A CADEMICUS REVIEW CENTER

Dean Ferdinand A. Tan

POLITICAL LAW CASES (2012-2016)

J. BERSAMIN

Nelson Lai vs. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 17599, July 1, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before
his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the
judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due
process.
FACTS:
The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the assailed decision
promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA). The conviction had been handed down
by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC). The
accused alleging that he was deprived of due process when this case was decided by the Honorable
Presiding Judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench.

ISSUE: Whether Lai was denied of due process because of the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba?

RULING: Yes.
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any accused.
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before
his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the
judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due
process.

The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, it has been held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just.

In support to this, Section 1 of Rule 137 contemplates two kinds of self-disqualification. The first
paragraph enumerates the instances when the judge is prohibited and disqualified from sitting on and
deciding a case. The prohibition is compulsory simply because the judge is conclusively presumed to
be incapable of impartiality. The second paragraph speaks of voluntary inhibition; whether or not the
judge can sit in and try the case is left to his discretion, depending on the existence of just and valid
reasons not included in the first paragraph, but in exercising the discretion, he must rely only on his
conscience. In relation to this, Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the

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Philippine Judiciary, which pertinently demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously
served as a lawyer of any of the parties.

As such, the mere appearance of his name as the public prosecutor in the records of the case
sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the
State in the prosecution of the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the
trial judge who would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself from being
the trial judge in the case.

Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his
appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner
did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation
whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge.

Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be
expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the
petitioner. His non-disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the
accused.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Veronica Nable

G.R. No. 176692, June 27, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
Section 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution has mandated the implementation of an agrarian reform
program for the distribution of agricultural lands to landless farmers subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowners
FACTS:
Veronica Atega Nable (Nable) was the sole owner of a landholding consisting of three
contiguous agricultural lots situated in Barangay Taligaman, Butuan City and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-5 whose total area aggregated to 129.4615 hectares. She had
inherited the landholding from her late parents, Spouses Pedro C. Atega and Adela M. Atega. In 1993,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired a portion of the landholding with
an area of 127.3365 hectares pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, or CARL). LBP valued the affected landholding at only 5,125,036.05, but Nable
rejected the valuation. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the
valuation of LBP. Nable instituted against DAR and LBP a petition for the judicial determination of
just compensation in the RTC in Butuan City, praying that the affected landholding and its
improvements be valued at 350,000.00/hectare, for an aggregate valuation of 44,567,775.00.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the determination of just compensation to a board of
commissioners, who recommends 57,660,058.00 as the just compensation for Nable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of just compensation was proper

RULING: Yes
The CA and the RTC did not disregard Section 17, Republic Act No. 6657, and DAR AO No. 5,
Series of 1998
Section 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution has mandated the implementation of an agrarian
reform program for the distribution of agricultural lands to landless farmers subject to the payment of
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just compensation to the landowners. The Congress has later enacted Republic Act No. 6657 to
implement the constitutional mandate. The Congress has thereby required that any determination of
just compensation should consider the following factors, namely: (a) the cost of the acquisition of the
land; (b) the current value of like properties; (c) the nature, actual use and income of the land; (d) the
sworn valuation by the owner; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government
assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed to the property by the farmers and
farmworkers and by the Government; and (h) the fact of the non-payment of any taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the land.
We cannot fail to note that the computation by the CA closely conformed to the factors listed
in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, especially the factors of the actual use and income of the
affected landholding. The Court has consistently ruled that the ascertainment of just compensation by
the RTC as SAC on the basis of the landholdings nature, location, market value, assessors value, and
the volume and value of the produce is valid and accords with Section 17, supra. The Court has
likewise ruled that in appraising just compensation the courts must consider, in addition, all the facts
regarding the condition of the landholding and its surroundings, as well as the improvements and the
capabilities of the landholding. Thus, we sustain the computation.

Farming Experience and Rule of Thumb Method of Conversion are relevant to the statutory
factors for determining just compensation
The Court finds nothing objectionable or irregular in the use by the RTC of the assailed
the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion tests. Such tests are not inconsistent or
incompatible with the factors listed in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as the aforequoted
elucidation of the RTC shows. Although Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 has not explicitly
mentioned the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion as methods in the
determination of just compensation, LBP cannot deny that such methods were directly relevant to the
factors listed in Section 17, particularly those on the nature, actual use and income of the landholding.

People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert Reyes Wagas

G. R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the
elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the
Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.
FACTS:
Wagas was charged with estafa. At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray
as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of
rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the
order by postdated check, but because of Wagas assurance that he would not disappoint them and that
he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented
and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time
received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash
and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank,
but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter,

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and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands,
Wagas did not pay him.
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they
transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Caada, the
brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. Wagas himself
testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Caada, his brother-in-law, not to
Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained
that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Caadas property that he wanted to buy, but
when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.

ISSUE: Did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the
crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?

RULING:
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the
check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to
whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
issuance of the check by the offender. The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check
is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima
facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated
check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment
because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard,
the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded
Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see
and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he
had talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made
payable to cash. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used
the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the
mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been
Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit
probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove,
and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock
for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of
the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of
the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its
evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up
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may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to
demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being
presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of
the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake
cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the
identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accuseds constitutional right of
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal, even though his innocence may be doubted.

People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-
finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman if the aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and
oppressive delay in the disposition of any case.
FACTS:
Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the
House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking
government official whom he then called the 2 Million Dollar Man. In reaction, the Office of the
President directed the Presidential AntiGraft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the
expos of Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark
Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez inviting them
to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the expos. On November 18,
2002, Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGCs invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez
was the government official who ha[d] knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his
expose. In his own letter of November 18, 2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the Million-
Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Villaramas privilege speech. On November 25, 2002, Cong. Jimenez
delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong. Villaramas expos,
and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in February 2001.
On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents
relevant to the expos.6 On November 26, 2002, Ombudsman Marcelo formally requested Cong.
Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his expos.7 Cong. Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002
by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint-affidavit of
Jimenez for the criminal case in which the respondents were Secretary Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and
Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for the administrative case involving only
Secretary Perez as respondent was redocketed.
The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People v. Hernando Benito Perez, et. al., and was
raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. Perezes moved to quash the information, which
was denied. Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for reconsideration. The State moved
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for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information. During the pendency of the States
motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division
of the Sandiganbayan. The Third Division denied the Ombudsmans motion for reconsideration.
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via petition for certiorari the resolution
of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008 quashing the information in Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the States motion for
reconsideration

The information charging robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, Revised Penal Code
was raffled to the Second Division (Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266). Escaler filed a motion to
quash ex abundanti ad cautelam, alleging that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Perezes
filed their own motion to quash the information. Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
respective motions to quash of respondents. Second Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the
motions for reconsideration, quashed the information charging respondents with robbery, and
dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM0266.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General, not the Office of the Ombudsman,
that had the authority to file the petitions to assail the Sandiganbayan resolutions
Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063, resorted to the wrong
remedy in assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the criminal charges against the
respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of petitions for review on certiorari.

RULING:
The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.
That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule,79 but the rule admits the
exception concerning all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986. More specifically, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 authorizes the exception.

Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 188165: The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the restrictive meaning of the term
transaction as used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 adopted in Soriano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan.
Jurisprudence did not overturn the interpretation made in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used
in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not
decisive in those cases. On the contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v. People, promulgated in
2007, the Court reiterated the restrictive interpretation given in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation between bribery
under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 by holding
that the latter is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the
public officer has the authority to intervene under the law.

G.R. No. 189063: The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that
there had been an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266

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The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution. The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. While the concept of speedy disposition is
relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the
right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of
time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the
respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted
under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents right under the
Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled
that a delay of almost three years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his
case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the
accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that political motivations had
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; (b) the Tanodbayan had
blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary
investigation; and (c) the simple factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a
greater reason for us to hold so in the respondents case. To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to
prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the
State miserably failed.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all
cases pending before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be
defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents right to the speedy
disposition of their cases had been violated.

Maria Carolina Araullo et al vs. Benigno Simeon Aquino III et al

G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency
must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, in a privilege speech delivered by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered in
the Senate of the Philippines he divulged that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an
additional P50 Million each as incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona. According to Secretary Jinggoy Estrada the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. He said that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each,
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. As an answer to Sen. Estrada's revelation, Secretary Florencio

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Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending
Acceleration Program explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, a program designed by the Department of Budget and
Management to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. DBM Secretary said that such
releases were made as their response to the letters of request for funding given by the Senators; and
that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made. According to the DBM
Secretary, DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements
had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
This revelation prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. They contended that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.DBM Secretary refuted her statement and argued that the
DAP is based on certain laws particularly the General Appropriations Act (GAA) (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively). DBM Secretary also explained that when he assumed
office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government
spending a significant focus of his Administration. Such focus unfortunately decelerated government
project implementation and payment schedules even if it resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5%
in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to July of 2011. Based on the observations of the
World Bank, the Philippines' economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be
weakened should the Government continue with its under spending and fail to address the large
deficiencies in infrastructure.
The DBM Secretary contended that the DAP was to be implemented and funded by declaring
savings coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated
allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3)
applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing P APs or to support other priority
PAPs. The Government, by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of
ensuring profitability for prospective investors. The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this
reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy and infrastructure development; (2)
beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into disbursements.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). 2. Whether
or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. 3. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative
Fact is applicable.

RULING:
There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an
appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so
long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public
fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent
not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the
Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies. Nonetheless, this
modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate
GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116
DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual
determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.
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In the decision, the Court has held that the requirement under the relevant GAAs should be construed
in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were denominated as standby
appropriations. Hence, revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise,
we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. We have even cautioned that the release of
unprogrammed funds based on the respondents position could be unsound fiscal management for
disregarding the budget plan and fostering budget deficits, contrary to the Governments surplus
budget policy. There must be consistent monitoring as a component of the budget accountability phase
of every agencys performance in terms of the agencys budget utilization as provided in Book VI,
Chapter 6, Section 51 and Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to the foregoing,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Commission on Audit (COA) require
agencies under various joint circulars to submit budget and financial accountability reports (BFAR) on
a regular basis, one of which is the Quarterly Report of Income or Quarterly Report of Revenue and
Other Receipts. On the other hand, as Justice Carpio points out in his Separate Opinion, the
Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) sets quarterly revenue targets for a specific
fiscal year. Since information on both actual revenue collections and targets are made available every
quarter, or at such time as the DBM may prescribe, actual revenue surplus may be determined
accordingly and releases from the unprogrammed fund may take place even prior to the end of the
fiscal year.
The authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers, further enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary
because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act in the
interest of the public as required by law. However, the presumption may be disputed.
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its
effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the
operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the
P144.378 Billions58 worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the
DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the
invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such
DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.

Raul Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
FACTS:
VECO was a public utility corporation engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within
Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreo was one of VECOs customers. VECO employed respondents Engr.
Constantino and Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC) inspectors. Respondent Sgt. Balicha, who
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belonged to the 341st Constabulary Company accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during
their inspection of the households of its customers pursuant to a mission order issued to him.
On that day, the Violation of Contracts Team conducted a routine inspection of the houses for
illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter
installations, including that of Sesbreo. After Sesbreos maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the
electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo
and one of the maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time,
plaintiffappellant Sesbreo was in his office and no one called to inform him of the inspection.
However, according to Sesbreo there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team
did in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was affected without his
permission and over the objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their way into his
house. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the
VOC Team when they searched the house. Hence, he filed a complaint for damages which was denied
by the RTC. Upon appeal, he CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sesbreo is entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights.

RULING: NO
Sesbreo insists, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing
the right of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. He states that a violation of
this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable to him for damages by virtue of
Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint
against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. In People vs. Marti, the court held
that if the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Balichas presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent
of the State within the ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by
virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its routine inspection.
Clearly, Sesbreo did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of
abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The law
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights that in the exercise of the rights, the standards
under Article 19 must be observed. Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise
should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith.
There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Sesbreo asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his
residence in his absence; that the members of the VOC team had intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreo is improper for consideration in this appeal. The RTC and the CA
unanimously found the testimonies of Sesbreos witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on
material points. Considering that such findings related to the credibility of the witnesses and their
10
testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a trier of facts, and is not
also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Only when Sesbreo could make a clear
showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and records by the trial and the appellate courts
should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Alas,
that showing was not made here.

Dennis Funa vs. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto Agra

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Complementing the prohibition is
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official
from holding any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
FACTS:
President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following
the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in
a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agras concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.

ISSUE: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

RULING: Yes
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII,
supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold
any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an
acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the
11
Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of
his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-
owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means
to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in
the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to
open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of
officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in
the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as
officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled
corporations.
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions against the holding of
multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio
capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials offices. It is
equally remarkable, therefore, that Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an
ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two
positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. Being included
in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the
broad exceptions provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the Constitution (Unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position) to justify his designation as
Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice
versa.
Agras concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not
come within the definition of an ex officio capacity. The magnitude of the scope of work of the
Solicitor General, if added to the equally demanding tasks of the Secretary of Justice, is obviously too
much for any one official to bear. Apart from the sure peril of political pressure, the concurrent
holding of the two positions, even if they are not entirely incompatible, may affect sound government
operations and the proper performance of duties. Assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General,
was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely
vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered
by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject
to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision.
The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary
functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are
such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an
incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agras designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to
be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.

Atty. Ma. Rosario Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines
12
G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
A reorganization undertaken pursuant to a specific statutory authority by the Board of Directors of a
government-owned and government-controlled corporation is valid.
FACTS:
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494. Republic Act No.
8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior
Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services
Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP. In 2002, TIDCORP President Joel C. Valdes sought an opinion
from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) relative to TIDCORPs authority to
undertake a reorganization under the law. On the basis of OGCC Opinion No. 221, the Board of
Directors passed Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002, on October 22, 2002 to approve a so-called
Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and
staffing pattern. Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No.
1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed
from her position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to which she had been previously assigned
during the reorganization of July 1998.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who
had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP

RULING: No
The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the
landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior. The doctrine of qualified political agency
essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the
President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This
doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive
organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the
President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has
been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to
personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office. But the doctrine of qualified
political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some
of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of
Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494,24 the five
ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other
members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from
the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a term of not
more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-
Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio,
or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
13
constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as
the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates
an enormous amount of power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly
inferred.
We uphold the 2002 reorganization and declare it valid for being done in accordance with the
exclusive and final authority expressly granted under Republic Act No. 8494, further amending
Presidential Decree No. 1080, the law creating TIDCORP itself. We reiterate that we cannot disturb
but must respect the ruling of the CSC that deals with specific cases coming within its area of
technical knowledge and expertise, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part.

Mayor Emmanuel Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official
ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3)
of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled
out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for
the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in RTC alleging that there were irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and,
based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to
the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal,
and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division,
without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of
the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of
the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. The First
Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process in using printout of ballot images
without notice

RULING: Yes
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
the Court held that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as
defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent
of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in
an electoral protest. That the two documentsthe official ballot and its picture image are
considered original documents simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In
short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.

14
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to
quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings
had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of
the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised. All the foregoing rules
on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to
only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots
and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a
good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be conducted.
It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties
are allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising
their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount
Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become unreliable,
the parties are immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising
original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the
First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a formal
notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not
even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images.
The parties were formally notified that the First Division had found that the ballots had been tampered
only when they received the resolution of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division nullified the
decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the
First Division to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the finding of ballot box
tampering, and did not also particularize how and why the First Division was concluding that the
integrity of the ballots had been compromised. All that the First Division declared as justification was
a simple generalization of the same being apparent from the allegations of ballot and ballot box
tampering and upon inspection of the ballot boxes.
The disregard of Maliksis right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the
ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by
the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be
exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First
Division, while Maliksis claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Divisions
recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First
Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was
deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount
through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to
assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision and recount proceedings would
not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by
their participation would the COMELECs proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The parties
presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed, including the required
authentication and certification that the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the
COMELEC was less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing
of the picture images of the ballots and the recount proceedings.
15
Elsie Causing vs. Commission on Elections and Hernan Biron Sr.
G.R. No. 199139, September 09, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and
detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement from one government
agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government
agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment; while detail as defined in
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without
the issuance of an appointment.
FACTS:
On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010, detailing her at
the Office of the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of the said order. On the same date, Mayor
Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio, another municipal employee, to
the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010, and
Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010, directing her to report to the Office of the Mayor effective
immediately upon receipt of said order.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the Office
of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 issued
by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the
election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section
1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of
2009.
On March 1, 2011, Atty. Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of
the complaint-affidavit. On September 9, 2011, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
recommendation of PES Doronilla. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal Mayor during the election
period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constituted a prohibited
act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the Commission on Elections.

RULING: NO
Procedural Issue: Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition
for certiorari

Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before coming to
the Court. Causing submits, however, that she was not required to file the motion for reconsideration
because the only recourse of an aggrieved party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of
the petition for certiorari under either Rule 64 or Rule 65. The well-established rule is that the motion
for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has
laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a
16
motion for reconsideration. A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the
foregoing exceptions was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for
reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.

Substantive Issues: Mayor Birons acts did not violate the Omnibus Election Code
and the COMELEC Resolution

E.O. Case No. 10-131 was founded on Mayor Birons alleged violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
8737, Series of 2009, in relation to Section 261(g), (h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and
detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement from one government
agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government
agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment; while detail as defined in
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without
the issuance of an appointment. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either
a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor some little steps away.
We cannot accept the petitioners argument, therefore, that the phrase any transfer or detail
whatsoever encompassed any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement, including the mere
change in office location.
Moreover, Causings too-literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the
provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an
election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every
reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused. In short, no act can be pronounced
criminal unless it is clearly made so by statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla poena,
sine lege).
Equally material is that Mayor Birons act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in his
power of supervision and control over the officials and employees serving in his local government
unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and functions. Verily, she thereafter
continued to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil
Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor Birons crystal clear intention to replace and transfer her
during the election period. As the COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not receive the order, and
Causing remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted.
Without the actual appointment of Belonio as the Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted
to criminally charge Mayor Biron of violating Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case, Causing initiated an
administrative case in the Civil Service Commission to challenge her reassignment pursuant to the
same office orders. In that administrative case, she referred to the personnel movement not as
a transfer or detail, but as a reassignment that constituted her constructive dismissal. On August 13,
2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City ruled that although Mayor Biron used
the word detail in referring to the personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually
took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment. Considering that reassignment was not

17
prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code, there was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor
Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

Arsenio Agustin vs. Commission on Elections and Salvador Pillos

G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a public office in the Philippines.
FACTS:
Petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). On October 5, 2012, he
filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections. As the official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be
elected to; that he was a natural born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty
candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in
his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite
having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte

RULING:
We note that the petitioners citizenship came to the fore because he himself asserted his Philippine
citizenship in his answer to Pillos petition to cancel his CoC in order to bolster his allegation of
compliance with the oneyear residency requirement. As such, he could not credibly complain about
being denied due process, especially considering that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos
motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that the observance of due process in administrative
proceedings does not always require or involve a trialtype proceeding, for the demand of due process
is also met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself.
Also, due process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. The rule is the same in election cases.

A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a persons declaration of his intention to run for public
office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume. The
valid CoC renders the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two
remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is
by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code involves a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but
also that such he made a material representation in the CoC that was false. The Court has stressed in
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), that in addition to materiality there must be
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate
ineligible.
18
The petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA
citizenship, he reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, the date he
filed his CoC he was, therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run for public
office. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make
therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

We uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be
voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6,
2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled
abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued
using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his
Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on
October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the
four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. The petitioners continued exercise of his rights
as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship
reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected
to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Valentino Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson

G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the
enjoyment by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a genuine and
meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the National Legislature has devolved the three great
inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political subdivision is thereby vested with such
powers subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). On July 29,
1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban
(Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon.
Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer,
Hon. Renato V. Osmea, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations
Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being
in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the
City of Cebu

RULING: Yes
Tests for a valid ordinance

19
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly: The tests of a
valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. As
jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted
within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements
of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of
Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the States great powers,
namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was
fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the
exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision
of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations. In particular, police power is
regarded as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs. It is unquestionably the power vested in the legislature by the constitution,
to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. The foregoing
delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the
problem of traffic congestions associated with development and progress because they were directly
familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best
position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their
communities. With the broad latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic
regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and
statutory safeguards.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty
of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Even
under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. To us, the
terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to
include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which
were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure a smooth flow of
vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times (Section 1).
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner
whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP
personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest
20
directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and
Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belcia officials named in the
ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the
stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not
diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the
immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or
vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that
situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic
citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the
transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of
the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the
immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the
smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Samson de Leon

G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
A public official is guilty of grave misconduct when he neglects to act upon a complaint about a
violation of the law he is enforcing. He may be suspended or dismissed from office for his first offense.
FACTS:
Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras, Rizal, Graft
Investigation Officer Dante D. Tomilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission order. Tornilla filed his report to
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, through Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and
Director Agapito B. Rosales, confirming the illegal quarrying. Tornilla recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted against Baras Municipal Mayor Roberto Ferrera, Baras
Municipal Planning and Coordinator Jonathan Llagas, and property owner Venancio Javier for the
probable violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
and that administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil Service Rules be also undertaken. DILG
Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G. Falcis II sought the inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) of Rizal. After the preliminary investigation, Graft
Investigation Officer II Edgardo V. Geraldez of the FFIB, Office of the Ombudsman, issued a
decision dismissing the complaint against all the respondents for lack of substantial evidence. The
case was then referred to Atty. Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a memorandum, duly
approved by the Ombudsman, finding De Leon liable for gross neglect of duty. CA promulgated its
assailed decision and held that petitioner SAMSON DE LEON is penalized with 3 months suspendion
without pay for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in modifying the findings and reducing the
penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING: Yes
An examination of the records persuasively shows that the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held
De Leon guilty of gross neglect of duty, a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first
offense. A PENRO, who is appointed by the Secretary of the DENR, has the responsibility to
21
implement DENR policies, programs and projects in the province of his assignment. De Leon was
appointed as the PENRO of Rizal and concurrently the Chairman of the PMRB of Rizal. Based on the
Civil Service Position Description Form, De Leon as the PENRO of Rizal was the highest executive
officer of the DENR at the provincial level. He had the authority to coordinate all the DENR agencies
within his jurisdiction, including the PMRB. In his concurrent positions as the PENRO and Chairman
of the PMRB, therefore, his paramount function was to ensure that the laws enforced by the DENR as
well as the rules and regulations promulgated by the DENR in implementation of such laws were
complied with and effectively implemented and enforced. Verily, he was the primary implementor
and enforcer within his area of responsibility of all the laws and administrative orders concerning the
environment, and because of such character of his concurrent offices should have made sure that he
efficiently and effectively discharged his functions and responsibilities.
In the matter that is now before us, De Leon evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively
discharge his functions and responsibilities. Except for issuing the investigation order and for denying
having granted any permit to quarry, he did nothing affirmative to put a stop to the illegal quarrying
complained of, or to do any other action that was entirely within his power to do as the PENRO that
the complaint demanded to be done.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of
a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach
of duty is flagrant and palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee
or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Conformably with these concepts, De Leon, given his rank and level of responsibility, was guilty of
gross neglect in not performing the act expected of him as the PENRO under the circumstances
obtaining. He was precisely assigned to perform tasks that imposed on him the obligation to do
everything reasonably necessarily and permissible under the law in order to achieve the objectives of
environmental protection.
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory, we hereby
hold that the decision is immediately executory, and that an appeal does not stop the decision from
being executory.

Brenda Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology , Regional Office
No. IX vs. Hon. Reynaldo Villar, Hon. Juanito Espino Jr. (CHR Commissioners) and Dir. Khem
Inok
G .R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. A
violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of
the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.
FACTS:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for human
resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary
reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology
mastery. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits (Magna
22
Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST. Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds
for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439. The DOST Regional Office No. IX in
Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees
commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA.
Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas, several
NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The disallowance by the
COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President
(OP) through his Memorandum for the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved
the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. Petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of
the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.

ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing their report?

RULING: No
The authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of
appropriation from the agencys savings would be validly effected. The first required that there must
be savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The second demanded that there must be
an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the
savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule.
Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or
provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOSTs savings in
other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted
GAA for 2001.
The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the
power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been
intended by law. The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings especially
when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse
of discretion.

Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari
brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must
show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole
office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the
COA gravely abused its discretion.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was a
firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits. Evincing their good faith even after receiving the NDs
from the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the OP for the authorization to use
the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials and
23
employees received the benefits because they considered themselves rightfully deserving of the
benefits under the long-awaited law. The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits
received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government.

Marichu Ejera vs. Beau Merto and Erwin Vergara

G.R. No. 163109, January 22, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. It is true
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule, but recognizes
exceptions; however, the exceptions did not cover the petitioners case. The rule is that judicial
intervention should only be availed of after all administrative remedies had been exhausted.
FACTS:
The petitioner held the position of Agricultural Center Chief I in the Office of the Provincial
Agriculturist in Negros Oriental. Upon the retirement of the Supervising Agriculturist, she applied for
that position, but one Daisy Kirit was eventually appointed. She filed a protest against the
appointment of Kirit before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office in in Cebu City but that
said office dismissed her protest. Meanwhile, respondent Provincial Agriculturist Beau Henry L.
Merto issued Office Order No. 008 (Amending Office Order No. 008, Series of 2000, Re:
Assignment/Re-assignment of BADC Area Coordinators and Development Team Members).
The petitioner was one of the personnel re-assigned under Office Order No. 008. When she
refused to obey the office order, Merto ordered her to explain in writing within 72 hours why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against her. After she did not submit her
explanation, Merto summoned her to a conference. She and her counsel, Atty. Lenin R. Victoriano,
attended the conference, but later on walked out allegedly because Vergara refused to record her
objections to the questions she was being asked to answer.

The petitioner filed in the RTC her complaint for final injunction with temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, and damages, averring that Merto had issued Office Order No.
008 because he had so bitterly resented her attacks against him before the CSC Regional Office. The
petitioner moved for the admission of a supplemental complaint in order to implead Gregorio P.
Paltinca, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, for issuing on June 29,
2001 Office Order No. 005, Series of 2001, to amend Office Order No. 008. The latter moved to
dismiss the supplemental complaint. The RTC dismissed the case, holding on the legality of Office
Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 were illegal for violating the rule
against indiscriminate and whimsical reassignment enunciated in the Administrative Code of 1987

Whether or not petitioners non-exhaustion of her available administrative remedies was fatal to her
cause.

24
Whether or not Paltincas motion to dismiss could be resolved before the admission of the
supplemental complaint.

RULING:

Firstly, Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the
personnel actions that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1) appointment through
certification; (2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7)
reassignment. The subject of the assailed office orders was a reassignment, which is not to be
confused with a transfer. The office orders themselves indicated that the personnel action involved
was a reassignment, not a transfer, for, indeed, the petitioner was being moved from the organizational
unit of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist in Dumaguete City to that in the barangays of the
Municipality of Siaton.
That the reassignment was made without the petitioners consent can be deduced from her refusal
to report to the station of her new assignment. She lost the opportunity to ventilate her reason for
refusing the reassignment by walking out of the conference instead of explaining her refusal to follow
Office Order No. 008.
Secondly, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power and function to [p]rescribe,
amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws.

A public servant who has an issue against a directive for her re-assignment must exhaust her
available administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action. The non-exhaustion of
available administrative remedies is fatal to the resort to judicial action.
The reassignment of the petitioner was a personnel and Civil Service matter to be properly
addressed in accordance with the rules and guidelines prescribed by the CSC. Her resort to judicial
intervention could not take the place of the grievance procedure then available to her.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. It is
true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule, but recognizes
exceptions; however, the exceptions did not cover the petitioners case. The rule is that judicial
intervention should only be availed of after all administrative remedies had been exhausted. The
Judiciary must not intervene because Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 both concerned
the implementation of a provincial executive policy. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the
administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial
power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative
character. The Court has always adhered to this precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now.
Verily, had the petitioner followed the grievance procedure under the CSCs Omnibus Rules, her next
step would have been to elevate her case to the CSC itself, the constitutional body charged with the
exclusive jurisdiction not only over disciplinary actions against government officials and employees
but also over cases involving personnel actions.

The petitioner filed her supplemental complaint to assail Office Order No. 005, and thereby raised
issues identical to those raised in her original complaint involving Office Order No. 008. Hence, the
RTC could already resolve Paltincas motion to dismiss even without first admitting the supplemental
25
complaint. Unlike an amended complaint, her supplemental complaint could exist side-by-side with
the original complaint, because the supplemental complaint averred facts supervening from the filing
of the complaint pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Alleged Loss of Various Boxes of Copy Paper During their Transfer from the Property Division,
Office of Administrative Services (OAS), to the Various Rooms of the Philippine Judicial
Academy
A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, September 30, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is grave misconduct when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule are present. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are
punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is also classified as a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws.
FACTS:
On October 23, 2008, Bocs Trading Co., Inc. delivered 1,300 reams of short copy paper and
1,100 reams of long copy paper to the Supreme Court intended for the Philippine Judicial Academy.
As instructed by Administrative Officer Recio, the delivery was initially accepted by Orcullo, the
Property Custodian of the PHILJA, because Supply Officer Isidro Austria and Store Keeper IV
Ordoez, both of the Property and Supply Section were then not around. When Orcullo left for his
lunch break, Ordoez took over. The rest of the deliveries were unloaded from the delivery truck at
the Centennial Building of the Court upon the instruction of Ordoez.
With the help of Judicial Staff Employee II Carmona, Ordoez then initiated the transfer of the
copy paper to the stockroom and the Reproduction Room of the Office of the Court Administrator in
the Supreme Court Multipurpose Building located in the SC New Building. In the afternoon of
October 23, 2008, Orcullo informed Administrative Officer Recio that 400 reams of short copy paper
and 40 reams of long copy paper were missing. Atty. Rodel O. Hernandez formally reported the
missing boxes of copy paper belonging to the PHILJA to PHILJA Vice Chancellor Justice Justo P.
Torres, Jr. The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) directed Austria, Ordoez, Glor and
Carmona to submit their respective comments, and to show cause why they should not be held
administratively liable for grave misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In his comment, Ordoez reiterated his denial of any knowledge of the loss of the 30 boxes of
long copy paper from the OCA stockroom, but admitted that he had initiated the transfer upon the
instructions of Administrative Officer Recio. On his part, Austria conceded that he had used the 50
reams of papers to pay for the copy paper he had borrowed from one Mr. Roy of the Jimmy Roy
Trading, a supplier of toners, inks, and sometimes copy paper. He denied that the copy paper was
payment for his personal loan, maintaining that he had only borrowed the copy paper in order to avoid
delays for an upcoming PHILJA training.
After conducting the investigation, the OAS concluded that Ordoez had failed to exercise the
required diligence in the performance of his task in overseeing the delivery of the copy paper by not
seeing to the safe storage of the copy paper, and by not properly endorsing the copy paper to his office
or to the security guard assigned in the area where he had left the reams of copy paper. The OAS
found that Austria and Glor had committed perjury by giving false statements, as borne out by the
incongruence of their initial narration of facts and their subsequent statements blaming each other as
the perpetrator of the theft of the copy paper; that it was clear that their act of taking the copy paper
without authority constituted theft; that they were liable for serious dishonesty considering that their
acts were attended by certain circumstances that rendered their offense serious.
As to Carmona, the OAS observed that he was still responsible for securing the trip ticket as a
driver even if he had been requested to help Ordoez.
The OAS ultimately recommended as follows:

26
 I. For having been found guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Mesrs. Isidro T. Austria and Eusebio M.
Glor, be meted with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of
benefits except accrued leave credits;
II. For having been found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Mr. Lenin Mario M. Ordoez,
be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of benefits except
accrued leave credits;
III. Mesrs. Austria, Glor and Ordoez, be directed to restitute to the Court the copy papers
stolen; and
IV. For driving without a trip ticket to the PHILJA Reproduction Room, Mr. Elizalde S.
Carmona, be WARNED that a repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Meanwhile, Ordoez resigned from the PHILJA, citing the approval of his familys visa application
for immigrant status in Canada as the reason for his resignation. On June 23, 2009, the Court En
Banc approved his resignation subject to the usual clearance requirements. The Third Division
directed the consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No. 2008-23-SC. The En Banc
accepted the consolidation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the OAS should be upheld.

RULING: YES
There is grave misconduct when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule are present. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave
offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service is also classified as a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws. The Civil
Service laws and rules contain no description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. However, jurisprudence has been instructive,
with the Court having considered the following acts or omissions as constitutive of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, namely: (a) misappropriation of public funds; (b)
abandonment of office; (c) failure to report back to work without prior notice; (d) failure to keep
public records and property safe; (e) making false entries in public documents; and (f) falsification of
court orders.
For making false statements, committing perjury and stealing the copy paper, Austria and Glor
are guilty of grave misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Their dismissal from the service is the proper penalty, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the Government.
On August 17, 2012 and during the pendency of A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, Austria turned 65 years old
and was deemed compulsorily retired from the service. He applied for retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 8291 (The Government Service Insurance Act of 1997), and his application was
docketed as A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory
retirement age did not render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC moot, let alone release him from whatever
liability he had incurred while in the active service. The jurisdiction acquired by the Court continues
despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction to declare a respondent
either innocent or guilty of the charge even in the extreme case of the respondents supervening death.
Where a respondent is found guilty of a grave offense but the penalty of dismissal is no longer
possible because of his compulsory retirement, the Court has nevertheless imposed the just and
appropriate disciplinary measures and sanctions by decreeing the forfeiture of all benefits to which he
may be entitled, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, including GOCCs, and by imposing a fine to be deducted from
the retirement benefits.
Austria is now being held guilty of the grave offenses of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct,
(either of which is punishable by dismissal for the first offense), as well as of conduct prejudicial to

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the best interest of the service, but since the penalty of dismissal could no longer be imposed on him,
the Court forfeits all benefits to which he could be entitled, except accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the Government, including
Government-owned and Government-controlled corporations, and fines him in the amount equivalent
to his salary for his last six (6) months in the service to be deducted from whatever accrued leave
benefits remained for him. Hence, his request in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. for the release of his
compulsory retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 is denied.
Ordoez is guilty of gross neglect of duty. Even if he did not have a direct hand in the theft of the
copy paper, his negligence facilitated the theft. Had he been diligent in performing his tasks and
responsibilities as a Storekeeper IV, Austria and Glor would not have managed to take out the reams
of copy paper out of the stockroom, of which he was then in charge. Indeed, he so admitted this
during the investigation. Neglect of duty is the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of
him. Gross neglect is such neglect that, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances,
becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. Those responsible for
such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court. The imposable penalty for
gross neglect of duty is dismissal from the service.
Ordoez resigned effective May 4, 2009, purportedly to migrate to Canada. His resignation would not
extricate him from the consequences of his gross neglect of duty, because the Court has not allowed
resignation to be an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability or administrative
sanction. Ordoez remains administratively liable, but his resignation prevents his dismissal from the
service. A fine can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion of the
Court. The fine shall be deducted from any accrued leave credits, with the respondent being
personally liable for any deficiency that should be directly payable to this Court. He is further
declared disqualified from any future government service.
The recommended sanction for Cardona is warning. Such sanction is sufficient considering that
Ordoez merely solicited the help of Cardona in transferring the reams of copy paper from the OCA
stockroom to the Repro Room in the SC New Building. We emphasize that all court employees, being
public servants in the Judiciary, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility. To maintain the peoples respect and faith in the Judiciary, they should be upright, fair
and honest. They should avoid any act or conduct that tends to diminish public trust and confidence in
the courts.

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