Sanidad Vs Comelec
2167 has no statutory JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766,
entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881),
said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated
November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V.
Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of
the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City
of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers. During
the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and
on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner
that said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined
in the Constitution.
Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No
2167 is unconstitutional
Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
that what was granted to the Comelec was the power
to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities,
media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their
right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No.
basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may
express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that
this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently
make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in
a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression
may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec
radio time may provide a forum for expression but
they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.
AQUINO V ENRILE 59 SCRA 183
Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the
President to Order Arrests
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to
the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a
number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr
even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino
and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan
Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common
and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid
pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in
accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the
President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state
of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet
disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid
exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.
50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law
Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution
Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate
implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to
enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries
from implementing the said constitution. Javellana
averred that the said constitution is void because the
same was initiated by the president. He argued that
the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution.
Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is
not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course
to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the
case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment
made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there
being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed
that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the
1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the
1973 Constitution is a political question which was left
to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer.
Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against
the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with
the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special
election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter
of conditional resignation did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of
a special election for President and Vice President
earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
1987. The letter states that the President is:
irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers
have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his
office, so long as the election is clean, fair and
honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the
Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding
of the elections
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed
and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on
February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than
the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as
the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the
purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual
vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through
their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a
new mandate or to elect a new president.
LAWYERS LEAGUE V AQUINO GR 73748 MAY 22,
1986\
FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon
Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government
is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that: The people have
accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government; and The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
IN RE: BERMUDEZ 145 SCRA 160
145 SCRA 160 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto
Government
Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the
validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which
provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear
as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to
declare and answer the question of the construction
and definiteness as to who, among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice
President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent
president.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and
common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term
to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding
on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the
legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was
likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it
was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright
by the Supreme Court which held that: Petitioners
have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
IN RE: LETTER OF REYNATO PUNO
June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA
FACTS: Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a
letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this
Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking
in the Court of Appeals. It appears from the records
that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his
oath of office for said position only on 29 November
1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in
the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was
reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled
An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes.
Petitioner was
appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7
November 1984, petitioner accepted
anappointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the
Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of
the Judiciary.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February
1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary. To effect the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court
and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was
created, with the then Minister of Justice, now
Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then
Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice Chairman.
President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative
powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive
Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned
reorganization of the Judiciary.
The Screening Committee recommended the return
of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of
Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven
(11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the
appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28
July 1986, petitioners seniority ranking changed,
however, from number eleven (11) to
number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority
ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for,
otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33.
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is
presumed to have intended to comply with her own
Executive Order No. 33 so much so that
the correction of the inadvertent error would only
implement the intent of the President as well as the
spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke
any kind of constitutionalconfrontation (between
the President and the Supreme Court).
In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29
November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos
request. The Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is directed
to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from
number twelve (12) to number five (5). However,
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the C
ourt en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed
by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A
. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected
by the ordered correction. They contend that the
present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty
one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim
a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim
that he was returning to his former court, for the
courts where he had previously been appointed
ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order
No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5)
for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue
of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance
of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution) that no right provided under
the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in
the Freedom Constitution.
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2
of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last
sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129,
statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal
and re-enactment mandate, according to positioner,
the preservation and enforcement of all rights and
liabilities which had accrued under the original statute.
Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power
of appointment is executive in character and cannot
be usurped by any other branch of the Government,
such power can still be regulated by the Constitution
and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits
set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power
of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law
ISSUE: Whether or not the present Court of
Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any
claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed
by petitioner in theCourt of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior
to Executive Order No. 33.
HELD: It is the holding of the Court that the
present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different
and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake
of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the
aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution
in 1986. A revolution has been defined as
the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it, or as a sudden, radical
and fundamental change in the government or
political system usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence.
It has been said that the locus of positive law-making
power lies with the people of the state and from there
is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform
and to alter any existing form of government without
regard to the existing constitution.
These summarize the Aquino governments position
that its mandate is taken from a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people.
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether
the then existing legal order was overthrown by the
Aquino government. A legal order is the authoritative
code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules
found in the enactments of the organs of the polity.
Where the state operates under a written constitution,
its organs may be readily determined from a reading
of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it
becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments.
The rules in such enactments, along with those in the
constitution, comprise the legal order of
that constitutional state. It is assumed that the legal
order remains as a culture system of the polity as
long as the latter endures and that a point may be
reached, however, where the legal system ceases to
be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by
the population nor enforced by the officials.
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the
presidency was not due toconstitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the
winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can
be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos
Government which was met by little resistance
and her control of the state evidenced by
the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers
of the administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the
Military signalled the point where the legal system
then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipino.
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration
and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of
Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time
the appointments were made by the President in
1986, are recognized and upheld.
De Leon vs Esguerra
Facts: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and
other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay
dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon
received memo antedated december 1, 1986 signed
by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987,
designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by
authority of minister of local government and similar
memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new
councilmen.
Issue: Whether or not designation of successors is
valid.
Held: No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the
date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and
not December 1, 1986.
2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period.
But provisional constitution was no longer in efffect
then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and
its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states
that all previous constitution were suspended.
3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987.
Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now
acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for
barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election
act is not inconsistent with constitution.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V COMELEC GR 127325
MARCH 19, 1997
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its
approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the
necessary publication of the said petition in papers of
general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD
Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples
initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and
no such law has yet been passed by
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three
systems of initiative namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The
two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided
for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution.
This omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to
include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2
of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right This provision is obviously not
self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of inititative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. The
people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever
reason does not provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on
November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position,
as shown by their various opinions already given
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did
not become stare decisis.
TOLENTINO V COMELEC 41 SCRA 702
41 SCRA 702 Political Law Amendment to the
Constitution Doctrine of Proper Submission
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an
advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even
before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino
then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed,
there will be an improper submission to the people.
Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for
ratification. Election here is singular which meant that
the entire constitution must be submitted for
ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the
people were not given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time
no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution
would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to
assess the proposed amendment in the light of the
entire document. This is the Doctrine of
Submission which means that all the proposed
amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or
rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a
prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the present constitution.
Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is without
power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution.
Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo
Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the
nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in objective.
ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention ratified validly in
compliance to applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the
people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to an existing constitution
is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has
been amended in the manner required by the
constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which
provides only one way for ratification (election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with
qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social
conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law) the
Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced
to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to
dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed
Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases
which considerations other than judicial are relevant
and unavoidable. The new constitution is in force as
there are not enough votes to say otherwise.
SANIDAD V COMELEC 73 SCRA 333
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law
Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of
the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable
to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976.
Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec
4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976,
Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to
he submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in
its whereas clauses that the peoples continued Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
opposition to the convening of the interim National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;
to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose
amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.
This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power
to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in
the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes
ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..
The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as
the legislature.
People vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
[GR 145951, 12 August 2003]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel
Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all
charged with Malversation through Falsification of
Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 25741. The Information alleged that
Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted for
their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00
from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS). On 12 November 1999, Ramiscal filed with
the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare
Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said
Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and
Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on 6
January 2000. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on 12 May
2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et.
al.'s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 25741. Upon
denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the
prosecution filed the present special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-
owned or controlled corporation or a private
corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are
public or private.
Held: The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential
Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to
those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension
funds of those in the military service. Members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are expressly excluded from the
coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore,
soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally
employees of the Government, rely on the
administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement,
pension and separation benefits. For this purpose, the
law provides that the contribution by military officers
and enlisted personnel to the System shall be
compulsory. Its enabling law further mandates that
the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an
agency, group, committee or board, which may be
created and organized by him and subject to such
rules and regulations governing the same as he may,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National
Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the
investment of funds of the System shall be decided by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS,
except for the initial seed money, come entirely from
contributions and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there have
been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to
the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded
from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above
considerations indicate that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with
public interest. As such, we hold that the same is
a government entity and its funds are in the
nature of public funds
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law;
Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and
its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene
the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing
in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
LEE HONG KOK V DAVID GR NO. L-30389 DEC.
27, 1972
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution
Imperium v. Dominium
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee
and the government
FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to
his miscellaneous sales application in accordance
with which an order of award and for issuance of
a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made
by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering
Lot 2892.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of
Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No.
510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City
on October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public
character for having been formed by reclamation (as
opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the
ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES: W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant.
- NO
W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal
justification for nullifying the right of David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor
by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee
and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs
cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the
land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared
as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a
free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free
patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but
in addition the person to whom it is granted has
likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a
period of 5 years.
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,
2000
DECISION
(En Banc)
BUENA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement
was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government
and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines
the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates
25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . .
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions,
held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse
of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the
VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . .
the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the
phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate
for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used
in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed,
in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.=
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United
States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as
long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States
Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
BAYAN VS ZAMORA
42 SCRA 23 Political Law Definition of
State
In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier,
Morocco (an international zone [foreign country] in
North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a
Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She
however left some personal properties (shares of
stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The
designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio
Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue
(CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to
pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is
exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to
section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
foreign country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible person property of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent
was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar
exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property
owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country.
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is
reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in
favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a
state as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax
Code and that the Philippines does not recognize
Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is
a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be
a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
through a government functioning under a regime of
law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign
will over the individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is
already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De
Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that
of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality
in the sense, did fall under the exempt category
provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus,
recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was
proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must
the Philippines honor the exemption as provided for
by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity.
Valmonte Vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be
directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names
of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having
yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are
now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as
citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records
on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda
Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging
to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law
granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His
position is apparently based merely on considerations
of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.
The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the domain of
the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the
time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It
cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions"
used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable
to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation are within
the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant
to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are afforded
the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his
child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated
that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the
proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only
ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the
mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money
in her favor and allow herself to be the childs trustee.
Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy
and contended that as a private contract its terms and
obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by
virtue of parens patriae to the terms
of the insurance policy?
YES. The Constitution provides for the strengthening
of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case
at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been
filed should resolve according to the best interest of
that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be
the mother as she was the immediate relative of the
minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows
more care towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that
the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. It may happen, family
relations may press their respective claims. It would
be more in consonance not only with the natural order
of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to
be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict
were between father and mother. Such is not the case
at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the
judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role
of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the
validity of her plea.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC
Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to
Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San
Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed
at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager.
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from
the retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a
fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she
needed to search her bags upon Bradfords
instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest
the search but she was told that it was to be made on
all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy
then performed the search on her person, bags & car
in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing
irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave
afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person
subjected to such search that day & she was informed
by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG
employees are not searched outside the store unless
there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya
cant recall any circumstance that would trigger
suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware
of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft
and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no
action was taken.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages
due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed
by petitioner in excess of her authority as store
manager. She claims that she has been exposed to
contempt & ridicule causing her undue
embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that
the act was not motivated by any other reason aside
from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a
blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for
moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of
P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served
on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along
with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a
foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent
and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in
the performance of her official functions under Phil-
US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has
rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary
for the establishment, use & operation & defense
thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases &
will have effective command over the facilities, US
personnel, employees, equipment & material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a
routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to
protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment
pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC
INST. 5500.1.
July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave
the country & was removing & disposing her
properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion
granted by RTC.
July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion
to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside
NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful &
highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority;
(2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is
personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity;
(3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military
base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts;
(4) the Court can inquire into the factual
circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford
acted w/in or outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ
of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed
to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for
failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of
Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable,
reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty
guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for
moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages &
P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for
Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC
from enforcing decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a
civilian employee thus not performing governmental
functions. Even if she were performing governmental
acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity
since she was acting outside the scope of her
authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public
officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is
liable for such acts. She believes that this case is
under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done
outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases,
it does not fall under offenses where US has been
given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford
does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further
claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances & determine WON Bradford is
immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction -
YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the
Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like
asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the
present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to
intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to
dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene.
By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have
subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion
in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion
to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause
of action is necessary so that Court would be able to
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer
in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state
a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. RTC should have
deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of
merit. But this is immaterial at this time since
petitioners have already brought this petition to the
SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI,
Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also
applies to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of
their duties since it will require the state to perform an
affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay
damages. This will be regarded as a case against the
state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this
is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where
the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of
plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers.
Action against officials by one whose rights have
been violated by such acts is not a suit against the
State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not
apply & may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private & personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public
official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted
w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs.
Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in
the Philippines merely because they have acted as
agents of the US in the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the
scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in
the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic
immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military
Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG.
Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity
are liable if they perform acts outside their official
functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no.
125865 January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and
ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated
the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal case.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioners case is
covered with immunity from legal process with regard
to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.
HELD: (1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered
by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in official
capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is
clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949 01December 1994
FACTS:
This petition arose from acontroversy over a parcel of
landconsisting of 6,000 square meterslocated in
the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot wascontiguous
with two other lots. These lots were sold to
RamonLicup. In view of the refusal of thesquatters to
vacate the lots sold, adispute arose as to who
of theparties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land
of squatters. Complicating therelations of the parties
was the saleby petitioner of the lot of concernto
Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immunefrom suit insofar as
its businessrelations regarding selling a lot to aprivate
entity
RULING:As expressed in Section 2 of ArticleII of the
1987 Constitution, we
havea d o p t e d t h e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d p r i n
c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w . Even
without this affirmation, suchprinciples of
International Law aredeemed incorporated as part
of thelaw of the land as a condition
andc o n s e q u e n c e o f o u r a d m i s s i o n i n t h e
society of nations. In theprese
nt case, if petitioner hasb o u g h t
and sol d l ands i n t h eordinary
course of real estateb u s i n e
s s , s u r e l y t h e s a i d trans
action can be categorized as a n
ac t j ur e gesti onis . Howev er , p e t i t i o n e r
has denied that thea c q u i s i t i o
n a n d s u b s e q u e n t di sposal of
t h e l o t w e r e m a d e f o r profit but claim ed
that it
acquireds a i d p r o p e r t y f o r t h e s i t e o f
i t s mission or the Apostolic Nunciaturein the
Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suitf o r t
he act of selling the lot of conc
ern is non-
p r o p r i e t a r y i n nat ur e. The lot was
acquir ed
bypetiti oner as a donation fr om theA r c
hdiocese of Manila. Thed o n a t i
o n w a s m a d e n o t f o r c om m er
cial purpose, but for t heu s e o f p e t i t i
oner to constructt h e r e o n t h e
o f f i c i a l p l a c e o f residence of the
Papal Nuncio. Thed e c i s i o n t o t r a n s f e r t h e p r
oper tya n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t d i s p
o s a l thereof are likewise clothed with
agovernmental character. Petitionerdid not sell the lot
for profit or gain.It merely wanted to dispose of
thesam e because the squatters living thereon
made it almost
impossiblef o r p e t i t i o n e r t o u s e i t f o
r t h e purpose of the donation.
Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 113191)
(G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996; J. VITUG, Ponente; First
Facts:
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against the
Asian Development Bank("ADB"). Upon receipt of
summonses, both the ADB and notified the
!aborArbiter that the
#fficers, were covered b$ an immunit$from legal
process e%cept for borrowings, guaranties or the sale
Bank(the "*harter") in relation to +ection & and
-heBank And -
- -he
Bank0s 1ead2uarters (the"1ead2uarters Agreement").
-he !abor Arbiter took cogni3ance of the complaint on
theimpression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunit$ from suit, and issued a 4udgment in favor of
the complainant. -he ADB did not file an appeal, but
-he latter
denied the re2uest.
6hether or not ADB is immune from suit7
5o.Under the *harter and 1ead2uarters Agreement,
the ADB en4o$s immunit$ from legal process of ever$
form, e%cept in the specified cases of borrowing and
guaranteeoperations, as well as the purchase, sale
and underwriting of securities. -he Bank8sofficers, on
their part, en4o$ immunit$ in respect of all acts
performed b$ them in theirofficial capacit$. -he *harter
and the 1ead2uarters Agreement granting
these immunitiesand privileges are treat$ covenants
and commitments voluntaril$ assumed b$
respected.Being an international organi3ation that has
been e%tended a diplomatic status, the ADBis
independent of the municipal law. #ne of the basic
immunities of an internationalorgani3ation is immunit$
from local 4urisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legalwrits and processes issued b$ the tribunals of
the countr$ where it is found. -he obviousreason for
this is that the sub4ection of such an organi3ation to
the authorit$ of the localcourts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government
ma$ interferein their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of theorgani3ation9
besides, such sub4ection to local 4urisdiction would
impair the capacit$ ofsuch bod$ to discharge its
responsibilities impartiall$ on behalf of its
member:states."-he ADB didn0t descend to the level
of an ordinar$ part$ to a commercial
transaction,which should have constituted a waiver of
its immunit$ from suit, b$ entering intoservice
contracts with different private companies. -here are
two conflicting concepts ofsovereign immunit$, each
widel$ held and firml$ established. According to the
classicalor absolute theor$, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in
the*ourts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theor$, the immunit$of the
sovereign is recogni3ed onl$ with regard to public
acts or acts 4ure imperii of astate, but not with regard
to private act or acts 4ure gestionis. *ertainl$, the
mere enteringinto a contract b$ a foreign state with a
private part$ cannot be the ultimate test.
ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as
a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the
IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a
preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager.
In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on
official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report
to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice
of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the
Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue
of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as
an international organization in the instant case filed
by petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity,
the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order
issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of
termination, respondent IRRI waives its
immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense
of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the
case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal
and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set
aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of
the IRRI as an international organization granted by
Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be
invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived
the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines
on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to
P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in
this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute
shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the
aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the
Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has
been held to be a political question conclusive upon
the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government or other officer acting
under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the
assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or
abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute
may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.
Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee,
vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate
Court, respondents-appellants.
Facts:
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring
Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and
the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the
filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the
decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that
they had been in possession of the land for more than
20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present
their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other
hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision and the trial court
ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for
reconsideration and then the case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the
Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent and hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for
recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:
No
Ratio:
A suit against the state is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the state has consented
to be sued, either expressly or by implication through
the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.
The complaint involves land not owned by
the state but private land belonging to Feliciano,
hence the government is not being divested of any of
its properties.
CONSENT
MERITT V GOVT OF THE PHIL
34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages
Liability of the State for acts of special agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of
Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E.
Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his
work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle
along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to have been negligent. Because of the
incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely
injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could
never perform his job the way he used to and that he
cannot even earn at least half of what he used to
earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to
sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for
the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state,
by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible
for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in
the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can
be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. The State can only be
liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as
an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a
special agent nor was a government officer acting as
a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of
the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest.
FROILAN V PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
Facts: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint
against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the
Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of
the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of
said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For
various reasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract
of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-
appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff
appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to
the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the
Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had
repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the
latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond
accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be
issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its
equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing,
he be adjudged to have the rightful possession
thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin
prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession
of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s
rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that
when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping
Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as
Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the
vessel, he filed an action to recover possession
thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of
said property. The Republic of the Philippines was
allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage
constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issues: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over
the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.
Discussions: When the government enters into a
contract, for the State is then deem to have divested
itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and
descended to the level of the ordinary individual.
Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action
and processes.
Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of
asserting claim for affirmative relief against the
plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of
the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to
sue private parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to
the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.
STATE ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACT
US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts: The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the military
bases agreement between phils. and the US.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding
conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves
in said base that was merely awarded to another
group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance
was filed by him against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able
to invoke state immunity.
Held: The traditional role of the state immunity
excempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule
is necessary consequence of the principle of
indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the
rules of international law are not petrified; they are
continually and evolving and because the activities of
states have multiplied. It has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now
extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be
descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the conracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the
project are integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both US and phils.,
indisputably, a function of the government of highest
order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
SUABILITY NOT SYNOMOUS WITH LIABILITY
SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON.
MALIAMAN, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional
Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a
government agency, was held liable for damages
resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner
spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the
driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not
liable for the act of its driver because the former does
not perform primarily proprietorship functions but
governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for
damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a
corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government, because its community services are only
incidental functions to the principal aim which is
irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with
proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law
and is liable for actions of their employees.
San Fernando v. Firme
G.R. N. L-579 [April 8, 1991]
FACTS: On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and
owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by
Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the
injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered
varying degrees of physical injuries.
The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for
damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot.
However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner. The case was transferred to
branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Bania
Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and
its regular employee Bislig were impleaded
as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered
the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly
and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot
expected earnings, moral damages and attorneys
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was liable.
RULING: The petitioner cannot be held liable by
virtue of the non-suability of the State.
The general rule Is that the State may not
be sued except when it gives consent to
be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.)
Express consent may be embodied in a general law
or a special law. The standing consent of the State to
be sued in case of money claims involving liability
arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
Consent is implied when the government enters
into business contracts and also when the State files
a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of
the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit.Nevertheless, they
are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if
it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereignimmunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued.Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck
of the municipality insists that he was on his way to
the Naguilian river toget a load of sand and gravel for
the repair of San Fernandos municipal streets. In the
absence of anyevidence to the contrary, the regularity
of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck
was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993
HON. RAMON J. FAROLAN, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and BAGONG BUHAY
TRADING, respondents.
Facts:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No.
170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port
ofManilacarrying among others, 80 bales of screen
net consigned to Baging BuhayTrading (Baging
Buhay).The import was classified under Tariff
Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs
Code at 35%ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the
duties and taxesdue in the amount of P11,350.00.The
Office ofthe Collector of Customs ordered a re-
examination of the shipment uponhearing the
information thatthe shipment consisted of mosquito
net made of nylonunder Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of
the Tariffand Customs Code. Upon re-examination,
itturns out that the shipment was undervalued
in quantityand value as previouslydeclared. Thus the
Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor
ofthegovernment.Private respondent filed a petition
on August 20, 1976 for the release
of thequestionedgoods which the Court denied. On
June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80
baleswerereleased to Bagong Buhay after several
motion. The sixteen remaining bales weremissing.
Therespondent claims that of the 143,454 yards
released, only 116,950 yardswere in good condition
andthe rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents
demandsthat the Bureau of Customs be ordered to
pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held
liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by the private
respondent.
Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual
damages that the private respondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private
respondent's claim to prosper would
violate thedoctrine of sovereignimmunity. Since it
demands that the Commissioner of Customs be
ordered topay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government,
itisobvious that this case has been converted
technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that state may not be sued
without its consent,
categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate
judicialpersonality of its own, the Bureau of Customs
enjoys immunity from suit. Alongwith the Bureau
ofInternal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent
power of sovereignty,namely taxation. As anagency,
the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmentalfunction of collecting revenues which
isdefined not a proprietary function. Thus
privaterespondents claim for damages against
theCommissioner of Customs must fails.
SUITS AGIANST PUBLIC OFFICERS
CITY OF ANGELES VS CA, TIMOG SILANGAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No.
97882. 1996
In a Deed of Donation , private respondent donated to
the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated
inBarrio Pampang, City of Angeles (50,676 sq
m). The amended deed provides that: The
propertiesdonated shall be devoted and utilized solely
for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Any
changeor modification in the basic design or concept
of said Sports Center must have the prior written
consentof the DONOR. The properties donated are
devoted and described as open spaces of
the DONORssubdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases
the DONORand/or assumes any and all obligations
and liabilities appertaining to the properties
donated.On 1988, petitioners started the construction
of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the
donatedland. Upon learning thereof,
private respondent protested such action for being
violative of the termsand conditions and also offered
another site for the rehabilitation center. However,
petitionersrejected the alternative because the site
was too isolated and had no electric and water
facilities. Privaterespondent filed a complaint for
breach of the conditions imposed in the amended
deed of donationand seeking the revocation of the
donation.Petitioners admitted the commencement of
the construction but alleged that the conditions
imposed inthe amended deed were contrary to
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise
known as theSubdivision Ordinance of the
Municipality of Angeles.
ISSUE: Whether a subdivision owner/developer is
legally bound under Presidential Decree No. 1216
todonate to the city or municipality the open space
allocated exclusively for parks, playground
andrecreational use
HELD: PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open
space as an area reserved exclusively for
parks,playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads,
places of worship, hospitals, health centers,
barangaycenters and other similar facilities and
amenities.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
andrecreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable. No portion of the parks
andplaygrounds donated thereafter shall be converted
to any other purpose or purposes.Upon their
completion x xx, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and
playgrounds shall be donated by the owneror
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be
mandatory for the local government
to accept;provided, however, that the parks and
playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners
Association of the project with the consent of the city
or municipality concerned. x xx. (amended sec. 31,
PD 957)It is clear from the aforequoted amendment
that it is no longer optional on the part of the
subdivisionowner/developer to donate the open space
for parks and playgrounds; rather there is now
a legalobligation to donate the same. Although there
is a proviso that the donation of the parks
andplaygrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of the city
of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the
owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate.Such option does not change the mandatory
character of the provision. The donation has to be
maderegardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement before the
samecan be donated to the homeowners association
emphasizes this point.We hold that any condition may
be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is
not contrary to law,morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. The contention of petitioners
that the donationshould be unconditional because it is
mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not
provide that the donation of the open space for parks
and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that
itshould be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding
the provisions of the decree. In the case at bar, oneof
the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of
Donation is that the donee should build a
sportscomplex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216
clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross
areaallotted for parks and playgrounds is non-
buildable, then the obvious question arises whether
or notsuch condition was validly imposed and is
binding on the donee. It is clear that the non-
buildablecharacter applies only to the 3.5% to 9%
area set by law. If there is any excess land over and
above the3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is
also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds
andrecreational purposes, it is obvious that such
excess area is not covered by the non-
buildabilityrestriction. Inasmuch as the construction
and operation of the drug rehabilitation center
has beenestablished to be contrary to law, the said
center should be removed or demolished. At this
juncture,we hasten to add that this Court is and has
always been four-square behind the governments
efforts toeradicate the drug scourge in this
country. But the end never justifies the means, and
however laudablethe purpose of the construction in
question, this Court cannot and will not countenance
an outright andcontinuing violation of the laws of the
land, especially when committed by public officials.
CONSENT TO BE SUED IS NOT SYNONYMOUS
WITH CONSENT TO EXECUTION
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings,
the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said
land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a
writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which
was deposited in PNB. However, such order was
opposed by petitioner through a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB
could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution,
for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under
the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter
affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of
Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders
of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public fund and thereby are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds
are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal
council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court
orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has
been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation of land they are already
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.
IMMUNITY NOT A TOOL TO PERPETRATE AN
INJUSTICE
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCIONSADAYA vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU
40 scra 464
FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927
the National Government through its authorized
representatives took physical and material possession
of it and used it for the widening of a national road,
without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an
allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its
price or return of its possession, but defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor
General refused to restore its possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune
from suit.
HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case
would result not only in the recovery of possession of
the property in favor of said citizen but also in a
charge against or financial liability to the Government,
then the suit should be regarded as one against the
government itself, and, consequently, it cannot
prosper or be validly entertained by the court except
with the consent of said Government. In as much as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of
his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule
of immunity of the State from suit.
NOTE: When the government takes any property for
public use, which is condition upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it
makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and
determine the compensation to which the petitioner
are entitle
(Ministerio vs.CFI, 40 SCRA 464)