Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
ARTICLE 3 BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The first guarantee of Section 6 is the liberty of abode which may only be impaired
upon lawful order of the court.
The second guarantee of this section 6 is the right to travel. The right to travel
means not only within the country but also outside the country. It is likewise
guaranteed and may only be impaired on the basis of national security, public safety,
or public health and as may be provided by law.
Judging from Section 6, freedom of movement involves 2 rights- the liberty of abode
and the liberty of travel
What is encompassed in liberty of abode?
The liberty of abode includes the freedom to choose and change ones place of
abode or residence within the limits prescribed by law and may only be impaired
upon lawful order of the court.
A clear example of an allowable order of the court would be a condition imposed in
the grant of bail. In granting a bail, there are conditions involved.
As held in Yap v. Court of Appeals, the liberty of travel includes the freedom to
travel within the country and outside. It may be impaired even without a court order,
but the appropriate executive officer is not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. He can impose limits only on the basis of national security, public safety,
or public health and as may be provided by law. (e.g. passport officers)
The case of Marcos v. Manglapus arose during the time when Marcos was in Hawaii
and wanted to return in the Philippines. Cory Aquino imposed a ban which prevented
Marcos from returning. Marcos brought a case against her. Manglapus then was the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The petitioner, Marcos pointed out
that under the Constitution, he may only be prevented to return as may be provided
by law, which means that Cory Aquino must impose the ban in accordance with a law.
But there is none. There is no such law which gives the authority to the President to
impose the ban. The case reached the Supreme Court. The SC found the authority of
the President within the four corners of the constitution, written or unwritten.
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Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Freedom of information cannot be absolute. The constitution itself recognizes that
there has to be limitations which must be provided for by law. (e.g. military secrets of
the AFP or PNP that are very sensitive, cannot be subject to the right of information)
This is an example of a limitation provided for by law. Unfortunately, there are only
administrative enactments of the Executive providing for these limitations. There is no
law yet imposing such limitation. The FOI Bill would have provided such limitations.
Since the FOI is an administrative order, then it will only be applicable to the
executive. It cannot be used as a basis for request for information regarding the other
departments of the government.
The rights guaranteed by the provision are the following:
1. Right to information on matters of public concern and;
2. The corollary right to access to official records and documents
Section 7 refers to political rights and not civil. These rights are available only to the
citizens of the Philippines. Section 7 is the only provision limited and applicable only
to citizens of the Philippines.
The right of access to public documents and records is a self-executory
constitutional right. It does not need an enabling law by the Congress to be
implemented.
But why do we still need an FOI bill? The FOI Bill would have to address only the
limitations, because as of now, the limitations are imposed by administrative orders.
There is no law yet regulating these limitations.
The right, moreover, was a public right where the real parties in interest are the
people. Every citizen has a standing to challenge any violation of the right and may
seek its enforcement by mandamus.
The case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari involves information on
an on-going evaluation of bids. The provision says, Access to official records and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded

the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In the case of PEA-
AMARI, the Supreme Court said that it is not yet ripe for the petitioner to ask for
information because the bidding process is still going on. There is no decision yet.
When a decision has been made regarding the bidding, then it becomes an official
act, transaction or decision. Before bidding is done or completed, it is not yet a
decision or a transaction. It is not yet an official act, it is still on-going.
Some of the recognized limitations on the right to information include:
1. National security matters
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters
4. Diplomatic Correspondence
5. Closed-door cabinet meetings
6. Executive sessions of wither house of Congress
7. Internal deliberations of the Supreme Court
These grey areas are the reasons why the FOI bill could not pass in Congress. The
debate is on-going on whether the FOI law would eventually allow these transactions
to be the subject of a petition on access to official records.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law. Even
without this provision, the protection of this right given to organizations- the right of
the people to organize themselves would still be protected, and the protection comes
from the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Philippine Jurisprudence, the right of association has figured in litigation involving
2 areas of associational activity: labor unionism and communist organization.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor, Section 23
of Republic Act No. 875 requiring the registration of labor unions was challenged as
violative of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court held that the theory to the effect
that Section 23 of RA No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and
association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis
The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section is not a limitation to the
right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without registration.
The latter is merely a sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations, or unions and the possession of the rights and privileges
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations. Anybody who does not want to
register under Section 23 may do so.
In People v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court held that mere membership in the
Communist Party or in the CLP renders the members either of rebellion or of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely
implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced
thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts
conducive thereto or evincing the same.
The same decision, however, declared membership in the HMB a sufficient basis for
conviction.
Membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implied participation in actual uprising or
rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring
class from thralldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and
the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used
to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing
more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by
law.
And when a HUK member, not content with his membership, does anything to
promote the ends of the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he
thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the
rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he commits rebellion.
Because of the People v. Hernandez case, Congress passed the Anti-subversion Act
(RA 1700) which makes criminal the membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines. This is to cure the case of People v. Hernandez.
This is now the case of People v. Herrer, which involved the constitutionality of the
Anti-Subversion Act. Justice Castro then proceeded to lay down what he called "basic
guidelines" for prosecution under the Act. He said that in addition to proving
circumstances which may affect liability, the following elements of the crime must be
established:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the
Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime
under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such
organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to
pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of
placing the country under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
On the labor front, a significant decision is United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union
(UPSU) v. Laguesma, where the dispute was about the right of association of
managerial employees.
The first sentence of Article 245 of the Labor Code provides that: "Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization." The
Petitioner-Union contended that this provision contravened the constitutional right to
form associations. The validity of the ban, however, was upheld because the "right
guaranteed in Art. 3 Section 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be
for purposes 'not contrary to law.'
In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees
from forming or joining labor organizations." It was held that "if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union
can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
the Union membership."
Government employees absolutely have the right to form unions, but even if they are
members of a union, they do not have the right to strike.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
There are 2 constitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain:
1. Private property must be taken for public use
2. There must be just compensation
The constitutional provisions on eminent domain are:
1. Article 3 Section 9 -- Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
2. Article 12 Section 18 -- The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to
be operated by the Government.
3. Article 13 Section 4 -- The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
4. Article 18 Section 22 -- At the earliest possible time, the Government shall
expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by law, for
distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.
The concept of public use is equated to the broader concept of public welfare of
national welfare. Section 4, Article 13 on the other hand deals with the just
distribution of agricultural lands subject to payment of just compensation.
The right to eminent domain must be understood to be the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate not only public but also the private property of the
citizens for public purposes. It is a power inherent in the sovereignty, and it need not
be granted by any fundamental law.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodged with the
executive arm of the government. The power must be granted by the Legislature. The
one that executes the power of eminent domain is always the Executive. Without the
Congress giving the exercise of power of eminent domain, the Executive cannot
exercise the same. Therefore, the power is inherent.
Section 9 does not provide the grant of eminent domain to the state. It is only there
to limit the enormous power of the state and that is the function of the Bill of Rights.
This power must be granted by the Legislature. Once authority is given to exercise the
power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive
authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent.

Under the Local Government Code, the power of eminent domain may also be
conferred to municipal government, other governmental entities and to private
entities operating public utility. As to the Legislature, the power is inherent. For
government agencies, local government and public utilities, it is only a delegated
power.
In the hands of Congress, the scope of the power is, like the scope of legislative
power itself. It is plenary. It is all-encompassing. It is as broad as the scope of police
power itself. It can reach even private property which the State might need for public
use. The delegated power of eminent domain of local governments is strictly
speaking not a power of eminent but of inferior domain a share merely in eminent
domain.
In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, the issue in the case was
authority over a portion of a Chinese cemetery which had been established under
authority of the Spanish Governor-General and "founded and maintained by the
spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and
industrialists." It was a cemetery "adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of
those born and educated in China" and authorized by the Spanish government as a
mark of recognition of the civic contribution of Chinese nationals. The city was
seeking to expropriate a portion of the property in order to open a street through the
cemetery. Did the city have authority to do it?
The Court asserted that a cemetery open to the public was already in public use "and
no part of the ground could be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
And general authority was all that the City of Manila could show. Hence, it was
without authority to expropriate the property.
The Court said that "if the legislature under proper authority should grant the
expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified purpose, the
courts would be without authority to enquire into the purpose of the legislation.
And that is what the legislature did; it authorized the City of Manila to expropriate the
specific parcel of property which accounts for the present extension of Rizal
Avenue across what once was a portion of the Chinese cemetery.
The requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain are:
1. There is taking of private property
2. The taking must be for public use
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
Public use means public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit, so that any appropriating of private property by the state under its
right of eminent domain, for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a
taking for public use. The concept of public use is as broad as public welfare.
The scope of the power of eminent domain has become broad as the expansive and
ever expanding scope of police power. The taking of private property for subdivision
and resale for land reform is for public use because land reform is mandated by the
Constitution, that fact already establishes the public purpose of the taking. (Mataas
na Lupa v. Dinayuga)
Expropriation for socialize housing is for public use. (Sumulong v. Guerrero)
Expropriation for the construction of irrigation canals. (Coscullela v. CA)
The case of Manosca v. CA involves the expropriation of the birthplace of Felix
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. For the purpose of preserving a historical
landmark, it was upheld by the Supreme Court as for public use, under the broadened
definition of public use. Moreover, it was questioned on the constitutional
prohibition of non-establishment clause of the Constitution. The SC said that the non-
establishment objection was answered by the argument that whatever benefit of the
Iglesia would only be incidental to the public historical purpose.
3. There must be just compensation
Just compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The compensation
given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum equivalent to its
"market value."
Market value is the price which the property will command if the seller is not bound
to sell and the buyer is not bound to buy. This is the definition of the deliberation of
the Constitutional Commission. A statutory determination of just compensation
would only be prima facie assessment. In the end, the final determination of just
compensation will have to be made by the Court.
Statutory determination is a determination by Congress, by statute or law.
Who are entitled to just compensation? It is not only the registered owner but
includes also those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned

including a mortgagee of a registered mortgage, a lessee, a vendee, or every person
having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled in to share
in the award of just compensation.
Entry may be made by the expropriator even prior to actual payment of just
compensation. What is merely required is that a deposit is made of the provisional
value of the property. PD 42 removed the discretion of the court in determining
provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed
value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that purpose. All that is
required is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned.
However, the determination of just compensation provision by PD 42 was declared
unconstitutional. What was merely declared unconstitutional was the computation of
just compensation, because there is now a jurisprudence that says that just
compensation can only be determined by the courts.
As a general rule, the value of the property expropriated is determined through the
time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. This is because the filing of the
case coincides the taking. But what if the property is immediately taken and the
expropriation proceedings will be filed later? Then the value of the property
expropriated is determined during the time of the taking of the property
expropriated.
The Court has consistently ruled that compensation for property expropriated must
be determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession thereof
and not as of the institution of the proceedings. (Republic v. Sarabia)
In the case of Secretary of Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses
Tecson, the Court thus determined the landowners right to the payment of just
compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The Court
has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. In Forfom, the payment of
just compensation was reckoned from the time of taking in 1973; in Eusebio, the
Court fixed the just compensation by determining the value of the property at the
time of taking in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot at the time of taking in 1972
served as basis for the award of compensation to the owner; and in Republic, the
Court was convinced that the taking occurred in 1956 and was thus the basis in fixing
just compensation. As in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this case
should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking,
that is, in 1940.
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not
the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the
filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the
public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may
have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the
value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due
to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
property at the time it is taken.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Borbon and CA, the expropriator who
has taken possession of the property subject to expropriation is obliged to pay
reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such possession
although the proceedings had been discontinued on the ground that the public
purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased. It is only equitable that when a
property is taken and used, the expropriator must have to pay.
There is part in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission on land reform.
Just compensation and expropriation for land reform can be less than the market
value, because land reform is both an eminent domain act and a police power act.
This deliberation is revealed by Bernas in his book. But the Constitution does not
provide that just compensation for properties taken for land reform can be less than
the market value. It could have been justified had there been a provision
implementing this deliberation.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the government must use the area test for
expropriation. It must comprise a big area such as haciendas and large estates. This is
the Guido-Baylosis cases. But under the 1973 Constitution, and even under the 1987
Constitution, the area test is no longer used. The area test was rejected in favor of
the states quest for social justice and peace. This is because of the strengthened
provisions of social justice under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Therefore, even if it
not a big landed estate, it can already be expropriated for resale to the landless. This
is called the Tuason Doctrine.
Is the valuation of properties for the purpose of just compensation subject to judicial
review? Yes, definitely.
How about the exercise of power of eminent domain? It depends. When the
expropriation is done not directly by Legislative authority but by another government
agency or by a municipal corporation, in virtue of an authorizing statute which

specifies neither the purpose of the taking nor the property to be taken, it is subject
to judicial review. When the Legislature itself specifies the purpose of the taking and
singles out the property to be taken, the judgment made by the Legislature is not
reviewable by the courts.
Res Judicata is the finality of judgment or decision. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the state dictates that the right to exercise the power
is absolute and unfettered by prior judgment or Res Judicata. Res Judicata does not
affect the power to exercise eminent domain. The scope of eminent domain is plenary
and, like police power, can 'reach every form of property which the State might need
for public use. However, the impropriety of res judicata "does apply to specific issues
decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation
suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precluded another suit raising the
same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying
with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of
eminent domain over the same property."
Regulation vs. Taking
Regulation- police power; when property right is impaired by regulation,
compensation is not required; does not amount to taking, merely regulatory
Taking- eminent domain; when property is taken, the Constitution prescribes just
compensation.
When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there
is compensable taking.
When property interest is merely restricted, the cause continued on restricted use
would be injurious to public welfare or where the property is destroyed because
continued existence to the property would be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking.
When the entry into private property is not just a simple right of way, which is
ordinarily allowed by court under the Civil Code, but it is for the purposes of
conducting mining activities such as exploration and extraction, there is already
compensable taking. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the
affected areas. (Didipio Earth Savers et.al v. Secretary)
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Constitutional Law 2 Notes Patricia Chan 2017
When the right of way enforced by the state results in making adjoining property
unusable, just compensation is due. (Republic v. Andaya)
So also, where the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines results in the imposition of limitation against the use of the land for
an indefinite period, there is compensable taking. (NPC v. San Pedro)
When the municipal property is taken by the State, compensation is required if it is
patrimonial property of the municipality (property is acquired by its private funds in
its corporate or private capacity) (Salas v. Jarencio)
But if it is any other property such as public buildings, merely held in trust by the city
for the benefit of the public but was private property held by the city in its proprietary
capacity, the State is free to dipose of it at will. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte
v. City of Zamboanga)
The power of eminent domain has been given to local governments by the Local
Government Code.
Expropriation by local governments under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
(R.A. 7160) must follow the following rules:
(1) "An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive,in behalf of the LGU.
(2) "The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.";
(3) "There is payment of just compensation, and
(4) "A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted."