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Rayleigh Simulation

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Rayleigh Simulation

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Gill R. Tsouri and Dov Wulich

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering - Communications Laboratory

Beer-Sheva 84105, ISRAEL,

e-mail: tsouri@ee.bgu.ac.il or dov@ee.bgu.ac.il

ABSTRACT

TX1

proposed. The method is based on the dispersive nature of TX2

wireless channels. Specifically, on the fact the channels from RX

receivers point in space and change over time. Each node .

estimates the channel between itself and the receiver. It then .

transmits a compensated signal yielding a robust joint TXN

constellation at the receivers point in space. The receiver

decodes and separates all nodes at once from the joint

constellation. An eavesdropper, placed at least a few

wavelengths aside the receiver, experiences a different and EAVESDROPPER

unknown channel. It is shown that this impairs his decoding

ability for various reasons. The method requires no extra

decoding complexity at the receiver, and allows the sources Fig.1 The general multiple access scheme

to transmit independently of one another. It is applicable to

systems with linear modulation and flat fading channels. Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) a leading

method for many wireless air interface standards.

1. INTRODUCTION In the proposed method the receiver sends a pilot signal to

Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, the nodes. Each node estimates the CSI between itself and the

commercial and military wireless communication systems receiver. It then uses a set of predefined Base Band (BB)

rely heavily on information security techniques [1,2]. Among information symbols and some form of linear modulation to

other possibilities, security can be inherent to the transmit a channel compensated signal to the receiver,

transmission method. This form of security is commonly independently to all other nodes. All nodes transmit their

termed Transmission Security (TranSec). Various TranSec channel compensated signal simultaneously using the same

methods have been suggested in the past [1,2,3]. For carrier frequency and the same pulse shaping.

example, spread spectrum systems utilize frequency hoping The receiver is equipped with a single MF, matched to the

or direct sequence transmission with pseudo random shaping pulse. Due to the linearity of the wireless channel,

sequences derived via cryptographic algorithms and keys [3]. the MF output is the sum of the compensated BB symbols

For obvious reasons, military applications are deeply engaged sent from each node separately. This sum constitutes a joint

with the issue as well [7]. The general multiple access scheme symbol, which carries the information from all nodes. Based

is depicted in Fig.1. on this joint symbol, the receiver performs joint decoding of

It is common practice to have the transmitters adjust their the information from all nodes using Maximum Likelihood

power-emission and transmission time based on channel (ML) detection.

conditions and network scheduling [3]. For achieving such The BB symbol sets are found offline to have a joint

control the receiver or transmitters must have Channel State symbol constellation at the receiver with maximal minimum

Information (CSI) of the channels from all nodes to the Euclidean distance, while keeping the nodes power emission

receiver. CSI is commonly obtained through the use of pilot constraints. Such an optimization yields a one to one mapping

signals. between any instance of nodes symbols and the symbols of

We adopt these prerequisites and further assume that: (i) the joint constellation. It also results with a constellation

linear modulation is applied for data transmission, (ii) Time having the lowest Bit Error Rate (BER) for additive Gaussian

Division Duplex (TDD) is used, and (iii) the channel exhibits noise, when ML detection is used.

slow flat fading, as is the case, for example, in Orthogonal

h1

constellation as the intercepted encrypted message. A pilot

sent by the receiver is in fact invoking a new key to be used

x1 superposition

TX1

due to channel by the nodes. The keys are drawn from the probability

h2 linearity receiver distribution describing the varying wireless channel. A key

n

may be re-invoked after a time period of channel coherence

x2 y ML time.

r decision

TX2 device

2. PROPOSED SYSTEM AND MODEL

.

.

The multiple access system of Fig.1 is modeled using the

hN

. BB equivalent model as depicted in Fig.2. It acts in two

phases: during phase 1 RX synchronizes the TXs to have

xN

TXN their transmissions reach him simultaneously and then RX

sends a single pilot signal to all TXs to estimate their channel;

Fig.2 Baseband model of nodes to receiver transmission during phase 2 all nodes transmit their channel compensated

BB symbols to RX.

It follows, that the nodes may transmit their information

independently, and that the receiver can separate their 2.1 Channel compensation at TX

transmitted information from the single received joint It is assumed that node no. i , i = 1,2,..., N estimates the

symbol.

This joint detection approach should be distinguished from complex valued channel attenuation, hi , from RX to node i

superposition modulation with successive decoding [10], and vice versa (TDD). Let s i be the information payload

where the nodes are indeed transmitting together, but each symbol of node i . The compensated symbol of node i

node is decoded in turn based on its own transmitted equals to

constellation, and is removed from the joint symbol based on 2

interference cancellation. It is possible to formulate the x i = s i hi* hi . (1)

proposed TranSec layer for successive decoding as well, but

that is beyond the scope of this work.

The set of { }

xi iN=1 is simultaneously received yielding at RX:

It should also be distinguished from Multi User Detection r = y + n , where

(MUD) [4], where multiple matched filters are used to N N N

perform interference cancellation of multiple CDMA users.

The complexity of MUD rises exponentially with the number

y= hi xi = hi si hi* hi

2 =

si (2)

i =1 i =1 i =1

of users. and n is the additive complex Gaussian noise. The received

The joint constellation at the receiver is the result of a signal r is fed to a ML decision device, which evaluates all

compensated, coherent, sum of nodes' BB symbols and

occurs at a unique position in space only: the position of the {s i }iN=1 at once.

receiver. Since the eavesdropper would have to occupy a It is assumed that hi is large enough (the attenuation is

different position in space it will receive some other sub-

limited) to be within the nodes power constraint. This

optimal joint constellation. This joint constellation would

assumption is usually made in multiple access systems with

change in time for a dispersive time varying channel and its

power control at the nodes. For example, in cellular telephony

structure would be a-priory unknown to the eavesdropper

a user would roam to a different base station when it cannot

because it has no knowledge of the channel compensation

compensate for the channel attenuation. So, at any instance of

done at each node. This knowledge is unattainable to an

time the base station manages nodes which are able to

eavesdropper because only the nodes receive the receiver

compensate for channel attenuation and the assumption holds.

pilots at their position in space. It follows that the

For now it is assumed that hi is estimated without error.

eavesdropper would have to find the unknown joint

constellation using some sort of blind estimation and then

decode the information based on a deteriorated joint signal 2.2 Optimal constellation at RX

constellation. For time varying channels, the eavesdropper s i is a payload symbol with limited energy which belongs

has to perform this during the time period for which the to a predefined set S i . The signal constellation at the receiver

channel is approximately constant.

It is possible to describe the proposed security layer using is made up of all the permutations in {S i }iN=1 which generate

the model for secrecy systems as defined in [9]. The nodes' y.

channel compensation can be thought of as an encryption To obtain the optimal constellation at RX we proceed as

operation, where the nodes wireless channel estimate is the

encryption key. The wireless channel can be viewed as a

follows. {S i }iN=1 are sets of complex numbers where

deciphering operation and the eavesdropper joint { }

S i = s1(i ) , s 2(i ) ,..., s (iM) ; i = 1,2,..., N and M is the number of

2

bits per symbol per transmitter. y is a set of complex

numbers made of all possible summations of N numbers,

where each number belongs to a different set S i , i.e.,

{

y y1 , y 2 ,..., y 2 NM } with

N

yj = l (ji ) , j = 1,2,...,2 M (3)

i =1

{ } { }

(node). l (j1) ,l (j2 ) ,...,l (jN ) lk(1) ,lk(2 ) ,...,lk(N ) for all j k , i.e.,

there is a one to one mapping of transmitted symbols vector

to received joint symbol.

def

2

Given the definition: d min = min y j y k , we wish to

j k Fig.3 received joint symbol constellation at receiver

find { }

S i iN=1 which yield max(d min ) under the following

power emission constraint: 3. TRANSMISSION SECURITY PROPERTIES

2 M The eavesdropper BB model is the same as depicted in

s (ji )

2

1

= P , i = 1,2 ,..., N . (4) Fig.2, with hi and n replacing hi and n respectfully. The

2M j =1 eavesdropper MF output is r = y + n , where

N N

2.3 Illustrative example

We limit each symbol set to be a rotated and scaled version

y = x i hi = si hi hi + n (7)

i =1 i =1

of BPSK. The following symbols sets were found by an Where hi is the channel coefficient from node i to the

offline parametric search over rotation and scale of all symbol

eavesdropper position, n is its additive complex Gaussian

sets, and guarantee max(d min ) at RX:

noise, and y is its received joint constellation.

S1 = {0.7124 exp( j 2.5558); 0.7124 exp( j 0.5858)}

The eavesdropped cannot estimate hi and hi from the

S = {0.9965 exp( j1.3720); 0.9965 exp( j1.7696)} (5)

2

pilot sent by RX as its position is different than that of the

S3 = {0.9890 exp( j 0.2016); 0.9890 exp( j 2.9400)} nodes. It may estimate the ratio hi hi using blind

A polar presentation of the resulting joint symbol estimation, but for that it needs sufficient observation time

constellation, along with the bit mapping to each joint and then estimation time.

symbol, is depicted in Fig.3. The bits correspond to TX1/2/3

from left to right. It so happens that this joint constellation is 3.1 Security layer setup

in fact a type of 8QAM used in some industry standards [5].

Let Ts denote symbol duration and LTS the number of

The ML decoding complexity of this constellation is as that

of the common 8QAM [6]. secured symbols. The protocol for setting up the security

In Fig.4 BER of the joint 8QAM constellation is displayed layer is as follows:

vs. Eb/N0. To make sure the proposed security layer does not

hinder performance, a common 8QAM [6] performance curve 1. N nodes request a secure link to RX.

of a single transmitter is displayed as reference. Performance 2. The receiver defines the secured transmission time

of the joint 8QAM is as that of the common 8QAM. TSEC = Ts LTS

To check the effects of power control errors and 3. The receiver assigns an index to each node.

synchronization errors, erroneous CSI is introduced to the 4. Each node uses its index to retrieve a symbol set from its

model. The CSI error is modeled as: predefined look up table.

~ 5. The receiver transmits a pilot signal.

hi = hi + ei

. (6) 6. Each node estimates hi .

Where ei is a complex normal random variable with a

7. Each node transmits LTS symbols and waits for a new

standard deviation of 1/10 that of hi . This is equivalent to a pilot from the receiver.

pilot signal with SNR 10dB higher than data SNR. It is seen 8. After a period of Tstat - the time when hi const

that CSI estimation errors of that magnitude have some effect

(channel coherence time) has passed, steps 5-8 are

on receiver performance (up to 1dB degradation for the given

repeated.

example). * Note that after step 4 no pilots are transmitted by the nodes.

1

0.9

N=6

N=5 N=7

0.8

0.7

N=4

0.6

0.5

N=3

0.4

N=2

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

L

Fig.4 Performance curves for given scenario Fig.5 Probabilities of total security for various N and L

3.2 Probability of security the proposed TranSec layer offers security with probability 1

As explained before, the security layer is based on the (total security) for these 2N symbols. Following 2N symbols

reception of a deteriorated signal by the eavesdropper. The the eavesdropper has some probability of receiving all

deterioration of the signal is due to four factors: possible joint symbols and the probability for security

decreases as more joint symbols are received by the

1. The eavesdropper would have difficulty knowing the eavesdropper. It follows that in order to achieve total

expected joint symbol constellation at its MF output, since it security:

has no knowledge of the channel compensation done at each

2 N Ts Tstat . (8)

transmitter, and no prior knowledge of the CSI from the nodes

to itself. Tstat is proportional to 1 B d , where B d is the Doppler

2. The signals from the group nodes would not reach the spread. It is commonly assumed that Tstat = 0.1 B d .

eavesdropper simultaneously. The minimal number of nodes for total security is:

3. The decoding complexity of the eavesdropper would be

N TS = log 2 (Tstat TS ) . (9)

much higher than that of RX. This is due to the fact that for

each channel instance the eavesdroppers' joint constellation As an example, for TS = 4 sec and B d = 100 Hz we have:

would change, making it impossible to design a constant and NTS = 8 .

computational efficient decoding algorithm. The RX decoding For some values of Tstat and Ts , the required N TS for

algorithm would be constant because each channel instance is

total security might be to big for a system at hand, so we

compensated for. This means that online decoding by the

analyze the effect on security when N < N TS .

eavesdropper is much more complex than at RX.

4. The joint constellation formed at the eavesdropper MF The probability for total security after receiving the first L

output is not optimal, since it was made to be optimal at a symbols PTS (L ) is defined as the probability that an

different point in space that of RX. eavesdropper does not receive all typed of joint symbols from

these L symbols. For L < 2 N , PTS (L ) = 1 , for L 2 N the

Factors 2,3 might be compromised based on the assumptions

of eavesdropper proximity to receiver and infinite online probability PTS (L ) corresponds to the dice problem

computation power. However, dismissing factor 1 requires that formulated in [11 pg. 8]:

the eavesdropper finds some means to discover its received 2 N 1 N N

L

( 1) j +1 2 2 j

joint constellation structure. The best case scenario for an

eavesdropper is to deduce its received joint constellation based

PTS ( L ) = j 2 N

(10)

j =1

on samples taken from the noisy channel. This in itself is a

Fig.5 displays this probability for various N and L . Notice

problem for the eavesdropper, but for the sake of argument we

assume that blind estimation is possible without error. that PTS (L ) is a non-increasing function of L and that

However, any blind estimation by the eavesdropper would when PTS (L ) decreases it decreases slower for larger N .

have to rely on receiving at least one joint symbol of all joint This means that as N increases total security is compromised

symbol types. Since there are 2N joint symbols the less. If for example we tolerate PTS (L ) > 0.99 , we obtain

eavesdropper remains blind for at least the first 2N symbols

duration of each node following a receiver pilot. It follows that such a security level for L LTS secure symbols as is shown

in Tab.1, which was derived from Fig.5. Note that LTS

N 2 3 4 5 6 7 5. CONCLUSION

LTS 3 8 25 68 175 434 A method for generating a transmission security layer for

nodes in wireless multiple access systems was proposed. The

Tab.1 Number of secured symbols with prob. 0.99 method is based on a physical impossibility a set of

transmitted signals cannot be made to be coherent for two

becomes much larger than 2 N as N increases, meaning that

different points in space. It was shown that the method gives

the relaxing condition of PTS (L ) > 0.99 extends the number total security for a certain transmission time the time it

of secured samples significantly. Since each joint symbol is takes the eavesdropper to perform blind estimation. This

the result of N separate node symbols, L indicates also the secured transmission time increases with the number of

number of secured symbols per node. participating nodes, and increases dramatically when the

The behavior of PTS (L ) is similar to that of equivocation probability of security is set to 0.99 instead of 1. An

as defined in [9]. Indeed, as for the unicity distance defined in illustrative example was given for three nodes in Rayleigh

[9], it is also inevitable that the eavesdropper would have full fading. It was shown that the BER of the eavesdropper

knowledge of its joint constellation with probability close to 1 degrades catastrophically even after total security has been

after some L > LTS is reached. breached, despite many relaxing assumptions. It was also

shown that system performance is unhindered by the method,

In the next section we analyze the illustrative example of that its decoding complexity remains low, and that it suffers

subsection 2.3 with regard to factor 4 for the case when L tolerable performance degradation in the face of channel

has been reached, and the eavesdropper can perform its own estimation errors.

joint decoding of the nodes.

6. REFERENCES

3.3 Illustrative example continued

We assume the three nodes are communicating to a central [1] R. K. Nichols, P. C. Lekkas, Wireless Security, McGraw-

RX in a slow flat Rayleigh fading channel, and that factors Hill 2002.

1,2,3 are compromised completely. We also ignore any other

attempt to secure the data, such as changing nodes symbol [2] J. R. Vacca, Guide to Wireless Network Security, Springer

indexes according to some predefined rule, scrambling, coded 2003.

encryption etc. [3] T. S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications., Prentice

It is assumed that all channels to RX and eavesdropper are Hall, 1996.

independent and have equal variance. This assumption is

valid if the eavesdropper is located at least a few wave- [4] S. Verdu, Multiuser Detection, Cambridge University

lengths away from the receiver [8], which is a small distance Press, 1998.

at high frequencies. [5] Data Over Cable Systems 2.0,Part 1:Radio Frequency

Fig. 4 depicts the BER of the eavesdropper. Recall that Interface, ANSI/SCTE 79-1 2003, page 53.

only factor 4 of subsection 3.2 is considered. It is clear that

the eavesdropper ML decoding is unsatisfactory for correct [6] J. G. Proakis, Digital Communications., 4-th. ed.,

decoding of the data. For example, if RX operates at Eb/N0 McGraw Hill, 1995.

of 14dB it would have an average error rate of 10-3, and the [7] S. Shanken, D. Hughes, T. Carter, Secure Wireless Local

eavesdropper would have an error rate of 10-1. It follows that Area Network, MILCOM 2004.

for the given scenario the eavesdropper cannot effectively

intercept the messages from the nodes, even when factors 1-3 [8] W. C. Lee, Mobile Communication Engineering,

are compromised. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1982.

[9] C. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy

4. APPLICATIONS Systems, BSTJ 28(4), 656--715, 1949.

The proposed method may be used in TDMA, FDMA

and CDMA multiple access systems. The difference is in the [10] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications, Cambridge

way the receiver groups the nodes. In TDMA the receiver University Press, 2005.

should assign them the same time slot, in FDMA the same [11] M. Conroy, A Collection of Dice Problems, 2007,

carrier frequency, and in CDMA the same complex signature http://www.madandmoonly.com/doctormatt/mathematics/mat

waveform. hematics.htm

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