01. Loadmasters Customs Services Inc.

vs Glodel Brokerage Corporation Although there was a claim made by Loadmasters that it was never privy to the
TOPIC: Solidary Liability of two or more persons in a Quasi-delict PONENTE: contract entered by Glodel it can still be held liable under Article 2176 of the
Mendoza, J. Civil Code under quasi-delicts or negligence. According to the case of Mindanao
Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc. vs Phoenix Assurance Company of New York:
FACTS: A tort may still arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship wherein
the tort is the cause of the breach of the contract. In the case at bar, the fact that
R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy MN-0015/2001 in favor of Columbia the subject cargo was in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees upon
insuring the shipment of 132 bundles of Copper against all risk. It was later investigation were instrumental in the hijacking/robbery of the goods
shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela to Manila on makes them answerable for the damages incurred who acted in breach of
August 28, 2001 and is due to arrive on the same day. Columbia then insuring that the goods reach the warehouse.
engaged in the services of Glodel for the withdrawal and delivery of the
cargoes from the pier to their designated plants while Glodel in turn
engaged in the services of Loadmasters for the use of the delivery trucks to
deliver the cargoes to Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded in 12 trucks (6 headed to Bulacan and 6 to
Valenzuela). Of the 6 trucks en route to Bulacan only 5 reached the
destination. It was later found out that the missing truck lost all of its cargo
upon recovery. For this, Columbia filed a claim for indemnity from R&B to
which the latter paid and proceeded to file a complaint for damages against
Loadmasters and Glodel for the reimbursement of the amount it paid to
Columbia.

RTC held Glodel liable and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim. R&B and
Glodel appealed to the CA which rendered assailed decision of the RTC holding
Loadmasters liable for the reason that it is an agent of Glodel. The former
argued that it cannot be considered an agent because it never represented the
latter in in its dealings with the consignee. Hence, Loadmasters filing the
petition.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Glodel and Loadmasters may be held solidary liable
to R&B insurance

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:

Both Glodel and Loadmasters are common carriers. Common carriers

are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy are expected to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them as required by Article
1733 of the Civil Code. Therefore in case of loss of goods it is presumed
that the common carrier did not exercise extraordinary diligence
expected of it.
02. WORCESTER v. OCAMPO, et al. (1912)
Topic: The defendants, persons who maybe sued for tort.
FACTS:
1) Dean Worcester commenced an action against the defendants in the CFI
of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting
from an alleged libelous publication.
2) The defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos,
Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in
the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippines.
3) Worcester alleged that for a long time the defendants have been
maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper,
with the malicious intention of injuring him, who on said date was, and
still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they
attacked his honesty and reviled his fame, not only as a private person
but also as an official of the Government of the Philippines.
4) In the said article, Worcester alleged that he likened to birds of prey
in the following manner: Such are the characteristics of the man who is
at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead andputrid meats, an owl who affects
a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the
victim until he leaves it bloodless.
5) The CFI ruled in favor of Worcester and ruled that the defendants are
jointly and severally liable for P60k.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI erred in sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay
Worcester in sum of P60k. NO! Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The
damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves.
They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying
an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount
RULING:
UNIVERSAL DOCTRINE: that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort
feasors.
GENERAL RULE: that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
a) The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of
the tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they were.
b) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured,
has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them
separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each
individual
c) Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less
than all.
a. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all
together are jointly liable for the whole damage.
b. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who
participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in
the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the other.
c. Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not
be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They
can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for
the full amount
d) Courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort
feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release
some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort
feasors even though they are charged jointly and severally
e) In an American jurisprudence, It is not necessary that the cooperation
should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of
assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common
law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists
in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who
aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime,
was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual
tort (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.).
03. Allied Banking Corp. vs. Sio Wan However, unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank. Producers Bank
was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and
TOPIC: The defendants (Persona who may be sued for tort) circumstances of the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and
2184, - owner is solidarily liable with driver. Metrobank for the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio
Wan.
FACTS:
Filipinas Cement Corp (FCC) deposited 2M a money market placement
with Producers bank, Santos being the assigned account holder.
Lim Sio Wan deposited a money market placement to Allied Banking
Corp valued at Php 1,152,597 for a term of 31 days.
Few weeks later, a purported Lim Sio Wan called Cristina So (Allied
Officer) to pre-terminate the MMP, instead issue a managers check and
hand it over to Deborah Santos Lim Sio Wan described Santos
appearance through phone.
Santos later on arrived at the branch and upon signing the application
form, Allied issued a managers check.
The check was deposited in the account of FCC with Metrobank forged
signature of Lim.
When the FCC placement matured, they demanded the proceeds.
On the same date So received the call, managers check was deposited
in the account of FCC, purporting to be the proceeds of FCCs money
market placement with Producers.
Upon the maturity, Lim Sio Wan demanded the proceeds of his money
market placement.
Allied advised him that it was already pre-terminated.
He filed a complaint with the RTC to recover the proceeds of the money.
RTC: in favor of Lim - Allied must pay!
CA: Modified. Absolved Producers bank from liability
Allied argued that Producers bank must be liable for the negligence of its
employee Santos for her negligence under Art. 2180

ISSUE(S):
Whether the court erred in absolving the producers bank from liability

HELD: YES

RATIO: Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-
delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to
civil liability arising from delict.

One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the part of the employer
for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the employee is based on the conviction
of the employee for a crime. Here, there has been no conviction for any crime.
04. Chapman vs Underwood
PONENTE: Moreland, J.,
TOPIC: Persons who maybe sued for Tort

FACTS:
Chapman has been visiting a friend named Creveling. He wanted to board a
certianSan Marcelino car from Santa Ana and is bound for Manila. When
he was told by Creveling that the car was approaching he walked from the
gate to the sidewalk to signal the car. The car was closed with the entrance
being either from the front or the back. Chapman attempted to board the
front but realizing that it will take him more effort he waited until the rear
platform would eventually face him. While doing so, he was struck from
behind and run over by Underwoods vehicle.
On Underwoods point of view, where he was driven by his chauffer. They
were following the street car until it switched to the left lying alongside the
main track. From there he no longer followed and remained on the right.
The car Chapman intended to board was on the main line and was bound
in an opposite direction where defendant was going. When the front of the
car was almost in front of Defendants automobile, he suddenly went to the
right and struck plaintiff.

RTC Found the defendants driver guilty of negligence for the reason that the
plaintiff was not obliged to observe when the car is coming from the left side
and had to guard himself from those coming from the right. Further, he knew
that according to the law of the road no automobile or other vehicle coming
from the left should pass upon his side of the car.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the owner of the vehicle is liable along with the
driver

HELD: No.

RATIO:
Citing Johnson vs David: An owner who sits in his vehicle and permits his driver
to continue violation of the law through the performance of negligent acts after
he has reasonable opportunity to observe and prevent them shall become
responsible himself for such acts. In the case at bar, the time the automobile
took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, it does not seem
to appear that there was sufficient time for the defendant to intervene or to
correct the act of his driver therefore he cannot be charged along with his
driver.
05. AGAPITO FUELLAS, PETITIONER, VS. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
Topic: Vicarious liability arising from delict. Articles 101 to 103 of the
RPC, Liability for minors.
FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas were both 13 years old. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City.
While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the
pencil of one Ernesto and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of
Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who
returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of
Pepito and pushed him to the floor.
Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go
home.
When Pepito was about to go home, he was met by Rico, still in angry
mood. Angelito a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito
extended his hand to Rico.
o Instead of shaking hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with
his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the
ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under
his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was
in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken."
Rico then got up and went away.
That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hopital for
treatment An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete fracture of
the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster
casting
On November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release from
the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the last day of
hearing of the case, the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter
than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be fully used.
Elpidio Cadano filed separate actions for damages against Agapito
Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and
Criminal Case for serious physical injuries against Rico Fuellas.
RTC: Rico guilty for serious physical injuries. Elpidio liable under 2180
(actual, moral and exemplary damages.)
Court of Appeals: Agapito is liable pursuant to par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code;
Agapito: The act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence"
is present; and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of
Rico, but deliberate intent, articles 2180 and 2176 are not applicable,
for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act
negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission
ISSUE: Whether Agapito Fuellas should be held civilly liable for his sons act.
n the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado,
o The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them,
is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the 'duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them in proportion to their means', while
on the other hand, gives them the 'right to correct and punish
them in moderation' (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage
It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be made
responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with deliberate
intent and with discernment, is an action based on the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the parents; that the
minor-Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical injuries at the
age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code, could
have been applied, but having acted with discernment, Art. 101 of the
same Code cannot include him.
o First, in cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person
and by a person under nine years of age or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part", the appellant
concluded that this provision covers only a situation where a
minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a criminal act
"without discernment."
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made
civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an
imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years
of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no
fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the
act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal
liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The
idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished' but to attach
 certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor
under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts
with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents
should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: 'The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who lived in their company.' To hold
that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son,
no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.

In view hereof, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed from is

affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
06. Sps. Libi v. IAC , J. Regalado
Topic: Children 15 years and below.
FACTS:
Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, petitioners, are the parents of Wendell
Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid
parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong, respondents, are the legitimate parents
of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took
place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old
first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December,
1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted
in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In
order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou
Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu
City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.
Sps. Gotiong, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that
Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and,
thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
Sps. Libi, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son,
rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom
Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must
have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification.
CFI: dismissed Sps. Gotiongs complaint
IAC: Sps. Libi ordered to pay Sps. Gotiong, P30,000.000 as Moral damages;
P10,000.00 as Exemplary damages; and P20,000.00 as Attorneys fees and costs.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was applicable in this
case to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
SC rejected petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it
was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that
the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime
nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe."
SC also rejected the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell Libi did
not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence
testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence of which point
to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for
her rejection of his persistent pleas for reconciliation.
Sps. Libi did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
safely locking the gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof
unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left
lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son,
despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the
time of Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
being drug informers, or even drug users.
the subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,"
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case
explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for
damages caused by their minor children.
the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not
subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the
act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his
death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such
parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages."cralaw
 the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their
minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise
of the diligence of a good father of a family.
the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Art. 101 of RPC:

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part."
07. SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA, plaintiffs-appellants, stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is
vs. JOSE BALCE, defendant-appellee. our Civil Code.

Topic: Over 15 but inder 18. (cf sec 5 AM No 02-1-18-SC) The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion
of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
Facts: mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in
their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case
1. Carlos Salen, son of Sps. Salen, died from wounds caused by because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
Gumersindo Balce, a son of Jose Balce. obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity
2. At the time of the incident, Gumersindo, a minor below 18 years of age, that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
was living with Jose. may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
3. As a result of Carlos death, Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the
was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent
4. Upon petition of Sps. Salen, a writ of execution was issued for the decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.
payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because
Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name.
5. Sps. Salen demanded upon Jose the payment of the indemnity
Gumersindo has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing
plaintiffs to institute the present action.
6. TC: Jose cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of
Gumersindo. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied by Sps. Salen, is not
applicable to the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses.
-Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses is governed
by the provisions of the RPC and civil liability arising from civil
negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil Code.

Issue:

WON Jose can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which
his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him. YES.

Held:

It is true that under Art. 101 of the RPC, a father is made civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son
who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Art. 12 (1,2,3), Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave
the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who
has the deliquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over
15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
08. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES
AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ,
LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners, defendant
vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR.
ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents, plaintiff
TOPIC: Liability of schools
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis
High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class 1-B and
Class 1-C at Talaan Beach, Quezon. Respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, Ferdinand's parents, did not allow their
son to join, but allowed him to bring food to the teachers, with the
directive that he should go home after. However, because of persuasion
of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in
the water, one of the female teachers was drowning. Ferdinand came to
her rescue, but it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was brought
the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis
High School, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers for
Damages. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure
of the petitioners St Francis High School to exercise the proper
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning.
ISSUE(S):
WON St. Francis High School is jointly and solidarily liable with their co-
defendants-teachers for the death of Ferdinand Castillo
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Under Article 2180, par. 4 of the NCC before an employer may be held liable for
the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must
occur while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance
of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises,
not on a school day and most importantly the incident happened while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. The picnic
had no permit from the school head or its principal because the picnic is not a
school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision, finding petitioners herein
guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding
the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein
are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their
counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The trial court ordered petitioners-teachers to pay damages. On the

ground that the defendant teachers failed to exercise the diligence
required of them. But dismissed the case against the St. Francis High
School, and Benjamin Illumin (principal). On the ground that no
evidence was shown that the panic was authorized by the school.

Upon appeal, CA ruled that St. Francis High School and the school principal,
Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of
NCC. On the ground that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner
and/or manager of the establishment.
09. Aquinas School v sps. Inton TOPIC: Liability of schools J. Abad
Topic: Liability of schools.
FACTS:
Jose Luis Inton was a grade three student at Aquinas School
Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin) is Inton's religion teacher
who began teaching Inton grade three religion class.
while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Inton left his
assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke
Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat.
However, Inton did the same thing so she approached Jose Luis
and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and
shoved his head on the classmates seat. Finally, she told the child
to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying
the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
The Inton Spouses-parents Jose and Victoria Inton f iled an action
for damages on behalf of their son. The RTC dismissed the wife-
Victoria's personal claims but ruled in favor of the child.
They also filed a criminal action for violation of Republic Act 7610
to which she pleaded guilty
1. Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed
that she was qualified to teach religion.
2. Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school
had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the
students.
3. the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty
Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students.
4. The school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach
5. the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation
Since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not
have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods . Either way, NO NEGLECT
- Court also finds no justification for increase of damages since they did not
appeal from the decision of the CA (they only included in their comment to the
petition)thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than
those that the CA already granted them in its decision.

Intons elevated the civil case to the CA to incerase the award of damages and
hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin- CA held Aquinas solidarily liable

ISSUE(S): Whether Aguinas is solidarily liable?

HELD: No

RATIO:
Employer-employee relationship:
(a) selects and engages the employee;
(b) pays his wages;
(c) has power to dismiss him; and
(d) has control over his work - right of the employer to control the work of the
employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same

the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a

congregation of sisters- in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would
send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. This
means that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods.

Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students.
Aquinas took steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the
students by their religion teacher through the following:
10. Amadora vs. CA
Topic: Liability of SChools
FACTS: (chronological order)
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a
gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of
Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal,
the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school
appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has
already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already
ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his
Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled
that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades
(vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides: Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of
the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a
distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools.
That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or
not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether
academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only
subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school
who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is
because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school
exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of
academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be
directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or
the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when
the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies
whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended
at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown
that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the
student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject
to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for
the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the
teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater
familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly
named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said
teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily
liable too.
This case abandoned fully the cases of Exconde vs Capuno and Mercado
vs Court of Appeals.
11. LVN PICTURES, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents-appellees.
SAMPAGUITA PICTURES, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Topic: Employer-Employee relationship, Control Test.
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) is a duly registered legitimate
labor organization.
LVN Pictures, Inc., Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., and Premiere Productions, Inc. are
corporations, duly organized under the Philippine laws, engaged in the making of motion
pictures and in the processing and distribution thereof.
Petitioner companies employ musicians for the purpose of making music
recordings for title music, background music, musical numbers, finale music and
other incidental music, without which a motion picture is incomplete. Ninety-
five (95%) percent of all the musicians playing for the musical recordings of
said companies are members of the Guild.
The Guild has no knowledge of the existence of any other legitimate labor
organization representing musicians in said companies. Premised upon these
allegations, the Guild prayed that it be certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agency for all musicians working in the aforementioned companies.
In their respective answers, the Petitioner companies denied that they have any
musicians as employees, and alleged that the musical numbers in the filing of the companies
are furnished by independent contractors.
The lower court sustained the Guilds theory. In consideration of the order complained
of having been denied by the Court en banc,LVN Pictures, inc., and Sampaguita
Pictures, Inc., filed these petitions for review for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON there is Employer-Employee Relationship between the Musicians
and the Companies.
RULING: YES.
RATIO:
Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts decision, to wit: Lower
court resorted to apply R.A. 875 and US Laws and jurisprudence from which said Act was
patterned after. (Since statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied). It ruled that the work of the
musical director and musicians is a functional and integral part of the enterprise performed at
the same studio substantially under the direction and control of the company.
In other words, to determine whether a person who performs work for
another is the latter's employee or an independent contractor, the National
Labor Relations relies on 'the right to control' test .
Under this test an employer-employee relationship exist where the person
for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the
end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching the
end. (United Insurance Company, 108, NLRB No. 115.).Notwithstanding that
the employees are called independent contractors', the Board will hold them to
be employees under the Act where the extent of the employer's control over
them indicates that the relationship is in reality one of employment. (John
Hancock Insurance Co., 2375-D, 1940, Teller, Labor Dispute Collective
Bargaining, Vol.).
The right of control of the film company over the musicians is
shown (1) by calling the musicians through 'call slips' in 'the name of the
company; (2) by arranging schedules in its studio for recording sessions; (3) by furnishing
transportation and meals to musicians; and (4) by supervising and directing
in detail, through the motion picture director, the performance of the musicians
before the camera, in order to suit the music they are playing to the picture
which is being flashed on the screen. The musical directors have no such
control over the musicians involved in the present case. Said musical directors
control neither the music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. The Premier
Production did not appeal the decision of the Court en banc (thats why its not
one of the petitioners in the case) film companies summon the musicians
to work, through the musical directors. The film companies, through the musical
directors, fix the date, the time and the place of work. The film companies, not
the musical directors, provide the transportation to and from the studio. The
film companies furnish meal at dinner time. It is well settled that "an employer-
employee relationship exists . . .where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also
the means to be used in reaching such end . . . ." The decisive nature of said control over
the "means to be used", is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co., et al., in
which, by reason of said control, the employer-employee relationship was held
to exist between the management and the workers, notwithstanding the
intervention of an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercise, the
power to hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over the
means to be used" in reading the desired end is possessed and exercised by
the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners herein. It is so ordered
12. National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and PHESCO
Incorporated
G.R. No. 119121 August 14, 1998
TOPIC: Labor only contracting
FACTS:
A convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the NPC left Marawi city bound
for Iligan city.
One of the trucks driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw.
3 persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw died, and 17 other passengers
suffered physical injuries.
The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and
PHESCO
PHESCO contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck but NPC,
and that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying
workers and technicians. It merely acted as a "recruiter" for and in behalf of
NPC.
NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck
was the employee of PHESCO. It alleged that it did not have the power of
selection and dismissal or the power of control over Ilumba.
It is evidently necessary to ascertain the contractual relationship between
NPC and PHESCO.
NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists
between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are
injured. Its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and
not quasi-delicts under Article 2180.
TC: NPC absolved of any liability. PHESCO and Ilumba liable
CA: PHESCO not liable due to lack of an employee-employer relationship
between them and the driver.
ISSUE(S):
WON NPC is liable as the employer of the driver under the labor only contract of
PHESCO? - YES
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right
of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement of the damages it
would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No costs.
RATIO:
Job (independent) contracting conditions:
a. the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the
contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according
to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the
work except to the result thereof; and
b. the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are
necessary in the conduct of his business.
Absent these requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under which the
person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of
the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the
same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the
"critical path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO.
Likewise, the manning schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO
were subject to confirmation by NPC. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that
the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy
facilities, is related to NPC's principal business of power generation. There is no
doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting with NPC and as
such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an
employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal
employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since
PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC,
including the driver, should be considered as employees of NPC.
On the issue on quasi-delicts under 2180
The action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used
by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code. It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the
"labor only" contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a
contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal
contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers. With
respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In
this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the
driver.
13. RCJ Lines v. Standard Insurance Co TOPIC: Presumption of employers only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
negligence family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise
Topic: Presumption of Employers negligence responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship
of pater familias or on the employers own negligence.Mangoba, per testimony
FACTS: of his conductor, was ten meters away from the Mitsubishi Lancer before the
Standard Insurance filed a complaint against the collision and was driving 60 to 75 KM/Hr when the speed limit was 50
petitioners Flor Bola Mangoba and RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. in MTC-Manila. kilometers per hour. The presumption under Article 2185 of the Civil
The accident which involves the Mitsubishi Lancer, RCJ Lines Bus and Code was thus proven true: Mangoba, as driver of the bus which collided with
the Toyota Corolla. Upon seeing a pile of gravel and sand on the road, the Mitsubishi Lancer, was negligent since he violated a traffic regulation at the
the Toyota Corolla, which is ahead of the Mitsubishi Lancer, stopped on time of the mishap. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the MTC,
its tracks. The Mitsubishi Lancer followed suit and also halted. This RTC and appellate court that Mangoba was negligent.
resulted the bus hit and bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi
Lancer causing it to move forward and hit the Toyota Corolla in front of DOCTRINE:
it. The Mitsubishi Lancer sustained damages amounting
to P162,151.22, representing the costs of its repairs. Diligence of a Good Father of Family When the employee causes damage due to
Under the comprehensive insurance policy secured by his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris
Rodelene Valentino, owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer, STANDARD tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
reimbursed to the former the amount she expended for the repairs of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.
her vehicle. Rodelene then executed a Release of Claim and Subrogation
Receipt, subrogating STANDARD to all rights, claims and actions she
may have against RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Flor Bola Mangoba.
RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. argues that maintained, among others, that the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the driver of the Mitsubishi Lancer when, for no reason at
all, it made a sudden stop along the National Highway, as if to initiate
and/or create an accident.
The MTC rendered its decision in favor of Standard. The RTC affirmed with
modification the MTCs Decision deleting the award for exemplary damages. The
appellate court found that the RTC committed no reversible error in affirming
RCJs liability as registered owner of the bus and employer of Mangoba

ISSUE(S): W/N the Court of Appeals erroneously disregarded the point that
petitioner RCJs defense of extraordinary diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver was made as an alternative defense

HELD: Petition denied.

RATIO: RCJ Lines, by presenting witnesses to testify on its exercise of

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
bus drivers, admitted that Mangoba is its employee. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Article 2176, makes the employer vicariously liable for the
acts of its employees. When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable

14. The Heirs of the late Ruben Reinoso Sr. vs CA Ponciano Tapales, Jose
Guballa and Filwriters Gauranty Assurance Corporation
Topic: Defense of employer
Facts:
1. Ruben Reinoso was a passenger at the jeepney he was riding, the
jeepney driven by santos which he was riding on collided with the truck
owed by Jose Guballa driven by Mariano Geronimo.
2. During Trial the employer Jose Guballa said that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in exercising the selection and
supervision of an employee: Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow this
presumption of negligence by showing that he had exercised the due
diligence required of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the
vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound
like the oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that
Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in
litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of
the compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied with two (2)
helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered as selection
and supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any
responsibility. This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as
equivalent to an exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his driver Mariano Geronimo.
3. Ruben Reinoso Sr died in this collision, and then his heirs filed this case
for damages. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the heirs however
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC for failure to pay the docket
fees.
Issue: Whether or not Guballa as an employer, sufficiently exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising employee/s
Held: No Ratio:The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the passenger
jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck reached a
certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit
the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck
driver should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E.
Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the
middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa,
failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision of
his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
provides:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.xxxxArt. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.xxxxEmployers shall be liable for the damage caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.xxxxThe responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his employee
Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualification, experience and service record. With
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.24 Thus, the RTC committed no error in
finding that the evidence presented by respondent Guballa was wanting.
Notes: The Supreme Court did not remand the case after deciding that the
liberal rule regarding docket fees should be applied because they found that
there was no intent to defraud the court of docket fees, but if there is an intent
to defraud docket fees, the case should be dismissed.because this case has been
on going for 30 years, to remand it would delay the case further.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory; Where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989) and not
the strict regulations set in Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987),
will apply.The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987), it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule
was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), wherein the Court decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was
made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the
more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, 529 SCRA 334 the Court
explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court
in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply.

Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned
shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien.The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference
between the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed
by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides: SEC. 2. Fees in lien.Where the court in
its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more
than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional
fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
15. GAUDIOSO EREZO, ET AL., vs. AGUEDO JEPTE, G.R. No. L-9605,
September 30, 1957
Topic: Liability of registered owner of vehichle
FACTS:
1. Defendant-appellant is the registered owner of a six by six truck
bearing plate No. TC-1253.
2. On August, 9, 1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo Espino
y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab at the intersection of San Andres
and Dakota Streets, Manila.
3. As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and another, and
the former suffered injuries, as a result of which he died.
4. The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence
before CFI Manila. The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Ernesto Erezo the sum of
P3,000.
5. As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against him,
plaintiff brought this action against the registered owner of the truck,
the defendant-appellant. The circumstances material to the case are
stated by the court in its decision.
6. The defendant does not deny at the time of the fatal accident the cargo
truck driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered in his name.
He, however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage,
of which he was the broker at the time of the accident.
7. He explained, and his explanation was corroborated by Policarpio
Franco, the manager of the corporation, that the trucks of the
corporation were registered in his name as a convenient arrangement
so as to enable the corporation to pay the registration fee with his
backpay as a pre-war government employee. Franco, however,
admitted that the arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicle
Office.
8. Trial court held that as the defendant-appellant represented himself to
be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his
representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the Government
and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on
his declaration of ownership and registration. It, therefore, held that he
is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his own
declaration. ISSUE: Liability of defendant as he argued that the vehicle
involved in the accident was owned by Port Brokerage even though it
was registered under his name.
HELD: The Court finds no merit or justice in the above contention. He is liable.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the
public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. the registered owner, The defendant-appellant herein, is
primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-
appellee, but he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the
amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the
plaintiff-appellant.
RULING:
1. In previous decisions, the Court held that the registered owner of a
certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or
damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the
operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to
a third person.
2. In dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the
public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is
the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to
enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by
the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required
to prove who the actual owner is.
3. However, this doctrine does not imply that the registered owner may
not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to
third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned
or conveyed the vehicle.
4. Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
is being driven on the highways or streets.
5. Defendant-appellant should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the
injuries occasioned to the latter because of the negligence of the driver
even if the defendant-appellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle
at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to another.
6. There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the
defendant-appellant as he is the registered owner in the Motor Vehicle
Office.
7. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides
that no vehicle may be used or operated upon any public highway
unless the same is properly registered. It has been stated that the
system of licensing and the requirement that each machine must carry
a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the
 precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury to pedestrians and
other travelers from the careless management of automobiles, and to
furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons violating the
laws and ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines
upon the highways.
8. Dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office a
report showing the name and address of each purchaser of motor
vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer's serial
number and motor number.
9. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents
or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive
identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall those circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily
ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible
for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

NOTE: Should not be registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who
the actual and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade
responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? The
laws does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does
not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon
him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner
allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or
owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to
escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to
one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the
damage or injury done.

A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to
recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the
vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of
liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the
registration that the law demands and requires.

16. Valuenzuela vs. CA 253 SCRA 303

17. THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the
HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC.,
MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees
PONENTE: MAKALINTAL
TOPIC: Liability of the registered owner of the vehicle (p.807)
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are the owners of the houses burned
2. Respondents are Caltex Service Station (principal/owner) and
Boquiren (agent)
3. March 18, 1948 at about 4pm Leandro Flores was transferring from a
tank truck to the underground tank of Caltex service station at the
corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. The location is
within a very busy business district near the Obrero Market, a railroad
crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood where a great
number of people mill around
4. An unknown Filipino lighted up a cigarette and threw the matchstick
near the main valve, Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed.
Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose
connecting the truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific
explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the hose from which
the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and the following
accessorias and residences.
5. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including
the personal properties and effects inside them.
6. Fire report: there appears a photograph showing thatin the premises a
cocacola cooler and a rack which according to information gathered in
the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between
the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.
7. A case was filed against Caltex and Boquiren. Negligence on the part of
both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
8. CFI: Dismissed petition: petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to
the supervision of their employees. CA: Affirm
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not there is liability from the owner
HELD: YES
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees
are held liable solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay them the aforesaid
sum of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of
the complaint, and costs.
RATIO:
This question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was an
independent contractor or an agent of Caltex. Under the license agreement the
operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the
premises and all equipment therein. The operator could sell only Caltex
products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the
approval, in other words control, of Caltex. The operator could not assign or
transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. Termination of the
contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator. These
provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of
the Caltex, not an independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be liable for
damages caused to appellants.
These facts are: (1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex;
(2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the
equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the
management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to
the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store
gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment
therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in question
was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract
with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of
the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time. Instead, what was
presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case,
since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year period it
was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex)
was executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948
so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity
provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion that it was
designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to the fire,
as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or
property while in the property herein licensed, it being understood and agreed
that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or agent of
LICENSOR (Caltex)."
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor should apply
Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which
extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a
fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man.
Negligence
Relating to cause of fire Res Ipsa Loquitor : The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees
and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
 CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Torts; Quasi-delicts; Force majeure; Intervention of unforeseen and unexpected

cause.The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in
the resulting injury. (MacAfee v. Travers Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
Damages; Liability of owner of gasoline station; Case at bar.A fire broke
out at the Caltex service station. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank into the underground storage. The fire spread to and burned
several neighboring houses owned by appellants. Issue: Whether Caltex
should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. Held: This
question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was an
independent contractor or an agent of Caltex. Under the license agreement
the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use
of the premises and all equipment therein. The operator could sell only
Caltex products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject
to the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. The operator could not
assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to
the operator. These provisions of the contract show that the operator was
virtually an employee of the Caltex, not an independent contractor. Hence,
Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants.
18. PNR vs IAC 217 SCRA 637
19, Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan
20. Quezon City Government vs Dacara