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,I

13 Party systems
, .
Daniele Caramani

Chapter eontents

Introduetion 319
The genealogy of party systems 319
The morphology of party sys tems 327
The dynamies of party systems 339
Conelusion 345

Reader's guide
This ehapter looks at the interaetions between parties and how party competition
leads to different types of party systems. First, the ehapter looks at the origins of
party systems. Historleal eleavages between left and right, the liberal state and
religious values or ethnoregional identities, agrarian and industrial sectors ofthe
economy, led to socialist, liberal, religious, regionalist, and other party fami lies. Why
are these old party fami lies still th e main actors in our time? Second, (he chapter
looks at the formol of party systems, some of which include two large parties
(two-party systems) while others are more fragmented (multi-party systems). What is
the infiuence ofthe electoral system, and what are th e consequences for
governmental stability? Th ird, the chapter analyses the dynomics of party systems.
To maximize votes parties tailor their programmes to voters' preferences and
converge towards the centre ofthe left-right axis. Is this why parties propose
increasingly similar policies and programmes?
Chapter"13 party systems 319

Introd uction
This chapter vicws panies in their cOlln cctions :.1I1d Thrce ma in e1cmcnts ofparty s)'slcl11S are import-
relations hi ps wil hin l S)'S ICIl1. As in planct systc lll s nlH:
(he focus is no!" 011 single pklllcts but 011 rhe constel- 1. \Vhich parties ex ist? \Vhy do so me parlies exisl
lations rh e)' form: the r l1umber, the bahmcc or size in all party systel11s (e.g. social ists) whe reas oth-
between Ihcm, <1nd the dislance that sepa ra les lh(I11. ers onl}' in somc (e.g. rcgio!1nlists. agra r;:lI1s, 01'
Partie~ can be ideolosically ncar Q!" d istant , thcre ale co nfessionnl p<trtics)? This relates bO th e origin, 01'
Systems wilh man}' small partics 01' fe. . \' arge ones genealogy, of part)' s)'stcms.
~r evcn-to pursuc the ana logy further-o ne large
2. Ho'" l11 any panies exjst and how big are the)'?
party with 'satcl li tes' (as in same authoritarian 5)'5-
\Vhy nre some s)'stems cO l11 posed of t"'o large
tems). Ove!" time somc s)'stems cha ngc ",h ile othcrs
pa r! ies and others of many SI11.l11 o nes? Th is relates
rem ain stable. The va ricty of party 'co nstella ti ons' is
lO the forma l, oI' Illorphology, ofpa r!")' systcms.
thus very lnrgc.
Whereas lhe dynami c prin ci pie of plancts is grav- 3. Ho\\' do parties beha ve? \'Vh}' in somc systems
ty, lhe mOlOr of political interacl io ns is competition do pnrties converge lownrds t"h e centre whereas in
for powe r. In liberal dClllocracies this cOlllpetition othcrs the)1divcrge 10 the ext remes of rhe ideolo-
is based on popu lar VOl cs. Thc shape and dyna m- gical 's pace'? This rela les 1"0 thc dynamics of pnrty
ks of party s)'stcms are dctcrlllined b)1 ("he electoral s)'slem.
game in which parties are rh e main actors. A part)' An obvious bU I importnl1t poin! is that party 5)'5-
system is rh erefore first and foremos! th e result of Icms must be composed of severnl p.uties. There
compctilivc intera ctions between parties. As in <1 11 is no 'systcm' with one Ul1il onl)'. T he competitive
garnes thcrc is <1 goal: Ihe lll<1 ximizatio n of votes 10 in!cracti on belween panies requ ires pl urnlis m . Ift he
control govcl'Illllcnt. In th is scnse, pa rl y S}'stCIllS are goal is lO gel lhe mos!" votes, the re IllllSt be free
much mo rc d}'namic (c hangcab lc) th an star S)/slcms. c1cct ions, SOIllC degree of enfranchisemcnl, and plur-
The set of interactions belween parties, however, is al islll wi th oul wh ich co mpctition ca nnot ex ist. This
not excJusivel)' cOlllposed of cOlllpet ition, but also of chapler Iherefore focuses 011 delllo cratic s)'stcms and
coopcralion . Pnrties, fOI" examplc, coopera tc whel1 cxcl udes to tal ital' ian 01' nllthoriraria n regillles \Vith
they build a coal ition lo support a govcJ"Illllcnt. single parties (s uch as Chi na 01' Syria).

KEY POI NTS

o Party systems are sets of parties that compete and large t!ley are, and (3) the way in whicl1 they maximize
cooperate with the aim of increasing their power in votes.
control ling government. O It is appropriate to speak of a party system only in
Q What determines interactions is (1) which parties ex- democratic contexts in which several parties compete
ist, (2) how many parties compose a system and how for votes in open and plural elections.

The genealogy of party systems


The 'national' and 'industrial' fi rst t\Vo clecades ofthe twcntieth. Lipsct nnd Rokkan
( 1967) distingll ish two nspec ts of Ihis Irnl1sforl11.l-
revolutions
lion: ( I) rhe Industrial Revo lut io n refel's lo changes
Mast COlltelllporar)' pa rti cs <1nd party fa mil ies origin- produccd b), ind ust rinl iza ti oll (a rad ical chnnge of the
ated from the radical socio-ecol1omic and poli ti cal eco nol11}/) nnd urbnnization (cilies and ne'" fnmi ly
changes between the mid-ninclecnth century and Ihe Slructurcs); (2) the Nati ollal Revolution rcfers to the
320 Daniele (aramani

fo rmation of nati o n-states (c ultul'al ly hOlllogeneo lls of thal' lime wcrc expressed in orga nizations tha
11 and ccntralized politi cal units), <1nd liberal dcmo- were l)/pical of Ihis ne\\' rcgimc. Polit ical pa rties are
craey (parli amen tar isl11, ind ividual civil and vo tin g the produ ct of he pa rliamentar)' and electo ral garnt
ri ghts. eqUl lity, and secul ar instiWlio l1s). Thcsc t\Vo and party syslcms refl ecl the social opposit io ns to,n
sets of transformatio ns caused 1I11preccdentcd lcvels charnc terize society when parti es first <l ppear, TI-t
o f social <lne! polilica l mo bilizati o n. fund amental fea tures of today's pa rty syst('ms WfIt
The Ind ustri al ane! Nationa] Revol utio lls erc- sel during th e carl)' phases of mobil iz<\1ion of, at
atee! socio -cco l1om ic ~ l1 d cultur;:! di visiolls o pposing fi rst, rdtrictr d eieclOJ ates (o nl)' ve ry fe\',' pcople had
differt" llt social groups, elites, 'sets of va lues, ane! the right to vo te whe n liberals and conservat'e
\
interes ts. Lipsct and Rokkan na me hese co nfl icts do minated in th e nineteenth century) 3nd, later, oC
c1cavages (see Box: \Vha l is a cleavagc?, in th e On lillc ' massif)'ing' electo ra tes when socialist pn rties mobil-
Rcsource Cent re). \'Vith the birth of l110dcrn parlia- ized I"he vast wo rki ng c1ass thnt emerged from tO!!
Ill cnts and free elections, and wir h lhe progress ivc Industrial Revolul'ion.
extension of fran chisc, political parties developed and Th e l'\ational Revolution prod uced t\\'o cJeavages..
refl ec ted th e socio-econo mic anc! cultural di visions
crea ted b), rh e two ' revoluti o ns' , Modern parl)' fam - Centre-periphery c/eavage
Iies appea red as lhe ' political translalion ' of soci .. l This conAict emerged when natio n-states formed
di visiolls in systcms in wh ich conAict is incrc<1singly and integrated in the nineteenth CC ntur)', and
scnled Ih ro ug h vote. Cleavages in 1110dern Slales can po litical power, administrati ve Sl"ructu res, ;:I nd lax-
bc classified accordi ng to \VO dim cnsions: <l lian systcl11s were central ized. It <lIso broughf
about - someri mes al'lificially- nation al l a ll guag~
ter rito rial: al olle end are territorialized connicts
and the adoption of a ntl tiona l religion, Ital}' in
Ihat oppose periph era l regions to Ihe centre of he
1860-70, Ge rma ny in 1870, Swi lzerland in 1848
slate (its elites and bureaucrac)'); at th e opposite
u ni fi ed ns nalio ll -statcs. Others fO l'med thro ugh inde-
end are no n- territorial con Aicts bctween groups
within the very centre ofthe Slale pe ndence (Ire land in 1922 fram the United Kingdom
Norw<1 y in 1906 from Swedcn, Finland in 1907/1
fun cti onal : at one end are conOicts abo llt rc-
fro mlhe Russ ian Empire). The !lew nntional terri tor-
SOll rces and their (re)distriblll'io n bctwee n social es were heterogcneolls with d ifferent cth ni cities and
grollps (c,g, eco no mic in l'e resl's) nI I' he Opposile langu;:lges, tl nd adl11 inis tration was fragmcnted. Na-
end are con niC1S on moral principies (e.g, religiolls tiannlist and liberal elites carried o ut state formation
values).
and nati o n-build ing. Cacing resistance fro m subjecl
popu latio ns in pe r ip heral territo ries in two aspects.
Cl eavages and th eir political
l. Admi nistrat ive: peripheri es were increasingly
t ranslation incorporated in lhe bllreallcratic and fiscal s}'stem
Lipset and Rokkan distin guish four I11tlin cletlvtlges of the new state (fol' exa l11 plc, wilh the crcation
crealed by Ihe two ' revol uli o ns' (see Table 13.1 ). of provinces 0 1' departments thro ugh which the
These revolll tions havc etlch produced two main cent ral slate contro lled lhe terri tory of and ex
c1eavages. Subsequent transCol'matio ns have pro- tractcd taxes), impl ying a loss oC au to nolll}' for
du ced add it ion al c1eavages, n<lmely Ihe ' Intern ati ona l regio ns.
Revo lu tion ' triggered by Ihe Soviet Revolution or 2. Culturnl: rcl igio us, eth nic, nne! linguis tic idcnti-
191 7, and Ihe ' Post- Industr ial Revolu ti o n' in lhe ti es in periph eJ'J l regions \\fere repl;:lced by Ihe al-
1960s-1 970s, which led lO a valu c c1eavage between leginnce to th e ne,"" nat ia n-state fostered through
ge nerations and globalizatio n sillce lhe late 1990s. compulsory schoo ling. military conscrip tion, Jnd
In th e tra nsfor mat ion of Ihe ninetee nlh century o th e!' mea llS of Ilntional socialization. As the firsr
socio-econo mic and cultural conflicts emerged sim - ltalian prime ministcr said in 1870 <1fter Iwlyuni-
ult aneo usly with democratic refo rms: Ihe crea tioIl of fi ed, 'we have macle Ital y, lel liS ma kc Italians',
Illodern parliaments, free com peti ti ve clcclions, and Natio n-buildi ng, look place also in old cSlablished
.! Ihe ex tension of civil ;:Ind political ri ghts, ConOicls states. In Frnnce in 1863, accordi ng to official

i'
Table 13.1 5tein Rokkan'.s cleavages and their partisan expresson
,
Rc\'olutio n T iming Clca\'age Di\'isivc iss uc (s) Part}' ramilics EXa~lplcs

Na li o nal Earl }' 19th cc nlury Cc nt rc- periphc r)' Libera ls :1I1d Regio nali sls, clhni c Sco tti sh Nati o ll ;'! 1
(rcs tri ctcd eo nscr\'a ti ves ra ee parti cs, lin gui sli e Palty, Bloc
electora tes) res istan ec 10 parti ~s, minoriti cs. Qu bquois, Partido
sta te/adm ini slrat ive NlC ionalis ta Vasco.
centrali zati o n a nd
cultural slall da rdi za tio n
(Ianguagcl religio n).

Slale-church Co nfl ic t betwcc l1 libera l Conserva tivc and AUSl ri<l11 Peoplc's
nnd secul ari zed St3t C rcli giou s part ies Parl Y, Christian
again sl cl eri cn l and (Cuholi c mainl )'), DClllocrati e Union,
arislocrati c pri vil cge. and Christian dc moc rac)'. Sw iss Ca th o lic Pan }',
ove r religio us ed uca lio n, P:l rtido Pop ular.
inflll cnce of church in
politics, de mocrati c
instituti o ns.

Indust ri al Lat e 19th cent ury Rllral- urba n Co nfli ct bctwec n Agrari a n " nd pcasant Fin n ish Cen tre Parl }',
(s uffra ge industrial and parti cs. A I I~ ~flli a n
Co un!r}'
exte nsion ) ag ricultural sectors o f Ihe Pan }', Polish Peasant
eco noll1 )' 011 trad e PCl"ljJj c's Part}'.
policies: agra ri an
protecti o nisll1 vs.
indu stria l liberalis m
.
n

-
~
(free l rade vs. ta riffs).
"C
ro
Workers-em plo)'crs Employc rs vs. Ih e ri sin g Worke rs' parties, Briti'i h La bo ur Pa ny, ~

~
",orkil1 g class o n job soc i;'!lists ami socia l Argc ntinian Socialisl w
see uri ty, pcnsio ns. soc ial demoe rats, labollr Pl rt }', Swedi sh 61
prot ec ti o n, dcgree o f partics. Soc ia 1- Dcmoc r:l t ic ~
state int c rve nti on in Wo rke rs ' Parl Y. ~

'i5i
cco no m y. S'''V1ish PSO E. ;;
~
3
(co l/fillllen)
W
( N
~
W
N
N

e
IU
:l
;.
D
Table 13.1 (continued) "O]
IU

3
IU
Rcvol uti on Ti min g Cleavagc D ivisive iss lIc(s) Party fumiles Examp les :l

Int crn ationa l Earl y 20th (c ntmy Com m 1I n ists-soc ia 1SIS Di vision ", ihi n th e 'Ieft ' Communis ts. Partit o CO lllunista
(I11 <1 SS electorales ) (wo rkers' mO VC Ill CI1 t ) Italiano , Izq uierda
ove r ce ntrnlit-y of Ih e 1 ' !~: .::i a , Parti
So viet U n ian COllllll un islc
COllll11unist Part-y and il s Fran c<l is, Japa n's
inlc rIl l tio na l lead ership, CO nlJ11l1lliSI Pan")'.
and ove r refo rmi sll1 VS.
revolut io n.

Posl- ind ust ri al Late 20 th (enlm)' M.Hcri alist-post- Ge nera tio nal cl cavage Gree n and eco logist Die Gr ncn. Austr ian
(de mob ili zcd mat cr ialist ove r po li e)' priorities: pa rti es. Grl1cn/Gr I1 c
cl('cta rat es.) va tu es new valu es o f civic All ernativc,
ri ghl s. pacifism , Dc mocral s '(ln.
fe m in ism , en vi ro llmcnl. Wo men's Pan y.

Open-doscd socie ti cs Globnli za tion of Ihe Proles l parties, FPO, Front Na tiol1a l.
eco no my. opcnin g up of natio nal isl parti cs, Dani sh Prog rC'ss
abolir l11arkets, ex treme righl . wing P" rt )'. Fifth I(cpublic
com pc lition fmm chcap parti es, nco - pop ulist Movel11cnt ( Hu go
Asia n bbo ur , fi sca l and pnrti cs. Chivcz). Movc lll cnt
111 0 n Cl<1. ry in tcgra t io n in fo r Sociali sl11 (Evo
Euro pc, and Morales).
ilnli Amcricani zati o ll of
cuhurc.
Chapter 13 Party systems 323

figures, onl )' 22 per eenl of rh e eommunes spoke it was no t until after the breakdowll of democrac)"
French. alllocated aro und th e Paris regio n (Webe r and the inter-war fascist perioe! that th e Catholi c
1976: 67). Chureh ful1 )' acce pted democrac)'. 'Christian demo-
crae)" - in Ilal)', France, Germa n)', Austri a- is the
Resislance lo admin istrati ve cenrrali za tion and cul-
fa mil )' that appears from Ihis cvolution after the
tural Slandardization was expressed in regionalist
Second Wo rld Wa r.
parties sllch as the Scottish Nat iona l Party, th e
An intercsting case is rh at of coun tri cs with m ixed
Swedish Party in FinJand, rh e va rio Lls 13asqu e and
religious strllcturcs. In th.e Neth,,: r1 ands th er~ W~I S one
Ca1,1lan partie;oi in Sp;- n, tile parti es of th e German-
unified Catholi c parr)' and a num be r of Reformed
and French-speaking mino rities in Ital)', the Bloc
and Calvin ist parties reflectin g lhe fragmentation of
Qubquois in Ca nada, and so o n, opposi ng nation-
Protestantismo Religious partics merged in 1972 into
.Iist/l ibe ral parties.
the Christian Democrati c Appea!. In Germany, too,
:'111 inter-confessio nal part"}' developed (th e Christian
State-church cleavage Democ rati c Union). In Switze rla nd a majo r Cathol ic
~ation-sta t es in the nineteen th eentur)' we re not pa rt)' emerged from the opposirion to the Prolestant
onl)' cen lra li zed and homogeneo us, but also based Radicals/Liberals.
011 rhe liberal ideology prol1101ing secular institutions rh e Indust rial Revolution prod uced Iwo addi-
(no church influencc), individualism, and democrae)' tional c1eavages.
(sometil11es republ icanism ). Liberal rcfo rms alld rh e
abolitio n of estates (c1erg)', aristoc!"aC)', bourgeoisie, Rural-urban cleavage
peasantr)') of pre-modern parliaments, as ",eH as in- T he nrsl was Ihe contrast betwee n landed rurtll in-
dividual vote allcl free elections, put an cnd lo c1ericclt le!"cs ts (ag ricll llure) and th e risillg c1ass of industrial
and aristocratic privilege. Liberals "'ere o pposed by and trad ing entrep rc lleurs. This c1eavage focused on
conscrvat ives who refused democra C)' an d defended trade policies, wil h agrari ans favouring tradc barriers
the monarchy. To a Iarge eXlent, this was tl confl ict for th e pro tec tio n of agri cultural products (protec-
beh\'CC n Ihe rising industrial bourgeoisie and th e tionism) ane! industrialists favouring free market
corporate privilege of c1erg)' and aristocrac)'. and trade libera lization \Vil h low tariffs (Iiberalism ).
The ne\V liberal secular state fou ght aga insr the This d ea vage \Vas re inforccd by cultural differences
long-established rol e of the church in educal ion. between countrysidc and urban centres where ind us-
Compulsoryeducati o n by th e state \Vas lIsed to ' forge' tries concentra lecI. Cultural opellness/closure added
citizens \Vit h ne\V (non -religious) va lucs. Especiall )' to the div isio n bctween pri ma r)' a nd seco ndar)'
in Catholie co untries this led to stron g eo nflicls, secti ons of lhe econolll)'.
whereas in Protes tant co ul1tries-\"here chllrches As a ge neral rul e, weak secto rs of the eeo nom)'
belong lo lhe state-the c1eavage foellsed on moral te nd to be pro tectionist beca use of the threat of
principies. The ch urch was also exprop ria lcd of land imports, whereas stro ng seeto rs favollr the open-
and buildings and, in Ital )', il lost its temporal po\Ver ing up of eco nolllic borders which favo ur ex porls
,nd state (about a fo urth of Ihe Italian peninsula) (Rogowski 1989). Agricll ltllre was threatened by lech-
when Italy lInified from th e previo LIS state mosaic in nological progress and acccle rati o n of productivity.
1860-70. The defe nee of agrarian inleres ts- when peasa nt
lhe con Oicl characteri zed the o pposition to lib- pop ul alions receivecI the ri ghl lo vote-was ex-
erais against th e conservatives, who bel ieved in a pressed f,.om lhe end of the nineteellth century
return lO the old pre-dellloc rati c rcgimc. In some throu gh agra dan pa rties (also called peasa nts' or
Countries, Catholics too k the place of eo nservati ves, farl11 ers' parties). Largc or small agrarian parties ex-
as in Belgilll11, Switze rland , Ge rma n)'. In oth er co un - isted eve r)'wherc in Europe but were particlllarl y
tries, Ca tholics were ballned through papal deerce S l r~)J1g in Eastern Europe ancI in Scandina via. They
from participatin g in th e polilical life of Ihe liberal were also CO ml1l01l in Latin Ameri ca.
nation-sta te (by being ca ndida tes, voti ng, 01' creating The period after the Second \Vorld \Nar witnesscd
a pany). For th is reason Ca thol ic parties did Ilot ap- bOlh Ihe decline ~1I1d transforlllatio n of these parties.
pear in Italy and Franee ulHil ('he ea rl y 1920s. In faet, On the one hand, in most eOllntries peasants' parties
324 Dan iele earaman i

di sa ppeared. On the at her, the largc agrnria n pa rties ill n~ss, p ~ogress ive taxat ~on , abo lilion of heritage,
of the nort h and east abtnc!oncd lhe agraria n plat- aCCide nt Il1S11 ri.1I1 ce, penslOn schemcs. Socialists ra.
fOrln and chan ged into centre part ies. T he recenl vO ll red eco nom ic policies wilh a stro ng intervenlion
reawake ning Oflhis cleavagc is 1110st notab le in Latn of th e state in steerin g lhe cconom)' and public in.
America where oppositio ll lO l11uhi- national (0111- vcstm cnts (later KC)'l1esianism ) against lhe liberal
pa nies. dcfence of raw materin ls and resaurces, and free-ma rket ideolog)'. They lookcd for statc o'Vner.
lhe threa t of global izatioll has lec! to pro tcction ist ship of infrastrll ct'u re (railwa}'s, energy), i n duslri~.
policies (e.g. zas ancl o il nat io l1 nlization in Bolivia al10 some!imes fi !lancial j;}stitulions.
.\!le! Ve nezuela ). In the 19905 a Ilumber of uph eavals Many sccialist and labour parties o ri gin::nc frOnt
of pcasa nts look place in thc Chapas regi a n in Mex- previollsly existi ng trade unio ns, -he main organiza.
ica. This clcavage is <l Iso prcscllt in the Europcan tions of the working class befo re uni versal Suffrage.
Unjan whcrc fa rme rs' prcss ure groups lobby fO I" pro- "Vi th resrrictcd fra l1chise mOSl workers did not hare
tcc tio nist tradc agreemenls and fOI" Slate subsidies. ("he right 1"0 vote. The state \Vas therefore COl1troUed
for mosl of the nineree nth ccnlur)' b), liberals and
Workers- employers cleavage conservatives \Vho were able to impose th ei r policies.
T his is the c1cavage betwcc n the indu s t r i~l cntre- Unions responded 1"0 a nllmber of Ilecds oi" Ihe \\'ork.
preneurial bo urgeoisie who started lhe I lldu s tr i~l ing class, increased solidarity ane! cooperat ion within
Revolution and the working c1ass lhat result ed fmm il, and provided l wide range of 'sen ices'. With
it. It is the opposition between 'capital' and '[abour' enfranch isement, \Vo rkers' pa rt ies developed as an
wh ich, tlp to rhe presen t, charactcrizes {"he left - ri ght 'electoral bra nch' of lrade unions.
'l\ ignment. 1n so far as this split is present in al! co un- The Soviet Revolll tioll of 191 7 prodllced a cloavag'
tries, it is rh e most important one. Left- ri ght is the within the \Vo rkcrs) movement.
most comma n ideological dime nsio n alo ng wh ich
pa rti es are placed (even in th e US where a socialist Communism - socialism cieavage
pa n y never developed: see Sox 13. 1). 111 lhe aftermath of lhe Firsl Wo rld War al1d lhe
Indus tr ializatio n had a ver}' dee p impact on \,Vest- Ru ssian Revo lll tio n Ihat led to the Soviet Union and
! :
em societies. Ir rad icall}' changed the prod ucti on the single-party reg ime colltrolled by the COl11 l11un
1110de, it caused unprecedented levels of geagra ph- iSI Party, in all counlries cOl11mllnist parties formed
icalmobili ty th rough urba niza ti on (Ih e dislocat ion of as splinters from Ihe social ists. The mai n iss ue was
people from coull tr}'sidc to urba n ind ustri al centres), Ihe acceptance of the lead of the Soviet Commullist
it transformed famil}' stru ctures from extended to Part)' in the international revolutiollar}' movement
nuclea r. ,.vo rkers moved lO new ind ustria l centres and also ideological diffe rences, namel}' whcthcr a
whe re livi ng co ndit io ns we re extremel}' poor. The}' revolu tio n wou ld be necessary to take rhe proletaria!
were therefore easy to Illo bi lize rhro ugh lrade uni- to power, o r if this goal would be ach ievcd throllgh
ons, with socialism providing a unif}'ing ideolog)'. elecloralmeans.
'''' ith the ex tension of vo ti ng rights social delllocratic As a reaclion aga inst rhe rldi ca lizatioll of the
and labou r parties gained parl iamentary represen ta- wo rki ng c1ass and its powerful act ion lhrough 3
rion. !lew type of mass party organi z~H i o n , fascist parties
Social ist parti es campa igned fo r labour pro tcc- emerged in a 11 11 111 ber of Ellropeal1 co un tri es andl
lion agai nst the capital ist eC0I101ll}'. The}' promoted mo re o r less di rectl}', do minalcd government during
social rights <llld \Ve/fare stllte provisio ns on top of Ihe 19305. T hese parties favou red Ihe natioll OVer
civil and polil ical ri ghts, <1 nd a substant ial equa liza- c1ass an d ' intenuni o nalism', and private propcrtf
tion ofliving co nd itio ns bcsides forma l legal cqual ity aga inst cO l11 l11 unisl11 . Fascisl parlies were Ihe product
(Marsha ll 1950; Kitsc hell 1994 ). T hese claims con- of the rad icali zatio n of the industr ial upper bour-
cerned und er-age and fema le labour, wages, wo rking gcoisie th rea tened by socialist policies, ane! of he
ho urs) con tract securi t)', protec ti o n in ("he wo rk- ar istocrac}' threatened by the rcd istri bu tion of land
place and duri ng periods of unemploymc ll t or and agra rian refo rms.

I'
Chapte r 13 Party systems 325
--
BOX 13.1 Why is th ere no socialism in the US?

A number of classical studies have addressed this ques- No feuda/ism: the absence of arisrocracy in America
tion. The main factors explaining the absence of a made the working class very similar to the European
socialist ideology and workers' party in the tlle most bourgeoisie.
advan::ed capitali)! country are Read :
Open (rantier: geographical and social mobility gave Lipset, S. M. (1977) 'Wlly No Socialism in the United
American v/orkers tlle Dossibiity to (llQve on in search St~tes:', in S. Bia!er and 5. Sluzar (eds.), Sources of
of better conditions. Contemporary Radica/ism (Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Party machines: dominance of Democrats and Repub- Press), l31-49.


licans in the nineteenth century made tlle rise of t hi rd - and Marks, G. (2000) It Oidn 't Happen Here: Why 50
parties difficult. cia/ism Fai/ed in lhe United Sta tes (New York: Norton).
Sombart, W. (1976) WiJy is there No 50cialism in the
The free gifl of the vote: workingclass white men all
Unired 51Otes 7 (London: Macmillan), translated from
had the right to vote, were integrated in the poltical
the German 1906 text.
system, and had a say in government's actions.
Roast beef and appfe pie: t lle American working class
was more affluent than the European and all socialist
utopas come to grief with a satisfied working class.

Finall )', the ' Post-I ndustri al Revolution' (Bell ' new lefl"' movements, the main being grccn parties
1973) created two more rccent cleavages. (MIler-Ro mmel and Pogull tke 2002). A mo re per-
vasive i mpact of the Post-1nd ustrial Rcvo lut ion is on
Materialism - post-materialism cleavage th e ' new right'.
A cleavage betwee n ge nerat ions ove r sets of socio-
political valllcs emerged in lhe 19605 J llcl 19705 as a Th e globalization clea vage
consequence ofth e prot ractcd pe riod of interna ti o nal Econo mic globali zati on has crcal" ed a fll rther post-
peacc, economic wealth, an d do mesti c securi ty sincc ind ustrial cleavage bctween sect"ors of the econom}'
the end of Ihe Second Wo rld War (I nglehart 1977) . th at profi t fm m the bl urri ng of cconomic boundaries,
Ihe yOll nger cohort devel oped 'post-material ist val - and sectors that are nega tivel y affec ted by th e com-
ues' focused 0 11 tolerance, eqlla lity, part ici p'at ion , petitio n fro m new markets and chca p labo ur from I
freedom of ex pression, res pect fo r the etwironment, the East and Asia. ' Losers' in globalizatio n and- in
t:., ir inte rn ational trade, peace, Th ird \'Vo rld aid, as lhe European Union - in tegratio n (\3etz 1994) have
opposed to rh e ' materia list' values of rhe \Var genera- reinfo rced sup port for neo-popul ist protest part ies
lion centred aroll nd themes of nat io nal securi ty, law who fa vo ur tracle barriers to protect 10cal mi.1I111fac-
and order, fu ll employmenl, protectio n of priva te tu re and 'locals- firsl' policies in rh e labou r market.
property, tradition, and alltho rity (within the fa mil)' Thesc groups are the small and medilltll en ter-
and the state). prises, unskilled wo rkers, craftsmcn, and agricultu ral
d
These new vallles were primari ly ex prcssed in a prodllcers.
number of new social movements (see Chapter 16): The econo mic defcnsive atli tude o fthese groups is
the civil rights 1110ve ment in lhe US in th e 1950s, pa-
cifisIll fm m th e Vietna m VI/a l' in th e 19605, fe minism
rcinfo rced by cultura l, anti -immigra tion , and xeno-
phob ic prejudice stressing rcl igio us and natio nal
I
in the 1970s claiming eqlla lity in the labour market values against tlllllti-ethni c sociCl"y and cos tllo pol-
nnd family, environmentalism in rhe 19805. In the itanisl11. Ma ny of lhese parti es rel}' upo n an extreme
1990s, new anti -glo baliza ti o n movctllents developed right-win g heritage, sllch as the Austr ian Liberal
against the global izatio n 01" th e eco no my and th e Party. the French and Belgia n National Fro nts, rhe
American iza ti on of culture (Delia Po rta el (jI. 1999). Italian Natio nal AII iance (Kitschel t 1995) . Others
Fro m a pa rty pol itics pcrspcctivc, ho\\'ever, there are are mo re spo radi c pa rt ies, sll ch as th e O nc-Na tion
onlya few exam ples of a signi ficant impact of th csc Party in Austral ia. 1n Lat in Amc rica neo-populist
326 Daniele Caramani

tende ncies ha vc a left-wing 'Bolivarian' charactcr (2) heterogeneo lls co nsteUations in which vario
11 as rhe I11Qvements led by Morales in Paraguay ane! OllS cleavages-economic, ethno-lillguistic, reli_
Chavez in Ve nezuela (Burgcss and Levitsky 2003). giOllS, territorial -overlap 0 1" cut across Qne other in
Neo-populislll is also a reaclion to changi ng secu rily plu ral dcmocracies such as BclgiuJ1l, Ca nada, India,
cond itions which-since lhe terrorist attacks in Ihe the i\etherlands, Switze rl and (Lijphan 1984).
carl y 20DOs- ha ve created a resu rge ncc of material-
SI va lues, the !leed fo r internal paliec anel external Tim e
co ntrol.
Lipet ~1I1d Rokkan do n01 take into aCCOunt de-
velopmcnts that look place after the 19205 as, aVer
Variations in cleavage time, clcavage cO lls tellatiolls and parly s)'stcms have
constellations remained extraord inari Jy stable. Up to the present
even pan)' labels have not changed (liberal, social-
Cleavage co nsteJlations change through space (from
st, conservative ), as a so rt of political il/lp rim that
co ul1lry 1'0 (a Unlr y) alld over time.
cr)'stallizcd. Lipset and Rokkan have forl11ulated the
Space so-called freezing hypothesis:
No! all cleavages ex.isl in all countries. The re is a , , [Tlhe party systems of the 1960s reflect, ~ith few but sign>
va ricty of constellat ions, and thus of pnrt")' systcms. ficant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s , .
''''hy do sa me cleavages ex ist in speci fi c co untries [Tlhe party alternatives. and in remarkably many cases.
",h ile nol in others? It is di ffic ult to summari ze Ihe the party organizations, are older than the majorities of
explicative pa r! of th e Lipset-Rokkan's 1110del herc. the nalional electorates. (l 967: 50; italics omined) "
Whcreas ril e Icft-ri ght clcavage cxists cvcrywherc and Today's pan)' s)'stcms refleet the o ri gi nal conflicts
is a so urce of similarity, the statc-church cleavagc fro m which lhey emerged (sec 80:-:: Pa rty fa milies, in
developcd especially in Cat holic cou ntrics in Euro pe the Online Reso urce Centre) in spi te of a decline in
and Latn Ame ri ca. The rural- urban clcavage \Vas clcavagc politics ",ilh the blu rr ing of soc ial divisions
strong in regio lls ",ith smaJl farming ;llld indepcnd- (Frankl in 1992). J n the 1920s the full mob ilization
en! un ils, wherc farmers we re not undel" he control of lhe electo ral ma rket through uni ve rsal suffrage
of kll1dl o rd s. The cc ntre- pcriphcry c1eavage appcn rs and PR caused ilS sal"uration. \oVith the eX l"ension
where th cre are cthn o-linguistic mino ri ties. of sllffragc citizens were incorpo rated in the polit
Cou lllr y-specific cleavage co nstellat ions are thcrc- ical S)'stCIll. Voters acqu ired st rong political identitics
fore delcr m incd b),: rhrough partisan idelltificatio l1 and social iza tion pro-
differences in objecti ve faclo rs such as diverse social ccsses thar proved stable over time. As in allmarkcts,
st ru cturcs: l11ulriple ethni ci ti es or rel igiolls groups, in the electoral l11arket too the re are entr)' barri
stru cture oflhe pcasantry, class relalions ers. Linlc room was left for new parlies. Existing
lhe ex tent to which socio-cco nomic <lne! cultural parties we re thus able to maintain their control over
di visions have been politicized by pa rti es, tha! s, electorates throllgh the ge nerat ions.
by the action of elites (Rose 1974; Lijphart 1968b ); Empirical research has co nfirmed th e basic sta
bility of electoral patt crns over ti me, rej ecting the
Ihe rclationship bctween cl e~vages : th eir ex istcnce
thesis 01" illcreasing rlea !iglllllellt (lIId realigll/lle/lt of
and strcngth can prevent Ihe dc"elopmcllt of new
Wes tern electora tes (Dalton er ni. 1985). Rose and
ones (agrarian cla ims have beell incorpo rated by
Urwin ( 1970) and, in a lo ng-e rm perspective, Barto-
Ca lholic parties o r by conserva,ti ve parties whcre,
lini and Mai r ( 1990) have anal)'seel trends of electoral
like in England, ag ri culture had bee n cO J11l11er c ial ~
vol;:tility (the cha nge of vo tes from one clection
1: izeel ea rl y) .
to the next) frol11 1885 to 1985. First, the)' found
Ge nerall )', two types of co nstellations are di s- that gene r;:l levels of vo latility are stable support
tingu ishcd: ( 1) hOl11ogeneous constellatio ns where ;lg th e freezi ng hrpot hesis. Secand, the)' fou nd Ihal
there is one predominant clcavage. namcly lhe vol;:tility between left and ri ghl declines. co nfirm-
Icft-righ t c1eavage on Ihe distribution of resources ing Ihe stabili zing of ideologica l identities. Third,
bctwecn classes (fol" eX:lmple, Britain ), and ho\Vcver, lhey found {"ha t volalil ily with in the left
Chapter 13 party systems 327

an d ",ithin rh e righr increases whi ch means rhat, of changc wit hin \,Vestern electarates-a dramari c
whereas left and ri ght ide ntities persist, tile identi- realig nment along new cleavages does na r seem to 11 1
fiL-atiOn \\' ith a specific pa rt)' declines (see also Kriesi have raken place, main tain ing th e val id ir)' of the
1998) . Therefo re, in spite of seculari za tion and post- freezin g hypoth esis.
industrial economies-a nd in spite of some deg ree

KE Y P\>INTS
,
'3 Madern party families originate from sacio-economic o The introduction of universal suffrage a~~ PR aj~er
and cultural cleavages created by industrialization, th e First World War 'freezes' the party constellations
urbanization, and the fo rmaton of centralized liberal that remain stable until the present. Afier the Second
states. World War the end of the state-church conflict leads
:J The centralized and democratic liberal state creates to the emergen ce of Christian democracy.
conflicts with the church and with peripheral regions, O The most significant examples of realignment in
leading to religious and regionalist parties. Industri- reeent ti me are the generational cleavage over
alizatian opposes liberal eco nomic interests to the (post-)materialist values and the economic changes
rural world as well as to the working elass, leading trigge red by globalization that led to new party famil-
to agrarian and labour parties. Parties ofthe working es: the greens and the neo-populist parties.
class divide in the 1920s into eornrnu nist and socia)
demacratie parties.

The morphology of party systems


An importan l elcment of th e competitive interaction of the hege mo ni c pan)' \Vith who m th e)' cann ot
between parties is rhe shapc of pan)' sys tcms (somc- compete to control gove rnm ent: these are also
times caUeel fo rm at) . The two main elements of the totalitarian o r autho ri tarian S)'stCIllS existin g in
morphology of pa rty systems are: ( 1) the IIIIJ/lber Egypt 01' AIge ria tod ay, an d in m any fO l'lner com-
of co mpeting units, that s, parties, and (2) the size rnu llist regillles befare 1989 in Central and Eastern
of these units. Haw I11all )' are rh e playe rs and how Europe.
stron;; are rhey? The llu l11ber and strengt h of ac to rs
The oth er fo m t)'pes are: ( 1) dOllli na nt-party sys-
can be observed al tw o levels: rh e votes parties ge l in
te m, (2) two -pan)' s)'stem, (3) mul ti-part)' s)'stem,
clections <lnd rh e seats in parliament. A 'variab le' rhat
and ('1) bipolar system.
mus t be considc red is therefare rh e electoral system
th rough which votes are tra nsla ted nto parli amen t-
ar}' seats.
Dominant-party syste ms
I
It is impo rtant to disti ngu ish Jypes of party systcllls.
Two types of pa rty systerns are 11 0t conside red in this DOllli nant-party systems are characterized by o ne
section beca use th ey do not ful fil th e democrati c ver)' large part)' rh ar dominares aUo thers with a In rge
co nditions tha\' allow compctition: ' /I/{/jority (\vell above th e absolute maj ority of 50 per
cent of p<l rli amcnta ry seats) ove r protracted perions oI
1. Single-pany systems ill which Olle part)' oll ly is tillle (seve ra l dccacles) . In th cse systems all partlcs are
legal: these are the tota litarian ancl auth o ri taria n legnl and nllowed to co mpcte in free elections with
cxperiences ofthe COl1111lunist Party in the Soviet uni ve rsal suffragc to chnllenge rhe dorninant party .
Un ia n, the Na tiona list-Soc ial ist Party in Ge rrn any Howcver, no other pa rt)' receives enough votes to
in the 19305, 0 1' the Baa thist Partr in Iraq until co me clase 1'0 50 pe r cen\. Electo rs vote massively
1993 an d in Syria. for th e dominant party . Thcre is th erefore no al-
2. Hegemonic-pa rt)' s)'stcms in which at her'partics tcrna ti o ll in power and thc do minant party does Ilot
are legal bu t are 'satell ites', unde r the strict co ntrol need to bui ld coalitions to fO l'm a govcrn ment. In
328 Daniele Caraman i

dOJllinal1t-p~rty s}/s tcms it is in faet irrelcvan l ha", the absol ule majority of .scats and fonn si ngle~part\.
111 <1 11 Yo ther pa rties exist. govern lllents witho ut lhe nced for pa rtnc rs.
AI1 example of a dominant-part)' S)'s tCI11 is India The feat ures of two-parl y systcms are thos e listo
belween 1947 ond 1975. Afle r 1ndependence ond cd in Tnble 13.2. The t"'o large parties ha ve similar
rhe ene! of colonial rule he Congress Part)' receivcd sizes around 35-45 pe r cent of the votes cach, that
electoral support above 50 per cen! <lne! was ab lc 10 pl uralit y elec tora l s}'stcms tt:~\I1 sfo rm in absolute ma.
rule ullchallcnged until 1975-77 whe n the 'slate of jo riti es of seats for the largcst party. This does not
emerge ncy' \Vas decla red. Over rhe lo ng period af Illean thnt hese are the onl)1 pnrties. A nlllilber 01
l:nconreste:t ru!e form s of p<itronagc dcvcloped and otrler smnlkr pa rties cO lllpc:~e in the cl ect~o ns. Haw.
in 1977 the Congress Party \Vas evcntu nlly dcfca tecl. ever, lhe)' are marginal as the)' are nO! n ~cessa ry lO
A mo re recen! cxa mple of a do mina nl-part)' sySlcl11 form l govcrnment. In lhe Uni recl Kingd olll, the Lib.
is SOll th Arrien since rhe ene! of apa rtheid in Ihe carly eral Democ ra tic Party. Scon ish Nation nl Party and
19905. T hc African National Congress, initially lec! by Plo id C)'mru (Ihe Welsh I1olio I1ol port y), and vorio",
Nclso n MandcJn, has bcen ab lc lo securc Ihe absolu tc pa rti es in Uls ter compete bU l do no! ha ve a strong
l11 <1jo ri ty of th e votes beca use of rhe role it hacl in impact 011 lhc party s)'s tem.
enfranchisi ng the black poplI lalion. In Europe a case In two -Ptrt)' systems single-party governmen~
of a dOl11 in ant~party s)'s tem is Sweclen. T he Social end to alternate frolll OIlC legislat ure 10 lhe next.
DCl110c rat ic \,Vo rkers' Pa n ), formed almost all gov- This is, lo a large eXlent, nn effect of pluralit)' electoral
crIlments from 1945 lIntil 1998, wi th arouncl45 per s)'ste ms. l3ecause rh e thrcshold in first -pnsHhe-post
cent ofthe votes on average. Onl), in a fe\\' cases d icl it (F PTP) s)'stems is ver)' high. the (wo mnin parties
have to form a minorit)' governme nt 0 1' rel)' 0 11 small have a majoritarian vocation. Parties propase policies
coali tio n partners slIch as lhe fo rm erl )' cOllllllll nist and program mes l"hat are accep table lO a arge part
Lcft Party. In J\llexico, Ihe Institut io nal Revol lltio n- of society. Pluralily leads lO ideological 1110deration
al'}' Party \Vas in power from the revollltion of 19 17 and similari ty of prog rammcs. In tmn, Ihis si milarit)'
until rhe 2000 eleclion when it was clcfcalecl fo r the Illakes it easier fo r vO l en; 10 switch (1'0 111 one party 10
first time. Ihe othc!' and creates nhern nt ion.
BNween 1946 ancl 1994 th e 1talian Christinn T herc are not man )' cases of two-pnrty systcms.
Democrac)' was lIn interrupted in po,,"cr. I-Iowever, Tbese systems are typicol of Ihe Anglo-Soxon world
on l)' lIntil 1953 did th is pa rl}' receive an abso lu te ma ~ where-unl ike con tin ental Europe where around
jority of the seats and was <l blc to form a si ngle-pa n y Ihe Firsl Wo rl d Wor all co un tries chonged from
govern lllcnt. After 1953 it relied on small coaliti on majorirnr ian lo PR electoral systcms-plurnlit)' in
pa rtn ers. A similar case is the Li beral Delllocratic single- member disLricls has been mai lltained. In ad
Po rty in Jopan belIVeen 1953 ond 1993. Foclions de- d itioll, thc trend seems to be declining. Only the
veloped wi thi n both parties and, becnuse of Ihe l<lck US providcs loday o 'perfect' exa mple of o h'o-
of alternat ion, Ihe)' beca me less responsivc 10 lhe de- party systcl11 where Rcpub licans and Democrats
11l<l llds from th e electora te wit h forms of patronage have dominated si nce 1860. 1 Australin mainlains
(S hi rolo ri 2004: 105 ). a strong t\\lo-pa rl")' systcm with the Australian La
bour Pa rly and Ihe Li berals. In Great Britnin the
Conserva ti ves and the La bo ur Party hnvc been in
Two-party syste ms creasi ngl)' ch<ll lcnged by '1hird ' parties likc the Liberal
A lwo-pa rt )' system is one in wh ich two fa id ), cq ually Dcmocratic Party. O lhcr examples include Costa
balanced largc parti es dominate the pan)' S)'Slem <l lld Rica (Nal ional Liberaliol1 Party and Citizells' Ac
altern!'te in powe r. The two pa n ies have comparable lion Porty) ond Moho (where Ihe Lobour Porly
sizes ancl cq ual ehanees of wi nning electio ns. Eve n ancl the Na ti onalist Pa ny receivc togeth cr clese 10
a small amoullt of votes eha nging from one pa rt )' 100 per cen l of Ihe vOles ). In Conada Conscr-
lo Ihe o lhe r (electoral swi ng) can couse o chonge of vatives nnd Libernls dominnted unt il 1993 (with
majority. Ahernation in power is th ercfore freqlle nt. n strong New Democrn lic Pnrty), since \'Jhen he
T hesc nrc ve ry competilivc systel11s. Bcca usc both I3loc Qubquois an d lhe Reform Parl )' have beco
pnrties are Iarge. fhe willning pa rty is li kcl)' 10 receive increasing th cir support.
Chapter 13 Party systems 329

Table 13.2 Types of party systems in democracies

Typ< of partr Fea tures Cases


system

Domi nan t One arge parl}' with more Iha n India ul1lil 1975, lapan betwecll 1955
parl )' abwl utc majority of votes a!ld 5e'1I 5. and 1993, fvlexico until 2000, S0l11h
No ot her pa rl)' app foachillg 50%. .'\ frila si nce 1994.

No alt crnati o n.
One-pan y govcrtlmcnt .
............ ...
Two-pa rty T wo arge parties sharin g logc lhc r Austria, Britain, Cost" Rica , Malta, New
amune! 80% of votes ,lI1d sca ls. Zca land unl il 1998, Spai n, Soulh Africa
B'llanced (35-45% each) wirh olle of unt il 1989, US o
Ih e IwO rCl ching 50% of sca ts.
Al terna tion bctween pa rt ics.
One-part)' government.

Multi-party Se"c f... l or m an}' parti cs, no Dil e' Belgiul11, Canada, Colombia, Czcch
approac hing 50% of vo tes and sents. Rcpu blic, DCllmark, Finlancl, Ge nnany
P;lrties of different sizes. unt il 1989, Hun ga ry. It al)' be fore 1994,
NC lhcrlands, PO)lIld, Russ ia,
Parties fun fo r clections indi vidualt y Sw it zcrkll1d , Turkc)'.
and form coali lions afte r cl ec tio ns.
Alternation through coa lition
changes.
Coal itioll gove rnme nl .

Bipolar Two l;U'ge coa li tions co mposed of France in lhe Fifth Repub lic. Germa ny
several p<1rties sh<1rin g logelher sincc 1990, It al}' sincc 1994, Portug;ll.
around 80% of votes and seats.
Coa lit ions are balan ced (40-50%
cae h).
Coa liti o ns are stab le over time and
run eleCliol1s as elec lorill all iances.
Altern"tio n bctween coalitions.
Coa li tion govefllmen t.

Two-party sys tem s ca n b e fou nd " Iso in COU I1 - ora s imi lar sizc: th e Span ish Socialist \Vo rkcrs' Par ty
tries with PR electoral sys tem s. Aust r ia sin ce th e and the Peo pl e's Pa rt)'.
Second World War has been dominated by t\Vo Fo!' )'ears Ge rmany (a m e c10se to a two ~pa rty s)'s-
parties- the Austria" People's Pat"ty and Austrian tcm :l ll d \vas named a ' rwo-and-a-half part)' system '
Socialist Pa rty- rcce ivi ng around 40 p er cent of wilh lwo largc pa rl ies co ll ectin g togeth er m o re tha n
the votes and seat s cach, a nd ab le to f01'111 s ingle- SO per ce n\" of lh e votes (th e C hristi;l n -Democra ti c
party governm ents in many legisla tures. In addi tio n, U ni o n and the Social Democ ralic Party ) <lnd a slTInl -
altern ation has takc n p lace fre q ll cnt ly. After the trans- lel' Liber;ll Par!"}' pa n)' (a rollnd 5 per cen t) with a
tion fro m Fra nco's rcgimc to democ rac)' in 1977, Ihe pivo tal pos it io l1 a nd ab le lO decide - throll gh all i-
partysystem ofSpai n moved towards a two-party sys- ancc-which of lhe arge r pa rt ies wo uld be in ch arge
temo In spite of many (bu! sl11all ) rcgio nalist parlies, or govcrIl m ent. VV il h lh e ri se of the Grecns lhe sys tem
the part")' system in Spnin prese nt s t\'lO largc pa n ies lurncd towards a bipolar s)'s lem . Is rael has lIsed a
330 Daniele Caramani

PR electoral system since lhe crea ria n of lh e sta le in since Ihe Second \,Vorld \'Var. tvlulti-pany s)'stellls
11 1948. Ve!" until lhe end or the 19905 rhe s)'stcm \Vas were held responsiblc fo r insta bility, frequcnt coali_
struclured arouncl (wo main pa rli es: lhe Likud and tion 'cri ses', and pOOl" responsive ness, with no single
the Labour Party. pan)' dearl)' accountable. Classical political scient_
ists such as Fi ner ( 1932), J-Iermens ( 1941 ), Duverget
(1954), and Al mond ( 1956) blamed PI< and ll1ulti_
Multi-party syste ms
pan)' sys tems fo r the lack ofideologicJlmodera tion in
Multi-party ~ys t c ll1 s are the mos! req ucllt tyre o' ,lbc 1920s and 1930:; which eventuall)' l~d te be break_
pany systcm. In the majority of cOlllltrics l11ulti - down of democrac)' in mos! continelHal European -
parl)' sys tcllls exist. Th is is l iso the mQS! co mplcx countries.
ty pe of pany s}'s tel11. In a mult-parl)' s)'stc m rhe Positive aspeets o fPR alld mull i-pa rt")' s)'slems have
Ilumber of pa rti es ranges frol11 three lo double-digil been stressed si nce an<1l)'sis in rhe 19605 ilnd 1970s
figures. Three to five pa rti cs exist in Ca nad" , Ire- including smilll countries sllch as Belgiu m. lhe Neth-
l:lI1d, Japan , anc! Nor",ay. Party syslcrns in whi ch the erl ands, Switzerland, and th e Scandina viall COUIl-
I1U mbe!" of partics approaches len (or cven mo re) are tries. Studies on 'collsenslIs democracies' showed
Bclgiul11. the Netherla nds, and Switzerland. None ai" Ihat multi -pa rty s)'slems are stable, fllllltioning.
lhe parties in a Illulti-part)' sys tem is majoritarian and peacefu!. In plural societ ies PR <llld multi-
(wi lh SO pe- cc nl of the vo tes o r seats). Furthermorc, part)' s)'stcms are th e onl)' viable ways 10 involve
the parties thnt compose J multi-pany s)'stem nre of minorities in dec isio n-ma king processes and reacn
difrerellt sizes: so mc are large (say, 30 per cenl of the c0I1Senslls. 2 As Chapler 5 shows, consociational or
vo tes) so me s111"1I (less than 5 per cent). consensus democracies represe nl a different modcl
Because in multi-part-y sys tems no single pany has of democ racy from the majoritarian or '\"'est minstcr'
an ove rall majo rity the result is that parties I11USt Illode!. 3 0th ha ve advantagcs and disadvantages (see
forl11 coalitions in arder 10 support a gove rnm ent. Ilox 13.2).
I n parliamcnlaq' syslems (see Chapters S and 7) Ihe The way in which Illulti -party systel11s function
vote of confidenee requires a SO per cent majorit-y of la rgel)' depends 0 11 lhe degree to which parties
seat"s. Partics run individually in e1ectiolls (co ntrary "re ideologica ll y polarized. Sartori ( 1976) has dis-
to bipola r sys tel11s) an d governmental eoa litions are tinguished t\Vo main types of multi-party sys-
negoliated after (he results are in. tems.
Unlike pluralit)' in sillgle-member cOl1slituel1cics,
PR does not hinder sl11a11 parties from addrcssing Moderate multi-party systems
sma11 segments of the electorate, somet imes through The logic is si milar to lhal of two- pan y S}'Slems.
extreme ideologies and programmes. PR therefore First, the nllmber of parties is limited (be\ow fiye)
does not lead to ideologica l moderation whic h, in and, second, lhe el irection of the competition is cent-
turn , makes it more d ifficult for voters lO swi tch ripe tal, -hat is, the Illain partics te nd 10 co nverge
from one party lo the other and ca use a gove rllm enl loward the ce ntre of the left- right sca le to atlrac[ the
chan gc. In addition, PR does IlOt providc Ihe 'amp- support ofrhe modera te dectorate. At the ccntreare
lifiea ti on' effeet of electoral swi ngs as docs pl urali ty. one or more small parties wilh whom Ihe \"\\'0 big
As a cOllscqucnce, govern menl ehan gc rarel y tJkes o nes 011 eith er side mal' for m a coa lition . The role
place thro ugh electoral change bUI rather by s\'laps of ('hese small par ti es is 'pivota l' in tha!" Ihe)' ca n de-
of coalition partners. cicle wherher the coalition is going to be cenrre-left or
\"' hile multi-part)' systems are consielcred to rep- centre- right. The ideological dis tance bel\\'cen parties
rese n! betler socio-poltica l pluralism in co untries is limited so thal all coa lirions He possible. This type
\'Iith religious, regio nal, and ethno-linguislic cleav- of pan)' sys tel11 is named ' mode rate' bccause of the
ages, their negative aspects have been at the forefrom abscnce of extreme parties:i

!
<

Chapter 13 party systems 331

BOX 13 .2 A normative debate: adva ntages and disadvantages of party systems

Two-party s)'s tcms Multi -part)' syslcms

HisroriCIIlJ)' posil liJe COI/llOta rim l H istorimlly lI egmi,c CO Ill/Ot{lI iOIl

Two-parl)' s)'stems are Ihe maio cases that After Ih e First \Vo rld War in Italy, Vleimar
resistcd Ihe breakd ow ll of democraC)' bctwccn Germ :lIl }', SplIlish Scco nd Rcpublic, and in Ihe
First and Sccond \Vorld Wars: Britai n and USo Frellch Fourth Republic (1946-56) instability Icd
( . 1 crisis of dcmocra..:y .
o' , ~

Effective {lIe!feaive
Produces govcrn mcnt s illlmcdiatcl y a[er Govcrnmen ts take lon g to form after clections
elcctions. Governmcllts are slablc bcca usc Ihey becallse of negoliali o ns betwecn P:Hlics .
afe for mcd by a single parl)'. Coal it ions lcad to 11llslable gO'fe rnments.

Accolllltable NO II-nCCOII/ltnble
Becansc here is onl y one pan)' in governmcnl Becausc governmcnts are formed by man)' partics
respo nsibilit)' is cl early ident in able by Ihe rcspo nsibi lity is obfusca led.
clectoratc.

AltenUl lio/1 No altel"l/m;o/l


Two main partics ahcrnale in power. Voten; Coali tion negolialions are OUI of the reach of
influc nce directly Ihe formation of govermenl: a voters' influence and shift of voles are nOI
small shifl can cause go vernrnenl change. necess:lril}' fotlo\\"ed by cbanges of gove rnlllenl. i
NOIl-represelltnl 'e Represelltm il'e
FPTP under-represens minori ties and PR rai rl ), represems lllino rit ies in soc ieti es with 1/
over- represcnts large mainstream parties of cl hno -lingui stic ;1I1d religious lllinorilies. I
left-right. '

N!odemte poliries Ex/reme politics


AlI main panies have a chance 10 govern and bus Ivlulti - part)' s}'stcms allo\\' represcntatiotl of
avoid extreme claims. Need 10 gathe r votes from ex treme (anti-system ) panies . So me do nOI have
large modera te segmcn ls of the electora le. <In)' govcrnment prospecl anel d o not hesilalc to
radicalizc Ih eir cl aims.

Diseolltillllif)' COl/ti/w il)'


Deeisions are made by majoril )' with a clear Dccisions are madI: by co nscnSlIS tbrough
strateg}' but there ca n be discontinuilYbetwccn consuha lion. More difJicult 10 find a clea r
subsequent goverrncllls. Legisbtion is oflen Slra! eg}' bu! more co n!itluity in legislation .
reversed.

Polarized multi-party systems share the principies orthe poli tical system and aim
lo change its insti tll tiolls (Capoccia 2002). Given
There are three mi.lin featllres \11 polar ized th e ideological distance belween parties not all co-
systems.
alitions are viable, Some parties ~I re contil1l1otlsly
excll.lded. 5uch parties kno\\' they are in constant
1. Polarizntion. There is a large ideological dista nce
opposition, beco me irresponsibl c. and radica lize
between par ties wit"h a st rong dose of dogllla l"ic
thcir discourse with promises thcy can l10t main -
radicalismo Extreme (lrlt i-sys tem p{/rles ailll nO I
lain (and kno\\' that they will never be called to
enly to change go vernlllent but also the systelll
pUl into practice).
of gove rnm ent ({"he regimc). These pa rt ies do no1'
332 Daniele (aramani
---
2. An occup ied ce ntre. Thcre is Qne mitin pa rt)' lhe eentTc-left coa lilion is composed ofSocial Demo.
11 placee! at Ihe cen tre of lhe lert-righl ax is which era ts, COl11munists, Grecns, and CathoJies, whereas
rep resents the 'syste m' agai nstwhich ext reme anti- the celll"re-right coal itiol1 is of Si lvio BerIusconi's
S}'stCI11 pa rt ics are opposed. The centre par!"y is Forza Italia, !he Northern League, a Catholi c and the
always in power <lile! becolllcs also irrcsponsible posl -fascist party. rhe eoalitiol1s have altcrnated in
ane! unaCColllltablc. This pa n)' is no! punishcd pO\\lCI' in 1996,200 1, and 2006. In Germany, li nally,
electo rall y beca use oC I he abse nce of viable altern - t",o coalitions oppose eac h other: Social Democrats
at ives. ane! Gree ns I)n lhe Qne hand, Christian-Democratic
3. Centrifugal co mpetition . The occ upalion of Ihe Uliiol1, Cb riHian-Social Un ion, and Liberals on
(e ntre d isco uragcs a cen tripetal move 011 rh e pan Ihe other.
of ot her partics beca use, ideologicall y, the ce ntre
is already occupied. As a co nscq ucn cc, there is The number of parties
divcrgencc. The co mp etition is ccntrirl1gal and
acccntuCltcd by a bila lend opposition 011 both So lhe numbcr of pa rtics is importa nt, bul how, ex.
sides of lhe centre. 3etl)" sho uld parlics be cDll1lted? If all parties tha! run
in an election are co untcd (o r even 0111)' those that gel
EX<1mples of polarized Ill ulli-part)' systel11s are lhc somc votes ) th eir l1 umbcr would be extremel)' lurge
We illla r Republi c in Gerllla ny, frolll 1919 un lil 1933, and useless in building a typo log)'. In eve r)' election
ancl Ilaly betwcen 1946 and 1992. ital y in pa rticular therc are dozcns of parties ane! eandidates rhat do
has ortcn been takel1 as an ideal type. A strong ce ntre 110t gel any votes 01' vcry few. It is th erefore neeessar)'
party, Christian Dcmocra')', \\fas opposcd 011 both la have reasonablc rules to decide whether a part}'
sidcs by unrcforlllcd anti-systcm parties: {he Italia n is 'releva nt' 01' not, and co unted 01' nat. Therc are
COllllllul1ist Part y and Italian Social Movelllent t\Vo ways to cou nt parties: (1) Ilwl1erica! with indiccs
(a post-fascisl part-y). Coalilio ns bel\Vccn Chrislian bascd on lhc size of parties; (2) qualilatil'e wilh rules
Dcmocracy and cither anti-systclll partics \Vcrc 1101 bascd o n the role of parties in the S)'SlCI11.
viable and Ch ristian DClllocracy ruled unintcrrupted
llntil 1992, although th e Co ml11l1nists had a large Numercal rul es
share of votes (35 per ce nl ). These ru les reprcsen t quantitative attempts to c1assi~'
part)' sys tcms on th e basis of the number and size
of parl ies thal co mpose thel11. Va ri ous indiees have
Bipolar systems
becn devised to sUIl111lari ze -his basic infol'mation: are
Bipolar part y syslcms co mbine elel11e nts of both there l11an)' S 111;:1 \1 pa rties {a frngl1lellted part"}' systcm)
11111lti - an d l\\Io-pa rt )' systems. As in Illulti-party sys- 01' few arge parlies (a C01Celllmten party system)?
tems there are ma ny parties. none of whic h has The mos t straightforward wa)' of cou nting is obvi-
a majority. And, agai n, coalitio n govc rnlll ents are ousl)' done b}' dec idi ng to indude all parties abovea
the ru le. Ho\Vcver, coalitio ns-rnther than single given thresho ld (say, 1 pe r cent). This melhod, ho,,
parties-are the impo rtant players. Thesc forl11 be- ever, has many problems, na mely parties with 2 and
fare electi ons and run <1 S electo ral allian ces. Thcy 49 pe r cc nt are cou nted o ne- to -one. Similar methods
rcma in stabl c ovcr tim e. There are uSllally '\VO large ind ude Rokkan 's methocl (1968) to dassif)' parIr 5)'S
o nes of evcnly ba laneed sizc altcrna tin g in po\ve r. tcms t'hrough an ind ex based 011 r-he distanee of the
Competiti on I' hercfo re rcscmblcs tha! of two-pa rty largesl pa r!)' frolll the 50 per ce n! absolu te majority,
syslems. the distanee of Ihc seeo nd part"}' frol11 th e first, :lnd
In FraIlee lefl' and right have altern at"cd in powcr so o n. Lijpharl ( 1968b) devised an index based 011
since 1958 4 The left indudes Socialists, Radicals, lhe su m of part ies' percentages in deereasillg order
C0I11I11 11nists, and Gree ns, whereas lhe righl includes ull lil 50 pe r cent is reached: r-he larger the number
I Ga ull ists and Liberals (Ihey Illergecl in 2003 as Ihe of pa rti es necdcd lo reae h I' he absolute ll1<ljorit}', Ihe
"
Union for a Popu lar Movcmcnt). In Ital}' sinec 199/1 more fragmented the part"}' sys tem.
Chapter 13 Party systems 333

COU NTRY PRO FilE Italy

Italian Republ.c (Repubblica Italiana) Upper house Senate (5enato): 315 seats, the winning coalition
in each region receiving SS per cent of that region 's seats.
5tate fa rma tion
The Kingdom ofltaly was proclaimed in 1861; Italy was finally
Electora! system (Iowe r ha use)
unified in 1870. The monarchy was abolished by a popular
referendum in 1946. Proponional representation.
ConsCituti.:Jn 19A7, effective 1 Januar 1948; amended many Formula If the political c')alition or party with the highest
times. number of votes fails te wln 340 seats, it is given 'bonus'
seats to meet the 340-seat requirement. The 277 remain-
Fornl of government ing seats are distributed among rhe other coalitions or lists
Parliamentary republic. using the whole number quotient and highest remainders
Heod of stoce President elected by an electoral colJege method.
consisting of both houses of Parliamem and 58 regional Conscituencies 26 multimember constituencies for 617
representatives, term of 7 years (no term limit). seats, 1 single-member constituency and 1 multi-member
Head of governmenc President of the Couneil of Ministers, constituency for Italians abroad.
appoimed by the President and confirmed by Parliament. Barrier clause 10 per cent nation-wide for a coalition, 2 per
Cabmet Couneil of Ministers, nominated by the Prime Min- cent for a party within a coalition, 4 per ceO{ for an inde-
ister and approved by the President. pendent party; for language minority lists, 20 per cent of the
AdmmistIative subdivisions 15 regions and 5 autonomous votes cast in rhei r constituency. A list obtaining the highest
regions. number of votes among alllists and which fails to win 2 per
cen l of the votes cast is also entitled ro a seat.
Legal system Suffrage Universal, 18 years (25 in senatorial elections).
Civillaw system; judicial review under cenain conditions in
Constitutional Court. Direct democracy
Legislature A consultative referendum can be called by Parliament, and
Bicameral Parliament. an abrogative referendum (with a Quorum of participation of
Lower IJouse Chamber of Deputies (Camera del Deputatl); 50 per cent) can be called by 500,000 citizens or S Regional
630 seats, the winning national coalit ion receiving 54 per Councils. An optional cor'lstitutional referendum has never
cent of them; term of 5 years. been practised.

party system Results of the 2006 legislati ve elections (Ch amber of Deputies):

El cctorate: 47,160,264 100.0%


Voters: 39, 425,98 1 83.6%

Party V;lid vo les % Seats


Oli vc Tree 11 ,928,362 31.2 220
..................
COl11 l11unist Reroundnt ion 2,229,604 5.8 4t
1,
Rose in the :Cilst 99 1,0,t9 2.6 18
.............. . .....
Ital y ofV;lues
Part}' of ltal ian COl11l11l1 ni sts
877, t59 2.3
................. .. ...........
884,9 12 2.3
16
16
I
Fedcration ofthe Grecns 783,9'14 1. 1 15
I
... .. .. ....... ... ... ..... .. .. ...
Pop ula r, (U D EUR) 534,553 1.4 10
SO llth T)'rol can Pcoplc's P:1l'ty 182,703 0.5 4
AUlOnOI11 )' (Va ll e d '\este) 34, 167 0.1
............. .
Oth crs 590,533 1.5 O
.. .. .. .... ... ......
Te!;l] 'The Un ion' t9, 036, 986 49.8 348
(eo/1 I ;'//Ien)
334 Daniele Caramani

COU NTRY PROFILE Italy (continued)

Pa rty Valid votes % Sca ts


Go Ital)' 9,045, 384 23.7 137
N:1tiona l Alli ance 4,706,654 12.3 71
Unio n ofChris lian amI Centre DClllocra ls 2,582,233 6.8 39
....... ........... .......... .......
North crn Lcague 1,749,632 4.6 26

Christia n Dcl11~::.~~~'.-.~.~~~'. ~~~.i~l. i.~~~................. ..... ~.~.~~ ?~~ ~ :~.?


.. .. .
O th el's 626,050 1.6 o
Tota l ' I-IOll SC 01' Frcedom ' 18,995,697 49. 7 28 1
O lhc rs 197,381 0.5
Total 38, 230,064 100.0 630 SOllrce: Ministr)'of
Interior.

The 111 0s 1 lIsed indices are Rae's fr<t cti ona lizatio n lransferable vote S)/S lCI11S in sillgle-l11ember distriCls
ind ex ( Rae 197 1) and the cffective llul11ber of partics (A ustralia, Frail ee, Great Britaill , Hungary, ~ialta.
(Laakso alle! Taagepcra 1979). The fract iol1<1li zati on lhe US ), whcreas Ihe mos! frng mented eoulllries
index ( F) varies fmm O (full concentration 01" sc::!ts lrc those wilh PR and many religious and clhno-
0 1' vo tes in Olle partr) lo I (total fraglllc nt ation wilh linguistie par ti cs (sllch as Belgium , Finland, Ihe
ea eh seat 01' vote going lo a diffcrent parI r) . The Netherla llds, Ncw Zealand, Norway, Switzerland ).
erfecLi ve I1l1 J11bcr of pnrties (E) indicares lhe l1umber
of partics in a sys tcm alld does no l ha ve an uppc r
limil.
Table 13.3 Rae's parliamentary
The t\Vo formu las are -he followi ng:
fractionalization index (F), effeetive number
of parliamentary parties (E), and Gallagher's
r- = 1- pi E = I/ pi
index of disproportionality (LSq)

where p is the perccl1tagc of votes or seats fo r part)' Count r)' Election F E LSq
i and L re prcsents lhe sum for all pa rt ies. The pcr-
ee nlages for all pa rti es are squa red lO we ighl parlies Austral ia 2004 .60 2.4 8.7
............... .............. ....
through their sizc. Ir there a re t\Vo parties A and 13, Austri a 1.6
2002 .65 2.9
reeeiving ca eh 50 per ee n! ofthe seats, Qlle ealculales
fil'st th e sq ua l'c fol' pa n)' A (.50 x .50 = .25) ami Argen tina 2005 .81 5.3 13.5
fol' pal't)' B (.50 x .50 = .25) ond then adel s them
I3clgiull1 2003 .86 7.0 5.9
togetbel' (.25 + .25 = .50) . Thus:
Brazil 2002 .88 8.5 3.7
r- = 1 - .50 = .50 E=I /.5 0=2
(m acla 2006 .69 3.2 8.i
In tbi s example, F is eXJetl)' betwee n O onel 1 (.50)
Chile 2005 .82 5.6 6.8
and E eQ unts perfeetly th<1t there a re two parties o nl }'.
In the rea l wo rl d, the di stribll tion of po\Ve r among Czech Republi e 2006 .68 3.1 6.3
parties is obviollsl)' more complexo
Table 13.3 lisIs lhe effeetive num bcr of parties Finland 2003 .80 4.9 3.5
(bascd 011 seat di srriblltions) in a nU J11ber of eountries
Franee 2002 .55 2.2 12.2
for rece nl cleeliolls.5 As olle can see th crc is a great
va riati on betwccn co unlri es. The Icss fragm cllted (colllill/et!)
cOllntrics are those lIsing plllrality/ majoritarian 0 1"

t
Chapter 13 party systems 335

Qualitative rules
Table 13.3 (continued)
In m an)' cases il is no l appropria tc 1:0 co nsider nu-
Count ry Electio n F E LSq mer ical cri teda onl)' to decide whether or no[ a
pa n )' is rc1eva n\. O ft cn sl1lall panies - tha t qua ll t-
German)' 2005 .75 4.1 3.3
ital ive rul es "'Quid no[ cou nt - ha ve fa r-reach in g
2004 .54 2.2 7.4 co nsequcnccs fo r coa litio ns, inAllcncing impo rtant
Greca
dccisio ns, mob ili zin g people in demonst rations, and
2006 .58 2.4 4.4 so 0 11 . .1n ma ny cases, sm<1 11 partics a re much more
impo rtanl th<ln thcir sheer size ",ould suggest. Sar-
India 2004 .86 7.1 3.9
....... . ... ... to ri ( 1976) ha s clcvclo pcd Iwo criteria-or rules-to
(rd ane! 2002 .70 3.3 6.6 decide whic h parties rea ll )' 'co unt ' a nd should be
................... 'co un t"cd ':
Isra el 2006 .87 7.8 3.2
l. Coalition po tenti a l: a sl11all parly is irrelevant if
IIal)' 2006 .8 1 5.1 3. 5 over a period of tim e it is not necessary for an y
... .... .............
type of govcrtlmenta l coali ti on. On th e co nt rar)', a
Japan 2005 .56 2.3 19.0
par l)' must be co unl ed if, disrega rding its sizc, it is
Malta 2003 .50 2.0 I.S pivota l and de termi nes whether 0 1' nol a coalition
is goi ng lo cx ist and whi ch.
Mexico 2006 .67 3.0 6.4
2. Blackm a il po tent ial : a small pany mu st be CO I1-
ethe rlands 2003 .79 4.8 1.4 sidered rel eva nI when it is able lo cxercise preSSllre
0 11 gove rtlm enl al decision s through threa ts 0 1'
New Zea land 2005 .66 3.0 lA vc to powe r a nd b), doing so alter the direc ti o ll of
11

2005 .7S 2.9 cO l11pctili on .


No nvay 4.6
..................
Paland 2005 .77 4.3 9.8
............... ....... ........ .... . ........ ..... Th e influence of electoral laws on
Port uga l 2005 .6 1 2.6 5.9
the format of party syst ems
Russia 2003 .70 3.4 10.7
Givcn the il11pac t of part)' s)'s tem frag m entat ion on
Spain 2004 .58 2.4 7.3 govc rtl mcnt slabil il-y, accollntabi lily, alld respo ns-
.............. .............. . ................. ive ness, as ",el I as 0 11 th e Iype o f co nse nSllS vs .
Swcdcn 2002 .76 4.2 2.5 majo rit arian decisio n- makin g, a large amount of
.................... .....................
cOlllparat ive pol itics has been concer ned ",ith es t-
Switzcrland 2003 .80 5.0 2.4
o., . ..... .... .... .... ....... ..... .. ... ablishing Ihe causes fOI" vary in g Ilumbers of parties
Turkey 2002 .46 1.9 27.4 and t"heir sizc. T wo seIs of causes have been identi-
"o .................. fi ed : (l) Ihe elecloral s)'slem al1 d (2) th e l1um be r of
United Kingdom 2005 .59 2.5 16.8 deavagcs in Ih e society .
.............
Unit cd St;lIes 2004 .50 2.0 3.9
Electoral systems
Mean ,69 3.9 7.3 Elec torll s)'stcms are mccha ni sms fOI" the tra nsla-
ti on of votes inlo pa rliam enl ary sea ts. Chapler 10
.~Ot's: Foc calclllatiOllS panics rather than "lliances have becn COIl- shows Iha l th ere are Iwo ma in 'fam ilies' of elec to ral
51dtred (Fr-Jncc, Chile, ltaly). Seal figures ah'/:l}'s based 011 final
aUocation. :or mixcd electoral S)'StCIllS, PR votes ha"c becn lakell sys l" cms: ( 1) majo ritarian s)'slcms in slgle-member
(JapJIl, Mcxicn, l-Iu ngary). For Gcrm;llIY ZlI'eilslillJlllell llavc becll CO nSl" iluell cics; (2) PRsystc ll1s in 11l111ti-mc mbercon -
u'\\ and in Franee (irsl-baIlOI fi gures for vales. As a general rul . .
r(lr including panics in Ihe calculmioll, 0111 pa rlic~ polling al Ic1St
stit ll cncics. Thc firsl an d best-know n fonn ul at io n of
I%,or sccuring :11 leasl une seal, ha\'c been lahn nlo accounl . Ihe C:llIsal relalionship bet",cell cJec toral and par!")'
Sut.rn: ,\ulhor's cakulalions bascd on rcsults in 'Colllllry Proflks'
Il.tcalso Ihc Gnline ResollTce Cenlre).
s)'s tCI11S is Du ve rger's Laws (ro m his class ic book Les
Pflrfis Poliriq// e!' ( 195 1, tran slaled in 1954 ). As can
336 Daniele (aramani

11 BOX 13.3 Th e infi uenee of electo ral systems on party systems


I

Duverger's 'Iaws' (1954) Sartori's 'tendeney laws' (1986)

Firsl Law Law 1


'Tll e majority [pl urality[ singleballot system tends to 'Given systemic structuring and cross-constitueney clis-
pa rty dualism'. persion (as joint necessary conditions), pturality systems
cause (are a sufficient condi tian of) a two-party format'o
Second Law
'The second ballot (majority] systen\ or proportional Law2
representatian tend to multipartyism'. 'PR formulas facilit~te rnultipartyism and are, conversely.
hardly conducive to two-partyism'.
MechanicaJ effects
Electoral systems with high thresholds of representatian Cox's 'coordination argument' (1997)
(first'past-the-post) exelude small parties from parl iament
'Why ... would the same two parties necessarily compete
whereas PR al10ws smal! parties to win seats.
in all districts [cross-constituency dispe rsion or national-
PsyclJOlogical effects ization]?' Local cand idates link togethe r because of the
Under plurality systems voters vote strategically avoiding need to coordinate in arder to compete more effectively
smal! parties; parti es llave an incentive to merge to pass for(l) seats to irnplern ent polieies, (2) support presi dential
hi gh tllresllalds af representat ian; und er PR voters vote ea ndidates, (3) eleet th e prime minister, (4) obtain more

sincerely far small parties Wllicll are nat penalized and upper-ti er seats, and (5) obtai n more campaln finances.
have no incentive to merge. ' If a system (1) eleets legislators by plura lity rule in
single-member districts; (2) elects its chief executive by
RaelRiker's 'proposition' (1971, 1982) something like nationwide plurality rule; and (3) hold
'Plurality fa rmulae are always associated with two-party executive and legislative elections concurrently, then it
competition exept wllere strong local minority parties will tend to . .. llave a national two-party or one-party-
exist'. dominant system'.

be seen in Bo:.: 13.3, lhe I\VO la ws are simple: plllrality excludcd (a pan )' with 5 per cent of vales gels rough1r
0 1' majaritarian electoral s}/stems favoll r l",o-pan"}' 5 per cent of seats) and Ihe overall num bcr of parties
s)'stell1s whereas PR leads la mull i-pan)' s)'stems. that end IIp in pa rli alllcnt is mllch hi ghcr th anunder
This causal reJat io nship oelwcel1 elecloral and pa rt-y single-mcmber pluralit-), s)'SI"Cm5.
systcms is due to both ml.:c hani cal an d psychological Psychological effects refer to the awa rcness of
drce ts. vote rs and partics of l11echan ical effects:
Mechani cal effects refer 10 lhe formula used lo
lranslate votes i!llo sea ls. In single- member conslilu - l. On th e de mand side (voters), in electoral systems
encies lo win Ihe one se:tl is diffi cult. One part"}' in wh ich onl )' large parties have a chance LO ""in
wirh the 1110s\ vo tes gels Ihe single s e~ll. The second, seats, voters lend lo vote strategicall y (not ncces-
third, founh , and so 011, do nol gel any seat (nrs l- saril)' the ir first party preference) to avoid wasting
past-the-posl). If in a cOllstituency Par-y A receives vo tes on small parties wilh no chance of gctting
29.4 per cenl of va les, Pan)' B 29. 3 per cenl, and all seat s. Con vc rging votes on large parlics red uces
o lher parlies even less, o nl y Part )' t\ is rep rese nlcd Ih eir overall number. On lhe contrar)'. with PR in
(winner-takes-all) . This Illea ns that Ihe lhreshold is which small parties ca n win seats, volers vote si n-
high <ll1d a1l parties but Ihe first one are e1i minated. ccrel y (their first preference ) beca use their vote
is not w:Js lecl. Th is increases th e vote rol' small
'1 , \o\' ith PR, 011 .. he COI1I1'<11")' , in e;lch l1lulti-lllcmber
p'lIties and thus th eir overall nUl1lber.
constiluency many seats are allocat cd in proportion
to the votes. If Party A receives 32.4 per ce n\" of votes) 2. O" th e sll pply side (parties), wirh p[ ura[ity small
il has i1 right - more 01' lcss-to a third of the scals part ics have an incentive lo merge wilh othcrs
allocated in lhat constilllcnc)'. Small parties are not 10 incrcase th ei r chances to pass the thrcshol d,
Chapter 13 Party systems 337

redu cing lhe number of parties. 011 rhe con- Latin America (Ca ra man i 2004; Ch hibber and Ko lI -
(ra ry, \Vith PR partics have 11 0 incentive lo merge:
they can sllrvivc on their own <l nd small spl illlcr
man 2004 ; ]oncs nnd Mainwarin g 2003 ) du c lo the
development of nnlional parl y orga ni znlio ns 3nd in -
III
parlies are nol pcnalized. This increascs the ovcrall creasing candid nte coo rdi na tio n (Cox 1997). \" here
numbcr of p,lrties. plll ral il)' systcms exist, therefo re, the reduclion ofthe
1111111ber of pnrtics did take pi<lce. Plurali ty syslems
Rae (197 1), Riker ( 1982), and Sano ri ( 1986 ) have
distor! pan )' voles when they translarc Ihcm inlo
qu cstioned thesc la \\ls b)' as king whether the rcdur:t-
seal s:
ve effecl of majoritaria n electoral systems works al"
rhe cOlIsti/llell cy leve! or (/1 lile IWliO/ wllevel. At rhe the), o\Jer-represcl1t largc pnrties ( l h~ share of scats
cons6tucnc}' levcl thc high th rcshold redu ces lhe for big parties is larger lhan thcir share of votes);
num ber of parties. Hut does this ahVa)fS transla le inlo th e}' lII uJer-represent s111a11 parties.
a reduClioll at the nalionallcvcl?
Suppose a parl iamcnl has 100 seats from 100 How Cil n we measlIre the empirica\ level of
single-mcmber consti tucncics. If in each cOllstitu- (dis)proportiontllit), between votes and sea ts? Va ri-
t!nC)' a diffe rent part }' wins the seat, \Ve would cnd OllS indices have been devised: rbe mosl used one
up with a fragmentcd parliamcnl. The question lhus is lhe Least Square index of disproport ionalit)' or
is: under which condil ions docs Ihe redllctivc cITect LSq (Gallagher 199 1; Gallagher nel Mitchcll 2005:
of FPTP at the constitucncy level, <lIso redu ce lhe appendi x B):
number of parlies at lhe national level? The answer LSq = J l f 2 L (v; - s; )'
is: majoritarian S)'SlemS produce two-party syste ms
al the natiol1nllevcl onl}' ifpn rlies are ' nationillizcd ', where l' is he percentage of votes for part)' i, s is
Le. receive hOl11oge neous supporl in all cOl1stilu- Ihe pcrccnlnge or seats for P~HI }' 1) and E represents
eneies (see Cox in Box 13.3) . If rhere are parties the SllI11 for al! pnnics. This index va ries bCI"\\'een O
with territoriall y concentrated support , Ihis lcacls to (full proportionality) and lOO (total disproportion -
fragmentatio n in Ihe nnrional par!}' s)'stcm. Uncler alil y). Take, as an cXlI11 plc) ("he reslIlts 01" Ihe 2005
pluralily, a natio n311 y small pan y can be stron g in New Zealand e1ection in Table 13.4. 1r the total of
specific regions and (hus win seats and crea te fra g- the squared dilTerences is hal ved (3.9/2 = 1.9) and
mentatioll in the natiollal pa rliament. J f many parties then Ihe sqllare roOI is laken, lhe result is l A, that is,
are terrilorinlly concentrated Ihe national fragmcnt- <1 11 almost perfccl proportioJ1nlit y betwecll vo tes and

ation is larger. seats.


An cxample is Ital),. In 19943 !lew, mosll)' plu r- In the Iast column of Table l3.3 values of the LSq
alit)', electora l !aw in singlc- mcmber districts was indcx are givc n. In countries wit h plllralil)' s}/stems
mtroduced wit h the aim of rcducing parry-s)'stel11 (Can nda, Grcal Britnin, India) there is a slrongcr
fragl11 cntation. Vet I"his diel not happen. Ma ny of distortio n of he popular vote. The sa mc lpplies for
the par lies hn vc regional strongholds such ;:s the olher s)'slcms bascd 011 single-member co nstitllen-
Northcrn Leaguc in I"he nonh , the Catholics in Ihe cies such as hnllcc \Virh a t"\Vo- ballot majoritarian
north-east, the Left Delllocrals in the centre, ami the s)'stem. On Ihe cOll trary. disproportionalit"}' is lower 1,
I
post-fa scist pa rt"}' Nal iollal Alli nl1ce in the 50ul"l1. In for coull lri cs wilh PR s)'sl" cms.
additioll, mnn y sl11a ll parties base rheir support on 'fhc Ilum ber of pa rties in parliamclll is alwa ys
local clie nteles. smaller than the llul1lber of parlies that rUll for elec-
In 1110S1 coulltries parl)' s)'stems 11<l lional izcd wilh tions. AII elcclonll s)/slcms- also PR s)'stems- havc
the begi nlling of cOlllpetiti ve elections in lhe miel - a rcductive cffecl on Ihe ll11mber of parties. DifTcr-
nineteenth ccntury, so lhe support pa rties receive is cllces among PR s}'stems are arge. Spain's s)'stem
incrcasingly hOlllogencous across reg ions and Icnit- is more disproportional than others. This is be-
orializcd support has decl ined. This can be observed cause 111 Spain the magnitude of constitucncies
in Eu rope, North America, but also in India and is sl11nll. The magniludc refcrs to lhe nlll11bcr
338 Daniele Caramani

1I Table 13.4 Resu lts of t he 2005 New Zealancl election and Gallagher's L5q index of
disproportionality

Pnrty Vo tes (%) Seats (N) Scats (%) Diffcrcl1cc Squa rcd
(% sea ls-
% votes)

Labour Party 4 1.1 50 41.3 0.2 0.0

N,llional Pan")' 39. 1 48 39.7 0.6 03

Ncw ZeaJan d Firsl 5.7 7 5.8 0.1 0.0

Grccn Party 5.3 6 5.0 -0.3 0.1

Maori Part-y 2. 1 4 3.3 1.2 1.4

Unitcd Future 2. 7 3 2.5 -0.2 0.1

Acr Nc\\' Zealand 1.5 2 1. 7 0.2 0.0

J A's Progressivc 1.2 0.8 -0.4 0. 1

O lh ers 1.3 o 0.0 -1.3 1.7

TOlal 100.0 121 100.0 3.9

NO/e: Votes re(cr 10 party lisIs votes whc rc\.~ seals indudc both p:my Iisl s('als :md clccloral(' seals.

of scats allocated in a give n co nst itucl1cy. The lar- wOllld have excl uded Iarge scgments of the soci-
ger Ihe magni ludc, the highcr (he proportionalit )/ el")' which the n- dangerousl)'- may have looked
belwee n votes and seats. If Ihe magni lude is small, for other (non- instilut iona l) channels of action.
Ihe re\\' sea ls go lo fe\\' parlies ane! are harder for small As a recenl art icle by Colomer (2005 ) argues, PR
parlies la ",in. 50 l11e PR systems artificially nerense electoral s)'stems are the result of an airead)' ex-
Ihe number of seats (th05e llsi ng th e Droap quota iSling political fragl1lenlalion, and not Ihe other
ar lhe Im pe rial i quata) in order to make il easier for wa)' round.
slllall parties to get represen ted. In these s)'stellls lhe Finall)', radical changes in lhe 11l0rpholog)' of
co rres pondence between votes <111(1 sea ts is gre<l ler. 6 pan)' systel1ls due 1'0 new elecloral s)'stems are
rareo Exal1lples are lhe change frol1l l1lajorita rian
to proponional as in New Ze;lland in 1998 (lead-
[, Cleavages ing to an in crease in lhe nUl1lbcr of parties), or
Large numbers of partics are <1150 Ihe result of the other way round in France with lhe 1958
soci:;d and cultu ral pluralism. The presence of nll - new conslitution (leading lo a bipolar ::.tructure).
merOllS cleavages leads to 1110re parties Ihan in When in 1986 PR was reinlroduced for one eJection
culturall)' hOlllogeneolls coulll rics. PR elecloral s)'s- onl )'. sl1lall parties such as Ihe Na tiollal Fron t re-
tems were illtroduced in plural societies lo in - ceived l1lany mo re seats Ihan under rhe majoritarian
corporate minorities in Ihe rcprcsclltat ion circuit system and thus caused a grca ler part)' fragmenta-
and in decision-l1laking processes. Pll1l'~lit )' s}'stems tion.

,. ,.
Chapte r 13 Party systems 339

KEY POINTS

'J TIle morphology oi party systems is important for o Measures of fragmentaton are based on the numo
understanding the competitive interactions between ber and size of part es. However, small parties, too,
parties: it (oncerns the number of players and their can be importanr if they have coalition or blackmail
size. The main types are dominant-party, tVIO-party, potential.
multi-party, and bipolar systems. O Tile format of party systems is influenced by electoral
'J In n'/o-party systems, moderate multi-party sys tem~, systems. Throug~ mech~nical and psycr!')logica ' ef-
and bipolar systems competition is centripetal and fE,tS plurality tends towards two-party systems (large
alternation between parties or coalitions takes place. parties are oveHepresented) and PR to multi-party
In dominant-party systems and polarized multi-party systerns (which are less disproportiona l).
Sysi:ems there is no alternation and competition is
centrifugal.

Th e dynamics of party systems


In the wa ke of Jose "h Sch umpeter 's ( 1943) d en nitio n ma rket and vores in lhe eleclO ral DIl C) . To maxim ize
of democracy-a sel 0 1' rul es for selccli ng political voles parties offe r progra mmcs th at ap peal ro a large
leaders and l11 akin g decisions by mC:JI1S o co mpct- pa r t of th e eleCl ora te.
ition for vo tes-aulhors have developcd analogics Vo lers, likeconsumers, faccal lernatives whie h lhey
between elec toral eo mpetilion and markcI eo mp eti - ardcr fm m mos t to leasl' prcferred and choase rhe
tion. In the elec to ral market, pani cs and ea ndidales alternat ivc that ran ks highes t. Voters make a raliona l
compete for 's hares' of Ih e electoratc as happcns in choice b), vo tin g for pa rti cs whosc progra lll l11 CS are
he eeollomic world wherc fi rms compe te ror shares closcst to th eir pol iey prefcrellces, beca llsc lhey are
ofllle markct. Parl" ies are o rgani zatio lls whose main close 1'0 Iheir inl cres ts 0 1' lo th eir val ues <l lld moral
motive is the /1/ aX;III;Zal ;oll o/ vales, and {"he exe han ge oricnlatio l1s. Vo ters vote 0 11 the basis ofthe proxilll -
between rep rese nted and rep rese nl<1ti ves is similar 1'0 il)' belwee n parties' posit io lls and their prefe rences
tha! between dcmand and supply in the ecol1o m)'
(see Tab le 13.5).
Table 13.5 The analogy between economic
and electoral compet ition
The market ana logy
Di tll cnsions Econom y Elce t iOll S
Anthon)' Dowl1s's AII ECOIIOII/ic Th eory oI Demo -
erae)' (1957) is a pioneering book in whi ch Ihe basic M arket Eco nomi c Elec toral
elements of th ese models were spelled out for rhe Firms Pa rties
first time. It is olle of the most inAucntia l ",orks in Ac to rs
the co mparative pany sys tems literature (sec Further Co nsulllcrs Vo ten;

rcadin g) . In th is 1110del, aetOfs (parti es and voters) Prol"ll MOllq Votes


are n ional. Parti es calcul ate th eir stra tegics br for -
mulating platfor ms ",ilh lhe goal of max imizing votes 5upply Goods, scr- Prog ramm es,
and bei ng eleeted or re-clccted, d isrcga rding paliey vices policies
priorities. Parties are coal itions of indi vidllals seekin g Dcmand Product prcf- Polic)' prefcr-
lO control instit utio ns ralher Ihan th e implcmenl a- erences cnccs
tion of programmes. Part ies ae t self- intereslcdl y to
gain office. Like lirms in th e econom ic markct, thcy COl1llll uni- Adve rtisi ng Ca mpaigns
are ind ifferent l O the 'p rodu ct' Ihe)' offer bul inter- cati an
ested in making profir (mollcta ry in the eeono mic
340 Daniele (aramani
--
<lne! so rhe}' kilo", what t" he ailcrnat ive proposals by lhe sa l11e qlla lity of bread fol' the sal11 c price and that
II different pa rti es are, that is, Ihey are illfo/"lJled abo ut
t hcir possible (hoiees.
co nsul11ers \\I ill rationall y try lo red uce their 'COSls'
by buying bread in the nearest shop (proximity), if A
Raliana! cit izens vote 011 Ihe basis of a self- and B .He located as th e)' are in th e fi gurc, B will have
inlcrcstcd calcula tio n, like co nSlIlllcrs wha calcula te a large r share of Ihe l11arkct. The share of B's ma rket
Ihe bencht bet \\lcc n ' pac ka gcs' . On Ihe other hand, goes fmm rhe righl -sicle end of the stree t to Ihe M-
parlies are likc busincsses co mpcting fOI" cllstorn - pain ! which is th e lllidcllc between th e locations of
ers. Thcy cstablish what peoplc ' li ke' so they c<l n seil A ,!ld B. Reside nls 011 e right of theM -poi nt will
more. Followi ng a logic of 5/1pply nlld rll'IJ/{/ /ui, part es bu y bread in baHr)' Il and residents on the eft of:he
offer policies th a! vo tcrs ca n cilher choosc lo 'b u)!, M-poin! will bu)' b read in bakery 1\ . The d}'llamic
01' no t. Once elC(led, parties scck rc-election thro ugh elemen t in this model consists of A's 1110ve lo incredse
pol icies appea ling lo la rge scgmcn ts of he clccl'or- its share of lhe marke t. By relocating rh e bakery in
ale. The parties' goal is to makc a ' prof-it ' in tcrms of AA, th e baker is i:lblc 10 ga in the share of lhe market
vo tes; the voters' goal is lo ma xim ize I/ti/il)' by buying indicated by the dashed area . Obviously, II too COn
a product tha! in creases th eir satisfaction. As in eco- 1110ve toward the cc ntre (EB) and win back parl of ~he
nOl11ic t"h eo r)', the sea rch for indiv idual advalllages losl share of the market. Both bakers ser k to oplilllizc
produces COIIIIIIO // goorfs, nal11c1 y respo nsivcness and Iheir loclI/ion .
accollntab ility . AI1 addi tional clemem introduced by Smitbies
Ra tional cho ice com petition Illodels were fi rst de- ( 1941') co ncern s the e1asticity of th e demando The
vi sed fol' two -parl)' sys tems- mainl)' Ih e USo How- fllrl her away from lhe grocery, the hi ghe r Ihe '(OSls'
eve r, vote-maxim izi ng srrategies have been observed fol' buye rs. '1'0 \Vhat ex ten t is a rclocation towards
in I11l1lti -part}' s}'slcms, too. To ma ximize va les i5 th e the centre lolcrated b), resi dellts of the extremes?
main motive also in systems in whi ch govc rtlments Ince nt ives for a new bakery at the eclges afrhe vi\lage
are coaliti ons. The more votes, th e better the chances increase as people feeltha t AA and BB are loo dislant.
lo enle r <l coalition, con tro l gove rnmenta l insri tu- The risk of strat egies of rclocations lo",ard the cenlre
ti ons) and place individuals in ke}' offcial positio ns. is th at a nc'" bake ry e ap pea rs taking <lW<ly part of
B's share of the market (the dark shaded area ). In
rh ese l110dels there are rherefore Iwo dynamic ele-
The spati al analogy ments: ( 1) lhe 1110VC l11ent caused b), Ihe search for
T he idea 01' proximil-y/d istallce bctween individ ual the optimallocation and (2) lhe ap pea rance of new
preferc nces and pa rti es' policies indicates Ihal players compelilors in spaccs left un cove red. Equ ilibrillm
move in a spacc of co mpetilioll. The second elcmcl1l is reachcd when no competitor has all intcrest in
th at Downs 'impo n ed ' from ecollomic J1lodels of cha nging ilS positio n along Ihe axis.
competition is Iheir spatial representat io ll. In par-
ticll h\r, Downs aclapt ed moclcls of th e dynamics of Down s's model
compelilioll belweel1 firm s, rh ar is, where firm s loc-
ate premises accordi ng to lhe ph)'sical distribul ion of Through Ihe spatial analogy betwcen physical and
lhe poplllation. ideological spacc, Downs imports th ese anal)'ses
Let liS take Ihe simple case 01' a vi llage in wh ich into electo ral sl udies. Mos t elel11ents . 1re mainlained:
lhere is 0111)' olle strecl (th e exalllple is fro l1l I-Iond- ( 1) the one-dimensionali ty ofthe space, (2) the prin-
ing 1929). O n cach side of Ihe streel there are even ly cipie acco rdi ng to which costs are redu ced by choos-
spacecl hOllses (thc sq llare dots in Figure 13. 1). \"' hat ing thc ncarest option (proxim il)') , (3) competitorS'
are th e d)'l1alllip between lwo cOlllpelitors, 5a)' two search for lhe optimal locario n lhro ugh a (o nver-
I b;keries A and B? I\ssllllli ng lhat both bakers offer gc nce toward l"he cen lre.

M N

A _ AA BB - - B e Fig.13 .1 Hotteling's model (1929)


Chapter 13 Party 5y5tem5 341

Do",ns represen ted Ihe ideological spacc thro llgh parl)' systems' dynamics: 'if we kn ow somcthingaboul
a Oro 100 sca le ra nging from len lo right. As will be Ihe dislribut ion of voters' prcrerenccs. w" can make
seen, one-d imcnsionalily is mainmined, cven ir il is speci fi c predictions abollt how ideologies change in
no l ah.ays a realistic assllmption, beca use it sllmmar- contelH as panies manC ll ver to gain power' ( 1957:
izes other dimensions and is lhe most im portant o ne 11 4). Ifone aSSlIllles a normal (o r 'bel1-s haped') d is-
(in terms of size of p<1rties that define th emsclvcs nc- tribution of lhe electora te wi lh man y voters al lh~
cording to this dilllcnsion ), and beca llse it is presellt cenl re of lhe scale and fewer al Ihe ex lremes (see l)'pe
in all pa rt)' systellls (t hus allowing cOlllparisoIlS). A in Fi gure 13.2), th e prcd ict io n of th e 111 0clel is again
Dolh Hottcling alld SIll: thies had previollsly ap- tht parties will converge toward the c~ntre. 7
pHed spatia llllodels lo politics through ana logies \\li th The first d)/llamic element of these l110dets is Ihat
me ideologica l space and we re ablc to predict that they pred icl lhe conve rgence loward he centre and
parties Icnd to converge towards one another in Ihe the increasing simi larit)' of platfo rms and poliey ac-
effor! to win the middle-of-thc-roa d vo ters, and lO tions. This ccnt ripet al compclitiol1 (Sarto ri 1976) is
present incrcasingly similar programmes and policies. determined by lhe parties' aim to win th e media1/
Oowns "dds one crucial elemenl 10 the models: lhe vo ter (see Box 13.4 ). Examples are the progressive
\'aria ble distriblltiol1 of voters alo ng th e left- right co nverge nce of previollsly rad icalleft-wi ng workcrs'
colltinuuJ11. Vo ters are no l dist ribllted regulad y along parlies towa rd lhe centre to altract modera te vo ters
the scale but concen tral e in particular ideological po- (lhe German Social Democrats in 1959, he French
sitions, namely arollnd rhe centre. For Downs this Socialists in Ihe 1970s, th e le\\' Labou r Pan), lInder
is Ihe crucial explanatory and predicti ve element of Tony Blair, o r th e US Democrat s lInder Bil! Cli nton ).

Type A: Downs's basic model (1957): the bell-shape (or normal) distribution of the
electorate: cemripetal competition

Nu mber of
electors

o 25 50 75 100
A
B

Type B: A llVo-modal distribution of electors: centrifugal cornpetition


1,
INumb" of
electors

o 25 50 75 100 Fig.13.2 Types ofvote r distributions


A ~.---- B (continued)
342 Daniele Caramani

Type C: A skewed distribution of electors: enfranchisement in the nineteenth century


and new parties
11
Number of
electors

o 25 50 75 100

c D .---A
_ .___
.------------ B

Type D: Polymodal distribution in multi-party systems

Number of
electors

o 25 50 75 100
A B C D Fig. 13.2 (continued)

The seco nd d ynamic elcmc nt consists of ce ntri - B. Th is is a cnsc of ideologicnl polarization within a
petal co m petitian arising 110t only beca use of the political systclll (for exa mple, ("he Wcillla r Republic
proxim ity principie, bUI also beca use therc are more and Italy during the ' fi,st republic'). The distribution
votcrs in the cent re. Parties' strategy does Ilor o lll y of the electorate therefore determines {"he directiolJ of
depend on the logic ofthe model (the assumption of competition (centrifu gal or ccntripctal ).
proximity voting) bUI also 011 the empi rical dislr ibu- The third e1emellt of lhe dYllamics of party systems
tio n of the electora te. Thc potential loss of vo lcrs al is thar in the middlc of the left-right ax is voters are
rhe ext remes does no! de rer parties fl"ol11 co nvcrging more flexible rha n al" the extrcmcs wherc (hey are
beca use there are fe\\' vote rs a t the ext remes. Th is i~ firml y eneapsu lated in striet ideologies and/or part)'
the case if the dist ri bu tion ofthe e1ectorn te is dif-
11 01' organizations. 'Available' votcrs (Bartol ini and Mair
fcrcnt, a two- Illoclel distributio n as depicted in typc 1990), loeated in the middle, are less ideologized

BOX 13.4 Th e median voter

The median voter is the voter who divides a distribu- side). Suppose, however, that there are 50 voters on
1 tion of voters placed on a left-right scale into two equal position 100, and the remaining voters distribute regu-
halves. In a distribution from O to 100 in which for larly between positions 49 and 99 (one voter on each
each point the,e is a vote' (incl uding position O), the position). In this case t he median voter is on position 99.
median voter is on position 50 (with 50 voters on each
Chapter 13 ?arty systems 343

have weak parl)' identific<ltions. These vo ters are t\Vo decades of Ihe Iwentieth radicall)' cha nged the
to changc their minds <lnd, Ihereforc, are ve ry shape of the disl ribul'ion of electo rs as rep resented by ! 1I
....1J<aJ'l ng to parties seeki ng lo 'sedu ce' them. the dashed cur\'e, Illaking il more similar to a normal
curve. This !l C\\' distributiol1 ex plai ns lhe emcrgence
of ne", parties C and/o r O of 'cxternal origin' (s uch
,..,"'".", wider application of rational as social democrals and agrarians ).8
Choice models The dream of reform ists (as againsl revolutiona ry
socialists) was thal socialism and the proletarial couId
What are the links of lhese l110dels wirh olher <lspects
ce me to powc r thro ugil vo l ~s (' papel' stones') and
of partics and pa rt)/ systcms? Fouf are particu larl y
the extension of the franchisc rather han throllgh
important as they show the range of their potential
revollltion (real stones!) . For anal )'tica l rvlarx isls the
application .
dcvelopll1ent of the industrial societ)' would natur-
aH)' lead workers 1'0 power through shecr llulllbers.
Party organization
Sin ce, howeve r, llum bers of industrial \Vorkers did
Rational choice 1110dels hel p to interpret the trans- nOI grow- i n faet, Ihey decl ined -socialist parties
(ormation of pa rt ies fmm m<lSS parlies lo 'cat ch-al! fa eed a dilemll1a belweell moving toward the cen lre
parries' (see Chapter 12) . This transfonnalion ca n be lo maximize Ihcir appeal 1'0 the middle classes-thus
~en as the organ izatio nal alld ideo logical adapta tion
relaxi ng the ir progralllllle- and giving up thei r ideo-
10 com petition.
log)' and losing voters from workers (Prze",o rski and
Sprague 1986),
Dealignment
These models also help to in terpret patterns of de- PR and multi-party systems
alignment, that is, {"he loosening of the rclal ionship Uncler FPTP convergence is likcl)/ beca use the threat
between parties and specific segments of the sacieiy of other parties appeari ng at the extremes is lo"" given
(workers for socinl democrats, peasa nts for ngm rians, Ihe high th reshold requ ired lO win a seat. Rather Ihan
middle classes for conscrvativcs and li berals). Ccnt- ncw parties, under these s)'stems, the modcl predicts
ripetal competition and the maximizatiol1 of vo tes iligil nbstclltiOll lCl'els as is the case in the USo Is il
lead parties to make their pmgrammcs and idcolo- di fferent in PR electoral systems'
gies more vague lo at Iract supporl fmm other gm ups. Firsl, multi-pa rly s)'stems OCCll r when PR elecloral
This blurs rh e connection between gro ups ancl pa rties syslems allow a lower thrcshold of rep rcsentation.
and causes a higher propensity to change vote from Second, In ulti -party systems develop ",hen Ihe dis-
one eleclion lo the next. Iribulion of Ihe eleclorale is polymodal, wit h more
than oneor two peaks (type D), With eleetors' distri-
Enfranchisement and democratization bU lions of Ihis t)/pe Ihe dynamics of Ihe co mpetition
In bOlh types A alld B the disl ribuliolls are syl11met- is no! cenlripeta l. PR is no hindrance lo new parties.
rical In type e, on (he contrar)', we have a skewed Exist ing parlies ha ve no incenli ve lO converge to",ard
distribution. The solid curve rep resenls <I n electorale the centre sinee Ihey would lose parl of thcir suppo rt I I

that is skewed l'owa rd the right of the a.x is. I-Ie re lO jneighbouring' parties and beca use the position I
the median voter is around position 65 rather Ihan Ihe)' would be 1l10ving to is already bus)'. It is there-
50, and parties A and B would accord ingl}' con- fore less likcl y than in twa-parl)' systems that parties
verge toward Ihis point. This is a situation Iypical willlook like eaeh other ideologieally,
of reSlricted electorates in lhe nine teenth cenlur}' Downs asslIl11cd t'hat thc idealogical space was
when lower c1asses \Vere excluded fm m the franch ise. fixed and not elaslie, Ihat s, ranged frol11 O lo 100.
A and B wo uld the refore be the typical parties of Observing lllulti-parl)' s)'slems, Sarlori ( 1976) ",as on
the periods of restricted electorat'es, namel)' Liberals the co ntra ry ab le to estab lish tha t ideologica l spaces
and COllserva tives as the parties of ' internal origin' are e1astic, Ihat is, Ihe)' ca n slretch, ",ilh extremes
(Duvcrger 1954 ) of Ihe bourgeoisie <llld ar islocracy. becoming more exlreme and an increasing ideolo-
Enfranchisemenl and democraliza ri on processes in gical dislance betwecn partics. Parties ma )' adoPl lhe
the second half of Ihe ninetecnlh cenlur)' <I nd firsl stra lcg}' of bcco l11i ng 1110re extreme to distingu ish
344 Daniele Caramani

themselves from modera te pa n ies. This leads to not prevent ll1cm from exisli ng ana stretching the
11 the radicalizalion oC pa rties wishing lO maintain a ideo logical space.
distincti ve character. In concl usiol1, lhe cru cial determinant is lhe dis-
In Ita ly between 1989 and 1992 fhe t\Vo main tribu tion of th e cleCloratc. Ir we kno\\' lhe shape
'a nli-system parties' underwcn t processes of ideolo- of rhe curve we can predict lhe behaviour of parti~.
gieal deradiealizalion with the Italian COI11mllnist
J However) to kno", wha l lhe vo ters' distribut ion looks
Pan), drop ping lhe communist ideology and labe!' like is a mattcr of cmpirical in\'cstigat ion- nOI of
alld trallsforming into a modcrn social democraric deducti ve models-namel)' through SUtveys asking
pan)' (as the Gt!nna~l SPD dicL in 1959 al the fam - res?o n"dents to plan' t h e I11 ~e1ves n a icfl-I ight scale
\
ous Bad Godesberg congress), and the Italia n Social (Budge and Farlie 1977; Laver 200 1).
Move ment abandoning it"s fo rmer neo- fascist" ideo- In spite of critiques (see Box 13.5) these model,
log)'. Fo!" both pa rties t" he centripetal move led lO remaill useful. 1n all elector:Jlcs l llu!11bcr ofless ideo_
splinter parl ies which ma intai lled rad ical ideologies logical volers are !"cad )' 10 cha nge lheir vote. This san
(lhe Pan), of COlll munist Refolllldation a!ld lhe fas- available electora te around which competilion turos
eist Tricolo r Fln llle). Bot h are slllaJl but PR did and 011 which these Illodels focus. This clectorate

BOX 13 .5 Critiques to ratio nal choice models

Ass u rnption Critique


Rationalil)' The rclat ionsh ip bctwcen partics "nd volers is dctcrmin cd b)' a Ilumber of
' non ~ rational ' ar 'irrational ' factors: socio-ccOll o mic condil ions, parl )'
idcntin cat ion, political sociali1...1l ion, inOu cncc of Ibe med ia. Emp rical
research shows thnt mos! volen; vot e acco rdil1!;; 10 Ibese (ICIO rS r:lthe( than
ra lional olles (Budgc et (1/.1976).
FulI informali o l1 VOlers are no! full)' informcd abollt the propoSalJ:lrtics pn.'scTlt in Ih cir
platforms and programmcs, and are unablc lo ('v,,[ual c Ihe cXlcnt 10 which
Ihey corrcspond 10 thcir QWIl preferences. Also. do \ot crs kno\\' what heir
prcferences are? Wilh lechnieal isslles Ihis afien proves unlikcl )'.

Vote maximi zat io n Parlies are nOI vale maximizers:


Pa ni es as offiee seekers do not re CJuirc 10 m ax imi se votes bUI lO gel jusI
enough. There is Ihe need lo \\'in bu! !h(' m:lgni ludcof the victo l")' is no!
imponant. Parties 'scek lo maximi ze onl)' IIp lo Ihe point o f subjcct ive
een ai nty of winning' ( Riker 1962 : 33) .
Parlies may jusI seek lo nlluen ce publie polic)' rathcr than ,lim for
offiee. As de $wann noles, ' Iel onsidcralions of pa lie)' are foremosl in
Ihe minds oflhe aelors . .. [T l h e parliam en tar)' game s, in fa cI, aholl!
the delenninatio n of majo r go\'c rnm ent polie)" ( 1973: 88).
Vale ma ximization faces resisla n ees \\1il hin p:mies lo kecp a less 'c)'lliea!'
altil ude and a more coherent ideology. The inOuenec of mil it.IIlIS,
activ islS, :llld ' rank :llld files' should nOI be undcrcslimaled.
ivl l!er and St r0 1l1 ( 1999) find thal o nly hall' of Ihe panics Ihe}' cxalllim' follo\\'
a slraleg)' of vale maximization.

Cne-dimensionalit}, It is nOI realistic thal all parties compele along Ihe lefl- righl d imensiono This
mal' be lrue in t\Vo-pa rl )' S)'StC IllS in w hich Ihe electo ral SySICIll reduces Ihe
variet}' of parties. In multi -party syslem s, howcvcr, the number of d imensions
is hlrger. Several cmpiri cal a nal}'scs show th at Ihe s p:!ee of eompel ili on is in
mos! cases pluri -dim ensional , as genetie Illodcls show.
ehapler 13 party systems 345

composed of opinion voters or 'pockel-book vot- increasing similarity of Iheir programmes. From a
ing', Ihal s, based on private interests, val ucs, and J11clhodological point of view it is difficlllt 10 se parate
opinions, rather Ihan idcntity vo ters 01' 'socio-tropic lhe impact of competition f1'om ot her facrors such
, based on socio-cconom ic and identificati ol1 as (1) Ihe develo pmell l of <1 l<1rgc and homogelleous
-~., v'" o
':H~ct,ors, The modcls described in Ihis section app l}f middle c1ass and Ihe disappearancc of other c1asses,
10 scgments thar are encapsulatcd in stron g idcl1 - namcly lhe "'orking c1ass; (2) the redu ction of social
lifications. For this reason these models app l}/ to the inequ <1l ities and lhe secula ri zation of societ"}' \Vith
ft-rigbt dil11c l1sion along wh ich VOt~TS are aV:lilable rhe disa ppearance of rcl igiolls co n~i c ls; (3) the ill-
rJther than other dimensiol1s (ethnic, li:lgUlstic, reli - tegratiol1 of societies and the disappearance of ethl'ic
giOllS) along which identities are stronger and voters and li ngllistic pa rlicula rities throllgh nat ionalization
kss available (Sa nori 1976) , Even ir these models and global izntion. In this respccl the elasticit)' of the
apply 10 pa rls of Ihe eleclorale on ly, they are crucial space is central. The space of competition seems to
as they determine the direction of com petition. 9 have beco me smaller wit h ex tremes falli ng a\va}'. Is
A more funda mental question, howeve r, is how Ihe conve!"gence of parlies a resu lt of lh is evollltion
to interpret lhe convergcnce of parries and the ralhcr Ihan a prodllct of competition?

KEY POINTS

:J In the electoral market parties (the supply side) left-right axis. Depending on the distribution of the
present programmes and platforms te appeal to a electorate along tl1e scale, parties move to a position
large number of voters whose vote is determined where the support in votes is largest.
by the proximity of their preferenees (the demand O The prediction of competition models i5 tl1at parties
side) with the parties' offer. Voters are assumed te converge toward the centre of the left-right axis as '1
be rational, that is, informed about alternative party the optimal location, as the point whe re most votes
proposals and able ro chose the alternative elosest to concentra te, and as the point where voters are less
their top preferences. rigidly ideologized.
;: The dynamics of party systems is determined by
parties' search for the optimal location on the

Conclusion
Understanding part)' systems requires the combin- laws bcing the mos1" important ones-i nfluc ncing
alon of -he va ri olls perspectives presented in this lhe l111mber and size of players.
(hapter. ' 2. 130th dcscriptive and expla natory rescarch are
needed. The ultimate goa l of research is 1"0 ac-
1. The macro-sociological ap proach must be COI11- co unl for lhe shape and dy namic of part-y s}'stems.
bined wit h institutional and actor-orien lcd Illod - Ho\Vcver, befare searching for causes, pan")' sys-
els. They compl cmcnr each orh e!" and are not tc ms should be desc ri bed careflllly. As seen with
mutually excl usive. VI/e C<1111101 11 l1derstand pa n )' coun ting parties, this is often more compl icated
systcms wil houl rcfercnce to the socia l c1eavages Iha n appears at (irst sight.
frOl11 whic h parties have emerged. Howevcr, we 3. Finall y, \Ve ca nnot undcrstand party s}'stems in
must also takc nto accOlln t parties' capacily to act isolat ioll. VVe need co mpa rison to asscss whether
indepcndenlly fmm social cond itions-in ract, lo al' not they are fragmell tcd al' unstablc, as well as a
shapo the rn - lhrough ideology and polie)', Thc long-term perspective rather than a myopic focus
motivations of parties are not enti rely determ ined on just the most recent c1eclions. Th is is the only
by their origins. Panies' strategies, in turn, must wa}' of assessing how exceptional a given party
takc into account the rules of the gamc-elcctoral s)'stem or a give n cha ngc really is.
346 Daniele Caramani

Questions

1. What are the National and the Industrial Revolutions?


2. What are Stein Rokkan's four main social cleavages and which pa"ty families emerged from them?
3. How should rhe number of parties na system be counted?
4. What are the cnaracteristic featu res of a two-party system?
5. What does 'effective number of parries' mean?
6. What is the 2ffec.t of ele:ctoral systems on lile shape of party systems?
1,
I 7.
8.
What does ir mean that parties are 'vote-maximizers'?
Describe centripetal and centrifugal party competirian in Downs's mod el.
9. Are voters really rational?
10. Can the space 01 competition be reduced to one left-right dimension?

Further reading

Classical texts on party systems


Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democrocy (New York: Harper Collins).
Duverger, Maurice (1954) Po/itieal Porties (New York: Wi ley).
Lipset, Seymour M., and Rokkan, Stein (1967) 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An
Introduction', in Lipset and Rokkan (eds), Porly Syslems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press), 1-64.
Sartori, Giovanni (1976) Porties aoc/ Porly Systems: A Fromework for Anolysis (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
For a more extended bibli ography see lile works (ited throughout in this chapter.
In addition, up-to-date reports on party systems can be found in journals. Detailed country-bY-CQuntry
developments from 1991 onwards are reponed in the Political Data Yearbook, an annual supplement ofthe
European Joumal of Political Research . Students rnay al 50 find useful material in journals such as the American
Political Sence Review, British Joumal of Politica! Science, Comparative POlities. Compararive Polirical Studies
ElectoralStudies. party Politics, and Wesl European Po/ities.

Web links

www.electionresources.org
Manuel lvarez-Rivera's Election Resources in the Internet.
www.psr.keele.ac.uk
Richard Kimber's website on Political Science Resources (University of Keele).
www.parties-and-elections.de
Database of Parties and Elections about parliamentary elections, parties, and politicalleaders in Europ ~
www.electionworld.org
Website includes information on poltical parties around the world with up-to-date election results and
other information on the party system and the main institutions.
Chapter 13 Party sys:ems 347

I'Iww.gksoft.com/govtlen/parties.html
Webpage of Government on the WWW devoted to political parties and party syslems around the world The
majn page neludes additional informarion on heads of state. parliaments, e>.ecutives. courts, and other
institutions.
www.epicproject.org
Website of the EP1C Projecl on election process information collectioll which neludes al50 nforrnaran on
parties and party systems.
I'fl'fw.georgetown.edu/pdba
WcbsitE: of rhe Poltical DatalJas; of rhe ...\mericas including inforl1ation on pa:ties and paty systems.
http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij
Website ofthe Lijphart Election Archive witl1 information on party systems, electoral systems, and re~ent
~1'2cti on resulls around the world.

www.c ia.gov/cialpublicabons/factbook
l,-',1ebsite ofClA's the World Factbook with information on institutions, social structures, economic data, and
party systems for most countries of the world.
wW'N.idea.int
Website of [he Internationallnstitute fo r Democracy and Electoral Assi stance (IDEA).
www2.essex.ae.uklelectldatabase/aboutProject.asp
Website ofthe proj ect on Poli tical Tran sformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe
(University of Essex).
\-vww.eiu.com
Country Reports and Country Profiles published by the Economist Intelligence Unit are very useful far an
overview and recent data.

Visit the Online Resouree Centre that aceompanies t hi s book for more information:
www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uklore/caramanil

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