SORTED

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Page |1
I. INTRODUCTION
EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(1) Lara vs Del Rosario

94 Phil 778
FACTS:
Petronilo Del Rosario was an owner of a taxi operating business which he sold to a certain La
Malorca. Because their former employer did not give them one months salary compensation in lieu
of the notice required in Artilce 302 of the code of Commerece, Manuel Lara with other taxi drivers
previously employed under herein respondent, sued the same. Aside from the latter demand,
Plaintiffs also filed a complaint for the compensation on the days they rendered that exceeded the
8 hour labor as prescribed by the 8 hour labor law and on Sunday and legal holidays thereof. The
defendant then filed a complaint through which a dismissal was favored and granted. Plaintiffs
appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which are finding the question of law
involved, certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs suit were to favor against defendant.
RULING:
The Supreme Court rules that plaintiffs have no legal basis for their claims since the provision of
the Code of Commerce that they were relying on was already repealed by the New Civil Code.
Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place after about 3 days from the New Civil
Code took its effect. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claim on violation of the 8 hour labor law has no
legal basis since under Section 2 from the same law, contemplated that drivers were excepted
from the law since they were paid on a piece work basis and not fixed compensation which the law
clearly applies on. Section 4 of the same law notes that public utilities performing public service for
transportation or communication cannot be the subject to addition compensation or at least twenty
five per centum of regular remuneration on Sundays and legal holidays since they are on a piece
work basis. The condition of employment between plaintiff and defendant are of piece work.
Meaning, their salary depends on the result of their labor and not the labor itself.
Moreover, assuming that the Article 2 of the Code of Commerce was still in effect and not repealed
thereto, the same only refers to laborers receiving a fixed salary, not to piece workers. The
computation of a months salary would be impossible since there is no fixed salary. Therefore
granting and finding favor for defendant, order appealed.
II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
A. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
ARTICLE 2
(2) Taada vs Tuvera

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.
RULING:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code do not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
Taada vs Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
RULING:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
(3) Fuentes vs Conrado Roca

G.R. 178902 (April 2010)
FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six
years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the
help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In
the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment
and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and
after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus
went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of
Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11,
1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and
control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to
annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of
Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses
claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4
years from discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony
of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action
has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed
since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property
without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years.
Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within
the prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted
that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent
was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain
why there was such difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in
1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships
already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by
Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With
that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the
action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied
to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud
but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given
by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case
to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the
action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void
from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite
that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely,
the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
(4) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE

PORT OF SUBIC vs HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179579 (February 1, 2012)
FACTS:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.The regulation provided an exclusive list
of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on
these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding
tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.A month after the issuance of CMO 27-
2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its
imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. Respondent contended that
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines
Law Center.Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade
supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported
food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing
them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated
when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty
(20) days from notice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 need to be published?
RULING:
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
(5) Acaac vs Azcuna, Jr.

G.R. No. 187378 (September 30, 2013)
FACTS:
PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection and

conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.PETAL built
some cottages on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal Construction
against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in
violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On
July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a Municipal Ordinance which
prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside
the sanctuaries;and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the
premises, except if authorized by the local government.
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on
the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island,
declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it
built on Capayas Island.
Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and damagesagainst
respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province as required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by
the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the
lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property
belonging to the public domain.
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.

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On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to
declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the
LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners?
RULING:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides: If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a public hearing was conducted prior
to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations,
petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject
ordinance was made.
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with
the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld
in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation,
which they, however, failed to do.
In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999) citing United States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil.
825 (1916), the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were
conducted in light of : (a) the oppositors equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the
local governments non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local
governments non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositors cause of action.
Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to
rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of
proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained
to uphold their constitutionality or legality.
The Petition is denied.
(6) Garcillano vs House of Representatives
FACTS:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to
favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by
each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense
and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on
National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to
prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible and the
other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.
RULING:
Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played
in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by
these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted
however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
B. IGNORANTIA LEGIS NON EXCUSAT

ARTICLE 3
CONCEPT AND APPLICATION
(7) Kasilag vs Rodriguez

69 PHIL 217
FACTS:
Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 years., and in
such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 years and that she would pay the tax on
the land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a
verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition
that they would not collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax,
would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract
clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis,
being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING:
Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume
that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may
be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the
laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the
land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly
as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again
bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
(8) Elegado vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-68385 (May 12, 1989)
FACTS:
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the
Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A. As he left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son,
Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with the Philippine Revenue
Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96, 509.35 on
February 9, 1978. This assessment was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm of Bump,
Young and Walker on behalf of the estate. The protest was denied by the Commissioner on July 7,
1978. No further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that protest. Meanwhile, on January
18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon Ward
Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his
attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines.
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary
administrator. As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
June 4, 1980. On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment on
the estate in the amount of P72, 948.87. This was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava,
Lucero and Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980. While this protest was pending, the
Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of
P96, 509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978. He said that this liability had not yet been paid
although the assessment had long become final and executory. The petitioner regarded this motion
as an implied denial of the protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second assessment of
P72, 948.87. On this understanding, he filed on September 15, 1981, a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment.
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner stressed, no answer was
filed during a delay of 195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a
letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982. This cancellation was notified to the Court of
Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and
academic. The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984. The petitioner
then came to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death or six
months thereafter and whether or not the first assessment is invalid because of the ignorance of
the foreign lawyers on our tax laws and procedures?
RULING:
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of P72, 948.87, the
Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only based on the
estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this Office for final determination of the correct
estate tax due from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after said investigation will be
assessed and collected later." It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can supersede
an earlier assessment which had clearly become final and executory. The contention is no less
flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid
because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our
tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance
therewith because of their ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed
to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own
laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the
petitioner is indeed difficult to find. But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact
that the first assessment is already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late
hour. The assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The
protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by the decedent's
estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and executory.
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its
validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals.
What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July
7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after
it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the
first two issues he now raises without basis in the present petition.
If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the computation of the
estate tax, as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the original
assessment has long become final and executory. If that assessment was not challenged on time
and in accordance with the prescribed procedure, that error for error it was was committed
not by the respondents but by the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

Processual Presumptions
(9) Yao Kee vs Sy Gonzales

G.R. No. L-55960 (November 24, 1988)
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing
leaving behind real and personal properties in the Philippines. The respondents, children of Sy Kiat
and Asuncion Gillego filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. This was opposed by
the petitioners, wife Yao Kee and their children contending that they are the legitimate heirs since
Sy Kiat and Yao Kee were married in China under Chinese customs.
Probate court decided in favor of petitioners and appointed Sze Sook Wah, oldest child of Sy Kiat
and Yao Kee.
CA declared children of Sy Kiat and Gillego as acknowledged natural children. The same
declaration was given with the children of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid in the Philippines
RULING:
The alleged marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat was in accordance with the custom of China
but petitioners failed to present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage.
If the foreign law is not properly alleged and proved, the presumption is that, it is the same with our
law (processual presumption). All children of Sy Kiat were declared his natural children.
(10) Board of Commissioners vs Dela Rosa

197 SCRA 853
FACTS:
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry.
However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed
the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of
William Gatchalian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as
Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is
declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino
citizen.
(11) Menandro Laureano vs Court of Appeals and Singapore Airlines

(February 2, 2000)
FACTS:
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hires as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited. In 1982
however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano was one of
them. Laureano asked for a reconsideration but was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor
case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a
civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case
here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid
pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, non-applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
RULING:
No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in
court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under
Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has
the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the
case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he only filed the
money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by
prescription
B. LEX PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT

ARTICLE 4
BASIS AND PURPOSE
(12) Jose E. Aruego Jr. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112193 (March 31, 1996)
FACTS:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian until
his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and Evelyn F.
Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and
the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate children of
their defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose
Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to one-half portion of
share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or
the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.
RULING:
Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under
Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the recognition of
natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when the parents die
during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with the New Family
Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription. Further, the
Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not impair the vested
right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is the Family Code cannot be
applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested right of the respondent to have
her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the fact that she
filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
(13) Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan

G.R. No. 157547 (February 23, 2011)
FACTS:
Elvin filed a case for violation of BP 22 against Eduardo Simon (Criminal Case No. 275381) before
the MeTC of Manila. After more than three years, Elvin filed an action for collection with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Civil Case No. 915-00) before the MeTC of Pasay
City, alleging that Simon employed fraud, deceit and misrepresentation when he issued the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 275381 which when presented for payment was dishonoured by the
drawee bank. Simon moved to dismiss the civil case on the ground of lit is pendencia, as a
consequence of the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381. Elvin opposed the motion to dismiss,
citing as bases Articles 31, 32, 33,34 and 2177 of the Civil Code which allows an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and who may be brought by the injured
part during the pendency of the criminal case provided the right to file the civil action is reserved.
The MeTC granted the motion to dismiss. The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision, but the CA
reversed the lore courts, ruling:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chans Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check as an independent
civil action.
RULING:
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
(14) Francisco vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102330 (November 25, 1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage, filed a
suit for damages and for annulment of the general power of Attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista, the daughter of Eusebio by his first marriage, to administer the properties of Eusebio,
namely: the house and lot, the sari-sari store and the apartments. The subject properties are
alleged to be acquired during their conjugal partnership. Petitioner also alleged the physical
incapability of Eusebio to manage their properties. The trial court renedered judgment in favor of
private respondents due to the failure of petitioner to establish proof that the subject properties
where acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the trial court.
Respondents contend that the subject properties were not acquired during the second conjugal
properties since the properties are the legitime of Eusebio. Petitioner avers that the application of
Article 116 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar because the Article 254 of the same code
expressly repeals Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court Article 245 of the Family Code which expressly repealed Articles 158 and
160 has a retroactive effect?
RULING:
No. The court ruled that the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions
were in force. Thus, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. To invoke this presumption, the petitioner carries the burden of proof to
establish that the subject properties are acquired during the second conjugal partnership, by which
petitioner failed. Hence, the subject property is proved to belong exclusively to Eusebio Francisco.
Further, the alleged physical incapability of Eusebio was proved to the contrary. Thus, the petition
was denied with cost to the petitioner.
(15) Pesca vs Pesca

G.R. No. 136921 (April 17, 2001)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married
March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in1988, petitioner
noticed that her husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became
violent. On March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and
respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11
days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
invoking psychological incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. CA
reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that (1)
respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be in cognitive of the basic
marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is grave, (3)
preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is psychological (6) that the root
cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8) that such
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on January 1995), as
well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no
retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta
should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not
its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply to the case at bar
RULING:
PETITION IS DENIED. The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim legis interpretado legis
vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part
of that law as of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith in accordance therewith (lex prospicit, non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her
allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent.
(16) Renato David vs Editha Agbay

G.R. No. 199113 (March 18, 2015)
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner
and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. On April 2001, petitioner
filed a Miscellanous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land, and in the said application he
indicates that he is a Filipino citizen. It was opposed by the respondent, averring that petitioner is
not a Filipino citizen and disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.
On October 11 2007, while petitioners MLA was pending, the petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he
filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. On January 8, 2008, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner
for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommendation the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petitioner for review he filed
before the Department of Justice(DOJ). On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued and order rejecting
petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not
cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born
Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have lost on account of said naturalization.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner may be indicated for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public
Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING:
While, Sec 2 of the R.A. 9225, declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine, such is qualified by the
phrase under the conditions of this Act laid down by Sec 3. Sec 3, lays down such conditions for
two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the
first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign land who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as Canadian citizen prior to the effectively of R.A. 9225,
he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Sec 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in foreign country.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen
at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at that time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
(17) Abad vs PhilComsat

G.R. No. 200620 (March 18, 2015)
FACTS:
Respondent PHILCOMSAT, along with the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation

(POTC) were among those private companies sequestered by the Philippine Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG) following the Edsa People Power Revolution in 1986. PHILCOMSAT owns
81% of the capital stock of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC) and the majority shareholders
of PHILCOMSAT are seven families who have owned and controlled the POTC. Within these
families, is a battle for control over the respective boards of PHC, POTC and PHILCOMSAT. One
is the group of Africa and Ilusorio, and the other one is the group of Nieto.
On 2004, the Nieto-PCGG group conducted separate elections during the stockholders meeting of
PHC of which Locsin was the Chairman. Prior to that, in the July 28, 2004 stockholders meeting of
POTC and PHILCOMSAT, Victor Africa of Africa-Bildner group was selected as Director. Locsin,
Andal and Nieto were also elected directors but did not accept their election, they instead held a
stockholders meeting for PHILCOMSAT. Immediately after the said meeting, the Nieto group held
an organizational meeting wherein Nieto and Locsin were elected as chairman and president. They
also issued a proxy in favor of Locsin and Nieto to represent PHILCOMSAT and vote the same in
the stockholders meeting of PHC.
The Africa group sought the invalidation of the proxy issued and consequent nullification of the
elections during the annual stockholders meeting of PHC in a civil case filed with the RTC. In
2005, Africa, in his capacity as President and CEO of PHILCOMSAT, wrote to the board of PHC
that PHILCOMSAT will exercise its right of inspection over the books and records pertinent to
business transactions of PHC, specifically the companys financial documents. On the day of
inspection, petitioners disallowed the conduct of the inspection which prompted the PHILCOMSAT
to make a written inquiry whether said refusal was authorized by the PHC Board of Directors.
Receiving no reply, PHILCOMSAT filed with the RTC a complaint for Inspection of books against
the PHC directors and officers. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction as it is the
Sandiganbayan that has, for PHILCOMSAT is sequestered corporation of the Republic.
PHILCOMSAT appealed through a petition for review under arguing that RTC has the jurisdiction
over the case involving a stockholders right to inspect corporate books and records. The CA,
finding merit in PHILCOMSATs argument granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Africa-Bildner group has the controlling power in PHILCOMSAT
RULING:
The question of whom between the contending factions (Africa-Blender and Nieto-PCGG) held the
controlling interest in POTC, and consequently PHILCOMSAT and PHC, the Court had settled
under the Doctrine of Stare Decisis where the validity of the compromise agreement the
government had concluded with Atty. Illusorio. As a result, government expressly recognized that
Atty. Ilusorio and his group gained the majority control of POTC. The RTC concluded that the
Nieto-PCGG group did not have the majority control, therefore cannot validly convene and hold a
stockholders meeting and election and that there could be no valid authority for Nieto/Locsin to
vote the proxies of the group in the PHILCOMSAT meeting.
D. MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY LAWS

GENERAL RULE ON EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF MANDATORY LAWS
EXCEPTIONS
(18) Nerwin vs PNOC

G.R. No. 167057 (APRIL 11, 2012)
FACTS:
In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to

bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood
poles and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him
being the lowest bidder. However, NEAs board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50%
the material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and
Pacific Synergy filed a complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-
qualification bid were falsified. Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Govt
Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other
bidders for IPB 80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which
was grabted by RTC Manila. PNOC Energy Devt Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid
for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject
portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents to the proposed
bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructure are
not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of
TRO except SC to govt projects
RULING:
Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary

injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions against govt.
E. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE 6
REQUISITES OF VALID WAIVER
(19) DM Consunji vs CA
GR No. 137873 (April 20, 2001)
FACTS:
Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The
attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA).
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin,
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint for damages in the RTC and was rendered a
favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji. DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
RULING:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police
investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioners personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.
(20) Aujero vs PhilCcomSat
G.R. No. 193484 (January 18, 2012)
FACTS:
It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter's Finance Department. After thirty-
four (34) years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement
was approved, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of
his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was Philcomsat's Senior
Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five
Pesos (P274,805.00).
Petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsats favor.
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits,
claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and
Fifty-Five Pesos (P14,015,055.00) and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as
supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to
declare his quitclaim as null and void.
Labor Arbiter issued a Decision in the petitioners favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the amount
of P4,575,727.09 and P274,805.00, representing the balance of his retirement benefits and salary
for the period from August 15 to September 15, 2001, respectively.
NLRC granted Philcomsats appeal and reversed and set aside LAs Decision. The NLRC
dismissed the petitioners complaint for unpaid retirement benefits and salary in consideration of the
Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed following his receipt from Philcomsat of the amount of
P9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his claims against Philcomsat.
By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioners claims, holding that the
NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondents appeal.
The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the validity of the petitioners
quitclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsats favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat?
RULING:
Court of Appeals decision is sustained. While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and
quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous
employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary
settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.
Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated,
this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was
pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the
petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and
understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse
before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his
motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere
afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
(21) Villareal vs People

G.R. No. 151258 (February 1, 2012)
FACTS:
February 1991- 7 freshmen law students of ADMU signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis
fraternity. They were met by members of AL at the lobby of Ateneo Law. They were informed that
there will be physical beatings and that they can quit anytime. The rites were scheduled to last 3
days. They were subjected to traditional Aquilan initiation rites such as the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds, Auxies Privilege Round, rough basketball, comic plays, and other forms of
paddling. Lenny received several blows, one of which was so strong that it sent him sprawling to
the ground. When they were already sleeping, the neophytes were roused by Lennys shivering
and mumblings. He was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents should be charged in accordance with the Anti-Hazing Law.
RULING:
No crime without a law punishing it.
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala
in seadhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment
thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.
This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against
typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently
wrong conduct or mala in seat the time.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the
foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the
injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in
effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of
hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the
act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of
his death.
(22) Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 192383 (December 4, 2013)
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various
businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their
properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged
their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the
conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was
in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the
conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in
the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a
mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear
that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE:
WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an
abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the
family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully
and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment
and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as
admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The
plaintiff even testified that the husband paid short visits implying more than one visit. Likewise, as
testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance
of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter
disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions
prejudicial to the latter.
(23) DOA ADELA EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. TRADE AND

INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP) & BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI)
G.R. No. 201931 (February 11, 2015)
FACTS:
A judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the
compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise
agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court.
Doa Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, declared
Doa Adela as insolvent and stayed all civil proceedings against Doa Adela. Atty. Arlene
Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the
necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective
claims. Doa Adela, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource
Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein Doa Adela
agreed to transfer a parcel of land with existing improvements in favor of TRC in full payment of
Doa Adelas obligation bearing the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. Creditors TIDCORP
and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, with a waiver of confidentiality provision.
Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed Compromise Agreement of
TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that Doa Adela has a personality separate and distinct from
its stockholders and officers.
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. Doa Adela filed a motion for partial
reconsideration and claimed that TIDCORP and BPIs agreement imposes on it several obligations
but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
ISSUE:
Is the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI bind Doa
Adela despite not being a party and signatory to the same?
RULING:
No. In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only.
There was no written consent given by Doa Adela or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that
Doa Adela is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the
confidentiality of Doa Adelas bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear
therefore that Doa Adela is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express
consent of Doa Adela who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
In addition, considering that Doa Adela was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its
property, assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee.
Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, Doa Adela was directed to
assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects
with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto, pursuant to Section 32 of the Insolvency
Law. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor
not exempt by law from execution. Corollarily, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement that Doa Adela waives its right to confidentiality of its bank deposits
requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money,
estate and effects of Doa Adela have been assigned and conveyed to her and she has the right to
recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter into Compromise Agreement,
she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and
BPI. In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC
and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty.
Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of Doa Adelas bank deposits.
(24) BBB V. AAA

G.R. No. 193225 (February 9, 2015)
FACTS:
AAA has her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named CCC. During the
relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD and EEE. BBB and AAA married
in civil rights and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including CCCs, was amended to
change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and
heated arguments. BBB alleges that AAAs irrational jealousy has caused their frequent
arguments. AAA, on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to BBBs
incessant womanizing. The breaking point for AAA came when BBBs alleged mistress, insulted
and humiliated AAA in public, in the presence of BBB himself who did nothing to stop the same.
Extremely hurt, AAA decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at
a friends house.
While living separately from BBB, AAA discovered that BBB was not paying the rentals due on the
condominium unit they were occupying, forcing AAA to move out. AAA was likewise compelled to
find work to support the family, after BBB has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the
family. AAA likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their
children. Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an
application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same
permanent after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court.
Finding good ground in AAAs application, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
which was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC. BBB filed before the CA
an appeal to challenge the RTC Decision. The CA affirmed the factual findings and dispositions of
the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings
who shall be awarded custody of the children. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). BBB alleges that he and AAA
had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support
of DDD and EEE. BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which
allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not
his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him,
being not his biological son.
ISSUE:
1. Is the petition a proper subject of a compromise agreement?
2. Is CCC, AAA's child from previous relationship, not entitled to receive support from the
petitioner, BBB?
RULING:
On the first issue, the instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. The
Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a
judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed
by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not
subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Re: Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children) explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of
violence against women. While AM No. 10-4-16-SC (Re: Rule on Court-Annexed Family Mediation
and Code of Ethical Standards for Mediators) on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of
all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property
relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as
regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAAs vacillation compels the Court to
exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties
are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but
the Court now requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and
fail to put an end to their bickering.
On the second issue, CCC is entitled to receive support from the petitioner, BBB. Article 177 of the
Family Code provides that "only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that "legitimation shall take place by a subsequent
valid marriage between parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs biological father. Such
being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application
and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should
not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by
the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179
of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including
the receipt of his fathers support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper
court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant
petition.
F. JUDICIAL APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

ARTICLE 8
(25) Pesca vs Pesca

G.R. No. 136921 (April 17, 2001)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married
March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in1988, petitioner
noticed that her husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became
violent. On March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and
respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11
days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
invoking psychological incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. CA
reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that (1)
respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be in cognitive of the basic
marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is grave, (3)
preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is psychological (6) that the root
cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8) that such
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on January 1995), as
well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no
retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta
should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not
its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply to the case at bar
RULING:
PETITION IS DENIED. The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim legis interpretado legis
vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part
of that law as of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith in accordance therewith (lex prospicit, non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her
allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent.
(26) De Castro vs Judicial and Bar Council

G.R. No. 191002 (April 20, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002
and G.R. No. 191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be
compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position
of the next Chief Justice. All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question
whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation,
because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.
De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries one side
holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months
immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as
President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments
to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest
justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer
the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President
or to her successor. He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself the judicial function
that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution, which has limited it to the task of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to finally resolve constitutional questions,
which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court under the Constitution. As such, he contends
that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of
nominees to the President; and that a final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions
raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go a long way to
keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V.
Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the
process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its
January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution, which reads:
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. It will publish the opening of the position for
applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of candidates; publish the names of
candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications; conduct public interviews of
candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional question of
whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
RULING:
The motions for reconsideration were denied for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby
raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on
some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly
insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. The contention has no
basis. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e.,
to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle
underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of
like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the
decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied
upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial
courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of
the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound
to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher
courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one
highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its
best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus,
the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision
that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is
strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as
binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents
are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be
followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are
relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable
to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed,
and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of
rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes
the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid
down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the
Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many
principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves
apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. For one,
the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the
ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle
of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

(27) Virtucio vs Alegarbes

G.R. No. 187451 (August 29, 2012)
FACTS:
Jose Alegarbes filed Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land which was
approved in 1952. Three years after, the land was subdivided into three lots lot 138, lot 139 and
lot 140. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio and Lot 140 to Virtucio. Both applied for homestead
application but was opposed by Alegarbes claiming that his approved application covered the
whole area.
The Director of Lands denied his protest. His appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was also dismissed. He sought relief to the Office of the President, but the latter
affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary.
Virtucio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership with preliminary injunction
before the RTC and it was favoured by the latter.
Alegarbes appealed to the CA which ruled that he can still acquire the land by acquisitive
prescription. Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition alleging that the CA ruling in the case of
Alegarbes vs Custodio be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying its decision in the case of Alegarbes and Custudio in
the present case
RULING:
It is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedence, only the final decisions
of the SC.
(28) Republic vs Rehman Enterprises

G.R. No. 199310 (February 19, 2014)
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and
20,357 sq m, respectively.
The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial
hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette
and was likewise posted in conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15
days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondents application for registration. Sometime
after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were
originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of
crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975,
Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until
the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the
subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced
by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the
respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject
properties; (4) Geodetic Engineers Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for
2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior
Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA,
claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map
of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of
National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties
range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual
topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly,
Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of
the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the
topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was
presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of
gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same;
that the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the
supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was
conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the
elevations of the subject properties.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC
opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that,
under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be
covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence,
the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna
Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by
the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away
from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of
Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?
RULING:
NO. That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a
finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a
trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial
reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however,
does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts finding that the elevations of the subject properties are
above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the
Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of
title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable."
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two
certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per
LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by the proper government
agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2)
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public
domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records.
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified
as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She
did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate
government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of
title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for
registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the
DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the
legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the
application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was
promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this
Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have
no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title was filed
and was granted by the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration was filed and granted by RTC
prior to the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to
the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of
the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that
law from the date it was originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one."
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena which are
but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject
properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent
failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it
and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land
registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have
indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject
properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The
supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual
cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the
respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it
acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation
purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.

THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM

Stare Decisis Non Quieta Movere
(29) Ting vs Ting

G.R. No. 166562 (March 31, 2009)
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18
years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because
he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
RULING:
1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly,
that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
LAW OF THE CASE
(30) AYALA CORPORATION vs

ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284 (December 1, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation, was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street,
Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On April 20, 1976,
Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The
Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained special conditions of sale and
deed restrictions. The Deed Restrictions contained the stipulation that the gross floor area of the
building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot area and the total height
shall not exceed forty-two (42) meters. The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025.
Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval envisioned a 24-meter high, seven-(7) storey
condominium project with a gross floor area of 3,968.56 square meters. It, however, submitted a
different set of building plan of The Peak to the building official of Makati that contemplated a
91.65-meter high, 38-storey condominium building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square
meters. The construction of the building ensued.
Thereafter, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty. The
lower court denied Ayalas prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the
construction of the building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on Rosa-Dianas title. The Register of Deeds of Makati, however, refused registration of
the notice of lis pendens on the ground that the case pending before the trial court, being an action
for specific performance and/or rescission, is an action in personal, which does not involve the title,
use or possession of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Ayalas appeal based on its decision on
Ayala vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation under the doctrine of stare decisis.
RULING:
Yes. There is no reason how the law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be applicable in the
case at bar. If at all, the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Ayala is
barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered as an obiter dicta. As earlier
mentioned, the only issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the
annotation of the lis pendens. The additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is
estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized that the said issue is being
tried before the trial court was not necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the
annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum is an opinion of the judge, which does not embody the
resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the
point, not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself. It is not necessarily limited to the
issues essential to the decision but may also include expressions or opinion, which are not
necessary to support the decision reached by the court. Mere dicta are not binding under the
doctrine of stare decisis.
The appellate courts decision in Ayala vs. Ray Burton cannot also be cited as a precedent under
the doctrine of stare decisis. It must be pointed out that the time the presently assailed decision of
the CA was rendered, the Ayala vs. Ray Burton case was on appeal to the Court. As held by the
Court in Ayala vs. Ray Burton, the CA went beyond the sole issue raised before it and made
factual findings without any basis in the record to rule inappropriately that Ayala is in estoppel and
has waived its right to enforce the subject restrictions. Thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. Rosa Diana was also ordered to pay Ayala
development charges and damages.
G. RULES ON APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

ARTICLE 9
Dura Lex Sed Lex
(31) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 (October 12, 1995)
FACTS:
Honorable Veneracion rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide. He sentenced both accused with penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessories provided by law.
City prosecutor of Manila filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the decision be modified in
that the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The Trial Courts finding of guilt is not the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Honorable Veneracion acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA no.
7659 after finding the guilt of the crime of rape with homicide?
RULING:
Judges are guided by the rule of law and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor.
Law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which the respondent judge found the
accused guilty was RA no. 7659. He was bound by its provisions which provides that:
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a
penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
The Supreme Court is aware of the judges misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of
his religious convictions. As cited in the case of People vs. Limaco:
as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for
its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the
Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to
apply them.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for
the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent
judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape
with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision imposing the
death penalty.
ARTICLE 10
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
(32) Philippine Rabbit Bus Line vs Hon. Ludivico Arciaga

148 SCRA 438
FACTS:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson as paying passenger on board a bus belonging to the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines (PRBL) sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus
crashed against an acacia tree in Balaoan, La Union. Thereafter, he filed a complaint for
contractual tort. In their answer, PRBL interposed the defense that the collision was due to
fortuitous event.
The case was set for trial but the case was dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff. He then
filed a motion for relief on the grounds of equity. He averred that his ride on the way had engine
trouble. Judge Arciaga granted the motion filed by Singson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case filed by Taurino Singson be dismissed?
RULING:
Yes. There is no reason to grant a petition for relief. Since, Singson and his lawyer let 61 days
lapse before filing their petition for relief. It must be filed within 60 days. Otherwise, judgment shall
become final and executory. Equity aids the vigilant not those who slumber on their rights.
(33) Cessario Ursua vs CA

(April 10, 1996)
FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get
a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that
because the law firms messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case.
Perez then told him than he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he does not have to reveal his
true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez. When he was
handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a staff of the
Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that
a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for
violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.
RULING:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No. 142,
as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity something which could not have been intended
by the lawmakers.Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not
allowed to use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and
publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case,
Ursua merely used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a business transaction, the
use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different
name, in this instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the
Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity
because the complaint is a public record open to the public. In short, the evils sought to be avoided
by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict
application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was
committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law
is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need
not be applied.
ARTICLE 13
COMPUTATION OF PERIODS
YEAR, MONTH, DAY, NIGHT
(34) Alfredo Montajes vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 183449 (March 12, 2012)
FACTS:
Alfredo (Montajes) was charged and convicted for Direct Assault against Barangay Captain Jose
(Rellon) when he allegedly tried to hit the latter with a bolo when he stopped a benefit dance which
already exceeded the time allowed for it. The Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista Agusan del
Norte convicted him, and his appeal to the Regional Trial Court was also denied, hence, Jose filed
a petition (motion) for extension of time to file a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals for
15 days, counted from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007. It appears that he received the copy of
the RTCs order denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007. He then filed his Petition
for Review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed his petition for review outrightly for being filed out of
time. The CA noted that Jose received the copy of the RTC order denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 4, 2007, hence he had 15 days within which to file the petition for
review. Considering that May 19, 2007 fell on a Saturday, it was error for Jose to compute his
extension of time on the first working day after the deadline (Saturday, May 19), or on May 21,
2007 since when a party is granted an extension of time, the 15-day reckoning period should start
from the last day which is Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to the CA. His motion for
reconsideration denied, Jose filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court,
arguing that his petition was not filed out of time since he filed it pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of
the Rules of Court; based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition falls on a Saturday, the
time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the reglementary period within
which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file the
petition was moved to the next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not
wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and not from May
19, 2007, Saturday. He asks that his petition be resolved on the merits rather than on
technicalities since he filed his petition for review long before the CA dismissed the case
ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Review was filed on time.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two (2) days late in strict
compliance to the provisions of Sec 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, clarified in A.M. No. 00-2-14-
SC dated February 29, 2000 .
However, the Court found the circumstances of the case to merit liberal application of the rule in
the interest of justice and fair play. Even if there was delay, there was no intention and bad faith on
the part of the respondent to cause harm and not to comply.
The Supreme Court so stated:
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not
automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a
few days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we
may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction .
Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected.
(35) CIR vs Primetown

(August 28, 2007)
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, petitioner Primetown Property Group, Inc., through its vice chair Gilbert Yap,
applied for refund or credit of income tax they have paid in 1997 due to the slowdown of the real
estate industry where they suffered losses. Even if they were not liable for income taxes, they
have paid quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate
sales to the BIR. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer required respondent to submit additional documents to support
its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus they filed for petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals but dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two year
prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax refund as it is found out that the respondent filed
its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on
that date, pursuant to Article 13 of NCC. Primetown appealed to CA which reversed the decision of
the CTA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the petition was filed by the petitioner within the two year period
RULING:
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under
the Civil Code and the administrative code. For this reason, the Administrative Code, being the
more recent law which impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC, governs the computation of legal periods.
The Court held that respondents petition, filed on April 14, 2000, was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed
within the reglementary period and Primetown is entitled for the refund.
(36) MA. VILMA S. LABAD vs THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN

PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 139665 (August 9, 2001)
FACTS:
Labad, an employee of University of Southern Philippines (USP), was under probation due to a
complaint filed to her by the Parent-Teacher Association on February 1, 1996. The complaints
rooted on Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Unfitness as a teacher, which involved incidents when
Labad lied of the amount she paid for the yearbook, violation of RA 7079 (Campus Journalism Act
of 1991), no release of the said yearbook, and abuse of students. The Investigation Committee,
constructed by USP, held that there should be a non renewal of Labads probationary status. The
salient dates are summarized as follows:
April 14, 1998- Civil Service affirmed the Investigation Committees decision
December 11, 1998- Civil services Committee denied Labads Motion for Reconsideration.
December 28, 1998- Labad filed a Motion for Extension to file Petition to CA.
January 12, 1999- Labad filed a Petition for Review to CA.
February 17, 1999- Labad received a Resolution granting her Petition for Extension.
March 10, 1999- Labad received a Resolution from the CA dismissing her Petition for Review.
The Court also stated that the Petiton for Review was filed beyond the extended period which
ended January 10, 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Review filed by petitioner before it on the
ground that the petition was filed late.
Whether the extension period started on December 26,1998 or on December 28, 1998.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the date when the extension should take effect was on December 28, 1998
since December 26, 1998 fell on a Saturday. According to Sec 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, if
the last day of the period, as computed, falls on a Saturday, on Sunday or on a legal holiday in a
place where the Court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Therefore, the Petition
for Review can be submitted until January 12, 1999. Henceforth, the petition was granted and
remanded that the appellate court for further proceedings.
I.HOW LAWS LOSE THEIR EFFECTIVITY

ARTICLE 7
EXPRESS REPEAL AND IMPLIED REPEAL
(37) Thornton vs Thornton

G.R. No. 154598 (August 16, 2004)
FACTS:
Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter.
After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her
old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child
was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office ISSUE:d a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for
habeas corpus in CA which could ISSUE: a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since
RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P
129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA has jurisdiction to ISSUE: writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such
petitions.
RULING:
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to ISSUE: writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant
be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining
custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be
left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction.
Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction.
The literal interpretation of exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect
the rights and promote welfare of children.
(38) Datu Kida, et al. vs Senate of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 196271 (February 28, 2012)
FACTS:
These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011,
where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of
August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of
the elected officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054.
RULING:
No. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for
the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA
No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date
of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA
No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e.,
those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the
Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.
(39) YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs TRANS-ASIA OIL AND

ENERGYDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No.207942 (January 12, 2015)
FACTS:
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and existing prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights that
cannot be impaired. Anarea located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose

Panganiban,CamarinesNorte is the subject of the present controversy.
In 1997, Trans-Asia filedan application for the approval of Mineral Pro
duction Sharing Agreement (MPSA)over the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the
Mines andGeosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in
1999, was granted on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given
the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the mineral
lands.
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had
acquired the mining patents of Philippine Iron Mines,Inc. (PIMI)from Manila Banking Corporation
(MBC)/Banco De Oro (BDO)by way of a deed of absolute sale from PIMI which held mining patent
over said area as early as 1930.However, Trans-asia countered this claim by alleging that Yinlu
failed to register the patent. DENR rejected this claim and stated that the patents were validly
transferred and were now owned by Yinlu.
The areas covered occupied more than half of the MPSA area of Trans-
Asia.Trans-Asia sought the assistance of the MGB Regional Office V in
resolving the issues over the mine. It was at that point that Trans
-Asia learned that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlus request to
register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.
ISSUE:
Are the mining patents held by Yinlu valid?

RULING:
Yes.Yin lus mining patents constituted vested rights that could not be disregarded. The decision of
the OP was actually unassailable in point of law and history. The lands and minerals covered by
Yinlus mining patents are private properties. The Government, whether through the DENR or the
MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-
Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive rightto explore, develop and utilize the
minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. The Court uphold the
rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed areas that had been established
to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asias
MPSA. Mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed,
the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest
had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired
even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work
obligation.
J. BINDING EFFECT OF LAWS

ARTICLE 14
TERRITORIALITY AND GENERALITY
(40) ASSALI vs COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
26 SCRA 382
FACTS:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC hasdecreed
that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evilsought
to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept inmind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. Thecourt
may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead toabsurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid onthe
contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.
RULING:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right toprotect itself
and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The
Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on
Philippine ship.
K. THEORY OF STATUTES AND CONFLICT OF LAW RULES

ARTICLES 15 and 17, Paragraphs 1 and 2
Lex Loci Celebrationis
(41) Tenchavez vs Escano

15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a
San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed
to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after
translating the said letter to Vicentas dad, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for
the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of
her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in
Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a
complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from
joining her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
RULING:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the
Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce
in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez
and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the
Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees
(42) Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna

G.R. No. 171914 (July 23, 2014)
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot
seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed
to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On
January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru
Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full
payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names
of the owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with
Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books
and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the
condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him,
the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no
children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding
all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce of Atty. Luna and Eugenia is void.
RULING:
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the
Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife)
is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce
decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending
parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
(43) Board of Commissioners vs De La Rosa

197 SCRA 853
FACTS:
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5
children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry.
However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed
the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of
William Gatchalian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as
Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is
declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino
citizen.
Where it held that, considering that in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family and every intendment of the law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, he, who
asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign
law.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, article 71 of the
Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code) provides that all marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country.
(44) ATCI Overseas Corporation vs Echin

G.R. No. 178551 (October 11, 2010)
FACTS:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Respondent was deployed
on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having
allegedly passed the probationary period. As the Ministry denied respondents request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented
by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. By Decision of
November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just
cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held
that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision by
Resolution of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal,
the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity
extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.
Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI. By
Decision of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said respondents employment contract shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law and Regulations of Kuwait?
RULING:
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the
pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged;
they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed
by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims
or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
(45) American Airlines vs CA

G.R. No. 114044-45 (March 9, 2000)
FACTS:
Private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines conjunction ticket. But the petitioner decided
to forego his trip to Copenhagen and in the absence of a direct flight, private respondent
exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to New
York from the petitioner Airline. Petitioner issued its own ticket in Geneva and claimed the value of
the unused portion of the conjunction ticket from the IATA clearing house in Geneva.
Private respondent filed an action for damages before the RTC for the alleged embarrassment and
mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport when the petitioners security officers prevented
him from boarding the plane, detained him and allowed him to board only after all the passengers
have boarded
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine court to entertain the
said proceeding under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court denied the motion which
was affirmed by the CA and held that the suit may be brought in the Philippines under the pool
partnership agreement among the IATA members, which include Singapore and American Airlines,
wherein the members acts as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to those who may
need their services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippines has jurisdiction over American Airlines under the Warsaw Convention
RULING:
Venue was no longer the issue as the petitioner is deemed to have waived it when it presented
evidence before the trial court.
The contract of carriage between the private respondent and Singapore Airlines although
performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by petitioner,
constitutes a single operation. Members of IATA are under a general pool partnership wherein they
act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket sales
worldwide.
The new ticket was simply a replacement for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both
tickets having same amount and same points of departure.
ARTICLE 16
Lex Rei Sitae
(46) Noveras vs Noveras

G.R. No. 188289 (August 20, 2014)
FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the US and in the Philippines.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California wherein the court awarded all the properties in the US to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC. The RTC awarded the properties in the Philippines to David,
with the properties in the US remaining in the sole ownership of Leticia. The trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the
court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the Philippine properties between the
spouses. David insists that the CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded
the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
RULING:
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply: Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each
spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its
net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive
legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At
the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt
the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to
liquidation.
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.
While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.
III. HUMAN RELATIONS
A. STANDARDS/NORMS OF HUMAN CONDUCT

ARTICLE 19
THEORY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
(47) Go vs Cordero
(May 4, 2010)
FACTS:
Cordero was an exclusive distributor of a shippingcompany is Brisbane. After incurring travel

expenses andclosing his first deal with a Cordero, he found out that the latter was directly dealing
with the shipping company for the secondtransaction, cutting off his commissions. Worse, his
lawyersalso connived with the client and the shipping company totake him out of the picture. He
sued them all for conspiring inviolating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton
disregard of his rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents acted in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in
securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of
Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
(3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
Petitioner Gos argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable solidarily with
Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees awarded to Cordero
since no law or contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit.
Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held
liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be
held liable.[68] Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the
balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of
US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.[69] On the other hand, the requirements of an award of exemplary damages are:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after
the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is thus in order.
However, we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as
reduced by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given
discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.
We believe that the amounts of P300,000.00 and P200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively, would be sufficient and reasonable. Because exemplary damages are awarded,
attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1). We affirm the appellate
courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the
Resolution dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby
reduced to P300,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTONABLE WRONG
DAMAGES, CONCEPT AND KINDS
(48) Manuel vs People of the Philippines

476 SCRA 639
FACTS:
Eduardo Manuel was first married to Rubylus Gana on July 18, 1975, who was charged with estafa
and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him since his last visit. Manuel met Tina
Gandelera who was then 21 years old. After 3 months they got married in Baguio without Tina
knowing the subsequent marriage of Manuel. After 3 months of marriage Tina learned about the
first marriage, she then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Manuel. Manuel in his defense
claimed that he declared himself single in the marriage contract because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he need to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The trial court sentenced him 6 years and
10 months imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 for moral damages. Manuel appealed before the
CA contending his good faith with no malicious intent to hurt Tina. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court with modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that petitioners wife cannot be declared or presumed
dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code and no judicial declaration of presumptive death provided
in Article 41 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The petitioner is held to have acted with malice in marrying Tina. Ignorantia Legis non excusat.
Where the spouse is absent for requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage after securing judgment of declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid
conviction of bigamy. Judgment is proof of good faith and so in the case, the absent spouse
reappears, the present spouse may not be held for bigamy. The court ruled that the petitioners
collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after marriage were willful, deliberate and with
malice, thus causing injury to the latter. The court awards moral damages to the innocent wife.
(49) UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs ROMEO A. JADER

G.R. No. 132344 (February 17, 2000)
FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st semester,
he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by
Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the
professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April
16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a
leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU.
Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar
exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations due to UEs negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
RULING:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the
latters actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he
was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as
what Court of Appeals held because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in
relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt
only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as
documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is
ordered to pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint
until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of
the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted.
(50) Viola Cruz vs NLRC

G.R. No. 116384 (February 7, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cruz was hired and employed by respondent Norkis as cashier/bookkeeper in its
Cagayan de Oro City branch and was later transferred to its Valencia, Bukidnon branch. On
October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were busy making an inventory of the
things to be moved preparatory for transfer, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to
the hospital. Starting October 15, 1990, respondent Norkis was informed of petitioners condition
and was able to recruit a replacement. Petitioner sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify the
status of her employment as an answer she received a termination letter. Petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent and asked for reward damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
from private respondent.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there is merit in petitioners submission that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal. Award of moral and
exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee has been
harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. Moral damages may be awarded to
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation occasioned by the employees unreasonable dismissal of the
employee.
This Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust
dismissals tainted with bad faith; where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is
far from noble.
(51) Globe McKay vs Barrios

119 SCRA 461
FACTS:
The petitioner cable company failed to deliver to the respondent spouses George and Olga Barrios,
both physicians, a cablegram from the Mercy Hospital in New York, which admits the respondent
wife for a rotating internship in the said hospital. As a consequence of which, she was unable to
signify her acceptance and the position was given to someone else. Respondent filed before the
trial court for award of damages for the petitioners negligence for its failure particularly considering
that respondents had received another telegram, identically addressed, delivered to them by
Eastern Extension, another cablegram company. Respondents alleged that such failure caused
them financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earnings for approximately six months,
serious anxiety and sleepless nights, for which the petitioner should be held liable. Petitioner filed
for Review in the Appellate Court to which had affirmed the decision of the Trial Court that
petitioner is grossly negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled for award for damages
RULING:
The Court finds the award for damages made by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals to be excessive. Taking into account the facts and circumstances, the petitioner is a quasi-
public corporation affected with public interest, that respondents would have had to incur living and
sundry expenses, thereby reducing the net earnings which they would have received, and that
respondent-wife succeeded in securing another better paying job approximately six months
afterwards, the judgment should be modified by reducing the amounts granted.
(52) RCPI vs CA
143 SCRA 657
FACTS:
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI).
However, at the end of the telegram were the following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT
BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages based
on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19. - Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the attached
message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which were not meant to be attached.
RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its
employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected greatly
his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of private
respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of
contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any
safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of
its concern for their clienteles interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its
employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It
cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.
Damnum Absque Injuria/ Injuria Non Fit Violenti
(53) Hotel Nikko vs Reyes

452 SCRA 532
FACTS:
An exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being held for
a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Amay Bisaya Reyes.
Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the
party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes
and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made
a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he
was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his
food, Lim approached him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told
Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him.
Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and
fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it
respectfully.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the
hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very
unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look
bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to
leave, Lim did so very close to him so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim
intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that shes going to tell Reyes and exclude other
guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes.
They do not know each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so
that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being
turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence
even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-
crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since
he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.
C. ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY

ARTICLE 21
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY, WHEN ACTIONABLE
(54) Abanag vs Mabute

AM P-11-2922 (April 4, 2011)
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against respondent for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The
complainant, a 23-year-old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent courted her and professed
his undying love for her. Relying on respondent's promise that he would marry her, she agreed to
live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent
brought her to a manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did
not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed
resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she
suffered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent breached a promise to marry.
RULING:
No. The sexual liaison is between two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a
natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court
has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married,
where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal
nor an unprincipled act.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct,
it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry. However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to
be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or
scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as
ARTICLE 33
CIVIL This
private individuals. LIABILITY FOR
is the best way DEFAMATION,
to preserve FRAUD,
and protect the integrity PHYSICAL
and the good name of INJURIES
our courts.
(55) Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals

109 PHIL 629
FACTS:
Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered decision in favor of P (soledad).
Lower Courts decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by increasing compensatory
damages and moral damages.
Substantive Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?
RULING:
When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover
moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical
and hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees.
Because of defendant-appellants seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for

him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman
after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new
Civil Code.
(56) BEATRIZ GALANG vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

4 SCRA 55
FACTS:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother
was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and
her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino
Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception
of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for
which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon
arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the
house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in
said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all
arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these
arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where
theylived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by
Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a
residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding
application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence
certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their
hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away
because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach of
promise to marry?
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our
law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
(57) Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA

219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure approval of her
parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was
a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner
started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he
was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to
be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
RULING:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court
held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious
desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that
petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

(58) Wassmer vs Velez

12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending
wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.
But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that
he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one
day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and
eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral
damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested
the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
RULING:
Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it
was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of
the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against him.
D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ARTICLES 22 and 23
(59) Landbank of the Philippines vs Ong

(November 24, 2010)
FACTS:
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi
City in the amount of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five (5)
cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would be
short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10 million would be
payable in seven (7) years. The Spouses Sy could no longer pay their loan which resulted to the
sale of three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000.00. Angelina Gloria Ong,
Evangelines mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Evangelines father,
petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform them about the sale and assumption of
mortgage. Land Bank Branch Head told Alfredo that there was nothing wrong with agreement with
the Spouses Sy and provided him requirements for the assumption of mortgage. Alfredo later
found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. On
December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against
Land Bank, as Alfredos payment was not returned by Land Bank. Alfredo said that Land Banks
foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his assumption of the mortgage was done in bad
faith and that he was made to believed that P750,000.00 would cause Land Bank to approve his
assumption to the mortgage. He also claimed incurring expenses for attorneys fees of PhP
150,000.00 filing fee of PhP 15,000.00 and PhP 250,000.00 in moral damages. This prompted
Alfredo to file a case with RTC against Land Bank. On its decision to the case, RTC held that the
contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit
investigation conducted on Alfredo where he was disapproved. As such, it ruled that it would be
incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation under
Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo
and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo and Land Banks active preparations for
Alfredos assumption of mortgage essentially novated the agreement.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not
apply and in finding that there is novation.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law when it affirmed the
trial court decisions ordering Land Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00 with interest at
12% annum.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification to the appealed decision that recourse against Land
Bank. Land Bank contends that Art.1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should
have sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of Land Bank. The court agreed with Land
Bank on the point mentioned as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. However, Alfredo
made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage which Land Bank required from him would be approved. Thus, he made payment not as
a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor. Furthermore, the contract between Alfredo and Land
Bank was not perfected nor consummated because of the adverse disapproval of the proposed
assumption. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Court of Appeals that there was novation in
the contract between the parties because not all elements of novation were present. The court
further stresses that the instant case would not have been litigated had Land Bank been more
circumspect in dealing with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment from Alfredo even before a
credit investigation was underway and also failed to informed him of the disapproval. The court
found that there was negligence to a certain degree on the part of Land Bank in handling the
transaction with Alfredo. A bank as a business entity should observe a higher standard of diligence
when dealing with the public which Land Bank neglect to observe in this case. The petitioners
appeal was denied by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed
with modification in that the amount of PhP 750,000.00 will earn interest at 6% per annum and the
total aggregate monetary awards will in turn earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
G. RESPECT FOR PERSONALITY AND DIGNITY OF OTHERS

ARTICLE 26
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
(60) Concepcion vs CA
G.R. No. 120706 (January 31, 2000)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion
St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing"
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor
Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities
with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence
Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after her capital investment
was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband
of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of conducting an
adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka
pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa
mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing." To clarify matters, Nestor went with
Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew
about the relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the
alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2)
confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo
backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo
called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill
Florence. As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the
extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do
business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the
Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and
customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity resulting in
frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her
husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and
payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas
spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages. In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned
Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to
protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an
appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas
spouses?
RULING:
Factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents. The court rejects petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such
award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It
does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an
invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores
the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms
that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant
consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the
culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently
protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then
the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected,
and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind.
It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in
Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions
are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts.
Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting,
humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages
which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive,
scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he
made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could
talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said that
he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florences
husband). How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he
would protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not say.
Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the
issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the
matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even
in public, to the latter's humiliation. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.
H. NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF PUBLIC SERVANT

ARTICLE 27
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
(61) Amonoy vs Spouses Gutierrez

G. R. No. 140420 (February 15, 2001)
FACTS:
In Special Proceedings No. 3103 for the settlement of an estate involving six parcels of land,
petitioner was the counsel. The project of partition was approved and his client executed a deed of
real estate mortgage in the adjudicated lot in favour of Amonoy as payment for attorneys fees. But
after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was
declared closed and terminated. Amonoys clients died. Since his fees were not paid, he filed for
the foreclosure of the adjudicated lot which was opposed by the respondents, being the heirs of the
deceased.
Judgment was rendered in favour of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay the attorneys fees. Failing
in the payment, the lots were sold in public auction where the petitioner was the highest bidder.
The sold lot includes the house of the repondents. On motion of Amonoy, order for demolition was
issued.
By the time the SC promulgated its decision, the respondents house was already destroyed,
supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition issued by the lower court.
Thus, complaint for damages was filed by the respondents but was dismissed by the trial court but
the CA set aside said decision and ordered petitioner to pay respondents actual damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable to the respondents for
damages
RULING:
Well-settled is the rule that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a
loss without injury damnum absque injuria for which the law gives no remedy. This rule is not
applicable in this case.
The petitioner commenced the demolition but records show that a TRO was issued by the SC.
Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had
been suspended when he received the TRO issued by the SC. Petitioner is obliged to repair the
damage he caused.
I. ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME/ DELICT

ARTICLE 20, 29, 30 and 45
EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN THE CRIMINAL CASE UPON CIVIL LIABLITY
(62) Guaring vs CA
S269 SCRA 283
FACTS:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
RabbitBus driven by Angelo Cuevas and wth a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along theNorth Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga.. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where
theaccused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that
thedeceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court
thatthe civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal
liabilitynecessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from
hiscriminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case
shouldpursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a consequence of the termination of
thecriminal case based on reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,which
means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirswas
based on quasi delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict,the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was basednot on
a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held:The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when itincludes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civilliability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as onlypreponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that theliability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civilliability; and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said
incidentmust continue for the recovery of damages of the victims heirs. The case was remanded to
thetrial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.
(63) Manantan vs CA
G.R. No. 107125 (January 29, 2001)
FACTS:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at the
irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they should
borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get Nicolas at the
Manantan Technical School. When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00
they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas,
and Ambrocio returned home with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening.
Manantan, soon after, invited the others to go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and
were not able to bowl but rather decided to go to a night club. They decided to go home after the
festivities. Manantan drove the car.
Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas

and Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per h
ouralong the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a
jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision
but was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at thec
enter of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio
suffered minor injuries to his head and legs. The parents of the deceased filed a criminal
case against Manantan but the case was ruled in favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas now seek for the enforcement of civil liability
against Manantan. Manantan argues that he can beheld no longer be civilly liable since he was
acquitted of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.
RULING:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due toreasonabl
e doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first is acquittal
because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second is the
acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is extinguished while
in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil liability merely requires
preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.
J. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

ARTICLE 31
CIVIL ACTION BASED ON OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
(64) Bonite vs Zosa

162 SCRA 173
FACTS:
On the 24 of September 1968, Florencio Bonite was hit by a truck driven by private respondent. As
a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. A criminal complaint for homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs (now petitioners) against the respondent
Abamonga. Petitioners through their counsel, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.
After trial on the merits, the court acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same
accused for the death of Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th
Judicial District, Branch III. The court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages on 25 February
1971. In its ruling, the court held that since the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file and
independent civil action, and the fact that they have been represented by a private prosecutor in
the prosecution of the criminal case, the action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already res
adjudicata. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was denied. Hence,
the filing of this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is
deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate
civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.
RULING:
Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused in a criminal case, where the acquittal is
based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted and requires only a preponderance of
evidence. This is pursuant to the express provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was dismissed on
the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly,
petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages
The court held that the petitioners may also base such separate civil action for damages on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Acquital of the accused from the charge of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for the recovery of civil liability,
arising not from criminal negligence, but from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by
law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed to recover damage in both scores (delict and quasi-delict).
Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for
damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The
only requisite to file a civil action from damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in
the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. When the law does not distinguish, the court should
not distinguish.
The court a quo's ruling that the petitioners did not reserve the right to file an independent civil
action is without merit. Article 29 does not include any reservation requirement to institute an
independent civil action. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the latter's
acquittal in the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. The reservation requirement of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure has also been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an
unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a
reservation. This provision has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, declaring such requirement of reservation as ineffective.
Petitioners active participation in the prosecution of the criminal action does not bar them from filing
an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code.
The Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the court a quo was reversed and set
aside, and a new one is entered reinstating the action for recovery of damages by the petitioners
and directing the said court to proceed trial with the case.
(65) People vs Bayotas
236 SCRA 239
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital.
The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on
the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose
of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, and Quasi Delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED without qualification.
(66) Mansion Biscuits vs CA

G.R. No. 94713 (November 23, 1995)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered

numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of
the goods on November 12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion
Biscuit Corp., four postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer biscuits.
Four other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each were issued by Ty Teck Suan
with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp.
delivered the goods. When the first four checks were deposited, they were all dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to
replace the checks with good cash or good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed said request.
Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits
plus cash advance by Suan and the amount paid was applied as payment for the first postdated
check. Hong sent Suan a formal demand letter requesting the latter to make good the value of the
remaining dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof. Thereafter, the second
batch of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but were all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit
Corporation filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks were issued merely to
guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the complaint.
HELD:
The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject to these two criminal
cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of the Batasang
Pambansa Blg.22 because one important element of the offense is missing: that the check is made
or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee
the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complaint when accused Suan would place
orders. Accused are hereby declared not guilty of the offense charged.
ARTICLE 32
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(67) Cojuangco vs CA
(July 2, 1999)
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several race horses which he

entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 toSeptember18,
1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places,
respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms totaling more than 1
million pesos. Danding sent demand letters to the PCSO and Fernando Carrascoso for the
collection of the prizes due him. And PCSCO and Carrascoso consistently replied that the
demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the PCGG.
Danding filed a collection suit before the RTC of Manila But before receipt of the summons, the
PCGG advised PCSO and Carrascoso that " it poses no more objection to the remittance of the
prize winnings" Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso.
Atty. Mendoza refused to accept the money since a case was also filed against them. After trial,the
RTC ruled in favor of Danding and ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the amount claimed
plus interest, damages and attorneys fees. The trial court ruled that
PCSO and its then chairman, Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject
racehorse winnings, since no writ of sequestration there for had been issued by the PCGG. It held
that it was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a
previous longtime associate of Danding in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had
supposedly been aware that Danding's winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that,
by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of Cojuangco and his family. CA reversed. It ruled that the former PCSO chairman was
merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of Danding. It noted
that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his cronies was notwell-defined. It also noted that the following actuations of
Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his
prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice
to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed
no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and
the law.
RULING:
No. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to
some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Carrascoso have not acted in
bad faith in the present case. The facts would show that he was actually uncertain whether the
race horse winnings should be included in the sequestration orders as this is shown in
Carrascosos letters to PCGG Chairman Salonga. Moreover, the finding of bad faith against
Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently
appointed chairman of the PCSO when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize
which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such
payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of
plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof,
interposed no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all
the winnings due to Danding. The rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot
be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefore
under the Civil Code However, Carrascoso may still be held liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code
for violating Dandings right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Under this
provision it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. While Carrascoso may have
relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis
therefore. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued
specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of Danding. There was apparently no
record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order
requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.
The withholding of the prize winnings of Danding without a properly issued sequestration order
clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Hence, he is liable for
nominal damages.
(68) Alcuaz vs Philippine School of Business Administration Quezon

City Branch
161 SCRA 7 (May 2, 1988)
FACTS:
In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the
premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered into
among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was
alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the
school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to
the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view
of their participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening professors were
sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression

and assembly and of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the
courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the schools
administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of
letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against them.
With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, the
respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors during
and when the investigation was going on.
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their
education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort
to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of
speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always
be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic
freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to
subvert freedom into degenerate license.
(69) Non vs Dames

185 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in the private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc, in Camarines Norte were not
allowed to re-enroll by the academic year 1988-1989 for leading and participating in student mass
actions against the respondent in the preceding semester. The subject of protest, however, was
not made clear.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission to the school, but the trail court
dismissed the petition, saying that the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-
enrollment with the respondent college when they adopted, signed and used its enrollment form,
which states that the respondent reserves the right to deny admission of students whose
scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose
conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the
efficient operation of the college. Therefore, students are required to behave in accord with the
respondent colleges code of conduct and discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners right to freedom of freedom and assembly infringed
RULING:
The protection to the rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly
available to students. However, there were limitations. The permissible limitation on student
exercise of Constitutional rights within the school presupposes that the conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason should not materially disrupt class work or must not involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
(70) Arafiles vs Philippine Journalists Inc.

FACTS:
About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the
Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National
Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director,
for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a
sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter
interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondents
newspaper which wrote, GOVT EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication,
petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner
alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-
up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with
malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING:
Petition denied. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to
contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline
and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS
actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently
convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita
had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider
that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable
them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
(71) NTERNATIONAL FLAVORS vs ARGO

G.R. No. 130362 (September 10, 2001)
FACTS:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of
the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H.
Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his
Personal Announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for
damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional
TrialCourt of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional
TrialCourt granted IFFIs motion to dismiss for respondents failure to reserve its right to institute a
separate civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional
Trial Court granted Argos and Pinedas petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in
an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages
and on the contrary, the complaint was replate with references that IFFI was being sued for its
subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an action against
the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce
its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in
the criminal case or when the employee adjudgedguilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the
Supreme Court granted IFFIs petition for dismissal.
(72) Marcia vs CA
G.R. No. L-34529 (January 27, 1983)
FACTS:
In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and
driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in
the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI
of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners
against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless
imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the
CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and
that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
RULING:
No. Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article
33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The
injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they
were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in
connection therewith. The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries
but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries
suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution.
(73) Ruiz vs Ucol

153 SCRA 14
FACTS:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed

anadministrative charge against defendant-appelle Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health
center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere
tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucols husband against Ruiz.
She was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol
based on thealleged libelous portions of Ucols answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then
granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action
for damages.
RULING:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case since the decision of the trial court did
not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an
offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from the
criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The court found that the appeal of Ruiz is
without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a
harassment suit on the following grounds.
1. Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint
2. Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer in the administrativecase after
the administrative cases dismissal.
3. Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very
case where he was the complainant.
4. After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.
ARTICLE 34
CIVIL LIABILITY OF MEMBER OF MUNICIPALITY OR CITY POLICE
(74) Barredo vs Garcia

73 PHIL 607
FACTS:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage thereby
killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla
and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and theemploy
er of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that negligence
of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under Article 1903
which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within hisrights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because
by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence andhas no property. It
was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that
Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed to
overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo
would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising
from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article1903.
B. STANDARDS/NORMS OF HUMAN CONDUCT

ARTICLE 19
Theory of Abuse of Rights
(75) Beltran vs People

G.R. No. 137567 (June 20, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the
civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is aprejudicial
question to the criminal case of concubinage.
RULING:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other th
an theproof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long
as thereis no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for
concubinage.
(76) City of Pasig vs COMELEC

(September 10, 1999)
FACTS:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of
Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite
on the creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to suspend
or cancel the scheduled plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay
involve areas included in the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of
boundary dispute, hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case
shall have been finally decided by the court.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued anotherordinance,

creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Again the Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel the
plebiscite on the same ground as for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan.
The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in
abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme Court,
arguing that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for beingmoot because the
plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the residents. Hence, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the City
of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still
in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome
of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation of
the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified
territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the governmental powers of the
LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover,
considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held.
The issues raised are still pending and must first be resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance; and
the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico should be annulled
and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final resolution of the
boundary dispute.
(77) Diaz vs Merced

109 Phil 155
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he
married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeths
relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal
case on grounds of prejudicial question.
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold the trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final
termination of the Civil Case. Reason alleged for the motion is that the civil action involves facts
which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
RULING:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
secured.
The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must
precede the criminal action for bigamy.
(78) Donato vs Luna

G.R. No. L-53642 (April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor
filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner
Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to
a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for
nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. In an order dated April
7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of
Landicho vs. Relova. The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds
for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila
should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
RULING:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the
second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as
to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
IV. PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
A. NATURAL PERSONS
ARTICLE 40
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
(79) Geluz vs CA
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazos wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician Antonio Geluz,
through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar
were legally married. To conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to have it aborted
by Geluz. She had an abortion again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
employed at COMELEC.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another abortion at
Geluz clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor has he given consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same
RULING:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an

aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find any basis for an award of
moral damages. Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would
be the beneficiaries.
It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made since he sued
Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which
under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
(80) Continental Steel vs Montano

G.R. No. 182836 (October 13, 2009)
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The
claim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while
she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company
granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner
argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus
without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the
benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillanos case.
They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil
Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued
that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die.
Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
RULING:
No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in
this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in
fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39
weeks without depending upon its mother.
ARTICLE 41
PRESUMPTION ON CAPACITY TO ACT
(81) Catalan vs Basa

G.R. No. 159567 (July 31, 2007)
FACTS:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June
1951he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to
herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian filed an action or
declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the
donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the
donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.
RULING:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation
is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden
of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed
capable of attending to his rights.
ARTICLE 38-39
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
(82) Eugenio Domingo vs CA

G.R. No. 127540 (17 October 2001)
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including
a house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. Petitioners Domingo, Mangabat and Capalungan who claim
to be Paulinas closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the property by means of
stealth, force and intimidation and refused to vacate the same. Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for
reinvindicacion against petitioners in the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging their ownership of the
land through the deep of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan and since then have been in
continuous possession of the properties and introduced permanent improvements thereon.
According to the petitioners, the deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious since they
inherited the three lots and the permanent improvements as nearest surviving kin within the fifth
degree of consanguinity to Paulina. The RTC ruled in the petitioners favor, declaring them the
lawful owners of the contested land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and
ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject properties and surrender possession thereof.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Paulina Rigonan was competent to enter into said contract
RULING:
In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was
already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a
year when the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed
were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a
person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities.27 However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to
prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is
undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of
the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She
narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there
is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for
her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received
by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial court's finding and conclusion on the matter:
The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was
ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of
land including the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null and
void ab initio.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the decision of the Batac
RTC is reinstated.
(83) Mendoza vs Ozamiz
G.R. No. 143370 (February 6, 2002)
FACTS:
On April 28, 1989, Carmen Ozamiz sold to her nephews, Mario, Antonio and Luis, all surnamed
Mendezona, three parcels of residential land in Cebu City, per a Deed of Absolute Sale or a
consideration of P1,040,000.00, in which deed the usufructuary rights were reserved during her
lifetime.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the property described in the complaint was sold, with
reservation of usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to the plaintiffs under a valid contract,
voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of sound mind, for sufficient and good
consideration, and without fraud, force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised upon
her, and consequently, the Court orders the defendants herein to acknowledge and recognize the
plaintiffs title to the aforecited property and to refrain from further clouding the same
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the factual findings of the trial court
and ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the
petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the
time of the execution of the contract the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously
impaired. Thus, the appellate court declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale of April 28, 1989 is null
and void. It ordered the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the petitioners names and
directed the issuance of new certificates of title in favor of Carmen Ozamiz or her estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmen Ozamizs mental faculties were seriously impaired when she executed the
said contract on April 28, 1989 thus render the sale null and void?
RULING:
In this petition at bench, Carmen Ozamizs mental faculties were seriously impaired when she
executed the said contract on April 28, 1989.
It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years
or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental faculties to
such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is
she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the
time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to
continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and freedom from undue
influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown.
Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
(84) People vs Bugalao

G.R. No. 154757 (October 5, 2011)
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court imposed upon accused-appelant of death for each count of rape. The
Court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Repuiblic Act No.
9346. Which prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of
moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, both Information charges a crime of rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A when committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. This crime was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to
have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance was
alleged in the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether the presence of aggravating circumstance of the case show highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender? In the case of (2) counts of rape and suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
RULING:
The petition was denied. Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape and sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications.
(85) Oropesa vs Oropesa

G.R. No. 184528 (April 25, 2012)
FACTS:
This is a petition for review (Rule 45), CA affirmed the order by RTC Paranaque dismissed Nilos
petition for guardianship over the properties of his father (widower). Nilo alleged that his father was:
-afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a
stroke in 2003
- that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization.
- that even before his stroke, he was observed to have had lapses on memory and judgment,
showing signs of failure to manage his property.
- due to his age and medical condition, he cannot w/out outside aid, manage his property wisely
and become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his GF
(Luisa Agamata).
RTC: Nilo failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Oropesa is incompetent to run
his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Gens demurrer to evidence is granted, and
the case is dismissed
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is considered an incompetent person as defined under Sec 2, Rule 92
of the ROC who should be placed under guardianship.
RULING:
The petition is without merit. Sec 2: Incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation. Finding that a person is incompetent should b anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to support his claims that his father is
incompetent due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. The only medical
document presented report of neuropsychological screening proves that he is indeed competent to
run his personal affairs
.
(86) CREWLINK, INC. versus EDITHA TERINGTERING

G.R. No. 166803 (October 11, 2012)
FACTS:
Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and inbehalf of her
minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of deathbenefits, benefit for minor
child, burial assistance, damages and attorneys fees.Editha alleged that her husband entered
into an overseas employment contract withCrewlink he took a medical exam and was declared fit
to work. On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was
denied byCrewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is enough that Jacinto
died during the term of his contract and while still on board. She asserted that Jacinto was suffering
from a psychotic disorder, or mood disorder bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not
deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder. Crewlink alleged that Jacinto
jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first time and someone was assigned to watch over
him. He jumped off a second time and was no longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not
entitled to the benefits because Jacinto committed suicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacinto was insane.
RULING:
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable
to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than
her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or
any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even
show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may
result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue
of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition
of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behaviour. Establishing the insanity of
an accused requires opinion/testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a
person was insane based on the witness own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim
(87) Cordora vs COMELEC

(February 19, 2009)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint affidavit before respondents law department against Gustavo
Tambunting asserting that he made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that
he is a natural born Filipino and a resident before the local election in 2001 and 2004. Petitioner
alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for lacking requirements for residency and
citizenship. Petitioner presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigrations which he stated
that, in two instances Tambunting claimed that he is an American and that he acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2000. Tambunting on the other hand
maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy; he also
presented his birth certificate which showed that he was born to a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambuntings possession of an American passport did not mean that he is not a Filipino
citizen; he also took an oath of allegiance in 2003 pursuant to RA 9225.
The COMELEC law department recommended the dismissal of the complaint because it failed to
substantiate the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC law department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that petitioner failed to
support his accusation by sufficient and convincing evidence. Tambunting could be considered a
dual citizen and moreover, he had renounced his American citizenship when he filed his candidacy
in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed for a petition but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC is right in considering Tambunting a natural born Filipino
RULING:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of A Filipino mother and an American father. He claims
that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth.
The Court affirms the previous decisions that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of
the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for him to undergo the process of
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship, which he had already at birth. The
certification showed by the petitioner claiming he is an American was refuted by Tambunting by
presenting same certificate that showed he is a Filipino. Clearly, he possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the2001 elections. The fact that he had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
(88) Reyes vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 207264 (June 25, 2013)
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is
without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her
oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18, 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution
dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which
petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to
the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013
COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
RULING:
Petitioner was denied of due process.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should
be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-
acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
(89) Go vs Republic
GR No. 202809 (July 2, 2014)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law. Aside from his representation of all other requirements, petitioner presented, as
witness, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go and Juan Go.
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had
no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that
petitioners medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioners family, said that
he had known petitioner since childhood through his association with the family in times of
celebration. Teresita described him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities
sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by profession, also
claimed that he knew petitioner personally.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for nasalization that the petitioner possessed
the qualification set forth by law. But the CA reversed and set aside said decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gos petition for naturalization should be granted.
RULING:
No, Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and
formal compliance with CA No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
enumerated under the law, and present at least two character witness to support his allegations.
(90) Agbay vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199113 (March18, 2015)
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased
a lot where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is a public land and part of the salvage zone. In April 2007,
David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated
that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she
also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile,
David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court. David
filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was denied.
Meanwhile, CENRO rejected Davids MLA, ruling that the latters subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an information for Falsification
of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court and a warrant of arrest was issued
against the David. The latter then filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause,
which was denied. Davids petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public
Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
RULING:
Yes. Section 2 of RA 9225 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by
the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225,
he belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who
lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA
63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 92 25 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect in so far as his dual
citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article172, paragraph 1.
(91) Olaguer vs Purugganan

G.R. No. 158907 (February 12, 2007)
FACTS:
Alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 share of stocks (worth 600k), employedas EVP
Businessday Corporation, President of Businessday Info System and Svces&Businessday
Marketing Corp. Active in the political opposition against Marcos together withresps Raul Locsin
and Enrique Joaquin. Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwrittenagreement that, in the
event that Eduardo was arrested, they would support the Eduardos familyby the continued
payment of his salary. Executed a Special Power of Attorney on 5/26/79appointing Locsin, Joaquin
and Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring petitionersshares of stock with Business day.
During trial, Eduardo testified that he agreed to execute theSPA in order to cancel his shares of
stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of
Businessday, in the event of a military crackdownagainst the opposition. Parties acknowledged the
SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan,Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of
Businessday, and at the same time, a notary publicfor Quezon City. By the time he was released
from prison 6 years later, he was no longer ashareholder in the said bank. According to the
respondents, they were just doing what wasaccorded in the SPA, given that the price of theirs
plummeted below market value because of thestigmabrought about by Olaguer being a very
prominent oppositionist.
ISSUE:
Whether absence as mentioned in SPA should be understood as that of NCC 381.
RULING:
NO. If it were, then the very existence of that SPA would be rendered nugatory.Olaguer has to be a
minor or insane for that SPA to have function. An SPA has to be construedstrictly but its provision
has to be construed as to its existence, i.e. understood in a way that willgive more power/ function
to that SPA. Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave powers tothe respondents to actually
dispose of his share, he cannot therefore assail such now. And evenif the said contract is
assailable, it was already ratified by the reception of the amount 600,000 byOlaguers wife and in-
laws from 1980-1982.
(92) Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis sr. vs. Juana Gonzales

G.R. No. 185922 (January 15, 2014)
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven children. In 1944, when Capitolina
died, Dr. Mariano took Juana as his common-law wife. They begot a child, Mariano. When Dr.
Mariano married Juana in 1974, he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano Jr., as his heir.
Mariano Jr., in turn married Larcelita with whom he has four children, Ma. Theresa Joana, Ma.
Cristina, James Mark, and M. Thea, all minors.
When Dr. Mariano Sr., died in 1995, he left behind several properties. Prior to his death, or in 1994,
he executed a Deed of Donation in favour of his grandchildren with Juana, a parcel of land and a
commercial building, which were among several properties he left behind when he died.
Claiming that the Deed of Donation prejudiced their legitime, the heirs of Dr. Mariano Sr., from the
first marriage filed an action for the RTC for revocation of the deed of donation, inventory,
liquidation and property of the late Dr. Favis. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favour of
the plaintiffs and ordered the annulment of the deed of donation as well as the inventory and
partition of the property of the late Dr. Favis.
The defendants seasonably filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failure to comply with a condition
precedent for filing a case, that is, by not exerting earnest efforts towards a compromise.
ISSUE:
May the Court of Appeals dismiss motu propio a case for failure to comply with a condition
precedent (failure to exert earnest efforts toads a compromise)?
RULING:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
ARTICLE 42
EFFECTS OF DEATH
(93) People vs Bayotas

G.R. No. 102007 (September 2, 1994)
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
the civil liability of Bayotas arising from his commission of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability.
RULING:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal liabilities are
extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by
way of separate civil action and may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on
the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his criminal liability upon his
death.
(94) Valino vs Adriano

G.R. No. 182894 (April 22, 2014)
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office,
married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2)
sons, three (3) daughters, and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned
about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were
not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was
buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than
twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living
together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She
contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in
a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos
last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents.
Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed
at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer,
transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park
in Novaliches, Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
CIVIL LAW: article 305 in relation to article 1996
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies
the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the
same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
CIVIL LAW: common law relationships

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law
partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and
sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter
forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he
should be considered a spouse having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his
common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or
legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the
facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to
the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling
significance.
To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty
to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to
Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in
their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valinos
claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the
supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and indefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor,
solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

(95) Berot vs Siapno

G.R. No. 188944 (July 9, 2014)
FACTS:
On May 23, 2002, Macaria and petitioner spouses Rodolfo and Lilia Berot obtained a P250, 000.00
loan from respondent Siapno. As security for the loan, Macaria and spouses Berot mortgaged to
Siapno a portion of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died. Because of
the mortgagors default, Siapno filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage and damages in the
RTC.
Spouses Berot alleged that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no
summons was served on her as she was already dead. Thus, the complaint was amended by
substituting the estate of Macaria in her instead. The lower court rendered a decision allowing the
foreclosure of the subject mortgage. On appeal, Rodolfo contends that the substitution of the
estate of Macaria for her is improper as the estate has no legal personality to sue and to be sued.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Macaria Berot has legal personality to sue and to be sued
RULING:
No. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much
so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. However,
petitioners failed to object to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria when
the latter was impleaded by respondents by amending the original complaint. Hence, the
defendants are deemed to have waived any objection on the personality of the estate of Macaria
Berot. An action begun by a decedents estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the
party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. A decedent does
not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
V. DOMICILE
KINDS OF DOMICILE
ARTICLES 50 to 51
(96) Marcos vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995)
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the same
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20,
1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the
March 20, 1995 deadline.
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of
2 to 1, came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification,
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31,
1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections, thus she may qualify for election for
representative?
RULING:
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place
of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances
leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which
is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
VI. MARRIAGE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
(97) Bernabe vs Alejo

G.R. No. 140500 (January 21, 2002)
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was
named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and
Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son
Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers estate.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and
that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son
RULING:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
(98) Fuentes vs Conrado Roca

G.R. 178902 (April 2010)
FACTS:
has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed
since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property
without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years.
Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within
the prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in
1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships
already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by
Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With
that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the
action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied
to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud
but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given
by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case
to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the
action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void
from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite
that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely,
the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
NATURE OF THE CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE
(99) Cercado-Siga vs Cercado, Jr.

G.R. No. 185374 (March 11, 2015)
FACTS:
Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that
they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married
last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their
father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land located at Barangay Kinagatan, Binangonan,
Rizal. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate
succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of
Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. Sometime in September 1998,
petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora
Ditablan has been extra judicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Petitioners prayed for
the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorneys
fees.
To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents:
1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued
by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3) Certification of
non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Pililla, Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record of
birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint
Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.
On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
The trial court upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the
subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that
the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial
court held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as
surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. Thus, the trial court ruled
that petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property subject of this
action.
Respondents appealed from said judgment.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of
Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same, as long as it is essential to the determination of the case before it. However,
the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private
document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the
appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive
proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco
attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court
for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action by
preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in its
Resolution18dated 14 November 2008.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the contrato matrimonial is a public document.
2. Whether or not the duplicate original of the contract is admissible and the original need not be
produced.
RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S.
v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are
no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before a private document is admitted in evidence,
it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.26 As observed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her
mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benitas handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is
illiterate.
2. We had previously ruled inVallarta v. Court of Appeals27 that a signed carbon copy or
duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original
and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But,
an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It
is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it
is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners argument still has no merit.
Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is
produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by
any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9
October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no
evidence of alteration.
The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court ruled that the requirement of proper
custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however,
we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita.
Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita,
it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the
extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.
(100) Espinosa vs Atty. Omana

A.C. No. 9081 (October 12, 2011)
FACTS:
On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omanas legal
advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a
document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the
conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow
employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not
valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD.
Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and
requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that
Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-
time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Omaa violated the CPR in notartizing the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. W/N the
Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
RULING:
SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving
the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
(101) Estrada vs Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651 (August 4, 2003)
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las
Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who
had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar,
a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that
it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
(102) Ancheta vs Ancheta

G.R. No. 145370 (March 4, 2004)
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and
had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children.
Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement
where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry
again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew
that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the
petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her.
Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner
was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was
filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage
with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among
others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never
received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals
dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
RULING:
NO.The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion, says the Court. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and
legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for
the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between
the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even
did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The
task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well. Petition is GRANTED.
(103) People vs Borromeo

133 SCRA 106
FACTS:
At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde
Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada
told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they
went to Susanas hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias
mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that
because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not
parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day
and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they
were married in a chapel by a priest.
ISSUE:
Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
RULING:
In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed
married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore,
the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage
which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not
invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil.
216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said
requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the
indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000.
(104) Corpus v Corpus
85 SCRA 567
FACTS:
Teodoro Yangco is the testator. He died in April 20, 1939. His will was probated in 1934. Yangcohad no forced
heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R.Yangco, (2) his
half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus,
the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4)Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his
half brother Jose Corpus. (Juanita had a legit son whose name was Tomas Corpus, the plaintiff) . Juanita died
in October, 1944 at Paluig, Zambales. Teodoro Yangco was the (natural) son of Luis Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Thomas Corpus. Before the union with Luis Rafael Yangco,
Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus (the first LEGIT husband), two of them
were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
The testate heirs of Teodoro had partition agreement. Tomas Corpus Jr. Signed a compromise
agreement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Teodoro Yangco entered into a similar
compromise with Tomas Jr. This agreement was approved by the court and became F&E in 1947.
After the agreement was signed, Tomas Jr. signed a receipt wherein he acknowledge his receipt of
P2000 as compromise.
Subsequently, however, in 1951 Tomas Jr. as sole heir of Juanita, filed an action for annulment of
Yangcos will, alleging that it is void because it perpetually prohibited alienation of Yangcos
properties. Such will being void, the partition is void, and the estate should have been distributed
according to Intestate Succesion .
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juanita Corpus, as represented by Tomas Corpus , may inherit from Teodoro
Yangco as forced heir.
RULING:
No. Juanita cannot be a forced heir of Teodoro Corpus in the first place. Hence, Tomas has no
right of representation.
The RTC found out that Teodoro Yangco is only a Natural Child.
The basis of the trial courts conclusion that Teodoro Yangco was an acknowledge natural child
and not legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, First I
declare that I have four children recognized: Teodoro, Paz, Luisa, Luis, which are my only heirs
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Thomas Corpus are presumed to be
legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Sempter
praesumitur pro matromonio.
Since Teodoro Yangco was acknowledged natural child or illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus
was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself legitimate, we hold the appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action of recovery of supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as
legal heir in Yangco;s state. Juanita Corpus was not legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate child and illegitimate relatives. The trial Court did not heir
in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
(105) Rivera vs IAC

182 SCRA 322
FACTS:
A wealthy and prominent man named Verancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claimed that to be the
only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed for a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Verancios estate. Adelaido Rivera opposed the petition denying that Jose was
the son of the deceased and averred that his father did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills. Adelaido filed with the RTC a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. The
petition was in turn opposed by Jose who reiterated that he is the sole heir. The RTC appointed
Adelaido as special administrator. It was also found out that Jose was not the son of the decedent
but of a different Verancio Rivera. But Jose insists that he is the sole heir, presenting marriage
certificate of his parents and his own baptismal certificate. He also presented a witness to prove
that he is the son of Verancio. The Court is not convinced, intriguing if it is true that he is the
legitimate son, why did he not assert his right when Verancio was still alive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, petitioner Jose Rivera has the personality to contest the wills
RULING:
The Court affirmed the challenged decision. The petitioner is not the son of the deceased, whose
estate is in question. Hence, being a stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have the legal effect.On the question of petitioner regarding the
authenticity of the wills, the respondent court considered them valid in accordance to Article 810 of
the Civil Code and that there was no necessity to present three witnesses required under Article
811 because the authenticity of the wills are not questionable.
(106) Abadilla vs Tabiliran

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 (OCTOBER 25, 1995)
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the
charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with
Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and
Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful
conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
RULING:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the
sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF EXISTENCE AND

VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
(107) Dela Rosa vs Heirs

480 SCRA 334
FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is
disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were
never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as
one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors, respondents here, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married and from then on lived together as husband and wife until
the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among
their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented pieces of competent evidence to support their claims.
Herein case that involves many ISSUE:s and pertains to who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
ISSUE:s that complicate its resolution. Nevertheless, the validity of marriage is to be reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
RULING:
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are

permitted to draw from proof of other FACTS. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The
following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and
wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of
the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
Supreme Court said in that they were not persuaded. First, although a marriage contract is
considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact
took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at
least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the FACTS stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon
to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In
this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
(108) Eugenio vs Velez
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
She cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of escaping. She
died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence on Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground
that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court ordered that the body
should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of
the court.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?
RULING:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child
and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another
woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
(109) Vda de Chua vs. CA

GR No. 70909 (January 5, 1994)
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28,
1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of
the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of
Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a
pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a
bachelor.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.
RULING:
The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could
not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between
petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali,
the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such
alleged marriage.
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful
wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.
A. REQUISITES OF A VALID MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 2
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES LEGAL CAPACITY
SEX/STATUS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
(110) Silverio v. Republic

(October 22, 2007)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto
to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for
reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male
but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that
there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
RULING:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or
if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he
intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of
entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.
(111) Republic vs. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676 (September 12, 2008)
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has
organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as
ruled by the lower court.
RULING:
The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it
failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest
therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the
local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in
his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality
which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY
applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the
foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To
him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
ABSENCE OF OTHER LEGAL IMPEDIMENT

ARTICLES 37-38
(112) Nollora vs People
G.R. No. 191425 (September 7, 2011)
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two
years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral
damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead,
she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert
way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that
he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the
one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told
her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned
that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got
married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article
35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to
Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano
due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15,
17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim
and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of
the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted
to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and
should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said council
fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27,
decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of his
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status
is thus further compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he
recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure
the criminal liability that has already been violated.
(113) Avenido vs Avenido

G.R. No. 173540 (January 22 2014)
FACTS:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla
is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was
recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II.
Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina,
which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her
claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and
certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died
on 22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the
marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact
of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in
accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?
RULING:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can
be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as
a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest.
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
(114) Donato vs Luna

G.R. No. L-53642 (April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor
filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner
Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to
a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for
nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. In an order dated April
7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of
Landicho vs. Relova. The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds
for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila
should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
RULING:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the
second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as
to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(115) Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy

143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage celebrated on July, 1978 with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Weigel on the g round that Lilia has previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion performed on June 25, 1972
Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting marriage and claimed that said marriage was
null and void. She asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence that:
The first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
The first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Lilia assailed the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on agreed facts; and the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying
petitioners motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the facts of the first marriage can change the result of the
annulment case filed by Weigel
RULING:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming as such, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable
(Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it
is clear that when she married the respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. The marriage of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under
the law.
(116) Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 (March 29, 1995)
FACTS:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent
Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through
a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991,
he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of
Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case.
FORMAL REQUISITES
1. AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
(117) Beso vs Judge Daguman

(January 28, 2000)
FACTS:
In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar
alleging
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiance BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar;
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor
and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN;
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at
all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my
marriage was not registered;
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the
Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:1.
solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction; 2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering our marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar because respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration
of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same
day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to
another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on
August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage
license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond
their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment
abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered
impracticable by the parties;1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired documents for
a valid marriage, which respondent found all in order1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited
Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so
doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
3. The failure of registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which
failure was also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of respondent: 3.1.
After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the three
remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his
office.3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to
the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three
last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman
to shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the
marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim.3.3. Considering the futility of contracting
complainant now that she is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis
of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after
August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that
said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" it seems reasonably
clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of
the marriage certificate:3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents
in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for
possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found
that respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5, 000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register
the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Daguman is allowed to solemnize outside of his jurisdiction.
RULING:
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
courts jurisdiction; xxx"
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that: ART. 8. The marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple,
or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect."
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect.
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by
it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not
only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing
so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in
the performance of their duties.
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its
significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior
to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.
A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of
his court. Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that.
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise
extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he
is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will
be dealt with more severely.
2. VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE
(118) Alcantara vs Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746 (August 28, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony
in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that
Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After
hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City
Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona,
Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place. The certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
RULING:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence,
petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents
of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the
validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
(119) Sevilla vs Cardena
G.R. No. 167684 (July 31, 2006)
FACTS:
In a Complaint dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on
19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry
of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Trial Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N.
Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well
as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license.
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman , the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already
retired." With said testimony it cannot just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil
registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that
no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied
in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient
to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
RULING:
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
Certifications presented bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted
to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage
Petition is DENIED
(120) Aranes vs Occiano

380 SCRA 402
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law for
solemnizing the marriage between her and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license. Because their marriage was nulled, her right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia
and her entitlement for a pension was not granted. Judge Occiano averred that before starting the
ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that
the parties did not possess a marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However,
due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes.Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the
petitioner because he officiated the marriage outside his jurisdiction and knowing that the
documents submitted to him lacked marriage license.
(121) Vda De Jacob vs CA

312 SCRA 772
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administrator for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of
a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Respondent Pedro Pilapil
on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported by an
Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought to intervene during the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceaseds estate
as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the
marriage between Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant claims that the
marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it
to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on the
reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage
Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere thumbmark was
purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage contract on 16
September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their
Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost
Marriage Contract mentioned in the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony
admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported
marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil,
sustaining his claim as the legallyadopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals sustained the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob was indeed valid
RULING:
Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.
Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An
affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years exempted them from the marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the
Civil Code).Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void because of the
absence of a marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the
Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract is the
best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents of a document may be proven by
competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offer or establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown
by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract. In the instant case, appellant provided
competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late
Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the
solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing,
and through the photographs taken during the ceremony.The absence of an entry pertaining to
1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing
officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be
duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was
not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of
marriage was not likewise rebutted.
(122) Trinidad vs Trinidad

G.R. No. 118904 (April 20, 1998)
FACTS:
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes,
his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following
evidence.
a. Testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. Testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios claims:
a. Testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. Her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a
neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the
baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are sufficient
RULING:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage:
fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other
documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced,
other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.
(123) Republic vs CA
(September 2, 1994)
FACTS:
In 1970, Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a
Court Judge. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. The couple
did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. When Castro gave birth, the baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas. Desiring to follow her daughter in the US, Castro wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, regarding
the possible annulment of her marriage. They discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. And it became her basis to file for the
annulment of their marriage. But the trialcourt denied the petition. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil
registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.As stated earlier, respondent
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of the marriage
RULING:
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. It will be remembered that
the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. The fact that only
private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. For her husbands
failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. It is noteworthy to mention that the
finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for
lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. Under
the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
(124) Sy vs CA
G.R. NO. 127263 (APRIL 12, 2000)
FACTS:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 in Quezon City. They had
two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal dwelling. Since then, they lived
separately with the children in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a
petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga which was later amended
to a petition for separation of property. In 1988, she filed a case of attempted parricide against
Fernando. However, the case was lowered to slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed for a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was denied.
On appeal, she raised the issue of their marriage being void ab initio for the lack of marriage
license. Their marriage license was obtained on September 17, 1972 while their marriage was
celebrated on November 15, 1973. Hence, the marriage license was expired already.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is valid
HELD:
No. Evidence shows that there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona. Marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Issue
on psychological incapacity is hereby mooted.
(125) Cario vs Cario

351 SCRA 127
FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her. In 1992,
SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior to his second
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days
after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao
was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of
the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of
the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and
void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also
claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
RULING:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment
of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party
shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned
by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated
to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which
provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding
the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
3. MARRIAGE CEREMONY
(126) Morigo vs People
G.R. No. 145226 (February 6, 2004)
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years, after which they lost
contact with each other. They reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when Lucia
was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986.
They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went back to Canada leaving Lucio
behind. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the court to take effect on Feb 17,
1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia,
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged with Bigamy in
information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG counters that
petitioners contention that he was in good faith in relying on the divorce decree is negated by his
act of filing a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy, and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
RULING:
No. The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the
subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance with the Family Code. What
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.Petitioner has
not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent is now moot and
academic.
EFFECT OF IRREGULARITY IN FORMAL REQUISITES
ARTICLE 4, PARAGRAPH 3
(127) Moreno vs Bernabe

246 SCRA 120
FACTS:
Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge Jose
Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The
complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be
married by him. The complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the
marriage is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be
held liable even if the complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant.
RULING:
Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court insisted
that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the judiciary and a
conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge displayed ignorance of the law which is
unacceptable for his position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.
(128) Navarro vs Domagtoy

259 SCRA 129 (July 19, 1996)
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in
Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise
solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
RULING:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being
a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-
compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively
liable.
C. FOREIGN DIVORCE
ARTICLE 26
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
(129) Fujiki vs Marinay

G.R. No. 196049 (June 26, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring
respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008,
Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with
Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese
court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki
then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue
requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only
the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed
as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor
General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not
apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General
argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
Castro v. De Castro and Nial v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
Recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
(130) Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna

G.R. No. 171914 (July 23, 2014)
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot
seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed
to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On
January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru
Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full
payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names
of the owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with
Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books
and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the
condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him,
the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no
children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding
all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce of Atty. Luna and Eugenia is void.
RULING:
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the
Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife)
is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce
decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending
parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even
if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event
that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article
119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their
property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil
Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.
To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the
case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.
Petition denied.

G. R. No. 18829 (August 20, 2014)
FACTS:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David
was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco,
California.
During their marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and in the USA. However,
according to the allegations of Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family
and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province.
with the properties in the United States remaining in the sole ownership of Leticia. The trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals directed the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. David insists that the Court of Appeals should have
recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Decree of Divorce obtained by the spouses in the Superior Court of California,
San Mateo, USA is recognized under Philippine Law in the Settlement of the properties of the
spouses which were situated in the Philippines.
RULING:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer
has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification
where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office
where the divorce decree was obtained.
(132) Edelina T. Ando vs DFA

G.R. No. 195432 (August 27, 2014)
FACTS:
On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil

wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga as evidenced by their Certificate of Marriage. On 16
September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under Japanese
laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly
issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Manila. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of
Manila. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil
wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga as an evidenced of their Certificate of Marriage.
In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of the
Japanese Family Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his
remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine
passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by
competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until
otherwise declared. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioners marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando must therefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise
declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be
declared entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol.
Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was later
raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent
and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court: (a) declaring as valid and subsisting the
marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise
declared by a competent court; (b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine
Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and (c) directing the Department of Foreign
Affairs to honor petitioners marriage to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine
Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well as
jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioners marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein
petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to
the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements
set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of absolute divorce in our country. It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that
herein petitioner does not have any cause of action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available
to the petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act
upon and grant, as it is only the family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 15
November 2010. In an Order dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her
petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family
Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest of substantial justice, the Order of the Court dated
November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already her
second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Code considering that the
first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never
recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi.
Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered as valid at this
time. On 1 February 2011, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February 2011,
considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished
with copies of the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce acquired between petitioner and Kobayashi is recognized under
Philippine law thus the second marriage of herein petitioner is valid?
RULING:
With respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport
to her under her second husbands name. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made in
accordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband
pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certified true copy of
her marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her
annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the
annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post which
has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first
husband. In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like
any other fact.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually
constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As
held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her
complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the
proper remedies available.
(133) TENCHAVEZ vs ESCAO

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in one of
Pastors friends house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicentas parents arranged for
them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a priest.
Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging that Pastor and
is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her
parents and Pastor went back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her husbands welfare in
her letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-prosecution because
she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her husband, she applied for a
passport, indicating in her application that she was single and left for the United States. She filed
for divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character which the Nevada court granted even when she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents Mamerto and
Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
RULING:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the remarriage of
divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to
a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other to
recover damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
(134) Republic vs Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577 (September 21, 2005)
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on
certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the
judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children.
In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to
the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children
inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity.
Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the
invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and
thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found
the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
ISSUE:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
MITIGATION OF CONSEQUENCES PRINCIPLE
(135) Van Dorn vs Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470 (October 8, 1985)
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,1975.
Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent
filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-Pof the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property; that
petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause
of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
RULING:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stop
ped byhis own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
(136) Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

GR No. 80116 (June 30, 1989)
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they
are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
RULING:
NO. Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered
and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
(137) FE D. QUITA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124862 (December 22, 1998)
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will.
On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of
the deceased Arturo, intervened.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be an heir of Arturo Padlan
RULING:
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only
to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary
estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should
be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
(138) San Luis vs San Luis

G.R. No. 133743 (February 6, 2007)
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a
motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that
the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and

(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988;
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration?
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province
"in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From
the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van
Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.Therefore, this
case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo
as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
CONDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION OF

FOREIGN DIVORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
(139) Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas

(August 11, 2010)
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas.
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding.
He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to
discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went
back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina
fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that
their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer.
RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens.
Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.
RULING:
Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
(140) Grace Garcia-Recio vs Rederick Recio

G.R. No. 138322 (October 2, 2001)
FACTS:
Rederick Recio was a Filipino when he married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. They
lived in Australia together but later on had a divorce there in 1989, in virtue of the decree of
divorce, issued by the family court. The respondent acquired his Australian citizenship before the
divorce was initiated.
In 1992, Rederick contracted his 2nd marriage with Grace Garcia in 1994. In 1995, they lived
separately and divided their conjugal assets in 1996. In 1998, Grace filed for a Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy claiming that she only learned about Redericks
previous marriage in 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decree of divorce submitted by Recio is admissible as evidence to prove that he
had legal capacity when he married Garcia.
RULING:
The decree of divorce presented by an alien is valid and recognizable. However, Recio failed to
show evidence to prove that he has legal capacity to marry Garcia, though he has a decree of
divorce. The decree was not authenticated by the consul or embassy of the country where it will be
used. Even after the divorce, the court may restrict marriages under some foreign statutes. In light
of this, respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his
status. Hence, legal capacity to remarry was not established.
The Supreme Courts words are:
xxx decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient.
(141) Republic vs Obrecido III

472 SCRA 114
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married to Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church
of Christ in Ozamis City. They had a son and daughter.
In 1886, the wife left for US bringing along their son. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that wife sometime
in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married another. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
RULING:
The court held that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
Hence, in the courts decision holding that Par 2 Article 26 of the Family Code be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
DIVORCE UNDER THE MUSLIM CODE

MC 45-55
(142) Llave vs Republic

G.R. No. 169766 (March 30, 2011)
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced. Since
then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon
his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
RULING:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage toEstrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personallaws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites.
(143) Marietta Zamoranos vs People

GR No. 193102 (June 1, 2011)
FACTS:
Marietta Zamoranos and De Guzman, both Muslims, were married in accordance with Islam laws.
Their marital relations were later on dissolved by divorce by talaq, also in accordance with Islam
laws. Zamoranos remarried a certain Pacasum, their relations turned sour, resulting to several
disputes over the custody of their common children and property. This caused Pacasum to institute
civil, criminal and administrative cases against Zamoranos. Administrative cases were dismissed.
The Civil case was also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for the marriage is governed by Muslim
laws and therefore the Family Code does cannot apply. The criminal case however proceeded and
an information charging Zamoranos with Bigamy was filed. Zamoramos filed a Motion to quash
such information but it was denied. This caused her to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper.
RULING:
YES. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy used to keep inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction to prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The SC found that the RTC indeed committed GAD for they did not take into
consideration the fact that Zamoramos and her first husband are Muslim. The charge of Bigamy
cannot proceed if it is not established that the first marriage of the accused was still valid and
subsisting while she contracted her second marriage. This determination should necessarily be
determined by Muslim law. The RTC, at the least, should have remanded the case to the Sharia
Courts.
D. VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES

2. CONTRACT SOLEMNIZED BY PERSON WITHOUT AUHORITY
(144) Moreno vs Bernabe

A.M. No. MJT-94-963 (July 14, 1995)
FACTS:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She
claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In his
comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize
the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent Judge contends that
he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in good
faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading
complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition. In
order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony,
with the express assurance that the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the
necessary documents were complete. In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized the
marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law." Respondent cannot hide behind his
claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability
but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.
Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
(145) Navarro vs Domagtoy

A.M No. MTJ 96-1088 (July 19, 1996)
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in
Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise
solemnize marriage of FlorianoDadoySumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
RULING:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being
a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-
compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively
liable.
3. CONTRACT WITHOUT MARRIAGE LICENSE
Article 35 (3) in relaton to Articles 27-34
(146) Alcantara vs Alcantara

(August 28, 2007)
FACTS:
On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same
day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent. Rosita
however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of
their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage is valid.
RULING:
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract
reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident,
is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the
domicile of the parties.
(147) Sevilla vs Cardenas

G.R. No. 167684 (July 31, 2006)
FACTS:
In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latters father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him
and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never
did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license
was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry
of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered, for the reason that the employee
handling is already retired. With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the
marriage license specified in the parties marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure
of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was
attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered. Simply put, if the pertinent
book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a marriage license issued?
RULING:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had
been exerted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony.Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.30
(148) Mallion vs Alcantara

(October 31, 2006)
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent wasnull and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
RULING:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as bar by prior judgment or estoppels
by verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res
judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or the rule of auter action pendant which
ordains thatissues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having
expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Courtfinds then that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is
denied for lack of merit.
(149) Cojuanco, Sr. vs Pala

438 SCRA 306
FACTS:
On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting marriage, wed Maria
Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on
November 1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the
complaint.
On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation. The
Assistant Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the
presence of respondents counsel.
On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend proceedings on
the ground that the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied.
The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of gross
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three years.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal
conviction in declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his
first marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for the
purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction when he declared
before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need
judicial declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same defense was
raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought.
We held:
xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument
ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold
Jordan Terre to his own argument, his frist marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal.
(150) CARIO vs CARIO
G.R. No. 132529 (February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao),
with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In 1988,
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146, 000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Respondent Susan Yee admitted
that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining
a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware
of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended
that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence,
we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the
records of this archives.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73, 000.00, half of
the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5, 000.00, and costs of suit.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Susan Nicdao with the deceased SPO4 santiago Carino is void ab
initio?
RULING:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case
at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable
to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract
of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. It is beyond cavil,
therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded
to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void
ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons,
like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the
sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
(151) Trinidad vs Trinidad

G.R. No. 118904 (April 20, 1998)
FACTS :
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes,
his siblings, and heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following
pieces of evidence:
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married

b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a
neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the
baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
ISSUE :
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are sufficient
RULING:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage:
fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other
documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced,
other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible.
Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

(152) ATIENZA vs BRILLANTES, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 (March 29, 1995)
FACTS:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent
Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through
a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991,
he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of
Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case.
EXCEPTIONS: MARRIAGES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCE ARTICLE 34
PERIOD OF COHABITATION
(153) Manzano vs Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 (March 8, 2001)
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void
and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administratorrecommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely. Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment,
hesitated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.00.
(154) Ninal vs Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778 (March 14, 2000)
FACTS:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfas death.
Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years
and thus exempt from marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the
death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a petition for declaration for nullity of
marriage (a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma
using the absence of a marriage license as a legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license
renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the
one described by the Civil Code. It is not the one described by the Civil Code because the
cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires five years.
If the respondent took into consideration the other years and months before the second marriage,
then the cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence
of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
(155) Sy vs CA
G.R. No. 127263 (April 12, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November

15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8,
1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then
on, lived with his father
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and
legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina
alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration
of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 1
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9, 1993,
denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando.
It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated November 21, 1996.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
RULING:
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain
us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
Petition is GRANTED.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time
of celebration
(156) Cosca vs Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents
are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court
II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized
marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able
to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay &
Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date
of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file
the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the
spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages
were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts
are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias &
Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte
was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal
solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon was valid?
RULING:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed
that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their
marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal
requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization
of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that
it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil
Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed
a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already.
However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days
old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what
is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started
living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit
in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides
that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable.
4. BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
ARICLE 35 (4)
(157) SSS vs Azote

G.R. No. 209741 (April 15, 2015)
FACTS:
In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a
deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another
set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no
answer. The SSC dismissed Ednas petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as
Edna could not proved that Edgardos previous marriage was annulled or divorced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member
RULING:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardos death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k)
thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latters SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage
with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was
already in force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no
impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of
Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second
wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits
of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is
required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic data
to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
(158) Jarillo vs People

G.R. No. 164435 (September 29, 2009)
FACTS:
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony in Taguig,
Rizal in 1974. Both newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a
church ceremony, in1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a
daughter. Jarillo, however, contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
celebrated through a civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged
marital vows in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed acivil case for annulment against
Jarillo. On the basis of the foregoing, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, that her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and void for lack
of a marriage license, and that the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where
Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement
declaring Jarillos marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos
psychological
incapacity. Jarillo, in her motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court as a ground
for the reversal of her conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy
RULING:
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration
of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo,
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent second marriage,
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid andsubsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would
a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
As held in Tenebro, since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidanceof criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage .
(159) MACARUBBO vs MACARUBBO

(February 27, 2004)
FACTS:
Florence Macarrubo, complainant, by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed a verified
complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Edmundo Macarubbo with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior
subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Complainant averred that when he started
courting her, he represented himself as a bachelor. They eventually contracted marriage which
was celebrated on two occasions and that although respondent admitted that he was already
married, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage
was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned her and their children without providing them
any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that she
was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage, but that she dragged him against his will to a
sham wedding to protect her and her familys reputation since she was then three-months
pregnant. Admitting having sired complainants two children, respondent denied ever abandoning
them and to refute the charge that he had abandoned them, he presented copies of fully paid
educational plans for the high school and college education of the children. Finally, respondent,
raised the additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant
is res judicata upon the present administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting
her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino. After
hearing, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation that respondent
be suspended for 3 months for gross misconduct and that he should comply with the moral and
legal obligations imposed upon him as a father of the children. The IBP Board of Governors
subsequently adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct
RULING:
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation
as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. Lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community. There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his
grossly immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. The penalty
of 3 months suspension recommended by the IBP is, not commensurate to the gravity of his
conduct.
(160) VERONICO TENEBRO vs COURT OF APPEALS

423 SCRA 272
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his
marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further
argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
RULING:
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
(161) Qulca vs CA
300 SCRA 406 (December 22, 1998)
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941.
No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a
final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving
no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters
of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that
the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that
the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previousmarriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
RULING:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of thedeceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamousmarriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
(162) Mijares vs Villaluz
274 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Priscilla de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz were married despite the pendency of Justice
Villaluz former marriage in court. Few days after the marriage, De Mijares and Villaluz had a
heated fight which led to exchange of offending remarks. Villaluz called the complainant a nagger
and told her to get the marriage contract and have it burned. Such unbearable utterances of
respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon.
Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant
rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even
bother to apologize for what happened. Several months after, she learned that respondent married
a certain Lydia Geraldez. Thus, the basis of this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent is valid.
RULING:
Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he
was facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in
civil case declaring the annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had not
attained complete finality, the marriage between complainant and respondent is not void but only
voidable.
(163) Wiegel vs Sempio-Dy

143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo
Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage. Having
been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and
void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
RULING:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will
not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing
evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under
the law.
(164) Balogbog vs Balogbog

(March 7, 1997)
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court
of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have
three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito
and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was
married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that
indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy
who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have
three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the
office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been
proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in
force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of
that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would
not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age
of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children
of Gavino.
(165) Tamano vs Judge Ortiz

G.R. No. 126603 (June 29, 1998)
FACTS:
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamanos death, Zorayda and her son filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as
single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC
RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment
against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia
courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction
since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be referred to
CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only
when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts,
the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature
of action?
RULING:
SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding. And
whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested
with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
EXCEPTION: VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
ARTICLES 41 - 44
(166) SSS vs Jarque

G.R. No. 165545 (March 24, 2006)
FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead. On December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the petition. Close to 13 years after
his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage
with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS beneficiary of Bailon.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits
on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void
as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailons marriage with Alice. Teresita protested the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was
not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may
terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon
RULING:
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil
Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved here falls under the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the
Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42
thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere
reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of
the spouses physical reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon &
Jargues marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
477 SCRA 277
FACTS:
On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet,
Camarines Norte.
On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an
order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition.
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolors counsel marked as Exhibits A to D,

respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor
of the Weekly Informer, and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court
confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.
ISSUE:
Petitioner assailed the trial courts decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground.
Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the requirements
specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order
1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied
with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988 before its Branch
Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, ,
rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant
case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had been published in
the September 10, 1988 issue of the Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official
Gazette issue of October 17, 1988
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional
requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there
was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner
concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which

affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the application of private
respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described therein is
DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court
which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it
was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the
fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those
documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of
its own record. But,the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December
1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.
Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of
the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however released for
publication only on 31 January 1989.
In petitioners brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the
issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could have easily resolved
the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but also by
ample jurisprudence
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the
provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides
that beforethe court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given
notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly
void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of
jurisdiction. And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks
authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application
should not be granted.
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in
the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious,the publication should precede the date of
initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication
only on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of
reference in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was
only on that date when the notice was made known to the people in general. Verily, the late
publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro
formanotice.
NOTES: In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, an issue similar to the one presented
in the present petition was posed, that is, whether theactual publication of the notice of the petition
in the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the
petition. We answered in the negative since the purpose of the publication of the notice of the
petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition
has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30)
days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case.
(168) Republic vs Nolasco

G.R. No. 94053 (March 17, 1993)
FACTS:
Respondent Nolasco was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's
contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose. Nolasco
further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he
had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address
of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination,
respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him
such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had
given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might
have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the
rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet
Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing
person's present whereabouts.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. The Republic
of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment
dated 12 October 1988. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial
court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to
form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead invoking Article 41
of the Family Code?
RULING:
Under Article 41 of the Family code, it clearly states that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to
be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. Petitioner's
argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for
his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities
or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that
Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be
said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were
all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances. While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco,
for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy
the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must
be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial
court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
(169) Valdez vs Republic

GR No. 180863 (September 8, 2009)
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio
until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document
to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June
1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with
Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio
RULING:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil
Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is
only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
valid.
(170) Bienvenido vs CA
237 SCRA 676
FACTS:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962,
without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May
22, 1961. The marriage was
solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelios marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or
the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelios death on May 28, 1988, he lived with
her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioners daughter, Nanette, stayed with
them as did Aurelios son, Chito, who lived with
them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were
staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his
name, Aurelio was described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner
Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 326681 was issued in petitioners name on January 11, 1985.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of
Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in
question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years,
that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisitas consent; and
that she was a purchaser in good faith.
ISSUES:
Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.

Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.
RULING:
RTC: (What is the RTCs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?)
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to
be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until
1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.
Court of Appeals: (What is the CAs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?)
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Although Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying in the
premises, the appellate court held that respondents action was not barred by laches because
Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had obtained title to the property. On the merit, the Court
of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelios first wife must be presumed
to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio
contracted a second marriage. On this premise, it held (1)
that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that
the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the same reason that donations between persons
who are
guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code.
Supreme Court: (What is the SCs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?)
The decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING the
complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelios
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers
to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting
spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this
case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita because apparently it was
Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had
already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in
1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the
conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place.
The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 326681
issued in due course in her name.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with
petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be
Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to
Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was
concerned, Chito could have been Aurelios child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore,
no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property
because she ought to have known that
Aurelio was married to Luisita.
(171) Manuel vs People

G.R. No. 165842 (November 29, 2005)
FACTS:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati,
which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. He met the private complainant Tina
B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having
his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was singl
e.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of
March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that E
duardo was"single." The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through
their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice
or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her. Sometime in January2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse,
he stopped giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they
exchanged their own
vows. After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyondreason
able doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil
Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article41 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase "or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law
were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like
annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. For the accused to be held guilty of
bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony : (a) he/she has been legally married; and
(b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of
good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. The requirement of judicial declaration is
also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require
that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community
and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances
the welfare of the community. In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two
willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each
other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an
invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may
well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the
first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided
for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of
the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse
(172) Calisterio vs Calisterio

GR No. 136467 (April 6, 2000)
FACTS:
Marietta is the wife of the deceased, Teoderico Calisterio. On 13 January 1946, petitioner was
married to James William Bounds. On 11 February 1947, James Bounds disappeared without a
trace. On 08 May 1958, after 11 years, Teodorico and Marietta were married without Marietta
having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. On 24 April 1992,
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate. On 09 October 1992, prespondent Antonia Armas y Calisterio,
a surviving sister of deceased, claiming that she is the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio,
and alleging that the marriage between the latter and respondent being allegedly bigamous and
thereby null and void. The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia, but the CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
RULING:
A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio
unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions
from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein
provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these circumstances to
be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by
a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse
of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time
of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask
for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article
40,[10] of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
PROCEDURE
(173) Republic vs Granada
G.R. No. 187512 (June 13, 2012)
FACTS:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at
Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the
relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007,
the RTC denied the motion.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated 3 April 2009.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the
RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
presented
RULING:
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
"as provided for" under the Family Code.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled
in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
6. CONTRACT IN VIOLATON OF ARTICLES 40, 52-53
DISTINGUISHED FROM BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE
(174) Nicdao Cario vs Yee Cario

G.R. No. 132529 (February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. He passed away on November 23 1992.
The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total
of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000. Yee filed an instant case for collection of half
the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her
marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she
became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased. In 1995, the trial court ruled
in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao?
RULING:
No.The court held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships. Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a
police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the
properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by
Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to
his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if
she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage,
she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his
legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other
than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
(175) Mercado vs Tan

(August 1, 2000)
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.
RULING:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after
Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is
void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
(176) Atienza vs Brillantes

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 (March 29, 1995)
FACTS:
An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge Brilliantes of MTC, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with De Castro who stays in Makati, Manila in
the house he bought and stayed while he is in Manila. Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent
Judge sleeping on his bed, upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent was
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant further alleged that respondent was married to a certain
Zenaida Ongkiko and begot five children. In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not
married to De Castro, he also denied having been married to Zenaida ongkiko, however admitted
having five children with her. He stated that the marriage between him and Ongkiko was not valid
since there was no marriage license and further claimed that when he married De Castro he
believed in all good faith of its intent and purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of previous marriage for purpose
of remarriage shall apply?
RULING:
As a general rule provided in Article 4 of the NCC: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a Judicial Declaration of Nullity is required before a
party can enter into second marriage however the said Code took effect only on August 3, 1988and
the marriages that respondent contracted was 1965 and 1991 however the provisions of this code
shall apply regardless of the date of the marriage, besides under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given retroactive effects in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws this is particularly true with Article 40 which is a rule
of Procedure, herein respondent has not shown any vested rights that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 this case.
(177) Domingo vs CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
Delia Domingo filed a petition of nullity and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig against petitioner Roberto Domingo. Alleged among others that they were married on
November 29, 1976 but unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz
on April 25, 1969; that she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. She has been working in Saudi Arabia while he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence. She discovered that
he was cohabiting with another woman and had been disposing of some of her properties without
her knowledge or consent. She prayed that such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact(her brother). The petition also prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary
RULING:
Family Code settled that a final judgment declaring the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required for purposes of contracting a second marriage. Parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. Art.
40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In which case "solely" would
clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage. Other instances where a party might invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage is in the case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, and in
the action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Marriage is
an "inviolable social institution. As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a
contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more.
(178) Beltran vs People

334 SCRA 106
FACTS:
In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but
after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage
due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain
Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found
probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting
rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court
denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated
the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in
the case at bar.
RULING:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should
his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement
that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
ARTICLE 36
CHARACTERISITCS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
(179) Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

GR No. 119190 (January 16, 1997)
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again,
there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or
sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in
1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was
kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want
to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
(180) Santos vs CA
G.R. No. 112019 (January 4, 1995)
FACTS:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things,
like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever
Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leouels marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
RULING:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt
the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs Hon Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429,
13 June 1994); thus: The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. Who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentially matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical
or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage
: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due ( cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws
on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. The petition is denied.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY:

ORIGINAL VS MODIFIED
268 SCRA 198
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married
in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends
on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at
the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her
husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological
incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this
case:
1. burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

2. root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
3. such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
4. such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials
of marital obligations of marriage
5. such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
6. decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
7. court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of
the state.
(182) Barcelona vs CA
412 SCRA 41
FACTS:
Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children. On 29
March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriageagainst petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriageto comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition
allegedthe non-complied marital obligations:During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due
to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, wasa disorganized housekeeper
and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the
whole dayWhen the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondentwithdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husbandOn November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria
and on the pretext of re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily
leave their conjugal dwelling.In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwellingThe
respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with theessential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found in the psychological examination conducted
on the relationship between the petitioner and therespondentDiana claims that petitioner falls short
of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action .
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana
RULING:
Yes, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or
omission as seen infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF
ILLNESS Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage petition does not need to
show root cause sinceonly experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical
incapacity Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. DIANA contends that the 2nd petition of his
husband is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the allegedpsychological
incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion
on thepsychological incapacity, it follows that there is no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine the root cause and at times they
couldnt determine it). What the new Rules require the petition to allege are physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo complieswith this requirement.
(183) Tongol vs Tongol

G.R. No. 157610 (October 19, 2007)
FACTS:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were
married. From their marriage they begot four children.On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati a verifiedpetition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Filipinas on the ground that she ispsychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas marriage was objected by the latters
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas parents, their attempts to break up their union and
their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk
shopbusiness, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his
junkshop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new
business venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and
began to
interfere with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. S
he alsoresented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the
subject oftheir frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the
income of hisbusiness to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their
children.Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however,
this was the fault of Orlandos psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of
theirconjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court. Evidence for Orlando
consisted of his testimony, his sisters, his employees, and Dr.
Cecilia Villegas psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent
only consisted of her
testimony. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Courts decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just difficulty, refusal orneglect.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third,there
was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychologicalincapacity
considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, notnecessarily
to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must
correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support for the family. Fifth,
marital obligations must not only include the spouses obligation to the spouse butalso that to her
children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearingand care of her
children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondentexhibited
Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, therespondent was
incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
ARTICLE 36
PETITION AS SUI GENERIS: RIGIDITY VS FLEXIBILITY
AS TO THE MOLINA DOCTRINE
(184) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557 (February 12, 2014)
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in
Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have
two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia
(Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively. 7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
(complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they
were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely
three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.1
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both
parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct."22 As for
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a
mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband,
adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only
manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couples union was bereft
of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."23
ISSUE:
Whether or not Natividad suffered psychological incapacity?

RULING:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos
which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be
characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's
condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital
obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the
incurability of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and,
hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr.
Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince
the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although
expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties
are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must
still be proven by independent evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court, however, does
not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the
Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be
declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's
duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the
Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these
reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

(185) KALAW vs FERNANDEZ

(January 14, 2015)
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone
had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more
children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6,
1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves the children without proper
care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She leaves the house to party
with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3) She committed
adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in the hotel room.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder and that it may have been
evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing.
Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family.
This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids
and husbands needs became secondary.
ISSUE:
Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity
RULING:
No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Malyns sexual infidelity was also not proven because she was only dating other
men. Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual infidelity cannot
be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground
for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
(186) GLENN VIAS vs MARY GRACE PAREL VIAS

G.R. No. 208790 (January 21, 2015)
FACTS:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in
civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however,
died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infants death was
caused by Mary Graces heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. The couple lived
together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production
engineer. Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn.
Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. On February 18, 2009,
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that
Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any
pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most
essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not
exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was
self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed
indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
left for an overseas employment in Dubai. To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought
professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist
Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as amply aware of his marital roles and capable of
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship. On the other hand, Dr. Tayag
assessed Mary Graces personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in college.
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the
couples fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-
oriented. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded
on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couples marriage due to psychological
incapacity.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already in her
system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. On February 18, 2009, Glenn
filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. On
January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary
Grace as null and void on account of the latters psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the
following as grounds: The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the
petition; Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of
the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary
Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her
marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Graces
disorder. On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC
ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA
stated the reasons; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological
condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sufficient evidence exists justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity of Glenns
marriage with Mary Grace?
RULING:
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or

psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the instant petition,
however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Graces
condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined
to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with
another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the
latter filed the petition before the RTC.
To use the words of Navales v. Navales: Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect
in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years
from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one
roof is not impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal
or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias
in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently
in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to
identify the root cause of the respondents narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags
conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition
except in a very general way. Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. If a psychological disorder can
be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit. The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity,
but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While
the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented
provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenns spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and
Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are
AFFIRMED.
(187) Mallilin vs Jamesolamin

GR No. 192718 (February 18, 2015)
FACTS:
Robert and Luz were married in 1972. They begot three children. On 16 March 1994, Robert filed a
case for annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Roberts petition was tried by the family court (RTC) of CDO. Robert alleged that
at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. He alleged that such incapacity became even more apparent
during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility,
deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent. (In the meantime, Roberts petition with Metropolitan Tribunal
and the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church was granted and their marriage
declared void) After the hearing, the family court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals
reversed family court and declared that there is no psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that there is no psychological incapacity
to warrant annulment of marriage
RULING:
Court of Appeals is correct.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity;
and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
What characterizes psychological incapacity to constitute grounds for annulment of marriage?
a) gravity
c) incurability
b) juridical antecedence and
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
When can the evidence of psychological incapacity be considered as medically and clinically
indentified?
Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that Luzs disposition of not cleaning the room,
preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male
visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity.The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother,
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
Is sexual perversion or promiscuity of an errant spouse alone enough to constitute psychological

incapacity? When can sexual promiscuity be considered psychological incapacity?
No. As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or excessive sex hunger. Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,
and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity. . respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to
establish that the respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
(Please observed however the tenor of the underscored portion of the decision. Roberts argument
that nymphomania constitutes psychological incapacity might have been considered had it been
backed up with proper evidence.
What is the probative value of the decision of the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church?
the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of
Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court stated
that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on
evidence. Thus: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be
decreed civilly void x x x. Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides: The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified. In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the
NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way
of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.
(188) YUK LING ONG vs BENJAMIN T. CO

G.R. No. 206653 (February 25, 2015)
FACTS:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co
(respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate
Church.3cralawlawlibrary
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent
residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with
respondent was nullified by the court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following
documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177; (2)
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306; (3) Decision,4
dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260
(RTC), Paraaque City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio;
and (4) their marriage contract5 with the subject decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was
perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been declared void ab initio.
The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of
nullity6 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. CV-01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioners address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo,
Manila. There was no showing of its status, whether pending, withdrawn or terminated.
On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of nullity7 on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent
indicated that petitioners address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes,
Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons.8 In his Servers Return,9 process server
Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of
the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner.
The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision10 in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding
respondents marriage with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on petitioner on August 1,
2002, but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public
prosecutor also stated that there were no indicative facts to manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC
concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment 11 under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court before the CA on November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed
against her. She prayed that the RTC decision, dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-
0306, be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because, as seen in Civil Case
No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the
trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in Civil Case No. 02-0306 because of
an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of
personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged
substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her
household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations.12cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 27, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment of
judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that
respondent employed fraud to insure petitioners non-participation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-
01-0177.
Relying on Robinson v. Miralles,13the CA further ruled that the substituted service of summons in
Civil Case No. 02-0306 was valid. It found that there was a customary practice in petitioners
townhouse that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and receive any communication
in behalf of the homeowners. With this set-up, it was obviously impossible for the process server to
personally serve the summons upon petitioner. It also declared that the process servers return
carries with it the presumption of regularity in the discharge of a public officers duties and
functions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution, 14
dated March 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview of
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.15
Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process servers
return only contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted to after several
futile attempts to serve the same personally,16 without stating the dates and reasons of the failed
attempts. Petitioner also reiterates her argument that extrinsic fraud was employed.
In his Comment,17 filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the servers return satisfactorily
stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002; and it was
improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address
which she declared in this present petition.
Petitioner filed her Reply18 on October 8, 2014 reiterating her previous arguments.
RULING:
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as

where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment,
that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.19 Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not
because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed
into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.20cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud
and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud, however, is too
unsubstantial to warrant consideration. The discussion shall then focus on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of
procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other processes on the
petitioner.21cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because
there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.22 If the
defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or
substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, which state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc)23 thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements
of a substituted service of summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
xxx
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff
to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite
why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed
or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on
personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of
the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve
the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements of the Court in Manotoc have been applied to several succeeding cases. In
Pascual v. Pascual,24 the return of summons did not show or indicate the actual exertion or positive
steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant.
Similarly, in Spouses Afdal v. Carlos,25 the process servers indorsements therein failed to state
that the personal service on the defendants was rendered impossible and that efforts were made to
find them personally. In both those cases, the Court ruled that the meticulous requirements for
substituted service of summons were not met.
There are cases, however, in which Manotoc was applied, but, nevertheless, it was ruled that there
was no lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In Sagana v. Francisco,26 the diligent
efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate the respondent were determined, not only based on the
sheriff's return, but also on the process server's notation and case records. In the case of Wong v.
Factor-Koyama,27 on the other hand, even if the sheriff performed an invalid substituted service of
summons, jurisdiction over the person of defendant was obtained because the latter had actively
participated in trial, amounting to a voluntary appearance under Section 20 of Rule
14.28cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-030629 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his
servers return,30 the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1,
2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons after
only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The servers return stated the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SERVERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of
petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St.,
Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to
serve the same personally. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient
age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.
Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of
August, 2002.
RODOLFO P. TORRES, JR.

Process Server
(Emphasis supplied)
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server
to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that
summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did
not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the
dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each
unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner,
who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner,
though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of
petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age
and discretion, the Security Officer thereat. It did not expound on the competence of the security
officer to receive the summons.
Also, aside from the servers return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which
would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent did not even
claim that petitioner made any voluntary appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-
0306.
The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not applicable. In that case, the return
described in thorough detail how the security guard refused the sheriffs entry despite several
attempts. The defendant in the said case specifically instructed the guard to prevent anybody to
proceed to her residence. In the present case, the attempts made by the process server were
stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
could be applied in the case at bench. This presumption of regularity, however, was never intended
to be applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that the
sheriffs or servers return is defective.31 As earlier explained, the servers return did not comply
with the stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to
uphold the CAs denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the
decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void.
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address [t]he numerous claims of
irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary
special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses.32cralawlawlibrary
Although the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002,
the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable
judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought
against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the
victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start
from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully
aware and ready for litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paraaque City
is hereby declared VOID.SO ORDERED.
(189) OCHOSA vs ALANO

G.R. No. 167459 (January 26, 2011)
FACTS:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 he, a young lieutenant in the AFP;
she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into
sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S.
Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their
union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-
old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in
her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as
the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were
given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup dtat. He
was incarcerated in Camp Crame. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in
various parts of the country, Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male
visitors in her bedroom
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caugh
t by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin.
Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer
bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona. During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar
admission to
Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the
needs of Ramona. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his
marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition
and nullified the parties marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal,
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential
marital obligations.
RULING:
There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects (sexual disloyalty with Jose, sexual
promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In
other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
juridical antecedence.
Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition (Histrionic Personality
Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual
circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias
for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. It is apparent from the above- cited
testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship
from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the
contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of
his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to
accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those
locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with
Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
(190) Yambao vs Yambao

G.R. No. 184063 (January 24, 2011)
FACTS:
After 35 years of marriage to Patricio, Cynthia wants out. She complained Patricio was indolent,
did nothing but sleep and eat all day, or spend time with friends. She was the only one who earned
a living. He went into several business ventures, but all failed. He loved to gamble. He did not
even help her in caring for their children when they still babies. He became jealous, insecure and
get mad every time he would see Cynthia talking to other people. When he started threatening
her, she became afraid and left home. Patricio denied the allegations. He had been trying to find a
decent job, but his old age and lack of qualifications got in the way. If he did find a job, he left
because the effort he exerted was not commensurate to the benefits for his family. He denied
gambling; how could he when he had no funds to gamble? As to the care of their children when
they were young, that is the duty of the household help. He also did not threaten Cynthia.
The RTC after trial dismissed the complaint. It held that respondent did indeed have many faults,
such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find
decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other
qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him,
since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures. Despite a supposedly horrible
married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly
any help from respondent, the RTC added. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage?
RULING:
The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. Article 36 of the Family Code states: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina, the Court has reiterated the tenet
that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be
decided based on its own set of facts.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of
the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents
efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide
for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by
his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is
clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many
failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or
ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help
care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a
psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to
psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
(191) Marable vs Marable

G.R. No. 178741 (January 17, 2011)
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay,
Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the
Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became
common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition
or to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep
feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so
self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground
of petitioners psychological incapacity.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) made an appeal and the CA reversed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision

RULING:
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the
afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr.
Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the
findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In
cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage.
Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause
of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no
factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful.
For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles and differences in handling finances and
managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not
manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void.
Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together.
Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact
worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal
differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as
valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
(192) AGRAVIADOR vs AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729 (December 8, 2010)
FACTS:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a

beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated
by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioners family was apprehensive
because of the nature of the respondents work and that she came from a broken family. They
begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of
the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible
immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed
away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take
care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use
the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex
with him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house, discovered
their love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she
engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with
her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to
marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took
care of their son at the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if
collusion existed between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed
the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and
documentary evidence as well as a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed
personality disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial
Courts decision on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondents psychological incapacity?
RULING:
No.The petitioners testimony established difficulty, refusal, and neglect. However, it did not
reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Moreover, Dr.
Patacs psychological report only enumerated the respondents behavioral defects but failed to
prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be
judged according to: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Additionally, the Molina case
set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity: (1) The burden of proof to show
nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological, not physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting,
and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of
used as a strict criteria or straightjacket.
(193) LIGERALDE vs PATALINGHUG

G.R. No. 168796 (April 15, 2010)
FACTS:
Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) filed a petition to declare his marriage to May Ascension A.
Patalinghug (May) void on the ground of Mays psychological incapacity. Silvino claimed that May
was immature, irresponsible and unfaithful. Silvino alleged that at one time in their marriage, May
came home at 4:00 in the morning; she claimed to have watched a video program in a neighboring
town, but later admitted that she slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino persuaded
her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother but his pleas were ignored and would
often lead to altercations or physical violence. Mays commitment to reform dissuaded him from
separating from her, and they started a new life. However, after a few months, May was back to
her old ways. One day, Silvino came home and could not find her; he searched for her and later
found her in a nearby apartment, drinking beer with a male lover. May subsequently confessed that
she had no more love for him, and they lived separately. The psychologist, to whom Silvino
referred the matter for psychological evaluation, certified that May was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was
still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage of Silvino and May void. The Court of Appeals
(CA), however, reversed the RTCs decision, holding that Mays alleged sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility did not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code, and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause of the
incapacity or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Silvino brought
the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court required May to
comment but she could not be found.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Silvino and May should be declared void on the ground of Mays
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
On procedural grounds, the petition before the Supreme Court deserved outright dismissal. Silvino
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court rather a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules. Substantially, the petition has no merit. The
CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. Psychological incapacity
required by Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. The Supreme Court had laid down the following guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Silvanos evidence failed to establish Mays psychological incapacity. His testimony did not prove
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mays condition. Even the psychologist failed to show the
root cause of Mays psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by
the totality of the evidence presented during trial. More importantly, Mays actions did not rise to the
level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires. Mays act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Silvano must be able to establish that Mays unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state. May was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character
flaws. But these imperfections did not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at
the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and
obligations.
(194) Reyes vs Reyes

G.R. No. 185286 (August 18, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in
1972 when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which
included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students
budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976,
petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with Ramons parents and they were supported
by them. They had a child which made their financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of
Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To make things
worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They
tried to attend counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner
confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. RTC granted the petition. CA
reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated
RULING:
Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent,
or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies
of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial
support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and
(7) criminal charges of estafa.
(195) Toring vs Toring

(August 3, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo Toring and respondent Teresita Toring were married and had 3 children.
Ricardo then filed a petition for annulment based on Teresita psychological incapacity. He alleged
that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who performed the psychological
evaluation conducted on Ricardo and their son, Richardson, testified that the major factor that
contributed to the demise of the marriage is Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that
rendered her incapable to fulfill her essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void due to
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
discharged by the parties to the marriage."
It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled
with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already
constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
(196) SUAZO vs SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 (March 10, 2010)
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any
means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and
Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this
often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito
thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the
alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns
testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The
RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation,
such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive
dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which
a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks but the CA reversed it and held that the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical
abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was
not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from
the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due
simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part
of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity. The psychologist

evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party,
could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation
may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos.
The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both
the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases
for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the
habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(197) Azcutea vs Republic

588 SCRA 196
FACTS:
After knowing each other for only two months, Marieta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta married each
other. Their marriage was okay at first but since Rodolfo cannot find any gainful employment,
Marieta began nagging him. In fact, it was Rodolfos mother who had to find an apartment room
near the mothers home for the new couple to stay.
Marieta would bring Rodolfo newspapers hoping that the latter may find employment. She would
give him new clothes and money for him to use for job interviews. One day Rodolfo informed
Marieta that he already found a job. Marieta was so happy but later she found out that Rodolfo was
not actually employed and that every time Rodolfo would go to work he was actually going home
to his mother and the salary he was receiving was actually coming from his mother. When
confronted, Rodolfo cried like a baby and explained to Marieta that he only did that so that she will
not be nagging him anymore.
At times also, when Rodolfo is drunk, he would become violent against Marieta.
And after four years of living together as husband and wife and childless at that, since Rodolfo also
did not want to have sex, Marieta decided to leave Rodolfo but she was hoping that Rodolfo
would follow her which did not happen.
Marieta filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated. Marieta presented as expert witness Dr. Cecilia Villegas. Villegas did
not personally evaluate Rodolfo but based on her interview with Marieta, she concluded that
Rodolfo is inflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder or may be associated with mamas boy
as he was too dependent on his mother so much so that he cannot decide for himself. She
explained that Rodolfo Azcuela is psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as Depedendent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
The RTC ruled in favor of Marieta but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.For
the CA, the totality of evidence does not support a finding of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
Yes. The ruling of the CA is reversed. The CA has no basis to make such a finding. Appellate
courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save
only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.
Rodolfo was already 28 years old at the time of the marriage.
The finding of Dr. Villegas that Rodolfo is inflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder is
considered a decisive evidence. A person with this condition cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
The court however emphasized that this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent
personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Psychology is not an exact science. Every case must be dealt with
independently. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the FACTS, as guided by expert
opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the
nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
(198) Alcazar vs Alcazar
603 SCRA 604
FACTS:
In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other. They lived together
for three weeks thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated
with Veronica despite Veronicas efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the
Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went straight to his parents. He did not even
tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his husbands return from
someone else. Veronica went to Reys parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the ground for annulment
was based on paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Reys failure to consummate the
marriage. But later, the ground was changed to psychological incapacity (Article 36).
During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who testified that Rey is
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be having a
grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too important, too unique, and too special.
Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Reys alleged sexual infidelity because when he
came home from abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain Sally in his parents hometown.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey should be annulled.
RULING:
No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that Veronica abandoned her cause under
paragraph 5, Article 45. The said provision states:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and
may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be
due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has
the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. No evidence
was presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact, Veronica admitted that she and Rey had sex
before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not exist int his case.
Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayags testimony on Reys NPD was not
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and Rey is merely a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his
wife. To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.
Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey is a poor attempt to bolster the claim
against Rey. Sexual infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica failed to establish
that Reys unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
(199) ASPILLAGA vs ASPILLAGA

G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
FACTS:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to Manila, she
discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin,
Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her
cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga
valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological incapacity
RULING:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has
been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties personality disorder; however, he failed to link
the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to
perform their obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will
hamper their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not
synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The intention of the law
is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the
basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders.
Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as
understood juristically.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of ones marriage as to
make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact,
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters are a
common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
(200) Najera vs Najera

(July 3, 2009)
FACTS:
Digna Najera filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, and Designation as Administrator of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains.Digna alleged that she and Eduardo are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but Eduardo is
presently living in the U.S. There were married on January 31, 1988; they are childless. Digna
claimed that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Eduardo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and manifested only after
the marriage as shown by the following facts: a.)At the time of marriage, Digna was employed as
an accounting clerk and Eduardo was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
dependent on Digna for support. b.)While employed as a seaman, Eduardo did not give Digna
sufficient financial support. c.) When Eduardo came home from his ship voyage, he started to
quarrel with Digna and falsely accused her of having an affair. He became a drunkard, started
smoking marijuana and also forced her into it. When she refused, he insulted her through
unprintable words.d.)Quarreling was constant and he continued with his vices. He also attempted
to kill her with a bolo but she was able to parry the attack. e.)Eduardo left the family home taking
along all their personal belongings. Petitioner prayed that an order be issued appointing her as the
sole administrator of their conjugal properties and judgment be rendered declaring their marriage
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent filed his answer wherein he
denied the allegations and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with
very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired
through his sole effort and money. From the interviews of Psychologist Cristina Gates to Digna (not
Eduardo since he was abroad), it was clear that Eduardo is afflicted with psychological hang-ups
which are rooted in the kind of family background he has (his parents are separated and his
brothers are also separated from their respective wives). Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, Eduardo is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. Furthermore, the ingestion of
prohibited substances is known to cause irreparable damage organically. Psychologist Gates also
testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Digna
contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of Eduardo
which is his dysfunctional family background. Hence, respondent could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to
marriage. RTC rendered a decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. CA also affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of FC.
RULING:
The Court is not persuaded. Republic v. Court of Appeals laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable.
(201) Te vs Te
GR No. 161793 (February 13, 2009)
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in
January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he
was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and
Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and
her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they
then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of
the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others
to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no
goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame
others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
(202) Paras vs Paras
G.R. No. 147824 (August 2, 2007)
FACTS:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Justo suffered psychological incapacity?
RULING:
The Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are
true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a
psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to
show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
There is no evidence that Justos defects were present at the inception of the marriage. His
defects surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he
lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his
wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after
almost 30 years of their marriage. Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos
defects are incurable or grave.
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.
(203) ZAMORA vs COURT OF APPEALS

February 7, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they
lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In
1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits
to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of private
respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position, he
alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact
that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent
abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that
throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. Respondent denied
that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse
by profession and that she would from time to time borrow her husbands niece and nephews
to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he
had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least
three children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff
consented to defendants trip to the United States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money
there because she wanted to help her husband build a big house at the Beverly Hills, Cebu City.
The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child, and the court is also convinced that he has two
children. However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any
psychological incapacity or that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. There is
no evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so that she could not carry out the
ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable
defect on the part of defendant.
ISSUES:
a)Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting
the result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for
more than twenty (20) years, her refusal to bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life
in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child; and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete factsshowing
that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
(204) Ferraris vs Ferraris

G.R. No. 162368 (July 17, 2006)
FACTS:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. It
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at
the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element
in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law?
RULING:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of
the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he
squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his
wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and
that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
(205) Antonio vs Reyes

GR No. 155800 (March 10, 2006)
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991
and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then
filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void
RULING:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe
that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,
Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
(206) Republic vs Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on
certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the
judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children.
In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to
the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children
inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity.
Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the
invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and
thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found
the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
ISSUE:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
(207) Siayncho vs Villalon

G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004
FACTS:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce
children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the
court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower
court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctors
findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitatedsufficient to
warrant the nullification of their marriage.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with another was caused merely by his
sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action
caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the
doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to
perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations
and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that
the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they
were merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out
of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void
(208) Buenaventura vs CA
G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both
he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage
entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son
in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the
care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal
was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support
pendants like to P20, 000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to
the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
RULING:
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the
general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the
properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.
(209) Republic vs Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 (May 20, 2004)
FACTS:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
The Regional Trial Court rendered the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, NULL and VOID.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents
failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
RULING:
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified."
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness.
We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Petition for review is hereby GRANTED.

(210) Macarubbo vs Macarubbo

A.C. No. 6148 (February 27, 2004)
FACTS:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a
certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he
representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated
on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the
latters Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel
in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on
June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous
marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T.
Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any
regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that
complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she
dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her familys reputation since
she was then three-months pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the civil case Edmundo L.
Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves, it declared his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew
attention to the trial courts findings on the basis of his evidence which was not controverted, that
the marriage was indeed a sham and make believe one, vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and
intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment and want of a valid
marriage license. Respondent raised the additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment
of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present administrative case; that
complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her letter
to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital relations,
respondent invoked the final and executory August 21, 1998 in the case Edmundo L. Macarubbo
v. Helen C. Esparza, declaring his first marriage void on the ground of his wifes psychological
incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three months
for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct?
RULING:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as
husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on
August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such
conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent was coerced by
complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the following transcript of his
testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with her and
even begot a second child by her. Thus, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of
gross immorality and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.
(211) DAVID B. DEDEL vs COURT OF APPEALS
(January 29, 2004)
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20,1967 in a civil
and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity of
their marriage on account of Sharons psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations.
He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a
lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment
by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon
returned to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her
back and even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David
to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the
Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial
court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial
courts judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. Davids motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharons infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
RULING:
No. Sharons infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. As held in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity
that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharons sexual infidelity
or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At
best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
Decision affirmed. Petition denied.
(212) Republic vs Dagdag

G.R. No. 109975 (February 9, 2001)
FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate
was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20,
1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at
large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not
be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared.
Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest
in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to
file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for
the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on
the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on
the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature
and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?
RULING:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the
interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity
of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.
(213) Pesca vs Pesca

(April 17, 2001)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca met on board an inter-island vessel bound
for Bacolod in. After a whirlwind courtship, the couple got married in 1975. Due to the fact that
Lorna was still a college student and that Zosimo was a seaman, the couple did not initially live
together. 6months after the marriage, the couple finally lived together. The couple had four
children. 13 years after they got married, Lorna started to notice her husbands true color. Zosimo
was emotionally immature, a habitual drinker and has induced physical abuse not only on Lorna
but also on the children. She had once left the house due to the abuse, only to forgive Zosimo and
give him another chance. Finally, on 1994, Lorna left their home for good, after being assaulted by
Zosimo for over half an hour. Lorna submitted herself to a medical evaluation and filed a complaint
against her husband. Zosimo was found guilty by the MTC and sentenced to 11 days imprisonment
for slight physical injuries. Lorna also filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court, praying for the
marriage to be declared null and void by invoking psychological incapacity (Art. 36, NCC). The
RTC declared the marriage between the parties to be null and void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity and ordered the liquidation of conjugal properties. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC on the basis that Lorna failed to show proof that Zosimo was
indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that would cause him to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina
should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case
RULING:
In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force
and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. The "doctrine of stare decisis,"
ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines
(214) MARCOS vs MARCOS

(October 19, 2000)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that
the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily,
the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution
of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the
guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
(215) Hernandez vs Court of Appeals

320 SCRA 76 (December 8, 1999)
FACTS:
Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcios
teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on
became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family
as her husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage
went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student
who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but
did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and
she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines,
Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result,
private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one
occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year
old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and
hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations
RULING:
The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must
exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a
spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the
happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 48
WHO MAY FILE AND WHEN
(216) ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO & TRINIDAD MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614
FACTS:
It is petition assailing the RTCs reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father. Eulogio Medinaceli
and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten seven children. Trinidad
died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six
months later, Eulogio passed away. Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Petitioner and the respondents late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage
lacks the requisite of marriage license, and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony due to respondents
father serious illness that made its performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her exemption from getting
marriage license. She sought then the dismissal of the respondents filed action by citing the AM-
02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par. (a) Rule of the family code. Pursuant to AM-02-11-10-SC embodied the
rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC
dismissed the respondents filed action. Respondents filed motion for reconsideration invoking the
ruling in the case of Nial v. Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the
standing to assail a voidable marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the
motion and issued an order for reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration
but denied, thereby petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule AM 02-11-10-SC or Nial v. Bayadog shall govern the instant
case
RULING:
Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity of the second marriage after the
death of their father; because the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC shall govern the said petition, under
the Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for
Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held decision on
Nial v. Bayadog casewhereas the two cases expressed a common cause of issue. Here the court
resolved that; in Nial v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of their fathers second marriage even after their fathers death because the impugned
marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico
v Heirs of Medinaceli where same holding cannot be applied because the marriage here was
celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already effective and under family code is embodied
the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC where this rule shall govern petitions for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.
Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have still remedy to
protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
(217) Amor-Catalan vs CA
(February 6, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,,

Pangasinan.Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner Amor-Catalan filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan Cityagainst Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismisson the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC Dagupan: declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope
E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy.
(2) CA: reversed RTC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American
citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
(2) Whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy
RULING:
(1) The records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce. Before it
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our
courts, cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
(2) Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.
(218) Ninal vs Bayadog

(March 14, 2000)
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal.1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?
RULING:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
(219) ABLAZA vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298 (August 11, 2010)
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had beencelebr
ated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making
him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validityof the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of themarriage of
his deceased brother?
RULING:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted onDecember 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner. Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the
presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral
relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the
right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano
had any descendants, ascendants, or children(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the
petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further
proceedings of the case.
(220) Carlos vs Sandoval

(December 16, 2008)
FACTS:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix
Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the
other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of
petitioner. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in
the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent. Teofilo II petitioner asserted that the
marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license . He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner likewise sought
the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. Evidence used by
respondents for existence marriage:
-affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.

-Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II., late Teofilo Carlos and respondent
Felicidad
were designated as parents
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying
that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a party outside of marriage can file for nullity of marriage
HELD:
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife, except nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, and Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of
the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
ARTICLE 39
(221) MALLION vs ALCANTARA

(October 31,2006)
FACTS:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the
petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license.
ISSUE:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds of lackof
marriage license?
RULING:
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity
of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a
cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no
marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question
the absence of a marriage license.
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE/PROHIBITION vs DEFAUL JUDGMENT

ARTICLE 48
(222) VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when
petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the
latters paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of
the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight
(8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15,
2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the
assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for the repudiation of
the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement
by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously
apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge,
denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
The petitioner filed a Petition with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the
Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7,
2002 that the Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3) when it denied
petitioners Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance and
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor. The CA
dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the
crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property, especially
considering that she had only been sentenced with the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty
that does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights
to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the
Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation,
respectively, do not apply, considering, too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Marriage filed by the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and,
hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that, although adultery is a
ground for legal separation, nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the spouses voluntarily
separated their property through their Compromise Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment for annulment and legal separation is a pre-requisite before a spouse
convicted of either concubinage or adultery, be disqualified and prohibited from sharing in the
conjugal property?
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. Truly,
the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence. While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public
Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se
nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the CA.
It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor
General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the
parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the instant case,
there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because
as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the
case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between
the parties. At the risk of being repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of
any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his
previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or
vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement,
could hardly be said to be evident.
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the rights
of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
(223) Republic vs Cuison-Melgar

G.R. No. 139676 (March 31, 2006)
FACTS:
Norma and Eulogio were married and begot five children. After more than thirty years, Norma filed
for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations manifested by his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and abandonment of his family.
Summons were served but Eulogio failed to file an answer or appear within the reglementary
period. The RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to investigate for possible collusion but it turned
futile. RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage. The Local Civil Registrar was ordered to
cancel the Marriage Contract.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can intervene on the decision of the declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Norma and Eulogio
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the trial level. Other that the Public
Prosecutors manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties, no pleading,
motion or position paper was filed. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage under Art.
36 of the Family Code. The totality of evidence she presented is completely insufficient to sustain a
finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature and not
merely physical. The Court cannot presume psychological defect and the circumstances presented
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
The petition is granted.

(224) Corpus vs Ochoterana

435 SCRA 446
FACTS:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For
these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him. The
conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the respondent
judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within
the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution. The respondent judge disregarded
the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After
the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-
parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion
to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr.
Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
RULING:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the
law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately
release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
(225) JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS vs MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS

410 SCRA 365
FACTS:
On February 6, 2001, Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Margie Corpus Macias.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the following grounds: (1) the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations; (2) the trial court has no jurisdiction because it is not among those designated to act as
a family court under Resolution A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC; and (3) the parties failed to resort to
barangay conciliation prior to the filing of the petition.
On April 19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion to
dismiss. Incidentally, in the same Order, the trial court granted respondents request (via long
distance telephone call) to set the hearing on April 30, 2001.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case had been submitted for decision, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying her motion to dismiss. The
trial court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in his Order dated May 16, 2001.
Consequently, on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
challenging the trial courts Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied her motion to dismiss; and
Order dated April 30, 2001 cancelling the April 30, 2001 hearing and resetting it on May 2 and 3,
2001.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting respondents petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner was deprived, by the Respondent Court, of her right to due process
enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, via its Orders, Annexes L and O of the
Petition, and its Decision.
RULING:
This Court will not countenance a denial of ones fundamental right to due process, which is a
cornerstone of our legal system.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of due process
enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural rules.
More to the point, the trial court, without even waiting for respondents motion for reconsideration of
the April 19, 2001 Order denying her motion to dismiss, hurriedly set the case for hearing. Also,
without allowing the respondent to file her answer to the petition and knowing there was no joinder
of issues as yet, the trial court hastily authorized petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.
We are convinced that respondents fundamental right to due process was blatantly transgressed
by the trial court. And resultantly, the proceedings conducted, including the trial courts Decision,
are void for lack of due process.
We have consistently held that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by
whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.
Indeed, in depriving respondent her constitutional and procedural right to due process, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion. It is, therefore, imperative that the instant case for declaration
of nullity of marriage be litigated anew in accordance with the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001 and Resolution
dated August 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
(226) Sin vs Sin

GR No. 137590 (March 26, 2001)
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence
filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995,
trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated
therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the
State in the proceedings.
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
(227) Ancheta vs Ancheta
G.R. No. 145370 (March 4, 2004)
FACTS:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. They had eight children
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and
their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement 5 where some of the conjugal
properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by
making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in
the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The
petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her
by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B.
Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the
petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of
jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She
further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering
from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the
RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the
petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition, hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rendering its decision.

RULING:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should
continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of
only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such
party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
The petition is GRANTED. The CA resolution is hereby set aside and reversed.
(228) EMILIO R. TUASON vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 (April 10, 1996)
FACTS:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the
time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio
was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the
family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victorias consent. Attempts for reconciliation
failed because Emilios refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she
further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria
presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of
Emilios relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies
of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilios evidence
was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then
declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victorias marriage to
Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from
judgment but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the case
where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing?
RULING:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment. Under
the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If
the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on
time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not
excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his clients
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled
hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
(229) PACETE vs CARRIAGA

(March 17, 1994)
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March
17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the
marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for
legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST COLLUSION
(230) Sin vs Sin

G.R. No. 137590 (March 26, 2001)
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence
filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995,
trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein, other
than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecuting attorney too steps to prevent the collision between parties
RULING:
No.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not
just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the manifestation
filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or
position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
The Court stated:

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented
(i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State
was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-formacompliance. The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.
(227) ANCHETA vs ANCHETA

424 SCRA 725
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on 1959 and had eight
children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner, left the respondent and their children. Their
conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement.
When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although he
knew that the petitioner was already residing in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner
was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless
substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then
declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the
trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Five years
later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others.
She alleged that the respondent lied about her real address in his petition so she never received
summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals
dismissed her petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid
RULING:
The trial court defied Article 48 of the Family Code. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal
separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. A grant of annulment
of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If
the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default
but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated. Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a
basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 43 Whether or not a
marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims
and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
(232) REPUBLIC vs CA
G.R. NO. 100995 (SEPTEMBER 14, 1994)
FACTS:
On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet,
Camarines Norte.
On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an
order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition. At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolors counsel marked as Exhibits
A to D, respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the
Editor of the Weekly Informer, and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court
confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.
ISSUE:
Petitioner assailed the trial courts decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground.
Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the requirements
specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order
By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied
with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988 before its Branch
Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, ,
rationalizing thus We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied
with in the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25,
1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had
been published in the September 10, 1988 issue of the Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42
of the Official Gazette issue of October 17, 1988
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional
requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there
was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner
concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which

affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the application of private
respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described therein is
DENIED. By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the
trial court which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are
declared VOID and it was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the
fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those
documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of
its own record. But,the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December
1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with. Although the
Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of the Official
Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however released for publication only
on 31 January 1989. In petitioners brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no
apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could
have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent
evidence but also by ample jurisprudence. The primary legal principle against which the legality of
all the proceedings conducted by the trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain
whether a court has jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23
of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that before the court can act on the application for land
registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication,
mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court
ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and
when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the
proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such
defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of
a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show the cause why the
application should not be granted.
RIGHT TO SUPPORT AND CUSTODY DURING

PENDENCY OF ACTION
ARTICLE 49
(233) JARILLO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 (September 29, 2009)
FACTS:
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony in Taguig,
Rizal in 1974. Both newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a church ceremony, in1975
in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo,
however,contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy celebrated through a
civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding
in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed acivil case for annulment against Jarillo. On the basis of the foregoing,
Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court rendered the assailed
decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonabledoubt of the crime of bigamy. Jarillo posits,
as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage, that her
marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and that the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed
the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo
rendered judgement declaring Jarillos marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of
the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter
denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy
RULING:
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicialdeclaration
of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime
of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo,
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent second marriage,
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would
a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
A plain reading of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
(234) Carino vs Carino

(February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between
Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at
the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal
wife, is not one of them.
(235) Leonor vs CA and Beldia

(April 2, 1996)
FACTS:
The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square meters of
residential land which they have inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos Bongato and
Eusebia. The former were ordered by the to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a
monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same, plus
attorney's fees and costs.
The Petitioners alleged that the said property became a subject of a cadastral survey due to
conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. In that survey, Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to
petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of IsidariaTrillo, their predecessor in interest, as
Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) covers 295 square
meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No.
311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to
respondents and that the land in question is part of the adjoining land, Lot No. 310, which belonged
to their predecessor in interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contiguous land of
petitioners' predecessor in interest?
RULING:
Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous
or that it included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot
now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138). Note that the difference in area
between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey plan is 65 square meters
while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the alleged sketch plan
of the resurvey was not presented in evidence.
Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the
Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said title
has not been contested up to the present, and, therefore, has become inconvertible evidence of
the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a Torrens certificate of title
becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be impugned
(Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were
found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith.
Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which
anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own faith shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige
the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the
choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment
of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands
the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose
to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that
event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is
for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of
the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and
must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the
case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the
conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361,
old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).
(236) Balogbog vs Balogbog

(March 7, 1997)
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court
of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have
three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito
and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was
married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that
indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy
who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have
three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the
office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been
proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in
force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of
that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would
not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age
of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children
of Gavino.
(237) Tamano vs Judge Ortiz

G.R. No. 126603 (June 29, 1998)
FACTS:
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamanos death, Zorayda and her son filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as
single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC
RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment
against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia
courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction
since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be referred to
CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only
when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts,
the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature
of action?
RULING:
SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding. And
whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested
with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
(238) Domingo vs CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity
of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they
were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage
license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is
still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued
them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a
consequence, to declare that h e i s t h e e x c l u s i v e o w n e r o f a l l p r o p e r t i e s s h e
a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio,
the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no
property which in his possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private

respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la
Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not
dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation
of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is b r o u g h t i s
l i k e w i s e c l o t h e d w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d e c i d e t h e i n c i d e n t a l questions regarding
the couple's properties.
(239) BELTRAN vs PEOPLE

(June 20, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the
civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is aprejudicial
question to the criminal case of concubinage.
RULING:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other th
an theproof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long
as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for
concubinage.
(240) Bobis vs Bobis

G.R. No. 138509 336 SCRA 747
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case
for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted
the motion to suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied.
On appeal, Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?
RULING:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter
action may proceed. Its two essential elements are
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in
the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at
the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage
and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious,
manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be
resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the
courts can render.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may
be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. In the light of
Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before
any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case.
(241) Ty vs CA
G.R. No. 127406 (November 27, 2000)
FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva both in civil and church ceremony.
However, on August 4, 1980, the marriage was declared null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent
of the parties. Before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Reyes wed
Ofelia P. Ty in civil and a church.
Reyes filed a civil case for his marriage with Ty to be declared null and void for having no marriage
license when they got married. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
of his marriage to Anna Maria had not yet been issued, thus, he was still married to Anna Maria.
Ty pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is
untrue. She submitted their Marriage License issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did
not question this document.
The Pasig RTC sustained Reyes civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and
void ab initio. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals which ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could
be validly contracted and upheld the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validly.
RULING:
Art. 40 Family Code. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense.
The Court finds that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a
valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. So
that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby
DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING
As for the payment of damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment, our
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY

ARTICLES 43-44
ON THE PRORTY REGIME OF THE MARRIAGE
(242) Valdes vs Valdes

(July 31, 1996)
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992,
Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It
also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article
147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will
own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.
RULING:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of
Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes
vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).
(243) Dino vs Dino

G.R. No. 178044 (January 19, 2011)
FACTS:
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) married on 14 January 1998.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful,
and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001 then married a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity and declared the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO
and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as
NULL and VOID from the beginning; and 2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of
property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition

and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
RULING:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless
of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man
and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45
of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
(244) YU vs JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU

G.R. No. 189207 [June 15, 2011]
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of
Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Erics partial offer of evidence
dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On
September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences
of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Eric
added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be
simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Erics opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline
filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed
for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.
RULING:
No. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one
which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the
parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders
were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering
that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal
in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory orders.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time
when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of
the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject
incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of
marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yus assertion that ruling the main issue
without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary
judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge
can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed
orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate,
this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the
CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of
Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
(245) Barrido vs Nonato
G.R. No. 176492 (October 20, 2014)
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa
house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no
more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition,
but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code
Ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and
lot, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of
the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to
Barrido.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the
present case, and in holding that Article 129 of the Family Code has no application in the present
case on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. Whether or not the CA
erred in holding that the lot is conjugal after being sold to their children.
RULING:
Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. Article 147 reads:
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue
of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the
former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be
noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into
a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.Unfortunately,
Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of
Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
Petition is Denied.
ON USE OFF SURNAMES, NCC

ARTICLE 371, 364, 369
(246) Yasin vs Sharia Court

G.R. No. 94986 (February 23, 1995)
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court issued an order which ordered
amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103,
Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has
been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the
petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the
use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is
necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of
petitioners maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the
former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change
of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
No.When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden firstname. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
thehusband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorceeneed not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order torevert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name isoptional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married
her husband, shedid not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required
tosecure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after themarriage, as no law requires
it. The use of the husband's surname during themarriage, after annulment of the marriage and after
the death of the husbandis permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.The
court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed bypetitioner before the respondent
court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is lready married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
B.M. No. 1625 JOSEPHINE P. UY-TIMOSA
(247) Remo vs DFA

(March 2010)
FACTS:
Petition is for Maria Virgina Remo Rallonza to use her maiden name Remo in her passport
renewal. Original passport is issued using married surname Rallonza.
Petitioner is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. The husband is alive and the couple is neither
annulled nor divorced.
DFA denied request. Office of the President denied appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
CA denied petition and motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WoN a married woman can use her maiden name in her passport renewal after using her married
surname in her prior passport
RULING:
Petition denied.
RATIO: Article 370 of the NCC:A married woman may use:
(1)Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Petitioner is neither divorced, widowed, or annulled.
When a woman gets married, she does not change her name. Only her civil status.
A woman is not obliged to changed hername upon marriage, she has the option not to. She is not
required to have judicial authority to do so.
In the present case, however, petitioner requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport arguing thatno law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
As per the rules of passport renewal, DFA allows women to use their maiden name in passport
even if they are married.They can also continuously use their maiden name in renewals or use
their married name thereafter.
In the present case, however, the petitioner is already using her married name and wants to revert
back to her maiden name. Petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands surname before, in
her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow
petitioners present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to
the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a
passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at will.
The issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of
identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is
issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder
to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection.
ON HEREDITARY RIGHTS OF THE FORMER SPOUSES

ARTICLE 43 (5), 50
EFFECTS OF DEATH
(248) HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR vs SERVACIO and GO

G.R. No. 157537 [September 7, 2011]
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio,
Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father
Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio
Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The
contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of
the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid,
because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his
share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that
what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless; the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Until then, all that he had was an ideal orabstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr.
and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the
rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a
co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued
to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
E. VOIDABLE/ANNULABLE MARRIAGES
2. INSANITY
(249) CREWLINK vs TERINGTERING

G.R. No. 166803 (October 14, 2012)
FACTS:
Respondent Editha Teringtering spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering, filed a complaint against
petitioner Crewlink, Inc. for the payment of death benefits. Her husband Jacinto entered into an
overseas employment contract as an Oiler. On 2001, at Nasr Oilfield, the Jacinto suddenly jumped
into the sea, and was saved. Because of that, a personnel was directed to watch him. However,
while the boat dropped anchor and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. He was
recovered but he was already dead from drowning. After learning of the death of Jacinto,
respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of death compensation and burial expenses, as
well as additional death compensation but was refused. Respondent claimed that in order for her
husband's death to be compensable it is enough that he died during the term of his contract and
while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or
Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual death.
Respondent further asserted that her husbands death was not deliberate and not of his own will,
but was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable. Petitioner asserted that respondent was
not entitled to the benefits being claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the case for lack of merit for his death was directly attributable to him. Respondent filed
a petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Wheter or not the petitioner is entitled to death benefits.
RULING:
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable
to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than
her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or
any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. Settled is the rule that
factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported
by substantial evidence. Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee
should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the
term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This
rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully
prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or
willful act.
3. FRAUD
ARTICLE 45
CONCEALMENT
(250) Villanueva vs CA
October 27, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition assailing the decision of the CA dismissing the appeal of the petitioners. CA
rendered that there was no contract of sale. In 1985, Gamaliel Villanueva (tenant) of a unit in the 3-
door apartment building owned by defendants-spouses (now private respondents) Jose Dela Cruz
and Leonila dela Cruz located at Project 8, Quezon City. About February of 1986, Dela Cruz
offered said parcel of land with the 3-door apartment building for sale and plaintiffs, son and
mother, showed interest in the property. Because said property was in arrears (overdue) in the
payment of the realty taxes, dela Cruz approached Irene Villanueva and asked for a certain
amount to pay for the taxes so that the property would be cleared of any incumbrance. Irene
Villanueva gave P10,000.00 on two occasions. It was agreed by them that said P10,000.00 would
form part of the sale price of P550,000.00. Dela Cruz went to plaintiff Irene Villanueva bringing with
him Mr. Ben Sabio, a tenant of one of the units in the 3-door apartment building and requested
Villanueva to allow said Sabio to purchase one-half (1/2) of the property where the unit occupied by
him pertained to which the plaintiffs consented, so that they would just purchase the other half
portion and would be paying only P265,000.00, they having already given an amount of
P10,000.00 used for paying the realty taxes in arrears. Accordingly the property was subdivided
and two (2) separate titles were secured by defendants Dela Cruz. Mr. Ben Sabio immediately
made payments by installments. March 1987 Dela Cruz executed in favor of their co-defendants,
the spouses Guido Pili and Felicitas Pili, a Deed of Assignment of the other one-half portion of the
parcel of land wherein plaintiff Gamaliel Villanuevas apartment unit is situated, purportedly as full
payment and satisfaction of an indebtedness obtained from defendants Pili.The Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 356040 was issued in the name of defendants Pili on the same day. The plaintiffs came
to know of such assignment and transfer and issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of
defendants Pili. Plaintiff Gamaliel Villanueva complained to the barangay captain of Bahay Turo,
Quezon City, on the ground that there was already an agreement between defendants Dela Cruz
and themselves that said portion of the parcel of land owned by defendants Dela Cruz would be
sold to him. As there was no settlement arrived at, the plaintiffs elevated their complaint to this
Court through the instant action. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Dela Cruz. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a perfected sale between Villanueva and Dela Cruz.
RULING:
Petitioners contend that private respondents counsel admitted that P10,000 is partial or advance
payment of the property. Necessarily then, there must have been an agreement as to price,
hence, a perfected sale. They cite Article 1482 of the Civil Code which provides that (w)henever
earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof
of the perfection of the contract. Private respondents contradict this claim with the argument that
(w)hat was clearly agreed (upon) between petitioners and respondents Dela Cruz was that the
P10,000.00 primarily intended as payment for realty tax was going to form part of the consideration
of the sale if and when the transaction would finally be consummated. Private respondents insist
that there was no clear agreement as to the true amount of consideration. Dela Cruz testimony
during the cross-examination firmly negated any price agreement with petitioners because he and
his wife quoted the price of P575,000.00 and did not agree to reduce it to P550,000.00 as claimed
by petitioner. Villanueva on cross-examination: After the Deed of Sale relative to the purchase of
the property was prepared, Mr. dela Cruz came to me and told me that he talked with one of the
tenants and he offered to buy the portion he was occupying if I will agree and I will cause the
partition of the property between us. Villanueva said that he agreed and that the price 550,000
was to be divided into two. (Sabio and Villanueva) *The contract which the appellant is referring to
was not presented to the court and the appellant did not use all effort to produce the said contract.
SC: The price of the leased land not having been fixed, the essential elements which give life to
the contract were lacking. It follows that the lessee cannot compel the lessor to sell the leased land
to him. The price must be certain, it must be real, not fictitious. A contract of sale is not void for
uncertainty when the price, though not directly stated in terms of pesos and centavos, can be made
certain by reference to existing invoices identified in the agreement. In this respect, the contract of
sale is perfected. The price must be certain, otherwise there is no true consent between the
parties. There can be no sale without a price. In the instant case, however, what is dramatically
clear from the evidence is that there was no meeting of mind as to the price, expressly or impliedly,
directly or indirectly. Sale is a consensual contract. He who alleges it must show its existence by
competent proof. Here, the very essential element of price has not been proven. Lastly, petitioners
claim that they are ready to pay private respondents is immaterial and irrelevant as the latter
cannot be forced to accept such payment, there being no perfected contract of sale in the first
place.
(251) Anaya vs Palaroan

36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
RULING:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and
therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
(252) BUCCAT vs BUCCAT
72 Phil 19
FACTS:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, as only
raises a question purely of law.
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938, committed on Sept and got married on 26
November the same year. After living together for 99 days, Luisa gave birth to a child of nine
months, in February 23, 1939. Godofredo abandoned Luisa and did not return.
In March 29, 1939 GODOFREDO requests the annulment of marriage with Luisa Buccat
Mangonon on the ground that he was defrauded in consenting to the marriage with Luisa. She had
assured him that she was virgin but the circumstances of the birth of the child after only 99 days of
cohabitation speaks otherwise.
Luisa failed to appear despite having been summoned which allowed Godofredo to present
evidence. The lower court decided in favor of Luisa in upholding the marriage. Godofredo
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Godofredos ground is valid to be granted an annulment.
RULING:
The plaintiffs allegation of fraud is impossible after it has been proven that Luisa is in advanced
pregnant condition by the time they were married. It seems childish considering that the applicant
was a freshman in law.
Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation on which society rests. In this case no
evidence has satisfied the court to merit an annulment. All the intendment of the law leans towards
the validity of marriage.
(253) Almelor vs RTC-Las Pinas

G.R. No. 179620 (August 26, 2008)
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners,
an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida
filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his private
life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of
their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged
lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from
her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his
affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr.
Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.
Dr. ValentinadelFonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas
claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on
Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of
Leonidas hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage,
not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.
RULING:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or
anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and
that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.
4. FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE
(254) Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
(October 27, 2006)
FACTS:
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia
sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties),
claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of
defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot
five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, they acquired
real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is
the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents
Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately
eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts
leased to corporations. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited
with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas,
then, was the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she
started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own
from which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties. Settlement
between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners
appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio
are conjugal
RULING:
YES, they are conjugal. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden
of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage
before they are presumed conjugal. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas
and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas
were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased
on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
(255) MACCARUBO vs MACCARUBO

A.C. No. 6148 (February 27, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie Maccarrubo
averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo
in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first
on December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the
Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was
married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family
and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent
entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned
complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage
since it was contracted with vitiated consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the courts declaration of nullity of
the marriage?
RULING:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by finaljudgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as
husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as
it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable forconcu
binage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a
public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred for
gross misconduct.
(256) People vs Santiago

51 PHIL 68
FACTS:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with automobile
that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay
the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court below
committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being
prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the
evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional
and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a
prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in
sentencing him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment of
costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and find that
the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently sustained
by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meter wide,
notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one
side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys, the
appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and
did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would
take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his
automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and
constitutional?
RULING:
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No. 58, the
defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General
Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of
constitutional law. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States
against the persons charged with the offenses.
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is made the
plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen

hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its own by the
Congress of the United States for, as a matter of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of its own
creation either before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to
this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the
Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Our
present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal
successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative branch of our
government has undergone transformations and has developed itself until it attained its present
form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in accordance with
international law and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in fact did legislate;
afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley which later were ratified by
Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government were
transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as a colegislative
body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to
the Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus
was formed the present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act
No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58. The
Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among which
we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating to counsels de
oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of the peace of provincial
capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature
had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals
to the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709
which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in order to be utilized as
state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our present
Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as the
successors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact, the crimes
committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were
prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the repression
of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign authority of the United States, whose
name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers and
notarial acts.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a transitory stage, is,
in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our constitutional law
regarding the use of the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal
prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective constitutional charters of the States of the
Union and incorporated territories a situation which must not be understood as depriving the
Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public crimes. The
fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the
United States, is autonomous.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal matters,
it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as
the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is not
violated.
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886,
do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886
is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit
any of the errors assigned. The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being
furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1, 000 and to the payment of the costs of both
instances.
(257) Reyes vs Zaballero

89 PHIL 39
FACTS:
Records show that in 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate
complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A
and 6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the petitioners, before the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and
T.G.-417. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan
Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the
payment of just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on
October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero and which became final on November 26,
1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for
the construction of low cost housing units is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings.
RULING:
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now
settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as
elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest,"
"public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." The rationale for this new approach is
well explained in the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et al., to wit:
"The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope
of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public
lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance
applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which
impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or
limited government resources.
xxxxxxxxx
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at
cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the
construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income
beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.
Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners,
commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.
5. IMPOTENCY
(258) VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs REY C. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G.
Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter,
the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode
at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for
Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While
working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner
tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after
respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come
home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioners house. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph
5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more
possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued an Order directing the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated
or suppressed. Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report
manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent, but
the latter never participated therein. Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place
between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them.
She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioners
Complaint was meritorious or not. The RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor
General. During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. Petitioner first took the witness
stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners
testimony. Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of
petitioner and respondent: After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data,
petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious
psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe,
long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of
grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts. The psychological incapacity of the respondent is
characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage.
Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n]
integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.
Tayag concluded in the end that:
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of
her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that: In the case at bar, the Court finds that the
acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the
moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC Decision. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove
respondents personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent is psychologically

incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations?
RULING:
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was
for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable;
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and
may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be
due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has
the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during
her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents
part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence
presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the
latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. In the case at
bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since
leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave
psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding
herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 132955 (October 27, 2006)
FACTS:
Villanueva and Lilia, private respondent got married in 1988. Four years after, he filed a petition for
annulment of marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant at the time; that he did not get her pregnant before the marriage; that he
never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that the child died during
delivery.
Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the case arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her;
that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost one month after their marriage; that petitioner
wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila; and that he knows the progress of the pregnancy
which ended in premature delivery. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
The trial court dismissed the case and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages,
exemplary and attorneys fees, plus the cost of the suit.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the amount for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Orlando and Lilia be nullified on ground of forced marriage
RULING:
The petition was partly granted.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. The Court is not convinced. He also invoked fraud to
annul the marriage as he was made to believe that appellee was pregnant when they were
married. This excuse is flimsy at best and an outright lie at worst.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter.
The RTC decision dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with private
respondent is affirmed.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
(260) Jimenez v. Caizares

109 Phil 27
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married in 1950. In 1955, Joel filed for annulment on grounds that
his wife, Remedios, is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was
already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint but
she refused to do so. She was also ordered to have herself be checked by an expert to determine
if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refuse.. The trial was heard
solely on Joels complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios impotency has been established.
RULING:
Impotency of Remedios cannot be deemed established. Her refusal to submit herself for
examination was natural for women in this country are shy and bashful. Impotency being not
presumed led the SC to rule for the presumption of potency.
(261) Jimenez vs Republic

109 PHIL 274
FACTS:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel
Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male
organ or penis for copulation and existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that
for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit a medical certificate on
the result thereof. with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the
required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26
April 1957 the city attorneys motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
RULING:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without
doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to
tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The decree appealed
from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
6. AFFLICTION OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
(262) Pacete vs Carriaga

G.R. No. L-53880 (March 17, 1994)
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March
17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the
marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract.
legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
(263) Tuason vs CA and Tyusaon

G.R. No. 116607 (April 10, 1996)
FACTS:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio R. Tuason.
That at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights
between husband and wife
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. That it was only in 1982 that they began
to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him
as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata;
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondents
marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for
relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petition for relief from judgment.
RULING:
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceedings thereof. -
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a court of
first instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceedings thereof. -
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a court of
first instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was
not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during
their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and
happy family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and
that his work as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public
eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These
facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us. Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous
Petition is denied.
RIGHT TO SUPPORT AND CUSTODY DURING PENDENCY OF ACTION

NECESSITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT/REQUISITES FOR REMARRIAGE
EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT
(264) Chan-Tan vs Chan

G.R. No. 167139 (February 25, 2010)
FACTS:
On June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons
Justin (born in Canada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993). Susie Chan-Tan,
petitioner, then filed a case of annulment under FC 36 (psychological incapacity) against Jesse
Tan. The parties, thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement. Thus, on July 31, 2003:
trial court issued a partial judgment of approval of the said compromise agreement.
Sometime in March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under the Family
Code, Article 36, on the ground of psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court
incorporated the compromise agreement it previously approved in said decision. Petitioner then
cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2 property, and
authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer it to other interested buyers. It also appeared that
the petitioner left the country with the children. Respondent then filed an omnibus motion, seeking
the main custody of the children claiming that petitioner brought the kids out of the country w/o his
knowledge; that said petitioner failed to settle the balance for the Megaworld property, w/c, if
forfeited, would prejudice the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to turn over to him
documents and titles in his name. The court awarded respondent custody of the children and
ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in his name, and allowed
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.
June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denied due
process, was notable to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said
that she was forced out of the country due to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner
also prayed for an increase in the respondent's monthly support obligation.
However, on October 12, 2004, the court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it
was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The court also declared petitioner in contempt of
court for non-compliance with the July 31, 2003 partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution
and also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly support obligation, since petitioner was able
to enroll the children to another school by herself without respondent's knowledge.
On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the
October 12, 2004 resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that
withdrawing from the case would be in the best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated
her from all prior orders, and leave the parties at a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-
instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.
On December 28, 2004 the court denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March
30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory upon lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period and on February 15, 2005 the court again denied another motion for
reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision and issued a Certificate of Finality of the March
30 and May 17, 2004 decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory
despite allegations of denial of due process?
RULING:
Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the 15-day reglementary period.
The alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner resulting in loss of petitioner's right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular. Petitioner cannot claim
she was denied due process, since records showed that she was very active in court. She also
cannot claim negligence on the part of her counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3,
2004, saying that said counsel made attempts to call the petitioner and failed.
(265) NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127358 (March 31, 2005)
FACTS:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its
decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered
petitioner are gular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of
Appeals, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to
P20, 000. The Court of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the
RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
RULING:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the
properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, bothby the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would
becovered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to
have been included or involved in said distribution.
(266) Quiao vs Quiao

G.R. No 176556 (July 4, 2012)
FACTS:
Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation
of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor
children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129
of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However,
it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples property relations.
RULING:
Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial
vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of
gains. Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal artnership of gains.
F. LEGAL SEPARATION
(267) ONG vs ONG

505 SCRA 76
FACTS:
On 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable considerations,
executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor. On
November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and donated the property to her son Rex. On
June 20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to recover the
land and to declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading, petitioners
claimed that the quitclaim is equivalent to a donation which requires acceptance by the donee, and
since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid acceptance. The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is
equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation
RULING:
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence
of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden
of proving such allegation. Even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article
741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of
minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where
the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens. Donation to an incapacitated donee
does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if said donation does not contain any
condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor
requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes any
obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not impose any condition.
(268) Banez vs Banez

374 SCRA 340
FACTS:
On the grounds infidelity by the (H), the (w) seeks to be legally separated from his husband and the
dissolution of their conjugal property relations, the division of net conjugal assets and the forfeiture
of the (H) share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children, the payment of
100,000 for attorneys fees, surrender of a motor vehicle and the husbands vacation pertinent to as
mall property. She also filed for damages RTC granted (w) except for damages- Atty. Gica was
appointed special administrator-the petitioner was compelled to post a bond of 1,500,000.00 for all
damages the respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of the said writ of execution and to
further answer to all the advances that the petitioner may have received the
special administrator.CA dismissed the motion to withdraw her own appeal due to legality (she
didnt pay the bond. (w) Posted a 1.5M bond to the Supreme Court for the damages (h) might
suffer and prayed 100,000 be granted in advance for attys fee. She also suggested that she be
required to post additional bond, agreed to submit an accounting and advance attys fees be
charged under her share of net conjugal assets. She filed an urgent ex parte motion to modify the
said decision while (H) filed an appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether there was a justification with regard to the decision of the CA?
Whether multiple appeals are allowed in the course of action pertinent to legal separation?
RULING:
Two cases were cited to explain the issue According to (Echaus V CA) the execution pending
appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency overweigh the damages that
may result from the issuance of the writ otherwise instead of being an instrument of solitude and
justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and equity .In the case at bar the court
deemed that there is no urgency in the awarding of damages , considering that the wife has ample
resources while (h) has none Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her
plea for execution pending her appeal to do so would make an execution routinely to the
rule rather than exception according to Archbishop v CA the rational behind the multiple appeals is
to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issues is resolved
by the court and held final.-this cant be applied because splitting the appeals in this case would
only be a violative rule of multiple appeals. In the case at bar legal separation the court contended
that legal separation should not be subject to multiple appeals. On the first issue it was denied for
lack of merit, the court of appeals is hereby directed to give due course with regard to the action.
(269) Gandionco vs Penaranda

GR No. 72984 (November 27, 1987)
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal
case for concubinage.
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal
separation may be ISSUE:d upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceed8ing or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the
same.
(270) Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606 (December 18, 1992)
FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint
against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for
support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision
to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered
in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for
her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit
and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but
the latter refused to accept her.
ISSUE:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.
RULING:
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of
dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of
marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did
not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From
1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation
of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will
be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
DEFENSES
ARTICLE 56
1. CONDONATION/PARDON
(271) ARROYO, JR. vs COURT OF APPEALS

(November 19, 1991)
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and Arroyo
(petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife, based, among
others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo. This decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial
contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a manifestation
praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity.
ISSUES/RULINGS:
1. Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband without the presence of
her counsel is admissible in evidence.
YES. The husband's testimony relating to the admission of adulterous conduct made by the wife to
her husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer nor an
investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said testimony rendered
inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a
"person under investigation for the commission of an offense."
The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from
respondent-accused.
2. Whether the husband is a competent witness against his wife
Yes. The husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in
criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other (Section 22, Rule 129, Revised
Rules of Court). In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's
testimony as he was a competent witness.
(272) Bugayong vs Ginez

100 PHIL 616
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949
at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of
Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that
Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the
dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan
to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some
from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of
infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed
her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy
Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of
the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where
they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their
own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of
answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity.
He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for
dismissal of the action.
RULING:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.
(273) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs GUADALUPE ZAPATA

G.R. No. L-3047 (May 16, 1951)
FACTS:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,and
Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the
period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby Dalmacio
Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of
guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same court, on
September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed
by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the defendants filed a
motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the
second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
RULING:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the firstcomplaint
does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second
complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery
committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or
acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a
married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first
charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the
commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was
a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should
pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt
the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon wa
s granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous
acts. The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is herebyreverse
d and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance
with law, with costs against the appellees.
(274) Ocampo vs Florenciano

(February 23, 1960)
FACTS:
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of adultery.
The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there
was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it
described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March
1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame. Because the defendant made no
answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial fiscal to
investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined the
defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff
presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar
Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.
According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant
were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived
thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In
March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where
she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going
out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by
the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to
which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the
defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must
agree with the Court of Appeals on this point. As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate
court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit connection,
expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing.
And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity
to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame.
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared
that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husbands right for legal separation could not be decreed and had prescribed
under Art. 101 and Art. 102 respectively?
RULING:
We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code,
which for convenience are quoted herewith:
ART. 100.The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made
by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession
of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand. This is not occur.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the
decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who
opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated
from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to
answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order
the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which
implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and
admitted the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The
Court of Appeals did not find collusion.) Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the
agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a
valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not
express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring
about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant
could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to
jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced
deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it.
And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter
had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It
will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered
her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.
Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the
husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination,
a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was
the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouses, all the consequent
effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano.
2. CONSENT
ARTICLE 56 (2)
(275) MATUBIS vs PRAXEDES

(October 25, 1960)
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For
failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed
to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3,
1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the significant portions of
which are hereunder reproduced.
(a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife.
(b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the
other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation.
(c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits
he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife.
(d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally
separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation
into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1,
1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said defendant (Exh.
C.).It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and
were generally reputed as such in the community.
After the trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the court a quo rendered judgment
holding that the acts of defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation. It
however, dismissed the complaint by stating:
While this legal ground exist, the suit must be dismissed for two reasons, viz:
Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within
one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the
illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was
filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason
action is barred.
Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. As shown in Exhibit B, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage
by her husband. Her consent is clear from the following stipulations:
(b) That both of us is free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife
without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for
adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation.
(Exh. B).
This stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having
consented to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for legal separation shall be denied for grounds of condonation or
consent from the aggrieved party.
RULING:
The very wording of the agreement Exhibit B. gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first
part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part
that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly
illegal. We do not share appellant's view. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation
of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the
plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).
Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the
grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the
ground that plaintiff and defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but
without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code"
(appellants brief, pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is
contrary to the evidence. In view of the foregoing, the Court found that that decision of the lower
court is in accordance with the evidence and law. Its decision therefore has been affirmed.
(276) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER

G.R. No. L-48183
FACTS:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena
Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a
document.
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a
decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On
May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of
the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the
city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein
instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the
conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of double
jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal
before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding the
question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused
was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused who has pending case of bigamy and concubinage is a double jeopardy?
RULING:
As to appellant's plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the office of bigamy for
which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two
distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of
the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other
hand, in the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife
characterizes the crime of concubinage. The first in an offense against civil status which may be
prosecuted at the instance of the state; the second, an offense against chastity and may be
prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party. And no rule is more settled in law than that,
on the matter of double jeopardy, the test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for
the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which
they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act
of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no
doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
Before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) the consent which bars the offended party from
instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been
committed. We are now convinced that this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as
well as the manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must
have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent,
for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance,
a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where,
upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We,
therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended
party from prosecuting the offense.
In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to

do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the
tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest
policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally
condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative
department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our
authority.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted.

(277) People vs Sensano

G.R. No. L-3772 ( March 27, 1933)
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and begot a child. After birth, the husband left
and for three years no communication or support for the child was sent to the wife. Poor and
illiterate, she struggled for her and her son until she met Marcelo Ramos who took her and the
child to live with him.
On the return of the husband, he filed a charged of adultery and both were sentenced to four
months and one day of arresto mayor. After completing the sentence, the accused left her
paramour and begged her husband to take her back promising to be faithful. The husband refused.
The wife then went back to her coaccused and lived with him ever since.
The husband knowing that she resumed living with her co-defendant did nothing to interfere and
shortly left for Hawaii where he remained for seven years. On his return, he presented the second
charge of adultery with the sole purpose to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Ventura can institute a criminal complaint against his wife and her
paramour after implied consent
RULING:
Art. 344 of the RPC Para (2) states that the offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
He may not have pardoned his wife but the Court came to a conclusion that the evidence on the
case and the husbands conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute
criminal proceeding.
There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against
the accused during the seven years of inaction. Case dismissed.
4. RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GIFT
ARTICLE 56 (4)
(278) Benedicto vs. Dela Rama
3 PHIL 34
FACTS:
On July 5, 1902, the CFI entered a final judgment decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff
(Agueda Benedicta dela Rama) on the ground of husbands adulteryand ordered Esteban Dela
Rama to pay her P81, 042.76 due her as her unpaidshare of the property belonging to the
conujugal partnership, as well as thesum of P3, 200 as an allowance for their support.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has jurisdiction to hear divorce cases?
RULING:
The partidas recognized adultery as a ground for divorce. Therefore, according tothe civil as well
as the canonical law in force here on August 13, 1898, thecommission of that offense gave the
injured party the right to a divorce. Thatprovision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by
the change of sovereignty. The complete separation under the American Government of churchand
state, while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, couldnot affect the right
itself. The fact that the ecclesiastical courts no longer exercisesuch power is not important. The
jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is nowvested in Courts of First Instance, by virtue of Act
No. 136. Section 56, first and fifthparagraphs of that act, provides that "Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction, first, in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable
of pecuniary estimation; fifth, and in all such special cases and proceedings as arenot otherwise
provided for." The result is (1) that Courts of First instance have jurisdiction to entertain a suit
fordivorce; (2) that the only ground therefor is adultery; (3) that an action on thatground can be
maintained by the husband against the wife, or by the wife againstthe husband; and (4) that the
decree does not dissolve the marriage bond. TheCourt of First Instance of Iloilo, therefore,
committed no error in assuming jurisdiction of this case.(2) A motion for a new trial having been
made in the court below on the ground thatthe findings of fact contained in the decision were not
justified by the evidence, itbecomes necessary to examine that evidence. The adultery of the
defendant was duly proved. The finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery is, however,
plainly andmanifestly against the weight of the evidence.For the sin of each one of them is of itself
a bar to an accusation against the other.Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled
to a divorce. The result makes it unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment which relatesto
the settlement of the conjugal partnership.
6. PRESCRIPTION
ARTICLE 56 (6)
(279) Brown vs Yambao

102 PHIL 168
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit to obtain legal separation from lawful wife Juanita
Yambao alleging that his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl which he learned only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter
the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership
and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be
just and equitable.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Joses questions elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived
with another woman and had begotten children by her.
The court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred
his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, and that there had been consent and
connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code since
the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether or not proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both spouses are
offenders
RULING:
No. One circumstance is the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it
bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
The court also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.
(280) De Ocampo vs Florenciano

G.R. No. L-13553 (February 23, 1960)
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent
the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952,
when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In
June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo
filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action has already prescribed.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the
defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must
agree with the Court of Appeals on this point.1
(281) Contreras vs Macaraig
G.R. No. L-29138 (May 29, 1970)
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila.
Out of their Marriage, three children were born: Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953;
Victoria C. Macaraig, on March 26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the
children are in the care of plaintiff wife.
Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing
establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset In September, 1962, Avelino
Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann
Alcala. After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs.
Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant
did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report
was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no collusion
present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the infidelity of the husband is
apparent, yet the case will have to be dismissed. Article 102 provides that, an action for legal
separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the
cause." In the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of the
term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can be attended with difficulty. For one
thing; that rules might be different in case of adultery, which is an act, and for concubinage, which
may be a situation or a relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963.
RULING:
After a careful review of the record, we are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time
when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the following happened
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily
Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period
of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
Appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the case is hereby
remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
ARTICLE 58
(282) Araneta vs Concepcion

G.R. No. L-9667 (July 31, 1956)
FACTS:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wife for legal separation on the ground of
adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children,
a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport. The
husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife
had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition granting custody
of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her
children.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the husbands request that evidence be allowed
to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which
reads as follows: ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed?
RULING:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of
their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against
one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The
law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances.
If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
In the case at bar, the court cannot ignore the claim of adultery by the husband in the face of
express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of
letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the
custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged
in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode. Evidence of all
these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and
alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it
does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not
affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive
to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the
court may determine which is best for their custody.
(283) Pacete vs Cariaga

G.R. No. L-53880 (March 17, 1994)
FACTS:
In Concepcion Alanis complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938; that
Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that
she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the
latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor
vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or
in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which was
granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis
asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis
submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper
RULING:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves. It is consonant
with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter
that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.
If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity
of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage
relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the
vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
(284) Somosa-Ramos vs Vamerita

G.R. No. L-34132 (July 29, 1972)
FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against
respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an
attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente
Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on
Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971,
that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the
reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the parties
to submit their respective memoranda on the matter. Then on September 3, 1971, petitioner
received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is
the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Respondents were required to answer
according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer was filed December 2 of that year.
Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation from parties in the case submitting the matter
without further arguments.
ISSUE:
whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation
before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from
acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a
suit.
RULING:
The court ruled, xxx from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971,
more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower
court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
ARTICLE 60, NECESSITY OF TRAL AND INTERVENTON OF STATE
1. LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
(285) SABALONES vs CA
(February 14, 1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner Samson Sabalones,an ambassador, left to his wife, respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for fifteen years. Petitioner
retired in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years
later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot Greenhills, belonging to
the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of
his hospitalization and medical treatment. The private respondent opposed the authorization and
filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being
occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals
from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease. She also
informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate
family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng
and their three children. She asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his
adultery. After trial, it was also found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985
at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not
entitled to support from his respondent wife. This decision was appealed to the respondent
court. The respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their properties. She also complained
that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the United States in
favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children. The petitioner opposed
and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of lease over the
Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent. The Court
of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the petitioner is entitled to the joint administration of their conjugal properties
RULING:
According to Article 124 of the Family Code, the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of the
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or the authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. The law
does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. While it is true that
no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of
Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under
challenge.
(286) ESPIRITU vs CA
GR 115640 (MARCH 15, 1995)
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named
Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got
married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the
Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in
1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody
of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the
paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated
from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for
a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was
rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact
he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is
not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy
and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at
least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
(287) Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that
her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for
the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground
of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel
duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
RULING:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned
union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
2. DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
ARTICLE 63 AND 64
(288) LAPERAL vs REPUBLIC
GR No. 18008 (October 30, 1962)
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique. Santamaria on
March 1939. Events led her to cease from living with Enrique. A decree of legal separation was
later on issued to the spouses. During their marriage, she naturally used her husbands surname,
thus adopted Elisea L. Santamaria.
After the decree of legal separation was granted she wanted to revert to her maiden name thus,
filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using Elisea Laperal. She was claiming that
continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Article 372 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision
of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.
RULING:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances was without basis.
It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that
the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea
for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of
Art. 372.
(289) Siochi vs Gozon

(March 18, 2010)
FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. The
property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon
(Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition
for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of
lispendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving the property for the price
of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would secure an Affidavit
from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the
back of TCT No. 5357, etc. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale is valid
RULING:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124
of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent
to the sale is still required by law for its validity. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement
is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn,
the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited
in favor of Winifred.
Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse
without the consent of the other spouse.
G. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPUSES
(290) Ilusurio vs Ilusurio

(May 12, 2000)
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children
namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They
separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila
and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo
city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano
which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in
Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
RULING:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to
visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at
liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a
matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
(291) ARROYO vs VASQUEZ-ARROYO

G.R. No. 17014 (August 29, 1921)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived
together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away
from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed
thatshe was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in t
urnprayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance
for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she
was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of
conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home?
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction?
RULING:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff todefendant
was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband
in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution in
enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de
facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible,
and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under
obligation to return to the domicile. When people understand that they must live togetherthey
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wives necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which
itimposes
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property
rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done
this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented
herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.
(292) Goitia vs Campos
35 PHIL 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for
a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her
to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such
acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and
different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not
compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
RULING:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal
abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
(293) TENCHAVEZ vs ESCANO

15 SCRA 335
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a
San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed
to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after
translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for
the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of
her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in
Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a
complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from
joining her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
RULING:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the
Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce
in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez
and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the
Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
(294) Cuenca vs Cuenca

G.R. No. 72321 (December 8, 1988)
FACTS:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real
property and damages against the petitioners before the then Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court
dismissed the complaint.
The private respondents appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. On
November 26, 1984, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. It
rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents the dispositive portion. The other claim of
the plaintiffs for damages and accounting of the value of the produce corresponding to their shares
is not granted for lack of evidence. The counterclaim of defendants is likewise dismissed for lack of
merit.
On December 3, 1984, the petitioners received a copy of the appellate court's decision. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. On February 22, 1985, the petitioners
then filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit and the supplemental motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for having been filed out of
time. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 6, 1985 resolution insofar as
the same held that the motion for new trial was filed out of time. The motion was denied for lack of
merit and legal basis.
ISSUE:
When does a party may file a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
before the appellate court?
RULING:
The Rules of Court under Rule 37 and Rule 53 provide two (2) instances when a party may file a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Rule 37, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial within the period for perfecting
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and giant a new trial
for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party.
b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence have discovered, and
produced at the trial and which if presented would probably alter the result; (emphasis supplied)
while section 1, Rule 53 states:
SECTION 1. Petition before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals becomes
executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence
and which is of such a character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly
discovered evidence.
The rules are clear and leave no room for interpretation, Rule 37 speaks of a trial court while Rule
53 speaks of the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly, the appellate court erred in denying the
petitioners' motion for new trial on the ground that it was filed out of time pursuant to Rule 37. The
applicable law is Rule 53 and since the motion for new trial was filed before the appellate court's
judgment could become final and executory, the motion was filed within the reglementary period.
In their motion for new trial the petitioners alleged:
1. There are newly discovered evidence consisting of ancient, authentic records which establish
beyond reasonable doubt, the status of defendants-appellees as legitimate children of the
deceased Agripino Cuenca whose estate is the subject matter of this case.
2. There is documentary proof beyond doubt that Agripino Cuenca was never married to Jesusa
Pagar.
3. The totality of defendants-appellees' evidence prove that Engracia A. Basadre was married
legally to Agripino Cuenca in 1920 and that defendant-appellees are legitimate children of Agripino
Cuenca and legitimate half-brother/half-sisters of plaintiffs- appellants who are entitled to equal
shares of their father's estate.
4. There is sufficient documentary evidence to prove that the lands in question were conjugal
properties of Agripino Cuenca and Engracia A. Basadre acquired during their marriage.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these
parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca
and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels
were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the
8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca
or respondent Restituto Cuenca.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and ineffective. The
documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change the result. The
motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned resolutions of the appellate
court are AFFIRMED.
(295) Go vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 101837 (February 11, 1992)
FACTS:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and
drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and
reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after
the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted
bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of
lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions
undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful
Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation
RULING:
Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization,
etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the
arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge
and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule
112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition
granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is
suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon
posting a bail bond.
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Republic Act No. 9262
(296) Go-Tan vs Spouses Tan

G.R. No. 168852
FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six
years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2)
(3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be

included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.
RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In
Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.
(297) San Diego vs RTC

G.R. No. 19396 (January 7, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information alleging that he used personal violence on the complainant, by pulling
her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading
the complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter, on August
12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no
longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she
had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was
responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent
slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC denied petitioners motion since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children
as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
ISSUES:
1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a
manner that will favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what
has been admitted should be quashed.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating
relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under
the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against
women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should
the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang
and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or
dating relationship.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such
as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law.
Finally, the Court finds the Order of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to
amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the
same.
(298) RALPH P. TUA vs HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG

G.R. No. 170701 (January 22, 2014)
FACTS:
Rosanna married Ralph in 1998. They have three children. On May 20, 2005, Rosanna filed a
verified petition for issuance of protection order for herself and her children, against his husband
Ralph. According to her, there was a time when Ralph pointed a gun at her and cocked it to
convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed against him; there was also an
instance when Ralph fed her children with chicken which her youngest child spat out; to make his
children stop crying, he would threaten them with a belt; when she told him to stop coming to the
house as she and her children were afraid of him, he threatened to cut off financial support to
them, among others. Acting on the verified petition, the trial court issued a Temporary Protection
Order good for 30 days and required Ralph to comment on the petition. In his comment questioning
the propriety of the temporary protection order, he maintained that Rosanna had been staying with
another man; she surreptitiously moved her children out of their abode despite their written
agreement; and Rosanna is pyschologically, emotionally and mentally unfit to keep the children in
her custody.
Without waiting for his Comment to be resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. In order not to render the petition moot, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order for the parties to enjoin them implementing the temporary protection order. Ralph
later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to restrain the RTC from
conducting proceedings therein.
The CA later dismissed his petition for certiorari. It ruled that the petition is still pending with the
RTC, hence the factual matters could be raised thereon. The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to
Ralphs contention that RA 9262 is unconstitutional, since the issue raised in the CA was the
alleged grave abuse of disruption by the RTC in issuing the TPO, the issue could be resolved
without ruling on the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262, which is not the very lis mota of the
petition.
Ralph thus filed his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality
of Republic Act 9262. According to him, RA 9262, particularly Section 15 thereof which allows the
grant of protection orders, is unconstitutional, since it deprives the respondent of due process
before issuance. It is also an invalid delegation of powers by Congress to the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the provisions of RA 9262.
RULING:
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides: Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders

(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after
ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or
all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date
of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on
the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for
the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of
a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon, wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection
orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from
greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of
minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator
and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary
judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily
the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection
orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.
(299) People vs Jumawan
G.R. No. 187495 (April 21, 2014)
FACTS:
This is a case about the accussed-appellant who allegedly raped his wife KKK.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
According to KKK, accussed-appellant rape and forces her to have sex with her even if she isnt
feeling well. Her husband forces her to have sex with her even in front of their children.
In the contrary, accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the
possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999.
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected
from her odd behavior.
In its Judgment, dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by
giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a
crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two
(2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband is to be charged of rape of his own wife.
RULING:
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value
and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It
can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife,
inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who
vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully
opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her
yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal
constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion
that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such
it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed
that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false
marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made
answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
The Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole.
(300) Republic vs Yahon

G.R. No. 201043 (June 16, 2014)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) filed a petition for review
which seeks to nullify and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court granting temporary and permanent protection order with financial spousal support to
respondent Daisy R. Yahon.
Respondent Yahon filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under RA 9262 against her
husband S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who
retired on January 2006. Respondent and Sgt. Yahon were married but did not have any children,
but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner. Upon trial for the protection order,
preponderance of evidence; oral and documentary showed that Sgt. Yahon had been repeatedly
inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the respondent and at
some instance Sgt. Yahon threatened her and her daughters life at gun point. The trial court
issued a temporary protection order with financial spousal support to the respondent. However,
Sgt. Yahon violated the TPO and did not provide for financial support.
Herein petitioner AFPFC filed before the trial court a Manifesto and Motion to lift the TPO.
Petitioner informed the trial court that S/Sgt. Yahons check had been processed and is ready for
payment but the check has not been claimed by respondent. The court of appeals denied the
petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the trial court. Thus, herein
petitioner contends before the court of last resort that it cannot comply with the trial courts directive
for the automatic deduction of 50% from the retirement benefits and pension of S/Sgt. Yahon to be
given directly to respondent, as it contravenes with Section 31 of PD 1638 stating that the benefits
authorized under this decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; with a similar provision found in RA 8291
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner military institution be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful
wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order pursuant to RA 9262?
RULING:
Yes.The court ruled that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the latter enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. It held that Section 8(g) of RA
9262, being the later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general
rule above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that
the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman notwithstanding other laws to the contrary.
As for the contention of the petitioner that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of
S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, the
court sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the amount of Php. 10, 500 payable to
the BML Trading and Supply. The court ruled that under Section 8(g) of RA 9262 used the general
term employer, which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all
employers, whether private or government.
The court further ruled that Section 8(g) of RA 9262 providing for spousal and child support is a
support enforcement legislation. Hence, the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family
and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. Thus, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is
affirmed and upheld.
(301) BBB vs AAA

G.R. No. 193225 (February 9, 2015)
FACTS:
AAA has her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named CCC. During the
relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD and EEE. BBB and AAA married
in civil rights and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including CCCs, was amended to
change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and
heated arguments. BBB alleges that AAAs irrational jealousy has caused their frequent
arguments. AAA, on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to BBBs
incessant womanizing. The breaking point for AAA came when BBBs alleged mistress, insulted
and humiliated AAA in public, in the presence of BBB himself who did nothing to stop the same.
Extremely hurt, AAA decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at
a friends house.
While living separately from BBB, AAA discovered that BBB was not paying the rentals due on the
condominium unit they were occupying, forcing AAA to move out. AAA was likewise compelled to
find work to support the family, after BBB has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the
family. AAA likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their
children. Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an
application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same
permanent after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court.
Finding good ground in AAAs application, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
which was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC. BBB filed before the CA
an appeal to challenge the RTC Decision. The CA affirmed the factual findings and dispositions of
the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings
who shall be awarded custody of the children. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). BBB alleges that he and AAA
had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support
of DDD and EEE. BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which
allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not
his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him,
being not his biological son.
ISSUE:
1. Is the petition a proper subject of a compromise agreement?
2. Is CCC, AAA's child from previous relationship, not entitled to receive support from the
petitioner, BBB?
RULING:
On the first issue, the instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. The
Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a
judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed
by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not
subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Re: Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children) explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of
violence against women. While AM No. 10-4-16-SC (Re: Rule on Court-Annexed Family Mediation
and Code of Ethical Standards for Mediators) on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of
all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property
relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as
regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAAs vacillation compels the Court to
exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties
are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but
the Court now requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and
fail to put an end to their bickering.
On the second issue, CCC is entitled to receive support from the petitioner, BBB. Article 177 of the
Family Code provides that "only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that "legitimation shall take place by a subsequent
valid marriage between parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs biological father. Such
being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application
and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should
not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by
the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179
of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including
the receipt of his fathers support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper
court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant
petition.
H. PROPERTY BETWEEN RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

ARTICLE 1 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 16,
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. DONATIONS PROPER NUPTIAS
(302) Abobon vs Abobon

G.R. No. 15583 (August 15, 2012)
FACTS:
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon were the plaintiffs in this action fer recovery of
possession and damages brought against petitioner Numeriano Abobon (Numeriano) in the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Labrador-Sual in Pangasinan (MCTC). The respondents averred
that they owned the land, and they just allowed the petitioner to occupy the said land, out of
benevolence.
The Petioner however, claimed the ownership of the said land. He said that he took possession of
the land by virtue of inheritance from his parents. He averred that his grandfather, Emilio,has
granted the 3000 square meters to his father, Rafael when he married his mother, Apolonia
Pascua, by virtue of donation proper nuptias and he was in possession of the said land for almost
59 years.
The MTC , ruled in favour of the respondents having found out that the land in question is different
from the land donated, the land the petitioner argues to be his.
The Court of appeals, affirmed the decision of the MTC, thus, the petition was made to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE LOT BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT BEING CLAIMED
BY PETITIONER.
RULING:
His insistence that the land he occupied had been donated to his parents and was different from
the land in question was bereft of factual support. All the lower courts uniformly found that his
evidence related to a parcel of land entirely different from the land in question. According to the
MCTC, "the land for which he has presented evidence to support his claim of ownership is entirely
different from the land the plaintiffs are claiming."23 On its part, the RTC held that "the land, subject
matter of this controversy is all of 4668 sq. meters and bearing different boundaries from that of the
donated property and was already registered under OCT No. 28727 as early as 1926," such that
"the subject property is separate and distinct from that property donated to the defendants parents
in 1937."24 Agreeing with both lower courts, the CA declared: "(i)n fine, what these decisions are
saying is that petitioner may have evidence that he owns a parcel of land but, based on the
evidence he had presented, the said parcel of land is different from the one he is presently
occupying."
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER
ARTICLE 84 AND 87, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(303) ARCABA vs VDA. DE BATOCAEL

370 SCRA 414
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in 1956. Zosima
died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of
Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he
asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was
then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store inside. According to Leticia,
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. Erlinda Tabancura, another
niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila said
that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to
and that he was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with him. Cirila she was 34
year-old and Francisco was 75 year old. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper
though her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became
bedridden. Few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila
who accepted the same. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the
petitioner. The deed was notarized and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. The
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid
RULING:
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least; cohabitation is a public assumption of
men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
The court considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that
she was not simply a caregiveremployee. Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
(304) Matabuena vs Cervantes

G.R. NO. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated
to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena,
his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was
made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
RULING:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is
as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility
of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
(305) Grecio vs Sun Life

48 PHIL 53
FACTS:
Gercio bought a Sunlife policy for 2000 pesos naming his wife Zialcita as the beneficiary. However,
Zialcita was convictedfor adultery after Gercio bought the policy. Gercio filed for divorce and
married a new woman, Adela. He informed Sunlife that he wanted to put in his new wife as
the beneficiary and revoke Adela. The trial court ruled in his favor and order Sun to cancel the
former wife as the beneficiary and name the new one as such. The company refused to obey.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the case be considered in the light of the Code of Commerce, the Civil Code, or the
Insurance Act.
Whether the insured the husband has the power to change the beneficiary the former wife
and to name instead his actual wife, where the insured and the beneficiary have been divorced and
where the policy of insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change
the beneficiary.
RULING:
No. None of these. American authorities considered. Judgment reversed. Nothing in the Code of
Commerce states a provision either permitting or prohibiting the insured to change thebeneficiary.
The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-insurance contracts or
to the destination of life-insurance proceeds.
As for Insurance Act, there is likewise no provision either permitting or prohibiting the insured to
change the beneficiary.
Hence, the courts gathered rules from American authorities given that the Insurance Act was taken
from the California Code.
One of the cases in the American jurisdiction applicable to the case at hand is Yore vs. Booth
which stated:
A person who procures a policy upon his own life, payable to a

designated beneficiary, although he pays the premiums himself, and keeps the policy in his
exclusive possession, has no power to change the beneficiary, unless the policy itself, or the
charter of the insurance company, so provides.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company vs Schaefer- We do not hesitate to say, however,
that a policy taken out in good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the
insurable interest, unless such be the necessaryeffect of the provisions of the policy itself
Central National Bank of Washington City vs. Hume- It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and
the money to become due under it, belong, the moment it is ISSUE:d, to the person or persons
named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that there is no power in the person procuring
the insurance, by any act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of
the person named.
In Louisiana, the civil law reconciled with modern insurance laws was considered as having been
similar to that of the Philippines.
Lambert vs Penn Mutual Life- where a policy is of the semitontine variety, as in this case,
the beneficiary has a vested right in the policy, of which she cannot be deprived without her
consent.
The Supreme Court said that they were unable to see how the plaintiffs interest in the policy was
primary or superior to that of the husband. Both interests were contingent, but they were entirely
separate and distinct, the one from the other. The wifes interest was not affected by the decree of
court which dissolved the marriage contract between the parties. It remains her separate property,
after the divorce as before.
(306) Harding vs Commercial Union
38 PHIL 464
FACTS:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift
from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines. The
cars value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta
Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some
repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed
by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by
Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the
cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated
that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under
the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
RULING:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding
to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence does
not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is more
than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta
Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that
the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the
automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies
must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.
REVOCATION
3. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
(307) Imani vs Metropolitan Bank

November 17, 2010
FACTS:
Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-sureties
binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding 6 Million php. CPDTI incurred an indebtednessaround 164,000 php to which it defaulted
in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its
sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by Imani and filed to consolidate
the title to its name.
Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.
2. Whether the property was subject to execution, it being a road right of way under PD 1529.
RULING:
No.
Civil Law: Conjugal Property
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a conditionsine qua nonto the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name ofEvangelinaDazo-Imani
married to SinaImaniis no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to
substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.Thus, it cannot be
rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
Remedial Law: Appeals
The argument regarding the road right of way must be rejected because it was raised for the first
time in this petition.In the trial court and the CA, petitioners arguments zeroed in on the alleged
conjugal nature of the property.It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.To consider the alleged facts
and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process. Denied.
(308) Navarro vs Judge Escobido and Go

(November 27, 2009)
FACTS:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of
replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro
alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since
Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed
the case but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos (husband) leasing
business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of
Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action
could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental
pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
RULING:
Yes. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a
judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest,
and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her
name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered
under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded
in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit,
based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband
and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section
11 of the Rules of Court.
PROPERTY EXCLUDED
ARTICLES 92 and 95
(309) MULLER vs MULLER

G.R. No. 149615 (August 29,2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and
the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation
of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within
the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. There is an express prohibition
against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property
under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to
do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
(310) Pacific Ace vs Yanagisawa

G.R. No. 175303 (APRIL 11, 2012)
FACTS:
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa married Evelyn Castaneda, who then bought a townhouse unit which
was registered in her name. Yanagisawa then filed a case against his wife on the ground of
bigamy, during pendency, respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a restraining order against
Evelyn and an application for a writ of a preliminary injunction to enjoin her from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. Evelyn then obtained a loan from Pafin
and executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Pafin over the townhouse unit which Yanagisawa
filed annulment.
Makati RTC Decision: dissolved the marriage between Yanagisawa and Evelyn; ordered liquidation
of their properties
RTC Decision: foreign national cannot own the mortgaged property
CA Decision: annulled real estate mortgage executed by Evelyn
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTCs decision is improper.
RULING:
Yes, jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable,
thus the party in whose favor the injunction is issued has the right to seek annulment of offending
actions.
(311) BEUMER vs AMORES

December 3, 2012
FACTS:
Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage
was declared a nullity by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity,
thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties
which he claimed were acquired during their marriage. Among the properties included in the
inventory were several lots and residential house, described below:
1. a Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square
meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.
2. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806
sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
3. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756
sq.m.
4. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of Avelina,
but it was purchased using funds he received from the Dutch government as disability benefit, and
Avelina had no sufficient income to purchase the properties. On the other hand, Avelina alleged
that except for the two residential houses and Lots 1 and 2142, all the other lots were her
paraphernal properties and acquired thru her funds.
After trial the RTC disposed of the properties as follows: It awarded to Willem several personal
properties (tools and equipments), the two houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 were declared as
co-owned by Willem and Avelina as there was no prohibition on aliens owning buildings and
houses and were acquired during the marital union. On the other hand, all the lots covered by
several TCTs were declared paraphernal properties , though acquired during the marriages, in
view of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real property in the Philippines. On
appeal to the CA, Willem asserted that all the money for the purchase of the lots came from his
funds, and were registered only in the name of Avelina because of the constitutional prohibition,
hence he prayed for reimbursement of one half of the value of the lots. The CA disagreed, ruling
that he cannot invoke equity when he very well knew the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning
real property in the Philippines. Thus, Willem elevated his case to the Supreme Court to assail the
RTC and CA decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the purchase price of the lots
subject of the case.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For
Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, the Court had already denied
a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that
Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
land, enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is well aware of the [above-cited] constitutional
prohibition and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
the subject properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable
intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement. As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he
who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful. In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to
purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have
previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently,
these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. In any event, the Court
cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no
right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the
purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the
parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into. Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement
on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on
unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, Article 22. Every
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another).
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion
in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v.
Johnson: The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however,
that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff. Nor
would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine
land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to
state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which
the Court is duty-bound to protect.
(312) Abrenica vs Abrenica

G.R. NO. 180572 (June 18, 2012)
FACTS:
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against
petitioner. The first was, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With
Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that
petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land
in Lemery, Batangas. The second was, also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership
Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two
clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.
The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies from the SEC to the courts. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226,
held that: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he
received as profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of P
4,524,000.00;
2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount of P
4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and converted
the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959
1. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he received under the
retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation
in the amount of P 320,000.00.
2. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received by him under the
Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of P
320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;
3. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash advance in the
amount of P 25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision becomes final;
and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004, he filed
a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which provides that
decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless
stayed by an appellate court. On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's
Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as
the correct mode of appeal from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of
Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents motion for execution.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should
take cognizance of the notice of appeal. Petitioner did not comply with the said Order. Instead, on
June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the
motion. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion.
Given the foregoing facts, the court dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that
the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, the court held as follows:
Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were timely
filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision
because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. "Public interest demands an end to every
litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no
purpose other than to delay the administration of justice." In the instant case, the trial court's
decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005. Respondents had already acquired a
vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners
Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment
assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject
of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment,
ISSUE:
The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct
documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.
II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on
testimonial evidence to prove their respective position[s].
III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said
petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law
partnership transaction.
IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.
V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P 3 million and
not P 8 million.
VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc.
was a law partnership transaction.
VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative
to the various personal loans secured by respondents.
VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted
without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction. 5
RULING:
We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner
Erlando only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined
Erlando as a co-petitioner.
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution6 dismissing the Petition. First, it reasoned that the
remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioners.7 Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was
directly attributable to them, the remedy under Rule 47 was no longer available.
Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and
the appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the
grounds for annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial
court did not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that,
in any event, petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, but they did not do so.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA
had by then already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and
executory.8
Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment
with the CA dated 25 May 20079 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the
ground of extrinsic fraud into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R.
SP No. 98679. The following were the grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:
A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based
on the following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:
I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not
present direct documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on
the gist of what its personnel did as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter [sic] in
collusion with the respondents.
II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied
mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally on what was
presented to it by its personnel who drafted the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the
respondents.
III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by
said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law
partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible
as against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same reasons as stated in
Nos. I and II above.
V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P 3
million and not P 8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta
Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II
above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive
counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents also for the same
reasons as the above.
B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its incapacity[,]
rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.10 (Underscoring in the original.)
On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution11 dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99719, which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the
following:
x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for the
annulment of the subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or
issues as the present annulment of judgment case.
xxx xxx xxx
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as

where there is no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA
96[2004]). Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA
167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the persons of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in
the exercise of jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal
(Republic vs. "G" Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration12 on 28 August 2007.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion13 with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties
belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still
had to determine the manner of distribution of the firms assets and the value of the levied
properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41
appeal was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim14 also with Branch 226 of the RTC of
Quezon City, alleging that she15 and her stepchildren16 owned a number of the personal properties
sought to be levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as
the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of
the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family
home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated
combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant
to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and
likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.
Accordingly, the RTC scheduled17 a hearing on the motion. On 17 October 2007, however,
petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with
respondents.18
Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de
Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the
auction sale of the property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement
of the money judgment.19
Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed
Resolution20 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as
the last day for filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in
the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions, which had already been dispensed
with.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not
been resolved by the RTC. That issue arose from the Order21 given by the trial court to petitioner
Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy
was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite
this Courts explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus
correctly dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC,
petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case.
They raise in the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of
Judgment (including the Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not
made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute
community of property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of
the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August
2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of
the law firm for the sum of P 5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint22 with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against
herein respondents and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC
of Marikina City.23 Petitioners sought the nullification of the sheriffs sale on execution of the
Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the payment of damages.
They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in
violation of their right to due process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from
consolidating TCT No. 216818.24
The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion 25
before us to cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This
Motion was on the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint
pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 an Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession.26 That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution27
issued on 10 November 2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari28
under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.)29 after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to
Vacate within five days from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the
CA has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when
the CA rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble
Motion for Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them.
Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing
remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of
annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed an appeal
under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of
petitioners themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule
43; and (2) filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the
RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,30 we said:
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should
be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party
must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must
be recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and
petitioner Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-
party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other remedy available to her.
Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was no longer interested in her case.
Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma.
Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April
1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April
1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998. 31
In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal
properties in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were
owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena
filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent
any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot
be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well
as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime.1wphi1 However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community
property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles
nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.
Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty
of forum shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City
while the case was still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,32 we explained forum
shopping in this wise:
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court
of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in
which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would
still be open," or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain
the same from the original court.
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in
executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the
present case questions the merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-
42959. These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were
clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2
August 2007 and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143286 (April 14, 2004)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eusebia Retuya, legal wife filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband and
his son with another woman seeking reconveyance of several properties claiming that subject
properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas which were acquired during their marriage. She
also prayed for accounting, damages and the delivery of rent and other income from the subject
properties.
Nicolas later suffered a stroke and was incapacitated. Natividad Retuya, daughter of Eusebia and
Nicolas tried to negotiate with Procopio, the son of Nicolas who was then receiving the income of
the subject properties, but he refused. Plaintiff complained to the Barangay Captain but no
settlement was reached.
It was elevated to the RTC which rendered its decision in favour of Eusebia applying Art. 116 of the
Family Code which states that all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. In the meantime, Eusebia died and was substituted by her heirs.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal
RULING:
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Both the
trial court and the appellate court agreed that the properties were acquired during their marriage. A
reversal of this finding only occur when petitioner show sufficient reason to doubt its correctness
which they failed to present.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person even for a long period does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act
that is both illegal and immoral.
Petitioners reliance on Art 148 of the Family Code that readily shows that there must be proof of
actual joint contribution by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them
in proportion to their contribution is misplaced. Proof of actual contribution of both parties is
required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners

failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita.The petition is denied. The CA decision
affirmed.
(314) Ching vs CA
423 SCRA 356 (February 23, 2004)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all
its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of
said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo
Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition
of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the
conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is
registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According
to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-
husbands profession or business.44
ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching
RULING:
No.
The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise
of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks
with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account
of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption
can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
(315) TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
273 SCRA 229
FACTS:
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly described as
Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he
has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older
brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him. Petitioner relies principally on the
fact that the van is registered in his name under Certificate of Registration. He claims in his
testimony before the trial court that the said motor vehicle was purchased from Balintawak Isuzu
Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his brother to pay for the van and the
receipt from payment was placed in his name because it was his money that was used to pay for
the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was working for his
company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to return the van to him and
appropriated the same for himself. On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT
Industries is a family business that was placed in petitioners name because at that time he was
then leaving for the United Stated and petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the
Philippines. When the family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the delivery of
machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of
P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for the van, which would be available in about a
month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend
Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless, respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioners name. It
was also their understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was
not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had been in possession of
the vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to
time to use the van for deliveries of
machinery. After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in theapp
eal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitionerappellant established proof of ownership over the subject motor
vehicle.
RULING:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the
motor vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the clai
m ofprivate respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A
certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in ones name indeed creates a strong presumption of
ownership.
For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner
thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent
proof.
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated
therein. Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is unde
niablethat an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was
placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private
respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot
repudiate the trust relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A
trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between
brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal
document. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
CHARGES AGAINST/OBLIGATIONS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
ARTICLES 94-95

G.R. No. 188289 (August 20, 2014)
FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the US and in the Philippines.
with the properties in the US remaining in the sole ownership of Leticia. The trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the
court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the Philippine properties between the
spouses. David insists that the CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded
the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
RULING:
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply: Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each
spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its
net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive
legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At
the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt
the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to
liquidation.
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.
While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.
(317) Ros and Aguete vs PNB Laoag

April 6, 2011
FACTS:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment
of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag
Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.
The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag
City.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of
P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-
appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the
Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB,
Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was
filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property
interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan
did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists
that it was plaintiffs-appellees own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel,
laches, abandonment and prescription.
On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners
The appellate court reversed the trial courts decision, and dismissed petitioners complaint.
The appellate court stated that the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it was
improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguetes testimony that her signatures on the loan
documents were forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the
documents knowingly and with her full consent.
Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros loan, the appellate court ruled
that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of
the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the familys
business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving weight to the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, and in reversing and setting aside such findings and conclusions without stating
specific contrary evidence, declaring the real estate mortgage valid and declaring, without basis,
that the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine National Bank Laoag
redounded to the benefit of his family, aside from the fact that such had not been raised by
respondent in its appeal.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either
of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge
upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and
wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility
or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the
end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Petition is Denied.
(318) NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No.114791 (May 29, 1997)
FACTS:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their
wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said
its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The
newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video
because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys
husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded
in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said:
that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are
supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses
neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her
husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages?
RULING:
Yes.The contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the
wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the
fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the
sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in
our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be
reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in
compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the
Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles
2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included
in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it
was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence
only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
(319) COTONER vs REVILLA
(November 12, 2014)
FACTS:
The transaction took place before the effectivity of the Family Code in 2004. Generally, civil laws
have no retroactive effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides that [it] shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws. Article 165 of the Civil Code states that [t]he husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that [t]he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by
law.
Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses) are the owners in fee simple of an
unregistered parcel of land. In 1983, Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-
Zacarias (Amada) to finance Alfredo Revillas travel to Saudi Arabia. By way of security, the parties
verbally agreed that until full payment of the loan, Amada would take physical possession of the
property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and realty taxes.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document dated March 19, 1979,
entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, with the Revilla
spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property. Consequently, the tax declaration in the
name of the Revilla spouses was cancelled, and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of
Amada.
In 1984, Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolfo and Elvira Casorla (Casorla spouses). In
turn, the Casorla spouses sold the property to spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses).
Upon Alfredo Revillas return from Saudi Arabia, he discovered that the propertys tax declaration
was already in the name of the Sun spouses. Subsequently, the Revilla spouses were served a
copy of the answer in the land registration case filed by the Sun spouses, with a copy of the
Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupaattached to it. The Revilla spouses then filed a complaint for the
annulment of sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the property with damages against
Amada, the Casorla spouses, the Sun spouses, and the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of theRevilla spouses. Amada appealedbut it was denied,
as well as her motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the reinstatement and reconveyance of
the property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses
RULING: The reinstatement of the property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses was anchored
on the lower courts finding that their signatures as sellers in the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa
were forged. Amada contends that the lower courts never declared as falsified thesignature of
Alfredos wife, Paz Castillo-Revilla. Since the property is conjugal in nature, the sale as to the one-
half share of Paz Castillo Revilla should not be declared as void.
The transaction took place before the effectivity of the Family Code in2004. Generally, civil laws
have no retroactive effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides that [it] shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.Article 165 of the Civil Code states that [t]he husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership. Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that [t]he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law. In any case,
the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, assuming arguendo that the signature of
plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ngLupa was not forged, her signature alone
would still not bind the subject property, it being already established that the said transaction was
made without the consent of her husband plaintiff-appellee Alfredo.
Lastly, Amada argues that she has no obligation to prove the genuineness and due execution of
the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupaconsidering it is a public document. The trial court found
otherwise. Atty. Diosdado de Mesa, who allegedly notarized the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa,
was not a commissioned notary public. Amada contends that the Sun spouses were buyers in
good faith for value, thus, the court erred in ordering reinstatement of the property in favor of
respondents Revilla spouses. The Court has held that the rule in land registration law that the
issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the
sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to the
land is clean[.]Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the Torrens
system for registered lands must be protected. On the other hand, those who purchase
unregistered lands do so at their own peril. This good faith argument cannot be considered as this
case involves unregistered land. In any case, as explained by respondents Revilla spouses in their
memorandum, this is a defense personal to the Sun spouses and cannot be borrowed by Amada.
The Sun spouses no longer raised this argument on appeal, but only made a partial appeal
regarding legal interest on the award.
REMEDIES IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENTS
SOLE ADMINISTRATION, WHEN PERMISSIBLE
(320) Siochi vs Gozon

G.R. No. 169900 (March 18, 2010)
FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. The
property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon
(Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition
for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis
pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving the property for the price
of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would secure an Affidavit
from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the
back of TCT No. 5357, etc. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale is valid
RULING:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124
of the Family Code provides:
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent
to the sale is still required by law for its validity. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement
is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn,
the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of
Winifred.
Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse
without the consent of the other spouse.
DISPOSITION
a. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
(321) AGGABAO vs PARULAN
(September 1, 2010)
FACTS:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Paraaque to the
petitioners. On February 1991, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses, met up with Elena Parulan at the
site of the property and showed them documents authorizing Elena to sell the property. The
petitioners paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of
Earnest Money which stipulated that the peitioners would pay an additional payment of P130,
000.00 on February 4, 1991; P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on
March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over the property. On February 4, 1991, the petitioners,
accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown
by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but
that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed
that the loan was effected through and SPA executed by in favor of Elena. The other lot on the
other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baos Rural Bank, with the
same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan. The
petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the Los Baos
Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for the court order
because the lot involved was conjugal property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the
final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor.
However, Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy
was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners
duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled
and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate
owners copy of TCT as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owners
copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an
SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacios instance, the
petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were
accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded
P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan
represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they
tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to
decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5,
1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Elena. Thus, on April 15, 1991,
Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z.
Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex
and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale
executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue
thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with
damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the
RTC. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land
the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not,the Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed
RULING:
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Article 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court rejected
the petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the
contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that
Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not
prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3,
1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an
agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale
of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
(332) Fuentes vs Roca

(April 21, 2010)
FACTS:
The husband of a wife who no longer lives with him sold a conjugal property without her consent as
the affidavit of consent was forged. After their death, their children questioned the sale. It must be
emphasized that their marriage was contracted under the Civil Code, but the sale was executed
under the Family Code. Ruling that the Family Code applies, the High Court held that the sale
could be made by the husband without the consent of the wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid.
RULING:
The SC ruled:
When the spouses got married, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of
gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made the husband the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void
but merely voidable.Article 173 gave the wife the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand,
after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that the husband fraudulently sold.
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband
and Wife. The Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)
(323) Spouses De Leon vs De Leon

July 23, 2009
FACTS:
Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot. Subsequently,
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite and was blessed with 2 children.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was
ISSUE:d in the name of Bonifacio as single.
Subsequently, Bonifacio sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa,
petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of
Anita.
Thereafter, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist
Parish in San Juan, Manila.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677
canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon
City Register of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911, the two
children of Bonifacio filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds to protect their
rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita and her children filed a reconveyance suit
before the RTC. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud
attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that
he was still the owner of the parcel of land.
The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to
them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and
Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Anita and her children and was affirmed by the Appellate Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not subject property is conjugal.

RULING:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Only
proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is
conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear,
the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is
well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of
contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to
the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so
that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller
and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title
passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years
after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration in the
amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the
share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount
paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.
(324) Spouses Bautista vs Silva
502 SCRA 334
FACTS:
Spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva were the owners of a parcel of land with a Transfer
Certificate of Title No B-37189 which was registered on August 14, 1980 in their names.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special
Power of attorney purportedly excuted by Berlina in his favor, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765 was
issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Based on the evidence presented, the signature appearing on the SPA as that of Berlina is a
forgery and
consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not
authorized by Berlina. Thus the RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988
executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina S. Silva, in favor of
defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land as null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property.
RULING:
Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the
husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the
wife. We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
(325) HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs MIGUELA C. DAILO
FACTS:
MiguelaDailo and MarcelinoDailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject
property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
executed only in favor of the late MarcelinoDailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife.
MarcelinoDailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo
obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, MarcelinoDailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela
learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car,
a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which
was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity
of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late MarcelinoDailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and
void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint
to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the
attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN
OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE
BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. . . .
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino.were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was
made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity
unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the
rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by
the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of
their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence
of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of
the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both
the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage
on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Eiincumbitprobatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
(326) Arturo Abalos vs Galicano Macatangay, Jr.

439 SCRA 649
FACTS:
Arturo and Esther Abalos were husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June 2,
1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano Macatangay, Jr. in which Arturo acknowledged he
received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and
that Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The
purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. However, the P5k check was dishonored due to
insufficiency.
Apparently however, Esther and Arturo were having a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in
favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was
alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that
Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared
a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that
the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not the
subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of the
earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.
RULING:
No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement
between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The promise to
sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it
noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase
price.
Assuming arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding for
Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender.
Still assuming arguendo, that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a
contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property is
conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest
money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil
Code.
The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction
between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.
(327) MELANIA A. ROXAS, vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 92245, (June 26, 1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"), although they are
already estranged and living separately.
Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their
conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of lease
between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.
Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no
cause of action.
The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving conjugal
real property without the consent of the wife.
RULING:
No. Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered,
he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty.
As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the transfer of the property and
possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one person to another ... The act by which the
title to real estate is voluntarily assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the
form prescribed by law." While encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in,
the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but
consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that impairs the use or transfer
of property or real estate..."
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance and/or alienation.
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to
give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be
definite or indefinite...." Thus, lease is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of
possession.
In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee. The lessor's right
of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected by the lessee if the lessor uses the leased
realty.
Therefore, lease is a burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. The concept of
encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes construed broadly to include not
only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but also attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights,
water rights, easements, and other RESTRICTIONS on USE."
Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee
becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing
affected by the lease.
Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the
remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract.
(328) Nicolas vs CA
154 SCRA 635
FACTS:
Nicolas and Buan entered into a Portfolio Management Agreement, wherein the former was to
manage the stock transactions of the latter for a period of three months with an automatic renewal
clause. However, upon the initiative of the private Buan the agreement was terminated, and
thereafter he requested for an accounting of all transactions made by the petitioner. 3 weeks after
the termination of the agreement, Nicolas demanded from Buan an amount representing his
alleged management fees as provided for in the Portfolio Management Agreement. But the
demands went unheeded, much to the chagrin of the petitioner. Rebuffed, petitioner filed a
complaint or collection of sum of money against the private respondent before the trial court. In his
answer, Buan contended that petitioner mismanaged his transactions resulting in losses, thus, he
was not entitled to any management fees. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Nicolas, ordering Buan to pay him for the management fees, attorneys fees and expenses
of litigation. Buan appealed the decision to the CA. Finding merit in his case, the appellate court
reversed the trial courts finding and ruled against Nicolas. Petitioners MR was denied by the same
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in overturning the decision of the RTC
RULING:
The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
NO; To begin with, petitioner has the burden to prove that the transaction realized gains or profits
to entitle him to said management fees, as provided in the Agreement: xxx For his services, the
INVESTOR agrees to pay the PORTFOLIO MANAGER 20% of all realized profits every end of the
month. xxx Accordingly, petitioner submitted the profit and loss statements for the covered,
showing a total profit of P341,318.34, of which 20% would represent his management fees
amounting to P68,263.70. The CA declared that these documents has no probative value.
Unfortunately, the profit and loss statements presented by the petitioner are nothing but bare
assertions, devoid of any concrete basis or specifics as to the method of arriving at the amounts
indicated in the documents. They are at best just self-serving statements. In fact, it did not even
state when the stocks were purchased, the type of stocks bought, when the stocks were sold, etc.
The statements simply tabulate the number of shares acquired from each company, a column for
profit and the last column for loss. The statements were not [even] authenticated by an auditor, nor
by the person who caused the preparation of the same. In short, no evidentiary value can be
attributed to the profit and loss statements submitted by the petitioner. These documents can
hardly be considered a credible or true reflection of the transactions. We find that petitioner has not
proven the amounts indicated adequately. Lastly, the futility of petitioners action became more
pronounced by the fact that he traded securities for the account of others without the necessary
license from the SEC. Clearly, such omission was in violation of Section 19 of the Revised
Securities Act which provides that no broker shall sell any securities unless he is registered with
the SEC. Stock market trading, a technical and highly specialized institution in the Philippines,
must been trusted to individuals with proven integrity, competence and knowledge, who have due
regard to the requirements of the law.
b. DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF ABSOLUTE

COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
ARTICLE 99
(329) MULLER vs MULLER

(August 29, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and
the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds
of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation
of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On August 12, 1996, the trial court
rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered
the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property,
therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property
of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the
personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of
that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be
recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in
without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the
trial courts decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the
Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the
costs for the construction of the house?
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena
Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in
Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and
ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
(330) MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ vs EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL

G.R. NO. 140422 (AUGUST 7, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal,
and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal
during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura
Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land located at Sta. Lucia, San
Juan, Metro Manila. Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than
six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names. Petitioners filed a petition in
their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and private respondents, but no
settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before
the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in
the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed
by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of Transfer Certificate Title issued in the
individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance with
the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of
Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31
January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to
1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Witness [petitioner
Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one year and seven months old. She
lived with the sister of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her
brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their father and the latters family. She claimed that
when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie
while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage
lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal. She is now residing at Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro
Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been living in the said property since
1948. She claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly those which belong to her
half brothers and sisters which were now converted into factories. She claimed that out of the five
hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the
subject lot. She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves
without giving the [petitioners] their share. She said that she was offered by [private respondent]
Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land in question or money because one of the
children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she
will have to ask the opinion of her other brothers and sisters. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a judgment, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with
the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant
evidentiary value and that petitioners inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. Not
satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision, ruled that they
were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring
their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal and whether or not petitioners right to recover their share of the subject property is
barred by laches?
RULING:
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the childs
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the
present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented.
Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in
accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on
31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to
1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof
by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura
Cristobals estate. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of
Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.
Respondents defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is
principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in
the instant case.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the
doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and
its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a
property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. The
amount to be awarded as such damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained
by the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of said damages. Such award is given in
view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the present case.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children
of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The Deed of
Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon petitioners who were
not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof. The subject property is ORDERED to be
partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title be
issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and Petitioners
are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as damages,
to be paid by private respondents.
(331) Go vs Yamane
G.R. No. 160762 (May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
Involved in the suit is a 750 sq m lot registered in the name of respondents wife which was levied
to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees to Atty. De Guzman. It was scheduled to be sold at public
auction. Four days prior to the auction, respondent filed a third-party claim with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal
property and therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of his wife and
her sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction and sold the property to spouses Go.
Respondent filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioners and Sheriff for the annulment and
cancelation of auction sale upon the same ground. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint of
the ground of res judicata.
The respondents wife also lodged a complaint for damages against Atty. De Guzman alleging, in
gist, fraud, misrepresentation, manipulation and unlawful acts of the defendant causing the levy of
the subject property with an estimated commercial value of 200,000.00 as against a charging lien
of 10,000.00.
The trial court ordered a joint hearing. The non-appearance of the wife despite due notice led to the
dismissal of the civil case. The RTC held that subject property was the paraphernal property of the
wife and was not a conjugal property. Having found that he has no legal standing to question the
auction sale, the RTC also dismissed the case.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the public auction null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not charging lien is chargeable against conjugal property
RULING:
Since the petitioner failed to present convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal, the
presumption that it is conjugal stands. The subject property in this case, being conjugal in nature,
cannot be levied upon.
The petition is denied

(332) Olegario vs CA
238 SCRA 96
FACTS:
Spouses Marciliano Olegario and Aurelia Rivera-Olegario owned a parcel of landmeasuring 91
square meters at Caloocan City. The Olegario couples were childless butreared and educated
private respondents. Petitioner Bonifacio Olegario is the brother of Marciliano while petitioner
Adelaida Victorino is the niece of Aurelia.Aurelia Rivera-Olegario died at the age of 83. Marciliano,
then eighty (80) years old,executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of
private respondentsfor P50,000.
The contract of sale was not

registered.Marciliano died intestate. Petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-
judicial Settlement of Estate. On July 13, 1989, the said Extra-judicial Settlement was recorded in
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. TCT No. 190363 was issued in their names. Who then
sold to athird party the property for P200,000.Private respondents alleged that the Extra-judicial
Settlement came to their knowledge onlyon August 21, 1989.
They tried to register their contract of sale 3 years from its execution.The registration was
denied.Private respondents filed for Annulment of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate andDamages
against petitioners. Elena Adaon and Nestor Tejon maintained they were buyersin good faith and
for value.In due course, the trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of absolute sale which was unregistered is valid.
RULING:
No. In a contract of sale, consideration is, as a rule, different from the motive of
the parties. Consideration is defined as some right, interest, benefit, or advantage conferredupon
the promissor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled. As contradistinguished,motive is the
condition of mind which incites to action, but includes also the inference as tothe existence of such
condition, from an external fact of a nature to produce such a condition.
Under certain circumstances, however, the motive of the parties may beregarded as the
consideration when it predetermines the purpose of the contract. When they blend to that degree,
and the motive is unlawful, then the contract entered into is null andvoid.In the case at bench, the
primary motive of Marciliano is selling the controverted 91-squaremeter lot to private respondents
was to illegally frustrate petitioners' right of inheritanceand to avoid payment of estate tax.Illegal
motive predetermined the purpose of the contract. In addition, the trial court andrespondent court
failed to consider the lack of cause in the alleged deed of sale of 1986.The evidence does not
show that private respondents paid P50,000.
(333) NABLE JOSE vs NABLE JOSE

41 PHIL 713
FACTS:
In the year 1880, Mariano Nable Jose was married in first wedlock to Doa Paz Borja and had by
her the following children: Remedios, Feliciano, Rocio and Mariano, the first three of whom are
now of age, Remedios is married to Fernando Arce, but the last child, Mariano, is still a minor and
is represented in this suit by the said Fernando Arce as curator ad litem. Paz Borja died intestate in
the year 1898, and left no heirs than the said four children and her surviving husband, Mariano
Nable Jose. The community partnership between Mariano Nable Jose and his Paz Borja has not
been liquidated since its dissolution in the year 1898. No proceedings whatever have been had for
the judicial administration of the properties of this partnership. Mariano Nable Jose got indebted
and mortgaged the community properties to Amparo Nable Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion Nable
Jose, niece Carmen Castro, The Standard Oil Company on September 27, 1909. This property is
encumbered by another mortgaged in favor of Carmen Castro. Paz Borja's heirs had no knowledge
mortgages nor did they give their consent to them. In order to recover payment and foreclosure of
mortgages, Amparo N. Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion H. Jose, The Standard Oil Company of
New York; and then Carmen Castro commenced actions against Mariano N. Jose y Vinluan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving husband, after the death of his wife may sell or mortgage the
community property acquired during coverture.
RULING:
The trial court erred in declaring the mortgage invalid in so far as it affects the one-half undivided
share of said property, which the court erroneously held to be the property of these heirs. The
judgment entered by the trial judge should be reversed, and that the record should be returned to
the court below, where a new judgment will be entered disposing of the contentions of the various
parties to this litigation as herein before indicated, and providing for the sale of the mortgaged
property in the form and upon the conditions prescribed by law.
(334) AGUSTIN DE LUNA, ET AL vs JOSE LINATOC

G.R. No. L-48403, October 28, 1942
FACTS:
The wife, who acted as an agent of the husband (De Luna), sold a portion of their conjugal property
during the subsistence of their marriage (The land was under the name of the husband only
because they already partitioned the parcel of land). Under the law, a conjugal property cannot be
partitioned during the subsistence of a marriage unless there was a judicial separation of property.
The spouses, claiming ignorance of the said prohibition, wanted to assail the sale of the land to
Jose Linatoc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid.
RULING:
The wife could not sell her portions of those lands in the name of her husband, because the
partition was illegal and void, as it was made during the marriage and there was no judicial order
authorizing separation of property between the husband and the wife (art. 1432, Civil Code).
Consequently, the character of these portions of lands as conjugal partnership assests. And the
wife may bind the conjugal partnership with the consent of the husband, according to article 1614
of the Civil Code.
EFFECT OF SEPARATION DE FACTO
(335) Cuenca vs Cuenca
G.R. No. 72321 (December 8, 1988)
FACTS:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real
property and damages against the petitioners before the then Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1240.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed
the complaint.
The private respondents appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
On November 26, 1984, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
When is the period when a party may file a motion for new trial before the appellate court.
RULING:
The Rules of Court under Rule 37 and Rule 53 provide two (2) instances when a party may file a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Rule 37, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial within the period for perfecting
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and giant a new trial
for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party.
b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence have discovered, and
produced at the trial and which if presented would probably alter the result; (emphasis supplied)
While Rule 53 states:
SECTION 1. Petition before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals becomes
executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence
and which is of such a character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly
discovered evidence.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31,
1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20
SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v. Montejo,
supra) The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the
marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as
to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the
documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either
respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail
"when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41
Phil. 713) Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should
also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and ineffective. The
documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change the result. The
motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the respondent court.
The Petition is Dismissed.

(336) Luis Wong vs Court of Appeals

351 SCRA 100
FACTS:
Luis Wong is a collector of Limtong Press, Inc., a company which prints calendars. Wong was
assigned to collect check payments from LPI clients. One time, six of LPIs clients were not able to
give the check payments to Wong. Wong then made arrangements with LPI so that for the
meantime, Wong can use his personal checks to guarantee the calendar orders of the LPIs clients.
LPI however has a policy of not accepting personal checks of its agents. LPI instead proposed that
the personal checks should be used to cover Wongs debt with LPI which arose from unremitted
checks by Wong in the past. Wong agreed. So he issued 6 checks dated December 30, 1985.
Before the maturity of the checks, Wong persuaded LPI not to deposit the checks because he said
hell be replacing them within 30 days. LPI complied however Wong reneged on the payment. On
June 5, 1986 or 157 days from date of issue, LPI presented the check to RCBC but the checks
were dishonored (account closed). On June 20, 1986, LPI sent Wong a notice of dishonor. Wong
failed to make good the amount of the checks within five banking days from his receipt of the
notice. LPI then sued Wong for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Among others, Wong argued that hes not guilty of the crime of charged because one of the
elements of the crime is missing, that is, prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds
against the drawer. According to Wong, this element is lost by reason of the belated deposit of the
checks by LPI which was 157 days after the checks were issued; that he is not expected to keep
his bank account active beyond the 90-day period 90 days being the period required for the
prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of fund to arise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Wong is guilty of the crime charged?
RULING:
Yes. Wong is guilty of violating BP 22. The elements of violation of BP 22 pertinent to this case are:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
Under the second element, the presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency arises if the check is
presented within 90 days from the date of issue of the check. This presumption is lost, as in the
case at bar, by failure of LPI to present it within 90 days. But this does not mean that the second
element was not attendant with respect to Wong. The presumption is lost but lack of knowledge
can still be proven, LPI did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of Wong that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks.
After the checks were dishonored, Wong was duly notified of such fact but failed to make
arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient
evidence that Wong had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issuance of the checks.
The Supreme Court also noted that under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check
must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking
practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days. LPI deposited the
checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale.
(337) PARTOSA-JO vs CA
216 SCRA 692
FACTS:
Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang. However, in 1980, the petitioner filed a
complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for
support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge
rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further ordered the payment of
support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite disposition for the judicial
separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
seeking for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties. The Court of Appeals however
dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the
ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code since the
separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the spouses. When their motions for
reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not allowed.
RULING:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on
either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2.
Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if
she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The record shows that as early as 1942, the
private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not
accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for
support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation
of their conjugal property. In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by
Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the
family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children
by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file
the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which
actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not
established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful
husband.
LIQUIDATION PROCEDURE
ARTICLES 102-104
(338) De Ocampo vs Delizo

69 SCRA 216
FACTS:
Nicolas Delizo contracted two (2) marriages, the first with Rosa Villlasfer, which lasted from April
20 1891 until Rosas death on Dec 7 1909, and with Dorotea Ocampo which esxisted for 46 years
until the death of Delizo on May 3 1957. An action for partition was instituted by the children of
Nicolas from the first marriage against him and Dorotea and their nine children. The respondents
however opposed the said partition claiming that the properties described in the complaint were
those of the second marriage.
The trial court distributed the said properties as follows: a) pro division to the three children of
the first marriage, b.) pro diviso to the all the children, both in the first and second marriage c.)
pro diviso to the survising spouse Dorotea.
The petitioners, however, appealed the decision to the court of appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entire Caanawan properties belonged to the first marriage.
RULING:
No. It was shown that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive in the
periods 1905 1909 , justice and equity demand that the rights to the said properties apportioned
to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been
complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.
It was also ruled that although most of the contented properties were acquired during the second
marriage, the produce of Caanawan properties were used to acquire such properties, thus,
proportional distribution should also be made.
(339) VDA. DE CONSUEGRA vs GSIS

37 SCRA 315
FACTS:
The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in the province of Surigao del Norte.
He contracted two marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the second, which was contracted in
good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance were paid to petitioner Basilia
Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Consuegra did not
designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him.
Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that
the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering
that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance
benefits. Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting
that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones
entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. The GSIS ruled
that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage
who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and
Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who
are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16. Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a petition
declaring her and her children to be the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement
insurance. The trial court affirmed stating that each family be entitled to one half of the estate.
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, each family be entitled to the retirement insurance benefits of the deaceased
RULING:
The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be
so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life
insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured. Retirement
insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee, to provide for his old age, or
incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a required number of years. If the
employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance. The beneficiary
of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee
dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal
heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the
insurance policy. GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be divided
equally between his first living wife and his second.
4. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
ARTICLES 102 - 104
(340) QUIAO vs QUIAO

G.R. No. 183622 (JULY 4, 2012)
FACTS:
Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation
of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor
children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129
of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However,
it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples property relations.
RULING:
Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial
vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of
gains. Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
(341) ORPIANO vs TOMAS

GR No. 178611 (January 14, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their conjugal estate is
a lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-23468. In 1979 Estrella
was declared an absent spouse, and Alejandro was granted the authority to sell the lot. On March
19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to the Tomas Spouses, herein respondents
and that very same day, a title was ISSUE:d in the name of the Tomas Spouses. They had until
December to complete paying for the land. Sometime later, Alejandro filed a case at the QC RTC,
seeking collection of the amount unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages.While the case was
still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs, including Estrella were substituted inhis stead in the
case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint to one for annulment of sale andcancellation of title,
but the court denied her motion. She moved to be dropped as a party plantiff butwas also
denied.On June 11, 2005 Estrella filed a case for annulment of sale and cancellation of title against
the TomasSpouses, claiming the declaration of absence and Alejandros authority to sell the lot are
null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed for the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum
shopping. RTC ruled infavour of the Tomas spouses and dismissed the annulment (of sale) case.
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether there was forum shopping
RULING:
YES. Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial
processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case should
be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned
to preclude.
If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case, proceeds to finality,
not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as
envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after having paid the balance of the price as
ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and return of the property could be
decreed by the annulment court. Court says that the absence of the consent of one (spouse to a
sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale. However while Estrella is raring to file the annulment case,
she has to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by necessity substituted therein by
virtue of her being Alejandros heir; but the collection court nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward
such end. There exists a just cause for her to be dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so
that she may institute and maintain the annulment case without violating the rule against forum
shopping. Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a measure of protecting her
conjugal share (but the ISSUE: of whether the sale should be annulled is a different matter
altogether).
Despite all these reasons, Estrella is still not allowed to take procedural short cuts.
APPLICABILITY OF ORDINARY PARTNERSHIP RULES
(342) Tan vs Andrade
GR 171904 (August 7, 2013)
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of land situated in Cebu City,
which she mortgaged to and were subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. When the
redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to
redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso
Andrade, Jr., evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of
Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration
of P50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade, one of
Rosario's sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment,
Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter
until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When
Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the
TCTs therefor were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario's children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory, Miriam
Rose, Joseph, Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. Santiago, filed a complaint for reconveyance and
annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between Rosario and
Bobby was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into to
secure Rosario's indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties
were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr., the subject properties were
conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In
this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with
Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name. Bobby contended that the subject properties
were solely owned by Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name and that he had validly acquired
the same upon Proceso, Jr.'s failure to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties. The
RTC ruled for Bobby. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties were exclusive properties of Rosario.
RULING:
Yes. Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states
that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the
party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired
during the marriage.
As held in Go v. Yamane: As a condition sine qua non for the operation of Article 160 in favor of
the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of
when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be
rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of
the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
Records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the
latters death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties
were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal
age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades
to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that
the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that she is the
absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her
son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court
upholds the RTCs finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
(343) Salvador vs CA
243 SCRA 239
FACTS:
AlipioYabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua, Cagayan de
Oro City, whose title devolved upon his nine children, including Maria, upon his death sometime
before or during the second world war. In 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria, filed
a complaint against the spouses Alberto and ElpiaYabo for "Quieting of Title, Annulment of
Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he alleged that he owned a total of eight shares of
the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share
of his wife, Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he did
not buy, he occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively
the two parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots in
question. On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late AlipioYabo
lodged a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia
Cristal, and the spouses Eulogioand Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and Lot
No. 6180 are the common property of the heirs of AlipioYabo, namely, the plaintiffs, defendant
Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had been sold to Alberto Yabo; that after
Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the
de facto administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise, they discovered that
the Salvador spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from the
lots, which act as a cloud on the plaintiffs' title over the lots. The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they,
as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in representation of his wife, and EneciaCristal, in
representation of Gaudencia, be declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be
declared as having no rights thereto except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor
Makibalo and Enecia Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned according to law among the aforementioned
co-owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the value of the fruits they harvested from
the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the litigation, and
costs of the suit. To cut the story short, the trial court decided in favor of the plaintiffs; thus, the
defendants appealed trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA held, among others,
that prescription and laches have not run against the private respondents with respect to the 1/9
share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired
from her brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription and laches can be applied against the co-heirs of Pastor Makibalo?
RULING:
NO. Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property, implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked when
one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription. What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has
acquired by prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a
period of time fixed by law. This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a
trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all
of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse
insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents,
fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not
borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. Thus,in
order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestuique trust orthe other co-
owners, the following elements must concur; (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestuique trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestuique trust or the other co-owners;
and (3) that theevidence thereon must be clear and convincing. The records do not show that
Pastor Makibalo. adjudicated to himself the whole estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed
with the Office of the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
or that he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax
declaration in Alipio's name and the issuance of a new one in his own name.
The only act which may be deemed as repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is
his filing on 28 April 1976 of an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000).The period of prescription
started to run only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private
respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174) of the
lots.
Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about six months would not vest in him
exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches
and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor
(344) SARMIENTO vs HON. REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ

August 17, 1987
FACTS:
It appears that, on August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another action against the
petitioner for a declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner from the PNB were
conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private respondent as her share. The case was
assigned to Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila, presided over by Judge Ricardo Diaz. The
petitioner filed an answer in which he contended that the complaint did not state a cause of action'
that there was another action peding between him and the plaintiff and that the plaintiff did not
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the suit. However, the trial court refused to
dismiss the complaint because the grounds cited were not indubitable. The case was therefore set
for pre-trial conference. For failure of the petitioner to appear at the pretrial conference on
December 19, 1985, the trial court declared him as in default.
On April 21, 1986, the private respondent moved for the immediate execution of the judgment in
her favor, on the ground that any appeal that the petitioner might take would merely be dilatory in
the light of the admission in his answer. The petitioner filed an opposition to the motion wherein he
manifested that he was not going to appeal the decision of the trial court but that he would instead
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the trial coourt.
ISSUE:
Whetehr on Not the petitioner is entitle in any portion of his retirement benefits and to deliver one-
half thereof to herein private respondent is contrary to law.
RULING:
The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz which ordered then
defendant PNB to desist and refrain from releasing to petitioner all monetary benefits and
emoluments due him as retirement benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent
also comes within the prohibition imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of the GSIS Charter. This, in
effect, is also a freeze order.
The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private respondent makes the
default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or
reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property
of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the government because of
previous work (like the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October
25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86),
this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code).
(345) Villanueva vs IAC

192 SCRA 21
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a
deed of extrajudicial partition. Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz
Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the
death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed
P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property. In the
loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement
as a witness. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest
bidder. About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint
against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and
they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged
discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victorias will stated that
her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership
be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares.
Modestos will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his
conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his owncapital property brought by him to his
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and
Victoria?
RULING:
Even if it be assumed that the husbands acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place
during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property because it was acquired
by him during the marriage by lucrative title.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and
Nicolasa, is hisexclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own
exclusively, as a matter of law.
(346) Tan vs CA
273 SCRA 229
FACTS:
Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a Cashiers Check

fromPhilippineCommercial Industrial Bank (PCIBank) to P30,000 payable to his order to avoid
carrying cashwhile enrouteto Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) in itsBinondo Branch. RCBC sent the check for clearing to the
Central Bank which was returned for having been missent or misrouted. RCBC debited Tans
account without informing him. Relying on common knowledge that a cashiers check was as good
as cash, and a month after depositing the check, he issued twopersonal checks in the name of Go
Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation. Both checks bounced due to insufficiency of
funds. Tan filed a suit for damages against RCBC.
ISSUE:
Whether a cashiers check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two checks subsequently
drawn.
RULING:
An ordinary check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. There is anelement
of certainty or assurance that it will be paid upon presentation; that is why it is perceived as
aconvenientsubstitute for currency in commercial and financial transactions. Herein, what is
involved is morethan an ordinary check, but a cashiers check. A cashiers check is a primary
obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, a
cashiers check is a banks order to pay what isdrawn upon itself, committing in effect its total
resources, integrity and honor beyond the check.Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an
unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank. Relianceon the laymans perception that a
cashiers check is as good as cash is not entirely misplaced, as it isrooted inpractice, tradition and
principle
OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION, ENJOYMENT AND

ADMINISTRATIN OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
ARTICLES 110-112
(347) MANOTOK REALTY, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS

April 30, 1987
FACTS:
Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara
de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 uponpermission being obtained from Andres
Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would
eventually buy the lot.
April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties covering the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under
custodia legis
.
April 22, 1950, Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent
amounting to P1,500 for the lot. Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700 which he did not
pay or was unable to pay because the heirs of Tambunting could not settle their differences.
April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and
the respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
March 13 and 20, 1959, Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful and vendee of
the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed inits favor by the
Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda.
The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale provided for terms and
conditions. Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba
advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages
would follow. This includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots. Trial Court
dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to
enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its
predecessor (Don VicenteLegarda).
ISSUE:
Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?
RULING:
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal
properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that
the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legardaa had its
inception befire the death of Clawa Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf
of Clara Tambunting byt was consummated only after death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore,
could not have validliy disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. Art. 136, New Civil Code.
The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she
delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give adequate security. The Court concluded that the sale
between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the said property.
(348) RAMON C. ONG vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-63025 (November 29, 1991)
FACTS:
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio Camino as
Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a parcel of
land, allegedly owners conjugally by plaintiff and his former wife Teodora B. Ong, awarded in favor
of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted on October 10, 1958 by the Deputy Sheriff
of Camarines Norte, herein defendant Camino, pursuant to a writ of execution dated August 8,
1958 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, to enforce its decision in Civil Case
wherein judgment was rendered to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering the defendant Teodora B.
Ong to pay to the plaintiff the sum P2,827.83, with interest of 8% per annum on the sum of
P1,000.00 from September 5, 1955, on the sum of P827.83 from December 30, 1955 plus 15% on
the total amount of P2,827.83 as attorney's fees; and the further amount of P2,503 with interest at
6% per annum from date of the filing of the complaint, and the costs of the suit.
The title to the property, in favor of the execution-creditor Boix was duly registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. It is not disputed that plaintiff's wife, Teodora B. Ong
conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance of her business operation,
on August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the amount of P2, 827.83.
Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her obligation. This prompted
Boix to file a complaint, based on the promissory notes executed by Teodora, to collect the sum
legally due plus interest against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined as husband of
the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and judgment was rendered, as aforesaid,
in favor of Boix. After the aforementioned decision became final and executory, Boix moved to
execute the judgment. The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land situated at Diego
Linan St., Daet, Camarines Norte, in the sole name of Teodora B. Ong, subject-parcel of herein
suit. In a notice of levy on Execution and notice of Public Auction sale, auction sales as already
mentioned, defendant Boix was adjudged highest bidder. A writ of possession was issued to place
the execution-creditor in possession of the property levied upon and sold on execution. A
corresponding Certificate of Sale was also issued in favor of Boix. Subsequently, thereafter,
Ramon C. Ong filed an Omnibus motion with the same Court of First Instance of Manila asking to
quash the writ of possession, which was denied in an order. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Consequently, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals to annul the
auction sale allegedly irregularly executed on the following grounds, namely, that the property was
conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that the
there was no valid publication thus making the auction sale void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeal show a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the lower courts
decision in favor of respondent on the auction sale of the property made by the petitioners wife
considering that said property is a conjugal?
RULING:
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion committed, by the lower
court in appreciating private respondent's allegation that petitioner was previously notified of the
supposed transfer of the date of public auction. Petitioner's other argument is also based on factual
considerations. Against the Court of Appeals' finding that the subject property is paraphernal
property, in view of the fact that it was "declared in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house
erected thereon was declared in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong is petitioner's
claim that the subject property is conjugal. Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the
surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora in
the aforesaid declaration that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage.
By reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not
sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is
undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built
thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a
careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, we hold that the lot in question is paraphernal,
and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, The presumption that property is conjugal
(Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage. When there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's
name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first
prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
When the property is registered in the name of the spouse only and there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the
same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code,
the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain
conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the
husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband
show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.
Let it be noted that due to the length of time that this case has remained pending, private
respondents Francisco Boix and Arsenio Camino have allegedly already died in the process. No
proper substitution of parties have apparently been made. Nevertheless, despite such supervening
events, for failure on the part of petitioner to show any grave abuse of discretion or reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court, we deem it wise to affirm the said court's decision.
Besides, the decision of the trial court is in accordance with law and the evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

PROPERTY INCLUDED IN CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
ARTICLES 116 - 120
(349) Lim vs Equitable PCI Bank

G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a
property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by
Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same
property which they failed to pay.
Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner
thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in
favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject
property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety
Agreement were forged.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract
giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioners mere allegation that his signature in
the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
notarized document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.
Whether or not Respondent Bank failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without
the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract
RULING:
Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to
prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures
of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.
Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an
issue. Hence, the absence of his wifes signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in
this case.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the
property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both
spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous
to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was
never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner
never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent
had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this
case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When
the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to
said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title
is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
(350) Ravina vs Abrille

(October 16, 2009)
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have
four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary
Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in
Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot
is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is
registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early
1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro
offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina.
Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the
house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. It appears on
the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro
together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting
in connivance with petitionersbegan transferring all their belongings from the house to an
apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering
it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo
Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary
Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that
one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being
contrary to law and evidence.
RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her
children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously
transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed
to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such
norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong
doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these
established civil law standards.
(351) TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs MANUEL DAVID SR.

G.R. No. 169548 (March 15, 2010)
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,1957. In
1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses
separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which the
previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by
Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale
be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in their
names. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf
of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be
his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. Subsequently,
Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint which was granted by the trial court.
Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint.
Martha failed to file an answer so she was declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.
RULING:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titanrequired
the consent of both spouses.
Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that thehusband is the administrator of the
Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law. Similarly, Article 124 of the
Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the
written consent of the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void.
(352) Ching vs CA
423 SCRA 356 (February 23, 2004)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all
its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of
said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo
Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition
of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the
conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is
registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According
to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-
husbands profession or business.44
ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching
RULING:
No. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the
exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks
with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account
of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption
can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
(353) Castro vs Miat
G.R. No. 143297 (February 11, 2003)
FACTS:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two (2) parcels of land during their coverture. The first
is located at Wawa La Huerta, Airport Village, Paraaque, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. S-
33535. The second is located at Paco, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 163863. Concordia died
on April 30, 1978. They had two (2) children: Romeo and Alexander.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire insurance
premiums.
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding, Mrs. Rosalina Castro,
mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had given Moises P30,000.00 as downpayment for the
sale by Moises of the Paco property to her son Virgilio.
Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to the
parents of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to
sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He accompanied his children to the
Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a judge and a lawyer. Also present in the meeting were
petitioner Virgilio Castro and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell the property to
the petitioners-spouses Castro.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel
Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him
upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to make them pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Paco property is a conjugal or capital and spouses Castro were buyers in Good
faith.
RULING:
Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage Moises did not bring it into
their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good
faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it at the
time of the purchase or before any notice of some other persons claim on or interest in it. The rule
is settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the possession of persons other than the seller,
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith.
This finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses were not buyers in good faith is
supported by evidence. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in his testimony that Romeo told him that
Moises had given the Paco property to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who
had the right to the property Moises or Romeo. As well pointed out by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-
appellant. The most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale,
Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with
Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if
Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right
over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he
knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the
property.
It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-spouses Castro did not buy the Paco property in good
faith. They have no right to the property.
(354) Francisco vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102330 (November 25, 1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage, filed a
suit for damages and for annulment of the general power of Attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista, the daughter of Eusebio by his first marriage, to administer the properties of Eusebio,
namely: the house and lot, the sari-sari store and the apartments. The subject properties are
alleged to be acquired during their conjugal partnership. Petitioner also alleged the physical
incapability of Eusebio to manage their properties. The trial court renedered judgment in favor of
private respondents due to the failure of petitioner to establish proof that the subject properties
where acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the trial court.
Respondents contend that the subject properties were not acquired during the second conjugal
properties since the properties are the legitime of Eusebio. Petitioner avers that the application of
Article 116 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar because the Article 254 of the same code
expressly repeals Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court Article 245 of the Family Code which expressly repealed Articles 158 and
160 has a retroactive effect?
RULING:
No.The court ruled that the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions
were in force. Thus, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. To invoke this presumption, the petitioner carries the burden of proof to
establish that the subject properties are acquired during the second conjugal partnership, by which
petitioner failed. Hence, the subject property is proved to belong exclusively to Eusebio Francisco.
Further, the alleged physical incapability of Eusebio was proved to the contrary. Thus, the petition
was denied with cost to the petitioner.
(355) Diaz vs CA
November 10, 1986
FACTS:
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property
in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at
One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not
used by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition
to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing
of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition
did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the
date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when
petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our resolution
of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular. In its
resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to
have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court
of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.
(356) Ayala Investments vs CA

G.R. No. 118305 (February 12, 1998)
FACTS:
Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security
for the credit lineextended to PBM, respondent Alfredo ChingExec. VP, executed security
agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
Ayala Investments. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of
money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending
appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuanceand service upon respondents-
spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private respondents,
spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce
the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not
redound to thebenefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the
lower court issued a temporaryrestraining order to prevent Magsajo from preceding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the saleof the said properties at public auction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be
redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
RULING:
The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural
for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a
spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But
isolatedctransaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third persons debt is not per se
considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs
showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.
(357) SALVADOR vs CA
243 SCRA 239
FACTS:
Maria Romayne Miranda is the owner of a parcel of land in Mariveles, Bataan. She appointed her
cousin, Gilbert Miranda, as her attorney-in-fact under a General Power of Attorney and authorized
him to execute contracts on her behalf and to manage her properties, including the a property
subject, and to perform other acts in her place. On 1990, Gilbert, entered into a Development and
Construction Contract with petitioner Renato Salvador for the development of the Property into the
Haven of Peace Memorial Park and the construction of several structures for that purpose. Work
on the Project began sometime in July 1990 upon Gilberts payment. In December 1990, however,
Salvador demanded that Gilbert pay additional amounts Contract Price and was particularly
insistent on the escalation. Gilbert responded by requesting for a detailed computation of the
proposed escalation. Dissatisfied with the computation, Gilbert required Salvador to submit receipts
showing the purchase of construction materials used in the Project, the dates of purchase of these
materials, and the increase in their prices. In a letter dated 16 January 1991, Salvador informed
Gilbert that his office had received a notice of illegal construction (DPWH Notice) from the Balanga,
Bataan district office of the Department of Public Works and Highways. The DPWH Notice stated
that the Project had no building permit and ordered Salvador to stop immediately all building
activities and to contact the district office within 3 days. Salvador reminded Gilbert that it was the
latters responsibility under the Contract to secure the necessary permits and licenses for the
Project. A few days later, Gilbert received a demand letter from Salvadors counsel requiring
payment of within 3 days. Salvador filed before the trial court a complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages or for declaration of claim as lien against Romayne and Gilbert. The trial
court dismissed Salvadors complaint and respondents counterclaims for insufficiency of basis.
However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Salvadors claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondents are entitled to their counterclaim and damages
RULING:
The trial court ruled that respondents counterclaim had no basis. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed this ruling and ordered Salvador to reimburse respondents the amount allegedly spent by
respondents in completing the Project, less the balance of the Contract Price and on the ground
that Salvador was in bad faith; the appellate court also awarded damages.
The Court found untenable the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees
to respondents. A breach of contract may give rise to an award of moral damages if the party guilty
of the breach acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In this case, both parties did not comply with their
obligations under the Contract. Respondents must share part of the blame for the stoppage of work
on the Project, as the stoppage was partly due to respondents failure to obtain the necessary
building permit. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the
guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Neither the
records nor the decisions of the trial and appellate courts indicate that Salvador behaved in such a
manner and to such degree as to warrant the grant of exemplary damages.
CHARGES AGAINST/OBLIGATIONS OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
ARTICLES 121 - 123
(258) ROS vs PNB

G.R. NO. 170166 APRIL 6, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of
Ilocos Norte.
The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the
loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she
had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage
instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining
to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
Yes. Petition denied. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without
the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give
her consent.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very
nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end,
his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
(359) Domingo vs Reed

477 SCRA 227, December 9, 2005
FACTS:
Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker and came home only for short vacations. He
purchased from the Government Service Insurance System [GSIS] on installment basis a 166
square meter property located at MRR Road, Mangahan, Pasig. Because he was working abroad,
it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. TCT No. 58195 covering said
property was ISSUE:d by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Metro Manila District II in
the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed. Guillermo Reed had allowed his brother,
Dominador, and the latters wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in connection with
the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who claimed to be the owner
of the lot where their house stands. Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the complaint filed
against them. Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay, where they met
Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the subject property.
Guillermo denied having sold his property.
In view of the claims of Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo that they bought the subject
property, Guillermo Reed made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig. Guillermo
discovered that his title over the subject property had been cancelled and he was able to secure
copies of documents pertaining to a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by him
authorizing his wife, Lolita Reed, to sell the subject property or a portion thereof and documents of
Deed of Sales executed by Lolita Reed in favor of the petitioners.
Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against Lolita Reed, spouses
Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had
been estranged, conspiring with the other petitioners that he did not sign the special power of
attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was working abroad; that the special
power of attorney was not submitted to the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City by Notary Public
Macario C. Cruz, as stated in the letter dated April 1, 1993 of Clerk of Court Grace S. Belvis; and
that spouses Villanera and Domingo and Eduardo Quiteves are purchasers in bad faith because
they knew, at the time they transacted with Lolita Reed, that he was working abroad and estranged
from the latter.
An Answer to the complaint was filed by Petitioners Eduardo Quiteves and spouses Danilo and
Alberta Domingo alleging that the sale of the subject property to them by Lolita Reed was valid
inasmuch as Guillermo Reed gave his written consent thereto, as shown in a letter dated July 26,
1986; that in a proceeding before the barangay chairman, Guillermo Reed admitted that he
personally signed the special power of attorney; that they have the right to rely on the presumption
of regularity of the notarized special power of attorney; and that they are buyers in good faith and
for value.
Per Sheriffs Return, Lolita Reed was not served with summons as she is no longer residing at the
given address while spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera were served with summons through
Mrs. Alberta Domingo.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners but which was
reversed by the Appellate Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Special Power of Attorney is authentic; whether or not Lolita Reeds justification
for selling the subject property is tenable
RULING:
The Supreme Court found that the petition has no merit. The alleged admission of Guillermo Reed
before the Barangay Chairman that he signed the special power of attorney, as shown in the
minutes of the meeting prepared by Barangay Secretary, does not appear to be credible. Guillermo
Reed has consistently denied having signed the special power of attorney. In fact, he was not
confronted during his cross-examination, of said minutes of the meeting in the barangay, where he
met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo for the first time, despite his insistence that the
subject property still belongs to him. Moreover, on rebuttal, Dominador Reed, whose signature
appears in the minutes of the meeting, testified that he affixed his signature on a small piece of
paper to show that he attended the meeting and there were no entries therein regarding the
alleged admission of Guillermo Reed that he signed the special power of attorney; and that
Guillermo Reed stated in said meeting that his property is not for sale.
All the foregoing circumstances successfully challenge the integrity, genuineness, and veracity of
the questioned document. Petitioners, therefore, cannot take refuge in the presumption of
regularity of public documents, a presumption that has been clearly rebutted in this case.
As to the assertions of Lolita regarding an alleged donation by respondent in favor of their children,
this matter is irrelevant to the disputed sales. We need not belabor the point. Besides, it would
mean that she should have sold the subject property not only in her name, but for and on behalf of
her children as co-owners of the property. To accept her contention is to open a whole gamut of
ISSUE:s that are not the subject of this appeal.
(360) Enbrodo vs CA
233 SCRA 755
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After
her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years
later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00.
Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private
respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.The trial court
rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorneys
fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may
recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having
possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the
Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead
when separated from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased child.
(361) Carlos vs Abelardo

(April 9, 2002)
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000
loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the
petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life
independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991,
the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded
that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed
violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994,
petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The
spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses
filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his
share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could
have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the
petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of
evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque
property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
RULING:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as
their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable
in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
(362) BA Finance Corp vs CA

(May 28, 1988)
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the
loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty
of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests
over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the
order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties
attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was
likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
RULING:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal
home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the
company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing
that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against
his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the
said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to
P660,000.00.
(363) Johnson and Johnson vs CA

GR No. 102692 (September 23, 1996)
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of
Vinluan Enterprises incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven checks of
varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Partial payments were made after several demands. When no further payments
were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses for collection of the
principal obligation plus interest with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found
that there was no privity of contract between J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding
the obligations incurred by the wife. Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise afer the
obligation involved in this action has been incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution
directing the sheriff to execute judgment on the properties of the wife. However, the 2 notices of
levy on execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of
the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking the
lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-party claim since Alejos
consent became evident when he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in
his wifes engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the
settlement of his wifes account. Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal
and paraphernal property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial court
with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final judgment. CA upheld private
respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his consent
and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
RULING:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the
third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be held
liable. And since the pwer of the execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to the
judgment debtor alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied
upon. In any event that Delilahs paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the
conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the husband or the
wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the husband must consent to his
wifes engaging in business. The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his
consent neither did the obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.
OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION, ENJOYMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
ARTICLES 124 - 125
(364) Fuentes vs Roca

(April 21, 2010)
FACTS:
has already prescribed. The CA reversed the ruling, stating that the action has not prescribed since
the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without
the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given
that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the
prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of
their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged
RULING:
The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to
assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action
anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from
the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that
sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the
Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude
any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
(365) Bautista vs Silva

502 SCRA 334
FACTS:
Spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva were the owners of a parcel of land with a Transfer
certificate of Title No B-371189 which was registered on August 14, 1980 in their names.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special
Power of atorney purportedly executed by Berlina in his favor, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 2765 was
issued in the name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988. Based on the
evidence presented the signature appearing on the SPA as that of Berlina is a forgery and
consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor os Spouses Bautista is not
authorized by Berlina. Thus the RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988
executed by Pedro M. Silva for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in favor of
defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land as null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value havind relied
upon a SPA which appears legal, valid and genuine on its face.
Whether the nullity of the deed of sale includes the one half share of the husband gratia argumenti
that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by the husband is null
and void
RULING:
There is no merit to petitioners claim that they are purchasers in good faith.
There was positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA and
on theuncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany working as a nurse
when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987. The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro
any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such
marital consent the deed ofsale was a nullity.The petitioners are not buyers in good faith. A buyer
for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in
the property.
He buys the property with the well-founded belief that theperson from who he receives the thing
had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
(366) Alfredo vs Borras

G.R. NO. 144225, JUNE 17, 2003
FACTS:
A parcel of land measuring 81,524 square meters (Subject Land) in Barrio Culis, Mabiga,
Hermosa, Bataan is the subject of controversy in this case. The registered owners of the Subject
Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo Alfredo (Godofredo) and Carmen Limon Alfredo
(Carmen). The Subject Land is covered by Original Certificate of Title issued to Godofredo and
Carmen under Homestead Patent.
On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras (Armando) and Adelia
Lobaton Borras (Adelia), filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen
before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4. Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint
that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for P7,000.00 with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land to
Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest,
and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed
the release of mortgage and returned the owners duplicate copy to Godofredo and Carmen.
Armando and Adelia subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the Subject Land for
which Carmen issued a receipt. Godofredo and Carmen then delivered to Adelia the owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the document of cancellation of mortgage, official receipts of
realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the name of Godofredo. Godofredo and Carmen
introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the Natanawans, the
old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land.
In January 1994, Armando and Adelia learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land
and were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land.
Subsequently, Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of
the Subject Land to several persons. On 8 February 1994, Armando and Adelia filed an adverse
claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan. Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and
Carmen had secured an owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the
issuance of a new copy. Godofredo and Carmen claimed in their petition that they lost their owners
duplicate copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen complaining about their acts,
but the latter did not reply. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.
On 28 March 1994, Armando and Adelia amended their complaint to include the following persons
as additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B. Savellano, Danton D.
Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon
(Subsequent Buyers). The Subsequent Buyers, who are also petitioners in this case, purchased
from Godofredo and Carmen the subdivided portions of the Subject Land. The Register of Deeds
of Bataan issued to the Subsequent Buyers transfer certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent Buyers (collectively petitioners)
argued that the action is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed out that
there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the Subject Land in favor
of Armando and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence Armando and Adelia
introduced or offered on the alleged sale unless the same was in writing and subscribed by
Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were buyers in good faith and for
value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of attorneys fees and incidental expenses.
On 7 June 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Armando and Adelia. The trial court
ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and Carmen and
the spouses Armando and Adelia. The trial court found that all the elements of a contract of sale
were present in this case. The trial court found the following facts as proof of a perfected contract
of sale: (1) Godofredo and Carmen delivered to Armando and Adelia the Subject Land; (2)
Armando and Adelia treated as their own tenants the tenants of Godofredo and Carmen; (3)
Godofredo and Carmen turned over to Armando and Adelia documents such as the owners
duplicate copy of the title of the Subject Land, tax declaration, and the receipts of realty tax
payments in the name of Godofredo; and (4) the DBP cancelled the mortgage on the Subject
Property upon payment of the loan of Godofredo and Carmen. The trial court ruled that the Statute
of Frauds is not applicable because in this case the sale was perfected. The trial court concluded
that the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 26 November 1999, the Court of Appeals issued
its Decision affirming the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals found the factual findings
of the trial court well supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the contract of sale
is not void even if only Carmen signed the receipt dated 11 March 1970. Citing Felipe v. Heirs of
Maximo Aldon, the appellate court ruled that a contract of sale made by the wife without the
husbands consent is not void but merely voidable. The Court of Appeals further declared that the
sale in this case binds the conjugal partnership even if only the wife signed the receipt because the
proceeds of the sale were used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The appellate court
based this conclusion on Article 161 of the Civil Code.
The Subsequent Buyers of the Subject Land cannot claim that they are buyers in good faith
because they had constructive notice of the adverse claim of Armando and Adelia. Calonso, who
brokered the subsequent sale, testified that when she registered the subsequent deeds of sale, the
adverse claim of Armando and Adelia was already annotated on the title of the Subject Land. The
Court of Appeals believed that the act of Calonso and the Subsequent Buyers in forcibly ejecting
the Natanawans from the Subject Land buttresses the conclusion that the second sale was tainted
with bad faith from the very beginning.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged sale of the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia is valid and
enforceable even it was orally entered into and not in writing and even Carmen did not obtain the
consent and authority of her husband, Godofredo?
RULING:
There is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial
and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the
lower courts from these facts.
The contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and Carmen and the spouses Armando and
Adelia was a perfected contract. A contract is perfected once there is consent of the contracting
parties on the object certain and on the cause of the obligation. In the instant case, the object of
the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts
found that there was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on the purchase
price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. We find no reason to
disturb this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence.
The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also been consummated because the sellers and
buyers have performed their respective obligations under the contract. In a contract of sale, the
seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver the
same, to the buyer who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller. In the instant case,
Godofredo and Carmen delivered the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia, placing the latter in
actual physical possession of the Subject Land. This physical delivery of the Subject Land also
constituted a transfer of ownership of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. Ownership of the
thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery. Godofredo and
Carmen also turned over to Armando and Adelia the documents of ownership to the Subject Land,
namely the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax declaration and the receipts of realty
tax payments.
The trial and appellate courts correctly refused to apply the Statute of Frauds to this case. The
Statute of Frauds provides that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the
party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt dated 11 March 1970, which is a
memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either partially or
totally performed. Thus, where one party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence will be
admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the parties have consummated the sale of
the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations under the
contract of sale. In addition, a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the
acceptance of benefits under the contract. Godofredo and Carmen benefited from the contract
because they paid their DBP loan and secured the cancellation of their mortgage using the money
given by Armando and Adelia. Godofredo and Carmen also accepted payment of the balance of
the purchase price.
The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988, provides that any alienation or
encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the
wife is void. However, when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wifes
consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads:
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
However, Godofredo can no longer question the sale. Voidable contracts are susceptible of
ratification. Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants as
the new owners of the Subject Land. The trial court noted that Godofredo failed to deny
categorically on the witness stand the claim of the complainants witnesses that Godofredo
introduced Armando and Adelia as the new landlords of the tenants. That Godofredo and Carmen
allowed Armando and Adelia to enjoy possession of the Subject Land for 24 years is formidable
proof of Godofredos acquiescence to the sale. If the sale was truly unauthorized, then Godofredo
should have filed an action to annul the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale
has long lapsed. Godofredos conduct belies his claim that his wife sold the Subject Land without
his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their debt with the
DBP. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Article 161 of the Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for
debts and obligations contracted by the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence,
even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the conjugal
partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

(367) Jardeleza vs Jardeleza

G.R. No. 112014, December 5, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza were married long before the effectivity of the Family Code and
begot five children. At 73 yrs old, Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke and lapsed into a comatose
condition.
Petitioner commenced with the RTC a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the person
and property of Dr. Jardeleza and prayed for the issuance of guardianship to his mother, Gilda
Jardeleza.
RTC set the hearing. Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for issuance of letter of
guardianship to him rather than his mother on the ground that she considered the property
acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed guardian. Respondents
opposed.
The trial court dismissed the petition and conluded without explanation that the petition is
superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under Art. 124 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art 124 of the Family Code renders superfluous the appointment of a judicial
guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person
RULING:
Art 124 of the Family Code is not applicable as ruled in a recent case and that the proper
procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
The petition is granted, RTC resolution was reversed and set aside. The Court remands the case
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with such decision.
(368) GUIANG vs COURT OF APPEALS

291 SCRA 372 (June 26, 1998)
FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence
and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and
went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an
amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain,
respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint
sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contract without the consent of wife is void
RULING:
Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the
case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent
events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private
respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners
filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the
effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the
Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
(369) Nicolas vs CA
(October 12, 987)
FACTS:
Nicolas and Buan entered into a Portfolio Management Agreement, wherein the former was to
manage the stock transactions of the latter for a period of three months with an automatic renewal
clause. However, upon the initiative of Buan his agreement was terminated, and thereafter he
requested accounting of all transactions made by the petitioner. Three weeks after the rumination
of the agreement, Nicolas demanded from Buan an amount representing his alleged management
fee as provided for in the Portfolio Management Agreement. Rebuffed, petitioner filed a complaint
or collection of sum of money against the private respondent before the trial court. In his answer,
Buan contended that petitioner mismanaged his transactions resulting to losses, thus, he was not
entitled to any management fees. After hearing, the trial court ordered its decision in favour of
Nicolas, ordering Buan to pay him for the management fees, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation. Buan appealed the decision to the CA which reversed the trial courts finding and ruled
against Nicolas. Petitioners MR was denied by the same court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed reversible error in overturning the decision of the RTC.
RULING:
The court affirmed the decision of the CA. the petitioner has the burden to prove that the
transaction realized gains or profits to entitle him to said management fees, as provided in the
Agreement. Accordingly, petitioner submitted profit and loss statements for the covered showing a
total profit of P 341, 318.34 of which 20% would represent his management fees amounting to P
68, 263. 70. The CA declared that these documents have no probative value. Unfortunately, the
profit and loss statements presented by the petitioner are nothing but bare assertions, devoid of
any concrete basis or specifics as to the method of arriving at the amounts indicated in the
documents. In fact, it did not even state when the stocks were purchased, the type of stocks
bought, when the stocks were sold, etc. the statements simply tabulate the number of shares
acquired from each company, a column for profit and the last column for loss. The statements were
not even authenticated by an auditor, nor by the person who caused the preparation of the same.
In short, no evidentiary value can be attributed to the profit and loss statements submitted by the
petitioner. These documents can hardly be considered a credible or true reflection of the
transactions. We find that petitioner has not proven the amount indicated adequately. Lastly, the
futility of petitioners action became more pronounced by the fact that he traded securities for the
account of others without the necessary license from the SEC. clearly, such omission was in
violation of Section 19 of the Revised Securities Act which provides that no broker shall sell any
securities unless he is registered with the SEC. stock market trading, a technical and highly
specialized institution in the Philippines, must have been trusted to individuals with proven integrity,
c0ompetence and knowledge who have due regard to the requirements of the law.
SOLE ADMINISTRATION, WHEN PERMISSIBLE

ARTICLE 124
(370) Uy vs CA
GR No. 109557 (November 29, 2000)
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a
petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would
require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC
ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his
father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules
of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in
Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing
mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court
found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis
of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the
wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard
is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
(371) Sabalones vs CA
G.R. No. 106169 (February 14, 1994)
FACTS:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours
of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985. filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building
and lot located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six
children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal
property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also
informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate
family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview,
Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation
of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as
well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife
The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a
new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants,
without his consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for by his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no
injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated.
RULING:
Art. 124 of the Family Code, reading as follows:
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or the authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of
them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The
administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian
under the Rules of Court.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's
legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the
private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in
our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner
may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that
inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the
conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its
management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the
express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.Petition
is Denied.
(372) Relucio vs Lopez

G.R. No. 138497 (January 16, 2002)
FACTS:
Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for appointment as sole
administratrix of conjugal partnership of properties, forfeiture, against defendant alberto lopez and
petitioner imelda relucio. in the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968,
defendant lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their
four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration
of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total
exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant lopez, after abandoning
his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
A motion to dismiss the petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent
has no cause of action against her. 4. respondent judge denying petitioner relucio motion to
dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some
of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant lopez, or solely in her name. 5.
mr denied. ca likewise denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy?
RULING:
No. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. The administration of the property of the
marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that
Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez.
There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause
of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing
to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist
against petitioner on this ground. The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J.
Lopez share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of
the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The respondent also sought support.
Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. Finally, as to the moral damages, respondents claim
for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. If petitioner is not a real party in
interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there
can be no final determination of an action. Petitioners participation in Special Proceedings M-3630
is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to
make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent
and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit
Alberto J. Lopez share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in
Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her petition in the
lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to
account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent
and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute community property with respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS
the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court DISMISSES Special
Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against petitioner.
C. STANDARDS/NORMS OF HUMAN CONDUCT

ARTICLE 19
Theory of Abuse of Rights
(373) NABLE JOSE VS NABLE JOSE

41 PHIL 713
FACTS:
In the year 1880, Mariano Nable Jose was married in first wedlock to Doa Paz Borja and had by
her the following children: Remedios, Feliciano, Rocio and Mariano, the first three of whom are
now of age, Remedios is married to Fernando Arce, but the last child, Mariano, is still a minor and
is represented in this suit by the said Fernando Arce as curator ad litem. Paz Borja died intestate in
the year 1898, and left no heirs than the said four children and her surviving husband, Mariano
Nable Jose. The community partnership between Mariano Nable Jose and his Paz Borja has not
been liquidated since its dissolution in the year 1898. No proceedings whatever have been had for
the judicial administration of the properties of this partnership. Mariano Nable Jose got indebted
and mortgaged the community properties to Amparo Nable Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion Nable
Jose, niece Carmen Castro, The Standard Oil Company on September 27, 1909. This property is
encumbered by another mortgaged in favor of Carmen Castro. Paz Borja's heirs had no knowledge
mortgages nor did they give their consent to them. In order to recover payment and foreclosure of
mortgages, Amparo N. Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion H. Jose, The Standard Oil Company of
New York; and then Carmen Castro commenced actions against Mariano N. Jose y Vinluan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving husband, after the death of his wife may sell or mortgage the
community property acquired during coverture.
RULING:
The trial court erred in declaring the mortgage invalid in so far as it affects the one-half undivided
share of said property, which the court erroneously held to be the property of these heirs. The
judgment entered by the trial judge should be reversed, and that the record should be returned to
the court below, where a new judgment will be entered disposing of the contentions of the various
parties to this litigation as hereinbefore indicated, and providing for the sale of the mortgaged
property in the form and upon the conditions prescribed by law.
EFFECT OF SEPARATION DE FACTO
ARTICLES 127 - 128
(374) Arturo Abalos vs Dr. Galicano Macatangay Jr

G. R. No. 155043 30 September 2004
FACTS:
Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June2,
1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt
andMemorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano in which Arturo acknowledged he received
aP5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that
Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. Thepurchas
e price agreed upon was P1.3 M. The P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency.
Apparently, Esther and Arturo have a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of
her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that
the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther
never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a
check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that
the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not the
subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured thedefect of the
earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.
RULING:
No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement
between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The promise to
sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it
noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase
price.
Taking arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding
for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender. Taking
arguendo that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a contract of sale, the
RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property is conjugal and under
the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest money here is not
actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code.The subsequent
agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction between Arturo and
Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified
(375) HEIRS OF REYES vs MIJARES

410 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Vicente and Ignacia Reyes were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974.
Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-B-2 to
respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares. TCT No. 306087 was issued on April 1983 in
the name of respondent spouses. Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on
March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs.
On September 1983, the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor children and
authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.
On August 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the
return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed a complaint for
annulment of sale against respondent spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to include
Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants.
In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the
sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand,
contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share, excluding the share of his wife,
and that he never represented that the latter was already dead. He likewise testified that
respondent spouses, through the counsel they provided him, took advantage of his illiteracy by
filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of guardian without his
knowledge.
The court ruled in favor of Ignacia. She also filed a motion for modification of the decision praying
that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to
her the rentals they collected on the apartments built. Petitioners contended that they are entitled
to reimbursement of the rentals collected on the apartment built on Lot No. 4349-B-2, while
respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in good faith. Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and
respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia
died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.On January 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of
Ignacias consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondents because they
were innocent purchasers for value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of
Ignacia
RULING:
The trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale in its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case
involving the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the husband without the
consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety
and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the
transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the
annulment of the whole transaction is the same. The plain meaning attached to the plain language
of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent,
may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the
contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. The
necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of the
wife, is not without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the
provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many
obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even
subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the
payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. These are considerations that go beyond the
mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be
stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more
fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack
of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.
(376) CASTRO vs MIAT

G.R. No. 143297 (February 11, 2003)
FACTS:
The evidence shows that the spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two (2) parcels of land
during their coverture. The first is located at Wawa La Huerta, Airport Village, Paraaque, and Metro
Manila and covered by TCT No. S-33535. The second is located at Paco, Manila, and covered by
TCT No. 163863. Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two (2) children: Romeo and
Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Paraaque and Paco properties
would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984, he
renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Paraaque property for
himself but would leave the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis on May 17,
1977. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. He
secured the title over the property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo, Moises violated
the agreement that their (Romeos and Alexanders) names would be registered in the title once the
balance was paid. Upon demand, Moises gave the owners duplicate of the Paco property title to
Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire insurance
premiums. In early August 1985, Alexander and his first wife left the house for personal reasons. In
April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property for P42, 750.00. He
received a partial payment of P6, 000.00 from Romeo. Nonetheless, he never executed a deed of
assignment in favor of Romeo, as he had lots of work to do and had no time and there was nothing
to worry [as] the title [WA] s in [Romeos] possession.
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding, Mrs. Rosalina Castro,
mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had given Moises P30, 000.00 as downpayment for
the sale by Moises of the Paco property to her son Virgilio.
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio Castro to the chambers of Judge
Anunciacion of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where the status of the Paco property was
discussed. On December 16, 1988, he received a letter from petitioner Castros lawyer asking for a
conference. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by Moises by
virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 for ninety-five thousand (P95,000.00) pesos.
Ceferino Miat, brother of petitioner Moises, testified that even before the death of Concordia there
was already an agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila for good, the agreement
was reiterated in front of the extended Miat family members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally
divided the Paco property between themselves. Later, however, Alexander sold his share to
Romeo. Alexander was given P6, 000.00 as downpayment. This was corroborated by Pedro
Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Miranda worked with Moises at the Bayview Hotel and the Hotel
Filipinas. His wife is the cousin of Romeo and Alexander. Virgilio is the brother of Moises.
Moises confirmed that he and his wife Concordia bought the Paco property on installment from the
Fraval Realty, Inc. There was still a balance of P12, 000.00 on the lot at the time of his wifes
death. He paid P3, 500.00 in 1981 and P8, 500.00 in 1984. He registered the title in his
name. Romeo then borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it to his friend Lorenzo.
Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for P30, 000.00 the Paco property to
the parents of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be
forced to sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He accompanied his
children to the Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a judge and a lawyer. Also present in the
meeting were petitioner Virgilio Castro and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell
the property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.
Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third (1/3) of the proceeds while he
received two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single centavo but was given the right to till their
Nueva Ecija property. From his share of the proceeds, Alexander intended to return to Romeo
the P6, 000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He considered the money to be a personal debt due
Romeo, not Romeos downpayment of his share in the Paco property.
The buyer of the property, petitioner Virgilio P. Castro, testified that he informed Romeo that his
father Moises was selling the Paco property. Romeo replied: Bahala siya. The second time he
informed Romeo about the pending sale was when he brought Romeo, Alexander and Moises to
Judge Anunciacion to consult him [as to] who has [the] right over the property. He further declared
that he went to the Metropolitan Trial Court because wanted to be sure whether he could buy the
property. During the meeting, he was told by Romeo that the Paco property was already given to
him (Romeo) by Moises. He admitted knowing that the title to the Paco property was in the
possession of Romeo. However, he proceeded with the sale. Moises assured him that he would be
able to get the title from Romeo.
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises
and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or
assignment of the Paco property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to
make them pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital?
RULING:
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of
the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which
the property was acquired does not appear.
Petitioners reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas is misplaced. That case involved two (2) parcels of
land that Magdalena Clemente purchased on installment and started paying for when she was not
yet married to Manuel Lorenzo. When she married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay the
installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment, the deed of final conveyance was
executed in her sole favor and the land was registered in the exclusive name of Magdalena
Clemente. The Court ruled that the two (2) parcels of land were the paraphernal properties of
Magdalena Clemente, thus:
x x x the fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband
Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of sale or
conveyance of parcel no. 6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still
alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente.
In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage Moises
did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Likewise, Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals cited by the petitioners is inapropos. In said case,
Daniel Jovellanos, while he was still married to his first wife, Leonor Dizon, entered into a contract
of lease and conditional sale with Philamlife. He continued paying the rental after the death of his
first wife and during the subsistence of his marriage with his second wife, Anette Jovellanos. He
completed the payment during the existence of his second marriage. The Court ruled that the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership with the second wife as Daniel Jovellanos acquired
ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in
possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that the
Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. Since as early as 1967, he was
already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal
partnership with his second wife. In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia executed a Deed of
Sale with Mortgage. The contract is one of sale the title passed to them upon delivery of the Paco
property. In fine, title was gained during the conjugal partnership.
(377) Perez vs CA
G.R. No. 112329 (January 28, 2000)
FACTS:
Primitivo B. Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation for P20,000.00.
Sometime in October 1987, an agent of the insurance corporation, visited Perez in Quezon and
convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50,000.00. Virginia A. Perez,
Primitivos wife, paid P2,075.00 to the agent. The receipt ISSUE:d indicated the amount received
was a "deposit." Unfortunately, the agent lost the application form accomplished by Perez and he
asked the latter to fill up another application form. The agent sent the application for additional
insurance of Perez to the Quezon office. Such was supposed to forwarded to the Manila office.
Perez drowned. His application papers for the additional insurance of P50,000.00 were still with the
Quezon. It was only after some time that the papers were brought to Manila. Without knowing that
Perez died, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application and ISSUE:d the
corresponding policy for the P50,000.00.
Petitioner Virginia Perez went to Manila to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the
deceased. She was paid P40,000.00 under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 but the
insurance company refused to pay the claim under the additional policy coverage of P50,000.00,
the proceeds of which amount to P150,000.00.
The insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50,000.00 had not been perfected at
the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company refunded the
amount paid.
BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation filed a complaint against Virginia Perez seeking the rescission
and declaration of nullity of the insurance contract in question.
Petitioner Virginia A. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his
prestations under the contractand all the elements of a valid contract are present.
On October 25, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering respondent
to pay 150,000 pesos. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court
saying that the insurance contract for P50,000.00 could not have been perfected since at the time
that the policy was ISSUE:d, Primitivo was already dead.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent court, the instant petition
for certiorari was filed on the ground that there was a consummated contract of insurance between
the deceased and BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the widow can receive the proceeds of the 2nd insurance policy
RULING:
No. Petition dismissed. Perezs application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF
Lifeman Insurance Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased
and respondent corporation was further conditioned with the following requisites stated in the
application form: "there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on
this application and that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and
the policy delivered to and accepted by me/us in person while I/We, am/are in good health." BF
Lifeman didnt give its assent when it merely received the application form and all the requisite
supporting papers of theapplicant. This happens only when it gives a policy.
It is not disputed, however, that when Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers
for additional insurance coverage were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in
Quezon. Consequently, there was absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have
been communicated to the applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as theapplicant at the time
was already dead.
Petitioner insists that the condition imposed by BF that a policy must have been delivered to and
accepted by the proposed insured in good health is potestative, being dependent upon the will of
the corporation and is therefore void. The court didnt agree. A potestative condition depends upon
the exclusive will of one of the parties and is considered void. The Civil Code states: When the
fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall
be void.
The following conditions were imposed by the respondent company for the perfection of
the contract of insurance: a policy must have been ISSUE:d, the premiums paid, and the policy
must have been delivered to and accepted by the applicantwhile he is in good health.
The third condition isnt potestative, because the health of the applicant at the time of the delivery
of the policy is beyond the control or will of the insurance company. Rather, the condition is a
suspensive one whereby the acquisition of rights depends upon the happening of an event which
constitutes the condition. In this case, the suspensive condition was the policy must have been
delivered and accepted by the applicant while he is in good health. There was non-fulfillment of the
condition, because the applicant was already dead at the time the policy was ISSUE:d.
As stated above, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, must be assented to by both parties
either in person or by their agents. So long as an application for insurance has not been either
accepted or rejected, it is merely an offer or proposal to make a contract. The contract, to be
binding from the date of application, must have been a completedcontract.
The insurance company wasnt negligent because delay in acting on the application does not
constitute acceptance even after payment. The corporation may not be penalized for the delay in
the processing of the application papers due to the fact that process in a week wasnt the usual
timeframe in fixing the application. Delay could not be deemed unreasonable so as to constitute
gross negligence.
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
ARTICLES 134, 143-146
(378) VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 (June 8, 2007)
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life
and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latters paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum
penalty. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as
Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-
trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. The
said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed
Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.
ISSUE:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
RULING::
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a subsequent
marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies
to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the
nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity. Article
2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided
the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the
validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by
Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a
circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is
misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
(379) In Re Bernas
14 SCRA 327
FACTS:
Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant
Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight.
Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First
Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations
governing cockfights ,to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner
Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of First
Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff'smotion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal
Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu
Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal
pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this nature,
that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he does
not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right
to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.
RULING:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for
decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing
that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art
6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof, the general
principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of
the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and judgment as
provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.
(380) Alfonso Lacson vs Carmen Lacson

24 SCRA 837
FACTS:
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint
docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter
referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an
amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property. On
April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their amicable settlement, read as
follows: Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson
left their conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to
reside in Manila. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership subject to judicial approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows: (a)
There will be separation of property petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any
and all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have
acquired no property of any consequence. (b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of,
possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may acquire without the consent of
the other and all earnings from any profession, business or industry as may be derived by each
petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively.
ISSUE:
What are the rights of their children?
RULING:
Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides: Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall
receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or
guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child rights which are not and should
not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His
welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this
case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose
custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to
present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records
reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI.
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 157
CO-OWNERSHIP, CONCEPT
(381) Maxey vs CA
G.R. No. L-45870 (May 11, 1984)
FACTS:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of
this common law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners).1903, when they started living
together, 1911-1912 when Melbourne bought the lands, 1919 when they married in church and
when 1st wife died. 1953 husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land. 1961 when children
discovered sale Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale over
particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their fathers 2nd wife. They allege
that common properties belonged to their parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and
through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their knowledge
and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.Children discovered sale in
1961.Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they believed that the
Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land. Respondent spouses insist that they are
buyers in good faith and they believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of
land. Melbourne and Maxey started living together in 1903. That same year, the children allege that
they got married in the military fashion. They acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got
married in 1919. Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the church marriage. 1953: husband
remarried.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 in a military fashion as
alleged by the children?
RULING:
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument that Act No.
3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and
Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No.
3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could not have
applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage
performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no
provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an
exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or
arrangement.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and Regina
Morales were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of
the case. There is no showing that this factual finding is totally devoid of or unsupported by
evidentiary basis or that it is inconsistent with the evidence of record.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late
wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return
one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay
some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however,
lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.
(382) Valdez vs RTC

G.R. No. 122749 (July 31, 1996)
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-
12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the
joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose
which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody
of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their
desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed
to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in
equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court
said:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant
to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
ownership.
RULING:
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
(383) ALAIN M. DIO vs MA. CARIDAD L. DIO

(January 19, 2011)
FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article
36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to
him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping
sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged
that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court
declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code
RULING:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45
of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties
of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(384) Buenaventura vs CA
G.R. NO. 127358 (MARCH 31, 2005)
FACTS:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio; 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant
moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with
6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00; (3) Ordering the
plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs; (4) Ordering the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding,
giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; (5)
Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises; (6) Awarding the care and
custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and (7) Hereby
authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of
their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied
or that such incident be set for oral argument. On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued
a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20, 000. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the said Resolution. On October 8, 1996, the appellate court
promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial
courts decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the
abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent are void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family code?
RULING:
The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family
Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as
willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as
a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an
innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same
set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act
of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice
by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
On the issue on what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of
annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of
marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
et al.). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case: When a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal
partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse.
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would
be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to
have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now
moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 and has, therefore,
attained the age of majority. With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for
Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura,
as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The
order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and
Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident
Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The Petition for Review on Certiorari
(G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and
November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy
Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
(385) MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 (June 8, 2007)
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life
and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in
the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery is a disqualification for her
to share in the conjugal property
RULING:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of
any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter
provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided
in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
(386) Gonzales vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 159521 (December 16, 2005)
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were
born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda
managed their pizza business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the
time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked
hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and
claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and
Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the
CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later
affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to
marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties
have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
(387) FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA vs ROBERTO PRADO, ET. AL

G.R. No. 156879 (January 20, 2004)
FACTS:
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential Quezon City and covered
by TCT No. 71344 issued in the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband,
Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents
herein. After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to
support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas
Calpatura, Sr., executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to
the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500. A Deed of Absolute Sale
was subsequently executed by the parties.
In 1976, Tomas' daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex withfirewall on the
northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the
land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora paid the corresponding taxes on the
property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas' cousin, built a small house on the
northern portion of the property. On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against
petitioners
Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the RTC.
Respondents alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Salebetwee
n Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa's children tried to redeem
the mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed
was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half
portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of
25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; that
Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the
property which she and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of
P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas. In their answer, petitioners countered among others, that Narcisa
owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first
husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; and that the consideration of
the sale in the amount of P10,500 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968.On April 2, 1997, the RTC
dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale
and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; and that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price
for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining
balance. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision with the modification the sale in dispute is declared
valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-Narcisa Prado in the subject
property. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
2. Was the transaction a sale or a mortgage?
3. How should the property be divided among the heirs of Patricio Prado, Sr.?
RULING:
CONJUGAL. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered
into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership to operate. In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she
bought the subject property from People's Home site Housing Corporation with her own funds, she,
however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the
property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr.
SALE. Public or notarial documents may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. It is well-settled that in
civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Except for the bare allegation
that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in
support thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private transactions
have been fair and regular. Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an
Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-
storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. While the deed of sale between Tomas and
Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the
possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property.
3. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal
partnership. Patricio's rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs,
which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the
legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose
between Narcisa and the other heir in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was
transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children
and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa
inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of
one-half () thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence,
Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and
her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property.
(388) ELNA MARCADO-FEHR vs BRUNO FEHR

G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003
FACTS:
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived
with him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on
installment. They got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties were
divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The custody of children was
awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of
Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property of
Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the
Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna of
the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna
filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.
RULING:
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and the
property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite
204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family
Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article
36. All these elements are present in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the common properties of Elna
and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void marriages under
(389) SUSAN NICDAO CARIO vs SUSAN YEE CARIO
G.R. No. 132529 (February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with
whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982
He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar that the office does not have marriage license of the petitioner and the
deceased.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee is entitled for the P73,000 death benefits of Santiago Cario.
RULING:
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion,
as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining
a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man
The properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs.
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner
to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of
the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits
under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court explained:
The court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
The Petition is Granted. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(390) Guillerma Tumlos vs spouses Mario Fernandez and Lourdes Fernandez

G.R. No. 137650 (April 12, 2000)
FACTS:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through
tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment
building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was
agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month
while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not
complied with by the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she
is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their
love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two
(2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of his marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of cohabiting
with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez?
RULING:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties
is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Guillerma Tumlos failed to
present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the property. In Article 148 did not
include also administration of the property as contribution, it is unsubstantiated.
(391) Malang vs Moson

338 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot
three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter
named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas
dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato.Hadji Abdula and
Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida
Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second
marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter,
Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan,
Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai
stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling of
rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim
women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui
Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence
in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of
buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and
Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such
banks as United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died
without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in
Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration
be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson
held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily
because the latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be
applied if there is more than one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil
marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship. The court further found that the
decedent was the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not
contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The
description married to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the
description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such description is insufficient
to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in
question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the properties are her conjugal property
with the decedent is doing violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time
of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing
marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the property
regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that
agreement is null and void for it is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and
customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the
absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article
38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court
concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal,
but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.[21]
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the
estate of Hadji Abdula.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors
objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. ]Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. However, on January 19, 1995,
she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following
provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions the decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from
the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action of certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. She contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when
she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado
Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties acquired
during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said properties are not
conjugal because under Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property,
in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract.
As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil
Code, under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal
partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held
the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression
--- this is a singular situation where the issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim
marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia
court for the Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae,
Justice Ricardo C. Puno[26] and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura[27]. The Court extends its
warmest thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memoranda[28] and in
the hearing of June 27, 2000.
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates
of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally,
Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. It also explains why
the evidence in the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three
which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely,
Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the enactment of the
Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family
Code took effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four
of whom he begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in
force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took
effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 (R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which
was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4,
1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply
inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To our mind,
any attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence
before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound
implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice and
accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Masturas words, missing links, that would be the bases for judgment and
accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take
it as an imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of
pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property
regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was
interposed in relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of
estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in
the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is but
propitious to go beyond the issue squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are
required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura
puts it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be
greatly enriched by a discussion of the watershed of collateral issues that this case presents.[30]
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form:
(1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
(1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple
marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to the estate
of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply
to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the
Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and
(7) Are Muslim divorces effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice
Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of respondent court, and for the direction
of the bench and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the
marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code[31] recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in
accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that ---
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be
performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal
requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to
comply with article 92.
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or
other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code.But the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration,
may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions
applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to
solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was
passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the
second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims
thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs.
Subano and People vs. Dumpo
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple
marriages.[32] It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification[33] of Muslim personal laws,[34] also
provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right
acquired or liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied;[35] accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of
laws.[36] Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body
of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim
Codes enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil
Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages
are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. [37] The Family Code which
superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage
celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be
void.[38] These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is
monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first
one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the
Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil
Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time.
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide,
since ---
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has
three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of
polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not
sanctioned by the Marriage Law[39], which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The
deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes
conviction for the crime of parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to
Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court
acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the
essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it
appears that the consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a
Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his
consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage
otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the
charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage
contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have
prospered.
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity
of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same
Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the
reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only
law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions
on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from
and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties
lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires
during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the
Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to
marry.[41] Situating these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a
valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is
not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving
that property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property,
respectively.[42] Absent such proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the
subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing
marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage. [43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code
are pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of the cohabitation.
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties live together as husband
and wife the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence,
Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance,
one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest
therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055,
and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the
share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing
marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should
determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective
shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who
entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the
performance of the marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of
conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way
that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim
Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the
Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of
valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever

claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two
years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against
this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical
impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of
the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife
contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born within six months from
the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former
marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that
she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became
aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his
heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the
provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code,
the sharers to an inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled
to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-
fourth of the estate.[44] The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110
abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in
accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval
of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.[45] Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place
from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further
situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court.Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of
the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage
would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting
marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages
were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time
frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from
June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. [46]
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of
the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and
who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined
by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be
determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December
18, 1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first
corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses
under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during
the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and
divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful
wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove
that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and
obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The
following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary
issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code,
which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their
respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety
the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in
order. Accordingly, evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates
of the marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the
dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites
and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria
prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact
periods of actual cohabitation (common life under a common roof) of each of the marriages during
which time the parties lived together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during
each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of
acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately,
conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or illegitimate)
begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of
Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is
REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case
based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS
ARTICLE 148
(392) Metrobank vs PASCUAL

547 SCRA 246
FACTS:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual andFlorencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During t
heunion,Florencia bought from spouses Claritoand Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with
a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City.
The Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)covering the purchased lot (Lot no.156283) was issued in the
name of Florencia married to Nelson Pascuala.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994 , Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, w/c was
granted by the Quezon City RTC in1995. In the same decision, the RTC,
interalia, ordered thedissolution and liquidation of the ex spouses conjugal partnership
of gains,w/c the latter failed.On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses
Norbertoand ElviraOliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
executed several r eal estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one lot no. 156283.
Dueto thefailure of Florencia and the spouses Oliverosto pay their loan obligation, MBTC
foreclosed the property. Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to
declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that the property, which
is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. MBTC alleged that the disputed
lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Florencia was declared
in default. The RTC rendered judgmentfinding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the
RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The disputed property is conjugal. While Metrobank is correct
in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal
provision since the property was acquired
prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal
ownership could belegally presumed, there must be ashowing that the property wasacquiredduring
marriage using conjugal funds.Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that all property of the marriage ispresumed to be conjugal partnership,unless it be prove[n] that it
pertainsexclusively to the husband or tothe wife. This article does not require proof thatthe property
was acquired with fundsof the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in
whichthe property was acquired does not
appear.As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of theproperty dur ing the e
xistence of themarriage, then the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to
when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is
an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
(393) FRANCISCO vs MASTER IRONWORKS

451 SCRA 494
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January
1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired
two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina,
married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior
to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he
waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a
loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a
General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter
filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then
issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged
property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the
trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her
paraphernal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo
RULING:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal
funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of
Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148
and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had
any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired
during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
(394) JOAQUIN vs REYES

G.R. No. 154645 (July 13, 2004)
FACTS:
The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who
died on September 12, 1981; that [respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are
the legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that
for years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B.
Joaquino; that before his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of
Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on
September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of
P315,0[1]1.79; that [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.
The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a property consisting of a
house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez
and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds
and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as
[petitioner] Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same; that [petitioner] executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth
Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the purchase price; that said Rodolfo A.
Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00
and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance
Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation; that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes
before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be
paid out of his Philam Life Insurance Policy.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioners] possession and that
the real and personal properties in [petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership properties of
the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to
[respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be
apportioned among the [other respondents] as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore, pray that
the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P.
Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that [petitioner] be ordered to reconvey the property in
[respondents] favor; that the two cars in [petitioners] possession be delivered to [respondents] and
that [petitioner] be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to [respondents] as well
as attorneys fees.
Petitioner eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the allegations of which have been
summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
In her Answer, petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in
question with her own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes
facilitated the mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly
amortization of the mortgage as attorney-in-fact of petitioner, the money came exclusively from her.
Petitioner further alleges in her answer, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that during all
the nineteen (19) years that she lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September
12, 1981 when the latter died, petitioner never had knowledge whatsoever that he was married to
someone else, much less to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes; that [petitioner] was never the
beneficiary of the emoluments or other pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo Reyes during his
lifetime or after his death because [she] had the financial capacity to support herself and her
children begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes. Petitioner prays for a judgment dismissing
respondents complaint and for the latter to pay unto petitioner moral and exemplary damages in
such amounts as may be determined during the trial, including attorneys fees and the costs of the
suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and trier of facts, the Regional
Trial Court, that petitioners three [3] illegitimate children are indeed the children of the late Rodolfo
Reyes.
RULING:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
which acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
(395) Mallilin vs Castillo

GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still
subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which
petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They
likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents
name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his
share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties
had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner
lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the
name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living
together.
RULING:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and
were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties
are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution,
property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership
even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.
Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and
equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is
unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
(396) JACINTO SAGUID vs CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and
GINA S. REY
(June 10, 2003)
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she
met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end
up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there are actual contributions from the parties
RULING:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.
Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of
their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
(397) Nicdao Cario vs Yee Cario

(February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between
Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at
the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal
wife, is not one of them.
(398) Uy vs CA
232 SCRA 579
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a
petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would
require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC
ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his
father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules
of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in
Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing
mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering
him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of
the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court
found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis
of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the
wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard
is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
(399) BELCODERO vs COURT OF APPEALS

October 20, 1993 (227 SCRA 303)
FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while
living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had
been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950
but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has
ensued during the latter Codes regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new
Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife. Alayo
Bosing died and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still subsisting).
First wife petitioned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second
wife?
RULING:
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This presumption has not been convincingly
rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa
at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably
was acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa.
(400) Juaniza vs Jose

89 SCRA 306
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths
and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been
cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court
decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased,
Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.
RULING:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to
marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-
law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its
operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and
physical injuries suffered by the passengers.
(401) Adriano vs CA
FACTS:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942 or prior
thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June
11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio
married Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and
second marriage as devisees and legatees. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private
respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for
the probate of the will on February 18,1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City.
The RTC allowed the probate of the will. On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for
settlement of estate were pending beforethe RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of
Lucio Adrianos will. In the complaint plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio
and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and
as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and administration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage.
RULING:
Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and womanliving
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated
to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with
Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and respondent court in
this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed
property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation
that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his first
marriage. Although in cases of commonlaw relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity
would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case
have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the property
in question.
VII. THE FAMILY
FAMILY RELATIONS
ARTICLE 149
(402) GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 109068 (January 10, 1994)
FACTS:
The complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the
same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged
defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his
answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of
petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B.
Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof
respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege
that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted
but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that
since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts
towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this
issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his
answer. On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding
that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for
failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case."
He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be
dismissed. On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without
prejudice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family?
RULING:
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the
Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code. Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement
is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides
as a ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made." The Code Commission, which drafted the
precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at
compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers .
. . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers . . .
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that
the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend
"sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of
"members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of
private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before
filing the present suit.
It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have
waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. On the
other hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private respondent that the case was, after all,
also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court for failure of petitioner to comply
with the court's order to amend his complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of are SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now
be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case
with deliberate dispatch.
(403) Coronel vs CA (in lieu of Scavias vs CA)

G.R. No. L-10280 (February 7, 1916)
FACTS:
The case arose from a complaint for specific performance filed by private respondent Alcaraz
against petitioners to consummate the sale of a parcel of land in Quezon City.
On January 19, 1985, petitioners executed a Receipt of Down Payment of P50, 000 in favor of
plaintiff Ramona Alcaraz, binding themselves to transfer the ownership of the land in their name
from their deceased father, after which the balance of P1,190,000 shall be paid in full by Alcaraz.
On February 6, 1985, the property was transferred to petitioners. On February 18, 1985, petitioners
sold the property to Mabanag. For this reason, Concepcion, Ramonas mother, filed an action for
specific performance.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract between petitioners and private respondent was that of a conditional sale or a
mere contract to sell
RULING:
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are the following: a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that
is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b) Determinate subject matter; and c)
Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the
first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicity reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or
consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of
an event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What
the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when
the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the
purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the
obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without
further remedies by the prospective buyer. A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral
contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full
payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller
may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present,
although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. If
the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated.
However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that
if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer,
ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act
having to be performed by the seller. In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer
to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective
seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in
cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted with,
but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of
the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith
and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no
double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because
there is no defect in the owner-seller's title per se, but the latter, of course, may be used for
damages by the intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale
becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the seller's title thereto. In fact, if there had been
previous delivery of the subject property, the seller's ownership or title to the property is
automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to
any third person. Such second buyer of the property who may have had actual or constructive
knowledge of such defect in the seller's title, or at least was charged with the obligation to discover
such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's
title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the
property subject of the sale.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which
prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers
themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase
price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume
that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would
have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and
consummated right there and then.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said
"Receipt of Down Payment" was prepared and signed by petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the
successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, Constancio P.
Coronel, to their names.
The provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the exceptions
being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b)
should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith,
acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies
these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer. In a
case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer
was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good
faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. If a vendee in a
double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of
the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property in a pervious sale,
the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right.
SUIT AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY

ARTICLE 151
(404) Hiyas vs Acuna

500 SCRA 514
FACTS:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City
acomplaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses
Felipeand Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending thathe did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract
of mortgage in itsfavor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who
were the ones thatbenefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not haveexecuted the said contract because he was then working abroad.4On May
17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed tocomply
with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of
thesame family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnestefforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner
contends thatsince the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward
a compromisehad been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders
denying the Motion to Dismiss. Inthe present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to its failure to comply withthe principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why
the instant petition could not have beenbrought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excessof jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a
ground for amotion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are
strangers to the familyare involved in the suit.
RULING:
The Court is not persuaded. Article 151 of the Family Code provides that No suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition thatearnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If
it is shown thatno such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not
apply to cases whichmay not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.Petitioner also
contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled thatpetitioner, not
being a member of the same family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of
the Family Code.Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(405) Martinez vs Martinez

GR No. 162084 (June 28, 2005)
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The
former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the
estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale
purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his
brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of
the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored
and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was
reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have
failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It
should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151
because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent
for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after
due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans
issuance of a certificate to file action.
(406) Hontiveros vs RTC

GR No. 125465 (June 29, 1999)
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result
of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were
married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied
depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the
private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to
petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not
verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards
a compromise as stated in Article 151.
RULING:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the
phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora
and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for
purposes of Article 151.
(407) Vda. De Manalo vs CA
G.R. No. 129242 (January 16, 2001)
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo,
and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen
M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including
a business.
herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely:
Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator
thereof.
Order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were
granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in
the filing of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order
of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of
the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the
trial court in its Order, (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise
among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached
to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward
a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the
petition but that the same have failed.
RULING:
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of
an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in
the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition
for settlement of estate.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition
for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court. Petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
ARTICLES 2034-2035
(408) Uy vs Chua
FACTS:
Petitioner Joanie S. Uy filed a petition for review assailing the resolution of RTC Branch 24 which
granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua which resulted to the dismissal of
a special proceeding for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent Chua.
Petitioner Uy filed two similar special proceedings for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation against respondent Chua. In the first special proceeding, petitioner and respondent entered
into a Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner declares, admits and acknowledges that there is
no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and Jose
Ngo Chua on the other; herein respondent, as a gesture of good will and by way of a settling civil,
monetary and similar claims without liability, binds himself to pay two million pesos for each
petitioner and her brother Allan; that petitioner and her brother declare that they have absolutely no
more claims, causes of action or demands against Jose Ngo Chua or Catalino Ngo Chua nor their
heirs, successors nor any and all corporations, companies nor businesses of respondent; that
respondent Chua waives all counterclaim or counter demand with respect to the subject matter of
the present petition.
The trial court approves the said agreement, judgment is rendered in accordance with the
provisions of the compromise agreement.
However, petitioner instituted before RTC branch 24 a similar special proceeding for the issuance
of a decree of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner alleged in her complaint that respondent had an illicit
affair with Irene Surposa, had two children (petitioner and her brother), respondent directed that
petitioners birth certificate be filled out for fathers name as Alfredo F. Surposa, respondent had
consistently and regularly gave financial support for petitioner before she got married, respondent
also provided her employment.
Respondent denied the alleged illicit relationship and filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the decision of RTC Branch 9 to the first special proceeding had already been barred by res
judicata.
The trial court gave due course to the demurrer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court bars petitioner from
instituting another special proceeding for a decree of illegitimate filiation?
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code prohibits any compromise for the civil status of persons, the validity
of a marriage or legal separation, any ground for legal separation, future support, the jurisdiction of
courts, and future legitime. The Compromise Agreement entered to and by the parties is covered in
the prohibition. The court further ruled that the compromise is against public policy rendering it void
ab initio and cannot be operative even by the parties alleged performance of their respective
prestations. The trial courts have no jurisdiction over the compromise agreement and it cannot
legalize something that is prohibited as it contravenes with public policy. Thus, the court reversed
and set aside the decision of the trial court for the demurrer to evidence and remands the same
court for further proceedings.
(409) NICANOR T. SANTOS vs COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T.

SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787 (November 15, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and
sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in
1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition"
covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her
husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for
recovery of inheritance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court has no application
RULING:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of
an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions
involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151
of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a
complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.
(410) Mendoza vs CA
19 SCRA 756
FACTS:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza.
Mendoza applied for a title. During pendency of the application before the land registration court,
Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the
pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering
the registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of
Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza,
Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration
court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing
the land title to Cruz who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz
appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a third party.
RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza
caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza
overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the
land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to
whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between
the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and
instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time
before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The
interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of
presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such
land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of
registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been
conveyed by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The only
requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested
party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2)
that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.
(411) VERSOZA vs VERSOZA

(November 27, 1968)
FACTS:
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint, later amended, for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in
arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite1 was
lodged against Jose Ma. Versoza by his wife, Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and their three
minor children. Reasons given are that defendant has abandoned plaintiffs without providing for
their support and maintains illicit relations with another woman. Defendant's answer attacked the
complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of action. Because, the
complaint which involves members of the same family does allege earnest efforts toward a
compromise before the complaint was filed. On February 22, 1965, following appropriate
proceedings, the lower court came out with its first appealed order. It there resolved to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice, upon the ground that there was no showing that efforts have been
exerted to settle the case amicably before suit was started.
Plaintiffs moved to reconsider. On March 30,1965, the lower court brushed aside this motion. In an
effort to conform to the position taken by the lower court, plaintiffs filed a second motion for the
reconsideration of the orders of February 22, and March 30, 1965. Plaintiffs at the same time
sought admission of their second amended complaint in which the required averment was made to
obviate the objection to their complaint. They there alleged that before starting the present suit,
they sought amicable settlement but were unsuccessful. On June 22, 1965, the second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, plaintiff is right in arguing that the Civil Code requirement of attempt to reach a
compromise and of its failure need not be alleged in the complaint
RULING:
The text of Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. 3 The
requirement in Article 222 has been given more teeth by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, which states as ground for a motion to dismiss that" the suit is between members of the
same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."cralaw
The cumulative impact of the statute and the rule just adverted to is that earnest efforts to reach a
compromise and failure thereof must ordinarily be alleged in the complaint. The Civil Code
provision that" no suit shall be filed or maintained" simply means that the attempt to compromise
and inability to arrive thereat is a condition precedent to the filing of the suit. As such it is a part of
plaintiffs cause of action.
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed
amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222
have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this
amendment, the subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and
damages, cognizable by the court.
FAMILY HOME
ARTICLES 149 - 162
(412) TRINIDAD vs PANGILINAN

G.R. No. L-27797 (August 26, 1974)
FACTS:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in barrio Sta.
Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime during the
last war she entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year
basis, i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, payable in advance in the month of January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the
fishpond by herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was
terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant, she
extended the lease for another year that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote the defendant that
he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however
ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the possession of the
fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959,
attorney's fees and costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia,
that the land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's father,
Potenciano Gabriel, in 1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the condition that he
would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which was already a fishpond be
improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease for whatever cause: that when the plaintiff became the owner of the
property through inheritance, she told the defendant that she would honor her father's contract with
the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the property, whose
original rental of P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he
wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally. As a special defense, the
defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the case.
ISSUE:
Was the relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease?
RULING:
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject
matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural
or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits.
As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold
tenancy is governed by special laws.
(413) Mondequillo vs Breva

GR. No. 86355 (May 31, 1990)
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those
enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land
and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of
law under Article 153.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
RULING:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the
judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.
BENEFICIARIES OF FAMILY HOME
(414) JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs DANILO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920 (July 20, 2010)
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos
and the company to pay the respondents back -wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service
incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued
which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by
levying a property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home
there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business
address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
RULING:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs
extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been
with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided
under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case,
since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as
1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family
home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the
Pandacan property valid.
(415) Equitable PCI Bank vs OJ- Mark trading

(August 11, 2010)
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As security for the said amount, a Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit where the spouses are residing.
Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the
registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. Respondent-
spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation; thus, they offered to settle
their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot, which at that time, was not
transferred in their name.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the TRO. The same was affirmed by the CA, the
latter holding that respondents have sufficiently shown their proprietary right over the condominium
unit sought to be foreclosed, entitling it to the questioned TRO. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 contending as follows: 1) it has a clear right to foreclose the
mortgage because the respondents failed to settle their obligations; 2) there respondents have no
right to an injunction because they have no clear right to a dacion en pago.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public
auction of the third-party mortgagors property.
RULING:
The Court REVERSED the decision of the CA. The Court held that respondent spouses are NOT
entitled to an injunctive writ because their rights are merely contingent and not in esse. According
to the Court: 1. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. On the face of their clear
admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the mortgage,
petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence
of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal
obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have
the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the
obligation. This Court has denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction that would
enjoin an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is proper when the
debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation. Where the parties stipulated that the
mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default by the

mortgagors, the
mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction improper. Therefore, the allegations of denial of due process
and prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagees unmistakable right to an
extrajudicial foreclosure.
(416) ALBINO JOSEF vs OTELIO SANTOS

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August
29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy
the judgment credit. On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children;
and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioners children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor
of respondent is legal.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It
is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and
likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie
that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection
of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution,
and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of
petitioners allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
(417) SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs

PLANTERSPRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
G.R. No. 172263 (July 9, 2008)
FACTS:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite
demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a wri tof
execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife
Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC
Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from
execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners?
RULING:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially.
All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,1988) are
constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family
home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family
home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to
the Civil
Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for thefollow
ing exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
(418) Gomez vs Inez

473 SCRA 25
FACTS:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of the
TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with their
children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the
ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus
exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house
and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they
occupied it in 1972
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot
was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed
constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in
1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within
the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home.
(419) MANACOP vs COURT OF APPEALS

August 11, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot
with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F.Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45.
Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with
private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That defendants will undertake to pay the
amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their
collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the
aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in
good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court
granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several
vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. Impartial satisfaction of the judgment debt,
these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued
by the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs
of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before
the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemedconstituted on
a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should
take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as
follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided,
as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house
and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year).
(420) PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND,
CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of property) in favor of private
respondent, two (2) petitioner's properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental
with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,
Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to
the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the
same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling,
transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed
of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and
Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon
their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No.
548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is
therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act. No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and
peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V.
Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject
property including their family home which was extra judicially constituted in accordance with law.
As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his
name Tax Declaration over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of
petitioners over said property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject
properties which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale on February 12, 1966. Said sale
has become final as no redemption was made within one year from the registration of the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court
of appeals. Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a
who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta.
Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was made
final only in 1979. As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in
possession of the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and
therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to
them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint. Premises considered,
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the
dismissal of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale pursuant to the wit of execution
issued by the trial court is prohibited and whether or not the family home is exempt from execution?
RULING:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of
the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of
the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the
statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of
repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase
exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by
his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a homestead is
restricted starts to be computed from the date of the issuance of the patent. But the prohibition of
alienation commences from the date the application is approved which comes earlier. Following
this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs
sale was not violative of the law.
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family
home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the
benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code. A family home is the dwelling place
of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicially and extra
judicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the
latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the
establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home extra
judicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles
240 and 241 of the Civil Code.
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary. Article 153 of the Family
Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied in the family residence. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment,
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment. The applicable law,
therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family
home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is
not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads: The family home extra judicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment, except: (1) for nonpayment of taxes; (2) for debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property; (3) for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such record of the declaration; (4) for debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for
the construction of the building.
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that
such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the
house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a
person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house
should be constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family
home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution
of their property but to no avail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
VIII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
PATERNITY, MATERNITY, FILIATION

KINDS OF FILIATION
(421) De Asis vs CA
303 SCRA 176 (February 15, 1999)
FACTS:
The private respondent brought an action for maintenance and support of her son who is a minor
against petitioner alleging that the latter is the father of the subject minor and that the father
refused and/or failed to provide maintenance despite repeated demands.
The petitioner denied paternity and that he cannot therefore be required to provide support. The
private respondent sent a manifestation and both parties agreed for the dismissal of the case. The
RTC issued an order of dismissal with prejudice based on said manifestation.
Another complaint for the same cause was brought against petitioner, this time in the name of the
minor represented by his mother. The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
res judicata alleging that the second complaint is barred by prior judgment on the dismissal of the
first complaint.
The RTC denied the motion ruling that res judicata in inapplicable in an action for support for the
reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the action for support is already barred
RULING:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The
original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.
With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and
agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack of any
filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be
decided by the Court itself.
While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the
parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in
the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot
bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the
defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the
subject of any compromise or waiver.
(422) Fernandez vs Fernandez

363 SCRA 811
FACTS:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa A.de Venecia were the registered owners
of a parcel of landlocated at Dagupan City consisting of 194 sq. m. and a two-storey building.
Generosa gave birth to a baby boy namedRogelio who died when he was only 12 years
old as paralytic. It was revealed that the late Spouses beingchildless by the death of their son,
purchased a one (1) baby boy who was later identified as Rodolfo Fernandez.On July 20, 1982,
Jose K. Fernandez died thereby
leavinghis wife Generosa and Rodolfo Fernandez an estateconsisting a parcel of land consisting
an area of 194-sq. m.wit a two-storey residential building.
On August 31, 1989,Rodolfo Fernandez (appellant) and Generosa de Veneciaexecuted a Deed of

Extra-judicial Partition dividing andallocating to themselves the following:(a)119.5 sq. m. of the said
parcel of land plusthe residential house will belong toGenerosa de Venecia.(b)74.5 sq. m. of the
said parcel of land will belong to Rodolfo V. Fernandez. On the same day, Generosa executed a
Deed of Sale toEddie Fernandez, appellants son, over her share.After learning the transaction,
Romeo, Potenciano, Julita,William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio,all surnamed
Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of thedeceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro
being a brother of Jose, filed September 21, 1994, an action todeclare the Extra-judicial Partition of
Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio.The complaint alleges that defendants (herein
appellants),motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and
maliciousacts of depriving the plaintiff and
other heirs (hereinappellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of
rights to succession or inheritance,taking advantage of the total physical and mental
incapacityof the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated byunlawful scheme confederated, coll
uded and conspiredwith each other on causing the fake, simulated grosslyinauthentic contracts
purporting to be executed on August31, 1989.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez byadoption entitles him successions and
inheritance.
RULING:
Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legallyadopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosade Venecia-Fernandez, hence could not inherit from thespouses. Because it was
negated by the fact of failing to present any birth certificate or any public document thatwould give
a proof of being a legitimate child. Rodolfoeven presented his baptismal as evidence but was
spuriousand falsified.
A. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
ARTICLES 164, 166 - 169
(423) Concepcion vs CA
GR No. 123450 (August 31, 2005)
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married
in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband
filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since
the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the
husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use
his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held
the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
RULING:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons
legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was
upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of
Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot
then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not
related to him in any way.
(424) Angeles vs Maglaya

G.R. No. 153798 (September 2, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the deceased in his first
wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving
wife (2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the administratrix.
RULING:
No, respondent is not illegitimate. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. The issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 1. The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 1. The open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
(425) Abalos vs Macatangay
G.R. No. 155043 (September 30, 2004)
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements
located at Azucena St., Makati City consisting of about three hundred twenty-seven (327) square
meters with a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989, in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to
any other party within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from
respondent in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), representing earnest money for
the subject property, the amount of which would be deducted from the purchase price of One
Million Three Hundred Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). Further, the RMOA
stated that full payment would be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been
turned over to respondent.
Esther agreed to surrender possession of the property to respondent within twenty (20) days from
November 16, 1989, while the latter promised to pay the balance of the purchase price in the
amount of one million two hundred ninety thousand pesos (P1,290,000.00) after being placed in
possession of the property. Esther also obligated herself to execute and deliver to respondent a
deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
In a letter dated December 7, 1989, respondent informed the spouses that he had set aside the
amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos (P1,290,000.00) as evidenced by
Citibank Check No. 278107 as full payment of the purchase price. He reiterated his demand upon
them to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property. Arturo and Esther
failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to cause the annotation of another
adverse claim on TCT No. 145316. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint for specific
performance with damages against petitioners. Arturo filed his answer to the complaint while his
wife was declared in default.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint for specific performance. It ruled that the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) ostensibly issued by Esther in favor of Arturo was void as it was
falsified.
On appeal taken by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It
ruled that the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction
between Esther and respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a contract to sell is a contract of sale, and in
ordering petitioner to execute a registrable form of deed of sale over the property in favor of
respondent
RULING:
Sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the
wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio because it is in
contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code. Since Article 166 of
the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against this
mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
In San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that neither spouse
could alienate in favor of another, his or her interest in the partnership or in any property belonging
to it, or ask for partition of the properties before the partnership itself had been legally dissolved.
Nonetheless, alienation of the share of each spouse in the conjugal partnership could be had after
separation of property of the spouses during the marriage had been judicially decreed, upon their
petition for any of the causes specified in Article 191of the Civil Code in relation to Article 214
thereof.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wifes consent if such
sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil
Code. In Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., the Court ruled that the husband may sell property belonging to
the conjugal partnership even without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for
a big conjugal liability which might endanger the familys economic standing. This is one instance
where the wifes consent is not required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Significantly, the Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration of the
conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of
administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the
conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of
the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Petitioners action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only
disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for
as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what
he has not.
Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

(426) Janice Marie Jao vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
FACTS:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to Perico Jao. After such introduction, Jao courted Arlene.
Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968,
Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but when the
child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case
was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing
result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice?
RULING:
Yes.The group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of
the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father
are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate
that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged
child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.
(427) Andal vs Macaraig

G.R. No. L-2474 (May 30, 1951)
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of

landin question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of
a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former on the occasion of his
marriage to Maria Dueas.Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the
landfrom 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig,taking advantage of the abnormal situation the
nprevailing, entered the land in question. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January
1941.Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to livein his house to help him work his farm. His
sicknessbecame worse that on or about September 10, 1942,he became so weak that he could
hardly move andget up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, MariaDuenas, his wife, eloped with
Felix, and both went tolive in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942,
Felix and Maria had sexualintercourse and treated each other as husband andwife. On January 1,
1943, Emiliano died without thepresence of his wife, who did not even attend hisfuneral. On June
17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birthto a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.If the son
born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question.
If otherwise, then the land should revert back toEduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child born by Maria is consideredas the legitimate son of Emiliano.
RULING:
Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that children born after the one hundred and eighty days
next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption
may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access
to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding
the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during
the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and
Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano
and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. There
wasno evidence presented that Emiliano Andal wasabsent during the initial period of conception,
especially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which
is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On
the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and
his wife were still living under the marital roof, or at least had access one to the other. Even if Felix,
the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse
since May, 1942,
thatdoes not preclude cohabitation between Emilianoand his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly
move and get up from bed does not show that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. He was
not impotent. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery cannot also overcome this
presumption. Therefore, presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not
been overcome.
(428) Teofista Barbiera vs Presentacion Cototal

G.R. No. 138493 (June 15 2000)
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the birth
certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries, to wit:
That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age; her last
child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order
the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who
inherited the estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her
certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on
the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena
and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the
Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171;
RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to
instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's
filiation to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The
reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's successional
rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth
Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not
prescribe because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was
different from other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as
evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of
age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to Teofista and
that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
(429) BENITEZ-BADUA vs CA
299 SCRA 408
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew,
herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The
latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified
that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the
relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the
petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the
legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy
RULING:
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is
not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal
rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the
sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing
such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it
appeared tha the was the petitioners father.
WHO MAY FILE, WITHIN WHAT PERIOD

ARTICLES 170-171
(430) LIYAO vs LIYAO

GR NO. 138961 (MARCH 7, 2002)
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon),
filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to
all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the
child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited
from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased
stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
the deceased.
RULING:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then
settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
(431) ESTATE OF DIZON vs CA

G.R. No. 142877 (October 2, 2001)
FACTS:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage that the
petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged petitioners
as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died intestate and
petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as illegitimate children
by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they be
recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.
RULING:
No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is presumed
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence
of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Since the petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents access to
each other during the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail
their presumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that
they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

ARTICLE 173 - 173
(432) Tijing v CA
G.R. No. 125901 (March 8, 2001)
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest
child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered
Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It
questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons
entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.
It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and
material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by
the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are
no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born
were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not
capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15
years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician
or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of
the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with
the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate
were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a
"common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the
two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical
records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
(433) Go Kim Huy vs Go Kim

365 SCRA 490
FACTS:
On May 1, 1933 petitioner came to Manila at the age of six (6) using the name Gaw Piak. Upon
arrival, he stayed with Bonifacio Go Kim until he left sometime in 1946 to study in Shanghai, China.
He returned in 1949 and pursued college education in Far Eastern University. Prior to his arrival,
Bonifacio Go Kim was already engaged in selling bakery supplies and grocery items. According to
him, respondent Santiago Go Kim Tian came to Manila in 1923 at the age of 11. Both he and
respondent Santiago helped in the business. In 1947, Bonifacio Go Kim & Son partnership was
formed. The partnership name was later amended to Bonifacio Go Kim & Sons to conform to the
registered business name. All those years, the business prospered resulting into accumulation of
several properties. He testified that Bonifacio Go Kim, being an alien, was disqualified to own real
properties. Hence respondent Santiago, who became a naturalized Filipino citizen on September
24, 1957, was entrusted with the properties purchased by his father. Several properties
accumulated were transferred under the partnership name and others were named under certain
persons who acted as dummies.
When petitioner left his job at the bakery in 1956, he worked in a stock brokerage business.
Subsequently, he organized his own import business and later on put up a manufacturing firm for
plastic containers. On April 20, 1964, the trial court granted his petition for change of name from
Gaw Piak to Go Kim Huy or William Go. His naturalization came in September 1978. He explained
that when he entered the Philippines, he used the name Gaw Piak as appearing in the landing
certificate. Such landing certificate was bought by his father in the open market for his easy access
to Manila. He came to the Philippines with his mother Chua Yiak and respondent Santiagos wife.
Both he and respondents wife used different names. He testified that he is known by his name Go
Kim Huy or William Go. He added that his schooling, sustenance and everyday needs were
shouldered by the decedent. He asserts that he was forced to file the case in court because
respondent Santiago refused to give him his just share in the estate of his father.
Respondent Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that
petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated as a family member because petitioners
real father was a close friend of the decedent. His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng Kee as
appearing in his landing certificate. He denied any relation with petitioner and declares that the
grant of petition for change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make petitioner
a member of the family of Bonifacio Go Kim.[6] Respondents declare that petitioner has received a
part of the assets of the decedent and that whatever claims he has, if any, against the estate of the
decedent were fully settled by respondent Santiago and acknowledged by petitioner after the death
of Bonifacio Go Kim.
While the case before the trial court was pending, respondents counsel filed a letter-
complaint dated May 23, 1983 with the Ministry of Justice [Department of Justice] attacking the
certification dated May 27, 1974, issued by the Commission on Immigration [Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, hereinafter referred to as BID] stating that the records filed in the said office
showed that the late Bonifacio Go Kim registered petitioner as one of his children.
In connection with the filing of the instant case, petitioner caused the issuance of notice of lis
pendens on the Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned in the complaint.[12] Consequent to such
issuance, annotations were made by the Register of Deeds of Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
Respondents opposed the annotation and moved to cancel the lis pendens.[13] On June 2, 1986,
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City issued an Order canceling the annotation on the
titles.[14] On April 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the lower court
Order.
In the interim, the BID issued a resolution, dated May 15, 1985, canceling its earlier certification
and declared that petitioner is not a son of spouses Bonifacio Go Kim and Chua Yiak and
accordingly ordered the correction of immigration records of both petitioner and the late Bonifacio
Go Kim. Petitioner appealed the foregoing resolution with the Ministry of Justice [Department of
Justice]. He argued that while the BID is authorized to make an inquiry or investigation, the
resolution ordering the correction of its records affected petitioners status, paternity and filiation
that has remained undisturbed in the public records for more than 33 years, since Bonifacio Go
Kim, during his lifetime, acknowledged petitioner as his son by registering him as one of his
children. In a letter dated February 24, 1987, the undersecretary of justice rendered his opinion,
thus
While it is to be conceded that the correction of entries in the immigration records of William Go
Kim Huy might affect his status, paternity and filiation, matters which are sub judice in Civil Case
No. 30154 of the CFI ofQuezon City, the said corrections will not be binding upon the court. The
court will have to base its findings and decision on the evidence to be presented before it.
This Ministry is thus making its position clear that while it upholds the authority of the CID to correct
entries in its records pertaining to the personal circumstance of William Go Kim Huy, it does not in
any manner pass judgment on the validity or correctness of the CIDs findings and conclusions on
the status of the above-named person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court should take notice of the filiation.

RULING:
Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law. Exhibit
I was considered both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in deciding the issue of filiation
that defeats petitioners imputation of relation with the decedent and the respondents. Petitioner
posits that we disregard Exhibit I. What petitioner wants us to do is to disturb our pronouncement
on August 22, 1988 where we upheld the authority of BID to correct its own records which
effectively upheld Exhibit I. We have repeatedly emphasized in a plethora of cases that judgments
which had already attained finality cannot again be subject of review, otherwise, there will be no
end to litigation. The documents petitioner wants us to reconsider were already cancelled by the
BID, which cancellation has been affirmed by this Court thirteen (13) years ago. Once a judgment
or an order of a court has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid to rest. Petitioner
cannot now demand that we calibrate anew the documents previously cancelled and give it weight
and credence, and worst, reverse our earlier pronouncement, which has long become final and
executory since 1988. In fact, petitioners alleged filiation was merely dependent upon the
certification issued by the BID in 1974 and he has failed to show by convincing evidence, other
than the certification issued by the BID which was later on cancelled, that indeed he was related to
the decedent. Petitioner failed to raise any substantial issue that demands consideration. In the
voluminous records presented, it all boils down to a reconsideration of the BID findings which
cannot now be disturbed.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

ARTICLE 174
(434) Heirs of Valentine Basbas vs Basbas

G.R. No. 188773 (September 10, 2014)
FACTS:
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs ofValentin Basbas (Valentin), and respondent Ricardo trace their
claim ofownership over herein subject property to Severo. Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment
of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1)
annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo
covering the contested lot, and (2) recover possession of the subject property beforethe Municipal
Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 1913.
Countering petitioners allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo denied petitioners ownership over Lot
No. 39 and contended that upon Severos death, he was survived by two heirs,Valentin
(grandfather of petitioners) and Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and
Ricardo) who evenly divided Severos estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject property, Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No.
40 was inherited by Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Heirs is entitled to the Lot?
RULING:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action beforethe expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the fatheror of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the
same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper
case, any of his heirs. If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they
should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
(435) Tecson vs Commission on Elections

GR 151434 (March 3, 2004)
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit.
3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR
161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of
the Philippines.
RULING:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of
FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of
Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo
Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful. The petitions were dismissed.
(436) In Re: Julian Lin Wang

(March 30, 2005)
FACTS:
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried
in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he
reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
RULING:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated
and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must
show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
B. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
ARTICLE 165
(437) TAYAG vs TAYAG-GALLOR

549 SCRA 68
FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of
the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles. On September 7, 2000, Ismael
Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of which are in the possession of
petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the
settlement of the decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her
brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only
gave each of them half the amount she promised. In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner
reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof
in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged
and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action
becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encro
achment upon the courts time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The
motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states
a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child
of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the
latter.
RULING:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which
had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father. In
contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because
of petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already
been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest
to maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
(438) TEOFISTO I. VERCELES vs MARIA CLARISSA POSADA
G.R. NO. 159785 (APRIL 27, 2007)
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of
Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa
accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office starting on
September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del
Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar
on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers
Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have
lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place
her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects. On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she
went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the
same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on
the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he
wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, however, petitioner opened a
hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with
his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to
herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that
she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In
a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, the petitioner then replied stating his love to her.
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably
because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners penmanship
which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office. Clarissa presented three other
handwritten letters sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of
Pandan. She also presented the pictures petitioner gave her of his youth and as a public servant,
all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and
P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review
course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another
P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan.
On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. Clarissas mother,
Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said they learned of their daughters pregnancy
through her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed by her
daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC,
Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner. The trial court issued a judgment in their favor, and ordering
the petitioner; (1) to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on
September 23, 1987 as he was proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor as
shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents]; (2) to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages; (3) to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) to pay the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (5) to pay the costs of the suit.
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification,
specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded; (1) to pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa
Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages; (2)To
pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) to pay each of the said three
[respondents] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support
pendente lite and whether this filiation of petitioner was proven?
RULING:
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find
petitioners stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a
string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give
meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance
thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the
petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages
coupled with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his
offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child,
his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of
paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing
is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code
which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case
because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence
that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding
damages to them. We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance with Article 2208
(2) and (11) of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
(439) Rodriguez vs Lim

G.R. No. 135817 (November 30, 2006)
FACTS:
Pablo Goyma Lim Jr filed a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against
Spouses Rodriguez alleging that his deceased mother, Dominga Goyma, owned the land bought
by the spouses from persons who were not the owners.
Spouses Rodriguez denied the material allegations and averred that Pablo Goymal Lim Jr is not
the son of the deceased and that the lot were conjugal properties of Frisco Gudani and Dominga.
When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her sole surviving heir, whose deposition later confirmed
that Pablo Goyma Lim Jr is the son of Dominga Goyma and that he does not know anything about
the parcels of land subject of the case.
Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo stating that he was not duly acknowledged or recognized by
either of his parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pablo Goyma Lim Jr is an acknowledged and recognized son of Dominga Goyma
RULING:
Based on the evidence presented, Pablo Goyma Lim Jr was an illegitimate and acknowledged son
of Dominga Goyma.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Various documents was presented by Pablo to prove that he was the illegitimate and
acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. It was proved that Pablo Goyma Lim Jr was the
acknowledged and recognized son of Dominga Goyma.
(440) Cabatania vs Regodos

441 SCRA 96
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as
his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid
that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the
Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on
suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead
brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,
assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private
respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to
work the following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another
job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years
Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited
her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to
lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse.
While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was
re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the
father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of
her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to
Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with
her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive.
Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child
of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in
support of the claim to be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the
plaintiffs mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was presented
before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the
child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with
plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not prejudice
the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness has been
found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole of
her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly reasonable to believe
the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts
(People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that
her first intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on
September 9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit A).
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial court and
there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the trial courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283
OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
RULING:
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the childs mother and the personal appearance of the child.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of
which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no
authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We
disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity
and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private respondents petition for
recognition and support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
(441) Eceta vs Eceta

GR No. 157037 (May 20, 2004)
FACTS:
Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named Vicente. The
husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. However, the
deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother was Rosalina, the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to
prove the filiation with the deceased.
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by: (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval. However, what was tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and
accounting of damages only. The filiation or compulsory recognition by Vicente of Theresa was
never put in issue. In fact both agreed in the trial courts pre-trial order that Theresa was
Rosalinas granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over
Theresa nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter. Hence,
the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.
(442) MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639 (June 2, 1994)
FACTS:
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring
petitioner as having acquired the status of a natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and, as
such, entitled to participate in the latter's estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one
Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her
surname in all her school records and correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassins gun, died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate on January 10,
1968. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the administratrix of the estate. After
the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix' Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970
and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.
ISSUE:
May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the
deceaseds natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her
claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?
RULING:
We hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased in accordance with Article 283 of the Civil Code which provides, inter alia:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child: (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or his family.
During his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize Ma.
Theresa Alberto, herein oppositor, as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his
family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by
openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter.
Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gangmates
manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be
hard to disprove.
Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be recognized as a natural child to enable
her to participate in the estate of the deceased, Article 285 of the Civil Code prescribing the period
when such action should be brought governs. It provides: Art. 285. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
The oppositor's case falls clearly under the above exception. Juan M. Alberto died during the
minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18, 1967 the day petitioner turned fourteen. As
such, petitioner had four years from the time she reached twenty-one on September 18, 1974,
which was then the age of majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had
until September 18, 1978 within which to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion
for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with the prayer that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate
of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore, seasonably filed three days
before the expiration of the four-year period.
(443) De Jesus vs Estate of Dizon

(October 2, 2001)
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie
de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and
Accounting of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents
assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceeding. Respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners
as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was
merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such
heirs.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
considered illegitimate if they were born within a wedlock?
RULING:
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said
case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition
filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a
private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a
case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare
that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been
first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,one that can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born
in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress
Petition is DENIED
(444) Aparicho vs Parugaya

May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe
Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in
order to conceal her disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father
Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1 They never lived together as man and wife.
On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain.
As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31,
1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion
as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and
interests. This was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on
appeal it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have
inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. After trial on the merits a decision was
rendered on July 6, 1962, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consolacion is the rightful heir of all of Lumains property rights or interests
RULING:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment:
(a) Declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the third parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint, with all the improvements. If defendant
Hipolito Paraguya is possessing this property, he is hereby ordered to vacate it
and deliver its possession to plaintiff;
(b) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of the second parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint, with all the improvements. If plaintiff is
possessing this land or any portion thereof, she is hereby ordered to vacate said
property and to deliver its possession to defendant Paraguya;
(c) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of Portions B and A of the sketch
Exhibit E-1, with all the improvements. If plaintiff is possessing these portions or
any part thereof, she is hereby ordered to vacate the same and to deliver its
possession to defendant Hipolito Paraguya;
(d) Declaring that plaintiff shall be entitled to the possession of Portions H, F and
G, of Sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the improvements. If defendant is possessing
these portions or any part thereof, he is hereby ordered to vacate them and to
deliver the possession thereto plaintiff Consolacion Lumain Aparicio; and
(e) Sentencing plaintiff to pay the Court the docketing fees and all other legal
expenses.
The present judgment is rendered without special pronouncement as to costs.

COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
(445) JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO vs COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
FACTS:
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They begot
a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother and
guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children of
the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that he be given his share in
the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but
later on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of
her father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the agreement was a SPA appointing
Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a mental hospital. Such compromise
agreement was approved by the court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick.
Thereafter, the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedicks illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the
compromise agreement made.
RULING:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that
must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is ineffectual because under
the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother,
sister or relative.
(446) People vs Bayani

(October 8, 1996)
FACTS:
Moreno Bayani was accused of raping the complainant. It was averred that that Moreno Bayani, by
means of force and intimidation with the point of the gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto.
As a result of the carnal knowledge, the complainant bore a child, Jhuen Nieto. The solicitor
general recommended that the accused should be made to support his illegitimate child in
conformity with Article 345 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender in rape, inder
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, who is married can only be indemnify the victim and
support the offspring, if there be any.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offender can be obliged to acknowledge the child, despite prohibition in Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or
abduction, shall be sentenced to (a) indemnify the offended woman (b) acknowledge the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from doing so (c) in every case, to support the offspring.
However, it was also stated in the provisions of this article that an offender who is married can only
indemnify the victim and support the child.
Article 283 of the Civil Code obliged a father to recognize the child in case of rape, adduction, and
seduction. However, with the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged
natural children and natural children by fiction has been eliminated. At present children are
classified as only illegitimate or legitimate, with no further positive act required of the parent as the
law itself provides the childs status. As such, natural children under the Civil Code fall within the
classification of illegitimate children in the Family Code. There is no further need for prohibition
against acknowledgement of the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental
authority on him.
(447) PEOPLE vs MANAHAN

September 29, 1999
FACTS:
On 5 January 1995, Complainant Teresita Tibigar, a 16 years old stay-in waitress in a canteen was
allegedly raped by accused Manuel Manahan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy.
When her parents discovered it and learned of her story, they brought her to the hospital where
she was examined. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl .
Thereafter, with the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel
Manahan alias Maning of rape. Accused denied having raped Teresita. He claimed they were
lovers. In September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita
but was later released but then was again arrested and detained. He asserts that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and reiterates that he and the complaining
witness were lovers, and that their sexual congress was consensual. The trial court convicted him
with the crimeof rape, as when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. Her testimony is credible where she has no
motive to testify against the accused, and ordered the accused to acknowledge the child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court could compel the accused to acknowledge the child
RULING:
The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in rape cases, and
vigorously maintains that the sexual intercourse was but the culmination of a mutual passion. But
we find otherwise primarily because the accused miserably failed to prove that he and the
complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her.
Moreover, there was no substantial evidence, e.g., love notes, mementos or pictures, presented to
support it. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the accused and the victim were really lovers,
that fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have
sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and,
worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a
quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing
so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v.
Guerrero, "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, the
Court sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
ARTICLE 172
(448) NEPOMUCENO VS LOPEZ

G.R. 181258 (MARCH 18, 2010)
FACTS:
Arhbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother Araceli Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition
and support against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. Arhbencel claimed that she was born out of
an extramarital affair between Ben-Hur and Araceli. To prove her filiation, Arhbencel presented a
handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount
of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting
Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez
without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child
and my income.
Petitioner denied that he was the father of Arhbencel and alleged that he was only forced to
execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that, among other things, Arhbencels Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners
signature; that petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner
performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the
execution of the note. Thus, Arhbencel appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the handwritten note is sufficient to establish Arhbencels filiation as an illegitimate
child
RULING:
No. Arhbencels entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation. The handwritten note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels
filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which provides that the filiation of illegitimate children may be established by a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned admitting such filiation. Here, petitioner has
not only consistently denied his filiation with Arhbencel, he has also not performed any
contemporaneous acts admitting such filiation.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,
has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner because the latter has not signed the
same.
(449) RIVERA vs HEIRS
G.R. No. 141501 (July 21, 2006)
FACTS:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married
to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent
Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed
anextrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the
cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the
estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales half -brothers contested such extra-judicial settlement and
questioned Angelinas illegitimacy. Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelinas filiation.
RULING:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as
"adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, and
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the FACTS
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by
the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence. Lastly,
Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she had been living
childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted
daughter.
(450) Cruz vs Cristobal

498 SCRA 37
FACTS:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private
respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventuras children from his second marriage.
Long after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such to
their names. Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their alleged
shares in the property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention was also
confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently proven.
RULING:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of
Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented who
testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as
being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation
by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice
to prove that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.
(451) Cabatania vs CA
GR No. 124814 (October 21, 2004)
FACTS/ISSUE:
Florencia, a married househelp had sexual intercourse with Camelo Cabatania and allegedly had a
child from him named Camelo Regodos. Can the court compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to
acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter?
APPLICABLE LAW:
RULING:
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them
gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Article 167 of the Family Code)
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity
and filiation before the courts of law.
(452) LABAGALA vs SANTIAGO

(December 4, 2001)
FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his sisters sued him for recovery
of2/3 share of the land alleging that he had fraudulently registered it in his name.
The trial court decided in favor of his sisters. Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint
before the RTC for recovery of the 1/3portion of said property which was in the possession of Ida
C. Labagala (who claimed to be IdaC. Santiago, the daughter of Jose).
The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed constitutes a
valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter. When appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of
the trial court. It took into account that Ida was born of different parents, as indicated her birth
certificate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title
and
possession.
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
RULING:
Yes. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.Use of a family name
certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through intestate
succession.
No. The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time.
Consent of thecontracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of
sale, absentwhich there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any
centavo
for the property which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides that if the
price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation,
or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the deed
is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.
725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by
her father or mother or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
those mentioned in the law accepted the donation for Ida.
(453) Locsin vs Locsin

G.R. No. 146737 (December 10, 2001)
FACTS:
On November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. [1] died intestate on
December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742)
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that
during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined savings,
current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real
properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin
Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the
decedent.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of
Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased,
filed an opposition to respondents petition for letters of administration. They averred that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during
his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name .
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in
the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D"
contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the
informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To
prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She
produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged
original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")[4] showing him and his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph,
respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the
deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and
the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the
deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is genuine for the suspect to be
considered acknowledge natural child and be entitled to the "Petition for Letters of Administration"?
RULING:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to
the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the
Civil Registry General prevails.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article
172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers
onlyprima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its evidentiary
worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the
Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of
nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a
falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring
discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the
genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent
that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while
standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested
personwithin the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition
for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
(454) Ilano vs CA
230 SCRA 242
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano
C. Virata.
Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again.
Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his
promise ofmarriage, they eloped.
While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio
Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to
return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate
to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern
as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School,
he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods
CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly

acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child.
RULING:
Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. A
recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would
be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects
public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such
act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De
Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that
Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand
diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger
to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures
and handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee
in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his
belated denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary
the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be
enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of
petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account
the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December
30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about
P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4
months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering
the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of
P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of
majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article
2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts
and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
(455) Fernandez vs CA
230 SCRA 130
FACTS:
The controversy here revolves around the appropriate reading of a clause in a lease contract that was
executed about fifteen years ago. July 31, 1973. Miguel Tajangco (respondent and lessor) and Celso
Fernandez (petitioner and lessee) entered into a ten-year Contract of Lease over a piece of land
situated along Kahilum Street, Pandacan, Manila, where Fernandez would put up the then proposed
New Zamora Market. The parties agreed that the lease, which was scheduled to end on 1 July 1983,
would be "renewable for another ten (10) years at the option of both parties under such terms,
conditions and rental reasonable at that time" and that, upon expiration of the lease, whatever
improvements were then existing thereon should automatically belong to Miguel without having to pay
Fernandez.
Before the term ended, asshole Miguel said to Fernandez that he is no longer willing to renew the
contract. Fernandez being a hardass, replied that he wants to renew the contract so he could recover
the expenses he had made. Miguel not giving in, replied through his lawyer, advised that Miguel could
not accept Fernandez's unilateral action to renew the lease because, under the contract, any renewal
or extension thereof was possible only "at the option of both parties.
June 12, 1983. Fernandez filed an action against Miguel. He said that he was entitled to renew the
lease contract, under paragraph 3 Section 2 thereof, for another ten (10) years, which paragraph in the
contract should be construed in a liberal manner and with justice. In his prayer, he sought to compel
Miguel to renew the lease agreement for another term, or asked the court to consider the original
contract as renewed for another ten (10) years or to fix another period for the renewal contract.
Miguel the asshole replied that judicial interpretation is not needed, the contract is so simple worded
that even Homer Simpson can understand it.The trial court held its decision in favor of Fernandez.
Miguel, being an asshole and wont accept defeat, appealed with the CA. The CA reversed the decision
of the trial court. BOOM! HEIRARCHY YOW!
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition of the contract is clear or not.
RULING:
The CA said that the contract language as comprising, not technical terms or terms of legal art, but
rather just plain and ordinary words. SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
(456) BARBARA RODRIGUEZ vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-29264 (AUGUST 29, 1969)
FACTS:
On December 31, 1958, in Paraaque, Rizal, by virtue of a document denominated "Kasunduan"

written in the vernacular and ratified before Notary Public Lazaro C. Ison of that locality, Nieves
Cruz, now deceased, authorized the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela, and Maximina Victorio and
Liberate Santos to sell a certain parcel of land of about 44,634 square meters belonging to her and
situated in Sitio Matatdo, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. Among, the anent conditions of
this authority were that the price payable to Nieves Cruz for the land would be P1.60 per square
meter and any overprice would pertain to the agents; that Nieves Cruz would receive from said
agents, by way of advance payment on account of the purchase price to be paid by whomsoever
may buy the land, the sum of P10,000.00 upon the execution of the agreement aforesaid, and
another P10,000.00 on January 5, 1959; that the balance on the total purchase price would be
payable to Nieves Cruz upon the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, the obtention of
which was undertaken by the agents who also were bound to advance the expense therefor in the
sum of P4,000.00 which would be deductible from the last amount due on the purchase price; and
that should the agent find no buyer by the time that Torrens title is issued, Nieves Cruz reserved
the right to look for a buyer herself although all sums already received from the agents would be
returned to them without interest.
As confirmed by Nieves Cruz in a "recibo", the stipulated "advance payment (paunang bayad)" of
P20,000.00 was duly made to her. Contrary to the agreement that the balance on the purchase
price would be paid upon the issuance of the Torrens title over the land, Nieves Cruz and her
children, however, collected from the agents, either thru Maximina Victorio or thru Salud G. de
Leon, daughter of Liberate Santos, various sums of money during the period from July 3, 1959 up
to September 3, 1961, all of which were duly receipted for by Nieves Cruz and/or her children and
in which receipts it is expressly stated that said amounts were additional payments for the land we
sold to them.
Eventually, pursuant to a partition between Nieves Cruz and her brother, Emilio Cruz, by virtue of
which the entire land was subdivided into two lots of 48,260 square meters each, Original Transfer
of Title No. 2488 was cancelled and superseded by two new transfer certificates respectively
covering the two sub-divided lots. Then, on September 15, 1961, Nieves Cruz sold the property in
question to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, her "balae" because the latter's son was married to her
daughter, for the sum of P77, 216.00. In consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80110 in the
name of Nieves Cruz was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91135 was
issued in the name of Barbara Lombos Rodriguez.
Forthwith, on September 16, 1961, Nieves Cruz, through counsel, gave notice to Atanacio
Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberata Santos of her decision to rescind the original
agreement. They, accordingly, returned Nieves Cruz' check. Thus rebuffed, plaintiff Nieves Cruz
hailed defendants Atanacio Valenzuela, Maximina Victorio and Liberate Santos before the Rizal
Court in the instant action for rescission of the "Kasunduan" heretofore adverted to, the
cancellation of the annotation on the title to the land respecting defendant's right thereto, and for
damages and attorney's fees. Pending the proceedings below, plaintiff Nieves Cruz died and was,
accordingly, substituted as such by her surviving children, to wit: Arsenio, Nelo, Jaime, Andres and
Amanda, all surnamed Nery, and Carmen and Armenia both surnamed Mendoza.
In due season, the trial court finding for plaintiff Nieves Cruz and her buyer, Barbara Lombos
Rodriguez, and against defendants rendered judgment thus "IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered (1) Ordering the cancellation at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91135 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, stating that the land covered
thereby was sold to the defendants; (2) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff, jointly and
severally the sum of P67,564.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; (3)
Dismissing the defendants counterclaim; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this
suit jointly and severally." On appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED in toto.
The petition in the present case, L-29264, while again assailing the findings of fact and conclusions
of law made by the respondent Court, adds two new grounds. The first is the allegation that the
land involved in CA-G.R. 35084-R has a value in excess of P200, 000. The petitioner complains
that the Court of Appeals should have certified the appeal to us, pursuant to section 3 of Rule 50 in
relation to section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as she had asked the said Court to do in her
supplemental motion of June 14, 1968. The second ground is the claim that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in denying her May 14, 1968 motion for new trial, based on alleged
newly discovered evidence. The heirs of Nieves Cruz filed an answer unqualifiedly admitting the
basic allegations of the petition, except as to the value of the land, as to which they are non-
committal. It is our considered view that the petitioner's claim of grave abuse by the respondent
Court in denying her motion for new trial is devoid of merit. It is not disputed that, on the
assumption that the respondent Court had jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner had already
lost her right to appeal from the decision of October 4, 1967 when the petition in L-28462 was filed
in January 1968. It logically follows that the case had passed the stage for new trial on newly
discovered evidence when the petitioner filed her motion for new trial on May 14, 1968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the above case?
RULING:
The joint petition in L-28462 afforded the petitioner herein the opportunity to question the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court. Again, the value of the land in controversy, was not questioned
by the petitioners, not even in their amended joint petition. It was not until June 14, 1968 that the
petitioner herein filed with the respondent Court a supplemental motion wherein she raised for the
first time the issue of value and questioned the validity of the final decision of the respondent Court
on the jurisdictional ground that the real estate involved has a value in excess of P200,000. That
the petitioner's present counsel became her counsel only in May, 1968 provides no excuse for the
petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence for over three years to discover that the land has a
value that would oust the respondent Court of jurisdiction. The fact remains that the petitioner had
allowed an unreasonable period of time to lapse before she raised the question of value and
jurisdiction, and only after and because the respondent Court had decided the case against her.
The doctrine of estoppel by laches bars her from now questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The
doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitation is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted.
In the case at bar, the records as of the perfection of the appeal on August 12, 1964 show
that the litigated real estate had a value not in excess of P200,000. Conformably with the Judiciary
Act of 1948, therefore, the appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil
case 6901 was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The fact that Atanacio Valenzuela, et
al. were agents of Nieves Cruz under the agency agreement of December 31, 1958 is not material,
for if it is true that Nieves Cruz did agree to sell to her agents the real estate subject of the agency,
her consent took the transaction out of the prohibition contained in article 1491(2) of the Civil Code.
Neither are articles 1874 and 1878(5) and (12) of the Civil Code relevant, for they refer to sales
made by an agent for a principal and not to sales made by the owner personally to another,
whether that other be acting personally or through a representative.
We declare, consequently, that the estate of Nieves Cruz is liable to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez
for the return to the latter of the sum of P77, 216, less the amount which Atanacio Valenzuela, et
al. had deposited with the trial court in accordance with the decision of respondent Court. We
cannot order the heirs of Nieves Cruz to make the refund. As we observed above, these heirs are
liable for restitution only to the extent of their individual inheritance from Nieves Cruz. Other actions
or proceedings have to be commenced to determine the liability accruing to each of the heirs of
Nieves Cruz.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition for mandamus and certiorari is denied, at petitioner's cost.
(457) Jison vs Jison

GR No. 124853 (February 24, 1998)
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death
and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that
she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of
11 witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison
RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms
of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts were established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed
by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove
paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting
that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that
Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for
the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on
open and continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action
well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
(458) Pe Lim vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 11222 (March 18, 1997)
FACTS:
Before us is one of those cases where a man woos a maid, succeeds in seducing and
impregnatingher, only to disclaim the paternity of the child when made to account for his
misdeeds.DNA, being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded official recognition
by ourcourts. Paternity will still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevantincriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
ISSUE:
Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they were only friends andnothing
more.
RULING:
Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they were only friends andnothing
more.The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the dispositive portion of which
states:"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendantordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter,
minor JoannaRose Pe Lim in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Philippine
Currency, per monthfor the support, maintenance, education and well-being of said child, the same
to be paid on or before the 5th day of each month and monthly thereafter starting June, 1991, until
the said minorJoanna Rose Pe Lim, shall have reached the age of majority.The defendant is
further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred (P7, 500.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses. No costs.
DNA TESTS: PROBATIVE VALUE IN PATERNITY CASES
(459) TIJING vs CA
G.R. No. 125901 (March 8, 2001)
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest
child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered
Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It
questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons
entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.
It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and
material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by
the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are
no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born
were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not
capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15
years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician
or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of
the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with
the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate
were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a
"common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the
two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical
records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
(460) AGUSTIN vs CA
G.R. No. 162571 (June 15, 2005)
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was
reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then,
been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this
petition.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD; and 2) W/N the court erred in
directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search
RULING:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the
prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
(461) Herrera vs Alba
G.R. No. 148220 (June 15, 2005)
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother
Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Trial court denied.
The appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation, he maintains
that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates
his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege
is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under
duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right
against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from
his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23
Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil.
735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on testimonial compulsion.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation
of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent
to claim his or her own defenses.Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the
limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
Petition is hereby dismissed.

(462) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656 (May 9, 2002)
FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At
5pm of the same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos
house and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning,
Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter
strangled to death. In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the
latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have
already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police
requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the
clothes were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At
the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab
from Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing
Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O. Buan also found that
the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed
a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn
statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be
inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy waters,
hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence?
RULING:
Yes.The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that
even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering
that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The Supreme
Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time
recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a
persons cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons
DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene
of the crime or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.
(463) People vs Yatar

428 SCRA 504
FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers (Isabel Dawangs) house, despite
her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the
morning. At 10:00 AM, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house
where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar,
who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor
andwas pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawangs house; Judilyn didnt find this
unusual sinceYatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatarcalled upon Judilyn, telling
the latter that he would notbe getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed
that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that thelatters
eyes were reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns
husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyns
husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her
house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which sheasked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the teenage
girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded
opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped inthe darkness of the second level of her
house, she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it.
Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found
Kathylyns clothes and under garments beside herbody. Amongst others, a white collared shirt
splatteredwith blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has
also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When subjectedunder DNA testing,
results showed that the DNAcomprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype.Yatar
was accused of the special complex crime of Rapewith Homicide and was convicted for the same
by theRegional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga.
Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court inorder to assail the court a quos
decision.On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred ingiving much weight to the evidence
DNA testing oranalysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid foundinside the victims (cadaver)
vaginal canal; (2) the bloodsample taken from is violative of his constitutional rightagainst self-
incrimination; and the conduct of DNAtesting is also in violation on prohibition against ex-postfacto
laws.
ISSUE
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done onthe sperm specimen may be used as
evidence for Yatars conviction?
RULING:
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004,which was three (3) years before the Rules
on DNAevidence took effect.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the UScase of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a
precedent. In thesaid US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinentevidence based on scientifically
valid principles could beused, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE.Hence, it was
called then as the DAUBERT TEST.
At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNAEVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7of
the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effecton 2007, provides for the factors to beconsidered in
assessing the probative weight orvalue to be given on evidence derived orgenerated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are,to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how thebiological samples were collected, howthey were
handled, and the possibility ofcontamination of the samples; (b) TheDNA testing
methodology, including theprocedure followed in analyzing thesamples, the advantages
anddisadvantages of the procedure, andcompliance with the scientifically validstandards in
conducting the tests; (c)The forensic DNA laboratory, includingaccreditation by any
reputablestandards-setting institution and thequalification of the analyst whoconducted the
tests. If the laboratory isnot accredited, the relevant experienceof the laboratory in forensic
caseworkand credibility shall be properlyestablished; and (d) The reliability of thetesting
result, as hereinafter provided.
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE
(464) Estate vs Diaz

December 17, 2007
FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz
for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a
decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and
ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the
pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. They
contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing,
as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the
present paternity dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.
RULING:
Yes.The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the person's
body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
(465) LUCAS vs LUCAS

GR 190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was not served with a copy of
the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel
therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a
Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the OrdeR setting the case for hearing and
urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. After learning of the
September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could
not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father.
Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
ISSUE:
Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a search which must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid?
RULING:
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The
same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding

these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon
the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHO MAY FILE AND WHEN FILE TO ACTION FOR

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION ARTICLE 175
(466) Reyes vs Mauricio

(November 24, 2010)
FACTS:
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or
less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and
cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of
Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by
respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F.
Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada
and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession
with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who
was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject
land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land
and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house
and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means,
Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September
1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public
Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained
to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence
and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduanrendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the
subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an
order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of damages. During trial, respondents
presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing
tenancy agreement.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified
that Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and
accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign
such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the
document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution
of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief
sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the
regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present
suit.
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial

Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving
spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB
held that the Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes
died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property
RULING:
Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of their late
parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the
DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by
Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as
to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.
(467) Estate of Ong vs Diaz

540 SCRA 480
FACTS:
On February 1993: Jinky married Japanese Hasegawa Katsuo. On November 1993: Jinky and
Rogelio got acquainted and fell in love and co-habited, and they had a daughter, Joane. Rogelio
paid for all the expenses upon their daughters birth and acknowledge her as his child. On
September 1998, Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving support, alleging that he is not the
father of the child.
RTC ordered defendant to recognize plaintiff as natural child and provide monthly support until
Joane reaches majority age. Rogelio appealed to CA but he died in February 2005 during its
pendency. On December 2000, CA granted appeal and remanded case to RTC for the issuance of
an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of Joanne as suggested by the petitioner, Rogelio in the early stage of
the proceedings before his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no
longer feasible due to Rogelios death
RULING:
No, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long
as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA .Even if Rogelio already died, any of his
biological samples may be used for DNA testing.
Death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. According to jurisprudence, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child andany physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito, citingTecson v.
COMELEC)Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed.
(468) Guy vs CA
502 SCRA 151
FACTS:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy
Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging
that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by
counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of
Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all
liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that
the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly
signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily
obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect
the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as
they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent
to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the
original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included.
As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a
claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
(469) Rivero vs CA
458 SCRA 714
FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint againstdefendants for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. Duringtrial, Mary Jane Dy-
Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she
is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as
a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC Granted
the compromisedagrrement.Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed
for annulment of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss.
CA directed Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her
reply, shequestion assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be
thesubject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did
notrecognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners
wereexploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is valid?
RULING:
NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane isnull and
void.Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status
of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationshipthat must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or
absence. Itcannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.Such recognition by Mary Jane ,
however, is ineffectual, because under the law, therecognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
(470) BRIONES vs MIGUEL

440 SCRA 455
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17,
1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of
whether the father admits paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were
under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the
courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the
latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.
(471) Herrera vs Alba

G.R. No. 148220 (June 15, 2005)
FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in
order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis
allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid
)DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba.
However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet
garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and
that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Herrera is correct.
RULING:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the
decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the
other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test
inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be
had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is
the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a
100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case
Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still disputable or refutable
evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against
self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial
compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera; hence, he cannot properly invoke self-
incrimination
(472) Marquino vs IAC

(June 27, 1994)
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support
and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in
that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was
hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial
assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged
natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all
these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979
but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were
ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the
heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to
compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be
continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs
and
2. Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
RULING:
SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted
because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right
is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for
recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the
best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at
bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of
their father.
IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.
(473) TAYAG vs COURT OF APPEALS

209 SCRA 665
FACTS:
Respondent Emilie Cayugan in her capacity as the mother and the legal guardian of minor
Cayugan filed a complaint of Claim for Inheritance against the Petitioner Corito Ocampo who was
the administrator of the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo.
Respondent Emilie Cayugan has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cayugan. Respondeand
Atty. Ocampo had an illicit relationship with each other. As a result of the illicit relationship, they
begot a child named Chad Cuyugan.
Chad had been showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by the putative father for
being his only son. This affection can be proven through letters and documents.
Respondent contends that although he is illegitimate he is nevertheless entitled to a share in the

intestate estate left by his deceases father, as one of the surviving
heirs. She was asking for a financial support from the estate of theputative father for she has no
means of livelihood and she only depends on
thecharityc. The plaintiff refused to satisfy the claim for the inheritance against the estate of the
deceased. The estate of the deceased has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including Chad has not been likewise been ascertained. The
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint merely alleged that the minor
Chad is an illegitimate of the child of the deceased and actually asking for the claim of the
inheritance. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition and was further affirmed by the
Appellate Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chad has the right to claim over his share of inheritance in the estate of the
deceased?
RULING:
The Mother proved the filiation of the child and it was filed within the prescriptive period as required
by the New Civil Code of the Philippine. In this case, SC ruled that if the action is based on the
record of birth of the child, final judgment, or admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a
public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is on the continuous possession by the child
of the status of an illegitimate child, that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. Article 285 of the Civil Code is the controlling factor since the alleged parent died
during the minority of the child, the action for the filiation may be filed within four years from the
majority of the minor. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 28 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Moreover, the right of the action of the minor child has been vested by filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Wherefore, the foregoing circumstances render that Chad has the right to claim over his share on
the estate of the deceased.
(474) People vs Bayani

(October 8, 1996)
FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of June, 1992, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moreno Bayani, by means of force and intimidation with
the point of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against her will.
In 1992, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St. Lawrence Academy, a
Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Appellant was a neighbor. He was close to her paternal
uncles, Eugenio and Rudy Nieto. One of her uncles is appellants kumpadre.
The rape incident was reported to the NBI. Accompanied by NBI agents, she went back to the
scene of the crime. It was only at that time that she learned that the building where appellant
brought her was a motel, Dragon Inn. On March 21, 1993, Maria Elena gave birth. After the
complainant underwent a lengthy cross-examination, the hearings on the motion for bail ended on
20 October 1993. On 18 November 1993, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for
bail. The prosecution presented no additional testimonial evidence for trial on the merits, but
submitted its documentary exhibits which were admitted by the trial court.
On 12 April 1993, the trial court denied the motion of the accused for bail and the motion of Romeo
Maganto, PNP Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, asking that the accused, who allegedly
voluntarily surrendered to Maganto, be detained at the PNP Detention Center instead of the
Provincial Jail. The trial Court further ordered Maganto to immediately bring the accused to court.
On 14 June 1993, the accused filed another motion for bail contending that while the charge is [for]
a capital offense the evidence of guilt is not strong. Primarily, the accused assaulted the
complainants credibility based on her affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation, upon
which a resolution was issued finding a prima facie case against him and recommending that the
information be filed in court. The prosecution, in opposing the motion for bail, presented Dr. Eden
Baraoidan, a Medical Specialist II of the Provincial health Office who conducted the medico-legal
examination of the complainant on 6 January 1993, and the complainant herself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the crime of rape against
private complainant?
RULING:
True, there were inconsistencies on some details between the private complainants testimony and
her affidavit. But these are minor inconsistencies which do not affect her credibility. Besides, she
had satisfactorily explained these discrepancies.
As to the version of the accused, the trial court observed: The accuseds insistence that he and the
accused mutually agreed to have sexual intercourse on June 28, 1992 and that there after they
maintained a sexual relationship does not inspire belief. The accused pictured the fifteen (15) year
old private complainant as one who belongs to a broken family and was in dire need of financial
help which he readily gave.
Indeed, this Court does not give credence to the accuseds stance that the private respondent
agreed to have a sexual relationship with the accused who is twice her age in exchange [for] the
financial help allegedly extended to her by the accused. In the instant case, with the trust reposed
by the complainant in the accused who she even called uncle, the disparity in their ages, coupled
with the complainants tender years and the fact that the accused is a policeman, we can pay no
heed to the accuseds avowal that the complainant should have used stronger force or resistance
against his acts. This Court, after a thorough examination of the transcript of stenographic notes, is
in full accord with the above observation of the trial court. Moreover, we find that the accused failed
to present evidence to prove the presence of any ulterior or improper motive on the part of the
complainant. In this light, this Court has ruled:
Considering a Filipinas inbred modesty and antipathy in airing publicly things which affect her
honor, it is difficult to believe that she would admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not
true. A complainant would not risk ruining her future and exposing herself to ridicule if her cha[r]ge
were not true. If she does undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer
scandals, embarrassments and humiliation (such action would indubitably invite, as well as allow,
an examination of her private parts), it is due to her desire to bring justice to the person who had
abused her. When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the offended party was
actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and her
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or
abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the
offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense
coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that
acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring
as part of the sentence. With the passage of the Family Code, however, the classifications of
acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction have been eliminated. At
present, children are classified as only either legitimate or illegitimate, with no further positive act
required of the parent as the law itself provides the childs status. As such, natural children under
the Civil Code fall within the classification of illegitimate children in the Family Code.
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother,
and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such,
there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender
who is married which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to
indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case then, the accused
should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena
Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined
by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City is AFFIRMED in toto. Furthermore, accused-appellant MORENO BAYANI
is ordered to support his illegitimate child Tracy Jhuen Nieto in an amount to be determined by the
trial court after due notice and hearing, called only to determine the amount and terms of support,
with support in arrears to be reckoned from 28 April 1995.
(475) Republic vs Abadilla
(January 29, 1999)

FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage and begot two children. In the birth certificate of the children, they were
registered with the surname Abadilla and the name of their father as Herson Abadilla. The entry
in the date and place of marriage of the parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.
Respondents filed an amended petition for correction/cancellation of entries seeking to correct the
entries in the birth certificates of the children (1) to delete the date and place of marriage of the
parents appearing in the birth certificate; and (2) to correct the first name of petitioner Gerson
Abadilla.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the corrections to be made.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the trial court
committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the date and place of marriage of
parents but failed to order the change of the childrens surname from Abadilla to Celestino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its failure to order the change of surname of the minor
children
RULING:
The petition must be granted.
There is not dispute that the minor children are illegitimate children of their parents who were not
married to each other.
Art. 176 of the Family Code explicitly provide that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code.
Thus, as illegitimate children, they should bear the name of their mother. The decision of the trial
court is hereby modified. The Civil Registrar is ordered to change the entry in the amended birth
certificates of the minors with respect to their surname, from Abadilla to Celestino.
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

ARTICLE 176
(476) CHARLES GOTARDO vs DIVINA BULING

(August 15, 2012)
FACTS:
Single mother seeking child support through establishing filiation with ex-fiancee.FACTSIn 1995,
respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for compulsoryrecognition and support
pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of herchild Gliffze, whose imputed paternity
the petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She met thepetitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both
worked. They became sweethearts in thelast week of January 1993. Sometime in September
1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented
room in the boarding housemanaged by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle.
The sexual encounters occurred twice amonth and became more frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, therespondent found out that she was pregnant. When told, the
petitioner was happy andmade plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out. The
respondent gavebirth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up
andfailed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on demandingrecognition of
and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer thedemand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and supportpendente lite. The petitioner took the witness
stand and testified for himself. He deniedthe imputed paternity; claiming that he first had sexual
contact with the respondent inthe first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant
for 3 months whenhe was informed of the pregnancy on September 1994. During the pendency of
thecase, the RTC, on the respondents motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child
support,retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner torecognize
his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly childsupport. The petitioner
argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs ruling, and that the evidence
on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings
andordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
RULING:
The Court denied the petition andaffirmed the ruling of the CA, sustaining theaward of P2, 000.00
monthly children supports, not finding any reversible error in the CAs ruling. In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner isthe putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved onlywith one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated hertestimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship. However, thepetitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations ofpromiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiarysupport.
The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; aparent is obliged to support
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consistsof everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
(477) Grande vs Antonio

(February 18, 2014)
FACTS:
In the case at bar, respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent father could compel his illegitimate children to use his surname, the
Supreme Court ruled the father could not.
RULING:
The SC voided the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9255 insofar as the
IRR makes it mandatory for the illegitimate child to use the recognizing fathers surname, since this
was contrary to the express permissive wording of Republic Act 9255amending Art 176 which
states that illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father. A relevant portion of the Supreme Courts reasoning in Grande
vs Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014) is hereunder quoted:
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father
or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by
law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to
mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.[16][Republic
v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255; Chartered Bank Employees
Association v. Ople, No. L-44717, August 28, 1985, 138 SCRA 273; Quijano v. Development Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 26419, October 19, 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia, No. L-25659, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111] Respondents position that the court can
order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor
child.
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon the latters
recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word shall in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of may in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by
which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and
fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
Antonio. However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court,
they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.[27][Rule 132. Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.] A
proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the childrens choice of surname by the trial
court is necessary.
(478) TEOFISTO I. VERCELES vs MARIA CLARISSA POSADA

G.R. No. 159785 (April 27, 2007)
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, met a
close family friend, petitioner Teofisto Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then offered Posada a job.
Posada accepted Verceless offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office. Along
with some other employees, Posada accompanied Vereceles to Legaspi City to attend a seminar
on town planning. One day, Verceles started to make amorous advances on her. She panicked,
and hurriedly left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as a
casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office starting
on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat
Del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a
seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers
Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have
lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place
her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-
upbarangay road and maintenance projects.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as
he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.
she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In
a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably
because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners penmanship
which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter
and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA
review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her
father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a
baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said they learned of their
daughters pregnancy through her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner
and shamed by her daughters pregnancy.
Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with
support pendente lite; (2) Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child
of petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
RULING:
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages
coupled with SupportPendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which
establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of
evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
matters.
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219of the Civil Code
which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case
because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding
damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2) and (11) of the
New Civil Code.
(479) In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

454 SCRA 541
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. That her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his surname.
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are
of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of
the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.
Petition is Granted.
(480) Briones vs Miguel

440 SCRA 445
FACTS:
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away?
RULING:
under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the
courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the
(481) People vs Glabo

371 SCRA 567
FACTS:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-
year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house. He
told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accused-
appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his
house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was
hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down. He
undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and pull
motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellants brute strength. She shouted for help, but
there were no neighbors nearby. Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the
house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground.
While underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through
the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith
went to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellants penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the victim
became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no longer be
concealed. Severino Lobrico, Milas father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her sister,
Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the police
and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
RULING:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed
on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the
Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an
offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental
authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the
trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
(482) Tonog vs CA
376 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Dinah Tonog had an illegitimate child with the respondent, Edgar Daguimol. Both cohabited
together and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City.
After Dinah, left for the United States to work, Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin
Faith. The trial court appointed respondent as the guardian of the child. Upon learning the decision
made by the court, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement, and remanded the custody of
her child to her.
The RTC, set aside its original decision and granted petitioners motion for custody of her child.
The Court of appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC and ruled that custody shall remain with
the petitioner. Thus, the issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mother has parental authority over their illegitimate child.
RULING:
While the court recognizes that insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their
mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their
children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement each other in giving nurture
and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological,
mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
The mother is favoured by law in custody of a child, however, there as excepting circumstances as
explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have
any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
The Court emphasizes that in custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the
welfare and well-being of the child, thus, giving the temporary custody to the father pending the
final pronouncement. The Court said that the minor should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she
had apparently formed an attachment.
(483) Republic vs Abadilla

(January 29, 1999)
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children and were
registered under the surname Abadilla but the name of their father was entered as "Herson.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries was filed with the RTC of
Laoag City seeking to have the following corrections made in the Certificates of Birth. During the
hearing of the petition, both Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino testified that they are not
yet married to each other despite bearing two children. The petition was granted. The instant
petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the
ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date and
place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors but failed to order the change of
the minors' surname from "Abadilla" to "Celestino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the change of minors surname
RULING:
There is no dispute that the children are illegitimate children.
During their birth, the Family Code was already the governing law and Article 176 of which
explicitly provides as follows: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
Thus, as illegitimate children, the children should bear the surname of their mother. Resultingly,
with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and
place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should
have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname.
(484) Mossessgeld vs CA
300 SCRA 464
FACTS:
In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan
(married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the childs
name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side
of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In
addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the childs surname in the
certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil
registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the
basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3,
1988, shall use the surname of their mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son
using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later,
he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the childs
mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity?
RULING:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child
using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative
father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of
adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his
surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the fathers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does
not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.
(485) Silvia vs CA
275 SCRA 605
FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos
and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according
to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped
working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways. The instant
controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent
contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company
On weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional TrialCo
urt, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
RULING:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of theconstitutionally
protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the
father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Courts upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children.
(486) David vs CA
260 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, a businessman.
Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. The relationship
between Daisie and Ramon developed into an intimate one, as a result Christopher J was born to
them followed by two more children, both girls. Private respondents wife knew of the relationship
when Daisie took Christopher J to Ramons house. After this, the children of Daisie were freely
brought by Ramon to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In summer
1991, Ramon asked Daisie to allow Christopher J, then 6 years old to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip Ramon refused to give back the child.
Daisie filed a petitioner for Habeas Corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The RTC rendered judgment
in favor of Daisie, granting rightful custody to the natural mother. The CA reversed on appeal
holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper; the question of custody of a minor child may be
decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each
other but are separated. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper?
RULING:
It is indeed true, as the CA observed that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case of SALVANA VS. GAELA (55 PHIL 680), it was held that the
writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the
parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the childs
mother. As such pursuant to Article 176 of the family Code, Christopher J is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus. The fact
that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213 of the
Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
That petitioner receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not
a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
ARTICLES 178-182
(487) BBB vs AAA

G.R. No. 193225 (February 9, 2015)
FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both
crimes charged, hence, this appeal.
Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and glass
wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to sleep.
Petitioners wife and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt
that somebody was on top of her mashing her breast and touching her private part. Norberto
ordered her not to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to
pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw
Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This prompted Norberto to leave the tent.
Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts
imputed out in the open as there were many people preparing for the simbang gabi. He further
assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the complaints were filed only for the
purpose of extorting money from him.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?
RULING:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of
a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman, in other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted
stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts
of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the
accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended
felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or susceptible of
double interpretation, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to
cause rape as the particular injury.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony
of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioners embracing and touching the victims vagina and
breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference
about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to
commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it,
if any, unless he committed overt acts leading to rape.
(488) De Santos vs Angeles

(December 12, 1995)
FACTS:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de factoseparation from Sofia.
This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a
month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage
in TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate
leaving properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00. On May 15, 1981, private
respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with
the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent
was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus,
in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private respondent's
children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted
during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967. The court,
declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Hence, she filed
the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can
be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
RULING:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents, who,
at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each
other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
(489) Abadilla vs Tabiliran

249 SCRA 448
FACTS:
Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left
and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could
not be known. In 1970, tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan, with whom he had three
children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and Baybayan got married in
1986. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single. Petitioner is a clerk of
court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Tabilirans marriage to Baybayan was valid;
(2) Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage.
RULING:
(1) The Supreme Court held Tabiliran culpable for gross immorality, having scandalously and
openly cohabited with Baybayan during the existence of his marriage to Bazuela. Evidently,
respondent and Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondents marriage to his (first)
wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court and Article 390 of
the Civil Code which provide that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. From the time Banzuela left the conjugal
home in 1966 until the time that respondent started to cohabit with Baybayan in 1970, only four
years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Banzuela was already
dead for all purposes.
As to respondents act of eventually marrying Baybayan in 1986, the Supreme Court (SC) declared
to be not in the position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for proper
determination. The SC considered the finding of the Investigating Judge that said marriage is
authorized under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code.
(2) As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to
Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at
the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and
Banzuela. The applicable provision in this case is Article 269 of the Civil Code, which states that:
Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other,
are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.
The reasons for this limitation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it
would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3) there will be the
problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and (5) it will be
very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
C. ADOPTED CHILDREN
RA 8522 OR DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998
(489) Republic vs Hughes

(October 26, 1997)
FACTS:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.
On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City to adopt Ma.
Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents,
gave consent to the adoption. On 29 November 1990, the RTC rendered a decision granting the
petition. A petition for Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's
decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the
trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Anthony and Lenita Hughes are qualified to adopt the minor niece and
nephews of Lenita under Philippine law
RULING:
No, it is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt under Article 184 of the Family
Code because he does not fall under any of the following exceptions enumerated in paragraph (3):
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter. While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify
pursuant to paragraph (3)(a).
The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of the Code, expressing as follows: Art. 185.
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Executive Order No. 91,
dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino amended Article 29 of PD 603 and is
expressed as follows Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental
authority shall be exercised as if the child were their own by nature. If one of the spouses is an
alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall not be allowed. As
amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances (1) when one spouse
seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that
James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This
view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely
assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily
flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use
of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties. We are not
unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not so
much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also realize
that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social
and intellectual welfare of the adopted for which the law on adoption has in the first place been
designed.
(491) Republic vs Toledano

(June 8, 1994)
FACTS:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up
to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The
RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouse Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse may adopt Solomon.
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.)

No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates the persons who are
not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be
provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She
sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot
be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When
one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by
the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
(492) Republic vs Hernandez

(February 9, 1996)
FACTS:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption
objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what
the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with
that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is
the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial
change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of
adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper
name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
RULING:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of
the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first
name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case,
cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.
It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance
as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
(March 15, 1996)
FACTS:
Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed a petition for the adoption of Midael Mazon and correction of the
name which was mistakenly registered as Midael to Michael. The RTC set the hearing.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition in so far as it sought the correction of the name of the
child from Midael to Michael arguing that the petition is basically for adoption and not correction of
an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC dismissed the opposition on ground that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons. The SG appealed to the CA reiterating his contention that
the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. CA affirmed in
toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoption of Midael Mazon is valid
RULING:
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz vs Republic where the petition for adoption and the notice
published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child Rosanna E. Cruz instead of her
name in the record of birth Rosanna E. Bucoy and it was held that this was a substantial defect in
the petition and the published order of hearing.
The present case involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted.
The decision of the CA was modified by deleting from the decision of the RTC the order to the local
civil registrar to change the name Midael to Michael in the birth certificate of the child.
(494) Republic vs Dye

(March 20, 1997)
FACTS:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City 1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and
12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga.
His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children.
Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and
declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. 2 Respondent
Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses
being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel
Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind
adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. 3 The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character,
sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Dye are allowed to adopt
RULING:
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses
Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens
cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code.Samuel
Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the
minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted
exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wifes legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was
already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the
coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an
exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien husband with a
former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the latters nephews and niece in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals. 5 Although the wife in said case was qualified to adopt under Article 184,
paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, she
could not jointly adopt with her husband under Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to
adopt here in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain
rather than defeat said purpose. 6 The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding
and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education
for less fortunate children. 7 Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for
adoption.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the
minors Maricel R. Due and Alvin R Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
(495) In Re: Michelle and Michael Lim

(May 21, 2009)
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen,
Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25
years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her
husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
RULING:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case
spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word shall
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring
and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.
(496) Laudingin vs Republic

493 SCRA415
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in
her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage
and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the
paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother.
RULING:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child,
if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
(497) Cang vs CA
FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs,
which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United
States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of
visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest
the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption,
holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to
be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held
that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
RULING:
Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of
the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of
the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of
adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he
maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and
send them packages catered to their whims.
NATURE AND EFFECTS
(498) In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

454 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.
He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and
that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
RULING:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V
of RA 8557. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
(499) DSWD vs Belen

275 SCRA 645
FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American
citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the
other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to
dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are
contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local
office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaa. However, when the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her
adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files
regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from
respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on
the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.
ISSUE:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare
officer of the court?
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: No petition
for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and
Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of
the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has
submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The
Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study,
that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by
this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect
to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and
the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases: (1) To
NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of
adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed; (2) To strictly
COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . . The Staff Assistant V.
(Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social
Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study.
.The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant
to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the
DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the
corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare
officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have
merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such
coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of
the law. By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in
jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption,
after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain,
the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaa, arrogated unto herself a matter
that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the
preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. ACCORDINGLY, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely
by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of
Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No.
603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II of
the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED
for violating Circular No. 12.
(500) Teotico vs Del Val

13 SCRA 106
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged
natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
RULING:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it
did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the
estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not
under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by
law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.
RECESSION OF ADOPTION; GROUNDS, WHO MAY FILE
(501) LAHOM vs SIBULO

(July 14, 2003)
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial
court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted
son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern
prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a
new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on
March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not
be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity
of R.A. No. 8552
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
XI. SUPPORT
ARTICLES 194-208
(502) Lacson vs Lacson

499 SCRA 677
FACTS:
Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that
these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
Whether or not the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.
RULING:
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while
Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important
right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work
injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and
oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
(503) BRIONES vs MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343 (October 18, 2004)
FACTS:
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his ownchild in
the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If
both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by
the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the
(504) QUIMIGUING vs ICAO

34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were neighbors in Dapitan City.
They had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. Carmen got pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by defendant. As a consequence,
Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to
a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
(505) Francisco vs CA
(January 29, 1996)
FACTS:
Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum period in
each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then elevated the case to the RTC in
which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for appreciating mitigating circumstances.
Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs decision making it final. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for probation
which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the Probation
Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the judgement is final.
Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the MTC was
not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up. Consequently, Francisco
lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. The law considers
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his assertion of his
innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners apply for probation when
their appeal was dismissed.
Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
ARTICLE 203, WHEN DEMANDABLE
(506) LIM vs LIM

(October 30, 2009)
FACTS:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned
the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the
trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued
petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support
of P6,000 pendente lite.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.
RULING:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found
in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued or support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
(507) Verceles vs Posada

G.R. No. 159785 (April 27, 2007)
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of
Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office starting
on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat
del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a
seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from My Brothers Place
where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at
Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her
companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone
knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident
to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and
maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds
for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the
lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as
he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would divorce her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.
she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter
and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA
review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her
father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,[7] she gave birth to a
baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said they learned of their daughters
pregnancy through her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and
shamed by her daughters pregnancy.
Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987.[8]
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification,
specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with
support pendente lite;
(2) Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven; and
(3) Whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
RULING:
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find
petitioners stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a
string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give
meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance
thereof.[19] In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the
petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.[20]
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states Damages
coupled with Support Pendente Lite, Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.[21]
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of
love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. [22]
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
matters.[23]
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219[24]of the Civil
Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this
case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or
jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2)[25] and
(11)[26] of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 27,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 areAFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
(508) Mangonon vs CA
494 SCRA 1
FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and
Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente
lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and
respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was
only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of
the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her
second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
ISSUE:
Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.
RULING:
As to the amount of support pendente lite, the court takes its bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to
the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for
half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount
given his various business endeavors. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have
already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, the court
deems it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they
entered college until they had finished their respective studies. The issue of the applicability of
Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is
best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina
are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts
already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.
(509) DE GUZMAN vs PEREZ

496 SCRA 474
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the
University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioners child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In
1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P 7,000.00 to help defray the
cost of the childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner
never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robbys needs, private respondent
accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because
of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However,
she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and
Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became uncertain.
On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family corporations. He apparently did well
as he led a luxurious lifestyle. He owned at least five luxury cars, lived in a palatial home in the
exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City, built a bigger and more extravagant
house in the same private community, and sent his children (by his wife) to expensive schools in
Metro Manila. He also regularly traveled abroad with his family. Despite his fabulous wealth,
however, petitioner failed to provide support to Robby.
In a letter dated February 21, 2000, private respondent demanded support for Robby who was
entering high school that coming school-year(June 2000). She explained that, given her financial
problems, it was extremely difficult for her to send him to a good school.
Petitioner ignored private respondents demand. The latter was thus forced to rely on the charity of
her relatives so that she could enroll her son in De La Salle high school in Lipa City.
On June 15, 2000, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of
child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lipa City. It was
docketed as I.S. No. 2000-2111.
In his counter-affidavit, petitioner averred that he never abandoned nor intended to abandon Robby
whom he readily acknowledged as his son. He claimed that he discharged his responsibilities as a
father and said that he paid P 7,000.00 for his sons hospitalization and medical
needs. He also shouldered the expenses of Robbys birth and sent money to help out when Robby
was sick or was in need of money. Claiming financial incapacity, he insisted that the acts attributed
to him did not constitute abandonment or neglect.
Petitioner pointed out that private respondent was the financially capable parent while he had no
fixed job and merely depended on the charity of his father. He asserted that the five luxury cars
belonged not to him but to Balintawak Cloverleaf Market Corporation. He denied ownership of the
big house in Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City. He lived there with his family only by
tolerance of his father. He also disclaimed ownership of the newly constructed house and again
pointed to his father as the owner. Even the schooling of his two children (by his wife) was
shouldered by his father.
On August 1, 2000, private respondent submitted her reply-affidavit. To prove petitioners financial
capacity to support Robbys education, she attached a notarized copy of the General Information
Sheet (GIS) of the RNCD Development Corporation. It showed that petitioner
owned P750,000.00 worth of paid-up corporate shares.
On August 15, 2000, the City Prosecutor of Lipa City issued his resolution dismissing the complaint
for abandonment but finding probable cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child punishable
under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610. Before petitioner could be
arraigned, however, he filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutors resolution with the
Secretary of Justice.
On January 3, 2002, public respondent dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the City
Prosecutors resolution. He found that petitioners ostentatious and luxurious lifestyle constituted
circumstantial evidence of his ample financial resources and high station in life. Petitioner did not
deny allegations that he failed to send a single centavo for the education of his son. All the
elements of the offense were therefore sufficiently established. Petitioners claim that everything he
had belonged to his father was a defense which should properly be raised only during trial.
The petitioner also argued that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603
attaches only if both parents are guilty of neglecting the childs education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of
Presidential Decree 603.
RULING:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect
of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the
familys station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate
himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance
with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the court dismissed the petition.

(510) JOSE LAM VS ADRIANA CHUA

G.R. NO. 131286 (MARCH 18, 2004)
FACTS:
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of
said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then
apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the
marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities,
such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the
conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was
approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. They had long been separated in bed and
board. They have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of
Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she
failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after
service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an
Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an
investigation for determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and to
submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating
that "there seems to be no collusion between the parties".
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified
that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her
married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and
instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending
for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul. After her testimony, counsel for Adriana formally
offered the documentary evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support
needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open on the ground that she was able to
secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. On July 6,
1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of
additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25,
1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982
between Jose and one Evan Lock, showing that Jose had been married twice before he married
Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage between
petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature. The
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Office of the Civil Registrar General are hereby
ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on January 13,
1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. Likewise, respondent
Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the
amount of P20,000.00. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the
decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there
was already a provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision dated February 28,
1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a
common fund for the benefit of the child. On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order
denying Jose Lams motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into
by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab
initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the
latter court. Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals, assigning only
a single error of the trial court.
On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the Pasay RTCs
decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the Court of
Appeals denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent to contribute to a
common fund for the benefit of their child was valid?
RULING:
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of
support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, we held that another action for
support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for
support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case that:
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.
The only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with the
Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child.
Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the case
for decision as of May 12, 1994. But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial
court set the case for reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to
present evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the
marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6,
1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in
open court.
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide
questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond
them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief
beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely
irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack. Insofar as the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned,
the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued
beyond its jurisdiction.
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded,
such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of
the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of John Paul
Chua Lam is concerned. The Decision and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
(Branch 109) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void, likewise only insofar as the
matter on support is concerned.
(511) Reyes vs Ines-Luciano

G.R. No. 48219 (February 28, 1978)
FACTS:
Private petitioner filed a complaint against her husband for legal separation on the ground that the
defendant had attempted to kill her. She also asked for support pendent lite for her and her three
children. The defendant opposed it on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her
physician.
The respondent judge granted plaintiffs prayer for alimony pendent lite. Petitioner filed motion for
reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case
and alleging that even if she is entitled to support, the amount awarded was too excessive. It was
reduced by the respondent judge.
The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an adulterous wife is entitled to support from her husband
RULING:
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support; however, the alleged
adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence. No evidence was presented.
The amount of pendent lite was reduced in as much as the children are in the custody of the
petitioner and are being supported by him. It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due
deliberation before fixing the amount of support.
The petition for certiorari was denied and the CA decision was affirmed with modification as to the
amount of the support.
(512) SANTERO vs CFI OF CAVITE

FACTS:
Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero (Petitioners) are children of the
late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodri o, !nsel"ina and Mi uel Santero
(Respondents) are 4 of the 7 children by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children
are the natural children of the late Pablo since neither of their mothers was married to their father.
Pablo was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The issue in this case springs from the Motion for allowance filed by Respondents through their
guardian, Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground cited was for support which included
educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted. Again, Respondents
filed a Motion for Allowance in 1982, citing the same grounds. Petitioners opposed and contended
that the wards for whom allowance is sou ht are no longer schooling and have attained
majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that
the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance becausewhatever
funds are in the hands of the administrator; they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit
of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator derives
the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo.
In the Reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she admitted that some of her children are of age
and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as
soon as they are given the requested allowances.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Respondents filed another Motion for
Allowance to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of Pablo with Anselma
praying that an order be granted directing the administrator to deliver P6,000.00 to each of the
seven children as their allowance. CFI granted again but Petitioners asked the CFI to reconsider.
An Amended Order was issued directing Anselma to submit her clarification or explanation as to
the additional three children included. Anselma stated that in her previous motions, only the last
four minor children were included and her first three who were then of age should have been
included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Article 188 of the NCC.
Petitioners argue that respondents are not entitled to any llowance since they have
already attained majority, two are gainfully employed
ISSUE:
Whether or not CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance to Respondents
despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of
Miguel?
RULING:
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts. 290 and 188 of the NCC. The fact
that respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the ROC limits
the allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the NCC gives
the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, respondents are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the
provisions of the NCC, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to
receive support dring the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired
by Rule 83 which is a procedural rule.
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted without hearing. It contains a Notice of
Hearing addressed to the lawyers for Petitioners. It was duly received because lawyer filed an
Opposition.
HOW GIVEN
ARTICLE 203 AND 204
(513) Lacson vs Lacson

499 SCRA 677
FACTS:
Alfonso and Carmen were married on February 14, 1953. They had four children. On January 9,
1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and resided in Manila. On March 12, 1963 she
filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself. However, through the assistance of their
respective lawyers, the spouses reached an amicable settlement as to custody of the kids, support,
and separation of property.
On April27, 1963, they filed a joint petition with the CFI of Negros Occidental, submitting that they
had mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. The terms included a)
separation of property, b) all earnings of each spouse shall belong to that spouse exclusively, c)
the custody of the two elder children shall be awarded to Alfonso and the two younger children to
Carmen, d) Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly allowance of P200.00 for the support of the
children, and e) each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation and every summer the
former spouses shall swap [my word] kids. For that particular year, however, Carmen was allowed
custody of all four children until June of 1963, when she was supposed to return the two older
children to Alfonsos custody. Finding the foregoing joint petition as conformable to the law, the CFI
issued an order approving their compromise agreement on the very same day.
On May 7, however, Carmen filed a motion with the JDRC alleging that the compromise agreement
was the only way she could get custody of all the children and praying that she be relieved of the
agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of the children and that she now be awarded full
custody [bitch]. Naturally, Alfonso opposed the motion and the JDRC ruled in his favour. Carmen
went to the Court of Appeals and the CA certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Carmen went to the CFI and filed a motion for reconsideration, basically claiming the same thing.
The CFI favored Alfonso and ordered Carmen to return the two older children by June, on pain of
contempt. It is from this decision that the instant case springs. Carmen instituted
certiorari proceedings with the CA against the CFI, saying the CFI committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the
compromise agreement. The CA declared void the portion of the agreement pertaining to the
custody of children.
ISSUE:
Was the assailed compromise agreementand the judgment of the CFI grounded on said
agreement conformable to law?
RULING:
Yes but only as far as the separation of property of spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, in accordance with Article 191 of the Civil Code. The spouses did not appear to have
any creditors who would have been prejudiced by their arrangement. At the time of the decision the
spouses had been separated five years and so the propriety of severing their financial and
proprietary interests was manifest. (However, the Court maintained that approving the separation
of property and dissolution of conjugal partnership did not amount to recognition or legalization
of de facto separation.)As to the custody of the children, they were all below 7 years of age at the
time of the agreement and so the CA was correct in awarding the custody to the mother.
X. PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

ARTICLE 209, 210, 211
(514) Caram vs Segui

G.R. No. 193652 (August 5, 2014)
FACTS:
Ma. Christina and Marcelino had an amorous relationship which made Ma. Christina pregnant.
She, however, did not disclose her pregnancy to Marcelino, as she intends to put up her child for
adoption by the Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation. When she gave birth to Baby Julian, it was the adoption agency who
shouldered her hospital expenses. Ma. Christina then voluntarily surrendered her child to the
DSWD by way of a Deed of a Voluntary Commitment. The DWSD, on November 27, 2009, issued
a certificate declaring Baby Julian as Legally Available for Adoption. A local matching conference
was held where Baby Julian was matched to spouses Vergel and Filomena.
Meantime, on November 26, 2009, Marcelino died of a heart attack. During the wake, Ma. Christina
narrated that she had a baby with Marcelino and that she gave up the baby for adoption due to
financial distress and embarrassment. Taken aback by the revelation, Marcelinos family vowed to
help Ma. Christina to recover and raise her baby. Thus, on May 5, 2010, Ma. Christina wrote the
DWSD asking that the adoption proceedings be suspended and that she intends to take her baby
back and make her family whole again. Also, Marcelinos brother, Noel sent a letter to the DSWD,
informing them that a DNA testing is scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the UP. The DSWD replied to
Noel that they are no longer in a position to stop the adoption process as the procedures taken to
make the baby legally available for adoption were followed to the letter. Thus, if Ma. Christina
wants to take custody of Baby Julian, she should institute appropriate legal proceedings herself.
Thus, Ma. Christina filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging that DSWD and the
other respondents blackmailed her into surrendering custody of Baby Julian to the DSWD utilising
an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to
misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
After several hearings, the Regional Trial Court denied the writ of amparo, hence Ma. Christina
elevated the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of amparo is a proper remedy to recover parental custody of a minor child.
RULING:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her enforced separation
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an enforced disappearance within the context
of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWDs May 28,
2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses
when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on
certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the
hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced disappearance
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing
the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting
her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It
is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. Petition denied.
(515) In Re Thornton
(August 16, 2004)
FACTS:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the
Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying
her husband.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls
from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a
writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petition
RULING:
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for
habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing
the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General
That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult
than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
Petition is hereby Granted.

(516) Madrinan vs Madrinan

GR No. 159374 (July 12, 2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode
bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their two minor sons
on the ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers
care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children
and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA
8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take
cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the
minors. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has
cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said
cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: Section
20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. The petition may likewise be filed with the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
(517) DE GUZMAN vs PEREZ

G.R. No. 156013 (July 25, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the
University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioners child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the second in 1993.
In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the
cost of the childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner
never provided any other financial support for his son. In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to
provide for Robbys needs, private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where
she worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to
support Robby and send him to school. However, she reached the point where she had just about
spent all her savings to provide for her and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus
became uncertain.
ISSUE:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in life
and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect
RULING:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect
of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the
familys station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate
himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance
with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against
him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Childs Development. (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including
those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including
those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect
of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents")
penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is
excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
(518) Tonog vs CA
G.R. No. 122906 (February 7, 2002)
FACTS:
Dinah Tonog had an illegitimate child with the respondent, Edgar Daguimol. Both cohabited
together and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City.
After Dinah, left for the United States to work, Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin
Faith. The trial court appointed respondent as the guardian of the child. Upon learning the decision
made by the court, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement, and remanded the custody of
her child to her.
The RTC, set aside its original decision and granted petitioners motion for custody of her child.
The Court of appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC and ruled that custody shall remain with
the petitioner. Thus, the issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mother has parental authority over their illegitimate child.
RULING:
While the court recognizes that insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their
mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their
children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement each other in giving nurture
and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological,
mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
The mother is favoured by law in custody of a child, however, there as excepting circumstances as
explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have
any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
The Court emphasizes that in custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the
welfare and well-being of the child, thus, giving the temporary custody to the father pending the
final pronouncement. The Court said that the minor should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she
had apparently formed an attachment.
(519) VANCIL vs BELMES

(June 19, 2001)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children by his common-
law wife, Respondent Helen G. Belmes.
Petitioner files guardianship proceedings w/ RTC of Cebu over the persons and properties of
minors.She was appointed legal and judicial guardian.Respondent submitted an opposition to the
subject guardianship proceedings asserting that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship and files for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, herself.
Asserting that she is the natural mother and should have the actual custody and of exercising
parental authority over the subject minors. RTC rejected and denied the motion.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the ruling.It statedthat the Civil Code considers parents, the father,
or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grandmother has right to guardianship to the minors over the mother
RULING:
The natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.
Article 211of the Family Code provides:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Being the natural mother of the minor she has the corresponding natural and legal right to his
custody.Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian. Petitioners claim to be the
guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant o
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and
has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, the petitioner has to prove, in asserting
her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Moreover the petitioners status as
a U.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the country deem her unlikely to be able to
execute the duties of a guardian. Moreover, courts should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts, for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
(520) BONDAGJYvs BONDAGJY

(December 7, 2001)
FACTS:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on
February 3, 1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or
four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989 and
Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the
time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian
woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondents family in Makati City. In 1990, the
parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two
years.Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrinas mother in 145
Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an
order from the court.Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La
Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed
from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina
Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd
hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.Such
clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs.
Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40.00 after
the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be
happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in
going home from school.
ISSUE:
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back
to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of
her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.
RULING:
The Sharia District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to
this case because the spouses were not yet divorced.
However, the Sharia District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus a
married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the community in which
she lives considers morally upright, and in a manner that her growing minor children will not be
socially and morally affected and prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has failed to observe
that which is expected of a married woman and a mother by the society in which she lives. The
evidence of this case shows the extent of the moral depravity of the respondent, and the kind of
concern for the welfare of her minor children which on the basis thereof this Court finds respondent
unfit with the custody of her minor children.
Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally disentitled to the
custody of her minor children by reason of wickedness when such wickedness is injurious to the
mind of the child, such as when she engages in zina (illicit sexual relation); or when she is
unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be trusted with the custody of the child who is
continually going out and leaving the child hungry.
On the other hand, the Sharia Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
When he was asked during the direct examination the question that, if ever this Honorable Court
will grant you custody of your children will you be able to house and give support to your children?
He answered, Of course, even up to now I am giving support to my children; And my comment is
that the father should give everything the needs of the family and now whatever the children needs
even in school, considering the past, I have to love them, I have to care for my children. In school,
even when they see something they love and like, I buy it for them. Or sometime (sic) I send my
staff and bring something for them in their house. It is very hard, in school in front of other parents
my son would still climb on my shoulder. I want to see them happy. I have pictures of my children
with me, taken only last week.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon the parties. The Court is
not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by
the parties. However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review or
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if we find that these do not conform to the evidence
on record.
In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of
the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and (10) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
(521) Sayala vs Islao

266 SCRA 317
FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie
and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica wase
ntrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to
bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelic
a.Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after
the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to
US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when
she was 10days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a
decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to
Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
RULING:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted
the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary
custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita
does not have the right to the custody of the child.
EFFECT OF DISAGREEMENT, ABSENCE/DEATH

ARTICLES 212 AND 213
(522) Dacasin vs Dacasin

February 5, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,
born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court,
19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its
ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent
sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement ) for the
joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of
the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the
Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding
sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following
the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening
Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child is valid.
RULING:
The agreement is contrary to law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by
the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if
the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority
when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is
void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated
or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical
reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child
and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract
away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually
drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the
exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to
judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit
this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements
beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven
years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple
expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her." This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other
(father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the
parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents. However,
these are objections which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The
forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules
seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents
may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article
213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under
seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner
and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie,
respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act
effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
(523) Gamboa-Hirsch vs CA
July 11, 2007
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which
granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter
Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati
City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal
home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklins permission for her to bring their daughter
to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in
court, CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that
Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor
child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.
RULING:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the
minor child to both parents.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.7 Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has
been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.1avvphi1
Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes
Gamboa-Hirsch.
(524) Gualberto vs Gualberto

June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left
him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code,
w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reason for such measure.
(525) SANTOS vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113054 (March 16, 1995)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
weremarried in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter
, hehad been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein,Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers,
visited the Bedia household, where three
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit andfalse
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometownin
Bacong, Negros
Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor WardLeo
uel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. After an ex
parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same dayawarding custody
of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed
this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,respondent appellate court
affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the
appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the
ground that under Art. 214of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is
proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to
him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of aminor
to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merelytemporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case ofthe parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by thesurviving
grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner'sparental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is
still preferredover the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at thepresent time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattentionis inexcusable, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decisionagainst him and his efforts to keep his only
child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts torectify his past misdeeds. To award him
custody would help enhance the bond between parent andson. The Court also held that his being a
soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over theboy. So many men in uniform, who are
assigned to different parts of the country in the service ofthe nation, are still the natural guardians
of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-
laws, thoughunjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
(526) Galangco vs CA
December 22, 1997
FACTS:
William Golangco Construction Corporation (WGCC) and the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCIB) entered into a contract for the construction of the extension of PCIB Tower II on
October 20, 1989. The project included, among others, the application of a granitite wash-out finish
on the exterior walls of the building.
PCIB, with the concurrence of its consultant TCGI Engineers (TCGI), accepted the turnover of the
completed work by WGCC in a letter dated June 1, 1992. To answer for any defect arising within a
period of one year, WGCC submitted a guarantee bond dated July 1, 1992 issued by Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. in compliance with the construction contract.
The controversy arose when portions of the granitite wash-out finish of the exterior of the building
began peeling off and falling from the walls in 1993. WGCC made minor repairs after PCIB
requested it to rectify the construction defects.
In 1994, PCIB entered into another contract with Brains and Brawn Construction and Development
Corporation to re-do the entire granitite wash-out finish after WGCC manifested that it was "not in a
position to do the new finishing work," though it was willing to share part of the cost. PCIB incurred
expenses amounting to P11,665,000 for the repair work.
PCIB filed a request for arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
for the reimbursement of its expenses for the repairs made by another contractor. It complained of
WGCCs alleged non-compliance with their contractual terms on materials and workmanship.
WGCC interposed a counterclaim for P5,777,157.84 for material cost adjustment.
The CIAC declared WGCC liable for the construction defects in the project. WGCC filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed it for lack of merit. However, its motion
for reconsideration was similarly denied.
There is a question of certiorari in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner WGCC is liable for defects in the granite wash-out finish that occurred
after the lapse of one-year defects liability period provided in Art. XI of the construction contract?
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of WGCC. The controversy pivots on a provision in the construction
contract referred to as the defects liability period:
Guarantee
In Article XI on Guarantee - the CONTRACTOR hereby guarantees the work stipulated in this
Contract, and shall make good any defect in materials and workmanship which [becomes] evident
within one (1) year after the final acceptance of the work. The CONTRACTOR shall leave the work
in perfect order upon completion and present the final certificate to the ENGINEER promptly.
If in the opinion of the OWNER and ENGINEER, the CONTRACTOR has failed to act promptly in
rectifying any defect in the work which appears within the period mentioned above, the OWNER
and the ENGINEER may, at their own discretion, using the Guarantee Bond amount for
corrections, have the work done by another contractor at the expense of the CONTRACTOR or his
bondsmen.
However, nothing in this section shall in any way affect or relieve the CONTRACTORS
responsibility to the OWNER.
Although both parties based their arguments on the same stipulations, they reached conflicting
conclusions. A careful reading of the stipulations, however, leads us to the conclusion that
WGCCs arguments are more tenable.
Autonomy of Contracts
The autonomous nature of contracts is enunciated in Article 1306 of the Civil Code.
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be
complied with in good faith.
The adoption of a one-year guarantee, as done by WGCC and PCIB, is established usage in the
Philippines for private and government construction contracts. However, the contract did not
specify a different period for defects in the granitite wash-out finish; hence, any defect therein
should have been brought to WGCCs attention within the one-year defects liability period in the
contract.
The inclusion in a written contract for a piece of work, such as the one in question, of a provision
defining a warranty period against defects, is not uncommon. This kind of a stipulation is of
particular importance to the contractor, for as a general rule, after the lapse of the period agreed
upon therein, he may no longer be held accountable for whatever defects, deficiencies or
imperfections that may be discovered in the work executed by him.
Unfulfilled Obligations
PCIB calls our attention to Article 62.2 which provides: Notwithstanding the issue of the Defects
Liability Certificate[,] the Contractor and the Owner shall remain liable for the fulfillment of any
obligation[,] incurred under the provisions of the Contract prior to the issue of the Defects Liability
Certificate[,] which remains unperformed at the time such Defects Liability Certificate is issued[.
And] for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of any such obligation, the Contract shall
be deemed to remain in force between the parties of the Contract. (emphasis ours).
The lower courts conjectured that the peeling off of the granitite wash-out finish was probably due
to "defective materials and workmanship." This they characterized as hidden or latent defects.
WGCC does not agree with the conclusion that the alleged defects were hidden.
First, PCIBs team of experts (who were specifically employed to detect such defects early on)
supervised WGCCs workmanship. Second, WGCC regularly submitted progress reports and
photographs. Third, WGCC worked under fair and transparent circumstances. PCIB had access to
the site and it exercised reasonable supervision over WGCCs work. Fourth, PCIB issued several
"punch lists" for WGCCs compliance before the issuance of PCIBs final certificate of acceptance.
Fifth, PCIB supplied the materials for the granitite wash-out finish. And finally, PCIBs team of
experts gave their concurrence to the turnover of the project.
The purpose of the defects liability period was precisely to give PCIB additional, albeit limited,
opportunity to oblige WGCC to make good any defect, hidden or otherwise, discovered within one
year.
Contrary to the CAs conclusion, the first sentence of the third paragraph of Article XI on guarantee
previously quoted did not operate as a blanket exception to the one-year guarantee period under
the first paragraph. Neither did it modify, extend, nullify or supersede the categorical terms of the
defects liability period.
Under the circumstances, there were no hidden defects for which WGCC could be held liable.
Neither was there any other defect for which PCIB made any express reservation of its rights
against WGCC. Indeed, the contract should not be interpreted to favor the one who caused the
confusion, if any. The contract was prepared by TCGI for PCIB.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 41152 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
(527) SILVA vs COURT OF APPEALS

275 SCRA 604
FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos
and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to
Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped
working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva,
in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children.
In an order issued by the trial court on April 7, 1989, the petitioner is granted visitorial rights to his
children during Saturdays and Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother or respondent herein. Silva somehow was satisfied with the
arrangement, but Gonzales interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime,
Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds immigrated to Holland with Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the
predicament and/or status of both petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We find it more
wholesome morally and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of custody of
said children. Allowing these children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their
father and the latter's live-in partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of
children of tender age. There is no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how temporary and/or
remote, would affect the moral and emotional conditions of the minor children. Knowing that they
are illegitimate is hard enough, but having to live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman
not their mother may have a more damaging effect upon them. This made the petitioner to bring
his petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is absolutely banned from exercising his visitational rights over his
children of tender age?
RULING:
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children,
however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has
observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot
be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent
to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for
no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in
instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined
the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages."[6]
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for
the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits,
his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written
consent of the mother." Furthermore, Article 49 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that during the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. The court shall give paramount consideration to the
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent whom they wish to remain
as provided for in Title IX.it shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the decision of the trial court is reinstated.
(528) David vs CA
250 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children,
all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed
into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to
them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June
9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in
1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J.,
then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. After
hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the petitioner and against the respondent: (1) the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T.
David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David; (2) respondent is
hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher
J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision;
and (3) to pay the costs of this suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding: We agree with the respondent-appellant's view
that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court that holding
that the custody of the child would be on his father?
RULING:
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a
habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are
separated. This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental
authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to
determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous
relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental
authority of the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support
should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable
in the case at bar because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of
the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their
support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas,

petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially
supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of
Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the
issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals
observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other.
It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him
to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family
Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason
for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able
to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning
from P2, 000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments
her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly
income of P4, 500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally
attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during
the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is
not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family
are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if
the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able
to support her children according to her means. The Regional Trial Court ordered private
respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P3, 000.00 a month, pending
the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to
his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped
giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed
a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed
his son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and
amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he
be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the
minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either
by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle
thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of
age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will
have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any
way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is
ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein
petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the
amount of support in an appropriate action.
(529) Espiritu and Layug vs CA and Macasuding

G.R. No. 115640 (March 15, 1995)
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named
Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got
married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the
Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in
1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody
of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother
RULING:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the
paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated
from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for
a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was
rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact
he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is
not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy
and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at
least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
(530) Perez vs CA
G.R. No. 112329 (January 28, 2000)
FACTS:
Primitivo B. Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation for P20,000.00.
Sometime in October 1987, an agent of the insurance corporation, visited Perez in Quezon and
convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50,000.00. Virginia A. Perez,
Primitivos wife, paid P2, 075.00 to the agent. The receipt issued indicated the amount received
was a "deposit." Unfortunately, the agent lost the application form accomplished by Perez and he
asked the latter to fill up another application form. The agent sent the application for additional
insurance of Perez to the Quezon office. Such was supposed to forward to the Manila office.
Perez drowned. His application papers for the additional insurance of P50,000.00 were still with the
Quezon. It was only after some time that the papers were brought to Manila. Without knowing that
Perez died, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application and issued the
corresponding policy for the P50, 000.00.
Petitioner Virginia Perez went to Manila to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the
deceased. She was paid P40,000.00 under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 but the
insurance company refused to pay the claim under the additional policy coverage of P50,000.00,
the proceeds of which amount to P150,000.00.
The insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50,000.00 had not been perfected at
the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company refunded the
amount paid.
BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation filed a complaint against Virginia Perez seeking the rescission
and declaration of nullity of the insurance contract in question.
Petitioner Virginia A. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his
prestations under the contract and all the elements of a valid contract are present.
On October 25, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering respondent
to pay 150,000 pesos. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court
saying that the insurance contract for P50,000.00 could not have been perfected since at the time
that the policy was issued, Primitivo was already dead.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent court, the instant petition
for certiorari was filed on the ground that there was a consummated contract of insurance between
the deceased and BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the widow can receive the proceeds of the 2nd insurance policy
RULING:
No. Petition dismissed.
Perezs application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance
Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased and respondent
corporation was further conditioned with the following requisites stated in the application form:
"there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on this application and
that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and the policy delivered to
and accepted by me/us in person while I/We, am/are in good health."
BF Lifeman didnt give its assent when it merely received the application form and all the requisite
supporting papers of theapplicant. This happens only when it gives a policy.
It is not disputed, however, that when Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers
for additional insurance coverage were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in
Quezon. Consequently, there was absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have
been communicated to the applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as theapplicant at the time
was already dead.
Petitioner insists that the condition imposed by BF that a policy must have been delivered to and
accepted by the proposed insured in good health is potestative, being dependent upon the will of
the corporation and is therefore void. The court didnt agree. A potestative condition depends upon
the exclusive will of one of the parties and is considered void. The CivilCode states: When the
fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall
be void.
The following conditions were imposed by the respondent company for the perfection of the
contract of insurance: a policy must have been issued, the premiums paid, and the policy must
have been delivered to and accepted by the applicantwhile he is in good health.
The third condition isnt potestative, because the health of the applicant at the time of the delivery
of the policy is beyond the control or will of the insurance company. Rather, the condition is a
suspensive one whereby the acquisition of rights depends upon the happening of an event which
constitutes the condition. In this case, the suspensive condition was the policy must have been
delivered and accepted by the applicant while he is in good health. There was non-fulfillment of the
condition, because the applicant was already dead at the time the policy was issued.
As stated above, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, must be assented to by both parties
either in person or by their agents. So long as an application for insurance has not been either
accepted or rejected, it is merely an offer or proposal to make a contract. The contract, to be
binding from the date of application, must have been a completed contract.
The insurance company wasnt negligent because delay in acting on the application does not
constitute acceptance even after payment. The corporation may not be penalized for the delay in
the processing of the application papers due to the fact that process in a week wasnt the usual
timeframe in fixing the application. Delay could not be deemed unreasonable so as to constitute
gross negligence.
(531) Sagala- Eslao vs CA and Dandan

(December 22, 1998)
FACTS:
When Maria Paz's husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted custody of her youngest child
Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law. She then returned to her mother's house with Leslie. Years
later, Maria Paz got married to a Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After this she
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then
informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband's willingness to
adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when she
was 10 days old. Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of
Angelica to her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the
full decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child
RULING:
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is
not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was
merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority. The law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ARTICLES 211, 215, 214, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222
(532) LIBI vs IAC

G.R. No. 70890 (September 18 1992)
FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on himself.
As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.
RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall
ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent
damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. It
was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant
of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box.
Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are
subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in
their company.
(533) Tamargo vs CA
209 SCRA 180
FACTS:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
Trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court's Decision
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural parents of Adelberto Bundoc will be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages he has caused?
RULING:
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to
assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial
custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents.
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES
ARTICLES 223-224
(534) Hebron vs Loyola

(July 5, 2010)
FACTS:
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of land
denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with an area of
17,688 square meters, was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario Loyola. Lot
No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by Januario Loyola, the husband of
Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin,
Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the heirs of
Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during
Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on September 15, 1969, administration
of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after some
time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of
the said properties was formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only one still
living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The rest were survived and represented by
their respective descendants and children; Conrado Loyola, by his children, Ruben Loyola, now
substituted by his heirs and respondents.
Petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the trial court, the complaint
for partition and damages from which the instant suit stemmed. While manifesting her conformity to
the partition demanded by her co-heirs, petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida
and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial
support extended them by her mother, Encarnacion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a spouse present cannot relinquish the shares in the parcels of land if it will deprive
minor children of their hereditary rights?
RULING:
No.The petition is denied and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. The minor children of
Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario.
These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited properties. Victorina
had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the
petitioners mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case.
"The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration
and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the
court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children."
In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval
of the sale of properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void. Although
the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its conclusion that Victorina had
no capacity to relinquish her children's shares in the inherited properties was, nevertheless,
correct.
WHEREFORE the petition for review is DENIED. The February 22, 2005 Decision and the July 7,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105 are AFFIRMED.
TERMINATIONS/SUSPENSION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ARTICLES 229 AND 232
(535) LANDINGIN vs REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948 (June 27, 2006 )
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in
her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage
and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the
paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD
submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother
was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed
to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother
RULING:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child,
if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent
and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for
a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
(536) Sombong vs CA
(January 31, 1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the
Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged
as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty,
who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained
and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,
without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be
their guardian.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioners complaint, filed an
information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in quezon city.
When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found.
Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasnt entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombongs favor and ordered the respondents to deliver
the child.
The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpusproceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child
subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the
effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the
question of the childs welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child
custody.
The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is habeas corpus the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
RULING:
Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is
an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first
part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we
have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of
her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather,
the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over
a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.
1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the
same person asCristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of
identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of
person.
The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met her lost
daughter.
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct
and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical and
analytical.
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioners child, Arabella, from that of private respondents foster child, Cristina.
According to one witness, there were several babies left in the clinic and it wasnt certain if Arabella
was given to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the
minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are
unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. Moreover, the way the
respondents obtained custody isnt material to the habeas corpus issue.
3. Private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of
the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the
best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of petitioner due top her lack of a
stable job and her separation from a married man.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ARTICLES 218-219
(537) SCHOOLOF THE HOLY SPIRIT vs TAGUIAM
FACTS:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After obtaining
permission from the principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming pool for their year-
end activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the
students. The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that
the mother allowed her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did
not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of
them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately,
while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance
man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive
when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival. The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and
submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on
the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. On July 25, 2001,
respondent in turn filed a complaint against the school for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for
reinstatement with full backwages and other money claims, damages and attorneys fees but was
dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
which ruled in her favor. The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that
respondents negligence was both gross and habitual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust
and confidence was valid
RULING:
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an
employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure
to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the
children were protected from all harm while in her company. Dismally, respondent created an
unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the
school itself.
All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross negligence resulting to
loss of trust and confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal.
(538) AQUINAS SCHOOL vs SPOUSES INTON

(January 26, 2011)
FACTS:
Jose Luis was a grade three student at the Aquinas School, while Sister Margarita was a religion
teacher who started teaching at the school only that year. On July 14, 1998m while Sister
Margarita was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went to a classmate
to play a prank on the latter. Despite Sister Margaritas instruction for him to go back to his seat,
Jose Luis kept on going back again.
Unable to tolerate anymore the childs behavior, Sister Margarita approached Jose Luis and kicked
him on the leg several times; pulled and shoved his head on his classmates seat, and told him to
stay in on the floor and finish copying the notes on the board while seated on the floor. Because of
this, Jose Luiss parents, Jose and Ma. Victoria, filed a case for damages against Aquinas School
and Sister Margarita.
They also filed a separate criminal case for violation of Republic Act 7610 against Sister Margarita,
to which she pleaded guilty. The RTC held Sister Margarita liable for damages but absolved the
school. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the RTC judgment but found the
school liable for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between it and Sister Margarita. Both parties appealed the CA decision. On
one hand, the school contended that it cannot be held liable, insisting that it was the congregation
who selected Sister Margarita to catechise its grade three students, pursuant to the schools
agreement with the congregation for the latter to send sisters so it can fulfil its ministry of
catechising students. On the other hand, the spouses sought to increase the amount of damages
awarded by the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.
RULING:
The Supreme Court: The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of
these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer,
whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means
and methods by which he accomplishes the same. In this case, the school directress testified that
Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry,
the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that
chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops
designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it
was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The
Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error
for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas
took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion
teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to
teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate
religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to
assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that
set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before
she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was
really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas
did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve
her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas
was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court finds no
justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for
the increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any
affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted them in its decision.
(539) ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE vs MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 (June 29, 2010)
FACTS:
While inside the premises of St. Josephs College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment,
Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the
experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one
of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates.
As a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he
had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in]the lower
court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon
learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jaysons] mother, who was working
abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had toforego her
salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of
atleastP40,000.00. Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded f
eelings as a result of his injury due to the petitioners fault and failure to exercise the degree of care
and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
RULING:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jasons injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of
due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate
it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of
what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had
full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps
to avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and
distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears
and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
(540) St. Mary's Academy vs Carpitanos

(February 6, 2002)
FACTS:
St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive, they campaign to different schools
for prospective students. On that fortunate day, one named Sherwin Carpitanos--student of St.
Mary and part of the campaign group went to a particular school with his classmates riding in a
mitsubishi jeepney owned by one named Vivencio Villanueva and driven by his classmate who was
a minor. Allegedly the latter droved the jeepney in a reckless manner and as a result the jeepney
turned turtle. As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to the injuries he sustained from the
accident.
The lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218 and 219 of the family code and the
guardians of the minor driver and the owner of the jeepney as subsudiarily liable. On appeal to CA
the owner of the jeepney was freed from liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
RULING:
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be
held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
(541) AMADORA vs CA
160 SCRA 315
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while in the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester ended. He was there to submit a
graduation requirement in Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victims parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the CC against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD, ED and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended.
ISSUE:
How should Art. 2180 be applied in this case
RULING:
The petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part
of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
(542) Salvosa vs IAC

(October 5, 1988)
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and
trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication,
Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive
Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his
salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a
commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon
was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the
BCF .
ISSUE:
Whether or not BCF is subsidiarily liable.
RULING:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The rationale of such liability is that so long
as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the student. Likewise, the phrase used in [Art. 2180 so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school, or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting
from his acts.
(543) PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION vs COURT

OF APPEALS
(February 4, 1992)
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of

Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic
community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his
parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the
victim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of acti
onagainst them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed,
and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
RULING:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in inloco
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case
for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form
liability. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with.
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession.
This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore
held liable for his death. Petition denied.
XII. NAMES AND SURNAMES
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN

ARTICLES 364-380
(544) Remo vs The Hon. Sec. of Affairs

(March 5, 2010)
FACTS:
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza.

Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed Rallonza as her
surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and Remo as her middle name. While her marriage
was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname
in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she made a similar request to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while
it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name, use of maiden name is allowed
in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or
the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in
cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.
Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretarys ruling. The CA
also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued
that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article
370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as
settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.
RULING:
No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.
Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge
Sharia District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her
husbands surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use
her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husbands surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her
new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do
so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d)
of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Yasin case not in point
Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee
whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remos marriage remains subsisting.
Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but
a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage.
Special law prevails over general law
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special
law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the
Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction
is that a special law prevails over a general law.
Implied repeals are disfavored
Remos theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized
as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the
two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.
State is mandated to protect integrity of passport
Remo consciously chose to use her husbands surname in her previous passport application. If her
present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to
the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in
a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be
countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders
will arise.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicants
constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the
integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a
Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a
possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.
(545) YASIN vs SHARIAs DISTRCIT COURT

(February 23, 1995)
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin, herein referred to as the petitioner filed in the Sharias District
Court in Zamboanga City a Petition to resume the use of maiden name. citing the following
circumstances as reasons of her petition:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact,
HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of
which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in
accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo,
Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the
Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was
officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman;
On July 4, 1990, the respondent Court issued an order to the petitioner to effect amendments of
the petition within one week from the receipt of such to reflect the formal requirements as it stated:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with
Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name
sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the
names by which the petitioner has been known
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not
covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground
that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule
103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would
result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
PersonalLaws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again toanother woman and th
former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change
of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court..
RULING:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the
husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p.
725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. The court finds the petition to
resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and
unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already
married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim
laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and
averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action,
nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's
desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former
husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the court granted the petition of the petitioner to resume
her maiden name and signature.
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
(546) IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

454 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.
He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and
that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
RULING:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V
of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
(547) In Re: Change of Name of Julian Wang

(March 30, 2005)
FACTS:
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried
in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he
reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in denying the petition
RULING:
show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
SIMILAR/IDENTITY OF NAMES AND SURNAMES
(548) People vs Estrada

(April 2, 2009)
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of Alias, was likewise filed
against him. In the Information, it was alleged that on or about February 4, 2000, in the City of
Manila, the President Estrada without having been duly authorized, judicially, or administratively,
taking advantage of his position and committing the offensein relation to office, i.e., in order to
CONCEAL the ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identityas the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally,
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS and use an and
employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Estrada was subsequenty arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan
issued. A special division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try, hear, and decide the charges of
plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias
and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to present evidence that proved
Estradas commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing the Criminal case
and in applying RA No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under
Commonwealth Act No. 142.
RULING:
No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of the libel- that mere communication to a
third person is publicity- does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. In order to be held liable for a
violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must
be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Valerde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and
Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representatives to be admissible. All of Estradas
representations to these people were made in privacy and secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secretary of Bank Deposits Law) are statutory protected
or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents
as Jose Valerde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there
was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition was
denied.
(549) Cesario Ursua vs CA

(April 10, 1996)
FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get
a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that
because the law firms messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case.
Perez then told him than he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he does not have to reveal his
true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez. When he was
handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a staff of the
Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that
a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for
violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.
RULIING:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No. 142,
as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity something which could not have been intended
by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a name
or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law, what
makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business
transactions without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the
name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with
the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was
not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting
a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the complaint is a public record
open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua
used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua
used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable
under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil
was produced by Ursuas act, said law need not be applied.
XIII. ABSENCE
ARTICLES 381-386
(550) NENITA BIENVENIDO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111717 (October 24, 1994)
FACTS:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962,
without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May
22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living
since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or
the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until
Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout
Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son,
Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. How they did is the subject
of conflicting versions. Luisita claims that Nenita called her (Luisita's) residence several times,
looking for Aurelio because the latter had allegedly left their dwelling place. Petitioner, according to
Luisita, introduced herself as Mrs. Nenita Camacho.
On the other hand petitioner claims it was the other way around that it was respondent Luisita
who had called up their residence many times, also looking for Aurelio to urge him to file an
application for American citizenship.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the
PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States
with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to
look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the
death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of
Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to
the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout
Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting
but efforts to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in question
using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the
sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita's consent; and that she
was a purchaser in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aureio and Luisita is valid.
RULING:
There is no dispute on the fact of appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. What is in
question is the validity of that marriage considering Aurelio's purported previous marriage to
Consejo Velasco. The appellee had attacked the validity of appellant's marriage in the trial below,
on account of the previous marriage of Aurelio to Consejo Velasco, presenting evidence to that
effect (Exhs. 43 and 44) to bolster her claim. Appellee likewise proved that Consejo Velasco
although then a resident of Australia, is still alive.
The burden of proof on the legality of appellant's marriage with Aurelio must rest on the appellee as
the party who stands to benefit from a declaration of its invalidity. But appellee failed to prove that
such second marriage (appellant's) was not valid because it was contracted at a time and on the
assumption that the first spouse had been absent for seven years without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive.
This Court finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita
has not been successfully assailed by appellee. The Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of
Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage
Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not
have news that his first wife was still alive.
Petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married Luisita, Aurelio's previous
marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting and, therefore, his second marriage was
bigamous. It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second
marriage to respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least
seven years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because
petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head.
Thus, Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As this Court has already explained, the general rule is that stated in the first sentence of this
provision: "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance." The exceptions are those stated in paragraphs 1 and 2. The burden is on the
party invoking any of the exceptions.
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent marriage will not be considered void: (1)
when the absent spouse has not been heard from for seven consecutive years and the present
spouse has no news that he/she is alive; (2) when, although he/she has been absent for less than
seven years, the absent spouse is generally considered to be dead and believed to be by the
spouse present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to be dead after four years from the occurrence
of any of the events enumerated in art. 391 of the Civil Code.
(551) Orpiano vs Tomas

(January 14, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano (Estrella) is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano (Alejandro). Part of
their conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. RT-23468 (the lot). In 1979 Estrella was declared an absent spouse, and Alejandro
was granted the authority to sell the lot. On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment
basis to the Tomas Spouses (respondents), the very same day a title was issued in the name of
the Tomas Spouses. They had until December to complete paying for the land. On Oct 28, 1996
Alejandro filed a case at the QC RTC, seeking collection of the amount unpaid by the Tomas
spouses, with damages. While the case was still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs,
including Estrella were substituted in his stead in the case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint
to one for annulment of sale and cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She moved
to be dropped as a party plantiff but was also denied. On June 11, 2005 Estrella filed a case for
annulment of sale and cancellation of title against the Tomas Spouses, claiming the declaration of
absence and Alejandros authority to sell the lot are null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed
for the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping. RTC ruled in favour of the Tomas
spouses and dismissed the annulment (of sale) case. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether there was forum shopping
RULING:
YES. Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial
processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case should
be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned
to preclude. If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case,
proceeds to finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered; an
unfair situation, as envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after having paid the
balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and return of the
property could be decreed by the annulment court. Court says thatthe absence of the consent
of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. However while Estrella is raring to file
the annulment case, she has to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by
necessity substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandros heir; but the collection court
nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward such end. There exists a just cause for her to be
dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so that she may institute and maintain the
annulment case without violating the rule against forum shopping. Estrella had the right to maintain
the annulment case as a measure of protecting her conjugal share (but the issue of whether the
sale should be annulled is a different matter altogether). Despite all these reasons, Estrella is still
not allowed to take prodecural short cuts. NOTES: In case maam asks, a summary of the
parties contentions: Estrella argues that were merely substituted in the case as his heirs by
operation of law; thus, she should not be bound by the collection case. She further adds that there
is obviously no identity of parties, cause of action, or reliefs prayed for between the collection and
annulment cases; the two involve absolutely opposite reliefs. She stresses the fact that she is
seeking annulment of the sale with respect only to her conjugal share, and not those of her co-
heirs. Tomas spouses emphasize that the rule prohibiting forum shopping precisely seeks to avoid
the situation where the two courts the collection court and the annulment court might render
two separate and contradictory decisions. If the annulment case is allowed to proceed, then it could
result in a judgment declaring the sale null and void, just as a decision in the collection case could
be issued ordering them to pay the balance of the price, which is tantamount to a declaration that
the sale is valid.
(552) Rep. vs Narceda

(April 10, 2013)
FACTS:
Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina Narceda on July 22, 1987, sometime in1994,
Marina went to Singapore, never returned since. There was never any communication between
them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, oneof their
town mates came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter
was already living with a Singaporean husband. In view of her absence and his desire toremarry,
respondent filed a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence in the
RTC.The RTC granted respondents Petition, after which, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner,
respondentfailed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and
enough to give rises to a well-founded belief that she was dead. CA dismissed the appeal on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Contending that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of
presumptivedeath is a summary proceeding under the Family Code. Article 247 of the Family Code
providesthat the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final
andexecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision for the declaration of presumptive death of Marina has become final
and executor.
RULING:
The CA points out, however, that because the resolution of a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are those
enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code. Articles 238, 247, and 253 thereof read:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall
apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other,
and incidents involving parental authority. x x x x
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. x x x x
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code, because the judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Article 247, are immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law,
is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, the right to appeal is
not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.
The Court agrees with the CA. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision of the Court
Appeals and its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the
appeal of the Republic ofthe Philippines are AFFIRMED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May 2005 declaring the presumptive
death of Marina B. Narceda 1s hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
XIV. CIVIL REGISTER
PROBATIVE VALUE OF CIVIL REGISTER

ARTICLES 407-413, 376
(553) REPUBLIC vs UY
FACTS:
Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of entry of live birth. Impleaded as respondent is the
Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8,1952 and is the
illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her certificate of live birth shows that her full
name is Anita Sy when in fact she is alleged known to her family and friends as Norma S.
Lugsanay . she further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name Norma S. Lugsanay. She also
alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had
to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not
Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
The RTC issued and order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the
case of hearing, with the directive that said order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for
three consecutive weeks at the expense of the respondent, and that the order and petition be
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General and the City Prosecutors Office for their information
and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other
indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of respondent to implead her parents and siblings as required under
Rule 108 can be cured by the fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of
general circulation
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen
and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsana. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the
correction of her first name and surname, her status from legitimate to illegitimate and her
citizenship drom Chinese to Filipino. Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest
and are affected by the changes and corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading
of Sections 4 and 5 , Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of
notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the person named in the petition and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore be served not for the purpose of vesting
the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected
parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excusd
where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when a party is
advertently left out. Such are not present in this case.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
entry I the civil register involves substantial and controversial alteration, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy or marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could
be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud
or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching.
(554) Iwasawa vs Gangan

September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as single and has never married before.
Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it.
To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration
of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous
RULING:
YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is
void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this
is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary
exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following
facts: ( 1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that
private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in
Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent
with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that
it was only on said date that private respondent's marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have
been dissolved; and ( 4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous,
hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.
(555) REPUBLIC vs OLAYBAR

(February 10, 2014)
FACTS:
Respondent Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five
years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in
the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. During
trial, respondent testified on her behalf. She completely denied having known the supposed
husband, also an employee of MTCC, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent and that the signature saw forged. The court granted the petition. However, petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The court hereby denies the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract may nullify the marriage
RULING:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record
of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
(556) ONDE VS OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

G.R. No. 197174 (September 10, 2014)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent.
Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also
stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler.
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the
ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial
since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioners status as a legitimate
child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error
in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a
Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother
can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048
RULING:
The RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be
corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
contested the RTCs ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be
done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change
of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change
of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is
to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mothers first name.
(557) REPUBLIC vs COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 (February 2, 2012)
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo(respondent) is

the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng
who, as respondents certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,2008 at
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification
from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary
up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child
where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran
and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN
M.L. COSETENG."On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his
petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule
103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its ISSUE:s of October 31-November 6, 2008, November
7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General(OSG).No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default
was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By
Decision of January8, 2009, the trial court granted respondents petition.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for
review to the Court on pure question of law.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should bemade
through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the
name of respondents father from his birth certificate.

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule
103(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as
a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds
however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alf
on, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had beenknow
n since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought
in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to
change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents
supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. An
d as theabove-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the
civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Rule 103 regarding
change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar
of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case. "A petition for a substantial correction
or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all
other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. "Rule 108
clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given
to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for
two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days
from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to
bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out.
(558) Silverio vs Republic
(October 22, 2007)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto
to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for
reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male
but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that
there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not change in name and sex in birth certificate is allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
RULING:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or
if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he
intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of
entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition
(559) Republic vs Cagandahan

FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian
structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted
possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her
Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to
Jeff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
RULING:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in
this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
(560) In Re: Change of Name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang

(March 30, 2005)
FACTS:
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Since the couple planned to live
in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa
decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his
registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated
against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name. After trial, the RTC
denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to
suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he
could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.
ISSUES:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
RULING:
show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
(561) Baldos vs CA
(July 9, 2010)
FACTS:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was
not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on 11 February
1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as
his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldos
birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sole issue is whether the late registration of Reynaldos birth is valid?
RULING:
Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act Requiring the Registration of Births and
Deaths in the Philippines which Occurred from 1 January 1974 and Thereafter, provides:
Sec. 1. Registration of births. All babies born in hospitals, maternity clinics, private homes, or
elsewhere within the period starting from January 1, 1974 up to the date when this decree
becomes effective, irrespective of the nationality, race, culture, religion or belief of their parents,
whether the mother is a permanent resident or transient in the Philippines, and whose births have
not yet been registered must be reported for registration in the office of the local civil registrar of
the place of birth by the physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or hospital or clinic administrator who
attended the birth or in default thereof, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or a
relative, or any person who has knowledge of the birth of the individual child.
The report referred to above shall be accompanied with an affidavit describing the circumstances
surrounding the delayed registration.
Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies referred to in the
preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree
without fine or fee of any kind. Babies born after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in
the office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the
attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in default of the
same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or any person who has knowledge of
the birth.
The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or the hospital or
clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register the new born
child. If there was no attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic,
then the parents or the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of
failure to register the new born child. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 766 amended P.D. No. 651 by extending the period of registration up to 31
December 1975. P.D. No. 651, as amended, provided for special registration within a specified
period to address the problem of under-registration of births as well as deaths. It allowed, without
fine or fee of any kind, the late registration of births and deaths occurring within the period starting
from 1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became effective.
Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the
coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldos birth falls under Act No.
3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a
general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No.
651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late registration
of Reynaldos birth took place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Reynaldos certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have gone
through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8 March 1995,
after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application for
delayed registration of Reynaldos birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should have
done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves
herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for
delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts stated
in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are more
inclined to stand by the former.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 8 August 2005 Decision and the 22
November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 65693 affirming the 16
August 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 79-
0-95.
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

(562) Lee vs CA
(October 11, 2001)
FACTS:
After his mother's death, petitioner filed a complaint against his father, private respondent, to
partition the conjugal properties of his parents.
In answer, respondent alleged that four parcels of land registered in petitioner's name are conjugal
properties. They were only registered in petitioner's name because at the time, he was the only
Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, respondent prayed for dismissal of the partition case and
to reconvey said parcel of lands to him.
In the meantime, respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land during
pendency of case. Petitioner moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens but trial court dismissed his
motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not it was proper to pass upon ownership in a partition case
(2) Whether or not a notice of lis pendens amounts to a collateral attack of his title obtained more
than 28 years ago
RULING:
The annotation of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it ever be considered as
equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Ownership
is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.
A notice of lis pendens may only be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the
purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
A notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property."
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that
until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Page |1

EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(1) Lara vs Del Rosario

Whether or not the plaintiffs suit were to favor against defendant.

II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

(2) Taada vs Tuvera

published have no force and effect.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

(3) Fuentes vs Conrado Roca

(4) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE

Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 need to be published?

(5) Acaac vs Azcuna, Jr.

PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection and

The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

(6) Garcillano vs House of Representatives

Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.

B. IGNORANTIA LEGIS NON EXCUSAT

(7) Kasilag vs Rodriguez

(8) Elegado vs Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

(9) Yao Kee vs Sy Gonzales

(10) Board of Commissioners vs Dela Rosa

(11) Menandro Laureano vs Court of Appeals and Singapore Airlines

Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.

B. LEX PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT

(12) Jose E. Aruego Jr. vs Court of Appeals

Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.

(13) Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan

(14) Francisco vs Court of Appeals

(15) Pesca vs Pesca

(16) Renato David vs Editha Agbay

(17) Abad vs PhilComsat

Respondent PHILCOMSAT, along with the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation

D. MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY LAWS

(18) Nerwin vs PNOC

In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to

Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary

(20) Aujero vs PhilCcomSat

G.R. No. 193484 (January 18, 2012)

Petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsats favor.

(21) Villareal vs People

No crime without a law punishing it.

(22) Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz

(23) DOA ADELA EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. TRADE AND

(24) BBB V. AAA

1. Is the petition a proper subject of a compromise agreement?

F. JUDICIAL APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

(25) Pesca vs Pesca

(26) De Castro vs Judicial and Bar Council

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

(27) Virtucio vs Alegarbes

(28) Republic vs Rehman Enterprises

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?

The Court does not agree.

WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.

THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM

(29) Ting vs Ting

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

LAW OF THE CASE