annex C,
Intelligence. The groups were Alex (12 men, 9 weapons); Sabica (6, 3); Trick (10, 5); Alux (9, 8); Rodak (10,
7); Rangkabian (8, 5); Pieter Doly (8, 3); and Lemorai (4, 4). Moore, S. asserts that ABRI “army officers did
not know how many guerrillas existed …” and “estimates were consistently on the low side.” - Moore, S.,
“The Indonesian Military’s Last Years …”, Indonesia, No 72, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2001, p.
13.
656
Warouw, R. S. Brigadir Jenderal, Plan for Operation “Halo Kapaz”, 30 August 1991, Sub-Annex 1 to
Annex C provides complicated “pie charts” with the overall Province “pie” showing 60 percent pro-
Indonesia, 39.4 percent “potensial”, 0.05 percent “aktifis”, and 0.5 percent as Resistance supporters.
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, ABRI Document 1: “The Way for Babinsa …”,
pp.176-177 lists nine of the “several factors” which ABRI saw as determining the “Degree of Trouble-
someness ((kerawanan)) of Villages”.
657
Warouw, R. S. Brigadir Jenderal, Plan for Operation “Halo Kapaz”, 30 August 1991. Sub-Annex II to
Annex C shows the Mau Nana group (8) and the Bonafasio group (8) astride the Los Palos-Iliomar road.
658
For Governor Mário Carrascalão’s account of the massacre, see Anderson, B. ; Djati, A. & Kammen, D.;
“Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, Indonesia, 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, pp. 15-19.
126

approach” 659 against the Resistance and launched a major Province-wide operation,
“Operasi Tuntas” (Operation Thoroughness/Complete).660 ABRI “Tuntas” documents
show ABRI assessed that the Falintil strength country-wide had increased from 143
guerrillas with 100 weapons - to 245 with 130 weapons.661 Groups operating within
Lautém District comprised Rodak (11 men, east of Laga), Taur Matan Ruak (5 men, Mount
Legumau area), Rangkabian (6 men, north of Luro), Alux (14 men, astride the Los Palos-
Iliomar road); Piter Doli (12, Maupitine – note Piter Doli was killed on 13 June 1992); and
Bonifasio (12 men, Mehara) – ie totalling 60 men with 37 weapons.

BONIF 12

RODAK RANGK 6
11
PITER 12
TMR 5

ALUX 14

ABRI ESTIMATE OF FALINTIL IN LAUTÉM - TUNTAS 1991
TUNTASTUNTAS 1991

ABRI was still concerned about the extent of Resistance influence and control –
particularly in the countryside, and again attempted to quantify the threat by regions. The
Kolakops operation order for “Tuntas” included a listing of the security classifications of
East Timor’s 442 villages662. The list divided villages into red, yellow and green – based on
their degree of “rawan” (“troublesomeness”). Province-wide, 18 percent were classified as
“red”, 45 percent “yellow”, and 37 percent “green”. Of Lautém District’s 34 villages, 12
were designated “red”, 12 “yellow”, and 10 “green” – making Lautém, together with
Viqueque, Ainaro, and Manufahi, the most “troublesome” Districts in the Province.663
In response to the increasing Falintil threat, ABRI also initiated a program to
upgrade its paramilitaries in East Timor. This ABRI program - termed “Milsas”
(“militerisasi” – “militarisation”), was apparently only undertaken in East Timor664 and

659
Liem Soei Liong and Budiardjo, C., “Military Operations …”, 21 December 92, relates Syafie’s criticism
of his predecessor’s “prosperity approach”, noting Syafie’s interview in Suara Pembaruan, Jakarta, of 4
March 1992.
660
Syafei, T. Brigadir Jenderal, Perintah Operasi “Tuntas I”, Kolakops, Dili, 1 April 1992. “Tuntas” began
in April 1992 with operations in Sector A (East), Sector B (Centre – based in Dili), and independent task
force operations in the Districts of Aileu, Kovalima, Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquiçá, and Ambeno/Oecusse.
Operations by Sector A (based at the Baucau airbase) employed three strike battalions, a special forces unit
(Dampak 86), and independent task forces in six Districts (Baucau, Lautém, Viqueque, Manatuto, Ainaro, and
Manufahi).
661
Ibid, Annex C to Perintah Operasi “Tuntas I”, Kolakops, Dili, 1 April 1992.
662
Ibid, Annex D, Sub-Annex I - and also related in Moore, S., “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years …”,
Indonesia, No 72, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2001, pp. 13-14.
663
The “Tuntas” Operation Order does not give colour gradings for Sub-Districts or individual villages.
664
Hasibuan, A., Dr (Chairman), Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations,
Jakarta, 31 January 2000, para 38.
127

mostly “regularised” existing Wanra elements. Milsas personnel were often termed
“tentara tiga bulan” - ie “three-month soldiers”, and senior officials in Jakarta sometimes
referred to Milsas as the “regional sons of the TNI”.665 Information provided for a United
States Senate report in 1996 by several East Timorese priests indicated that Milsas
elements had been established in almost all Districts, with 300 in Lautém District.666 In
August 1998, TNI records listed 2,566 Milsas and 929 Wanra in East Timor.667
In Iliomar, the Wanra - about 40 in two platoons, underwent the upgrading and
were retitled “Milsas”. In small groups, the Iliomar Milsas members undertook their
upgrading military training, lasting three months, at ABRI training centres - principally in
Bali and in Malang (East Java) – and occasionally in Bandung (West Java) and Kupang
(West Timor). Milsas personnel wore the ABRI camouflage field uniform – with an Army
insignia; and, in Lautém District, a local Kodim 1629 patch; red stripes as rank insignia; a
camouflage cap with a central black star; and were armed. The monthly wage for Milsas in
early 1999 was 300,000 rupiah (about USD 38.00) but, when on field operations, this could
increase to 700,000 rupiah.
At about this time, the Iliomar Kamra police auxiliaries were incorporated into the
ABRI Police - ie into Polri (Kepolisian Republic Indonesia). Although wearing Polri
uniforms, the local ex-Kamra could still be distinguished from Polri “regulars” as the ex-
Kamra did not wear any rank – while “regular” police personnel had at least one “stripe” ie,
chevron.

THE DECLINE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE GROWTH OF THE
KLANDESTIN/CLANDESTINA

In mid-February 1991, after near capture in the Ainaro area, the CNRM and Falintil
leader, Xanana Gusmão, moved to Dili and lived clandestinely in the southern suburb of
Lahane – and, disguised, reportedly travelled widely throughout East Timor.668 In July
1991, Xanana met secretly with Bishop Carlos Belo at Ossú, south of Baucau. Xanana
proposed that a special mass be arranged in Dili for the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary
delegation, but this was rejected by the Bishop as “very dangerous” - fearing that related
demonstrations and confrontations would lead to bloodshed.669
A number of Iliomar youth took part in the funeral procession immediately
preceding the Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili on 12 November 1991 - including Viríssimo
Madeira, Evangelino A. Ximenes, Salvador X. Pinto, João Savio, and Tito de Deus from
Iliomar I; and José Zeferino, Domingos Savio, Tito dos Santos, Gonçalves, José Ferreira
(Ailebere), Olinda Marques (Tirilolo) – and also from Tirilolo: Sao Pedro da Costa,
António Monteiro, José da Costa, and Júlio Madeira.670 João Savio (Iliomar I), aged 16

665
Ibid, para 38. From 2000, official Indonesian announcements often referred to Milsas as “TNI reservists”.
666
Pell, C. (Senator), CRS Military Appendix to: A Report to the Committee for Foreign Relations – US
Senate, 1996, VIII.A.d.
667
Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere, “ETO: Breakdown of Indonesian Armed Forces …”, 11
February 1999, FA03, p.2.
668
Pinto, C. and Jardine, M., East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle, 1997, pp.160-161.
669
Kohen, From the Place of the Dead …, 1999, p.189. Bishop Belo’s next meeting (ie third) with Xanana
took place in Cipinang prison (Jakarta) in July 1998 and was, according to Belo, “closer, open, friendly” -
p.333.
670
It is unclear whether the last four Tirilolo youths named above participated in the Santa Cruz
demonstration – the Tirilolo village report, p.5, indicates that these four - together with participant Olinda
Marques, returned safely to Tirilolo sometime soon after the incident.
128

years, disappeared during the Massacre and, although his fate is not known, he is presumed
to have been killed by ABRI.
Following the Santa Cruz Massacre, the Indonesian security apparatus moved
against the Klandestin leadership in Dili. Executive Committee officials including
Filomeno da Silva, Francisco Branco, Jacinto Alves, Juvencio Martins and Gregório
Saldanha were arrested and imprisoned. The Secretary, Constâncio Pinto, fled overseas.
On 23 January 1992, Xanana’s political deputy, Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak (José
Amancio da Costa), was captured in Dili.671 Soon after, the outline organisation of the
Resistance was:

Commander : Xanana Gusmão
Deputy: Taur Matan Ruak
Senior staff: Mau Huno, Mau Nana, Mau Konis
Konis Santana (Political Assistant)

Região Frontiere Região Centro672 Região Ponte Leste
CONDOP West CONDOP Centre CONDOP East
Venâncio Lere (1987-1994) Armando Nolasco (-1987)
Ernesto (“Dudu”) Ular Rihik David Alex
Falur Rate Laek Lere Anan Timor (1994-99)
(1994-1999)

With Xanana Gusmão’s capture in Lahane (Dili) on 20 November 1992 by a
Kopassus team led by the future Danrem 164 Major Mahidin Simbolon673, Xanana was
replaced as Falintil leader by Mau Huno (also known as Ma’ Huno Bulerek Karataiano/
Karathayano – “BAKAR” ie António João Gomes da Costa)674, – who was himself
captured six months later675, and succeeded by Konis Santana. Soon after the capture of

671
Mau Hodu (sometimes as “Hudu”) was granted amnesty in 1993 (Ant, “Amnesti bagi Sisa …”, 9
December 1996; and AFP, “ABRI Repeats …”, 9 December 1996) – see also footnote 675. Mau Hodu
became Political Secretary of Fretilin in 1999, and reportedly “disappeared” on 8 September 1999 after being
detained by TNI/Militia in Kupang, West Timor. According to Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …, London, 2002,
p.257 his body was exhumed from a shallow grave in October 1999 at Batugadé (a few kilometres within
East Timor on the north coast). However, in May 2005, it was reported that Mau Hodu , while being
transported by the TNI from Kupang to Atambua, had been shot by TNI Sergeant Suryadi – and his fate
remained unknown (“Leandro Minta RI Bebaskan Mauhudu”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 13 April 2005, p.1,
p.11). According to the Commission for Truth and Friendship, “Per Memoriam ad Spem” - Final Report of
the Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) Indonesia -Timor-Leste, Denpasar, 31 March 2008. p.181 -
Mau Hodu was killed by ABRI sergeants Simão Correia and Luís dos Santos at Sanirin, Atabae.
672
Região II and Região III were subsequently created principally from Região Centro – with Região III also
titled as “Cruzeiro”. Região Frontiere became Região IV and Região Ponte Leste became Região I.
673
Author’s (Chamberlain) discussions with Colonel Mahidin Simbolon (Danrem 164), Dili, 29 April 1996.
For an Indonesian military report on Gusmão’s capture, see Butarbutar, B.S. & Kusaeni, A., TIDAR – Bhakti
Tiada Akhir: 40 tahun pengabdian AMN Angkatan ’65, Ridma Foundation, Jakarta, December 2005.
674
The revised leadership was announced in the “Declaração ‘20 de November’ ” signed by Ma’Huno
Bulerek Karathayano (BAKAR) as Secretary of the Comissão Directiva da Fretilin (CDF) for the CNRM on
28 November 1992. Lu’Olo and Konis Santana were announced as Vice-Secretaries of the CDF and Taur
Matan Ruak was declared as Estado Maior das Falintil (responsible to the Secretary of the CDF).
675
Mau Huno (also also as “Ma’Huno”), a founder of ASDT/Fretilin, was captured on 3 April 1993, about 56
km south of Dili. He was granted amnesty in August 1993. According to ABRI Colonel M. Simbolon
(Danrem 164), Mau Hodu (see footnote 671) and Mau Huno became “wirawasta berhasil” (successful
entrepreneurs) following “pembinaan” (“guidance”) - Ant, “Amnesti bagi Sisa …”, 9 December 1996.
Nominated by Fretilin for the Constituent Assembly in 2001, Mau Huno suffered a stroke and relinquished
his position – his wife, Maria Teresinha Viegas, was a member of the National Parliament (2002-2007).
129

Xanana Gusmão, the CNRM leadership suspended Gusmão’s functions in order to
“"invalidate any actions or statements which he might make under pressure".676 The
Resistance was then led by a “troika” of Konis Santana, Keri Laran Sabalae (Pedro Nunes -
Head ie Secretary of the Klandestin Movement), and Ramos-Horta (“Overseas”) until their
Resolution 1/03/94 dated 23 March 1994 reinstated Xanana as leader in early May 1994 677
In 1993, the CNRM leadership under Konis Santana established the Executive
Committee of Struggle/Clandestine Front (Comité Executivo da Luta/Frente Clandestina –
CEL/FC) as a wing of the CNRM to coordinate the Klandestin movement. At the same
time, to conduct the armed struggle, an Executive Committee of the Struggle/Armed Front
(Comité Executivo da Luta/Frente Armada – CEL/FA) was formed. However, the role of
Falintil local commanders remained strong – as “the practical structure of the Clandestine
Front functioned in Dili, but it was mostly the Armed Front that coordinated the clandestine
people”.678
The CEL/FC structure to mid-1995 was:679

Secretary: Keri Laran Sabalae (Pedro Nunes)
Vice Secretary : David Dias Ximenes680
Regional Directive Organs (Orgão Diretivo Regional):
West - Aquilino Fraga Guterres (Ete Uco)
Centre - Paulo Alves (Tubir Loke Dalan)
East - Paulo Assis (Funo Matak)

In theory, this structure presided over the Zone Executive Committees and the
subordinate Nureps and Celcoms – but in practice, these did not function throughout the
country. As noted earlier, in Iliomar, Resistance organisational terminology such as
“nurep” (for village cell) and “celcom” (for sub-village cell) appear not to have been
widely used.
The CEL/FC Secretary, Sabalae (Pedro Nunes), was captured by ABRI near Gleno
- about 45 kilometres southwest of Dili, on 1 June 1995 and later killed.681 The then in-
country CNRM leader, Konis Santana682, assumed leadership of the Clandestine Front.

676
This was an issue of concern following East Timor Governor Abilio Soares’ television interview with
Xanana Gusmão in Denpasar on 27 November 1992 (broadcast on TVRI on 1 December 1992) – see press
coverage in “Xanana Menyesal dan Minta Maaf – Timor Timur Milik Indonesia” (“Xanana Regrets and
Apologises – East Timor Belongs to Indonesia”), Kompas, Jakarta, 2 December 1992, p.1, p.14. See also
critical comments by Rogério Lobato and Abilio Araújo in Jolliffe, J., “Gusmao still fights back: journalist”,
The Age, Melbourne, 13 December 1992. For a report on the TNI interrogation of Xanana Gusmão in Bali
and Jakarta in late November 1992, see: H. Nurhana Tirtaamijaya, TNI Colonel (Retired), Dialog dengan
((Dialogue with)) Xanana Goesmao [sic], Surabaya, August 2007.
677
Lusa, Jornal de Noticias: 10 May 1994. Note however that Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 164
relates that both Xanana Gusmão and Konis Santana “rejected” the “troika” concept.
678
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 163 – quoting the “last leader of the Clandestine Front”, Lu’ Olo
(Francisco Guterres)
679
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, part 5, para 165.
680
Born in Baguia (Baucau), David Dias Ximenes had been an alferes (second lieutenant) in the Portuguese
Army in 1975 (together with Rogério Tiago Lobato and Roque Rodrigues) – and command was passed to him
on Ataúro when the Portuguese administration departed in December 1975. In Darwin, the evacuated
Portuguese military commander, Major António Eduardo Quieroz de Martins Barrento, commented that the
Portuguese “overseas empire is now Macau and Lieutenant Ximenes” (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 14).
681
A Jakarta magazine article alleged that Sabalae – and also Rodak, David Alex, and Konis Santana; were
killed as a result of a “mutual agreement” between Colonel Mahidin Simbolon (Danrem 164) and the
imprisoned Xanana Gusmão – ie purportedly to enable Gusmão to wrest control from the more radical
Resistance leadership - see Yuniardi, S., “Eks Tentara mengaku: Konspirasi Xanana Gusmao dan Mahidin
130

At about this time in 1995, following a dispute with the Falintil leadership, a group
led by Commandante Rodak – and including Elle Sette (L-7 – Cornélio Gama)
disassociated themselves with the Falintil command and, as “isolados”, based themselves
in the Laga/Los Palos area.
Villagers in Iliomar characterise the 1990s as “sudah aman” (“safe”) – a time of
comparative security, with declining harassment by ABRI and few armed clashes. The
Iliomar people also became more resigned to the Indonesian occupation, with several men
joining the Indonesian public service (“pegawai negeri sipil” – PNS) and many joining
ABRI, including Polri. Some young men of Iliomar served in ABRI Kostrad683 infantry
units – including on operational tours of duty in Irian Jaya (Papua), but very few – if any,
served in the Los Palos-based Yonif 745.684
In Iliomar, Lere Anan Timor regrouped Falintil fighters, and on 17 March 1993,
reportedly entered the remote sub-village of Larimi (about 10 kilometres northwest of
Iliomar Town) with about 40 men seeking information and supplies.685 Also in 1993,
combined patrols of Hansip from Iliomar and Los Palos accidentally engaged one another
in the Rofohe area of Iliomar village, and a Hansip member from Iliomar I (Vatamatar) -
Albertino Monteiro, was shot and killed.
In 1993, according to the Tirilolo village report686, an ABRI patrol from their post
at Tirilolo clashed with a Falintil group in the Nunderder area resulting in 10 ABRI killed
and one soldier missing.687 ABRI launched a follow-up operation, and the Tirilolo village
chief, Adão Fernandes Ximenes, was detained and tortured at the Yonif post at Cainliu for
three days. Subsequently, a Tirilolo villager, Salvador Nunes of Borupai, was arrested and
tortured at Cacaven.
On 4 January 1994, Robert Jerónimo (Nami Hala – 54 years) of Leilor sub-village
(Ailebere) was killed in the forest near Heidan (Fuat) by Team Alfa and Kopassus. The
following day, in either Dili or Baucau, Matias da Costa of Ailebere village was arrested as

Simbolon” (“Ex-soldier Admits: A Conspiracy Between Xanana Gusmão and Mahidin Simbolon”), Gatra 42,
Jakarta, 7 September 2004. However, the circumstances of their deaths would discount such an allegation.
682
Nino Konis Santana was wounded in a clash with ABRI in 1996 and died in Mirtutu village (Ermera) of
complications from his wounds on 11 March 1998 – see also footnotes 681 and 707. For a brief description of
Konis Santana’s activities (1991-1998) and eventual death at Mirtutu - where he had established a
headquarters underground see Carey, P., “Writing on human skin”, History Faculty Alumni Newsletter No.3,
Oxford University, Oxford, May 2005. In December 2005, former Falintil Region IV Secretary, José
Agostinho Sequeira (“Somoco/Somoxo”) warned that any discussion on the reason for Santana’s death
should not be made public “as it could cause a civil war” – Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 10 December 2005.
683
Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command) whose units are at a
higher combat readiness and effectiveness than territorial units under Kodam (Military Region) command –
see Conboy, K., Elite: The Special Forces of Indonesia 1950-2008, Equinox Publishing (Asia), Jakarta, 2008.
684
6,097 East Timorese were serving in ABRI in mid-1998 (34 officers, 558 senior NCOs, 5,505 other ranks)
– Budiardjo, C., and Liem Soei Liong, East Timor Under The Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of
Indonesian Army Documents, Tapol Occasional Report No. 26, October 1998. Most East Timorese served in
the 700-series territorial battalions subordinate to Kodam IX Udayana (headquartered in Denpasar, Bali) and
Kodam VII Wirabuana (headquartered in Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi). For a history of Kodam IX/Udayana,
see Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) – Kodam IX/Udayana, 42 Tahun Pengabdian Kodam IX
Udayana (42 Years of Service by Military Region IX, Udayana), Kodam IX/Udayana, Denpasar, 27 Mei
(May) 1999.
685
According to a knowledgeable resident of Larimi – as related to the author in April 2002.
686
Tirilolo village report, p.5.
687
The ABRI/TNI Operasi Seroja memorial at Cilangkap (Jakarta) does not record any such large number of
ABRI casualties in East Timor in 1993. However, note that the memorial does record those ABRI members
of Zipur 3 killed in Viqueque in August 1983 and Zipur 9 in Iliomar in November 1986.
131

a suspected Klandestin on the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Sarining Setoyo Utomo
(Commander, 551 Combat Detachment), tortured and killed.688
In 1994, Lere Anan Timor assumed command of Region I (East) – with David Alex
replacing him in command of Region II.689

Lere Anan Timor (right) leading a Falintil night patrol – Iliomar area, April 1994690

In April 1994, Lere directed Abílio Pinto to reform the Klandestin organisation in
Iliomar as a Zone - ie as “Zona Titus Lima”, and to increase Klandestin support activity.
This was undertaken, but Abílio did not revert to using the terms “Nurep” and “Celcom”
for the Klandestin organisations at the village and sub-village levels respectively as he
feared that such an association would endanger the village and sub-village officials.
Gonçalves da Costa was the first recruit – as an estafeta, followed by Veríssimo dos Santos
- also as an estafeta, and Tito de Deus as the Zone Vice Secretary. Abílio Pinto met
regularly with Lere at a number of jungle locations in the Eastern Region and occasionally
in Abílio’s house in the Akara sub-village area south of Iliomar Town and also in Lere’s
former home in Cainliu village.
In April 1994, there was a major clash between ABRI and Falintil in the area of the
Veira River about 10 kilometres northeast of Iliomar, resulting in six ABRI killed and their
weapons recovered by Falintil. A large ABRI operation was also reported in the
Iliomar/Loré border area in July 1994.

688
CNRM Current Assessment, 14 May 1994. However, the Ailebere village report indicates Matias was
killed in the forest (ie, ailaran) as a Falintil fighter in 1995.
689
For a 1994 organogram, see Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na
resistência à ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit., 2014, pp.227-228 – that shows: Renan as the Secretary of the
Ponte Leste Region; “Rodak Tekitimur” as the deputy military commander under Lere; five platoons in Ponte
Leste commanded respectively by “Leti Moko, Neves, Ranbabian, Mau Alsi, and Peter Doli”; and eight
sections commanded by “Maulenorai, Nando, Maufitur, Mate Laka, Foti, Serasa, Soru Mah, and Mau Nani.”
690
Lere is in the right foreground. In 1994, he was Falintil Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the
Ponte Leste Region (Região I).
132

Falintil group, including Serasa, in Iliomar – 15 April 1994 691

In 1994, Kopassus Colonel Prabowo Subianto formed Gada Paksi (also as “Garda
Paksi” – “Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi”: Youth Guard of Integration Upholders”) as a
youth militia to oppose the Resistance – principally the Klandestin youth movement. In
Iliomar, the four-strong Gada Paksi group was sponsored by the “Iliomar” representative in
the Lautém People’s Representative Council (ie, DPRD-II), Afonso Pinto.692 However, the
group was soon infiltrated by Klandestin and was of limited effectiveness (see notes on the
Gada Paksi at Annex E).
In March 1995, in the Buidala area east of Iliomar, Falintil killed two ABRI soldiers
and recovered their weapons. A Falintil fighter, José Mauwani, a younger brother of
Falintil commander Lere, was also killed in this clash. Several months later, on 4 July
1995, ABRI forces killed three Falintil (Fernando, Nuno, and Lariko) in a clash in Iliomar
Sub-District.
On 26 September 1995, East Timor Governor, Abílio José Osório Soares, was
briefly harassed by Falintil fighters in southwestern Iliomar while enroute from Los Palos
to Viqueque693. Soares was leading a motorcycle convoy touring the Districts to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence. Near Namane, about six
kilometres southwest of Iliomar Town, the convoy of about 30 riders was sighted by a
group of ten Falintil - including Vicente Lourdes, who fired about 15 warning shots from
his machine gun near the Governor’s group. No casualties were reported. Later however -
as the Iliomar-based BTT sub-unit had a post at Namane (a few kilometres east of the
incident site), there were recriminations between Koramil 03, the BTT and Kopassus on the
lack of security for the Governor’s movement through Iliomar Sub-District.
By 1995, the reformed Iliomar Klandestin organisation under Abílio Pinto totalled
eight: Abílio, Tito de Deus, Orlando dos Santos, Carlos da Costa (“Resi Lafu” - a former
Falintil who had been captured at Quelele), and four estafeta. However, in October 1995,
ABRI broke up the Klandestin cell in Iradarate (Iliomar II), and Amancio da Costa was
forced to flee into the forest and join Falintil elements.
ABRI pressure continued in Iliomar with major operations in the forest border areas
of Iliomar/Loré, and on 18 January 1996, a Falintil guerrilla - Vicente Lourdes (aged 40 –
involved in the November 1986 Ossohira ambush and the September 1995 firing on
Governor Soares’ convoy) surrendered in Bubutau at the Yonif 612 post. Also in January
691
The group is led by José dos Santos (Mau Vani) – followed by Serasa (both armed with M-16s). Serasa’s
appointment was “Comandante de Secção nas áreas de Iliomar”.
692
The Iliomar Gada Paksi members received three months’ training in Java.
693
The incident was briefly reported in the Republika newspaper (Jakarta) of 27 September 1995. Abílio José
Osório Soares (died 16 June 2007, Kupang) served as Governor from September 1992 to August 1999.
133

1996, Fernando Teki (Fernando de Deus – younger brother of Tito de Deus) was arrested in
Iliomar but escaped from the ABRI vehicle enroute to Los Palos. Assisted by priests in Los
Palos, Fernando avoided recapture. About a month later, on 27 February 1996, the ABRI
Kodam IX Udayana commander based in Denpasar (Bali), Major General H.A. Rivai,
visited Iliomar to commemorate the anniversary of ABRI’s civic action program – “ABRI
Masuk Desa” (ABRI in the Villages) and opened a public sanitation project. Falintil
reported a major clash with ABRI in Iliomar Sub-District on 27 September 1996, but did
not provide any details of the incident.
By 1996, the Klandestin organisation in Iliomar had been developed and numbered
18 members. Under Abílio Quintão Pinto’s direction, the OMT and OJT694 (Organisação
Juventude Timorense – Organisation of Timorese Youth) were quite active. However, in
Iliomar security remained extremely tight within the Klandestin organisation with members
often not known to each other – all contact was made through a small number of “estafeta”
which included Mariana Pinto (Fuat), her son - Ricardo Pinto Lourdes, Gonçalves da
Costa, Lino de Deus, Domingos Pinto, Simão Castello, Carlos, and Martins Pinto and
Tomás Pinto of Cainliu. The estafeta carried messages between Klandestin cadre, and also
to Falintil in the jungle – principally to Commander Lere Anan Timor in the Falintil base
area at Laivai695 (in the vicinity of GR 5266, about 13 kilometres inland from northern
coast – ie within Lautém District, about four kilometres east of the Baucau/Lautém border)
and later at Atelari (in Baguia Sub-District of Baucau District, about 15 kilometres
southeast of Laga - ie 25 kilometres northwest of Iliomar). Messages were also
occasionally carried to and from Baucau and Dili. OMT (ie, female) cadre also carried
messages and small supply items to Laivai and Atelari. In January 1997, while visiting Dili,
the Iliomar Zone CNRM Secretary - Abílio Quintão Pinto, was advised by telephone that
ABRI in Iliomar were aware of his role and activities (as confirmed in later BTT
reporting696). However, he returned to Iliomar later in January and was not questioned or
arrested. He opined that, following the opening of East Timor in 1989 and in the aftermath
of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, ABRI were more careful in dealing with the people - and
overt mistreatment reduced considerably.

694
Fretilin’s student wing, UNETIM – “União Nacionalde Estudantes Timorense”, was active 1974-1977
until it was replaced by the Fretilin youth organisation OPJT. Timor-wide, underground resistance youth
organisations included OJETIL, LORIKO, FITUN, RENETIL, and the Students’ Solidarity Movement. See
Constâncio Pinto, “The Student Movement and the Independence Struggle in East Timor: An Interview” in
Tanter, R., Seldon M., Shalom S.R. (eds), 2002. Nicholson, D., “The Lorikeet Warriors’’, October 2001 -
provides a comprehensive review of the underground student movement. Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part
5, para 145-170 provides a history of the “Clandestine Liberation Movement” – particularly the involvement
of Timorese youth. In 1997, several youth were members of the Resistance’s “Brigada Negra” (Black
Brigade) – founded by Avelino Coelho (alias Shalar Kossi) operating in Central Java and engaged in “bomb-
making”. Two were arrested enroute to Dili with home-made bombs and documents in late-1997. When
interrogated in Cipinang Prison (Jakarta),Xanana Gusmão stated that he had authorised the making of bombs
and took “responsibility” for the activities – noting that the explosives were not for use against civilian targets
or in Indonesia, “but to bolster our armed resistance to the Indonesian army.” - ----, “Timorese charged with
explosive offences, TAPOL, Bulletin No.144, December 1997 pp.3-4.
695
The Laivai base had been used by the Rodak and Lekinea groups from the mid-1980s - and also by Elle 7
(Cornélio Gama – see footnote 754) based further west in the Laga area. The Laivai base was attacked and
briefly occupied by a combined ABRI force in 1998 - principally Kopassus and Tim Alfa, but Falintil
withdrew without casualties.
696
Suseno, Situasi Dan Kondisi: Daerah Pos Desa Illiomar (JUATA), Iliomar, November 1997, Annex D –
see Annex G.
134

ELECTIONS IN ILIOMAR – 1997, 1998

On 29 May 1997, Iliomar villagers participated in the Indonesian general elections
– their fourth in the Indonesian period (ie 1982, 87, 92). ABRI records in Iliomar indicated
that 65 percent of the Sub-District’s voters chose the ruling Golkar party; 30 percent chose
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party); and 3 percent cast their votes for the Muslim-based
PPP (United Development Party)697. Iliomar-born Afonso Pinto (Golkar) was re-elected as
an “Iliomar representative” to the Lautém District 20-member DPRD-II (ie, Assembly) and
was joined by a second Iliomar-born member, Jaime da Costa (also Golkar – the Iliomar
Camat in 1985). The report by the ABRI BTT sub-unit in Iliomar noted: “there has been an
increase in the acceptance of integration, as evidenced in statements of village notables and
youth. The understanding of Indonesia’s political organisation and system has risen as
shown in the successful and smooth conduct of the 1997 general election. The quality of
human resources remains low, especially in government agencies which hampers the
implementation of development”.698
In May 1998, the Indonesian administration conducted the first elections in Iliomar
for village chiefs - who had previously been appointed by the Sub-District Chief (Camat).
In Iliomar I, Iliomar II, and Fuat - José Luís da Costa, Felipe Pinto, and Joachim Henriques
– the respective incumbents, were elected; in Ailebere, Américo Jerónimo was replaced by
António de Jesus; in Cainliu, Martinho Hornay was replaced by Júlião Soares; and in
Tirilolo, Selso Martins replaced Adão Fernandes Ximenes.

CONTINUING VIOLENCE AND ABUSES

While overt violence by ABRI declined from the mid-1990s, serious human rights
abuses continued. On 8 October 1997, Luís Pinto (Lalumato sub-village/Ailebere) was
killed by Team Alfa and members of ABRI Yonif 511 at Osso-Nomar in the Ailebere area.
A villager from Ailebere, Doli-Boru, was killed by Kopassus soldiers at Asonomar, about 4
kilometres from Ailebere, on 11 October 1997.
On 8 April 1998, in Jakarta, about 20 students from the Iliomar Youth and Students
Union (IMPI – Ikatan Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Iliomar)699 demonstrated outside the offices
of the Indonesian Human Rights Committee (Komnasham) against alleged abuses in
Iliomar by the Indonesian security forces. They cited recent ABRI reinforcements, tighter
movement restrictions, military operations planned to commence on 20 April, and recent
violations by Kopassus, Rajawali and SGI (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen – Joint Intelligence
Unit) teams and the Gada Paksi (Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi – Youth Supporting
Integration). They specifically claimed that: Albino da Costa had been shot and killed in
Ailebere in April 1997700; Saturnino Nunes dos Santos had been arrested on 29 November
1997; Selso (also “Celso”) Martins, village head of Tirilolo, had been tortured by Kopassus
in January 1998 for reporting the death of Albino – see above; Agostinho Geronimo, 70

697
Ibid, p.2. These figures vary considerably from the official Lautém District figures for Iliomar Sub-District
which show an average 2,724 voters (of an eligible 3,136) casting DPR RI/I/II votes for: Golkar 81/82/84
percent; PDI 18.4/17.3/15.6 percent; and PPP .7/.6/.4 percent. ----, Kabupaten Lautem Dalam Angka 1997,
pp. 29-34.
698
Suseno, Situasi Dan Kondisi …, November 1997, p.2.
699
Matabean, Jakarta, 8 April 1998. Mericio Guevara - a University of Indonesia student, was noted as the
IMPI chairperson and Graciliano Oliveira - a Surabaya Technical Institute student, as a spokesperson.
700
No such killing is recorded in the Ailebere village report of 24 July 2003.
135

years, had been tortured on 3 March 1998 by an Iliomar representative in the Lautém
Parliament - ie DPRD II, Afonso Pinto; José de Deus, Francisco Barreto, Amancio
Ximenes Perreira and Fernando dos Santos had been arrested by Kopassus on 23 March
1998; and Eco dos Santos arrested on 28 March 1998.
Although ABRI violence against the villagers had reduced, serious abuses still
continued. On 13 October 1998, a young married woman in Bubutau (Fuat village) was
raped by a soldier from the local BTT sub-unit of Yonif 642. The incident was reported,
but villagers were eventually intimidated by the Iliomar Koramil staff into not pursuing
charges against the ABRI soldier.701

THE ORGANISATION OF THE RESISTANCE :
THE CNRT, THE ARMED AND KLANDESTIN WINGS

In 1996, a report by BIA (Badan Intelijen ABRI), ABRI’s intelligence agency in
Jakarta (Kalibata), listed Falintil’s strength country-wide as 188 with 88 weapons. In the
Ponte Leste (Eastern Region) - ie Região I, the report detailed Falintil as totalling 46
guerrillas with 35 weapons, and organised as follows:

Talisman (Região code name)

Lere Anan Timur Rangkabean Bonifacio Rodak Alux (ie Aluc)
(Iliomar) (Cacaven) (Luro) (Laga) (Loré )
Strength: 4 Strength: 4 Strength: 4 Strength: 4 Strength: 5
Weapons: 2 Weapons: 3 Weapons: 3 Weapons: 4 Weapons: 3

Maunana David Alex Renan Selak Bere Malai Laka702
(Mt Paichau) (Samalari) (Maupitine) (south of Mehara)
Strength: 3 Strength: 8 Strength: 8 Strength: 6
Weapons: 3 Weapons: 6 Weapons: 6 Weapons: 5

701
East Timor Human Rights Centre, Annual Report 1998, Case 3.3.1: 1 March 1999.
702
In 1983, Bere Malai Laka (also as “Malay Laxta” – Frederico Raimundo) was Secretary of the Department
for Information, Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Region (Nakroma) – see earlier photographs. He
was reportedly killed during an attack by ABRI on a Falintil headquarters encampment near the Galata River
(Venilale) on 27 August 1988 (with Oan Timor) – see Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili, Document
07124.005, p.1.
136

BML 6

BONIF’ 4 MAU N’ 3
RODAK 4
ALEX 8 RENAN 8
ALUX 5

RANGK 4

LERE 4

ABRI ESTIMATE OF FALINTIL STRENGTH
IN PONTE LESTE - 1996

In September 1996, a BIA report listed Falintil strength in ABRI’s Sector A area
(Baucau, Viqueque, Lautém) as 71 armed and 27 unarmed guerrillas. A subsequent 1997
BIA report showed the Ponte Leste/Região I leadership as :

Commander – David Alex; Deputies – Lere A.T., Rodak (Cipriano)703, Alux.

A November 1997704 report on Iliomar by the Iliomar-resident ABRI BTT sub-unit
- ie A Company of Yonif 613, listed 22 Klandestin members in Iliomar Sub-District –
including Abílio Quintão Pinto and his deputy Tito De Deus (see extract of the ABRI
document at Annex G). The report also listed “GPK” (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan -
Security Disturbing Elements – ABRI’s preferred term for Falintil from about 1990) as
follows:

Leader: Lere Anan Timor (Tito Dos Santos);
Strength: four men with two weapons;
Areas of Operation: Namaluto River, Mount Tarafalua, Mount Duilele,
Mount Denofai, and Mount Samarogo;
Sub-villages regularly visited: Larimi, Bubutau.

The November 1997 report by BTT Yonif 613 included a sketch map of the Iliomar
Town and adjacent areas outlining Falintil routes and logistic areas – see below:

703
Rodak, who led a Falintil “isolados” group, had reportedly been killed earlier in July 1995 - either in a
clash with Yonif 330 in the Larimi area of western Iliomar or when lured to a festival at Ililai on the northern
coast. However, he may have been killed some months later – as late as 1997. See also the discounted
allegations at footnote 681. The website of the TNI 330th Airborne Infantry Battalion notes the killing of
Rodak – “the Falintil leader of Laga”,during Operation Mantap III on 7 July 1995 as a “prestasi”
(“achievement”).
704
Suseno, Situasi Dan Kondisi …, November 1997, Annex D – see extract at Annex G.
137

Bagan Dislokasi Pos Dan Route Klasik GPK 705
(Sketch of Posts and Classic Falintil Routes)

The sketch shows the the headquarters of ABRI’s A Company/Yonif 613 (ie, the “house”
symbol) in the former Portuguese Posto building in the Iliomar Town centre. The road
north to Los Palos is shown – and from the “T” junction at Ailebere village south of the
Town, the road leads west to the Irabere River and Uato-Carabau; and south-east to Iliomar
II village and then further east along the coast to Lore. The Lihulo River is shown west of
the Town. The four “hatched” areas represent Falintil “logistic areas” (“daerah logistic”) ie
as “RAH LOG” – including one east of the Town centre ie adjacent to Caentau sub-village
of Iliomar I. Dotted clockwise arrows indicate Falintil regularly-used routes, and the
smaller arrows in/out and around the Town centre show ABRI’s inner security patrol
routes.
The Senior Leadership of the Struggle

In 1998, the CNRM reported that the Falintil commander, Nino Konis Santana, had
died of injuries in the Ainaro area on 11 March 1998 following a fall into a ravine during a
night-time movement.706 This was also reported in statements by Resistance leaders that
also announced the replacement of Konis Santana as Falintil leader by Taur Matan Ruak.
However, information available in early 2004 indicates that Konis Santana had been
wounded in an ABRI ambush in 1990 and subsequently died of his wounds in the village of
Mertutu near Ermera town on 11 March 1998.707 The Resistance apparently intentionally

705
Ibid, Annex A. The Bahasa title of the sketch map is not completely clear. “Dislokasi Pos” may mean
ABRI “posts that are harassed”; and “Route Klasik” can probably be interpreted as “regularly-used routes”.
For “GPK” ie “Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan” (“Security Disturbing Elements”) as “Falintil”, see footnote
461.
706
Ramos-Horta, J., Liberation Fighter – Nino Konis Santana: 1959-1978, CNRM - Lisbon, 30 March 1998.
707
Email to author from Gerry van Klinken dated 20 February 2004. See also footnotes 681 and 682. Jolliffe,
J., “Lunch …”, The Age, Melbourne, 26 August 1994 notes that Konis Santana was wounded (in the neck,
thigh and sole) in an ABRI ambush in 1990 – six of his eight-strong unit were reportedly killed in the ambush
(Keleke survived, but was later killed in combat).
138

reported his death as accidental - both to deceive ABRI and to maintain the morale of the
Struggle movement.
On 23 April 1998, at a National Resistance conference in Peniche (Portugal), the
CNRM was retitled CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense) - ie the word
“Maubere”, regarded as a politically-redolent and negative “proletarian” term, was replaced
by the more inclusive “Timorense”. Xanana Gusmão was elected President of the CNRT
and José Ramos-Horta elected as Vice President.708 The Conference also adopted a broad
policy platform, or “Magna Carta”.709 However, these changes had little practical effect in
Iliomar where the Resistance cadre continued to be comprised almost solely of Fretilin
supporters.
The formation of the CNRT was followed by organisational changes in the in-
country political and clandestine movement which - as an “Internal Political Front” (Frente
Politica Internal – FPI) replacing the CEL/FC, was re-organised to match the Falintil
regional structure – as follows:

FPI Secretary: Francisco Guterres (Lu’Olo)
Vice Secretary: David Dias Ximenes
Região I Secretary: Renan Selac/k (Faustino dos Santos)
Região II Secretary: Sabika Besi Kulit (Américo Ximenes)
Vice Secretary: Marito Nicolau dos Reis
Região III (Cruzeiro): Secretary: Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raúl)
Vice Secretary: Vírgilio Smith (Kranek Hali Mesak)710
Região IV Secretary: Riak Leman (Vidal de Jesus)711
Vice Secretary I: Aquilino Fraga Guterres (Ete Uco Terba Tim)
Vice Secretary II: Calisto dos Santos Coliati
Região Autónoma Dili: José da Silva (Fo Laran)

Falintil’s Regional Organisation

By late 1998, the CNRT/Falintil country-wide structure had consolidated and
expanded – and Indonesia reports indicated its organisation and strengths as follows:712

Headquarters
Xanana Gusmão: President/Falintil Commander in Chief (jailed in Cipinang, Jakarta)
CNRT Deputies: David Ximenes (Fretilin), Leandro Isaac (UDT)
Falintil (Deputy) Commander: Taur Matan Ruak; Chief of Staff: Lere Anan Timor

708
According to Xanana Gusmão: “In late 1998, I gave authorization to Manuel Tilman, Father Francisco
Fernandez, Father Domingos Maubere and Father Filomeno Jacob to go to Portugal to help Ramos-Horta and
Fretilin as well as UDT to organise a Conference aimed at changing CNRM to CNRT, so that it would
embrace all Timorese. This was due to the fact that UDT did not accept the term ‘Maubere’, and wanted the
‘T’ to represent Timorese.” – Gusmão, X., President of the Republic’s Message to Fretilin, Dili, 22 June
2006.
709
Niner, S., “A Long Journey of Resistance …”, 2000, pp. 11-17.
710
In 2008, Vírgilio Smith was Secretary of State for Culture in the Timor-Leste Government and President
of the Comissao Homenagem for Resistance veterans.
711
Riak Leman was born in Same, 1952; was Secretary Região III, 1995-98; Fretilin Central Committee -
1998; Member of Parliament 2002-2008 as member of PSD – see Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 2 August 2007.
712
Herman, J.M., “Pola Hit and Run Jadi Andalan Falintil”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 13 April 1999. This media
report was the most comprehensive exposition of the Falintil organisation and strengths publicly available in
April 1999. These Falintil personnel strengths for each of the Regions are repeated in Durand, F. B., East
Timor: A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific – A Geo-historical Atlas, Silkworm Books,
Chiang Mai, 2006, p.117 (figure 101) as “according to the Indonesian army”.
139

Secretary, Internal Political Front (FPI): Lu’Olo
(Falintil strength: 242 men; 127 weapons: G-3, FNC, Mauser, M-16, SS-1, TP)

Regions/Região

Região IV Frontiere Região III Região II Região I Ponte Leste
(Ermera, Liquiça, (Dili, Aileu, (Baucau, Viqueque, (Lautém, Baucau)
Bobonaro, Cova L’) Ainaro, Man’) Manatuto)

Region Commanders
Ernesto Fernandes Falur Taur Matan Ruak Lere Anan Timor
(“Dudu”) Rate Laek
60 men; 27 weapons 45; 28 60; 55 77; 17

Group Commanders (each group about 10 strong)

Mau Konis* Manubela Maubuti – II Deputy Aluk Descartes
António Sabika* Lekinaea Rena(n) Selak: Sek’
Somoco Terabulak Berdudu Mau Nana*, Larimau*
Deker* Matagaio* Ular*, Amico Martino, Celula*
Riak Leman: Sek* Samba 9* Falux, Lu’Olo* Eugenio Nunes/Neves
Alukiak, Haksolok

* Notes: Mau Konis is the nom de guerre of António Santana. Riak Leman (Vidal de
Jesus) became a member of the National Parliament (2002-2008). Samba Sembilan (“9” –
also know as Samba Anu Siak) is the nom de guerre of Jaime Ribeiro. On 9 November
1998, Falintil attacked the Koramil post (1634-02) in Alas Sub-District town (about 175
kilometres southeast of Dili in Manufahi District)713, reportedly contrary to Xanana
Gusmão’s direction on limiting military activity. TNI reprisals soon ensued.
Subsequently, Sabika (also known as Sabica Besi/Besse Kulit/ Kalil – Américo Ximenes),
the Falintil Região III commander, was replaced by Xanana with Falur Rate Laek/Lai
(Domingos Raúl) – see also footnote 601. Further command changes occurred in early-
1999 when Ular Rihik (Vírgilio dos Anjos – see footnote 556), was appointed Commander
Região IV with Deker and Roke (Jacinto Viegas) as principal subordinates, and Sabika was
appointed Commander Região II.714 In 2001, Sabika and Falur Rate Laek were appointed
lieutenant colonels in the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF = F-FDTL: Falintil-Forças
Defesa de Timor-Leste)715 – with Falur commanding the F-FDTL’s First Battalion based in
Los Palos/Baucau (until 2008); and Sabika Besse as the commander of the F-FDTL
training base in Metinaro. Matagaio is the nome de guerre of Matias Menezes. Mau Nana
(Cornélio Ximenes) was appointed an F-FDTL major (later promoted to lieutenant colonel)
heading the F-FDTL J-2 (intelligence function). Ular Rihik and José Maubuti (Manuel
Freitas) were appointed majors, and Amico was appointed a captain. Deker (Domingos

713
Suratman, T., Brigadir Jeneral, Untuk Negaraku …, 2002, p.42 provides detail on the incident eg three
TNI killed, seven kidnapped and 36 weapons seized and cites “Tera Maubulak” (ie António da Costa e Silva)
as the commander of the Falintil force.
714
See Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, pp. 80-81 for a TNI view of the Falintil
organisation in 1999; and the OSINT email report of 20 July 1999 for charts and maps of the Falintil
organisation.
715
Falintil was formally disbanded on 1 February 2001, with the F-FDTL founded on the same day.
140

Agusto) was appointed a lieutenant - but in September 2003, Deker was dismissed from the
F-FDTL. Lu’Olo (Francisco Guterres) became Fretilin Party President in 1999 - and later
also President of the National Parliament (2002-2007). Larimau (Justino Bernardino da
Costa) was also Regional Political Assistant, but was captured earlier near Bauro village on
27 or 29 March 1998. Aluc Descartes (João Miranda)716 was appointed a F-FDTL
lieutenant colonel in 2001 and subsequently commander of F-FDTL’s Second Battalion
mid-2003 to mid-2006 – then ACOPS J1 Personnel until appointed military assistant to the
President in late 2006. “Celula” refers to couriers (“estafeta”).
However the detailed Falintil organisation related above in April 1999 by
Indonesian journalist Justin Herman is probably not as accurate as the following:717

Falintil Headquarters
Taur Matan Ruak (José Maria Vasconcelos)
Lu’ Olo (Francisco Guterres) – Secretary FPI
Mau Nana (Cornélio Ximenes)
Bersama (Mário Baptista)
Leki Luru, Aikitu (Lorenco Cabral), Alin Laek, Naroman, Malkom (Césario da Costa)

Region I Region II
Commander: Lere Anan Timor Commander: Sabika Besi Kulit
(Tito da Costa) (Américo Ximenes)
Deputy: Aluc Descartes Deputy: Mau Buti (Manuel Freitas)
(João Miranda) Pol Asst: Hamar (António Baptista Alves)
Pol Asst: Punu Fanu
(Benedito Dias Quintas)
Domin
(Domingos da Costa Santos)

Group Commanders: Group Commanders:
Kasian Susar (north) Manu Bela
(Elias da Costa) (Paulino Freitas )
Mau Alsi (east) Berdu’u
(Amelio Garcia) (Fernando Gusmão)
Nando (west) Amiko
Piter Doli (south) (Domingos da Câmara)
Neves ie Superman (east) Rai Ria
(Higino das Neves) (João Pedro da Silva)
Mau Velis (east) Haksolok
(Martinho Pereira) (Césario S.M. Ximenes)
João Lino (communications)

716
Aluc is a abbreviation of “A Luta Continua” (“the Struggle continues”) – author’s discussion with Aluc
on 23 August 2006. In early 2007, Aluc was appointed military advisor to then President Xanana Gusmão.
717
As provided to the author by F-FDTL Lieutenant Mário Baptista (Bersama) in Dili in July 2005 and in
brief discussions with Vírgilio Smith on 2 July 2007. Region I group commanders were confirmed to the
author by former Falintil Region I Deputy Commander, Aluc Descartes, in October 2005. A detailed
organogram of Falintil’s 1998 organisation is at pp.258-259 in Lousada, A.P., Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D.,
A luta armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit., 2014. That organogram shows the
Ponta Leste Region commanded by Lere Anan Timor, with Aluk as the deputy commander, platoon
commanders: “Kasian, Neves, Mau Alsi, and Peter Doli”; and section commanders: “Bikismao, Mau Lenorai,
Nando, Maufitur, Mate Laka, Foti, and Serasa.”
141

Region III Region IV
Commander: Falur Rate Laek Commander: Ular Rihik
(Domingos Raúl) (Vírgilio dos Anjos)
Deputy: Eli Foho Rai Boot Deputy: Tata Mai Lau (António Soares)
(Cornélio Gama) Roke (Jacinto Viegas Vicente)
Pol Asst: Sai La Fila Samba Sembilan (Jaime Ribeiro)
(Roque Soares Baptista) Somotxo (José A. Sequeira)

Group Commanders: Group Commanders:
Sadia R. Laek Deker
(João Silva Pereira) (Domingos Augusto)
Anin Fuik (Francisco Alves) João Lino
Matagaio Kakehe
(Matias Menezes) (Alberto de Almeida Magno)
Railakan Murak
Terra M. Bulak (António Augusto)
(António da C. e Silva) Teti Dias
Funa Lakan Taroman
Susar Lemorai
(Francisco R. Santos)
Sunu Moris (now deceased)
Samodok
(Raúl Madeira).

718
Regional Clandestine Organisation – Region I

CNRT Klandestin Lautém District

Zona: Los Palos Luro Iliomar Mehara/Tut’ Moro/Laivai
Code: “Sera Lima” ? “Titus Lima” “Tango A” “Halihun”

Sek’: Justino Agapito Abílio Felisiano Sergio
Valentim Ramos Quintão Pinto

In the Iliomar (Titus Lima) Zone:

Abílio Quintão Pinto (Codename: “Abut Mesak”)
Zone Secretary (from August 1995)

Tito de Deus: Vise (Deputy) 1 (Codename: Naga Sakti)
Mário Fernandes Cabral: Vise 2 (Codename: Boro) - until 1998

718
Based on discussions with former local Klandestin leaders in the period 2001-2008 and advice from
Justino Valentim in late October 2008. The organisation and codenames of the Sub-District cells changed eg
the “11 September” cell covered: Bauduro (?), Fuiloro and Com; the “7 December” cell covered the villages
of Parlamento, Maina I and II, Serelau, Home, Souro, Baduro, Luro and Cacaven; and Daudere was within
“Halihun”.
142

OMT (Womens’ Organisation) OJT (Youth Organisation)
Olinda Marques “Bile Cur” Liborio Madeira “Luru Asu”
Alicia Gonçalves “Luru Asa” Gonçalves da Costa
Sidalia Mesquita Ximenes719 Alfredo Lebre

Hub’ Masyarakat Kemiliteran Logistik Jaksa Penerangan
(People’s Relations) (Military) (Logistics) (Justice) (Information)
Felipe Pinto Mau Lo Lulik Felipe Pinto Domingos
“Tasi Malai” (João Fernandes
Jerónimo)

Medicin Mobilisasi Massa Administrasi (?)
(Medicine/Health) (Mass Mobilisation) (Administration)
Mateus Ribeiro Jeremias Pinto Adolfo Pinto

Estafeta: 6 , plus:
– including Gonçalves da Costa (“Lulik Fera Klaran”), Lino de Deus (“Karan-ulun”),
Domingos Pinto (“Iradarate”), Carlos (“Lari-kua”), Ricardo Pinto Lourdes, Simão.

A more comprehensive list of Iliomar-born Falintil and Clandestina/Klandestin
members throughout the Struggle is at Annex F.

THE MILITIAS

From the mid-1970s, ABRI had recruited East Timorese into a variety of
paramilitary organisations to assist in the maintaining of security, including Hansip, Wanra,
Kamra, Ratih - and in the 1990s, Gada Paksi and Milsas. Kopassandha, and its successor
Kopassus, had also specifically raised East Timorese auxiliaries to assist in intelligence
gathering and field operations. These Kopassus auxiliaries – often termed “partisans” in the
mid-1970s to mid-1980s, operated in most of the 13 Kabupaten (Districts) of East Timor,
with the most notable being Halilintar (Atabae/Bobonaro - formed 1975 and active until
1980; reformed 1995), Makikit (Viqueque), Tim (Team) Sera (Baucau - formed 1986), Tim
Saka (Ossú/Baucau - 1987), Railakang (Baucau – late 1970s), and Team Alfa (Lautém –
founded 1986).720 According to a leaked ABRI document, in 1997, these paramilitary
militia numbered 1,188 in twelve teams – including Tim Alfa in Lautém721; and leaked
documents also suggest that in 1998 these groups were, at times, administratively classified
as Wanra.722

719
Sidalia/Cedalia Ximenes married Lere Anan Timor, F-FDTL Chief of Staff, in Cainliu village in 2001.
720
“Partisans/militia” had been raised as early as 1975 during ABRI’s Operation Flamboyan. Conboy, K.,
Kopassus, 2003, pp. 310-312 relates the later founding of Tim Sera and Tim Alfa in 1986 by Lieutenant
Colonel Luhut Panjaitan’s Task Force (Satgas/Dampak 86) based on ex-Falintil personnel with a
Kopassandha cadre.
721
Tapol, East Timor Under the Indonesian Jackboot, Occasional Report No. 26, October 1998, p. 7.
722
Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere, “ETO: Breakdown of Indonesian Armed Forces …”, 11
February 1999, p.2 notes militia groups numbering 1,200 men “grouped within the Wanra branch”. Militia
control, organisation and activities – particularly in the 1998-1999 period, are comprehensively covered in the
Final Report of the Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF), Denpasar, 31 March 2008. The Final Report
143

In Lautém District, the Kopassus headquarters commanded the Tim Alfa militia
detachments – averaging about eight strong who were armed and in civilian clothing, that
operated under local Kopassus command in each of the Sub-Districts. In Iliomar, Tim Alfa
members were well-known to the villagers and, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, were
particularly feared - as their intelligence-gathering activity could lead to denunciation of
villagers, interrogation, imprisonment – and worse.
Following President Habibie’s 9 June 1998 suggestion of granting greater
autonomy - ie “special status” to East Timor, ABRI began to raise additional paramilitary
units – particularly in the western and central areas of the Province.723 These new milisi
(militia) units included Ablai (Manufahi/Same), Ahi (Aileu), Aitarak (Dili/Ainaro), Besi
Merah Putih (Maubara/Liquiça), Dadarus (Maliana), Darah Integrasi (Ermera), Darah
Merah (Ermera), Garuda Hitam (Ainaro), Junior 59-75 (Viqueque), Laksaur (Covalima),
Mahadomi (Manatuto), Mahidi (Ainaro/Cassa), Makikit (reformed - Viqueque), Meo
(Ambeno/Oecusse), Naga Merah (Dili/Ermera), Pana (Maubara), Railakang (Ermera), Saka
Loromonu (Batugadé), Sakunar (Ambeno/Oecusse), Tim Kosong Kosong (Ainaro),
Tatarah (Dili/Maubisse) and Jati Merah Putih – ie “Real/True Red and White” (Lautém)724.
These militia - ie milisi, were a separate entity from ABRI/TNI’s uniformed Milsas
auxiliaries, discussed previously.
A branch of the militia political group BRTT (Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur – East
Timor People’s Front) was also formed in Lautém District. All three militia elements in
Lautém District - ie Tim Alfa, Jati Merah Putih, and BRTT, were directed by the Bupati
(Regent/District Administrator) Edmundo da Conceição e Silva; the TNI commander - ie
Dandim 1629, Lieutenant Colonel Sudrajat A S; and the local Kopassus commander -
Lieutenant Rahman Zulkarnaen.
Beginning in December 1998, militia elements committed serious human rights
abuses against East Timorese supportive of independence – principally in the western half
of the Province. In April 1999, a form of “legal” cover for these militia was belatedly
attempted when the TNI commander in East Timor, Colonel Tono Suratman (Danrem 164),
and Governor Abílio Soares declared the militia to be legal elements of Pam Swakarsa
(“Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa” - Self-Initiated Security Groups) under police

cites an ABRI statement indicating the strength of the militia groups as 1,100 with 11,950 “militant
supporters” under these groups – p.78.
723
Senior TNI officers have claimed these militia units arose “spontaneously” …“at the initiative of the
people” for protection against “terror, murder and robbery” and were supported by the Local Government as
Pam Swakarsa - see following footnotes 724 and 725 and Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …,
2002, pp. 74-76. Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.4, para 662 notes “25 militias” in 1998-1999; and
Part 4, pp.28-30 provides a listing of 28 militia groups. At Annex 1, the CAVR Final Report also provides
Robinson, G., East Timor 1999 – Crimes Against Humanity, July 2003 that includes Chapter 9.8 covering
Team Alfa activities.
724
Contrary to one press report, Darah Integrasi did not operate in Lautém – but operated in Ermera District.
See Anwar (Makarim), Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, pp. 77-78 for a listing of 20 “militia” units
that includes leaders, founding dates and areas of operations. TNI Major General Zacky Anwar claims these
units were not known by the people as “milisi” (a term he claims was coined by the Western press), but rather
as “Pejuang Pro-Integrasi (PPI) – Pam Swakarsa” (Pro-integration Fighters – Self-Initiated Security Groups)
– pp. 73-74. For an objective outline of the formation and organisation of the militias see UNICEF/Barry, L.,
East Timorese Children Involved in Armed Conflict, 2001, Appendix 5 – but which omits Lautém’s Jati
Merah Putih. See also Kingsbury, D., “The TNI …”, 2000; Suratman, T., Merah-Putih – – Pengabdian dan
Tanggungjawab di Timor Timur , 2000; UNTAET Political Handbook, 6 April 2001; HQ PKF Military
Capability Study, 16 March 2001; and the OSINT email report of 20 July 1999. The 2005 Chega !,CAVR
Final Report states that in the 1998-1999 period, there were 25 militia groups – Chega !,CAVR Final Report,
Chapter 7.4, para 662. See also Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, pp.28-30 for a listing of 28 militia
groups.
144

command, entitled to carry arms, and paid by the Province authorities.725 This specifically
included Tim Alfa in Lautém. According to the report of the Indonesian Human Rights
Commission (KPP-HAM), “the majority of the core leadership and personnel of the militia
were members of Kamra, Wanra (two kinds of civil guard), Milsas, Gada Paksi, and
Hansip (another kind of civil guard) and members of the District Military Command.” 726
On 7 March 1999, the pro-integration militias were nominally consolidated under
the broader control of the Integration Struggle Forces (Pasukan Perjuangan Integrasi -
PPI) commanded by the Halilintar militia leader João Tavares, with Eurico Guterres - the
Aitarak militia leader, as second in command.727 The pro-autonomy militia in Lautém
District were listed under the “sub-command” of the PPI’s “Sektor A” led by Joanico
Césario Belo.728
In Iliomar, the only resident militia were the eight Tim Alfa729 members under
Kopassus command, led by Raimundo Ferreira of Cainliu (members included: Júlio
Cardoso, Tirilolo; José Ferreira, Iliomar I; and Tito Fernandes, a former sub-village head of
Larimi). In Iliomar, only one former Falintil reportedly served with Tim Alfa : Mateus of
Larimi sub-village. Although feared by villagers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by mid-
1998 the Iliomar Tim Alfa rarely harassed villagers, had been infiltrated by the local
Klandestin, and were considered to be “ineffective” by the senior CNRT Klandestin cadre
in Iliomar.

RELIGION AND THE CHURCH IN ILIOMAR

An ABRI report of November 1997, recorded Iliomar’s population as 99.6 percent
Roman Catholic – with only 15 persons noted as Islamic who worshiped in their homes.730
The report also noted : “a part of the Iliomar inhabitants are followers of animism”731 and

725
Oki, “Pam Swakarasa …”, Kompas, Jakarta, 28 December 1999. Lieutenant General (Retd) Kiki
Syahnakri (TNI martial law administrator in East Timor - 7-27 September 1999) stated “Alfa and Makikit
were trained in discipline and bound to certain rules … as Wanra”, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 26 July 2007.
See also Major General Zacky Anwar’s explanation of militia as Pam Swakarsa in Anwar (Makarim), Z. (et
al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, pp. 73-79 eg “in fact, Pam Swakarsa are not much different to
neighborhood or community watch ((organisations)) in large cities with criminal problems like New York or
Amsterdam” - p.75. See also Wiranto, Witness in the Storm - A Memoir …, 2003, pp. 101-102. Pam
Swakarsa were originally raised in November 1998 in Jakarta by Abdul Gafur (the former Soeharto Minister
for Youth and Sport) as a countervailing “vigilante” force to oppose students demonstrating against the
Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).
726
Hasibuan, A. Dr (Chairman), KPP HAM Report, Jakarta, 31 January 2000, Chapter II - notes that Tim
Alfa had operated under Kopassus command for several years before the raising of additional militia units in
1998 and 1999.
727
Herman, J.M., “Menelusuri Mereka …”, Surabaya, 12 April 1999. Van Klinken, G. & Bouchier D., “The
Key Suspects”, Canberra, 2002, p. 214 gives 27 February 1999 as the founding date of PPI.
728
Joanico (da Costa) Césario Belo was the leader of the Tim Saka militia (Baucau) - 1996-1999. He took
over the leadership of Saka after the death of its founding commander, Julião Fraga, on 24 October 1996.
729
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part 4, p.29 suggests that in 1999 Tim Alfa changed its title to Jati Merah
Putih – but this has yet to be confirmed.
730
In 2002, only one Muslim family remained in Iliomar – Marcos dos Santos, a teacher at the Iliomar I
Primary School. A mosque (closed in 1999) is located in Los Palos, and in November 2002 there were 26
Muslim families (90 people) in Los Palos town. The major concentration of Muslims in Lautém District was
in Luro Sub-District with 160 persons (as at 2002).
731
In 1972, 67.7 percent of East Timor’s population was categorised as animist and 31 percent as Catholic. In
1992, 90.24 percent were listed as Catholic – see Saldanha, The Political Economy …, Jakarta, 1994, p. 365.
A Lautém District statistical report for 1997/98 showed Iliomar residents as: 5,282 Catholic; 12 Islam; 3
Hindu; and 1,418 Others. “Buan” (“magic/witchcraft” ) is currently not regarded as a significant element in
Iliomar/Makalero culture.
145

“the influence of religious personalities such as the pastor and catechists is very dominant
in the people’s lives”.732
The Roman Catholic church in the Sub-District (Nossa Senhora de Fatima) was
located in Iliomar Town - with adjacent accommodation for the priest. Smaller chapels
were built in Ailebere (Igreja Nossa Senhora das Dores – the largest), Iliomar II/Iradarate
area (in Iliomar sub-village),Tirilolo, Cainliu, and Caidabu. The Church also established
several schools: the Junior High School (“Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama João Paolo
II”)733, and the primary school in Caidabu sub-village.
There was no Roman Catholic priest regularly resident in Iliomar until mid-1999.
Preceding this, routine religious duties were performed principally by catechists – about six
for most of the period. Catechists would hold Sunday services in the chapels, and for
several years a priest would come to Iliomar every few months to conduct major services.
The visiting priest from the late 1970s until the late 1990s, “Pastor” Louis Preto, was
highly regarded by the Iliomar population for his monthly visits to the Sub-District. On
occasions, he would walk from Los Palos to Iliomar (46 kilometres) to conduct the
services. To the annoyance of the Indonesian administration, he was supportive of the
Klandestin and also sometimes conducted masses in the jungle for Falintil.734
The Roman Catholic church in Iliomar was administered from Baucau - and was
not a parish (“paroki”), but a “quasi-paroki”. Throughout the later Resistance period in
Iliomar, the Church was regarded as “netral” (neutral). However, at least one catechist was
killed by ABRI (Joachim Sanches, 22 December 1983 - see above) and several catechists
(including Gaspar Pinto) had previously been imprisoned by ABRI. Priests and visiting
Red Cross officials also sometimes carried messages for the Resistance to Los Palos and to
Dili.
A Roman Catholic priest (ie pastor) - Augustino da Costa (of Baucau), became
resident in Iliomar on 14 August 1999, and the number of catechists expanded to 12. Since
late 1999, there has been a decline in church attendance in Iliomar, principally by male
youth. From that date, activists no longer need church protection or sanctuary and appear to
have focused on political associations or more material pursuits.735 The regular absences of
the Iliomar priest (in Baucau) in the period 1999-2002 also reportedly alienated many of
the Iliomar congregation.

THE RAPID GROWTH OF FALINTIL : 1998-1999

In early 1998, Falintil strength in the Province of East Timor was about 300 – with
those joining after 1991 termed “novatos” (“newcomers”), as distinct from the “veteranus”.
However, from mid-1998, Falintil’s strength country-wide grew rapidly. With the prospect
of autonomy – and later, independence, many former fighters rejoined Falintil in the jungle
areas. Importantly, following the increased militia violence in early 1999, Falintil numbers
were further “swelled” by hundreds of youth, including clandestine front members fearing

732
Suseno, Situasi Dan Kondisi …, November 1997, pp. 2-3.
733
In mid-2002, following demonstrations by students and parents against monthly school fees of USD 3.00,
the Catholic junior high school was threatened with closure – but these difficulties were overcome.
734
For a summary of the Catholic Church in East Timor see Lundy, C., “From Passivity to Political Resource
…”, Spring 2000. For general Church humanitarian and moral support to Falintil see Smythe, P., “The Role
of the Church …”, Sydney, 1999, p.106.
735
This phenomenon is noted in Gef., “Umat Nasrani makin jauh dari gereja”, Suara Timor Lorosae, 15
November 2002, p.1.
146

arrest736. Deserting East Timorese paramilitaries also joined the armed Resistance in their
base areas.737 Falintil camps also became crowded with large numbers of villagers fleeing
ABRI/TNI and militia violence. By late August 1999 prior to the popular consultation (ie,
“referendum”), Falintil estimated the strength of their forces at 1,500.738
In the Eastern Region (Região I) major base camp at Laivai (about five kilometres
inland from the northern coast – and about 50 kilometres north of Iliomar Town), Falintil’s
strength was reportedly about 80.739

1999 – CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE IN ILIOMAR

In early 1999, the Iliomar Sub-District Chief (Camat) was Horacio Marques, and
the Sub-District Secretary (“Pendamping”) was Gaspar Seixas – both Lautém-born. The
Indonesian “commander” of the Sub-District was the territorial Koramil 2903 commander
(Danramil), Second Lieutenant Mohd. Nur Hamsah (Sulawesi-born), with Sergeant 2nd
Class Suprapto as his deputy. The Koramil directly commanded a small staff (about six),
the six village Babinsa, and two Milsas platoons of local men (about 40-strong) led by
Valenti Madeira with the rank of “Prada”. The TNI BTT rifle company from Yonif 621
was headquartered in Iliomar Town and commanded by Captain Erwin Setiawan, with 12-
man outposts: at Alapupu (north of Dirimuni), Dirimuni, Ula-ia (north of Caidabu),

736
In February 2002, the Falintil High Command provided a listing of 1,093 Falintil and former Falintil
combatants, not selected for service in the ETDF (F-Falintil), as eligible for the Falintil Reinsertion
Assistance Program (FRAP). This number was increased to 1,308 by April 2002 of which “nearly a third of
all FALINTIL Veterans deemed eligible for FRAP benefits actually joined the guerrilla group in 1998 or
1999 – during the last two years of armed conflict” – McCarthy, J., FRAP Final Evaluation Report, p.40. See
Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p.42 for a Falintil recruiting drive in Regions II
and III in late 1998/early1999. McDonald, H., “The big question now is does the country actually need an
army”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 1 July 2006, reported a Falintil “rush of volunteers … (numbers
rose from 500 to 600 fighters in 1996 to 1,600 by October 1999 when Indonesia left)”. “Taur Matan Ruak
stated … six hundred had joined in 1998 presumably because of the greater freedom that resulted after
Suharto’s fall in May of that year” – Moore, S., “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years …”, 2001, p.13.
737
Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p. 82 - deserting East Timorese members of
TNI, the police and security paramilitaries also swelled Falintil ranks eg on 8 September 1999, 34 personnel
from the Soibada Koramil - about 80 km southeast of Dili, kidnapped their TNI captain and deserted to
Falintil. Martinkus, J., “Giving Peace the Bullet”, Melbourne, 19 October 1999 relates youth in the Ainaro
area in October 1999 seizing abandoned TNI equipment and declaring themselves as “Falintil”. See also
Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …, London, 2002, p. 172.
738
UNICEF/ Barry, L., East Timorese Children Involved in Armed Conflict …, 2001, p.12. TNI estimated
the strength of the Klandestin cadre at 3,000 which included 230 of East Timor’s 33,602 public servants –
see Anwar (Makarim), Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p. 81. The 2002 Falintil Reinsertion
Assistance Program (FRAP) states 18,000 as the most frequently quoted number of Klandestin who had
participated in the Resistance – see p.119/footnote 163 in McCarthy, J., FRAP Final Evaluation Report, June
2002. Reportedly only 112 Falintil fighters from the original phase of the Resistance in 1975-1983 were still
in the field at the end of 1999 – see McDonald, H., The Age, 20 April 2002. More authoritatively: “Of the
surviving 23,461 Falintil veterans of the armed struggle in 2008, only 242 claimed to have served over 15
years or more – and only 49 claimed to have participated in the armed struggle for the entire 24-year period
(World Bank - Report, Defining Heroes: Key Lessons from the Creation of Veterans’ Policy in Timor-Leste,
Dili, 19 August 2008, para 55) – see also Annex F. Interestingly, an Australian military officer, assessed that
“Militarily, Falintil was a spent force in 1999.” - Kilcullen, D.J., The political consequences of military
operations in Indonesia 1945-99 …, 2000, p.139 - see Bibliography (Dissertations). Kilcullen’s study
however is focused essentially on the western districts of Timor-Leste - with almost no coverage of activities
and operations in Região I-III inclusive.
739
The 2002 Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) supported 1,308 eligible former Falintil
combatants not selected to joint the ETDF (F-Falintil) – of these 140 (10.7 percent) were from Lautém
District – McCarthy, J., FRAP Final Report p.46.
147

Caidabu, Naunili, Bubutau, Maluhira, Tirilolo, and Manulor (Ossohira). Four Kopassus
personnel occupied a separate building in Iliomar Town and commanded eight local Tim
Alfa members740 led by Raimundo Ferreira of Cainliu. The police presence - commanded
by Sergeant Major Andreas (Adrianus) Nidat, comprised the Polsek station opposite the
Junior High School with 19 personnel (11 Polri - including six village Bimpolda, and eight
former Kamra). Only the police commanders carried weapons – other weapons were kept
in the Polsek station. A police paramilitary element of 18 Brimob personnel commanded
by Lieutenant Surtopo had quarters in the centre of Iliomar Town – the Sabhaia/Samatta
Bhayangkari barracks.
Falintil strength in Iliomar was only eight guerrilla fighters: Comandante Lere (Tito
dos Santos), Serasa (Orlando Jerónimo), José Pinto, Vitorino Madeira, António Pinto,
Casmiro Pinto, Armindo Ransel, and Domingos Cunha (nom de guerre - Funukia). In
accordance with the Resistance policy of emphasising the political struggle while retaining
a military presence, they avoided clashes with the Indonesian security forces. However, the
local Falintil had regular contact with the CNRT Klandestin organisation in Iliomar
(numbering about 30) and several hundred supporters. CNRT Vice Secretary Tito de Deus
often met with Serasa (his elder brother) in his (Tito’s) home, at the home of shop-owner
Orlando Soares, and on Baitomar and Iliomar Hills.
Indonesian President Habibie’s 9 June 1998 surprise offer of “wider autonomy”
(“otonomi yang diperluas”) and his subsequent 27 January 1999 offer of a choice for
“separation from Indonesia” (“berpisah dengan Negara Kesatuan RI”)741 generated great
excitement and expectation among Iliomar villagers – but consternation for the Indonesian
military and administrators, and also for the many East Timorese committed to integration
eg civil servants, military, and paramilitary – and their dependants. Unlike the western
region of East Timor however, Lautém District did not suffer the polarization and militia
violence evidenced in Maliana, Suai, Liquiça, Ainaro and Dili in late 1998 and the first half
of 1999. The Resistance had traditionally been far stronger in the eastern half of the
Province – and any sentiment for continued association with Indonesia was far lower there
than in the western districts. Indeed, “Easterners” (“Lorosa’e”) – ie, the energetic “Firaku”
(“our comrades” in Makassae) considered the taciturn “Westerners” (“Loro’munu” or
“Kaladi”) as somewhat passive and less committed to the Resistance and the cause of East
Timorese independence742.
About 50 Tim Alfa members from Los Palos743 and several of the Los Palos-based
Jati Merah Putih militia744 participated in the major pro-autonomy rally in front of the
Governor’s office in Dili on 17 April 1999 – at which the Indonesian-appointed Pam
Swakarsa head, Eurico Guterres, called for violence against those who had “betrayed

740
Leaked ABRI documents indicate that in mid-1998 Tim Alfa strength in Lautém District was 115 – see
Tapol Bulletin 151, March 1999.
741
See ----, East Timor in Transition: 1998-2000 – An Australian Challenge, DFAT, Canberra 2001, pp. 38-
54 for detailed discussion of the Habibie offer.
742
The terms Kaladi and Firaku reportedly emerged during the 1911-12 Dom Boaventura rebellion with the
rebels as “Kaladi” and the coalition of eastern Timorese levies used against them termed “Firaku”. On 6
January 2004, in a public statement, F-FDTL Commander, Taur Matan Ruak warned against pitting Firaku
against Kaladi. The F-FDTL “Petitioner Incident” and violence of 2006 had roots in Easterner disparagement
of a perceived Westerner lack of commitment during the Struggle. Accordingly to a 2008 World Bank report,
the casualty “figures by district also show fairly even levels of participation across the country during the
1975-1979 period, with disproportionately high mortality rates in the western districts that the Indonesian
armed forces overcame” - World Bank - Report, Defining Heroes: Key Lessons …, 19 August 2008, para 55
(citing the CAAC-CAVF Technical Report of August 2004).
743
Moore, S., “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years …”, Indonesia, No 72, Cornell University, Ithaca,
October 2001, p.36, footnote 70 – but cautions that this number might be inflated.
744
Yayasan HAK, “Aitarak Dan Kampanye Kekerasan …”, Dili, 21 April 1999.
148

integration”. Although there was considerably less tension or impact in Lautém in late 1998
or the first half of 1999, the Jati Merah Putih militia undertook several “pawai keliling”
(“convoys”) around Los Palos town and to several Lautém villages, beginning in mid-
April, to intimidate the populace. Local government officials, often led by the Bupati and
the TNI Kodim commander, participated in these militia rallies.745
Following the 5 May 1999 Agreement signed at the United Nations in New York,
the CNRT organisation in Iliomar became more public, but remained wary746. In June, a
group of Iliomar notables747 travelled to the Falintil base in the Atelari area to discuss with
Commander Lere Anan Timor the formation of a “broad front” organisation in Iliomar to
include both pro-integration and pro-independence supporters. On their return, a 22-
member “Forum Komunikasi Rakyat Iliomar” (FKRI - Iliomar People’s Communication
Forum) was established to negotiate arrangements for the “popular consultation” (ie, “jajak
pemungutan/penentuan pendapat” – ie, in effect, a “referendum”). The Forum was chaired
by Felipe Pinto – who was concurrently Iliomar’s “adat” leader, village chief of Iliomar II,
and a senior CNRT cadre. Martinho Hornay (a public servant) was the Deputy, with José
Luís da Costa (village chief of Iliomar I) and Adolfo Pinto as Secretaries. The Forum
members also included the other four village chiefs and several nominally pro-integration
supporters, such as past and present Indonesian public servants.
During the months of mid-1999, TNI offensive activity in Iliomar all but ceased.
Although on 24 May, Carlos Pinto of Caidabu sub-village was shot and killed in the jungle
by troops from the Yonif 621 post in Caidabu.748 Second Lieutenant Mohd. Nur Hamsah,
the Koramil 03 commander, met often with senior cadre – including at the home of Vice
Secretary (Vise I) Tito de Deus. Nur Hamsah was reportedly quite dispirited, believing that
the autonomy option – “Opsi I”, would be rejected in the forthcoming August 1999 popular
consultation. In such private meetings, he opined: “otonomi pasti kalah” (“autonomy will
definitely be defeated”), and sought discussions with the CNRT on ensuring a peaceful
transition to the Resistance administration of Iliomar and the safe departure of his ABRI
personnel.
On 7 June 1999, Iliomar villagers voted in the Indonesian general election749 - with
the incumbent Afonso Pinto (Golkar) re-elected to his seat in the Lautém District DPRD-II
Assembly. The other incumbent, Jaime da Costa (Golkar), was replaced by Adolfo Pinto
(Golkar, of Iliomar II village). Domingos Morais (PDI-P, of Caidabu/Iliomar II) was also
elected to the Lautém DPRD II. Subsequent events however, prevented any of those elected
from taking their positions in the Lautém Assembly.
UNAMET’s750 mandate for the management of the popular consultation set voter
registration to begin on 22 June, with polling day on 8 August 1999. Subsequently,
administrative and security considerations - principally militia violence, forced the
745
Matebean, “Kabupaten Lautém – Ancaman, Teror dan Intimidasi”, 25 May 1999.
746
Iliomar CNRT cadre were aware of the call by the Darah Merah (Ermera) militia commander Lafaek
Saburai (Afonso Henriques Pinto) for “Operasi Sapu Jagad” (Operation Clean Sweep/Total Cleansing) “with
the object of eliminating the cadre” of “the anti-integration” – see Saburai, L., Front Pembersihan …,11
March 1999; Saburai L., Red and White Greetings, 13 April 1999; Comissão … FA10-1999/10/21eng, 28
October 1999 - and for analysis and comment see Robinson, G., “The fruitless search for a smoking gun”, pp.
246-247 in Colombijn F. & Linblad, J.T. (eds), Roots of Violence, Leiden, 2002.
747
These included: José Luís da Costa, (village chief of Iliomar I); Américo Jerónimo (village chief of
Ailebere from late 1999), Fernando Jerónimo (village chief of Fuat from late 1999), and Francisco da
Costa (Secretary, Cainliu village).
748
Carlos, a suspected Klandestin, was buried by the TNI in a shallow grave – later, heavy rains and local
flooding swept away his remains. One report cites the TNI element involved as a “Caçador” ie “Hunter” unit.
749
Province-wide, voter turnout at the 919 polling stations was reportedly 93 percent, with Golkar receiving
47 percent and PDI (P) receiving 35 percent.
750
UNAMET - United Nations Mission in East Timor: 11 June-29 October 1999.
149

deferment of these dates to 13 July and 30 August respectively. UNAMET District
Electoral Officers (DEOs) arrived in Iliomar on 4 July, and on 7 July were joined by two
Australian UN CIVPOL (Civilian Police) officers, Aaron Crabtree and Brad McMeeking.
DEOs began voter education on 10 July, visiting all six villages in the Sub-District. The
DEO group initially comprised two team leaders (Barry Robert Hay, New Zealand; Máriola
Ratschka, Poland), a DEO from Argentina (Angel Osório), and a DEO from Nepal (Aryal
Gyanendra).751 The international UN personnel lived in the church accommodation
adjacent to the Iliomar Catholic church and established an office within the Junior High
School. The DEOs employed several local people as interpreters (four) and drivers (two),
and over a period of 20 days from 16 July registered voters in Iliomar - concluding on 6
August. The DEOs then returned to Los Palos and lived there - but commuted to work in
Iliomar on most days, while the two UN CIVPOL remained in Iliomar Town. On 18
August, the DEOs returned to live in Iliomar for the scheduled five-day “exhibition and
challenges” period, and recruited and trained about 15 local electoral staff. On 14 August,
the Catholic priest Father Augustino da Costa became permanently resident in Iliomar.
In accordance with the Agreement, Falintil guerrillas began moving to their four
cantonment areas in early August (originally planned to begin on 18 June – see the map
opposite) - ie to Odelgomo (Aiassa village near Bobonaro); Ermera (Holarema sub-village
in Poetete village – 10 August); Uaimori (also as “Waimori”), about 35 kilometres
southwest of Baucau, just inside Viqueque District)752; and Atelari (25 kilometres
northwest of Iliomar in eastern Baucau District)753.

751
UNAMET/UNTAET personnel who served in Iliomar are listed at Annex C.
752
For an eyewitness account of activity in the Uaimori cantonment, see Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …,
London, 2002, pp. 177-191, pp. 196-201.
753
UNAMET was informed that 187 Falintil were cantoned at Aiasa/Aissa (Odelgomo), 153 at Poetete, 260
at Uaimori (Waimori), and 70 at Atelari: ie totalling 670 – see Greenlees, D. and Garran, R., Deliverance,
2002, p.182; Cristalis, I., Bitter Dawn …, London, 2002, p.187. A 2014 Portuguese publication listed the
cantoment sites and Falintil occupants as: Atelar (Lere) 70, Uaimori 260 (Taur Matan Ruak, Falur),
Aiassaa/Odelgomo 187 (Ular Rihik); Poetete 153 (Tata Mai Lau) = total 670 combatants. Lousada, A.P.,
Oliveira, A.J., & Afonso C.D., A luta armada timorense na resistência à ocupação 1975-1999, op.cit., 2014,
p.263.
150

By mid-August, Falintil fighters in Iliomar and Falintil from the main Região I
base at Laivai had concentrated at Atelari where they celebrated the Falintil “birthday” on
20 August 1999. Up to 300 Falintil were grouped in Atelari, together with several thousand
villagers – ie internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing militia and TNI harassment.
Initially, the Atelari cantonment was reportedly commanded by Eli Foho Rai Boot
(Cornélio Gama)754; but soon after Lere took command. Unarmed UNAMET military
observers (UNMOs) from Malaysia and Brásil were stationed in the Atelari cantonment
site. While both Falintil and the pro-autonomy militias were required to disarm755, no
disarmament took place in the eastern districts of the Province. Citing the escalating
violence by the pro-integrationists, Falintil refused to disarm but, despite provocations,
remained within their four cantonment areas – with but only minor exceptions.756
In Los Palos on 2 August 1999, the CNRT office was opened by Armindo da Silva,
the CNRT Deputy Secretary for the Eastern Region. About 550 people were present,
including UNAMET representatives and several low-level Indonesian officials and TNI
officers.757 The Indonesian administration in Iliomar campaigned strongly for continued
integration - distributing pro-autonomy material such as T-shirts, and providing cigarettes
and sums of money (20-50,000 rupiah), particularly to youths, to induce pro-autonomy
votes. During the “campaign period” in Iliomar from 11 to 27 August, the Iliomar CNRT
became publicly active and held a pro-independence rally on the Iliomar sports ground
(Lapangan Merdeka) on 24 August. At that rally, TNI personnel threatened that “if
Autonomy won – blood would drip; if Autonomy lost – then blood would flow !”. While
the Los Palos-based Jati Merah Putih militia conducted “pawai keliling” intimidatory visits
to several villages in Lautém District, they did not journey into Iliomar Sub-District –
reaching only as far as Cacaven village about 24 kilometres north of Iliomar Town.
However, local UNAMET electoral employees in Iliomar were often intimidated verbally
by Indonesian security force personnel eg their police security guards - although no

754
Elle 7 (Cornélio Gama – also as “L-7”, “Eli-7”, “Elle-Sette”, “Elisepti” – born in Laga), a charismatic
shaman, founded the Sagrada Familia (Sacred Family) - a quasi-religious (Catholic) clandestine network, in
Dili/Baucau in 1989. Earlier in the mid-1980s, he had reportedly supported Abílio Araújo’s opposition to
Xanana’s leadership and operated “independently” until 1988 – see UNTAET PKF Threat Assessment, 31
March 2001, p. 77. He reportedly again left Falintil command in 1995 with Commander Rodak and operated
as an “isolado” group in the Laga/Los Palos area. On Rodak’s death in 1997, Elle returned to Região II – and
then to Região III under Falur Rate Laek. Elle’s brother, Mauk Muruk (Paulino Gama) surrendered on 24
January 1985 and moved overseas (see footnote 603). Elle, as a Região III sub-commander, may have led the
attack on Alas in November 1998. His group cantoned in August 1999 at Uaimori before moving to the
centralised Falintil cantonment at Aileu. Subsequently, denied command of Falintil Company 5 in Aileu, Elle
left Aileu prematurely in February 2000 and returned with his group to the Baucau area. Cristalis, I., Bitter
Dawn …, London, 2002, pp. 170-176, 197-201, 278-279 provides a detailed first-hand account of meetings
with Elle in 1999-2001. In late July 2002, Elle – who led a disaffected group of Falintil veterans, was offered
an appointment as a “security adviser” to the East Timorese Government by Minister for Internal
Administration Rogério Tiago Lobato. On 20 July 2004, Elle led a protest in Dili demanding veterans’ rights
– that was dispersed by the PNTL and 30 protestors detained. In August 2005, he became President of the
political party Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência (UNDERTIM) and was elected to the National
Parliament in mid-2007.
755
See the Joint Agreement of the Peace and Stability Commission (Komisi Perdamaian dan Stabilitas)
signed in Jakarta on 18 June 1999.
756
Martin, I., “The Popular Consultation and the United Nations Mission – First Reflections”, pp. 141-142 in
Fox, J.J. and Soares, D.B. (eds), Out Of The Ashes …, 2000. Martinkus, J., A Dirty Little War, Sydney,
2001, p. 376 notes Falintil sorties to Laleia and Manatuto. Falintil also ambushed Team Alfa elements after
the militia killings of the “church group” in Lautém on 25 September. See also Madjiah, L.E., Timor Timur:
Perginya …, Jakarta, 2002, pp. 39-44 for a list of alleged Falintil violations.
757
Subsequently, Indonesian officials complained of UNAMET “bias” when UNAMET representatives did
not attend the local 17 August Indonesian National Day ceremony.
151

violence occurred. However, it was widely rumoured in Iliomar that the Milsas had a plan
to kill all local UNAMET employees immediately after the 30 August polling.
In August, the senior CNRT cadre in Iliomar received a copy of the secret 3 July
“Garnadi letter”758 stolen by a Klandestin member from the Korem 164 Wira Dharma
military headquarters in Dili. The memo from retired TNI Major General H.R. Garnadi to
his superior, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Feisal
Tanjung, recommended courses of action should the special autonomy option (“Opsi I”) be
rejected. In Iliomar, the CNRT cadre interpreted this memo to mean that - if the referendum
produced a pro-independence result, then Indonesian security forces and the militia would
take violent action against the CNRT and its supporters. The CNRT cadre were also aware
of the PPI directive of 17 July 1999 by its leader João Tavares which foreshadowed
destruction and violence against pro-independence supporters should “Opsi I” – the
autonomy option, be defeated.759 Accordingly, beginning in mid-August, CNRT cadre in
Iliomar began removing their furniture and belongings from their homes - hiding larger
items in the houses of relatives and burying smaller items.
On 27 August, at about 1730 hrs, 10-15 militia members armed with automatic
weapons and machetes attacked and firebombed the CNRT office in Los Palos. The militia
also attacked the adjacent home of 60-year old Veríssimo/Viríssimo Dias Quintas - the
traditional ruler (“Raja Agung”) of Los Palos and a prominent independence supporter, and
killed him.760 The news of this violence reached Iliomar on 28 August, following which the
CNRT cadre and almost all of the villagers in the Iliomar Town area (ie Iliomar I, Ailebere,
and Rumutau) fled into the jungle. Villagers in the Iradarate area on the coast also fled their
homes on 29 August when news reached that area. The weather was fine, and most of those
who fled slept outdoors on the ground.
Early on polling day, Monday 30 August 1999, the villagers – most of whom had
returned from the jungle, assembled at the Junior High School in Iliomar Town - the sole
polling centre, and cast their votes in its six polling stations. The ballot paper, see the
following page - printed in English, Indonesian, Tetum and Portuguese, offered the options
of “Accept” or “Reject” the “proposed special autonomy for East Timor”.

758
Garnadi, H.R., “Gambaran umum apabila Opsi I gagal” (“A general depiction should Option I fail”),
Memo M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999, 3 July 1999. Major General (Retd) H.R. Garnadi was a deputy chairman
of “Satgas P3TT” (Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation in East Timor) - initially
the “P4OKTT”, which operated 18 May-Sep 99. By late July, the text was available on the Internet – see
Solidamor, Surat Rahasia …, 20 July 1999. Indonesian authorities contend the letter was a forgery ie “ palsu”
(“false”) and “black propaganda” – see Kor, “Masyarakat tidak Perlu Gelisah” (“People Need not Worry”),
Kompas, Dili, 22 July 1999 (comments by H.R. Garnadi and D.P. Djalal); and Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al),
Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p. 86. See also analysis and comment in: Crouch, H., “The TNI and East Timor
Policy”, pp. 164-165 and 169-170 in Fox, J.J. and Soares, D.B., (eds), Out Of The Ashes …, 2000;
Robinson, G., “The fruitless search for a smoking gun”, pp. 249-251 in Colombijn, F. and Linblad, J.T. (eds),
Roots of Violence, 2002; and Madjiah, L.E., Timor Timur: Perginya …, 2002, pp. 202-208 (Attachment 3).
759
Siar XPOS, “TNI Ancam Perang di Timor Timur” (“TNI Threatens War in East Timor”), 18 August 18
August 1999; Pratiwi, “Catatan Perjalanan …” (“Journey Notes”), Bogor, 5 October 1999. See also
Robinson, G., pp. 247-249 in Colombijn, F. and Lindblad J. T (eds), Roots of Violence, 2002 which queries
the authenticity of the JoãoTavares PPI letter and notes that the UNAMET political office concluded that the
letter “was probably not authentic”.
760
On 19 November 2002, an indictment for the killing was filed against the Bupati (Lautém District Chief),
two Kopassus members, seven Team Alfa members, and two members of the BRTT: Martinho da Costa and
José Solari. Three of the Team Alfa members were acquitted of the murder charge in mid-December 2003.
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 15, Annex 1, p.170 notes that Viríssimo was “at one time a strong
supporter of Indonesia”. He is known to have participated in the killings at Maupitine in 1983 – see footnotes
593 and 594.
152

Of the locally-engaged electoral staff, only two did not report for duty, and they
were quickly replaced with reserve staff. At the close of polling at about 1600 hrs,
Indonesian police (members of both Polsek and Brimob) - together with several Milsas and
some Team Alfa militia, gathered threateningly outside the polling centre. The Polsek
commander, Sergeant Major Andreas Nidat, announced in Bahasa that “the voting is now
completed; UN staff must leave, and local staff must return to their homes or my men will
use their weapons”. After quick “memento” photographs with the UNAMET international
DEOs, the East Timorese staff returned to their homes, collected food and water, and then
left immediately for the jungle. Soon after, the UNAMET international staff departed by
vehicle to Los Palos with the sealed ballot boxes, and thence to Dili where the vote
counting was undertaken.761
After voting, and fearing violence, almost all of the Iliomar villagers returned to
nearby jungle and mountain areas - with many of the villagers subsequently living in the
jungle for several weeks. Iliomar I villagers concentrated on Iliomar Hill, Tirilolo villagers
on Mount Tirilolo, Cainliu people on the western side of Mount Naunili, and Fuat villagers
and some from Iliomar I on Mount Quelele. During this period, the weather remained fine,
and most of these people lived outdoors. They gathered food from local gardens, ate
coconuts and bananas, and foraged for cassava and other tubers. In the Tirilolo area, youth
blackened their faces with carbon powder from batteries and, armed with machetes and
bamboo spears, prepared to repel any militia who might attempt to cross the Lihulo River
into Tirilolo from the east. Villagers in the Iradarate/Iliomar II area on the south coast

761
Counting was conducted centrally in the Province Museum in Dili - ie not conducted in the Districts, to
avoid particular Districts being identified as either pro-autonomy/integration or pro-independence.
153

destroyed about 10 small bridges and culverts on the road from Iliomar Town to Iliomar
II/Iradarate to prevent any access by TNI vehicles to their area.
The results of the popular consultation were announced in Dili’s Mahkota Hotel
(now Hotel Timor) by UNAMET on Saturday 4 September: 98.6 percent of the electorate,
ie 438,968 voters participated in the popular consultation - with 21.5 percent supporting the
proposal for wide-ranging autonomy (“Opsi I”), and 78.5 percent rejecting the proposal.
The pro-autonomy organisations - UNIF (United Front for East Timor) and FPDK (Front
for Unity, Democracy and Justice), citing UNIF and Polsek (Police Sector) sources,
claimed that ballot boxes at the Iliomar polling centre had been tampered with to
disadvantage the pro-integration Opsi I - ie “filled” with pro-independence ballots before
voting began, and that the voting was just a “formality”.762 These claims were rejected by
UNAMET.

VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION IN ILIOMAR – SEPTEMBER 1999

In Iliomar, the Indonesian security forces began withdrawing to Los Palos on
Sunday 5 September, with the early elements including most of the 18-strong Brimob
detachment.763 At about 10pm on Monday 6 September, TNI BTT personnel began burning
public buildings in Iliomar Town – see the sketch map at Annex H. These included: the
Camat’s office; the Camat’s residence; the Sub-District medical centre (Puskesmas); the
PLN electricity generator station; the BTT headquarters and accommodation; the Koramil
headquarters and barracks buildings; the KUD office (Koperasi Unit Desa – Village
Cooperative Unit); the offices of the PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga – Family
Welfare Movement); the Iliomar Primary School; and the Iliomar Junior High School. Polri
and Brimob set fire to the Polsek police buildings and staff accommodation, the Brimob
barracks, and the adjacent Kopassus office. Seven houses in Iliomar were also burned down
or severely damaged by fire - including the Toko Cina building complex (owned by
Fernando Lay), and the houses of Gaspar Seixas, Martinho Hornay, Orlando Soares, Júlio
Jerónimo, Adolfo Pinto, and Camilio Seixas. Some villagers contend that this was
intentional, while others state that flames from the burning Koramil office - borne by the
prevailing wind, started the fires in these houses. The nearby homes of several known
CNRT senior cadre, including Secretary Abílio Quintão Pinto, were not damaged.

762
Soares, Domingos M. Dores, Kejahatan Sempurna (The Perfect Crime) – Buku Kedua, Yayasan Futuro,
West Jakarta, 2000 p.33. See also Anwar (Makarim), Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p.450 – Annex
9, Serial 59 for a similar report alleging pre-polling “box-filling” in Iliomar.
763
The TNI withdrawal from East Timor was a planned contingency operation as directed by the Bali-
headquartered Kodam IX/Udayana’s “Operasi Cabut II” – “Operation Withdrawal Phase II”.
154

Sketch Map of Destruction in Iliomar Town – ie red shaded areas (see also Annex H)

The burnt-out Sub-District Health Centre (Puskesmas)764

764
Puskesmas equipment was taken, destroyed - or smashed and thrown into a well in the right foreground.
155

The burnt-out Indonesian BTT Headquarters - ie the former Posto building 765

At about 0500 hrs on 7 September, the BTT detachment in Cainliu set fire to the
Cainliu primary school, the Health Sub-Centre and ten houses. Later that day, the families
of Milsas members and pro-autonomy supporters began to be transported by truck to Los
Palos. The following day, 8 September, the remaining Indonesian security force elements
in the Iliomar Town area, principally BTT, moved by foot north to Maluhira sub-village.
On 9 September, these TNI elements departed by truck from Maluhira to Los Palos. The
departing TNI troops shot and killed a large number of domestic animals766; and also
caused minor damage to the water pipes from the mountain springs – eg bullet holes in the
pipes at the Senira spring north of Maluhira sub-village. When passing through Caidabu,
about 10 kilometres north of Iliomar Town, the TNI troops destroyed the sub-village’s
small medical post and also the primary school on the southern edge of the village.767 In
Dili, a Cainliu villager, Anselmo Ximenes (25 years) was killed by pro-integration militia.

765
The Portuguese-era Posto building had been used as the headquarters of the resident ABRI BTT battalion
element – the Indonesian flag can bee seen on the building’s northern wall.
766
The Cainliu village report, p.12, records that 50 buffalo and pigs were killed in Cainliu.
767
A World Food Program (WFP) analysis dated 25 October 1999 assessed infrastructure destruction in
Iliomar Sub-District at 90-95 percent – see Fitzpatrick, D., “Land Policy …”, 24 November 2000. For the
Province, the World Bank “estimated that over 70% of the population was displaced following the ballot
result and almost 70% of physical infrastructure destroyed or rendered inoperable” – World Bank, Report of
the Joint Assessment Mission …, 8 December 1999, p.1.
156

Nokametu Statue – disfigured by the TNI

In a TNI operation termed “OP KENZEN” 768, the civilians evacuated from Iliomar
– 709 persons according to Iliomar CNRT records (712 by UNTAET records)769, travelled
by truck to Los Palos - with some staging through the TNI Yonif 745 base on the northern
edge of the town. Most were then concentrated at Com port on the northern coast before
boarding vessels for Kupang in West Timor. However, some Iliomar evacuees travelled
indirectly to Kupang, stopping enroute for several weeks in Wonreli on Kisar Island,
Ambon Province (about 45 kilometres north of Com). The Iliomar evacuees included three
village chiefs: Selso Martins of Tirilolo, António de Jesus of Ailebere, and Joachim
Henriques of Fuat. Several Indonesian public servants - who were regarded by the CNRT
cadre as supportive of the Resistance or “netral”, remained behind in Iliomar, including the
Sub-District Secretary - Gaspar Seixas, and Martinho Hornay (whose houses were burnt),
and Domingos dos Reis.

768
OP KENZEN may only have been conducted in Lautém District. Police (Polri) support of the evacuation
of civilians was reportedly covered by the Police operation “Hanoin Lorosa’e II”.
769
At November 2003, only 18 Iliomar families (about 90 persons) who fled in September 1999 had yet to
return to Iliomar.
157

On 8 September, while the TNI were in Maluhira sub-village north of Cainliu, a
small group of Falintil fighters from the Atelari cantonment, under the command of Serasa,
entered Caidalavarin sub-village of Cainliu. On about 9 September, this group comprising
Serasa, Armindo, José Pinto, Victorino, Amancio – and accompanied by village chief
Julião Soares from Cainliu and former Tirilolo village chief Adão Fernandes Ximenes,
entered the Iliomar Town area. Serasa met with CNRT leader Abílio Quintão Pinto and his
deputy Tito de Deus – both had returned from the jungle on 7 September. Earlier, in
August, Falintil had provided a small radio to the CNRT leadership in Iliomar to enable
communications with Falintil in the Atelari cantonment and the CNRT Region/District
leader - Renan Selak, in Los Palos. In Iliomar, the radio was operated by Abílio Quintão
Pinto, Tito de Deus – and occasionally by Domingos dos Reis. However, by 7 September,
the codes for the radio had become invalid and communication ceased. On his arrival
however, Serasa was able to readjust the settings and communications resumed.
On 10 September, the CNRT in Iliomar convened a meeting of its highest body –
“Komisaun Rekonsiliasaun dan Estabilidade – Iliomar”, attended by almost all of their
senior cadre. Throughout mid-September, small numbers of villagers returned to their
homes. Following CNRT communication with Falintil in Atelari, an airdrop of emergency
food aid for Iliomar was arranged, and on 24 September a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft
from Darwin made a successful “free-drop” of US-made “humanitarian daily rations
(HDR)” in the vicinity of the Iliomar church.770 Large numbers of the rations – in 30cm x
20cm yellow plastic “envelopes”, split open on impact, and some were taken by pigs and
dogs. However, almost all were recovered and distributed to the villagers by the CNRT
cadre. Some villagers reportedly suffered diarrhoea after eating the rations as they were
unaccustomed to such high protein food.771
On 25 September 1999, in northern Lautém District on the main road to Baucau
near the village of Verokoco, a group of Team Alfa militia led by Joni Marques murdered
11 people including three priests and two nuns.772 On 27 September, a Falintil element
reportedly ambushed a militia group in Lautém – but little detail is available on this alleged
incident.773 However, on 27 September, several of the Lautém militia were captured by
Falintil and subsequently handed over to INTERFET774 troops (the UK’s 2nd Battalion,
Royal Gurkha Rifles – 2RGR) who had escorted an aid convoy into Los Palos on 30
September and secured the District capital. 2RGR troops also moved quickly to Com and,
following a brief firefight with militia, released about 3,000 villagers awaiting forced

770
The World Food Program (WFP) managed the “free-dropping” of ration packs to internally displaced
people (IDPs) in the period 17-29 September using Australian (RAAF), British, French and WFP C-130s.
771
These HDR were provided by the US Department of Defense and valued at USD 4.25 per HDR ration.
World Food Program records indicate 20,000 HDR were dropped on 22 September on Luro, Baguia and
“Umari” – unlocated, probably Uaimori/Waimori or perhaps Iliomar.
772
On 11 December 2001, Joni Marques and another three Tim Alfa militia were sentenced to 33 years jail
for the 25 September killings - with other militia members receiving sentences of from four to 19 years. The
charges also included other killings, attacks, and forced deportations. On 20 May 2004, President Xanana
Gusmão reduced their sentences to a maximum of 25 years to accord with Timor-Leste’s criminal code. In
June 2008, following a Presidential Amnesty, Joni Marques was released. Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Part
12, p.170 cites these killings and notes that in Lautém District “more than 50 people were killed by Team
Alfa and TNI soldiers. The killings occurred almost entirely in the Sub-Districts of Los Palos and Muro. No
killings were reported in the Sub-Districts of Iliomar, Tutuala and Luro, although these latter areas were
extensively burnt. Virtually all of the victims were wellknown supporters of independence.” For human rights
violations by ABRI and militias in Lautém see also See Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Annex 1; Robinson, G.,
East Timor 1999 – Crimes against Humanity, University of Los Angeles, July 2003, pp.165-168.
773
Final Report of the Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF), Denpasar, 31 March 2008, p.232.
774
INTERFET – International Force in East Timor (UN-sponsored): 20 September 1999-23 February 2000.
INTERFET was established and deployed under UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.
158

evacuation by sea. At about 9pm on 4 October, an INTERFET vehicle convoy from 2RGR
entered Iliomar along the coast road from Viqueque District and transited, without
stopping, through the Sub-District to Los Palos. The few villagers in Iliomar Sub-District
who had returned to their homes mistook these INTERFET troops for returning TNI and
were initially quite frightened.
On the return of UNAMET to Lautém in late September, Falintil was governing the
District under Renan Selak. A provisional government structure was soon established in
early October comprising CNRT, Falintil, and UNAMET (and, subsequently, UNAMET’s
replacement - ie UNTAET).
In Iliomar, the CNRT cadre established a temporary administration structure headed
by Abílio Quintão Pinto as Secretary, Tito de Deus as Vice Secretary I, and Mário
Fernandes Cabral as Vice Secretary II - and contact was continued with Falintil in the
Atelari cantonment. On 9 October, Serasa returned to Atelari, accompanied by Abílio
Quintão Pinto, and returned the radio to the Falintil cantonment. The Falintil strength in the
Atelari cantonment was estimated as about 300 with up to 150 weapons by one source, but
Abílio Quintão Pinto assessed the number in the encampment as only 60-70 together with a
large number of recently arrived youths.775
On 9 October, two Klandestin youth from Cainliu village (Lorenzo Amaral, Martins
da Costa) led a group of about 50 youth from Cainliu across the Lihulo River to Tirilolo
and burned down the houses of two Milsas members.776
On 10 October, Deputy CNRT Secretary for Iliomar, Tito de Deus, travelled to Los
Palos and participated in a Regional/District CNRT meeting chaired by the Secretary,
Renan Selak.777 With a permanent INTERFET/UNAMET presence now established in
Lautém District, the meeting decided to direct all villagers to return from the jungle. Tito
returned to Iliomar on 12 October, and – as directed, those villagers still in the jungle soon
returned to their homes. The CNRT administration in Iliomar appointed village chiefs -
three were unchanged: ie José Luís da Costa, Iliomar I; Felipe Pinto, Iliomar II; and Julião
Soares, Cainliu - and three were new: Américo Jerónimo, Ailebere; Fernando Jerónimo,
Fuat; and Adão Fernandes Ximenes, Tirilolo.

2000 - RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION BEGINS

On 22 October 1999, as an element of the UNTAET Peace Keeping Forces (PKF),
a 419-strong Republic of Korea (ROK) Special Forces Battalion (ROKBATT) deployed to

775
In lateOctober, Falintil left their four cantonment areas and concentrated at Aileu, about 45 km south of
Dili. In late November, UNTAET estimated Falintil strength in Aileu as about 1,350 with 240 weapons,
including 150 fighters with 24 weapons from Region I under Lere Anan Timor – UN Military Observer
(UNMO) Report dated 25 November 1999. “About 1,500 guerrillas took up residence in the camp … nine
hundred were experienced fighters … while six hundred had joined in 1998” - Moore, S., “The Indonesian
Military’s Last Years …”, 2001, p.13. See also preceding footnotes 736 and 737. In January 2004, 343 ex-
Falintil weapons were detailed in an F-FDTL stocktake. About 25 percent were ex-Portuguese Army weapons
and about 75 percent had been acquired from ABRI – with a larger percentage of ex-ABRI weapons held by
Falintil elements in Falintil’s Regions I-III (author’s analysis).
776
On 13 October 2003, the first truth and reconciliation hearings sponsored by CAVR were held in Iliomar
Town at which statements/admissions were made by Afonso Pinto (previously a DPRD II representative) and
Lorenzo Amaral and Martins da Costa. While Afonso’s admissions were considered disingenuous and poorly
received by the villagers, Lorenzo and Martins were not admonished for the destruction of the two homes in
Tirilolo on 9October 1999.
777
Renan Selak (Faustino dos Santos b. 5/5/1958) joined the political party led by Elle-7 (see footnote 754) –
ie Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência (UNDERTIM), and was elected to the National Parliament
in mid-2007.
159

Lautém District and occupied the former base of the TNI’s Yonif 745 on the northern
outskirts of Los Palos. Subsequently, ROK security and civic action patrols extended into
Iliomar in late 1999.778.
By early December 1999, the following relief agencies were active in Lautém
District: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, Concern, International
Rescue Committee (IRC), and Medecins du Monde (MDM). In early 2000, beyond earlier
emergency relief, UNTAET reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts began, and the schools
(several re-roofed by UNICEF and USAID) soon reopened. During early 2000, many of the
forced evacuees also began returning from West Timor to their homes in Iliomar.
In February 2000, the World Bank’s Community Empowerment Project (CEP) was
launched in East Timor with the aim to “support poverty reduction” and “build
accountability and participatory local institutions at the village and sub-village levels”. In
March 2000, UNTAET Regulation 2000/13 provided for a country-wide management
structure for these development funds by the establishment of democratically-elected
Village Development Councils and Sub-District Development Councils.779 These Councils
were to manage development funds only and not to replace the role of traditional leaders
(eg Conselho dos Katuas – Council of Elders) or the village chiefs – who were excluded
from Council membership. With CNRT support, the Councils were established in
Iliomar,780 but tensions occasionally arose between the Councils and the established
leadership structures.
The heavy rains in April-May of 2000 caused considerable damage to the Los
Palos-Iliomar road, with a major landslip (497 metres) about 11 kilometres northeast of
Iliomar Town closing the road for several months. Flooding also destroyed the two large
bridges over the Lihulo River to Tirilolo village. During this period, UNTAET personnel
visited Iliomar by helicopter – including UN CIVPOL and military patrols from the ROK
PKF battalion. Korean military engineers also undertook the major repairs to the road north
of Caidabu, completing the task in April 2001.
In November 2000, an UNTAET District Field Officer (DFO), Robert Akankwasa
(Uganda), was assigned to Iliomar Sub-District and, together with four UN CIVPOL
officers, established an UNTAET office in the repaired Sub-District administrative
headquarters (ie, former Kecamatan) building in Iliomar Town. Following repairs,
UNTAET DFO and CIVPOL living accommodation was set up in the former Toko Cina
building. In 2000, an UNTAET Republic of Korea ROK military detachment of 12
personnel, commanded by a captain, established a permanent presence in the former TNI
BTT accommodation opposite the UNTAET office. The ROK troops undertook security
patrols by foot and vehicle, and a range of civic action tasks.
Reconstruction in late 2000 included the establishment of a small health centre in
Iliomar Town to replace the destroyed Puskesmas facility, and the re-roofing of damaged
schools. In November and December, the national immunization program was
implemented in Iliomar, but the “turn-out” was initially low due to inadequate publicity
and promotion. In December 2000, 160 bags of fertilizer were delivered to Iliomar.

778
ROKBATT served in Lautém until January 2002 when it was redeployed to Oecusse (Ambeno) as part of
the UNTAET phase-down/redeployment. From January to October 2002, Lautém security was covered by the
PKF Thai battalion based at Baucau airfield.
779
For detail on the Council selection and the management process, see UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/13 –
On The Establishment of Village and Sub-District Development Councils For The Disbursement Of Funds
For Development Activities, Dili, 10 March 2000.
780
The initial CEP Sub-District Chairman was Gaspar de Souza, who was replaced by Camilio Seixas
(Iliomar I). This organisation was supplanted in 2003 by the Sub-District Development Committee chaired by
the Community Development Officer (CDO), a Timorese civil servant, and including representatives from
community agencies and organisations.
160

2001 – “TIMORIZATION” AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION
OF 30 AUGUST

By early 2001, about 300 of the 709 evacuated villagers had returned to Iliomar. In
March 2001, an UNTAET Civil Registration team (UNVs Roberto Sanchez – Philippines;
Angelika Karpol - Germany) began registering all Iliomar residents over the age of 16 -
with the principal aim of creating a voters’ roll for the August 2001 Constituent Assembly
elections, a project that continued until mid-June. On 29 May, two UNTAET District
Electoral Officers (DEOs: Ernest Chamberlain – Australia; Charles Ligtvoet – Netherlands)
deployed to Iliomar to manage the electoral process in the Sub-District.
The Fretilin political party was well established in Iliomar with a structure of 26
Sub-District cadre; eight cadre in each village; and eight cadre in each sub-village – a total
of 274 cadre. The Fretilin leadership comprised: Secretary, Abílio Quintão Pinto (the
CNRT Secretary); Deputy Secretary I, Felipe Pinto; and Deputy Secretary II, Domingos
Fernandes.781 The only other party with a permanent presence in Iliomar was the Partido
Socialista de Timor (PST), established on 10 April 2001 (and restructured on 24 June 2001)
that maintained an office in a private home opposite the Iliomar soccer field. The PST had
a structure of 18 cadre and was led by Permanent Secretary Gaspar de Souza and
Coordinator Mateus Seixas Miranda.
In May 2001, as part of the progressive “Timorization” of governance and
administration, Mário Fernandes Cabral (a former senior Iliomar Klandestin cadre) was
appointed as the Sub-District Coordinator (SDC) in Iliomar – an East Timor Transitional
Authority (ETTA) appointment (the SDC would eventually replace the UNTAET DFO).
Beginning in early June, in preparation for the Constituent Assembly election and
consideration of the Constitution, civic education activities were conducted in Iliomar by
the UNTAET Lautém District Civic Education team, and also by East Timorese NGOs
including Educação Civic Constituição ISEG (Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão –
Dili), Presidium Juventude Lorico Aswain -Timor Leste (PJLA-TL), and Timor Lorosa’e
Moris (TILMO). At meetings in the sub-villages, presentation topics included democracy,
the Constitution, human rights, and the independence process.
On 9 June 2001, to encourage and enhance independent party activity for the
election, the CNRT was disbanded country-wide. In Iliomar, almost all the Klandestin and
CNRT activists declared themselves as Fretilin supporters – with the exception of the SDC
Mário Fernandes Cabral who became a member of the Democratic Party (PD – Partido
Democrático). The Iliomar CNRT women’s organisation – OMT, and the youth
organisation – OJT, re-established themselves immediately as branches of Fretilin’s OPMT
and OJETIL respectively. On 18 June, members of the Constitutional Committee (Komisi
Konstituante/Konstitusi), including local commissioner Abílio Quintão Pinto (the former
Iliomar CNRT Secretary), visited Iliomar and, in public meetings (“Pertemuan
Keakraban”), sought input towards the development of the Constitution.
Heavy rains on 19 June (217mm in 24 hours) precipitated a major landslip on the
Iliomar-Los Palos road (23 kilometres northeast of Iliomar Town – three kilometres south
of Cacaven village) that severely disrupted direct vehicle movement to and from the Sub-
District for almost six weeks. While no serious damage occurred in Iliomar, Los Palos
suffered its worst floods in 54 years – including the destruction of the major bridge over the
Papapa River on the northwest edge of the town, and many houses were destroyed.782

781
In August 2000, Fretilin broke with the CNRT policy that had required that political parties abstain from
activity at village level.
782
Japanese PKF engineers replaced the Papapa bridge with a Bailey Bridge in late October 2002.
161

At a meeting in the UNTAET Iliomar office on 5 July with the UNTAET DFO and
the ETTA representative (SDC Mário Fernandes Cabral), all six village chiefs of the Sub-
District resigned, citing their dissatisfaction with the “injustice” of an ETTA decision not to
provide them with any salary, honorariums, or allowances.783 During July and August, an
ROK engineer detachment located to Iliomar Sub-District and completed major road
repairs at the “Cacaven Gap”, Gudaluan Hill (Cainliu), and on the Iliomar I-Iradarate/
Iliomar II road which opened for traffic in late August.
In mid-August, the ROK PKF unit organised a District-wide soccer and volleyball
competition in Los Palos. On 14 August, the soccer competion was won by the Iliomar
team which defeated Los Palos.
During the preparation process for the Constituent Assembly election (for 75
national representatives and 13 district representatives), the UNTAET DEOs (assisted by a
locally-recruited deputy ie DDEO, Alicia Gonçalves) undertook voter education in all the
sub-villages, managed an “exhibition and challenges” period, checked voters’ eligibility,
and established a voters’ roll (for residents 17 years and over) of 3,287 voters. During the
campaigning phase, meetings and rallies were held in Iliomar by Fretilin, PST, Partido
Democratico (PD), Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC), and Partido Sosial Democrata
(PSD) – all without incident.784 Iliomar residents however, were disappointed that none of
the candidates for the Lautém District “seat” in the Constituent Assembly was “Iliomar-
born” or a Makalero speaker. To staff the polling centres, the DEOs recruited and trained
51 local polling staff – including 14 women. On 28 August, three international NGO
electoral observers (Australian) visited Iliomar, staying overnight in the UNTAET office.
On 29 August, the day prior to the polling, three international observers (European Union)
briefly visited Iliomar and had discussions with a DEO.
The voting in the Constituent Assembly election was conducted successfully on
Thursday 30 August at three polling centres: Iliomar I (Junior High School) - in its three
polling stations; Iliomar II (Iradarate Primary School) – two polling stations; and Cainliu
(Cainliu Primary School) – three polling stations. Voter turnout in Iliomar was assessed at
about 93 percent of registered voters (at the Junior High School: 97 percent), and was
observed by about 40 East Timorese party agents and electoral observers.
Following the counting of the ballots in Los Palos (31 August-3 September
inclusive), the Fretilin candidate, Armindo da Conceição Silva Freitas won the Lautém
District seat (in a field of 11 candidates) with 52.27 percent of the “District” vote. The
Fretilin vote in Lautém was somewhat lower than expected as one of the independent
candidates, Aurelio Freitas Ribeiro, a former charismatic Fretilin youth leader, attracted
about 16 percent of the vote – presumably from Fretilin supporters. Fretilin also achieved
most votes in the “National” poll in Lautém – 62.76 percent, followed by PD with 10.41
percent, and PSD with 10.11 percent – that was contested by 16 parties and five
independents.785
Reconstruction and aid increased in 2001 and included two agricultural irrigation
projects (Iradarate, Irabere), the provision of two mechanized hand-tractors, two rice-
milling machines, and one corn-milling machine (to be managed by local cooperatives).
The Community Empowerment Project financed several local projects including crossings

783
These resignations were precipitated by the UNTAET letter: “Continued Recognition of Chefe de
Suco/Aldeia Structure” dated 14 June 2001 – while a “cause célebre” for several weeks, the village chiefs
continued in their positions and cooperated fully with the DEOs (Bahasa-speakers).
784
João António de Jesus was the Iliomar PSD President, the local PDC was led by Anacleto Madeira, and
the UDC/PDC by Tomás Amaral.
785
De Sousa, L. S-C., “Some Facts and Comments …”, Lusotopie, October 2001, pp. 299-311 (available on
the Internet) provides a useful analysis of the 2001 Constituent Assembly election.
162

on the Paifakaver River to Tirilolo (concrete ford, re-surfaced bridge, and a mid-stream
gabionade). A Makalero Foundation, coordinated by the SDC Mário Fernandes Cabral and
chaired by Julião Soares (Cainliu village chief), was also established in Iliomar to manage
development aid.

2002 – THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND INDEPENDENCE

In November 2001, the process of changing the national currency from the
Indonesia rupiah to the US dollar commenced. In Iliomar, the exchange of currency began
in February with “dollarisation” teams visiting from Los Palos and conducting their
operations in the UN CIVPOL office.
On 21 January 2002, the “Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in
East Timor”, an independent statutory authority, was formally established in Dili. The
Commission’s mandate was to inquire into human rights violations committed on all sides,
between April 1974 and October 1999, and to facilitate community reconciliation with
justice for those who committed less serious offences.786 The Commission was not
constituted to grant amnesty to offenders, with all serious offences to be referred to the
Justice Department in Dili.
In preparation for the April 2002 Presidential Election, two UNTAET DEOs
(Ernest Chamberlain - Australia, Gunalan Sarvanan - Malaysia) deployed to Iliomar on 4
February, together with a locally-recruited DEO, Albino Albuquerque. Unlike the
arrangements for the 2001 Constituent Assembly election, villagers of Caidabu were
allocated to a polling centre at Dirimuni (managed by DEO Samarapala Vidanangamachchi
– Sri Lanka). In the following weeks, the DEOs undertook voter education, visiting each of
the sub-villages in the Sub-District on several occasions. On 26 February, ETTA staff of
the “Komisi Sistematisasi dan Harmonisasi Konstituante” visited Iliomar and held
meetings to “socialize” the draft Constitution. The villagers were annoyed that there had
been no prior notice of the visit, nor the opportunity to study the draft Constitution
beforehand.787 In early April, 48 local electoral polling staff were recruited and trained by
the DEOs, and three polling centres established - as in 2001: Iliomar Junior High School,
Iradarate Primary School, and Cainliu Primary School. On 13 April, the day before polling,
a small party of international electoral observers from the European Union visited Iliomar.
On 14 April, polling was conducted without incident and observed by a large number of
accredited local observers and party agents. The number of eligible voters in Iliomar (less
Caidabu) was assessed as 3,674, but voter turnout in the fine weather, at 70.7 percent, was
considerably less than in 2001 (93 percent). Many villagers reportedly did not bother to
vote – assuming that Xanana Gusmão would certainly defeat the other presidential
candidate, Francisco Xavier do Amaral.788
In Lautém District, Xanana Gusmão received 94.52 percent of the valid votes, and
Francisco Amaral, 5.48 percent - while nationally Xanana received 82.69 percent and
Amaral 17.31 percent. However, Xanana was “in dispute”789 with Fretilin during the
campaign period and, in several areas, villagers were reportedly encouraged by some local

786
The Commission’s official title was “Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste
(CAVR)” – in Indonesian: Komisi Penerimaan, Kebenaran dan Rekonsilisasi (KPKR). Its website was:
http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/
787
The Constitution was signed into force by the Constituent Assembly on 22 March 2002.
788
Fretilin President from 29 November 1975 to mid-September 1977 – see footnotes 370, 379, 412 and 449.
789
For background, see Shoesmith, D., “Divided Leadership …”, p. 243 in Asian Survey, 43:2, 2003 – the
article also traces Gusmão’s political rift with Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri back to 1986-87, see pp.241-242 .
163

Fretilin cadre not to vote, to vote informally, or to vote for Amaral. In Lautém District
however, such activity was only noted in the villages of Raça and Titilari – villages
immediately north of Los Palos Town.
On 17 April 2002, Xanana Gusmão was announced as President-elect. The newly
independent East Timor swore in its first Government - a semi-presidential system, and
held an inaugural session of the National Parliament on the morning of 20 May - just hours
after more than 120,000 people celebrated the birth of the nation at a very large ceremony
on the western outskirts of Dili. The Government, composed primarily of the same cabinet
members that comprised the pre-independence Council of Ministers, was officially
inaugurated by President Xanana Gusmão. The ceremony was attended by some 300
dignitaries - including United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who handed over
authority from the United Nations to the Speaker of East Timor's National Parliament.790
East Timor's Parliament then held its first session at which President Xanana Gusmão
presented Secretary-General Annan with a request from East Timor to join the United
Nations.

RECONCILIATION AND RECOVERY

In June 2002, regional representatives of the Commission for Reception, Truth
Reconciliation (CAVR) were appointed. In Lautém District, the two commissioners
appointed were Albino da Silva – the Los Palos CNRT Secretary 1999-2000; and Justino
Valentim – a former senior Klandestin cadre in Los Palos and former school teacher who
had served in Iliomar. Lautém CAVR staff members included Abílio Quintão Pinto, the
former Iliomar CNRT Secretary. In November 2002, CAVR teams took statements in
eastern Lautém District and began work in Iliomar in early 2003.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction activity continued in Iliomar, including road
repairs. However much-needed repairs to the important clean water system (pipe damage)
remained stalled, and the local management processes of the Community Empowerment
Project in Iliomar was criticised.791
In late 2002, a proposal was developed to list those who had lost their lives
violently during the Indonesian occupation and to attempt to return any remains to their
home villages. In Iliomar, an ad-hoc committee under Cainliu village chief, Julião Soares,
collated information for the six villages of Iliomar. On 9 November, during the visit of F-
FDTL Chief of Staff, Lere Anan Timor, a mass meeting was held in Iliomar I village at
which a “Committee for the Recovery of War Victims”792 was formed with “adat” leader
Felipe Pinto (village chief, Iliomar II) as Chairman, Domingos Fernandes as Deputy, and
Alicia Gonçalves as Treasurer. The first draft of the Committee’s report tabulated 385
Iliomar-born victims whose remains had yet to be recovered – listed by name, home village
and next of kin.793 Of these, 103 were Falintil fighters. By village, the figures were:

790
UNTAET was dissolved on 20 May 2002 and replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET) with an initial two-year mandate – later extended for a further year until May 2005. UNMISET
was replaced by the UN Office in East Timor (UNOTIL) until August 2006. UNOTIL was replaced by the
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a mandate until early 2009.
791
----, “The Community Empowerment Project Revisited”, p. 6 in The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, Vol. 3, No.
7, October 2002.
792
“Comissão Recolhamento de Vitimas da Guerra do Sub Distrito de Iliomar – 1975-1999”.
793
The draft did not include a date of death or location of death/temporary burial.
164

Iliomar I: 69; Iliomar II: 37; Ailebere: 76; Tirilolo: 29; Cainliu: 30; and Fuat: 144.794 The
difficulties of recovering remains from jungle areas after many years was understood, and
the Committee’s work was expected to take many years.795
In mid-2003, each of Iliomar’s village completed reports for the CAVR: Iliomar I
(30 May 2003 – José Luís da Costa); Iliomar II (3 July 2003 - Felipe Pinto); Ailbere (23
July 2003 - Eurico Jerónimo); Cainliu (1 July 2003 -Julião Soares); Fuat (9 June 2003 –
Fernando Jerónimo); and Tirilolo (2 June 2003 – Adão Fernandes Ximenes). These reports
– along with other declarations by Iliomar villagers, were significant contributions to the
CAVR Final Report – Chega !, completed in 2005.796

“TO RESIST IS TO WIN ! ”797

On 27 September 2002, East Timor was admitted into the General Assembly of the
United Nations as the Republic of Timor Leste - its 191st member nation. Timor Leste thus
became the first independent state and nation of the 21st century.
The struggle and sacrifice of the Timorese people for national liberation and
independence had not been in vain. For decades, Falintil carried the fight in the countryside
– including in Iliomar, and suffered significant casualties. The Klandestin movement and
other Resistance supporters also kept their faith and bravely contributed to the struggle.
The people of Iliomar – indeed all Timorese, had suffered oppression and endured
decades of hardships and losses. Having prevailed and won the right to determine their fate,
the people of Timor Loro Sa’e can now move forward to build a just and democratic civil
society in the spirit of peace, healing and reconciliation. With the “Struggle” behind them,
the Makalero people of Iliomar are ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of their
new nation.

794
Committee members opined that Fuat suffered the heaviest losses as its former principal location, in the
Bubutau area, was contiguous to Falintil base areas towards the Iliomar/Loré border. This is confirmed by
figures released in 2008 – see Appendix 2 to Annex F.
795
In mid-2002, Lere Anan Timor’s clan established an “ossuary house” in Titiraven sub-village (Cainliu) for
the storage of the remains of deceased clan members.
796
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e
Reconciliação de Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega ! – Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), Dili, 2005. Abilio Quintão Pinto also completed a series of
complementary sketch maps for the CAVR records to illustrate the village reports which are held in the
CAVR Archives.
797
“To Resist is to Win !” is the title of Xanana Gusmão’s autobiography written in Cipinang Prison (Jakarta)
in 1994 – see Bibliography ie Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist Is To Win ! : The Autobiography of
Xanana Gusmão with selected letters & speeches, Aurora Books, Richmond, 2000. See also: Niner, S.,
Xanana: Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North
Melbourne, 2009.
165

Flag Raising Ceremony President Gusmão addresses the
Xanana Gusmão with Kofi Annan – UN New York UN General Assembly – New York
27 September 2002 27 September 2002

Annexes:

J. Maps :
Distrito de Lautém;
Lautém District – Time and Distance Chart;
Lautém District – Village Boundaries;
Iliomar Sub-District (Map No. 2507-41) 1:25,000 - Extract.

K. Iliomar: Rainfall, Humidity and River Flow Data.

L. Iliomar: Statistics and Notes on Administration.

M. Elomar – WWII Map (Australian Army).

Elomar – Sketch Map: Japanese WWII Garrison.

N. Indonesian Security Forces and Pro-Integration Elements in
Los Palos and Iliomar.

O. Iliomar Falintil and Clandestina/Klandestin.

P. Klandestin in Iliomar – 1997 (An ABRI Listing).

Q. “Sketch Map” – Iliomar Destruction, September 1999.

R. Iliomar - Summary of Known Casualties 1975-1999.

J. Lere Anan Timor – Biographical Data.

K. Abílio Quintão Pinto – Biographical Data.

Bibliography
166

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167
168
169
170
171
172

ANNEX C

ILIOMAR : STATISTICS798 AND NOTES ON ADMINISTRATION

Terminology:
Indonesian Portuguese CNRT Tetum
Região
District: Kabupaten Distrito/Conselho Sub-Região
Sub-District: Kecamatan Posto Zona
Village: Desa/ Suco Nurep
Kelurahan
Sub-village/hamlet: Kampung/ Aldeia/Povoação Celcom
Dusun
Family group Rukun Cabo
Tetangga
Family: Kepala Knua uma
Keluarga kain

Time in Timor Leste

In Timor Leste, time is UTC/GMT “plus 9 hours” - ie one hour ahead of “Kupang
time” (West Timor), and 30 minutes behind “Darwin Time”. The time difference between
Timor-Leste and “Eastern Australia” (ie NSW, ACT, VIC) is minus one hour (East Coast
winter) or minus two hours (East Coast summer)

Lautém District: Villages 34, Sub-villages 147.

Iliomar is one of Lautém District’s five Sub-Districts (ie Lospalos, Luro, Moro,
Tutuala, and Iliomar). Lautém (1,813 sq km – 12% of Timor-Leste’s land area; coastline of
178.92 kilometres) was formally established as a Kabupaten on 30 July 1976. The District
had a population of about 56,293 (6% of Timor-Leste’s population (2004 Census) living in
34 villages (comprising 147 sub-villages). The Lautém District motto/acronym (in Bahasa
Indonesia) is/was : “Lincah” (“energetic/active”) = Lautém Indah (beautiful), Nyaman
(pleasant), Cantik (attractive), Anggun (neat), Harmonis (harmonious). Lospalos (also as
“Los Palos”), the District capital, is 226 kilometres by paved road from Dili and 89
kilometres from Baucau. According to the 2001 Survey of Sucos (discussed in detail in
following pages), Lautém was one of the Districts least impacted by the post-referendum
violence of September 1999 – the worst affected were the western Districts of East Timor.
In 2001-2008, the District Administrator (formerly “Bupati”) of Lautém was Olavio da
Costa Monteiro Almeida – a government-appointed position.
Rainfall statistics for Lautém District for the eight-year period 1990-97 show a dry
season of five months (July to November inclusive), and a wet season of seven months

798
Almost all statistics to 1997 inclusive are drawn from the Indonesian series Kabupaten Lautem Dalam
Angka 199x (Lautem Regency In Figures), published by the Lautem Statistics Office in Lospalos. The last
edition was published in August 1998 for the period 1997/98. Some later detail is also drawn from the 2002
Lautem District profile ie: Simpson, R & Wei Sun (eds), Profile of Lautem District – March 2002, East Timor
Public Administration – Lautem, Lospalos, 13 April 2002. The most recent statistics are derived from the
2004 Census of Population and Housing and 2007 electoral data.
173

(December to June inclusive). Lautém’s monthly rainfall averages 1990-97 were: January
176.8 mm, February 153.5 mm, March 167.6 mm, April 155.6 mm, May 209.1 mm, June
136.5 mm, July 41 mm, August 12.5 mm, September 23.8 mm, October 3.5mm, November
62.9 mm, and December 231.9 mm. For Iliomar rainfall data, see Annex B.

Iliomar Sub-District : Villages 6, Sub-villages 25

In the period 1952-65, there were five villages in Iliomar, comprising 27 sub-
villages. A Portuguese source (Timor Pequena Monografia) shows the Iliomar population
in 1965 as 5,350. Tirilolo was established as the sixth village in 1971 – it had previously
been a povoação of Cainliu village (see footnote 282). In a 1980 census, Iliomar’s
population was recorded as 5,435. In 1990, Indonesian statistics showed Iliomar with an
area of 375 sq km and six villages made up of 47 sub-villages (population was 5,518). In
1991, Sub-District borders within Lautém were revised, and Iliomar’s area reduced to
292.3 sq km (areas were ceded to Luro and Lautém Sub-Districts, but Iliomar’s coastline
remained at 28.33 kilometres). Sub-villages were also redefined in Iliomar, consolidated
and reduced to 25. In the period 1993/97, Iliomar’s general land-use potential was defined
as: 50 hectare (ha) of settlements, 433 ha of ricefields, 523 ha of dry farming, 1,277 ha of
coconut plantations, and 25,945 ha of forest (ie total of 29,230 ha). The 1993 population
was 6,358 (1,218 families). 67 percent of the Sub-District lies at a height of 100-500m
above sea level. On 12 November 1991, two sub-villages of Fuat (Acadirilo and Vataomar)
were established at the “old” Fuat site at Bubutau – with Rumutau remaining adjacent to
Iliomar I.
In 1997, the population was listed as 6,715: 3345 males, 3,370 females – 2,596
children, 4,119 adults (ie, 15 years and over: 1,934 males, 2,185 females) in 1,279 families.
In the age-bracket 20-49 years, there were 868 males and 1,062 females. Government
figures for 1997 also noted 92 disabled people in Iliomar Sub-District and 130 “anti-social
elements” - 120 youth, two families, two transvestites, and six former criminals. In 2001,
the CNRT stated Iliomar’s population as 7,235, comprising 1,544 families – while the 2001
“Suco Survey”799 recorded the Sub-District’s population as 6,803: 1,474 households, with
51 percent of the population as female. The population of the six villages as at 2002 was
reported as 7,376 (UNTAET) – representing about .92 percent of East Timor’s population.
In 2002, East Timor’s population was estimated at 820,000 – 76 percent rural.800 In 2003,
Iliomar’s population comprised 7,074 (3,510 males and 3,564 females in 1,519 families).
As at April 2004, of the 709 Iliomar residents that had fled or had been forcibly
evacuated from East Timor during the September 1999 violence, all but 18 families
(comprising 87 persons) had returned.801
According to the comprehensive national census conducted on 11 July 2004,
Iliomar’s population was 6,598: comprising 3,301 males and 3,497 females in 1,606
households.802 This was subsequently amended by the 2004 Census of Population and

799
The Survey of Sucos in Timor Lorosa’e (SSTL) was undertaken in early 2001 by the East Timor
Transitional Authority (ETTA), the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations
Development Program.
800
East Timor – State of the Nation Report, April 2002, p.13.
801
With effect from 21 December 2002, the UNHCR declared the cessation of refugee status for East
Timorese in Indonesia. In 2004, an estimated 28,000 former East Timorese were resident in West Timor with
about 60 percent consisting of former Indonesian military, paramilitaries or civil servants – and their families.
802
Census 2004 recorded a total Timor-Leste population of 924,642 – with the population of Lautém District
as 57,543 – see Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) of Timor-Leste, The results of the Census 2004,
Volume 2, Number 3, October 2004.The Iliomar population was three percent lower than recorded in the
2001 “Suco Survey” ie SSTL. However, the less accurate Suco Survey admittedly had “substantial errors of
174

Housing803 to a population of 6,726 in Iliomar (302 sq km) comprising 1,625 households.
The Census recorded a ratio of 89 males to every 100 females – the lowest sub-district ratio
in Timor-Leste.804 The median age in Iliomar was 18.2 years with population “break-up”
as follows: 0-14 years – 3,048 ie 45.3%; 15-64 years – 3,290 ie 48.9%; 65+ - 388 ie 5.8%.
The principal language in Iliomar was Makalero – with the 2004 Census recording
that Tetum was spoken by 27.8%; Indonesian by 31.1%; Portuguese by 5% and English by
2%.805
Village and Sub-Village Population Figures 2002806

Iliomar I Iliomar II Ailebere Fuat Cainliu Tirilolo807
1,571 1,528 876 584 1,281 1,536

Iliomar Acara Leilor Rumutau Titiraven Tirilolo
514 377 223 252 234 549
Ara Ara Lihina Marafal Acadirilo Maluhira Tatalalarin
287 396 229 103 334 329
Caentau Madarira Heitali Vataomar Liufalin Etevata
295 266 184 158 161 658
Ossohira Boquila Lalumato Caidalavarin
317 129 240 322
Vatamatar Caidabu Larimi
158 360 230

Notes:
About half of Iliomar sub-village of Iliomar I is located near the south coast in the
Iradarate area, northeast of and adjacent to Iliomar II. About 20 families of Iliomar II reside
adjacent to the soccer field in the Iliomar Town area (their “forced” location in 1978). The
sub-village of Caidabu, about 10 kilometres north of Iliomar Town, is part of Iliomar II
village. The Fuat sub-villages of Acadirilo and Vataomar are located about six kilometres
north of Iliomar Town in the Bubutau area – the site of Fuat pre-1978, while Rumutau sub-
village has remained in its forced resettlement location of 1978, ie on the northern edge of
the Iliomar Town area. While Boropai is shown on maps as a major village west of
Tirilolo, Boropai is administratively part of Etevata sub-village of Tirilolo. Village chiefs
(Chefe do Suco/Kepala Desa) are assisted by a Village Secretary (Sekretaris/Ajudante) and
a Village Council (Conselho do Suco).
From 1980-1985, as an organisational and control measure, the Indonesian
administrative system of “RW” (“Rukun Warga” – “Ward Associations”) and “RT”
(“Rukun Tetangga” -“Neighbourhood Associations”) was established within each sub-
village. Each RT comprised several families, and the RW oversaw four or five RTs. With

estimates at aldeia, suco and even sub-district levels’ – The 2001 Survey of Sucos – Initial Analysis on
Implementation for Poverty Prevention, October 2001.
803
Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004 – Atlas, National Statistics Directorate, Dili, 2006.
804
The movement of males to seek work in Dili and other towns – and also education, is probably a
significant factor.
805
Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004 - Atlas, 2006, Table 18 – the author questions the
accuracy of this data eg the rate for Tetum is probably higher; and for Portuguese and English, lower.
806
For a selected listing of Iliomar’s “Who’s Who 2002/2007”, including village and sub-village heads, see
page 8 to this Annex.
807
Note that there is also a Tirilolo village in Baucau District. The Timor-Leste Census of Population and
Housing 2004 – Atlas, 2006, Table 16 categorised Tirilolo (of Iliomar, Lautem) as an “urban suco” – this is
undoubtedly a statistical error.
175

streets un-named and houses un-numbered, the RT/RW system was a useful control
measure for Indonesian administrators and ABRI.

Village Development Criteria 1997, Village and Sub-District Development Councils,
and the 2001 Survey of Sucos

In 1990, all six villages (desa) were classified as “swadaya” (“self-supporting” –
the lowest stage in the Government’s Indonesia-wide three-tiered development system ie
continuing to exist in the “adat” sphere). In 1997, two of the villages were still classified as
swadaya, three villages as “swakarya” (“self-developing” – the medium development
level), and one village was classified as “swasembada” (“self-sufficient” – the most
developed stage). Each village head was assisted by a Village Council for
Resilience/Development Planning and Guidance (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa –
LKMD). In Iliomar in 1997, one LKMD was graded Category I, four were graded Category
II, and one was graded Category III (the highest).
In February 2000, the World Bank-managed Community Empowerment and Local
Governance Program (CEP) was launched in East Timor with the aim to “support poverty
reduction” and “build accountability and participatory local institutions at the village and
sub-village levels”. In March 2000, UNTAET Regulation 2000/13 provided for a country-
wide management structure for these development funds by the establishment of Village
Development Councils and Sub-District Development Councils.808 These Councils were to
manage development funds only and not to exercise legislative, executive or judicial power
– or to replace the role of traditional or local leaders. Village chiefs and the Sub-District
Coordinator were not to be members of the Councils. Early tensions with the Program,
including in Iliomar, were reported.809 CEP funds for Iliomar were USD 9,000 in 2000;
USD 50,000 in 2002; and USD 50,000 in 2003. The CEP was closed on 31 March 2004
and with a replacement program transferred to Timor-Leste Government management.
In the period March-April 2001, a survey of East Timor’s 498 sucos (villages) was
undertaken by ETTA/UNDP/ADB/World Bank. This “Suco Survey”810, mentioned earlier,
showed the Iliomar population as 6,803: 1,474 households, with 51 percent of the
population as female. As a result of the September 1999 violence, the survey noted 30
Iliomar families had yet to return (as at Feb 2001), 24 houses had been made unliveable,
and 182 animals lost. Iliomar was one of the Sub-districts least affected by the violence eg
the “average” Sub-District in East Timor suffered 296 families yet-to-return; 1,088 houses
made unliveable; and 4,657 animals lost.
The Survey included a Suco Development Index (SDI) based on component
considerations of relative wealth, availability of social services, and access. In Iliomar, the
villages were rated: Iliomar I: 64; Iliomar II: 32, Ailebere: 63; Fuat: 59; Cainliu: 77; and
Tirilolo: 76. Iliomar II rated in the poorest 50 sucos of the 498 sucos surveyed; while
Cainliu and Tirilolo rated in the highest rated 50 sucos. The average SDI for sucos in
Lautém District was 59 – and the average for East Timor was 52. Respondent village chiefs
in Iliomar noted that for three months of each year, families had insufficient food ie
November, January and February – with Iliomar II suffering an additional “fourth month”

808
For detail on selection and the management process, see UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/13 – On The
Establishment of Village and Sub-District Development Councils For The Disbursement Of Funds For
Development Activities, Dili, 10 March 2000.
809
“The Community Empowerment Project Revisited”, pp.6-9 in The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, Vol 3, No 7,
October 2002.
810
The 2001 Survey of Sucos – Initial Analysis on Implementation for Poverty Prevention, October 2001.
176

of shortages. In March 2008, the village chief of Iliomar II – Adolfo Pinto Ximenes,
reported “hamlaha” (“hunger”) in his village.811

Iliomar Clans (Warga/Tripul)

The Makalero of Iliomar comprise 42 clans (warga/tripul) as follows812:
Busa Rulu; Iliomar; Dirimuni; Komili; Luru-Ira; Pukakesi; Ta,a-Matu; Mumun; Wardai;
Lorasa; Ma, a-Lewet; Liusoru; Uru-Hu, a; Tafarira; Non-Nira; Nau-Nira; Uaritir; Buabere;
Abubul; Hulahlain; Lafidebar; Ina-Meli; Luanira; Betunomar; Fehira; Derekun; Maluhira;
Ailebere; Deni; Kaparesin; Mua-Rai; Lutu-pere” Upu-Ira; Kiltau; Upulira; Wai-Telu;
Manir; Perut; Paidur; Nutupupul; Luru-Boitafa; Mauberu.
The strongest and most influential clan is the “Uae-Falun” (or “Iliomar”), followed
by the Lorasa, and Dirimuni.

Electricity

In 1997, diesel-fuelled electricity generation by the Sub-ranting station in Iliomar
serviced 98 customers with a connected VA of 54,050 and a KWH production of about
6,100. The station was destroyed by the withdrawing TNI in September 1999. Two
temporary UN-provided generators supplied administrative power from 2000, and a new
station was constructed with Japanese aid in 2001. However, due to a lack of power poles
and cables, electricity from the new power station was not reticulated to homes until
August 2003. As at April 2004, 110 households were connected – at a cost of USD 10
connection fee for villagers’ homes, USD 15 for kiosks and shops, and USD 20 for public
servants and police. The average monthly tariff was USD 3.
In the period 2004-2007, the electricity service was intermittent due to difficulties
in funding the necessary diesel fuel for the two Japanese generators. In October 2008, the
generators were inactive due to maintenance problems.

Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries813

In 1997, principal agriculture activities were officially reported as follows:

Area for cultivation (ha) Area harvested (ha)

Rice (wet paddy)814 115 91 (2 ton per ha)
Rice (dry field) 1.25 .98
Corn (jagung) 696 625 (1.45 ton per ha)
Cassava (ubi kayu) 113 103 (6.5 ton per ha)
Sweet potato (ubi jalar) 42 39 (4.5 ton per ha)
Peanuts (kacang tanah) 34 31 (1.15 ton per ha)
Soy beans (kacang kedelai) 8 7 (.6 ton per ha)

811
“Hamalaha tamba udan la tuun”, Radio Comunidade Lospalos, 4 March 2008.
812
Fernandes, D., “Lero Iliomar nia Lisan (Marga/Tripul)”, Lero Nian Huno Ulun, Vol I - 2007, Iliomar,
2007, p.3.
813
For detail on agricultural and livestock practices in the eastern districts, see Metzner, J.K., Man and the
Environment in Eastern Timor …, ANU, Canberra 1977 – particularly Chapter 3.
814
These very low figures for rice cultivation are probably due to the Indonesian restrictions on access by
farmers to the major rice-growing area of Irabere in the southwest of Iliomar Sub-District.
177

Mung beans (kacang hijau) 4 3 (.61 ton per ha)

Mango trees: 2,269; Breadfruit trees: 819; Jackfruit trees: 115; Pineapples: 473.

Coconut (kelapa) plantations: 600 ha under cultivation, but 128 ha not yet producing
(comprising 470 ha of kelapa dalam and .1 ha of kelapa hibrida). Producing 216.4 tonnes.

Candle Nuts (kemiri): 110 ha producing 60 tonnes.

Areca Nuts (pinang): 40 ha producing 6.5 tonnes.

Animal Husbandry815: Cattle (Bali): 1,866 (520 male; 1,346 female). Buffalo: 770 (230
male, 540 female). Ponies: 166 (70 male; 96 female). Pigs: 2,837. Goats: 1,292. Sheep:
141. Chicken: 3,012. Ducks: 402.

Fisheries: In 1997, Indonesian statistics for Iliomar listed 30 fishermen, 2 fishing groups,
and 2 part-time fishing groups – no boats were listed. In 1999-2002, on the southern coast,
only very limited fishing activity (without boats) was noted.

2004 Census:816 Iliomar’s 1,625 households were recorded as engaging in the following
agricultural activity:
Rice cultivation: 1,221 households; Maize: 1,456; Cassava: 1,437; Vegetables: 833;
Fruit: 1,482; Coffee: 118; Coconuts: 1,525;
Other temporary crops: 1,452; Other permanent crops: 1,508.

Minerals

Mineral resources are sparce in Iliomar Sub-District. Gravel deposits are located in
the lower reaches of the Namaluto, Veira, Massoco, Cocolai and Irabere rivers. Clay is
found west of Cainliu village on the upper Cocolai River and to the south-west between the
Cocolai and Irabere rivers. An ochre deposit is located north-west of Tirilolo village to the
east of the Cocolai River.817

Social Services

In 2008, the Government commenced payment of an old-age pension to citizens
over 60 years – of USD 20.00 (payed six months in arrears). The first payment - ie of USD
120.00, was made in Iliomar in October 2008. In 2014, the neediest female-headed
households received a monthly subsidy of between US$5 and US$30 for each child to
assist with education needs (depending on the education level of the child). The pension for
the elderly and disabled was raised to US$30 per month.
In 2006, as part of the “Valorization Program”, pensions became payable to former
resistance members based on their “rank” or function within the resistance structure. In
2014, pensions ranged from between US$276 and US$575 per month for veterans who
participated in the resistance for at least eight years or who were “incapable of work due to

815
These figures are for 1997. In the period 2001-2002, when resident in Iliomar, the author saw very few
goats in Iliomar (less than 50) and very few ducks.
816
Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004 - Atlas, 2006, Table 15.
817
ESCAP, Atlas of Mineral Resources of the ESCAP Region, UN New York, 2003, Volume 17 – see map at
p.68 : “Mineral Occurrences in Lautem District, East Timor” - based on a 1999 survey by V. Lacerda.
178

physical or mental disabilities resulting from their participation”, and US$230 and
US$287.50 per month for surviving family members. A small number of senior resistance
figures receive a pension of US$750 per month for their “outstanding contribution to the
struggle”.

Health Care and Fertility

In 1990, Indonesian records listed one Health Centre (Puskesmas) in Iliomar Town
and six Village Health Posts (Posyandu) and six Family Planning Clinics (Pos KB) in the
villages. 12 Health Posts were listed in 1993. In 1997, one Health Centre in Iliomar Town
(with in-patient beds), 3 Health Sub-Centres (Puskesmas Pembantu), and 13 Health Posts
in the villages were recorded. Sub-District health staff were listed as: one doctor, four mid-
wives, four nurses, one dental nurse, and five health supervisors. In early September 1999,
the Health Centre and one of the Sub-Centres (Cainliu) were destroyed by the withdrawing
TNI troops – the Sub-Centres in Iliomar II and Tirilolo were looted, but remained intact. A
“Sub-Centre sized” temporary Health Centre was built by the UN in Iliomar Town in 2000,
and a new Health Centre constructed in mid-2002. In late 2002, the two Health Sub-
Centres (Tirilolo, Iliomar II) had yet to be re-equipped and staffed.
Of 34,459 medical cases detailed in Lautém District in 1997 : Respiratory tract
cases represented 28 percent; Malaria – 14.5 percent (Lautém is the “most malarial” of the
13 Districts); Diarrhoea – 7 percent; Scabies – 4.3 percent; TB (Lungs) – 6.2 percent; Skin
disease – 7.7 percent; Bronchitis – 4.8 percent; Conjunctivitis – 3.9 percent; Influenza – 1.4
percent; Rheumatism – 13 percent; Dental caries – 1 percent; Accidents – 4.2 percent;
Bowel system – 3 percent.
In 1997 in Iliomar, 92 people were classified as handicapped, comprising: 57 with
physical disabilities, 16 blind; 12 “speech”, two mental, and three chronic skin conditions.
Population growth for the 1980s in Lautém District is calculated as averaging 2.4
percent per annum, and for the period 1990-1997 at 1.52 percent per annum. Official
statistics state the average annual population growth rate for Lautém District in the period
1993-1997 as 1.61 percent per annum.
In 1997, family planning contraception (KB) figures for Lautém District were
declared as : 3,483 akseptor (acceptors – presumably couples) totalling 13.79 percent
(of eligible couples in a District population of 54,634). Family planning (contraception)
figures for Iliomar were declared as:

1990 164 acceptors including 137 by injection, 10 by IUD.
1993 292 acceptors including 257 by injection, 25 by pill, 7 by IUD.
1997 373 acceptors comprising 324 by injection (87 percent), 39 by pill, 7 by IUD, 1
by “MOW”. Assuming acceptors as “couples”, this represents an estimated 12
percent of Iliomar’s eligible couples as acceptors.

According to a UNICEF-managed survey in 2002, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in
East Timor of about 7.4 was one of the highest in the world, and only seven percent of
women utilized contraceptives.818 In late October 2003, President Xanana’s wife, Kirsty
Sword participated in a seminar held by the East Timor Health Department and the UN
Family Planning Association in Dili on the “Implementation of Family Planning”. She
stated that family planning was a positive step in fulfilling womens’ rights, and that the

818
UNICEF, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS-2002), Dili, May 2003, p.12.
179

family planning program would continue – but not in the same manner as during the
Indonesian period.819

2004 Census:820 The fertility rate in Iliomar – ie the average number of children per
woman in her lifetime, was 7.80 (compared to the national Timor-Leste figure of 6.99). The
teenage fertility rate – ie the number of live births per 1,000 for females aged 15-19 years,
was 57.7 (compared to the national figure of 59.2). The change in infant mortality rates (per
1,000) in the period 1996 to 2002 showed an increase from 119 to 129.

Cooperatives:

Iliomar’s Cooperative - Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) Makalero, had 319 members in
1997. Its building near the market in Iliomar Town was destroyed by the withdrawing TNI
in September 1999.

Name Meanings

In Fataluku: “La Pala” means “flat farms” or “infested fence”– corrupted by the
Portuguese to “Lospalos” (see also footnote 2).
In Makalero: Iliomar means “stone house”; Ailebere: “heavy rains”; Iradarate:
“water rising”; Cainliu: a particular group of trees; Fuat: a type of flower - “bunga kayu” in
Bahasa Indonesia; Tirilolo: unknown – there is also a Tirilolo village in Baucau District
which occasionally causes some confusion. Irabere: “much water”.

Iliomar – Chefe/Encarregados de Posto/Escriturário/Camat/District Head/Sub-District
Coordinators/Sub-District Administrators:

1934 (?) – 1942: João Braz (corporal, artillery – aspirante administrativo interino)
1946: Jorge Dargent Pereira Caldas
1947: Rui Serrão da Veiga Teixeira Lopes
1948: Fernando Paraiso Guerreiro – to December 1948.
1948-49: José Vitor Pacheco da Costa Sequeira – to March 1949.
1949: Carlos Alberto Monteiro Leite – to 22 April 1949, transferred to Tutuala.
1949: José Vitor Pacheco da Costa Sequeira – from 22 April to late 1949.
1950: Gil Germano Gonçalves Ferreira – from January to May 1950.
1950: António Ernesto Pires Antunes – May 1950 to September 1951.
1951: Jorge Lopes de Rocha Vieira
1952: Eduardo António Vaz de Quina Pinto Crisóstomo – to March 1953.
1953: António de Oliveira Leite – to November 1954.
1954-1959: Filomeno da Cruz Miranda Branco (Encarregado at Luro in 1949, 1953-54)
– to August 1959.
1959: Francisco Augusto Nobre Júnior – to March 1961.
1961: Agusto César da Costa Mousinho – to February 1962.
1962: Tito dos Anjos – to August 1962.
1962: Analecto Francisco Xavier Ribeiro – to March 1963 as a “terceiro-escriturário”.
1963: Fernando Domingos de Almeida e Sousa – June 1963 to July 64.
1967: João Olivio Sequeira de Araújo – February 1967 to October 1968.

819
“Nonya Kirsty Sword Gusmão: Program KB sangat positif”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 20 October 2003.
820
Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004 - Atlas, 2006, Tables 22-24 inclusive.
180

1968: José Nunes Lopes – October 1968
1968-1969: Rui Manuel de Morais e Silva (?)
1969: Agapito Alvaro Maria Borges – July 1969 to September 1970
1971: Jose Manuel de Oliveira Frade – March 1971 to January 1972.
1972: Agapito Alvaro Maria Borges – to April 1972.
1972: André da Costa – August 1972 to
1975: André da Costa (Mestizo)
1978: Orlando Marques (of Raça, Lospalos) – left by helicopter821, disappeared.
1980: Horacio Gago Kopsadas (of Lospalos)
1981: Raimundo Fernandes (of Lospalos)
1982: Roberto Seixas Miranda Jerónimo – born 12 June 1955.
(jailed in Cipinang -Jakarta 1983-95, now lives in Portugal)
1985: Jaime da Costa
(later DPRD II representative in Lautém; 2002: high school teacher in Lospalos)
1988: Lieutenant Sirana (ABRI – Javanese) served for four years
1993: Florindo Ferreira (of Lospalos)
1995: Tomás Neves (opposed Indonesians, dismissed – now in Lospalos)
1997: Mateus da Costa (of Lospalos) – temporary, served six months.
1998: Horacio Marques (now teacher, University of East Timor – Dili)
2001-2003: Mário Fernandes Cabral (first Sub-District Coordinator)
2003-: Abílio Quintão Pinto (former CNRT Secretary ie to mid-2001 –
first Sub-District Administrator)

Notes:
Afonso Pinto served as Iliomar’s representative in the DPRD II in Lospalos 1982-
1999; Jamie da Costa. Adolfo Pinto, and Domingos Morais - all Iliomar-born, were also
elected to the Lautém DPRD II in June 1999.
Public servants in Iliomar in the period 1990-1997 (not including police or military
personnel) numbered 12-14. In 1997, the 12 public servants comprised: six Grade I (lowest
grade), five Grade II, one Grade III (the Camat ie Sub-District Administrator). One Grade
II public servant managed the Sub-District electricity generator (sub-ranting).

A SELECTED WHO’s WHO : 2002 - 2008

Lautém District : District Administrator (“Bupati”) – Olavio da Costa Monteiro Almeida

Iliomar Sub-District Coordinator: Mário Fernandes Cabral 2001-2003
Iliomar Sub-District Administrator: Abílio Quintão Pinto (from early 2003)
Iliomar Deputy Sub-District Administrator: Luís Fernandes (from 2006)
Community Development Officer (CDO): David Jerónimo Sanches (from July 2003)
Security staff (Segurança): José da Costa, Veríssimo dos Santos (from late 2003)
until replaced by Germano Ferreira.

Iliomar “Customary” (“Adat”) leader: Felipe Pinto (Village chief Iliomar II)

Former “Resistance”/CNRT Iliomar Zone Secretary : Abílio Quintão Pinto (to mid-2001)

821
According to Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, p.87 – Orlando Marques was arrested in Tutuala
in June 1979, taken to the Yonif 745 base at Trisula (Lospalos) and “disappeared”.
181

Police: Iliomar Station Commander – Sergeant Castello Branco dos Santos (born Larimi).
Officers (13): Sabino Dias – 2ic; Ameno da Gama, Carolino

Village (Suco)/Sub-Village (Aldeia) Heads/Village Councils822:

Iliomar I (1,571 – SDI 64): José Luís da Costa*, Secretary: Camilio Seixas
(Council: Domingos dos Reis, Juanita da Costa, Marito dos Santos, Margarida Teles,
Natalia Pinto)

Iliomar Ara Ara Caentau Vatamatar Ossohira
Herminio Pinto* José Sanches* Pedro Cabral* Francisco João Monteiro*
Dos Santos*

Iliomar II (1,528 – SDI 32): Adolfo Pinto Ximenes, Secretary: Adolfo Pinto
(Council: Gaspar Ximenes, Helder Aguas, Fernanda Pinto, Felicidade da Costa P.)

Acara Lihina Madarira Boquila Caidabu
Francisco Filomino Martinho Mateus de Artur Madeira
Barreto* Baptista Ximenes Oliveira

Ailebere (876 – SDI 63): Eurico Jerónimo, Secretary: Martinho Ximenes
(Council: João Hornay, Domingos Jerónimo, Amelia Quintão, Amelia Ximenes)

Leilor Marafal Hetali Lalumato
António Jerónimo* Marcus da Costa* António Gomes Francisco Madeira

Fuat (584 – SDI 59): Fernando Jerónimo*
(Council: Martins Pinto, António de Oliveira, Ilda de Anunciacão, Cristina Lourdes, Anina
Lourdes)

Rumutau Acadirolo (Bubutau) Vataomar (Bubutau)
Felisberto da Silva* Constantino Madeira José Martins*

Cainliu (1,281 – SDI 77) : Julião Soares*, Secretary: Francisco da Costa
(Council: Raimundo Ferreira, Constancio Oliveira, Felismina de Jesus, Delvina Savio)

Caidalavarin Maluhira Titiraven Liufalin Larimi
Igino de Carvalho* Orlando Lino João Baptista* Justino Belo
Barbosa* Fernandes*

Tirilolo (1,536 – SDI 76): Hermengildo do Carvalho
(Council: Inacio Perreira, Alegria Barros, Augustinha Soares, Ana da Costa)

822
Chefes de aldeias (sub-villages) were elected on 17 March 2005, and chefes de sucos and members of the
conselhos do sucos were elected on 23 March 2005. Asterisks * indicate the incumbent village and sub-
village heads who were re-elected. Village heads had earlier been appointed by the CNRT in October 1999 ie:
Iliomar I - José Luís da Costa; Iliomar II - Felipe Pinto; Ailebere - Américo Jerónimo; Fuat - Fernando
Jerónimo; Cainliu - Julião Soares; Tirilolo - Adão Fernandes Ximenes. The members of the elected conselhos
do sucos comprised: Ancião/Lia Nain (community elder), Rep. Juventude Feto (youth representative –
female), Rep. Juventude Mane (youth representative – male), and several Rep. da Mulher (womens’
representatives).
182

Tirilolo Tatalalarin Etevata (Boropai)
Manuel da Costa António Dias* José Martins*

In 2008, village chiefs received a monthly wage of USD 35.00.

Religion: Roman Catholic priests - late 1970s until the late 1990s: “Pastor/Father” Luís
Preto; mid-1999 to December 2007: Father Agostinho (Agustino) da Costa; December
2007 - : Father Arlindo da Silva.

Education (pupil numbers are as for 2004 only):

Iliomar Junior High School: 240 students. Coordinator/Principal – Jacob dos Reis. Senior
teachers include – Thomas Pinto, Sabina Savio, Tomás Amaral, Juvita Boavida, Ameliano
da Silva (link to Larimi - remote) +.

Primary Schools Coordinator: Marcos dos Santos

Iliomar Primary School: Principal – Marcos dos Santos 375 students
Teachers – Benediktus Ola +
Cainliu Primary School: Principal – Eduardo Dias, Teacher – Felismina da Jesus +
185 students
Tirilolo Primary School: Principal – Matias da Cruz Correia, Teachers –
Napoleao Leki Nahak, Manuel da Costa, Justo Baretto +
324 students.
Iradarate (Iliomar II) Primary School: Principal – Paulo Pinto, Teachers –
Francisco Birisasi + 202 students
Larimi Minor Primary School: Principal: José da Silva, 83 students
Caidabu Minor Primary School: Anacleto Madeira 138 students
Bubutau Minor Primary School: Alegria David , 35 students - building collapsed mid-2001,
rebuilt November 2003)

2004 Census: The population over-18 years in Iliomar ws 3,382 (1,503 males; 1,879
females) – of whom 246 had graduated from high school (172 males; 74 females).823

Health:

Puskesmas (Health Centre) destroyed September 1999, rebuilt mid-2002.
Staff: Mateus Ribeiro (Head), Honorio Ramos, Narcisio Camoes, Armindo Ferreira,
Carolina Hornay (midwife).
Puskesmas Pembantu (Health Sub-Centre): Tirilolo and Iliomar II – buildings not
equipped or staffed in 2004 – need refurbishment; Cainliu Sub-Centre destroyed September
1999.
Posyandu (Village Health Posts – reportedly 13 in 1997); Caidabu post destroyed in
September 1999: not staffed/equipped in 2004.

823
Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004 - Atlas, 2006, Table21.
183

Elections and Political Parties:

From 2001 (ie, for the Constituent Assembly Election), several political parties
were active in Iliomar Sub-District – see below:

Fretilin: Abílio Quintão Pinto. Secretaries: Felipe Pinto, Domingos Fernandes.

PSD: João António de Jesus. Vice – Eurico Jerónimo, Secretary: Heraldo da
Costa.

PD: Mário Cabral, Mateus da Cruz.

PDC: Anacleto Madeira.

PST: Gaspar de Sousa, Mateus Seixas Miranda.

UDC/PDC: Tomás Amaral.

However, by early 2005, only the Fretilin party remained active. In the March 2005
elections for village chiefs, village councils and sub-village chiefs only the Fretilin party
stood candidates – together with “individual” (“independents”). Fretilin candidates won
five village chief positions – with Tirilolo won by an Independent. Independents won nine
of the 25 sub-village chief positions.

In the 2007 Presidential Election – first round (9 April), a total of 2,801 valid votes
were cast in seven polling centres: Ailebere, Cainliu, Fuat, Iliomar I, Iliomar II, Iliomar II
(Caidabu), and Tirilolo - ie a centre in each of the six villages and one in the “dislocated”
sub-village of Caidabu about 8 kilometres north of the Iliomar township. Iliomar Sub-
District results for the eight Presidential candidates, by percentage, are shown below –
with, for comparison, the candidates “country-wide” percentage shown in brackets:

Lu’Olo (Francisco Guterres) – Fretilin 73.6 (27.9) percent
Jose Ramos-Horta (Independent) 10.6 (21.81)
Avelino Coelho (PST) 5 (2.06)
Lucia Lobato (PSD) 4.5 (8.86)
Fernando “Lasama” de Araujo (PD) 3.3 (19.18)
Manuel Tilman (KOTA) 1.3 (4.09)
Francisco Xavier do Amaral (ASDT) 1.2 (14.39)

The results in Iliomar can be interpreted against the background of the “East v West
Crisis” of 2006 – ie with, in general, Fretilin support remaining strong in the eastern
districts of Lautém (including Iliomar Sub-District), Baucau and Viqueque, but Fretilin
losing support in the central and western districts. Ramos-Horta’s “ousting” of Fretilin
Prime Minister Alkatiri in mid-2006 and Fernando de Araujo’s support of the F-FDTL
Petitioner’s significantly reduced their appeal in the eastern districts. Moreover, Lu’Olo – a
24-year Falintil veteran from neighbouring Viqueque – and a Makassae (ie, ethno-
linguistically related very closely to Iliomar’s Makalero language and culture) appeared to
have been “parochially” preferred by Iliomar voters. Additionally, as Iliomar was a
Resistance “heartland” during the Indonesian occupation, Falintil and Fretilin remained
well-regarded. Fernando de Araujo (born Ainaro) and Jose Ramos-Horta (born Dili) would
184

be seen as “outsiders”. Avelino Coelho, a clandestine Resistance leader (born Laclubar,
Manatutu – ie almost an “Easterner) whose party is more “radical” than Fretilin – did
relatively well in the Iliomar Sub-District polling. A closer examination of the results in
Iliomar, by village, indicates that support for Fretilin was not uniform throughout the Sub-
District. Lu’Olo (Fretilin) did best in the villages of Cainliu and Fuat – with 92 and 93
percent of the vote respectively; and worst in the village of Tirilolo (40 percent) and the
Iliomar II sub-village of Caidabu. In Tirilolo, this may have reflected discontent with the
2005 suco (village) election when Fretilin replaced its village chief, Adao Fernandes
Ximenes . The influence of the Catholic church is quite strong in Caidabu sub-village –
which might explain the low vote for Fretilin there. Ramos-Horta polled well in Tirilolo –
31.2 percent; and Caidabu – 26.5 percent. The only other candidate to reach “double
figures” in any village polling centre was Fernando de Araujo’s 13.5 percent in Tirilolo.
The overall results also suggested that the influence of the Catholic church on Iliomar
politics is not strong.
Detailed results for the second round of the Presidential Election in Iliomar (9 May
2007) are not publicly available. In Lautém, 26,466 votes were cast – with Lu’Olo winning
51.2% and Ramos-Horta winning 48.8% - ie compared with their national votes of 30.8%
and 69.2% respectively.
Iliomar results for the 30 June 2007 Parliamentary Elections are also not available.
In Lautém, 27,026 votes were cast – with Fretilin receiving 45.5%, CNRT 14.6%, PD
14.7%, ASDT/PSD Coalition 12.5%, Undertim 4% and PMD 2.1% (eight other parties
polled less than 2% each). Nation-wide, Fretilin received 29.02%, CNRT 24.1%,
ASDT/PSD Coalition 15.73%, PD 11.3% - and other parties less than 5% each.

Fretilin Organisation – October 2008

Iliomar: President: Abílio Quintão Pinto
Vice-Presidents: Domingos Fernandes
Felipe Pinto

Village Presidents: Iliomar I – Domingos dos Reis; Iliomar II – Felismina Ferreira;
Ailebere – Fernando Costa; Cainliu – Julião Soares;
Tirilolo – Ernesto Madeira; Fuat – Joaquim Henriques.

Local NGOs:

OPMT/OMT (Womens’ Organisation): Felisberta Madeira, Alicia Gonçalves, Margarida
Amaral Teles, Cristina Lourdes, Olinda Marques, Rosalina Fernandes, Merlinda da Costa,
Amelia Quintão Seixas +
Grupo Feto Neon Ida/Wanita Sehati (from 2003): Alicia Gonçalves, Olinda Marques.
OPJT (Youth Organisation): Liborio Madeira (Chair), Francisco da Costa, Honario da
Costa, Gonçalves da Costa, Alfredo Lebre

Selected Locations:

Iliomar Town: 8˚ 42’ ́́
185

References:

Maps 1:50,000 Edition 1-1999 Series T-754 No 2507-24 Luro; -51 Laga; -52 Lautém; -61
Fuiloro; -23 Baguia; -33 Lospalos; -21 Uatolari .
Map 1:25,000 Edition 1-1993 No 2507-241, Iliomar .

Matabean Mane 370470 Matebean Feto 355441 Mount Naunili 613416
Raça 772668 Titilari 792635 Com Junction 870662
Com 864758 Lautém Beach 689753 Baguia 425455
Caidabu 625448 Iliomar 610368 Luro 615550
Uato-Carabau 452313 Uatolari 288241 Atelari 473545

UNAMET/UNTAET PERSONNEL SERVING IN ILIOMAR 1999-2002

UNAMET 1999 Popular Consultation:

UNV DEOs: Barry Robert Hay (New Zealand) 6 Jul-30 Aug ; Máriola Ratschka (Poland) 6
Jul–18 Aug; Angelo Osório (Argentina) 11 Jul-30 Aug; Gyanendra Aryal (Nepal) 6-13 Jul;
Tahira Yukiko (Japan) 20 Jul-30 Aug; Xavier Noc (France) 25-30 Aug.
UN CIVPOL: Aaron Crabtree (Australia), Brad McMeeking (Australia) 7 Jul-30 Aug.

UNTAET 2000

UNV DFO: Robert Akankwasa (Uganda ) Nov 2000 -
UN CIVPOL: Khaled Sweiti (Jordan) – Sep 2001; Firas Sawaftah (Jordan) – Feb 2002;
Charles … (West Africa); … …. (West Africa).
Peace Keeping Force (PKF): 12-man Republic of Korea (ROK) military detachment
(Special Forces) deployed to Iliomar in 2000 from the battalion group of the ROK
“Sangroksu” (“Evergreen”) Contingent which arrived in Lospalos on 22 October 1999 –
based in the former Yonif 745 camp adjacent to Kartini sub-village.

UNTAET 2001

UNV Civil Registration: Roberto Sanchez (Philippines) Mar-May; Angelika Karpol
(Germany) Mar-May.
UNV DEOs: Ernest Chamberlain (Australia) 29 May- 12 Sep; Charles Ligtvoet
(Netherlands) 29 May-30 Aug; Patrick Pacaud (France) 15 –30 Aug. East Timorese
DDEO: Alicia Gonçalves –30 Aug.
UN CIVPOL: Khaled Sweiti (Jordan) – Sep 2001; Firas Sawaftah (Jordan) – Feb 2002;
Don Barret (Australia), Mike Whitehead (Australia) 10 Jun –2 Nov; Pongsri Pongwuit 20
Jul-12 Oct (Thailand), Meesornrit Amnvay (Thailand) 20 Jul –17 Oct; Mr Yin (China), Mr
Chen (China) 28 Oct-Dec;
Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) Detachment: 12 Republic of Korea (ROK) military personnel
(Special Forces); also 8-man military engineer detachment for several weeks in late 2001
(road repairs).
186

UNTAET 2002

UNV DEOs: Ernest Chamberlain (Australia) 4 Feb-21 Apr; Gunalan Sarvanan (Malaysia)
4 Feb-14 Apr; Samarapala Vidanagamachchi (Nepal) – resident in Lospalos and covering
Caidabu only : Feb-14 Apr. East Timorese DEO: Albino Alberqueque 4 Feb–14 Apr.
UN CIVPOL: Firas Sawaftah (Jordan) – to early Feb; Syaiful (Bangladesh) – to mid Apr;
Ali (Bangladesh) – to early Apr; Stephen Bimpeh (Ghana) 20 Feb-; Francis X Manlasi
(Ghana) 20 Feb-; Akwasi Ankoma Adutwum (Ghana) 20 Feb- ?.
PKF Detachment: In January 2002, the ROK unit based in Lautém District was redeployed
to Oecussi (Ambeno) District, and the Baucau-based Thai PKF battalion took security
responsibility for Lautém. Thai PKF vehicle-.mounted patrols visited Iliomar every few
weeks, normally transiting from Uato-Carabau (until mid-2002)

Iliomar I - Town Centre – 2002
View to the northwest : yellow “bus to Los Palos” in the left foreground; burnt-out
Portuguese-era building in the right foreground (former ABRI Kopasssus HQ);
Toko Cina in the centre; Catholic church in the left background.
187
188

ANNEX D

SKETCH MAP – JAPANESE WWII GARRISON: ELOMAR
189

ANNEX D

SKETCH MAP – JAPANESE WWII GARRISON: ELOMAR

In 1979, a Japanese WWII military veteran - Shōgorō Nishimura, published a 78-
page Japanese-language monograph – Eromaru monogatari (Elomar story). This map from
the monograpah - and translated extracts and the legend below, were passed to the author
by a Japanese historian – Takahashi Shigehito in January 2009. Shōgorō Nishimura – a
junior officer in the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Taiwanese Regiment, was the commander of
the Japanese platoon at Elomar. See also footnotes 167, 187, and 192 in the main text.
190

ANNEX E

INDONESIAN SECURITY FORCES AND PRO-INTEGRATION ELEMENTS IN
LOSPALOS AND ILIOMAR
(Note: ABRI reverted to its previous title of TNI in April 1999)

Lanud Baucau : Sektor A: Commanded by a Colonel – usually Kopassus, Sektor A
Headquarters was based at the Baucau (Cakung) military airfield (lapangan udara – Lanud
Baucau); located 6 ½ kilometres west of Baucau Town) and directed major field operations
in the eastern half of the Province, principally in the districts of Baucau, Manatuto,
Viqueque and Lautém.824 This headquarters employed infantry battalions and Satgas Darat
(Task Force) Rajawali (“Eagle”) elements - including “kompi pemburu” (“hunter/pursuit
companies” – from October 1995) formed from Kopassus and Kostrad units.825 In 1998, the
Sektor Commander was Colonel (Kopassus) Sunarko (NRP 29354), who was reportedly
succeeded in September 1999 by Colonel Irwin Kusnadi.826 The Sektor B Headquarters ie
“western headquarters” was located in Same, briefly in Dili (1992), and for most of the
1990s in Ainaro. Sektor C Headquarters was located in Dili until late 1991.

Lospalos: Kodim 1629 (Komando Distrik Militer 1629 – founded March 1979) -
Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, this District military headquarters was located in
Lospalos Town and responsible for military security and administration in Lautém District.
Kodim 1629 had five subordinate Koramil (numbered 29-01to 29-05 inclusive, one in each
of the Kecamatan) and a total strength in November 1998 of 604 personnel (436 ABRI, 78
public servants, 90 Wanra). The commander (Dandim 1629) in 1999 was Lieutenant
Colonel Sudrajat AS. Activities of Kodim 1629 are also covered in Chega !, the CAVR
Final Report.827 The Kodim 1629 headquarters staff in November 1998 are listed at:
http://homepage.esoterica.pt/~cdpm/orgepen.htm ABRI casualties in the Lautem Regency
(Kabupaten) are not known.828 However, ABRI suffered heavy casualties in engagements
with Falintil in the forests of eastern Lore – and a Falintil ambush of ABRI combat
engineers north of Iliomar on 21 November 1986 resulted in 34 ABRI killed in action (see
footnote 623).

824
In late 1992, the Sector A Commander concurrently held the position of Commander, 3 Airborne Infantry
Brigade (Kostrad) based in Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi – for detail see Kammen, D, “Notes on
theTransformation …”, Indonesia, 67, April 1999.
825
Rajawali was a continuation of the special composite battalion concept - ie Parikesit, first fielded in East
Timor in December 1978 – see Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p.272 and Conboy, K., Elite,pp.34-35. For the
founding, organisation and operations of Rajawali companies and their four 25-man hunter (Pemburu) teams,
see Conboy, K., Elite, 2008, pp.87-89. On their uniforms, Rajawali personnel wore a chest qualification
badge of an eagle - and a Pemburu shoulder badge.
826
Van Klinken, G. & Bourchier, D., “The Key Suspects”, Canberra, 2002, p. 170.
827
See Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Annex 1, Robinson, G., East Timor 1999 – Crimes against Humanity,
University of Los Angeles, July 2003, pp.165-168.
828
For an analysis of ABRI/TNI casualties in East Timor, see Van Klinken, G., “Indonesian Casualties in
East Timor 1975-1999: Analysis of an Official List”, Indonesia, Vol. 80, Cornell University, Ithaca, October
2005, pp. 109-122. That article analyses the names on the ABRI/TNI Seroja Monument at Cilangkap
(Jakarta) - ie a listing of 3,804 names of personnel who died in combat in East Timor (2,277 military
personnel and police; and 1,527 East Timorese irregulars). The names of ABRI/TNI military personnel on the
Monument are listed by year – and show rank, service number and unit; but not the location or circumstances
of the death. The listing of the 1,527 East Timorese irregulars has yet to be made public.
191

Lospalos: 745 Battalion (Yonif 745 SBY) Sampada Yudha Bhakti.
745 Battalion was formed on 10 August 1978 with its first commander as Major
Theo Syafei (until 1980).829 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the headquarters and most of
the battalion were based in Baucau with C Company on the outskirts of Viqueque town.
Battalions 744 (founded in January 1978) and 745 became organic battalions of Korem
164/Wira Dharma on 20 October 1984. The headquarters of 745 Battalion moved to
Lospalos in the late 1980s, and in 1999 the headquarters, A, C, and D (support) companies
were based in the battalion camp on the northern edge of Lospalos town adjacent to Kartini
sub-village – with B Company remaining south of Baucau town near Fatumaca. 745
Battalion is cited in the 2005 CAVR Final Report for 1,073 human rights violations in the
period to late 1999. About 29 percent of the reported incidents (309) were committed in
Lautém District.830
This nominally East Timorese infantry battalion would occasionally garrison
outposts in Iliomar (eg at Naunili) and also patrol and join major operations in the Sub-
District. Together with Yonif 744 based in Dili (formed 24 January 1978), Yonif 745 was
an “organik” battalion, as distinct from assigned or duty (“penugasan”) BTTs. Leaked
ABRI documents indicated in mid-1998 that the strength of Yonif 745 was 663 (including
27 officers and 126 NCOs), and in November 1998 was 690-strong. Of the total, 171 were
East Timorese (about 26 percent). There were no East Timorese officers, and 25 percent
(32) of the NCOs were East Timorese. Only three or four Iliomar men ever served in Yonif
745 – the most senior being Sergeant António Pereirra.
During the period 1978-1999 inclusive, Yonif 745 suffered 29 personnel killed in
combat.831 All but five appear to have been Timorese. The 29 comprised junior personnel –
corporals and privates, and one sergeant.
In 1999, the battalion commander was Major Jacob Djoko Sarosa (NRP 29991).
The battalion began withdrawing from Lospalos in mid-September 1999 – by sea from
Com to Kupang, with the rear party led by Major Sarosa departing Lospalos late on the
afternoon of 20 September. Yonif 745 is alleged to have killed 21 civilians in September
1999 during its withdrawal.832 The battalion was disbanded in Kupang on 30 March 2000 –
together with its superior headquarters Korem 164.833

Iliomar: Koramil 29-03 (Komando Rayon Militer - Military Sub-District 29-03):
This headquarters was located in Iliomar Town with an adjacent “asrama” (barracks)
building for its staff. Established in early 1980s, the Koramil had an establishment of 44

829
The known commanding officers of 745 Battalion are listed in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Annex 2
(Command Responsibility), Table 13 (p.10).
830
Chega !,CAVR Final Report, Annex 2 (Command Responsibility), Annex 2, p.10.
831
Van Klinken, G., “Indonesian Casualties …, op.cit., October 2005, p. 11.
832
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Djoko Sarosa and Lieutenant Camilo dos Santos were indicted by the UN’s
Serious Crimes Unit (Dili) in November 2002 on 14 counts of murder allegedly committed during Yonif
745’s overland withdrawal westward from Lospalos to Dili on 20 and 21 September 1999 – including the
murder of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes in Dili on 21 September. See also Chega !,CAVR Final Report,
Part 10.14, Battalion 745 Rampage 20-21 September 1999, pp.240-244 and Annex 1, Robinson, G., East
Timor 1999 – Crimes against Humanity, University of Los Angeles, July 2003, pp.165-168. Colonel Jacob
Djoko Sarosa – Danrem 163 Denpasar, was promoted to Brigadier General in mid-2012.
833
On withdrawal from East Timor, the other “organic” battalion, the Dili-based Yonif 744 Satya Yudha
Bakti established its base in West Timor at Naibola (about 9 km west of Kefamenanu) and is under command
Korem 161/Wira Sakti (Kupang) – Kompas, 24 April 2002. Yonif 744 subsequently served in Aceh – and
suffered casualties in the December 2004 tsunami. 744 Battalion returned to West Timor in early 2005 and
was tasked with border protection beginning in the second half of 2008..
192

personnel in 1997 comprising one Lieutenant, eight senior NCOs, and 35 privates/
corporals. This included the six Babinsa ( Badan Bintara Desa – ABRI village sergeants,
one in each village), and two platoons of Milsas that under “militerisasi” had been
upgraded from Hansip in the early 1990s. The Koramil commander (Danramil) was usually
a Lieutenant. The final commander - ie to September 1999, was Second Lieutenant Moch.
Nur Hamsah (middle-aged, from Sulawesi) who had served as the Danramil in Iliomar for
several years. The Babinsa in November 98 were: Iliomar I – Cristiano da Costa, Iliomar II
– Gonsalo dos Santos, Ailebere – Armando dos Santos, Fuat – Oktavanius Taiboko,
Cainliu – Carlos Freitas Belo, Tirilolo – Januario Pereira. The Babinsas had authority over
the village Bimpolda (see “Police” discussed in following paragraphs), but all elements
were sometimes combined under the control of a “Tim Pembina Desa” (“Village Guidance
Team”) assigned to all “kerawanan” (“troublesome”) villages834.

BTT: Batalyon Teritorial (Territorial Battalion): BTT battalions (designated by TNI as
“penugasan” - ie “assigned”) were home-based in other provinces, and their tour-of-duty in
East Timor was usually 9-12 months. Usually one rifle company (up to 120-strong) was
assigned to Iliomar, with the battalion (Yonif – batalyon infanteri) headquarters remaining
in Lospalos (usually at barracks east of Raça village). In Iliomar Sub-District, the BTT
company headquarters was in Iliomar Town (in the old Portuguese Posto building) with 10-
12 man security posts within Iliomar Sub-District established at Dirimuni, Caidabu, Ula-ia,
Naunili, Bubutau, Maluhira, Cainliu, Tirilolo (Bukit Puntinal), Baitomar Hill, Kota Omar
(Ailebere), Manulor (Ossohira), and Namane. The established strength of BTT battalions in
East Timor was 644, but in October 1997, on its deployment Yonif 144, was noted with an
established strength of 986, and Yonif 642 was noted with a strength of 985.

Known tour-of-duty dates, units and commanders in Iliomar are shown below:

1978 Yonif 328/Dirgahayu, Commander: Captain Samsul Andi
1979 Yonif 315, 141
1980 Yonif 505, Commander: Captain Satria Buana
Yonif 143 TWEJ Lampung, Sumatra
1983 Yonif 320 ?
1983-1984 Yonif 321
1985 Yonif 301
1989 Yonif 521, Commander: Heru
1990 Yonif 412 Bharata Eka Sakti – retitled Yonif 412/Raider
Divisi 2 Kostrad in December 2003.
1991 Yonif 527 of Brawijaja Division
1993 Yonif 301 ?
1994 Yonif 431 Ujung Pandang (Operation Mantap II)
1995-96 Yonif 612/Modang – retitled Yonif 600/Raider Kodam Tanjungpura
in December 2003.
1996 Yonif 327, 433 operated into Iliomar from Uato-Carabau. Yonif 327
was retitled Yonif 300/Raider Kodam Siliwangi in December 2003.
1996-1997 Yonif 623
1997 Yonif 613 Raja Alam
1998 Yonif 642/Kapuas (Operation Taloli II); Nov 1998: 985-strong

834
Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War …, 1984, ABRI Document 1: “The Way for Babinsa …”,
pp.176-177 lists nine of the “several factors” which determine the “Degree of Trouble-someness of Villages”.
193

1998 Yonif 428
1999 Yonif 621/Manuntung (Kandangan and Tanjung) –
South Kalimantan.
Company A: Captain Erwin Setiawan

ABRI did not deploy field artillery or armoured vehicles in Iliomar Sub-District. However,
the Yonif elements in the Sub-District were often supported by their organic 81mm mortars
– particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On a small number of occasions, ABRI
armour (eg PT-76 light amphibious tanks) was deployed in neighbouring Uato-Carabau
Sub-District to the west.

Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus - Special Forces Command): Prior to 26 December
1986, the unit was termed “Kopassandha”835 and was referred to colloquially by Iliomar
residents as “Komando”. Detachments in Iliomar were initially code-named “Nanggala”,
then from mid-1983 as “Chandrasa” (both mythical Hindu weapons836), and reverted to
Nanggala and Tribuana (“three worlds”) in the 1990s. The Iliomar Kopassandha/Kopassus
detachments were usually comprised of four-eight men and operated from an office in
Iliomar Town. The detachment focussed on intelligence collection (including interrogation)
and reconnaissance, and commanded an eight-man “partisan”/militia Tim Alfa element.
The Kopassus Lautém detachment was headquartered in the Laruara district of Lospalos
Town, collocated with the District Tim Alfa headquarters. In 1999, the Kopassus
commander in Lautém was Lieutenant Rahman Zulkarnaen.

Militia837: The Tim Alfa element was formed in Lospalos in 1986838 by a senior
Kopassandha officer, Lieutenant Colonel Luhut Panjaitan, Commander of Task Force
(Dampak) 86, and was managed operationally by Kopassus. Team Alfa was reportedly
named after its first Timorese Commander, Alfonso, and initially comprised a core of no
more than nine Kopassandha personnel and 21 Timorese – mostly former Falintil
guerrillas. It was “regularised” in late 1998 as nominal Wanra, and in April 1999 declared
as Pam Swakarsa.839 Tim Alfa was armed, but did not wear uniforms. According to ABRI

835
From 1955, the Army’s special forces were titled RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat) –
changing to Kopassandha on 17 February 1971 ie prior to involvement in East Timor.
836
As related in the Mahabaratta and Ramayana epics: Nanggala was a multi-pointed spear and Chandrasa
was an axe-like weapon.
837
For the earliest use of Timorese “partisans/militia/paramiliter” in 1975 (Operations Flamboyan and
Seroja), see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, pp.19-22, para 76-90 and Conboy,
K., Kopassus, 2003, p. 207, pp.211-253. For Kopassandha’s formation of subsequent partisans/militia under
Nanggala command in 1976, see Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, pp. 266-276. Chega !, CAVR Final Report,
Part 4, Table 2 lists militia groups in the period 1975-99, and its Chapter 7.4, para 662 notes “25 militias” in
1998-1999. The Report’s Annex 1 provides Robinson, G., East Timor 1999 – Crimes Against Humanity, July
2003 that includes chapter 9.8 covering Team Alfa activities. For an historical study of militias, see Robinson,
G., “Colonial militias in East Timor from the Portuguese period to independence” in Hack, K. and Rettig, T.,
Colonial armies in Southeast Asia, Routledge, Abingdon UK, 2006. Militia control organisations and
activities – particularly in 1998-1999, are extensively covered in the Final Report of the Commission for
Truth and Friendship (CTF), 31 March 2008.
838
See Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, pp. 310-311 for detail, and also Othman, M.. and Alford S., 2001, p. 6.
However, it is also claimed – probably incorrectly, that Tim Alfa was formed in Lospalos in 1983 by (then)
Kopassus Major Prabowo Subianto – Greenlees,D. and Garran, R., Deliverance, 2002, p.132.
839
For an ABRI/TNI view on the formation/status of militia, see Anwar, Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …,
2002, p.75-77 that claims “militia” was not a term used by the people but coined by the Western press.
Rather, the book contends the approximately 20 PPI groups (including Jati Merah Putih) were legal Pam
Swakarsa elements formed by the initiative of citizens for their own defence. Anwar also implies that ABRI
support elements founded before 1990, such as Team Alfa, were originally Wanra - p.76. On 27 December
194

documents, Tim Alfa strength in Lautém in mid-1998 was 115; on 12 April 1999, the “Java
Pos” (Surabaya newspaper) estimated Tim Alfa as 300-strong with 300 weapons; while in
late April 1999, a report by Dili-based human rights activists cited Tim Alfa strength in
Lautém as “about 210”.840 Within Lautém, Tim Alfa was directed by Kopassus and the
Bupati/District Administrator, Edmundo Conceição e Silva.841 The local East Timorese
field commander in Lautém was Joni Marques842, and the Tim Alfa District headquarters
was collocated with the Kopassus headquarters in the Laruara district of Lospalos Town.
In 1999, Tim Alfa in Iliomar Sub-District was eight-strong and led by Raimundo Ferreira
(Cainliu) - and included Júlio Cardoso (Tirilolo), José Ferreira (Iliomar I), and Tito
Fernandes (Cainliu). In Iliomar, Tim Alfa also had a number of local youths as “assistants”.
On withdrawal to Lospalos in early September 1999, the former Iliomar Tim Alfa
personnel operated as “militia” - ie harassing pro-independence elements, principally in the
Lospalos area. The last Tim Alfa leader in Iliomar, Raimundo Ferreira of Cainliu village,
returned to Iliomar in February 2000.
The other Lautém militia group, Jati Merah Putih (The Real Red and White)843,
was founded in 1999 and also directed by the Bupati Edmundo Conceição e Silva844, did
not operate into Iliomar Sub-District – but one “pawai keliling” (“motorised tour/
demonstration”) did reach Cacaven village a few kilometres from Iliomar’s northern
border. One source incorrectly notes the Ermera District militia group “Darah Integrasi” as
operating in Lautém.845
The BRTT (“Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur” – East Timor People’s Front)846 was an
over-arching pro-autonomy political group that also committed militia-type human rights
abuses in Lautém District – but not in Iliomar. The Lautém BRTT group was directed by
the Bupati/District Administrator, Edmundo Conceição e Silva.
The Tim Alfa and Jati Merah Putih militias were nominally under the command of
the Persatuan Perjuangan Integrasi (PPI – Integration Struggle Forces) founded in early
March 1999 and led by João Tavares – and regionally, the Lautém militias were
subordinate to the PPI’s “Sektor A” commanded by Joanico Césario Belo. The militias
were also gathered under a political front led by the Dili District Head (Bupati), Domingos

1999 before the KPP HAM in Jakarta, former Danrem 164 Brigadier Hartono Suratman claimed Team Alfa
were Pam Swakarsa and denied that TNI had trained or armed them, rather they were trained by the Police
and funded by Local Government - Titus, A., “Former Military Commander: Pam Swakarsa …”, December
1999.
840
Fonseca, J., “HAK: Laporan Situasi …”, 30 April 1999.
841
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation,Table 2, p.29 suggests that in 1999 the title of
Tim Alfa was changed to Jati Merah Putih – but such is yet to be confirmed and is considered unlikely. For
Jati Merah Putih, see the following paragraphs.
842
José Pereira was also alleged as the Lautém Team Alfa commander in 1999 – see Judicial System
Monitoring Programme, The General Prosecutor V Joni Marques …, March 2002, p.10.
843
According to Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, Table 2, p.29 - Tim Alfa was
renamed Jati Merah Putih in 1999.
844
Fonseca, J., “HAK: Laporan Situasi …”, 30 April 1999 notes Jati Merah Putih principal leaders included
senior officials Francisco Correia Pinto, Jaime Lemos, and Horacio Gago Cabeadas.
845
Hasby, E. (et al), “Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste”, Kompas, Jakarta, 23 August 1999, p.4.
846
BRTT was founded on 20 May 1999 as a pro-integration “counter” to the CNRT with FX Lopes da Cruz
as the BRTT General Chairman. Lopes da Cruz, was Indonesia’s Roving Ambassador for East Timorese
affairs. In June 1999, the BRTT joined the FPDK, together with the PPP of João Tavares. Overall political
direction was by UNTAS (UniTimor Aswain) led by Domingos Soares (Bupati of Dili). For a summary in
Bahasa, see Hasby (et al), “Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste”, Kompas, Jakarta, 23 August 1999. For
tensions between BRTT and FPDK, see Guterres, F. da Costa, Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East
Timor (PhD dissertation), Griffith University, Brisbane, January 2006, p.167.
195

Soares847 – initially (from 27 January 1999), the Unity, Justice and Democracy Forum
(FPDK – Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan); then, from June 1999, the United
Front for East Timor Autonomy (UNIF – Front Bersama Pro-Otonomi Timor Timur)
which combined FPDK and BRTT; from 20 September 1999 ie post-referendum, the
National Unity Front (FPB - Front Persatuan Bangsa) founded in Balibo; and finally from
5 February 2000, the United Timorese Warriors (UNTAS - Uni Timor Aswain).

Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil – Civil Defence)848 were established in Iliomar in the 1979-1980
period. Hansip fell within the more general category of Ratih (trained civilians) and,
although under ABRI command in Iliomar, were formally sponsored by the Ministry of
Home Affairs and, hence, under the local government authority. Armed and uniformed –
and many eventually “full-time”, Hansip were under the command of the Iliomar Koramil
commander. In the mid-1980s, Hansip strength in Iliomar was a company of two platoons –
totalling about 40 personnel. In 1982, Hansip members received monthly pay of 33 kg of
rice and 11,500 rupiah. Hansip in Iliomar was subsequently upgraded to Wanra status
(Perlawanan Rakyat – People’s Defence) - ie under formal ABRI management. In 1990,
Indonesian records show 30 Hansip, 11 Kamra (auxiliary police) and 19 Wanra in Iliomar.
In the early 1990s, Hansip/Wanra in Iliomar underwent “militerasisi” - ie forming the
Iliomar Milsas unit.

Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih – Trained Civilians)849:
The basis of Indonesia’s defence policy was “Sishankamrata” (Sistem Pertahanan
Keamanan Rakyat Semesta – “total people’s defence”) 850 within which the populace
participates at the village level as “Ratih” – with a limited number of weapons. Following
ABRI’s Operation Kikis (Operation Erosion/ Chipping Away) in East Timor in 1981, Ratih
units were established in many areas851. The development of Ratih was intended to reduce
the number of Hansip/Wanra. Unlike Hansip, Ratih only received payment (rice or corn)
when called out for operations away from home. In late 1982, Ratih was “re-organised”, a
system of recruiting Hansip from Ratih articulated – with Wanra and Kamra to be then

847
For a profile of Domingos Soares and pro-integration political fronts, see Van Klinken, G. & Bourchier,
D., “The Key Suspects”, 2002, pp. 197-199.
848
In the early 1980s, ABRI documents often noted “Wanra” – which were usually termed “Hansip”. For a
history of Hansip, see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, pp.23-24 that reports
5,897 Hansip in East Timor by mid-1978 – with “the fewest in Lautem (187)”, para 94.
849
Ratih and its components Hansip, Wanra and Kamra were legally established under the Government
statute UU No.20 of 1982. For background on Ratih, see For a history of Hansip, see Chega !, CAVR Final
Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, pp.23-24. For a description of Ratih and its components in the early
1980s see Instruction Manual No JUKNIS/06/IV/1982, Babinsa/TPD Activity in Developing and Phasing Out
Trained People’s Resistance Forces, 10 September 1982 - Document 6 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong,
The War …, 1984, pp. 223-227; and also the following Document 9, Plan to Re-structure the Trained
People’s Forces (Ratih), 238-242.
850
See Rabasa A. and Haseman, J., 2002 for discussion of the “New Paradigm” in Indonesian defence policy
that modifies Sishankamrata.
851
Before Operation Kikis, Ratih elements – along with Hansip, “Partisan” and “Combat”, had been raised
by Nanggala (ie Kopassus). Following Operation Kikis, Ratih were to be established in every village in
accordance with a Korem 164 Technical Instruction (JUKNIS 03/XI/1981) which, unlike Wanra and Hansip,
“would not receive routine support”. The planned development of Ratih is detailed in JUKNIS/06/IV/1982,
10 September 1982 – which also includes the service conditions for Ratih and Wanra/Hansip. The Bahasa
version of the 1982 instruction can be found at the website of the Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili, within
Document 06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 – Bakau Timtim, Baurah”).
196

recruited from Hansip members.852 Later, Ratih also became an over-arching term also
encompassing Wanra/Hansip and TBOs.
In Iliomar in 1980, as there were only six Hansip, about 100 armed and uniformed
Mambae-speaking Ratih from Aileu were deployed and stationed in the villages of Iliomar
for about one year. They were replaced by local Ratih who served for several years until
replaced by Hansip. In Indonesia’s Defence Policy, in concept, all Hansip were to be
phased out and replaced by Ratih – but the continuing resistance by Falintil forced ABRI to
subsequently upgrade most of Iliomar’s Hansip to Wanra, and subsequently to Milsas.

Milsas: In the early 1990s, ABRI upgraded many members of Hansip/Wanra in East
Timor by “militerisasi” training and formed Milsas units. Milsas members wore ABRI
uniforms, were armed, and undertook three months individual upgrading training outside
the Province - principally in Java and/or Bali.853 In 1996, Milsas strength in Lautém
District was reported as 300. In August 1998, ABRI records showed 2,566 Milsas in East
Timor. In Iliomar, Milsas strength peaked at two platoons, about 40 men – under command
of the Koramil headquarters. The last Milsas commander in Iliomar was Valenti Madeira,
with the rank of “Prada”.

Police
The Police (Polda – Kepolisian Daerah) sector headquarters (Polsek) for Iliomar
Sub-District was located opposite the Junior High School on the northern edge of Iliomar
Town. The police commander (Kapolsek), usually a sergeant major, commanded about 11
“regular police” and about 8 East Timorese police (ex-Kamra), some of whom functioned
in the villages as Bimpolda (Bimbingan Masyarakat Kepolisian Daerah). The last
Kapolsek - ie to September 1999, was Sergeant Major Adrianus Nidat (of Flores).
Paramilitary police or Brimob (Brigada Mobil) were more heavily armed. About
20 were stationed in Iliomar, with an “asrama” (barracks) in Iliomar Town adjacent to the
Kopassus office. This element was usually commanded by a lieutenant. In the mid-late
1990s, the Brimob elements in Lautém were from KI (Kompi – Company) 5486; KI 5127
from North Sumatra; KI 5135 from Riau; and KI 5151 from Palembang.

Miscellaneous:

Combat Engineers (“Zenipur” or “Zipur”): In 1985 and 1986, Zipur Battalion 3 and Zipur
Battalion 9 operated in Iliomar – principally on road and bridge construction. Zipur 9
suffered heavy casualties in a Falintil ambush north of Maluhira in December 1986.

Gada Paksi (Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi – Youth Guard of Integration Upholders) –
also as “Garda Paksi”: “Gada Paksi”, was formed by (then) Kopassus Colonel Prabowo
Soebianto in July 1995 (also reported as 1989854) as a youth militia to oppose pro-

852
The Bahasa version of Korem 164 instruction: Rencana Penyususn Kembali Rakyat Terlatih (“Plan for the
Restructuring of Trained Civilians”), Dili, 10 September 1982 can be found at the website of the Arkivu ho
Muzeu Rezistensia, Dili, as Document 06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 – Bakau Timtim, Baurah”). This
“Rencana …” instruction however, only details arrangements within Kodim 1628 ie the Baucau Regency.
853
Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, Regime of Occupation, p.24 provides detail on Milsas noting that,
with the growth of Milsas, the number of “civil defence” personnel (including Hansip, Wanra and Kamra)
were reduced from 4,996 to 2,475 in the period 1989 to August 1991. The Report also notes that Milsas
“functioned only in East Timor”.
854
Hasby, E. (et al), Hasby (et al), “Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste”, Kompas, Jakarta, 23 August 1999,
p.3.
197

independence elements.855 Overall, Gada Paksi were controlled by Kopassus – however,
during a press interview on 17 July 1998, Korem 164 Commander, Colonel Tono
Suratman, explained that Garda Paksi youth were “under the direct management of the
Korem Chief”, and “no longer managed under Group A or SGI” (ie, Kopassus).856 Gada
Paksi members were often described by pro-independence supporters as “algojo/informan”
(“murderers, bullies and informants”).
In Iliomar, the four-member Gada Paksi unit was sponsored by the Iliomar DPRD II
representative, Afonso Pinto, and comprised Camilio Seixas as chairman and Apolonario
Anunciacão, Francelino da Costa, and Fernando Jerónimo as members. Iliomar Gada Paksi
members attended a three-month course in Java857 – but almost all actively supported the
Resistance. The Iliomar Gada Paksi group initially included José Zeferino, but he withdrew
on the day before the group was scheduled to leave for Java and was replaced by “Lino” da
Costa. According to IMPI in 1998, Gada Paksi were active in Iliomar. Press reports noted
clashes initiated by Gada Paksi in neighbouring Uatolari in February 1999.

Pam Swakarsa (Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa – Self-Initiated Security Groups): Pam
Swakarsa were vigilante-style security forces first raised in Jakarta in November 1998 by
the Deputy Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) to counter students
demonstrating against the MPR Extra-ordinary Session. These Pam Swakarsa were
reportedly recruited principally from Muslim Ambonese and Muslim villagers in West
Java.858 In April 1999, the TNI commander in East Timor, Colonel Tono Suratman, and
Governor Abílio Soares declared the militia elements as Pam Swakarsa – under police
command, entitled to carry arms, and paid by the Local Government authorities.859 About
50 Tim Alfa members from Lospalos860 and several of Lospalos-based militia Jati Merah
Putih861 participated in the major pro-autonomy rally in front of the Governor’s office in
Dili on 17 April – at which the Indonesian-appointed Pam Swakarsa head - Eurico
Guterres, called for violence against those who had “betrayed integration”. It is unclear
whether any Tim Alfa members from Iliomar participated in this rally.

Other uniformed groups in Iliomar sponsored by the Government included: six Karang
Taruna – Neighbourhood Youth Associations; and the Pramuka – Scout Association862.

855
For background on Gada Paksi, see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, p.28.
856
Prabandari, P.D., “Ada Perintah Tembak di Tempat” (“There is an Order to Shoot on the Spot”), Tempo
Interactive, 25 July 1998. p.2.
857
Gada Paksi members received training at the STPDN (Interior Ministry Government High School) in
Jatinangor, Bandung (West Java) and several BLK (Balai Latihan Kerja – Job Training Institutes) in Java –
see Anwar (Makarim) Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …, 2002, p.76, p.79.
858
Aditjondro, G.J., Guns …, Part III, 2000. However, ABRI Major General (retd) Kivlan Zein declared in
late May 2004 that he had raised these first Pam Swakarsa (30,000) on the orders of ABRI Commander,
General Wiranto – see Siboro, T. & Khalik A., “Damning Accusations …”, The Jakarta Post, 2 June 2004.
859
Oki, “Pam Swakarasa ...”, Kompas, Jakarta, 28 December 1999. See also Titus, A., “Former Military
Commander: Pam Swakarsa …”, December 1999 and Anwar (Makarim), Z. (et al), Hari-Hari Terakhir …,
2002, pp. 74-79.
860
Moore,S., “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years …”, Indonesia, No 72, Cornell University, Ithaca,
October 2001, p.36, footnote 70 – but cautions that this number might be inflated.
861
Yayasan HAK, “Aitarak Dan Kampanye Kekerasan …”, Dili, 21 April 1999.
862
For Pramuka - sponsored by the Indonesian Police, see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 4, p.27.
198

ANNEX F

ILIOMAR FALINTIL AND CLANDESTINA/KLANDESTIN

During the Struggle, several hundred Iliomar-born men and women were active
members of Falintil and the Clandestina/Klandestin organisation. Most of the Iliomar
Falintil served in the Ponte Leste Region (Regiao I) – with many also serving in the Central
Region – and several in the Batugade/Bobonaro/Atabae area in late 1975. While an
authoritative listing of all Iliomar-born Falintil and Clandestina is not yet available, the
2008 pension eligibility data (see Appendix 2) provides useful information.
In July 2001, Xanana Gusmão founded the AVR (Associação Veteranos da
Resistência - Association of Veterans of the Resistance) to advance the interests of former
Falintil and Clandestina – which soon after claimed 18,000 members (mostly “External
Front” and Clandestina).
Subsequently, two veterans’ associations emerged - principally the CAAC
(Comissão para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes – Commission for Former
Combatant Affairs) – for service in the period 1975-1979; and the CAVF (Comissão dos
Antigos Veteranos dos Falintil – Commission for Falintil Veterans’ Affairs) – for the
period 1980-1999. However, these merged under a joint commission in early 2004 that
progressed recommendations for recognition and benefits for veterans. One of their tasks
was to confirm and list those involved in the armed struggle. To this, in late August 2004,
was added the CAQR (Comissão para os Assuntos dos Quadros da Resistência –
Commission for Former Resistance Cadres) under Vasco da Gama ("Criado") - a
Presidential-sponsored commission formed to list the clandestine and political front
members. Through the CAQR process, 36,806 former members of the civilian resistance
were registered, including 9,796 women (27%). The CAQR data was merged with that of
the CAAC and the CAVF (totaling 38, 337) – ie a total registration of 75,143863 of whom
18,516 (8%) were deceased.864
In October 2004, HQ F-FDTL submitted a “Envio de Lista de Veteranos” to the
President and Prime Minister which detailed 194 ex-Falintil with 14 or more years service
with Falintil who were still living. This list included 16 veterans from Iliomar (see
Appendix I).
In 2005, a parliamentary bill on veterans was progressed - in May, the Parliament’s
Ad-Hoc Committee on the Independence War Veteran’s Law finalized a bill entitled "O
Estatuto dos Combatentes da Libertação Nacional" (National Liberation Combatants’
Statute). With input from District and Sub-District Administrators, a comprehensive data
base of veterans was developed. The subsequent Bill was passed by the National
Parliament on 12 April 2006 as Lei No.6 - O Estatuto dos Combatentes da Libertação
Nacional. Beginning in August 2006, medals (see the following paragraphs) and some
cash payments were made to selected veterans (based on a complex formula of time served,
position held etc) - but this was seen as not wholly satisfactory.
In April 2007, a data base of veterans eligible for pensions was coordinated by Sr.
Virgílio Smith as the Presidente Komisaun Homenajen, and further submissions were
sought from District and Sub-District Administrators. Following a medal presentation
ceremony on 2 December 2007, 205 “Category A” Falintil veterans (ie with more than 15
years’ service) were each presented with cheques for USD 9,600. Pensions became payable

863
This includes about 13,000 with less than three years service – and who, according to the Law, are not
defined as “veterans” and therefore not recognised.
864
For detail on the registration of veterans and pension eligibility see – World Bank - Report, Defining
Heroes: Key Lessons from the Creation of Veterans’ Policy in Timor-Leste, Dili, 19 August 2008.
199

to former resistance members based on their “rank” or function within the resistance
structure.
Subsequently in 2008, Marito Nicolao dos Reis - as Secretary of State for Veterans’
Affairs, progressed a “Lei Pensaun ba Veteranus no Kombatenti Libertasaun Nasional”
which was approved by the Council of Ministers on 26 March 2008. At meetings in
February and April 2008, the names of candidates for pensions were endorsed in three
categories: “Survival”, “Special Reform” and “Special Survival”. On 12 May 2008, the
procedures for payment of pensions were formally proclaimed - with a total of 12,538
pensions to be granted (payable retrospectively from 1 January 2008) to:
- 631 living former Falintil combatants ie: with more than 15 years of full-time
participation in the Struggle; those war-disabled (120) who have been unable to
work; and the elderly over 55 years who were combatants for over eight years
full-time.
- The heirs of 11,907 fallen combatants (one heir per combatant).
The value of the pensions varied between USD 85 and USD 550 per month, depending on
the time served in the Struggle and the position occupied by the beneficiary. A provisional
listing of eligible Iliomar-born pension recipients under these provisions - ie living former
“combatentes” (17) and deceased (“mártires” - 181), is at Appendix 2.
In early June 2008, 17 veterans from Iliomar Sub-District - led by the Sub-District
Veterans’ Coordinator, Carlos da Costa (Resi Lafu), contacted the Ministry of Social
Solidarity seeking inclusion in the pension programme.865 A second phase of “one-off”
payments totaling USD 20m was mooted for 2009 that was expected to include veterans
with 3-7 years’ service and some Clandestina.
Under the Law866, those former Falintil combatants whose names were not included
in the public proclamation were entitled to seek re-consideration and inclusion as
beneficiaries. In 2014, pensions ranged from between US$276 and US$575 per month for
veterans who participated in the resistance for at least eight years or who were “incapable
of work due to physical or mental disabilities resulting from their participation”, and
US$230 and US$287.50 per month for surviving family members. A small number of
senior resistance figures receive a pension of US$750 per month for their “outstanding
contribution to the struggle”.

Honours and Awards

Beginning on 20 August 2006, decorations and medals 867 were presented to
participants in the Struggle – with about 500 receiving awards at a ceremony in Dili on 7
December 2006. The awards comprised Ordem da Guerrilha (three grades); Ordem
Nicolau Lobato (three grades); Ordem das Falintil (three grades); Ordem de D.
Boaventura; Ordem Funo Nain (for “martyrs”, three grades); Ordem Laran Luak
(“external” service); Ordem Lorico Aswain (for the families of those killed or disappeared
at Santa Cruz in 1991). While a listing of “Iliomar recipients” had yet to be collated by the
end of 2008, confirmed recipients included Colonel Lere Anan Timor, Abílio Quintão
Pinto, Senior Sergeant Orlando Jerónimo (Serasa), Libório Madeira (Luru Asu), Sra.
Amelia (wife of Serasa), António Pinto, Caetano da Costa (Mau Assu), Domingos Pinto
(Funu Kiak), João Hornay Jerónimo (Mau Lo), and José Soares (Soares).

865
“Veteranu Husi Iliomar Ezije Tributu”, Suara Timor Lorosae, 10 June 2008. This number later reportedly
increased from 17 to 20 by late October 2008. Serasa visited Iliomar in late October 2008 to review claims.
866
Decree Law 15/2008, Pensões dos combatentes e mártires da libertaçao nacional, 4 June 2008.
867
The medals are depicted at http://www.amrtimor.org/combat/index.php?page=2
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

ANNEX G

KLANDESTIN IN ILIOMAR – 1997 (AN ABRI LISTING)

The following list of suspected Klandestin has been copied from Attachment D to a
“Regional Situation and Conditions Report” compiled by the resident BTT company in
Iliomar (Rifle Company A, 613 Yonif/Raja Alam) dated November 1997.

“Attachment D (List of Klandestin)

No Name Location Employment Age Married ?

1 Abilio Quintao Illiomar I Teacher SMP - Yes
2 José Jevalino “ Farmer - Yes
3 Luís Da Costa “ “ - Yes
4 Antoni Da Costa “ “ - Yes
5 Tito Benrandino “ “ - Yes
6 Amilia Yumenes “ “ - Yes
7 Fernando “ “ - Yes
8 Gonsalkes D. “ “ - Yes
9 Tito Desus “ “ - Yes
10 Duarte Sarmento “ “ - Yes
11 Ricardo Pinto “ “ - Yes
12 Tome “ Health Tutuala - -
13 Liborin Maidera Fuat Farmer - -
14 Paulino Pirera “ “ - -
15 Carlos Da Costa “ “ - Yes
16 Meres Seino M. “ “ - Yes
17 Dominggus J. Ailebere “ - Yes
18 Abilio Jurinimo “ “ - Yes
19 Florindo “ “ - Yes
20 Titimau Illiomar “ 65 Yes
21 Americo Jerenino Ailebere “ 40 Yes
22 Matius Illiomar “ 40 Yes

Compiled in : Illiomar
Date : November 1997
Post Commander

Suseno
Sergeant 2nd Class NRP 598503

((Notes: There are many errors in the spellings of the above names. Klandestin leader
Abílio Quintão Pínto and his deputy, Tito De Deus, are identified (1, 9) – as is OJT head
Liborio Madeira (13).))
212

ANNEX H

SKETCH MAP - ILIOMAR DESTRUCTION
SEPTEMBER 1999
213

ANNEX I

ILIOMAR – SUMMARY OF KNOWN CASUALTIES 1975-1999 868
Details of many casualties are not known – this listing is incomplete as it comprises only
those violent deaths where the date, location and circumstances are known with some
surety. Village reports prepared for the CAVR in 2003 provide further detail.

Name Date Comments
Alarico Jerónimo Oct 1975 Bobonaro – killed in clash with ABRI.
Manuel Seixas Feb (?) 1975 Los Palos – killed in clash with ABRI.
Paulo Hornay 13 Nov 1975 Irafok – killed by FADE.
António de Oliveira,Oscar 17 Nov 1976 “Muapepeh Purge” killings by Fretilin –
Ferreira, Angelo Pinto, at Kakimatar/Fifirasan on the
António Soares, Silvino Iliomar/Lore border.
Ximenes, Julio Ximenes,
Libertino Bastos, and
Bernardo Soares.
Igildo Ximenes 17 Nov 76 (?) According to the Tirilolo village report.
Francisco Ruas Hornay, 24 Nov 76 “Muapepeh Purge” killings by Fretilin -
Duarte Ximenes Pinto, Manuel Sarmento (Tirilolo/Tirilolo)
José Nunes, Dinis de escaped from the execution site, but
Castro (Tatalalarin/ was later captured and executed.
Tirilolo), Marcos Pinto
(Cainliu)
Manuel Sarmento Late Nov 76 Executed at Sailarin by Fretilin.
(Tirilolo/Tirilolo)
Afonso da Costa (Tirilolo) Late 1976 Killed in a clash with ABRI in the
and one Falintil fighter Irabere River area.
from Fuat and one from
Ailebere
Luís Sarmento (Fuat 1977 Killed in a clash with ABRI in the
village) Irabere River area.
Iliomar villagers and Sep-Nov 78 During ABRI attacks on Matabean –
Falintil fighters see village reports prepared for CAVR.
António da Silva, António Late Nov 78 Matabean Fetu – executed by ABRI
dos Reis, Abel, José Felis, after the fall of resistance at the
Gregorio Pinto, António Matabean Mountain base. Serafin and
Reis, Adelino Ximenes, Celestino (Jerónimo ?) were detained in
Julio Lebre, Aparicio Baguia before their summary execution.
Nunes, Serafin, Celestino,
José Felix (Falintil) and
Artur Ramos (50, Falintil).
+ about 10 others.

Julio Madeira 10 Jan 79 Falintil. Killed by Hansip near Naunili.
Francisco Ferreira + 3 1979 Village chief, Fuat – killed by Falintil at

868
A Falintil “Declaração” in 1990 - that listed 275 “comrades killed by the Indonesian military from 1975”,
included 20 from Iliomar ie four in 1980 (including Olimpia da Costa – see footnotes 466 and 467) and 16 in
June 1983 – Declaração, Document 05001.195, Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia Timor, Dili, p.7.
214

A’hasan.
Domingos Ximenes 1979 Killed in a clash with ABRI at Buidala.
António Pereira, Lupu 1979 (?) TBOs from Cainliu – killed at
Rasa, Lava Ili and Tome Porumaularin and Daramutu
Francisco Amaral Early 1980 Killed by Hansip on Iliomar Hill.
Domingos Barreto 1980 Iliomar I – killed by Falintil at Buidala.
Angelo Da Silva, 1980 Tirilolo – detained by ABRI and
Francisco Amaral disappeared.
Olimpia da Costa 7 or 12 Mar Klandestin, killed by ABRI at Manulor;
1980 see footnotes 466, 467, and 868.
Sebastiao Madeira Pinto 1980 Ailebere – killed by ABRI Yonif 126 at
Veru Codo.
Kiki Lay 1980 Ailebere – killed by ABRI in Lubu Rara
area.
Domingos da Costa 1980 Ailebere – killed by ABRI at Vani Abat
Bara Soru 1980 Ailebere – killed by ABRI in Heidaun
area.
Cou Vatu 1980 Ailebere – killed by ABRI in Bubutau.
Alarico Jerónimo 1980 Cainliu – killed as suspected Klandestin
Bruno da Costa 1980 Cainliu – killed as suspected Klandestin
by Hansip at Dapu-mana.
Isabel Pinto 1980 Cainliu – killed as suspected Klandestin
at Daman Fuat.
António Rodrigues 1980 Cainliu – killed as suspected Klandestin
by Yonif 126 at Caidava-Ira
Namipua (of Fuat) 1981 Fuat - suspected Klandestin killed by
ABRI at Koramil 03 HQ.
Duarte Madeira 1981 Falintil - killed by Hansip Siluman.
Afonso Pinto 1981 Hansip – killed by Falintil at Iraamuh.
José Valente 1981 Hansip – killed by Falintil at Rorok.
Isabel da Costa Jun 1981 Tirilolo – killed by ABRI at Raanur.
Orlando Jerónimo 1982 Hansip – killed by Falintil at Kudaluan.
Martinho da Cruz 1982 Cainliu – killed by ABRI/Hansip at
Titiraven sub-village.
Joachim Ferreira 1982 Cainliu - Suspected Klandestin, killed
by ABRI/Hansip at Vata-Ira.
Domingos de Jesus 1982 TBO Los Palos ? – killed by ABRI
Yonif 320 at Hama-um.
Venancio Savio 8 Aug 1983 Falintil, killed by Hansip at Caentau.
Amilcar Rodrigues 8 Aug 1983 Falintil, killed by Hansip at Caentau.
Filomeno da Gama 9 Sep 1983 Hansip, killed by Hansip at Iliomar
Primary School, Iliomar Town.
Francisco Serpa Rosa, Early Nov Ailebere – arrested and later killed by
Manuel da Costa 1983 ABRI Yonif 315 at Cainliu.
Carlos da Costa, Luís Nov 1983 869 Iliomar I - Hansip, killed by Hansip on
869
A Fretilin document lists 29 killed by Kopassus troops in Iliomar in the period “17-26 November” 1983.
The following are not listed in the tables above: Osso-Ira (Iliomar I) : Herminio Pinto (26 years), António
(35); Hara-Ara (Ailebere): Ernesto Pinto (23); Leilor (Ailebere): Francisco Roxo (34), Nou-Lai (39); Marafau
(Ailebere): Mateus Jerónimo (24); Titiraven (Cainliu): Jacinto Fernandes (21); Caidalavarin (Cainliu): Doli-
215

Lopes, Ernesto Madeira the road to Iradarate/Iliomar II.
Belmonte Jerónimo 3 Dec 1983 Iliomar - suspected Klandestin, killed at
ABRI direction.
Joachim dos Santos 4 or 19 Dec Killed by Hansip in Tirilolo.
1983
Fernando dos Santos 4 or 19 Dec Killed by Hansip in Vatamatar (Iliomar
1983 I).
Marcelino Hornay 9 Dec 1983 Cainliu, killed by Hansip in Cainliu.
Paulo Fernandes, 14 Dec 1983 Suspected Klandestin, killed by
Magarida Fernandes Hansip/ABRI at Titiraven (Cainliu)
Agusto da Cruz (42 years) Dec 1983 (?) Cainliu.
Martinho Monteiro, 22 Dec 1983 Hansip, killed by Hansip at Cainliu
Humberto da Cruz
Americo Cipriano, 22 Dec 1983 Interrogated at Koramil, killed by
Venancio da Costa Hansip just north of Iliomar Town.
Carlos Correia 22 Dec 1983 Fretilin Secretary Iliomar Zone, killed
by Hansip at Caentau (Iliomar I).
Joachim Sanches 22 Dec 1983 Suspected Klandestin, killed by Hansip
at Caentau (Iliomar I).
José Anunciacão 22 Dec 1983 Suspected Klandestin, killed by Hansip
at Caentau (Iliomar I).
António Jerónimo 22 Dec 1983 Suspected Klandestin, killed by Hansip
at Caentau (Iliomar I).
Claudio Ferreira Late 1983 Iliomar I - Arrested in Iliomar – and
disappeared.
António Bouvida, 1984 Hansip - killed in a Falintil ambush at
António da Silva Sirimana.
Mateus Gomes 1984 Tirilolo - killed by ABRI at Natura (Los
Palos Town).
António Murau, Veronica 8 Jan 1985 Accidentally killed in Falintil/ABRI
da Costa Seixas, António firefight, Osso-Ira (Iliomar I)
da Costa – Osso-Ira.
Tomás Preto/Barreto, 8 Jan 1985 Accidentally killed in Falintil/ABRI
Francisco Ruas, Luciana firefight, Vatamatar (Iliomar I).
de Deus, Rosa dos Santos
Pinto, António da Costa
- Vatamatar sub-village.
Teofilo 8 Jan 1985 Falintil, killed in a firefight with ABRI
near Kota Omar (Ailebere).
José Raimundo, Afonso 8 Jan 1985 Accidentally killed in Falintil/ABRI
Pinto, Kiki Manu, Marta firefight in Ailebere village.
Jerónimo – Ailebere.
Daniel da Costa, António 8 Jan 1985 Village security guards killed by
da Costa, Calisto da Costa, Falintil, Titiraven (Cainliu).
Venancio/Inacio da Cruz.

Laua (60), Higino Amaral (23), Lourenço Amaral (26); Maluhira (Cainliu): Libório Amaral (30) and Soro-
Mau (wife). The document also lists 43 imprisoned and four arrested – CRRN/Fretilin, “Mensagem de
Saudação”, Lisboa, 2 January 1985, pp.26-28 (Document 06516.026, Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia Timor,
Dili).
216

Raul Amaral, Abel da 8 Jan 1985 Hansip, killed by Falintil – Tirilolo.
Costa – Tirilolo.
Filipe Camilho, Arthur 8 Jan 1985 Accidentally killed in Falintil/ABRI
Ramos, Mateus da Silva, firefight in Tirilolo village.
Igino Perreira, Lucia da
Gama – Tirilolo.
Julião Teles 8 Jan 1985 Hansip, accidentally killed by ABRI
mortar round ? - Tirilolo.
Frederico da Costa 8 Jan 1985 Accidentally killed by Falintil in
Iliomar II village.
Francisco Pinto, 8 Jan 1985 Hansip, killed by ABRI fire – Iliomar II
Francisco Suto Maior village.
Iri-Lai 1986 Cainliu – killed in a night-time Falintil
attack.
António da Costa 1986 Falintil – killed by Hansip during a
(Caentau), Falintil attack on Lari-Soru (Iradarate).
Manu Soru (Ailebere)
Francisco Jerónimo 10 Apr 1986 Village security guard – killed by
(Ailebere) Falintil in Lalumato sub-village.
Faustino Pinto (Iliomar II) 1986 Killed by ABRI at Alapupul – north of
Caidabu sub-village.
Martinho Madeira (Fuat) Late 1986 Sub-village chief – killed by ABRI.
Caetano Gonçalves 1986 “Luru Asu”, former Falintil platoon
(Iliomar I) commander in Iliomar mid-1970s -
exiled to Aileu, killed by ABRI.
33 ABRI soldiers, one 21 Nov 1986 Ambushed by Falintil at Ossohira
TBO (Op’ Support Force) Spring, two km north of Maluhira.
Pedro Correia Nov 1986 Killed by ABRI in Tirilolo.
Julio Madeira Nov 1986 Wounded in eye by ABRI at Naunili.
Diborsio Nov 1986 Wounded by Yonif 745 at Cainliu.
Jaime da Costa (Tirilolo), Mar 1987 Killed by ABRI – (C. Chrystello –
Martinho Hornay “Historiografia …, October 2005).
(Maluhira)
Bernardo Soares (Tirilolo), 1987 TBO (Operational Support Assistants)
Miguel Santalin (Tirilolo) – killed by ABRI.
José da Costa (Cainliu) 1989 Killed by ABRI Yonif 320.
Mouzinho Jerónimo 7 Mar 1990 Killed by a Milsas member.
(Ailebere)
Albertino Monteiro 1993 Hansip - killed in a Hansip firefight in
(Iliomar I) the Rofohe area, Iliomar village.
Robert Jerónimo (Nami 4 Jan 1994 Killed by Kopassus and Team Alfa near
Hala) - (Ailebere) Heidaun (Fuat).
Matias da Costa (Ailebere) 5 Jan 1994 Lalumato/Ailebere, suspected
Klandestin – arrested and killed by
ABRI (551 Det) in Dili or Baucau.
Six ABRI Apr 1994 Reportedly killed by Falintil in the area
of Vieira River.
Two ABRI Mar 1995 Reportedly, killed by Falintil in the
Buidala area.
217

José dos Santos (Mau Mar 1995 Falintil, killed by ABRI in Buidala area.
Vani) – (Cainliu)
Two ABRI Mar 1995 Killed by Falintil in the Buidala area –
Jose Mauwani (see above) also killed.
Fernando, Nuno, Lariko 4 July 1995 Falintil, reportedly killed by ABRI in
Iliomar Sub-District.
Luís Pinto (Ailebere) 8 Oct 1997 Killed at Osso-Nomar (Ailebere area)
by Yonif 511 and Team Alfa.
Doli-Boru (Ailebere) 11 Oct 1997 Killed by Kopassus in the Asonomar
area (Ailebere).
Carlos Pinto 24 May 1999 Killed by ABRI (Yonif 621) in jungle
near Caidabu – remains not recovered.
Anselmo Ximenes (25) 1999 Killed by militia in Dili

In late 2002, a proposal was developed by Government officials to list those East
Timorese who had lost their lives violently during the Indonesian occupation and to attempt
to return their remains to their home villages. In Iliomar, an ad-hoc committee under the
Cainliu village chief, Julião Soares, collated information for the six villages of Iliomar. On
9 November 2002, during the visit of the F-FDTL Chief of Staff, Lere Anan Timor, a mass
meeting was held in Iliomar I village at which a “Committee for the Recovery of War
Victims”870 was formed with “adat” leader Felipe Pinto (village chief, Iliomar II) as
Chairman, Domingos Fernandes as Deputy, and Alicia Gonçalves as Treasurer. The first
draft871 of the Committee’s report in November 2002 tabulated 385 Iliomar-born victims
whose remains had yet to be recovered – listed by name, home village and next of kin. Of
these, 103 were Falintil fighters. By village, the figures were: Iliomar I: 69; Iliomar II: 37;
Ailebere: 76; Tirilolo: 29; Cainliu: 30; and Fuat: 144.872 The difficultiesof recovering
remains from jungle areas after many years was understood, and the Committee’s work was
expected to take many years.
A Parliamentary bill on veterans – to include compensation and pensions, was first
drafted in 2005 – for background, see Annex F. After a prolonged and complex research
process – including at the District and Sub-District level, in 2008 Marito Nicolao dos Reis
(Secretary of State for Veterans’ Affairs) tabled a “Lei Pensaun ba Veteranus no
Kombatenti Libertasaun Nasional” which was approved by the Council of Ministers on 26
March 2008. At meetings in February and April 2008, the names of candidates for pensions
were endorsed in three categories: “Survival”, “Special Reform” and “Special Survival”.
On 12 May 2008, the procedures for payment of pensions were formally proclaimed - with
a total of 12,538 pensions to be granted (payable retrospectively from 1 January 2008)
including to heirs of 11,907 fallen combatants.
For a listing of Iliomar-born Falintil and Clandestina eligible for pensions – as at
mid-2008, see Appendix 2 to Annex F ie “Combatants and Martyrs of the National
Liberation”. That listing includes many of the casualties listed in this Annex I.

870
“Comissão Recolhamento de Vitimas da Guerra do Sub Distrito de Iliomar – 1975-1999”
871
The draft did not include a date of death or location of death/temporary burial.
872
Committee members opined that Fuat suffered the heaviest losses as its former principal location, in the
Bubutau area, was contiguous to Falintil base areas towards the Iliomar/Loré border.
218

ANNEX J
LERE ANAN TIMOR –
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Lere Anan Timor.

Baptismal name: Tito Cristovão da Costa
also known as Tito Ililawa

Born: Akara sub-village, Iliomar II village,
Iliomar Sub-District, Lautem District.
Lorasa clan.

DOB: 3 February 1952 (or 2 February 1952).

Spouses: Elsa da Costa - died January 1982.873
Cidalia Mesquite Ximenes (born Iliomar I village,
later resident Cainliu village, Iliomar Sub-District, Lautem District0.
Iliomar clan. Married to Lere Anan Timor - 17 November 2002.

Parents: Family moved to Caidavalarin sub-village, Cainliu village, Iliomar Sub-
District when Lere was quite young – Lere is now “associated” with Cainliu
village.
Father: Domingos Costa dos Santos (Akara sub-village, Iliomar II)
Mother: Filipa dos Santos/Sabu Ili874 (Akara sub-village, Iliomar I)

Siblings: Lere is the eldest child:
Martinho da Costa (Mau Hama) aged 40 years – Falintil, killed by ABRI
(Kopassus) in the Fuat area in 1991.875
Filipe da Costa – killed by ABRI

873
Their second son - “Elito” – b. 19 August 1981, was adopted by ABRI Brigadier Soentono and taken to
Indonesia – aged seven months. Elito (as Gunawan Adi Gunarahman - “Bobi Rahman”, “Boby”) was
reunited with his father in Timor-leste on 20 June 2010.
874
Exiled to Ataúro Island in the early 1982-83 – together with many other relatives of “Falintil families”.
875
Alferes Helder da Costa, eldest son of Martinho da Costa, is an F-FDTL officer.
219

José dos Santos (Mau Wani) aged 37 years – Falintil, killed in clash with
ABRI in Buidala area (Iliomar) in March 1995.
Berta Pinto – lives in Caentau sub-village, Iliomar I.
Sabina dos Santos (Costa) 876

Education: Primary School – Iliomar, 1960-63;
Primary School - Don Bosco, Fuiloro, Los Palos, 1964-68;
High School – Salesian Technical Agricultural School, Fatumaca
(Baucau), 1969-72.

Languages: Makalero (the Iliomar regional language), Tetum, Portuguese, Makassae,
Fataluku, some English.

Portuguese Military Service:

“National service” in Portuguese Army in Portuguese Timor in the period August
1974 to mid-1975. He served as a driver in Destacamento de Páraquedistas No. 1
(Parachute Detachment No. 1) that arrived in Portuguese Timor on 7 April 1975. In
late August 1975, the Detachment withdrew to Ataúro – Timorese members were
disbanded, and Lere returned to Iliomar (via Baucau and Baguia).

Resistance (Fretilin/Falintil) and F-FDTL Service:

 1975: Commenced political career – ie a member of Fretilin.
 1976: Member of the Iliomar “Mauser” (codename) Zone (Sub-District) Fretilin
Committee as Assistant Politico (under Secretary Tomás Pinto - total seven
members)877.
 1976: Participated as a principal in the purge/destruction of the “Reactionaries” led
by Falintil leader Francisco Ruas Hornay of Iliomar II – 15 dissidents executed878.
 1978: Participated in the Matabean Campaign as Iliomar Zone Secretary879 until the
fall of Matabean redoubt on 24 November – withdrew to southeast (with Koru Asu,
Aluc, Renan Selak, Falo Chai, Latu Asa, Mau Nana, Serasa and others) via Ossu to
“Tasibu” – then to a base area in the forests on the Iliomar/Lore border.
 1979: Became a Falintil military commander.
 March 1981: Elected as a member of the Fretilin Central Committee at the Maubai
(Mount Aitana) meeting.880
 1981: Political Commissar, Funu Sei Nafatin (Eastern) Region under Region
Commander Marcur (Rubileki).
 1983: Served in the Viqueque area and also as Political Commissar for the Lospalos
Region (ie Região I/Ponte Leste)

876
Married to former Falintil combatant, Vicente Lourdes – resident in Bubutau, Fuat, Iliomar. Sabina is
formally registered as a former Falintil combatant, Category A – with 16 years service.
877
Some sources cite Lere as a Vice Secretary ie “Vise”.
878
Lere supported the Fretilin Minister for Finance, Sera Key (Juvenal Inácio dos Reis) and Fernando
Tzai/Cay who led the purges in the East. At a public meeting in Iliomar on 9 November 2002, Lere explained
his role in these “Muapepeh” purge killings as “necessary” to avoid wider bloodshed.
879
The Iliomar Zone codename was then “Traktor” – Lere may have succeeded Mateus Sipsama.
880
CAVR Report, Part 5, para 99.
220

 1984-1990: Falintil Central Region Commander – located in the Same, Ainaro and
Natarboro areas and operating as far west as Zumalai, Cova Lima, Suai and
Bobonaro.881
 1991-1999: Falintil Ponte Leste/Região I (Eastern) Region Commander.
 2001: February – Chief of Staff F-FDTL as a Colonel.
 1 December 2009 – promoted to Brigadier-General.
 6 October 2011, Major General - Commander of the F-FDTL.
 9 February 2016 – promoted to Lieutenant General.

Lere is formally listed as a “Category A” former Falintil combatant with 24 years
qualifying service882. He is regarded by the Makalero ethnic/linguistic group883 as their
principal public figure. In a short item in the Dili daily newspaper, Lere was described
as “be-whiskered, firm and resolute, calm, not very talkative – and with a patient
nature”.884

Personal Details:

First wife: Elsa Pinto (born Akara sub-village, Iliomar I)885. Elsa Pinto died in the
jungle in July 1981, soon after giving birth to their second son.

Son – Carlos Alu da Costa -“Alu”, born 14 June 1978 – cared for by Lere’s
grandmother, mother-in-law, and Joana Pinto. Alu was detained and tortured by ABRI in
mid-1990s; 2005 - studying commuter science (Comoro, Dili).

Son – Oan Ki’ak Lere (“Elito”) – born 19 August 1981. Following his mother’s
death, he was taken to Iliomar on 14 January 1982 by Lere’s sister Sabina where he was
initially cared for by an Indonesian Red Cross doctor. At seven months of age, Elito taken
by Indonesian officials and “fostered” to an Indonesian family (ABRI Brigadier Brigadier
Soentono) in Java. As Gunawan Adi Gunarahman (“Bobi Rahman”, “Boby”), Elito
returned to Timor-Leste on 20 June 2010 and met with Lere and his family.

Hobbies and Interests

Football (soccer) – President of the AS Lero Soccer Club (Dili-based
Iliomar/Makalero team).

Hunting

881
Lere did not participate in the December 1985 Falintil attack on Iliomar led by Mau Hunu.
882
Envio de Lista de Veteranos, CDF HQ F-FDTL dated 1 October 2004.
883
The Makalero speakers, about 7,000-strong, inhabit Iliomar Sub-District. There are also a small number of
Makalero speakers in neighouring Uato-Carabau and Luro sub-districts.
884
“Tito da Costa Cristavão – Sang Kolonel”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 30 June 2005, p.12
885
Elsa Pinto was a younger sister of Abílio Quintão Pinto, Resistance Klandestin Zone Secretary for Iliomar
in the 1990s - and subsequently the Sub-District Administrator, Iliomar Sub-District.
221

ANNEX K
ABILÍO QUINTÃO PINTO –
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Abílio Quintão Pinto

Born: 2 January 1962
Iliomar sub-village, Iliomar I village

Clan: Iliomar886

Parents: Father - Gregorio Pinto887, Akara sub-village, Iliomar I
Mother – Isabel Pinto, Larikua, Lihina sub-village, Iliomar II

Wife: Natalia da Costa Pinto, born 20 June 1969, Ara Ara sub-village,
Iliomar I village. Buna Kosi clan. Married: 6 January 1991.

Children: Gregorio Manuel dos Reis
Elsa Belina dos Reis
Elisanadra Solana dos Reis
Jose Natalicio dos Reis
Aderito dos Reis
Isadora Maria dos Reis

Education: Primary – 1969-1975 at Colegio Don Bosco, Fuiloro, Los Palos
Junior Secondary – 1982-1985 at Externato de São José, Balide, Dili
Senior Secondary – 1986-1989 at Externato de São José, Balide, Dili888

Languages: Makalero, Tetum, Portuguese, Indonesian, English

886
Abílio Pinto’s great grandfather was Laimeta, the “raja” of Iliomar. His grandfather was Francisco Manuel
dos Reis.
887
Gregorio Pinto was killed by ABRI troops after the fall of the Fretilin/Falintil defence at Matabean in late
November 1978, aged 48 – his body was not recovered. Gregorio Pinto’s daughter Elsa Pinto, ie Abílio
Pinto’s sister, married Lere Anan Timor in 1981 – Elsa died in 1981 (see Lere biography)
888
This school was destroyed in late 1991 by Indonesian authorities as a “reprisal” for its students’
involvement in the Santa Cruz massacre incident of November 1991.
222

Activities:
 1975-1978: Member of the Fretilin Culture & Education Group889, and
Coordinator of the Illiteracy Eradication Section – “Mauser” (Iliomar)
Zone.
 September 1978: Moved to the Fretilin/Falintil base in the Matabean
Mountains – via Lavatere, Siri Afa, Nalidole (Laga). Iliomar villagers
moved constantly in Matabean ie from Matabean Feto (Hai Koni) to
Matabean Mane. With the fall of Matabean on 22 November, returned to
Iliomar via Baguia.
 1982: Moved to Dili and recommenced studies at Junior High School –
joined a Klandestin ie underground youth group in Dili.
 1983: During the ceasefire period (March-August), operated as a Klandestin
courier (estafeta) for Iliomar Sub-District. As all the Iliomar Klandestin
leaders were arrested in late 1983, in November Abílio fled to Oecusse. He
remained in Oecusse working for a local NGO until March 1985.
 1986: Returned to Dili and entered Senior High School – with friends re-
established a Klandestin group among youth and students.
 1989: With friends, arranged and participated in the demonstration before
Pope Paul II at Tasi Tolu (9 km west of central Dili).
 1989: Returned to Iliomar.
 1991: Employed as a teacher at the João Paulus Secundo Catholic Junior
High School in Iliomar.
 1994: Under direction from the Falintil Ponte Leste (Região I) Commander -
Lere Anan Timor, re-established the Klandestin underground movement in
Iliomar – as Secretary of the “Titus Lima” Sector. First recruit was
Gonçalves da Costa as an estafeta – followed by Veríssimo dos Santos, also
an estafeta, then Tito de Deus as the Vice-Secretary.
 1995: Appointed headmaster of the Junior High School. Formed Iliomar
Cooperative (Korporasi Unit Desa – KUD). Iliomar Klandestin organisation
totalled eight: Abílio, Tito de Deus, Orlando dos Santos, Carlos da Costa
(former Falintil, captured at Quelele), and four estafeta. In October, ABRI
broke up the Klandestin cells in Iradarate (Iliomar II) who had been
providing support to Falintil. Amancio da Costa was forced to flee into the
jungle and join Falintil.
 1996: January – Klandestin member Fernando Teki (Fernando de Deus,
younger brother of Tito de Deus) was arrested in Iliomar but escaped from
the ABRI vehicle enroute to Los Palos and, assisted by priests, avoided
recapture. Iliomar Klandestin numbered 18.
 1999: Iliomar Klandestin organisation numbers 42 - plus hundreds of active
supporters. 20 July, Abílio was appointed as Secretary of CNRT India Lima
Zone/Sub-District with Tito de Deus and Mario Cabral as deputies (Vise).
28 August, all Klandestin leave the villages and move into the jungle due to
Indonesian harassment, returning to vote on 30 August then returning
immediately to the jungle.
 2001: 9 June, CNRT disbanded. Abílio appointed as a member of the
Lautém District Constitutional Commission (sixty days).

889
Group leader for the Iliomar-Baguia area was Alexio da Costa Belo (of Lore village).
223

 2002/2003: July-February – member of the Investigation Team in Lautém
District of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR).
 10 February 2003: Appointed Sub-District Administrator, Iliomar Sub-
District.
 2005: 19 June-17 July – sponsored by a Portuguese NGO, visited Portugal.
224

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Reports, Dissertations, Theses, Declarations, Websites and Maps
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----, East Timor: Indonesian Military Forces – list of officers.
http://homepage.esoterica.pt/~cdpm/orgepen.htm

----, East Timor – National Development Plan, Planning Commission, Dili, May 2002.

----, East Timor Colloquy – Dimensions of Domination, American University, 25-26 April 1991.

----, East Timor Transitional Administration/UNTAET – Lautém, Profile of Lautém District, Los Palos,
September 2000 (see also R. Simpson for 2002 edition).

----, Estatuto politico-administrativo da Província de Timor, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1963.

----, Falintil Command Organisation, UN Military Observers, Aileu, 25 November 1999.

----, Integrasi Timor Timur 1976 (I), (II), Center for Strategic & International Studies, Jakarta, 1983.

----, Kabupaten Lautém Dalam Angka 1990, BPS, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Lautem, Los Palos, July 1991.

----, Kabupaten Lautém Dalam Angka 1994, BPS, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Lautem, Los Palos, 1995.

----, Kabupaten Lautém Dalam Angka 1997, BPS, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Lautem, Los Palos, August
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----, “For First Time, Central Java Transmigrates 25 Families to East Timor”, Kedaulatan Rakyat, Magelang,
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----, “Rogerio Lobato – An Interview”, Timor Information Service, No 18/19, Walker Press, Fitzroy, April
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----, “The Church in East Timor – The Church and Indonesia’s birth control programme”, Timor Link,
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----, “The Community Empowerment Project Revisited”, The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, Dili, Vol. 3, No. 7,
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----, “The Kopassus-Militia Alliance”, Tapol Bulletin 154/5, November 1999.
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Berlie, J.A., “A Concise Legal History of East Timor”, pp. 138-157 in Hull, G. and Eccles, L. (eds), Studies
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Bud, “Gubernur TimTim Selamat Dari Penembakan”, Republika, Jakarta, 27 September 1995.

Budiardjo, C., “Hawk Aircraft Are Being Used In East Timor”, Tapol, 14 November 1994.

Budiardjo, C., and Liem Soei Liong, “Leaked ABRI Documents Reveal Occupation Numbers”, Tapol, 17
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Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere, “ETO: Breakdown of Indonesian Armed Forces stationed in
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Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere, ETO, “Numbers and Identification of Indonesian Military in
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Cribb, R., “From total people’s defence to massacre: Explaining Indonesian military violence in East Timor”,
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Della Giacoma, J., “Military Precision as Timor Remembers”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 18 July 1995,
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