The elections in Myanmar raise a bundle of questions about the need for such ele

ctions, the compulsions of the Junta to announce them when they already yield al
l the power in Myanmar and the validity of such elections when NLD has boycotted
them. Where is the catch and what does the future hold for Myanmar under such a
dubious elections arrangement?
I do not wish this post to be a primer on the current situation in Myanmar but d
iscuss the larger implications in pre and post poll Myanmar and how it is likely
to shape events in Asia. To begin with,
Myanmar has been under military rule for half a century. The challenges of the f
orthcoming elections should not undermine the fact that Myanmar now is at least
headed in the right direction. The elections and the constitution the military w
ill introduce will define the future political scene and provide a direction tow
ards managing the long-overdue social, economic and political reforms in Myanmar
.
Jim Della-Giacoma of the International Crisis Group has observed that:-
The election will create political institutions that Myanmar has not had for dec
ades – a presidential system, two houses of parliament, 14 regional governments
and assemblies. All the same, a quarter of those sitting in parliament will be f
rom the military. And it is likely that many civilians in the house will be thei
r cronies. Still, “it will be the most wide-ranging transformation in a generati
on and offers an opportunity for a change in the future direction of the country
”.
The army chief will be the most powerful man in the country, able to appoint key
ministers and assume power “in times of emergency”. The military will hold 25 p
ercent of seats in the new parliament, and hold veto power over parliamentary de
cisions. It is clear that the top leaders, Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye, wil
l step aside after the elections, making way for a younger generation of militar
y officers. Although the old guard may continue to wield significant influence b
ehind the scenes, the reins of power will be in new hands, and the new political
structures make it unlikely that any single individual will be able to dominate
decision-making in the way that Than Shwe has in recent years.
All or Nothing?
Considering these factors, however flawed the Junta might be in the conduct of e
lections, the elections provide possibility of a dispensation likely to deliver
on some semblance of democracy after 50 year of military rule. The very fact tha
t the Junta, whether under internal pressure to perform or under international s
anction regime has buckled this far, should be the take off point for a possible
future in the country. The accusations that the military has already taken upon
itself, by manipulating the rules, to prop up their cronies in the elections sh
ould not undermine the fact that these cronies still have to win the elections.
The possibility of a NLD win here appeared bright as they did in the previous el
ections two decades ago. The transition from 50 years of military rule to a free
democracy is not possible without a transitory phase. Those fighting for the ut
opia have to comprehend that in “full democracy or nothing” argument, they are m
ore likely to get nothing.
Journalist Siddharth Varadarajan, writing in the Hindu newspaper, has drawn atte
ntion to the seeming blunder the NLD has committed in boycotting the poll:
‘‘A boycott will be effective only if the NLD can mobilize enough support on the
streets and if the military fears the adverse impact this would have on its int
ernational standing. Neither of these conditions hold. The SPDC [State Peace and
Development Council] has already hit rock bottom in the global popularity stake
s and the opposition’s chances of paralyzing Yangon, Mandalay and the new capita
l of Naypyitaw are low indeed. Given how well-entrenched the military is and giv
en Southeast Asia region’s preference for ‘order’, a ‘guided democracy’ is the b
est that can be hoped for under the present circumstances. But even this would b
e a huge improvement over the current stalemate and would open up political spac
es that Daw Suu Kyi and the NLD could slowly utilize.”
In this context it is important to note that during the past two decades, not a
single one of the NLD’s political goals have been met – political dialogue with
the military for national reconciliation, honoring the 1990 election result, the
release of all political prisoners, withdrawing the military from politics, etc
. If this cumulative failure is behind the party’s boycott decision, a firm adhe
rence to the political integrity of the NLD leadership, particularly Suu Kyi, ha
s led to the party’s demise, at least for now. (Himal South Asia)
What are the possible scenarios that can unfold after the elections?
Business as Usual
For one, the Junta manages to retain power through its cronies and it is busines
s as usual. There would be the two houses with 25 and 33 percent uniformed parti
cipation and the rest who might just change from uniforms to civil dresses. The
state heads will be nominated by the “elected” government and in all possibility
we may see a larger Junta participation here too. Largely it will “legalise” th
e existing form of governance. Civilians backed, or at least vetted, by the junt
a will probably be given some government positions, but analysts say the power-h
ungry and staunchly nationalist military will still control the major policy and
budgetary decisions.
An important question here is that in such dispensations will the sanctions rema
in? The West is only drawing Myanmar closer to China by these sanctions. The oil
pipe line and overcoming the Malacca dilemma apart from other military cooperat
ion are worrisome for the West. The West therefore may loosen the slack once a “
democratic” dispensation takes shape in Myanmar.
Hybrid Government
The Junta may genuinely restrict themselves to the stated percentages and allow
the democratic process to take its course within the ambit of the 2008 constitut
ional referendum. In this case also it will retain the power to run the governme
nt albeit with greater freedom of action to democratic forces. It would thus rep
resent a hybrid government on the lines of Pakistan where the military will stil
l call the shots.
Future elections, constitutional amendments and shifts in the power structure or
patronage systems could lead to the emergence of splinter groups or factions wi
thin the military; some may favor offering roles to experienced, educated civili
ans deemed capable of handling key areas, in particular, the economy.
That the constitution retains the power to bring military back in power may temp
t the new generation of military leaders to take greater risks in experimenting
with democracy.
The Inferno
There is remote possibility of the ethnic groups going up in arms on the eve of
the elections which might scuttle the entire process and result in the military
seizing power once again. Remote but possible. This is likely to end the debate
and we shall see a Myanmar still continuing the same way.
Long Term Perspective
In the long term, Myanmar could undergo a gradual transition of power to a civil
ian government, free of military control. This would be an evolutionary process
rather than a military-inspired shift.
The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is poss
ible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its ci
tizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules
of enforcement and censorship that are an aspect of life in contemporary Myanmar
. Over the medium term, it may be possible to see a more balanced approach to fo
reign policy as the internal tensions between the military and civilian Burmese
are assuaged, and perhaps even the constitution amended. This might allow more c
ivilian influence on foreign policy. This is a slight and somewhat distant ray o
f hope for positive.
Conclusion
In summary, to quote David I Steinberg, the international globalized economic sy
stem will play little role in influencing Myanmar’s internal politics. Although
the state’s natural resources are attractive to multinational corporations, Myan
mar’s decentralized economy would allow the state to continue even if these reso
urces were to erode. Myanmar’s orientation is not a product of its participation
in the international economy, but rather is a product of its history – its colo
nial past and the perceived dangers and insults of that period, the past predato
ry roles of its neighbors, ethnic strife, and the glorification of the Burmese m
ilitary tradition to which the present tatmadaw (the military) lays claim. The r
egime is able to force compliance while titularly espousing a particularistic br
and of “democracy” (akin to Suharto’s Indonesia) in which multiple political par
ties affect only the periphery of power and policy, but under strong, iron bands
formed by the Myanmar military.
This analysis is not an end but the beginning of an investigation into the enigm
a called Myanmar. There is a lot of ground yet to be covered especially the role
of ethnic groups, the provincial structures and the outside influences. For the
time being the world and Myanmar need to evolve more options for workable democ
ratic set up in Myanmar….without Nuclear Weapons.