CHARLES H.

KAHN

RETROSPECT ON THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE

CONCEPT OF BEING

When I began work on the Greek verb to be in 1963, in the project that
took shape in the article 'The Greek Verb "to be" and the Concept of
Being,l and eventually resulted in a book on the Greek verb 'to be' in
1973, 2 my aim was to provide a kind of grammatical prolegomena to
the study of Greek ontology. I wanted to give a description of the
linguistic facts concerning the ordinary use and meaning of the verb,
apart from its special use by the philosophers, in order to clarify the pre-
theoretical point of departure for the doctrines of Being developed by
Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. I thought at the time (and still think)
that the ancient use of the verb estileinail on was poorly understood, and
that much of the modern discussion is vitiated by false assumptions, in
particular by an uncritical application of the notions of existence and
copula to the interpretation of ancient texts. I take the present occasion
to summarize the results of my work both for the theory of the verb and
for the interpretation of some of the early philosophical texts, referring
to earlier publications for more detailed exposition and defense of the
views outlined here.

I. THE DISTORTING INFLUENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

As I see it, confusion reigns both in the traditional account of the verb
given by linguists and philologists, and also in much of the philosophical
exegesis of ancient theories of being. The two lines of confusion have in-
fected one another, since the linguists have borrowed their notions of ex-
istence and the copula from philosophy (and from rather superficial
philosophy at that), while philosophers have in turn made use of
linguistic doctrine as a basis for their own account of Greek ontology,
and in some cases as the weapon for a general attack on the Greek notion
of Being. I begin by stating what I take to be the principal errors in the
standard view, by which I mean the views prevailing twenty years ago and
still to be found in many handbooks and commentaries.
(1) It was generally assumed that the uses of einai could be classified
either as (a) meaning 'exists', or (b) serving only as copula. 3 But this

S. Knuullila and 1. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic oj Being, 1-28.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
2 CHARLES H. KAHN

dichotomy is theoretically unsound and descriptively inadequate. It is

theoretically unsound because (a) is a semantic and (b) is a syntactic no-
tion. A rational theory would contrast 'exists' with other meanings of the
verb, and the copula syntax with other constructions. The dichotomy
could be justified only if there were a one-to-one correlation between
sense and syntax, so that copula uses were all meaningless and the verb
in absolute (non-copulative) construction always meant 'exists'. But
both assumptions are false.
(2) The traditional account of einai and its Indo-European root*es- in
comparative grammar (which goes back to Brugmann and Meillet, and
is reflected in some accounts of the copula in English) takes the existence-
copula distinction for granted and proceeds as follows. The verb be
(einai, *es-) was originally a verb like other verbs, with concrete meaning.
The original meaning was to exist, or perhaps something even more con-
crete like to be present or to be alive. Predicate nouns and adjectives were
originally expressed without any verb, in the so-called "nominal
sentence" familiar from Russian and many other languages: John is wise
was simply John/wise; John is a man was John/(a) man, and so forth.
But in the course of time it became useful to introduce a verb into the
nominal sentence in order to express the tense, person, mood, and other
modalities carried by the finite verb in Indo-European. Hence the verb
be (meaning exist) was introduced into the nominal sentence, where it
gradually lost its original meaning and degenerated into an "empty"
verb or "mere copula," a syntactic device which serves to satisfy the re-
quirement that every sentence must contain a verb.
This historical-sounding theory is enshrined in the textbooks,4 but
there is really no evidence to support it. What looks like evidence is a
misleading parallel to other verbs that take a predicate construction (like
turn pale, grow tall) and that clearly had an independent meaning, but
which in the course of time came to be used as substitutes or suppletives
for be, and even provide forms that are now integrated into the conjuga-
tion. (Thus am, are, and is in English are derived from *es-, but be comes
from I.-E. *bheu- 'to grow', 'become'; was comes from *wes- 'to dwell,
stay in a place'; eta is, he in French, stato in Italian, estar in Spanish all
come from Latin sto/stare 'to stand'.) However, these parallels prove
nothing to the point, since in every case the known historical develop-
ment presupposes the existence of a basic copula verb in Indo-European. 5
And there is no doubt that the original copula was *es-, our verb 'to be'.
The notion of a prehistorical state of Indo-European without a copula
verb is a pure figment of the imagination. !n Greek at any rate
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BFINC; 3

the copula uses of einai are overwhelmingly more frequent than any
other use in the earliest texts. The idea that the existential uses are
somehow more fundamental or more primitive seems to be a mere pre-
judice, a prejudice based in part upon a mistaken view of existence as an
ordinary predicate, taken together with an empiricist theory of meaning
which assumes that the original sense of any word must have been
something concrete and vivid, something like what Hume calls an
"impression" .
Hence I propose a modest Copernican revolution: to reinstate the
copula at the center of the system of uses of einai. I do not claim that
the copula uses are older, since for that claim also there is no evidence.
In purely synchronic terms I propose that the copula uses must be regard-
ed as more fundamental in three respects: (1) they are statistically
predominant, (2) they are syntactically elementary, whereas other uses
(existential, veridical, potential) are grammatically "second-order",
operating as functors on a more elementary sentence, and (3) they are
conceptually prior and central to the whole system of uses of the verb,
in a sense that remains to be clarified, but which bears some analogy to
the unifying role of a central term in Aristotle's scheme of "focal mean-
ing" or pros hen legomena. Thus if we take the copula uses as given, we
can see why the same verb may serve in other ways, for existence, truth,
possession and the rest. But if we take any of the other uses as primary,
the way back to the copula becomes difficult, if not impossible [Q
understand. 6
(3) It was correctly noted by a number of linguists that the existence
of a verb to be in our sense, which is at once a verb of predication, loca-
tion and existence (to name only three of its functions), is a peculiarity
of Indo-European. 7 As we can see from the monograph series on "the
verb 'be' and its synonyms" edited by .I, W. M, Verhaar, the topic of
be can itself be defined only by reference to Indo-European verbs from
the root *es-. But why should a historical peculiarity of this kind be of
any general significance, and how can a concept based upon the
parochial usage of an Indo-Eurorcan verb provide a genuine topic for
philosophical theory? Thus A. C. ~:(2harn has claimed, a rropos of the
very different situation in Chinese. thJ.t
there is no concert of Being which languages ar~ wei! Of iii cquiprcd to l'-C",'flL: tnr rune
tipn." or 'to ht" as ('opld3 depend lIPon a grarnmatical rule t'O!' thl...' i:-" ,~-:atinn ,)\" the
sentence. and it would b::.- merely a :elDcid'.:r~'(' ~r one found an\'thi:,,(~ Icscnl~)l;-:,' 11 in (:
ir-tr!!!uagc without this rule. S - - .

Such arguments from linguistic relativism tend to rei:lforce the

4 CHARLES H. KAHN

philosophical complaints which Mill and others have directed against

"the frivolous speculations concerning the nature of Being", which
Mill thought had arisen from overlooking the distinction between the
verb of existence and the diverse uses of the copula, and from supposing
"that a meaning must be found for it (namely, to be) which shall suit
all these cases.,,9 So Mill's godson Russell insisted that "the word is is
terribly ambiguous" and proposed that instead of a unified notion of Be-
ing we need to distinguish various "senses" of to be, including existence,
identity, and predication. Both logical and linguistic criticisms thus tend
to converge in a general suspicion that doctrines of Being in traditional
ontology reflect a projection onto the universe of the linguistic structure
of Greek or of Indo-European.
I do not intend to do battle here against a general thesis of linguistic
relativism, and I shall certainly not deny that the union of predicative,
locative, existential and veridical functions in a single verb is a striking
peculiarity of Indo-European. Whether this diversity is properly regard-
ed as a case of ambiguity of meaning is a question on which I do not
propose to take a stand. \0 What I do deny is that this cumulation of func-
tions in the verb to be was necessarily a philosophical disadvantage. On
the contrary, I want to suggest that the absence of a separate verb "to
exist" and the expression of existence and truth (plus reality) by a verb
whose primary function is predicative will have provided an unusually
favorable and fruitful starting-point for philosophical reflection on the
concept of truth and the nature of reality as an object for knowledge.
This was due in part to the puzzling con verge'.lce of so many fundamental
notions and functions in a single linguistic form. It was Parmenides who
first introduced "what is" (to on) as a central topic for philosophical
discussion, and the paradoxical argument by which he developed his
thesis turned out to be one of the most creative innovations in the history
of Western thought. In the first place he elaborated the stative-durative
aspect of the verb into a systematic claim that what is must be
ungenerated and incorruptible. And this claim provoked all the element
theories of the fifth century, including the theory of atoms, as an account
of how the most fundamental realities could remain immune to change.
(If the doctrine of indestructible atoms is no. longer with us, we may
perhaps recognize its Parmenidean shadow in the conservation laws of
modern physics.) And it was the same Parmenidean thesis of unchanging
reality that provided Plato with the ontological resources for his own ac-
count of immutable Forms. On the other hand, because esti is not only
a verb of truth and reality but also the sign of predication, Parmenides'
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 5

paradoxical insistence upon the monolithic unity of what is stimulated

both Plato and Aristotle into working out theories of predication, and
eventually led Aristotle to propose his scheme of categories as an ac-
count of how "what is is said in many ways". Finally, the Aristotelian
doctrines of matter and form, potency and act were also formulated as
a response to Parmenidean paradoxes about the concept of change (as
we can see from the structure of his argument in Physics I). Thus Western
physics, logic, and metaphysics have all been the beneficiaries of a fierce
century and a half of philosophical dispute generated by Parmenides'
bold attempt to fuse into a single entity the diverse features of the verb
to be.
I hope to shed a little light on some of the earlier phases of this momen-
tous episode. But first we need a realistic description of the pre-
philosophical uses of the verb.

II. THE LINGUISTIC THEORY OF TO BE

1. The Copula

In order to see this as the central focus of the system of uses of einai, we
must have a more adequate account of the copula itself. Linguists often
speak of the copula as a dummy verb, as a merely formal "bearer" of
the verbal marks of tense, person, and mood. 11 Hence a recent author
can describe the entire function of the copula as "simply to act as a ver-
balizer," to convert "an adjective like 'cunning' into a verb-phrase 'is
cunning', which is of the same category as 'snores' " or of any finite
verb. 12 Abelard, who was either the inventor or at least the codifier of
the classical theory of the copula, rightly associated the copulative func-
tion (vis copulativa) with all finite verbs. He saw is as distinctive in that
it provides only the predicative link and not also the predicate (copulat
tan tum et non copulatur); other finite verbs do both.13 Abelard's theory
has the merit of focussing attention on the verbal function as such, and
not simply on is as the verb for nominal predicates. What he saw is that
the copula separates out the specific function of the verb, which is
obscured in the case of other verbs such as runs, sleeps, just because they
combine the information content of the predicate (running, sleeping)
with the verbal form. This general verbal function is what one might
identify as the propositional tie or mark of assertion; what we, following
Abelard, call the copula is simply the canonical expression of this func-
tion in a sentence of the form X is Y.
6 CHARLES H. KAHN

In sentences of this form, the copula expresses what is otherwise in-

dicated by the verb-ending: in either case we have a "sign of predica-
tion". What is meant by predication here has both a syntactic and a
semantic aspect. (I) Syntactically, the copula or verb-ending serves to
make a grammatical sentence out of two terms that would otherwise only
form a list: John and running (or to run). It thus indicates not only tense,
mood, and person but something more fundamental: sentencehood. In
many cases the finite verb does this alone, without a noun, both in imper-
sonal verbs like UH (pluit, "it is raining") and where the subject is
understood from the context: 7f!x.H (currit, "he is running"). (2)
Semantically, if we take the indicative-declarative form as basic, the verb
or copula gives formal expression to the truth claim of the sentence. (We
need not attend here to the ways in which this truth claim may be
modified, by interrogative or conditional sentence structure or by the
various moods; in some but not all of these cases, the modification will
be reflected in the verb ending.) Limiting ourselves to indicative forms
used in declarative sentences we can say: tbe semantic function of is as
copula or sign of predication is to bear the mark of sentential truth Claim,
to serve as focus for the claim of the whole sentence. (The truth claim
of a sentence corresponds roughly to the fact that it can have a truth
value because it does have truth conditions.)14 This basic assertive func-
tion of the copula - more precisely, the intimate connection between the
copula and the assertive function of the sentence - shows up when we
stress the verb in pronunciation: "Margaret is clever, I tell you!" "The
cat is on the mat after all." This semantic role of the copula as sign of
sentential truth claim permits us to understand one of the most important
special uses of einai in Greek, the so-called veridical, where the verb by
itself (both in the third person indicative and in the participle) expresses
the notions of truth and reality. If we lose sight of this connection be-
tween the copula and the truth claim that is fundamental for all
declarative discourse, the fact that "being" in (;reek (to on) may mean
reality will become a mysterious anomaly, quite independent of the
predicative function of the verb. Hence philolog.ists have often tended to
overlook the veridical use or to conflate it with the existential, despite the
fundamental differences in sentence structure. This is a principal support
for my claim that the copula use is fundamental; neither veridical nor ex-
istential use can be explained on the basis of the other, but both can be
understood on the basis of the copula.
Before considering these special uses of einai, I call attention to two
features of the copula verb which are often on:rlooked.
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 7

(A) The verb einai, whether used as copula or in other constructions,

has only durative (present-imperfect) forms, and no forms in the aorist,
that is, in the punctual or non-durative aspect. (The future forms lie out-
side this aspectual contrast.) This formal peculiarity of einai (and of I.-E.
*es-) is reflected in its semantic value as stative copula, in contrast to the
mutative copula becomes (gignesthai in classical Greek). 15 The antithesis
of Being and Becoming, opposed to one another as stability to change,
was deeply built into the system of copula verbs, long before it was ex-
ploited by Parmenides and Plato.
(B) Among the copula uses of be in a broad sense are what we may call
ldcative uses, where the complement or predicate expression is not a
noun or adjective but a local adverb (here, there) or a prepositional
phrase of place (at home, in the marketplace). Some linguists may prefer
not to count these as copula uses, since in this construction is cannot be
replaced in English by the mutative copula becomes (though in Greek
gignesthai may be used in locative sentences); whereas locative is func-
tions (a) in contrast to a verb of motion (goes there, arrives in the
marketplace) and (b) in parallel to a wide variety of verbs (John works
at home, Socrates talks in the marketplace). This use of is, which I will
call the locative copula, shows a special affinity with a small group of
verbs of posture, which may serve as static replacers for copula is with
predicate nouns and adjectives as well as with locative phrases: sits,
stands, lies. 16 Because of these connections, and because of the more
vivid or concrete sense that seems to attach to einai in locative sentences,
and which (as we will see) often suggests an existential nuance that gets
rendered in English by there is, some scholars have suggested that the
locative or locative-existential use of einai represents the basic sense and
function of the verb. l ? But although the locative uses are certainly impor-
tant for understanding the intuitive force of the verb to be in Greek as
a verb of state or station, I do not believe that they are more fundamental
than the copula use with predicate nouns and adjectives. For one thing,
it is possible to add locativt modifiers to copula sentences, as to many
others, and then derive the locative copula by zeroing the nominal
predicate: Athens is a city -+ Athens is a city in Greece -+ Athens is in
Greece; John is busy -+ John is busy at home -+ John is at home. But
there does not seem to be any plausible derivation in the opposite direc-
tion. Whereas locative phrases are optional modifiers for a wide variety
of sentences, the introduction of a predicate noun or adjective presup-
poses the basic construction with a copula verb, as I have argued
elsewhere. 18 Even more important, in my opinion, is that it is only the
8 CHARLES H. KAHN

general copula function as "verbalizer" and mark of sentencehood,

and not the locative use, that can explain the deep connections of einai
with the notions of truth and fact.
I turn now to the two principle classes of non-copulative uses of the
verb: the veridical and the existential. For present purposes we can ignore
other non-copula constructions, such as the possessive (esti moi, "I
have") and the potential (esti + infinitive, "it is possible to").
2. The Veridical Uses
The Lexicon recognizes, what every good Hellenist knows, that in many
cases the verb esti and its participle on must be translated by "is true" ,
"is so", "is the case" or by some equivalent phrase: esti tauta "these
things are so" (cf. French c'est cela "that's right"), legein to onto "tell
the truth", "state the facts" .19 Comparative grammar shows that this is
a pre-historic use of*es- in Indo-European 2o ; and Aristotle himself notes
this as one of four basically different uses of einai (Met. 117). All I have
done is give this use a name, "the veridical," and correlate it with a
definite sentence form. The veridical construction proper is character-
ized by three syntactic features: (i) the understood grammatical subject
of esti is not a noun form (like man or hunting) but a sentential structure,
as represented in English by a that-clause (that the man was hunting); (ii)
the construction of the verb is absolute, i.e. there is no nominal, locative
or other adverbial complement, except the comparative "so" (houtos),
which introduces (iii) a comparative clause of saying or thinking. which
is expressed in the full veridical construction and implied in every case:
These things are as you say, fCTn raimx ovrws 'WCT1I"EQ CTU Af'YHS.
Without claiming that the veridical construction is derived from the
copula use, either historically or transformationally, I nevertheless
believe that it is easy to see how the two uses logically and naturally
belong together, as long as we keep in view the semantic function of the
copula as the mark of truth claim. A properly veridical use of to be (as
in "Tell it like it is") simply makes general and explicit the truth claim
that is particularized and implicit in every declarative use of the copula
("The cat is on the mat"), as in every declarative sentence. Because the
great flexibility of the copula construction makes it possible to produce
an Sis P sentence that is roughly equivalent to every noun-verb sentence,
the copula tends to serve as verb par excellence, that is, as representative
for the finite verb as such and for its predicative force, what Abelard
called its vis copulativa. It is because of this very general function of the
copula as sign of predication and sentencehood that the very same form
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 9

(esti, "is") can serve to express the veridical idea as such: to bring out
the implicit truth claim ("This is how I say things are") and the cor-
responding notion of reality ("This is how things really are").
Despite my general reluctance to decide when a different use becomes
a different sense, I am inclined to speak here of a veridical meaning or
connotation of einai, in cases where the Greek verb cannot be adequately
translated by the copula or by an idiomatic use of is alone. This is most
conspicuous when the participle (to) on is used to mean "truth" or "the
fact of the matter", and when it may be replaced in Greek by a word like
aletheia or (to) alethes. 22 And there are clear cases of the veridical con-
notation attached to a copula construction, as in the example which
Aristotle cites of einai meaning "is true": esti S6krates mousikos, "that
Socrates is musical, i.e. that this is true". 23 In English as in Greek, this
force of the verb is typically brought out by a contrast between Being and
Seeming: "He wants not to seem (dokein) but to be (einOl) the noblest"
(Aeschylus Septem 592). Here again a basic philosophical contrast - be-
tween appearance and reality - is fully prepared in the pre-philosophical
usage of the verb.

3. Existential Uses
I briefly describe three uses of einai that we intuitively recognize as "ex-
istential" and are inclined to render by there is or even (in the third case)
by exists.24
(1) The existential copula:
(a) "There is a city (esti polis) Ephyre in a corner of horse-
nourishing Argos". (Iliad VI. 152)
(b) "There is a certain Socrates (estin tis Sokrates), a wise man,
student of things aloft ... who makes the weaker argument
the stronger". (Apology 18B 6)
Perhaps the most common of all "existential" uses of the verb in Greek
are sentences such as these, where esti seems to functions twice: to assert
the existence of a subject ("There is a city ... ") and then to say
something about it: "The cityEphyre is in the corner of Argos". In most
instances the predicative use will be locative, as in (a); (b) is one of the
rare examples where a purely nominal copula takes an existential force.
It is clear that the underlying syntax of the verb in such sentences is that
of the copula, but that this construction has been overlaid with a secon-
dary function, which I would analyze as introducing a subject for further
10 CHARLES H. KAHN

predication, and which accounts for the existential nuance we render by

"there is". In most cases, where the construal is locative, the verb serves
to introduce (posit, assert existence for) its subject by locating it in a
definite place or context. But as (b) shows, esti may perform this function
even without the support of a locative construction. In either case the
verb typically occurs in the emphatic initial position (like "there is",
which always begins its clause); but initial position is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the Greek verb to play this role. 25
What do we mean by classifying the verb in such sentences as "existen-
tial"? It is in fact false t.J the intuitive force of the sentence to say that
it asserts the existence of Ephyre or Socrates. The verb simply introduces
its subject into the narrative, or into the stream of discourse, as a subject
for further predication or, more often, as a local point of reference for
the episode that follows. We may be inclined to connect the verb with the
existential quantifier of formal logic, since the sentence does imply that
the set of objects specified by the following predicates is not empty:
"There is something, not nothing, which is a city in Ephyre, etc.". But
the trouble with this analysis of the "existential" copula in sentences of
type (1) is that it applies equally well to straight copula versions of the
same sentences: "Ephyre is a city in Argos", "Socrates is a wise man".
What is logically implied is one thing, what is expressed is another.
Somehow, in virtue of initial position, locative function or more general
contextual features (introducing an item for future reference), the verb
in (a) and (b) gathers to itself the existential claim that properly belongs
to the sentence as whole. How can the copula verb assume this function?
Perhaps because the verb itself provides no lexical content but agrees for-
mally (in person and number) with a subject term that does have content,
emphasis on the copula serves to focus attention on the subject, to pre-
sent it in an emphatic way (usually by localizing it), and thus to focus on
the subject as such, as subject of "is" and hence precisely as a subject
for predication.
Whatever the explanation, the secondary existential force of the
copula verb in type (1) points the way to a purely existential use, with no
copula construction, in type (2).
(2) The existential sentence operator:
"There is someone (no one) who does such-and-such" (ouk)
esti has tis + relative clause. 26
In typical examples, sentences of this type refer to persons, but variants
occur which give this form the full generality of the logical scheme (3x)Fx
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 11

where Fx stands for the relative clause and an initial esti functions as ex-
istential quantifier: "there is someone/something such that ... ". The
verb esti serves precisely to affirm or deny (the existence ot) a subject for
the following clause, to assert that the set specified by the following for-
mula is or is not empty. There is no trace of the copula construction, nor
any way to derive this form logically or syntactically from the copula con-
struction. But there is a logical overlap with type (1), which can be seen
as a copula construction overlaid with the existential function of type (2).
This properly existential use is relatively rare: I found only 4 examples
out of 562 occurrences of einai in the first twelve books of the Iliad. I
think it would be unreasonable to suppose that (2) somehow represents
the original, prehistoric value of*es-. Can we offer a historical explana-
tion of this use of esti? My suggestion is that it arose out of the copula
use by way of sentences of type (1), where the copula acquires "existen-
tial" connotations in virtue of its locative association and its rhetorical
function of introducing a subject for predication. Given these connota-
tions, it is natural that the existential function of (2) becomes one of the
values esti can have when used alone, without nominal br locative com-
plements. (The veridical, possessive, and potential uses represent other
values esti may possess when it appears outside of the copula
construction.)
It is on the basis of the existential force of the verb in (1), where this
force is secondary, and in (2) where it is primary but serves directly as
the basis for ensuing predication, that we can understand the appearance
of a new sentence type, in which esti itself becomes the grammatical
predicate.
(3) The existential predicate:

(a) "There are (no) gods" (auk) eisi theoi,

(b) "Zeus does not even exist" oud' esti Zeus.

Type (2) is rare in Homer, but type (3) does not occur at all. My earliest
specimens are from Melissus, Protagoras, and Aristophanes in the mid-
dle and second half of the fifth century B.C., and they clearly show the
influence of philosophical speculation. 27 Sentences of this kind are
sometimes cited as exhibiting the oldest meaning of *es- in Indo-
European. On the contrary I regard this as a fifth-century innovation,
based upon the existential force of the verb in the older types (1) and (2),
but focussing attention on existence as such (i.e. on the question whether
or not there is such a thing), as a result of philosophical speculation,
12 CHARLES H. KAHN

theological sceptIcIsm, and the general disputes about "Being" that

begin with Parmenides.
Whatever its date and origin, the verb in this sentence type is best
understood as an abridgement from type (2), "There is someone (no one)
who ... ". Thus "Zeus is not" and "Ther~jlre gods" are to be construed
as generalized versions of "There is no Zeus who ... " and "There are
gods who ... ", where the effect of generality is achieved by dropping
the relative clause with its particular content and thus presenting (or re-
jecting) a subject for any and all unspecified predication. But the idea
that in such sentences the existential verb would itself constitute the
predicate is an illusion to which the Greeks seem never to have fallen
prey.28 The functions of einai as instrument of predication were so fun-
damental that the same verb could not easily be seen as forming a self-
sufficient predicate. 29 In Greek linguistic intuition, "There is no Zeus"
(ouk esti Zeus) means that Zeus is not a subject for any predication, that
there is nothing true to be said about him. The Greeks are thus un-
troubled by the modern puzzle of negative existentials, whicli arises from
the temptation to assume that "Zeus does not exist" says something
which is true of Zeus.

III. THE EARLY PHILOSOPHIC USE OF TO BE

The outcome of my linguistic survey has been to underline the fundamen-

tal role of einai as copula verb and at the same time as verb of state and
station, characterized both by locative and by durative-stative values.
Among the non-copula uses I have called attention to the veridical ex-
pression for truth and fact, and I have insisted upon the very limited
range of early existential uses, bound to a specific locative or predicative
context. Thus while existential sentences of type 1 and 2 are well attested
in Homer, the stripped-down "absolute" use of type 3, in which einai
appears alone as existential predicate, is not found before the fifth cen-
tury, and then only in contexts where philosophic or sophistic influence
is clear. 30 My suggestion is that for understanding the early philosophical
usage, both in Parmenides and in Plato, the veridical notion (whether or
not it is the case that p) turns out to be more important than the idea of
existence (whether or not there is such a thing as X), although both no-
tions are present.
To illustrate the new, quasi-technical use of the verb as a pure existen-
tial (my type 3), we may cite what is probably the earliest unambiguous
example, the welI-known statement of Protagoras that, concerning the
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 13

gods, he does not know "either that they are (has eisin) 0;- that they are
not (hos ouk eisin), or what they are like in form" (fr. 4). The contrast
furnished by the last clause guarantees that einai here refers to the ques-
tion of the gods' existence; and the verb itself might properly be
translated as "exists". 31
However, in another even more famous quotation from Protagoras
the natural reading of the verb to be is veridical: "Man is the measure
of all things, of the things that are (ton onton), that they are (has estin) ,
and of the things that are not, that they are-not (has ouk estin)" (fr. 1).
Here we have prefigured, in a slight modification of the old idiom for
truth ("tell it like it is"), the distinction between ~he intentional being-so

of judgment and statement (hOs estin) and the objective being-so of the
way things stand in the world (Tex 11m). This intuitive distinction between
the ways things are and the way they are judged to be, which Protagoras
recognizes only to deny its validity, is precisely what we find in the two
terms of Aristotle's definition of truth, where the participle (ta onta) is
used for the facts of the case, as in Protagoras fr. 1, while the finite
verb in Protagoras' formula is replaced in Aristotle by the infinitive, for
the asserted einai of thought and statement. 32 The parallel being so exact,
it is no accident that Protagoras' book was called "Truth". 33
Another early example from the philosophical literature shows how
veridical and existential values can intersect in a single occurrence, or
how an author can oscillate between the two. Melissus is conditionally
assuming what he wants to deny: the reality of phenomenal diversity.
If there really is (ei eSlI) earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold, and living and
dead, and black and white and all the other things men say are true or real (hosa phasin
... einai alethe), if these things really are (ei tauta estl), and we see and hear correctly ...
(Melissus fro 8.2).

Melissus is actually insisting upon a radical discrepancy between the way

things are and the way they seem to us. He is stating in an extreme form
the distinction which Protagoras is attacking, and Protagoras' formula
for truth could reasonably be read as a direct response to Melissus. Now
in Melissus' own statement the first esti is pretty clearly existential: it
looks like a pure existential of type 3. But the veridical undertone makes
itself heard in the summary clause "all the things men say are true (einai
alethe),', and the last occurrence of the verb in ei tauta esti is neatly am-
biguous between "if these things exist" and "if these claims are true".
And in what follows, the thesis about reality or existence is repeated in
the veridical mode with a copula cC'nstruction: "these things would not
change if they were true" (or "real": ei alethe en).
14 CHARLES H. KAHN

This instability of the type 3 existential use is characteristic not only

of the early texts but also of the verb in Plato and Aristotle. 34 On the one
hand there is no doubt that, for Melissus as for Protagoras and for all
later writers of Greek, esti used alone can mean "exists" or "there is such
a thing". 35 On the other hand, the verb performs so many other func-
tions, and its copula role is so prominent, that there is rarely any
system:ltic reliance upon the fixed sense of the verb as "exists", except
in certain special contexts such as the existence of gods and mythological
creatures. Bur when Plato wants an unambiguous expression for an
assertion of existence, he has recourse to a copula construction: dva,{ TL
"to be something" rather than P-T]OEV dVaL "to be nothing". 36 Further-
more, although Plato and Aristotle both use sentences of type 3 to assert
and deny existence, neither philosopher mentions existence as one of the
basic notions of einai. When Aristotle applies his scheme of categories
to show how Being (it is) "is said in many ways", we may prefer to
describe his various modes of being as so many different kinds of ex-
istence, or even as so many different senses of "exists". But Aristotle
does not speak in such terms, and he regularly illustrates his categorial
distinctions by copula uses of to be: "Socrates is a man", "is wise",
"is 6 feet tall", "is in the marketplace". For Aristotle as for Plato, ex-
istence is always dva,{ TL, being something or other, being something
definite. There is no concept of existence as such, for subjects of an in-
determinate nature. 37 Thus the limited literary use and unstable semantic
value of type 3 existentials is reflected in the explicit philosophical doc-
trine that being (and a fortiori existence) is not a genos, not a definite
kind of thing.
So much by way of caveats before we turn to Parmenides, where I shall
urge that the veridical use gives us a better initial grip on the argument
than the existential does, although both are needed together with the
copula construction in order to give a complete exegesis. In a deliberate
challenge to what seems to be the prevailing interpretation, I want to
claim that for Parmenides, as for Plato and Aristotle and also in the pre-
philosophic usage of the verb, existence is a subordinate and not a
primary component in the concept of being. The notion of existence (or
the use of the verb meaning "to exist") must be included in our account
of Parmenides' argument, since "what is" (to on) is contrasted with
"nothing" on the one hand and with coming to be (genesis) and perishing
(olethros) on ;he 0ther. To sustain these contrasts, to on must be (a)
something rather than nothing, (b) something that is already there, and
(c) something that continues to be there, something that persists. These
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 15

contrasts define the sense in which for Parmenides esti means "it exists",
where the durative and locative values of the verb give some definite
shape to the claim of existence. But there is no reason, neither in the pre-
philosophic usage nor in the context of the poem nor in the later echoes
of the Parmenidean thesis in Protagoras (fr. 1, cited above) and Plato
(Rep. V, 476E - 477 A, cited below), to suppose that in the initial presen-
tation of his thesis in the one-word sentence esti in fr. 2, the sense of
Parmenides' claim can be adequately captured by the translation "it
exists" . 38
How are we to construe this claim? The contrasts just cited require
that, if the argument is to be coherent, the content of what is claimed
must be such that it is (a) something rather than nothing, (b) already pre-
sent, and (c) guaranteed to endure. But that gives us no clue as to where
the argument begins, or how we are to understand Parmenides' initial
presentation of the thesis so as to provide him with a plausible starting-
point. For this we must look at the context in the poem and above all at
the preceding context: the allegorical proem. 39
Parmenides' thesis (that it is and that it cannot not-be)is introduced as
the acceptable member of a pair of alternative "ways of inquiry" for ra-
tional cognition (noesal) to travel on (fr. 2.2). Where is this inquiry sup-
posed to lead? Obviously, to knowledge and to truth, as is clear both
from the proem and from the words immediately following the thesis
(2.4: "it is the path of Persuasion, who follows on Truth"). In the
allegorical proem the voyager on the right road is a "knowing mortal",
transported by wise horses and clever escorts, the daughters of the Sun
who are leading him "to the light" (fr. 1.10). When he arrives, a goddess
promises to instruct him in everything, but first of all in "the unshaken
heart of persuasive Truth" .40
This is what Parmenides gives us as a background for understanding
his thesis that it is, and that it cannot not-be. To interpret the thesis we
must be able to say: what is the subject of the claim esti? And what is
the content of that claim? I think the subject can be specified with some
confidence, on the basis of clues from the proem and the immediate con-
text. With these clues Parmenides makes quite clear that what the god-
dess holds out is a promise of knowledge, and that the path of it is must
lead to truth. Hence the understood "it" which the goddess is referring
to in the thesis must be located in the region of knowledge and truth; it
can also be identified as the goal of inquiry and the object of that quest
that began in the first verse of proem, where the horses are said to carry
the youth "as far as his desire can reach". So we C:in ciescribe the subject
16 CHARLES H. KAHN

referred to by the goddess as what our youth has come to find out, and
what will be made hIOwn to him in the revelation of persuasive truth.
Such an initial characterization of the subject as "the object of inquiry"
or "the knowable" can be taken for granted before the thesis is ar-
ticulated, though any fuller characterization remains to be spelled out in
the course of the argument. 41
What does esti say about the object of inquiry that (a) can be taken
for granted as a point of departure, and (b) can justify the immediate,
categorical rejection of the negative way, that it is not? Recent inter-
preters, looking ahead to see what content is given to the thesis later in
the argument, propose to read esti as "it exists". But in addition to the
dubious procedure of reading a poem backwards, this view has the disad-
vantage of saddling Parmenides from the outset with an essentially
anachronistic notion of to be. If my interpretation of the linguistic
evidence sUPlmarized above is even approximately correct, then it is
highly unlikely that either Parmenides or his readers would understand
a bare unadorned esti as meaning primarily or predominantly "it exists".
Of course the parallel to sentence types 1 and 2 guarantees that "there
is such a thing" will be there as a background meaning for Parmenides
to rely upon. But the primary idiomatic sense of an unqualified esti in
the early fifth century can only be the veridical, in this case taken objec-
tively for the reality as known: "it is so" or "this is how things stand".
And the logic in support of the initial thesis then becomes unassailable:
what is known or knowable must be the case and cannot not be so. "For
you could not know what is not (so)" (fr. 2.7).42 Thus Plato, when he
echoes this argument in Rep. Y, 476E-477A, has Socrates ask: "Does
a knower know something or nothing? ... Something which is (on) or
which is not (ouk on)?" To which the interlocutor replies: "Something
which is (on); for how could anything which is not (me on tl) be known?"
Plato adopts Parmenides' starting-point here precisely because he wants
to make the premises of his argument as plausible as possible. For the
ancients as for the moderns, knowledge entails truth: what is known
must be really SO.43
It is the veridical use, then, which not only provides the idiomatic
background for understanding Parmenides' stark initial esti, but also
provides the conceptual grounds for granting it,; necessary truth (best
understood as necessity of the consequence: if p is knowable, then,
necessarily, p is the case). Once this starting point has been granted, on
the basis of a veridical what is (so), Parmenides will go on to unfold the
richer implications of an esti whose full content will depend on other uses
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 17

of the verb, including the locative associations which justify his assump-
tion that to eon is spatially continuous, indivisible, and sphere-like if not
spherical. Among these other properties of Parmenides' being there will
surely be some that depend upon the copula use (Being is unchanging,
for if it is F, for any F, then it can never be not-F without falling into
Not-being), and some that reflect the existential use in the sense specified
above: if Being is, it is not nothing; if it is ungenerated it is already there;
if it is imperishable it will persist. Whether Parmenides' move to these
richer senses of einai necessarily involves him in a fallacy of equivocation
is not entirely clear. We might well suspect something of this sort, in view
of the astonishing nature of his conclusions. Plato is at pains to show,
against Parmenides, that something can be X and also not be Y without
falling into nonentity; whereas Aristotle distinguishes being not only in
terms of the categories but also in terms of potency-act and substrate-
privation-form (in Physics I) in order to avoid the conclusions which
Parmenides draws by taking to on as univocal. Here I suggest that
Plato's diagnosis cuts deeper into the actual structure of Parmenides'
argument. Some unclarity but no radical incoherence results if
Parmenides takes to on (I) veridically, as the objective state of affairs re-
quired for truth and knowledge, then (2) existentially, as a real, enduring
object which is the "subject" of this state, and also (3) copulatively as
being F for various F's, as well as (4) locative, i.e. spatially extended. 44
Fallacy enters only with negation, and the assumption that what-is-not
in any respect must be a Non-being pure and simple. The inference from
(I), "there is something which is the case, which is determinately so" to
(2) and (3) "there is'something which exists as an enduring subject, and
which is F" requires for its validity only the reasonable (if not inevitable)
assumption that for a state of affairs to be definitely so there must be a
definite subject with definite properties. The undeniable category-shift
from a propositional entity that is the implied subject of esti in (I) to a
substantial or thing-like entity for (2) and (3) is precisely parallel to the
shift between "if these things are true (einai alethe), ' and "if these things
exist" (ei tauta estl) in the text of Melissus cited above, and parallel also
to the cat ego rial ambiguity of einai alethe in the same text: "if they are
true" and "if they are real". Since similar shifts and ambiguities between
propositional and substantial entities occur in Plato and Aristotle too,45
it would be surprising indeed if the paradoxical esti of the earliest Greek
ontology were quite unequivocal in this respect. 46
This interpretation of Parmenides' thesis also provides a natural
historical explanation for the paradox of false statement and false belief,
18 CHARLES H. KAHN

which seems to have been popular with some sophists and which per-
sistently recurs in Plato's Cratylus (4290), Theaetetus (189A 10-12)
and Sophist (236E, 237E), with an early variant in the Euthydemus
(283E - 284C). If speaking falsely is saying what is not (the case), and
what is not is nothing at all, then speaking falsely is saying nothing and
hence not speaking at all. There may be other dimensions to this
paradox, but the crucial move is clearly the slide from what is/what is
not as the object of true and false statement and belief to what is not as
that which is nothing at all, the non-existent - a slide precisely parallel
to the one we have identified in Parmenides' argument, and which has
its counterpart in Melissus' oscillation between doubts that the multitude
of phenomenal things really exist, on the one hand, and claims that we
do not see or hear correctly, on the other hand, or that there are not as
many things "as men say are true". Thus "true being" (to on alethinon)
for Melissus (in fro 8.5) is both (a) what really exists and (b) what is true,
as the content of true statement and belief. This ambiguity is relatively
harmless in the affirmative case, where (a) and (b) coincide (given the
failure to distinguish between facts and things). But the corresponding
negation leads to fallacy and paradox, if the denial of (b) in a reference
to the object of falsehood is also taken as a denial of (a).
Since I have treated Plato's use of esti and to on at length in a recent
article, I will here simply list my chief conclusions concerning Plato's on-
tological vocabulary in the preliminary and mature statements of his
theory of Forms.
(1) In the so-called Socratic dialogues, the first philosophically rele-
vant use of einai is its occurrence in connection with the What-is-X?
question of Socratic definition. Examples: Laches 190B7-C6: "we ought
to possess knowledge of what virtue is" eidenai hoti pot' estin arete); "we
say we know what it is" (eidenai auto hoti estin); "But if we know, then
we can say what it is" (ti estin). In the Euthyphro we find the contrast
between such a "whatness" and other attributes of a thing hardening in-
to a terminological distinction between ousia, "essence", i.e. the content
or correlate of a true answer to the what-is-it? question, and pathos, any
other property or attribute (Euthyphro IlA7-8). Here ousia is simply a
nominalization for the verb estin in the what-is-it? question (to hosion
hoti pot' estin, IlA7). In such contexts the verb is syntactically the
copula, but logically or epistemically strengthened by the context of use
into what we might call the definitional copula or the is of whatness,
which aims at locating the true, proper, deep or essential nature of the
thing under investigation.
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 19

(2) The first trace of a more technical use, growing directly out of the
definitional copula, appears in the Lysis, where the attempt to explain
what makes something dear, friendly, or beloved (phi/on) leads to the no-
tion of "that which is primarily dear (ekeino ho esti prOton phi/on), for
the sake of which we say that all other things are dear" (219C 7), these
other things being potentially deceptive "images" (eidola) of "that
primary thing, which is truly dear" (ekeino to prOton, ho hos alethos esti
philon (219D 4). What is new here is (a) the use of the definitional copula
as a kind of proper name for the concept under discussion, or for its
primary instance: what is (truly, primarily) X, prefiguring the canonical
reference to the forms in later dialogues as to ho esti X, and (b) the
veridical strengthening of the copula in "what is truly (alethos) dear" cf.
tpC)..OIl Of T~ olin at 220 BI and B4), by contrast with the "images" which
are only "verbally" dear (220B 1), i.e., said to be dear because of their
relation to the primary case (219D 1). Just as the Euthyphro adds preci-
sion to the is of whatness by a version of the essence-accident distinction,
so the Lysis reinforces the metaphysical import of a privileged use of this
formula by introducing a contrast between Reality and Appearance, bet-
ween what really is F and what is only an image or a putative instance
of F.
(3) In Plato's first explicit statement of his mature doctrine, in the
speech of Diotima in the Symposium, the Beautiful itself is announced
as the goal of a process culminating in a final study "which is (ho estin)
the study of nothing but that Beautiful itself", where the student will end
by knowing "that which itself is beautiful (auto . .. ho esti kalon, 211 C
8). This is the formula of the Lysis, with its veridical force (' 'he will know
what is truly beautiful") again underscored by contrast with appearance
and images (2IIA 5, 212A 3). But in this case the formula unmistakably
refers to the Form. For here we have a new (or newly formulated) doc-
trine in which, for the first time, Plato provides his specimen Form the
Beautiful with a definite ontological status, based upon the Eleatic op-
position between eternal, unchanging Being (aei on) and inconstant,
perishable Becoming (211A I - 5). In this context the participle on is used
both existentially ("it is forever") and as copula ("it is not beautiful in
one respect, ugly in another,,).47 It is precisely in such Parmenidean con-
texts, where Being is contrasted with Becoming, that it seems most
natural to regard to on in Plato as existential, though the aspectual value
is that of the stative copula.
(4) In the Phaedo and Republic, where the doctrine for Forms is
systematically developed, the philosophical uses of einai become too
20 CHARLES H. KAHN

diverse for cataloguing here. I would emphasize only that (a) the veridical
overtones of to on, used roughly as a synonym for "truth", are predomi-
nant in the initial presentation of the Forms in both dialogues: in Phaedo
65B - 67B, to on and ta onta occur together with aletheia and to alethes
for the "true reality" which the philosopher's soul desires and pursues
(and which is identified as Forms at 650); in Republic V, 476A the Forms
are introduced by the contrast of Reality and Appearance: each of them
is one but appears (phainesthal) as many (A7); and their ontological
status is again expressed by a use of to on for the object of knowledge;
that which is wholly real (pantelos on) is wholly knowable; that which
is in no way real (me on medame) is in every way unknowable" (477A
3). The veridical-epistemic contrast between Being and Seeming
(phainesthal) serves to distinguish the Forms and "the many"
throughout this passage (cf. 479A 7 - BIO).
(b) The formula auto to ho esti (ison), "that itself which is (equal)",
familiar from the Lysis and the Symposium, is gradually developed in the
Phaedo from idiomatic phrases into a semi-technical designation for the
Forms (notably at 7502 and 7804, recalled at 9308), with a parallel use
of ousia for the distinctive being, essence, or reality of the Forms. 48 The
same designation is used to reintroduce the Forms into the central
epistemological passage of the Republic: the Beautiful itself and the
Good itself and the other unique entities, "each of which we call what
it is" (ho estin hekaston prosagoreuomen, 507B 7). In this designation
the predicative form is Fis taken separately, independent of all subjects,
and made itself the target of the question 'what is it?' Thus ho esti serves
in Plato, like to ti en einai in Aristotle, for the objective essence or defini-
tional content given in a correct answer to the question "what is Fl" for
a given predicate F. The syntax of the verb is still that of the copula, but
its predicative role is reinforced now not only by the definitional search
for the true nature of a thing but also by the ontological dualism of
Plato's neo-Parmenidean opposition between Being and Becoming, the
One and the Many, the Intelligible and the Visible. The specifically
Platonic use of einai in the doctrine of the middle dialogues thus consists
in a convergence between (i) the definitional copula from the what-is-it?
question, (ii) the veridical Being that contrasts with Seeming, and (iii) the
stative-invariant Being that contrasts with Becoming and Perishing. An
unqualified use of to on, einai, or ousia may bear any and all of these
connotations. 47 The predicative syntax is always latent if not manifest.
The existential value appears above all in (iii), but even here the copula
use, on which the stative-mutative contrast of Being-Becoming is found-
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 21

ed, may reappear at any moment. so The Platonic concept of Being is con-
stituted not by a fusion of copula and existence but by the union of
timeless-invariant Being (in contrast with Becoming) and cognitively-
reliable, veridical Being (in contrast with Appearance), both of them ex-
pressed or expressible in copula predications, but most rigorously dis-
tilled in the frozen auto ho esti version of the definitional is of whatness
in application to the Forms.
(c) In the Eleatic introduction to the doctrine of Forms at the end of
Republic V, Plato has moved beyond Par men ides in a number of in-
teresting ways. First, by accepting an intermediate "mind" reality be-
tween Being and Not-Being as object for the cognitive state of opinion
(doxa) between knowledge and ignorance, Plato has provided an on-
tological basis for change and becoming, which was simply the domain
of error and falsehood for Parmenides: Plato thus accounts for the
possibility of true opinion short of knowledge by giving it an object of
its own. In the second place, by his development of the copula use for
parallel designations of Forms (as "what is F") and particulars (as "what
is and is not F"), Plato opens the way to a philosophical analysis of
predication and the diverse uses of to be which he will pursue in the
Sophist and elsewhere, and which will lead eventually to Aristotle's
theory of categories and his distinction between essential and accidental
predication. On the other hand, where Plato in the Republic has not
moved substantially beyond Parmenides is in his conception of the nega-
tion of Being as what is not in any way (to medame on); for this is in-
describable and unintelligible, as Parmenides had insisted and as Plato
in the Sophist will finally agree. The paradox of false statement and false
belief will haunt Plato until he works out a way to negate the "being"
of truth without falling into this hopeless region of blank non-entity.
This is far enough to pursue a project that began as linguistic pro-
legomena to Greek ontology and not as a history of the subject. In con-
clusion, I want to say a word against the charge of linguistic relativism,
in so far as it claims that ancient ontology was vitiated or distorted by
the accidental possession of a verb that combines the functions of ex-
istence and predication. It is certainly true that the verb einai serves a
multitude of functions that are rarely combined in languages outside of
Indo-European. And if Greek-ontology had begun with a radical confu-
sion between existence and the copula, then its first task should have been
to distinguish the two, a task that neither Plato nor Aristotle undertook.
On the contrary, both of them systematically subordinate the notion of
existence to predication; and both tend to express the former by means
22 CHARLES H. KAHN

of the latter. In their view to be is always to be a definite kind of thing:

for a man to exist is to be human and alive, for a dog to exist is to be
enjoying a canine life. Instead of existence, which is a tricky notion at
best, it was another use of to be that gave Parmenides and Plato their
philosophical starting point: the veridical use of esti and on for "the
facts" that a true statement must convey. Thus the Greek concept of Be-
ing takes its rise from that naive, pre-philosophic notion of "reality" as
whatever it is in the world that makes some statements true and others
false, some opinions correct and others mistaken. But this notion of what
is as whatever distinguishes truth from falsehood, reliable information
from idle rumor, is surely not peculiar to Indo-European. Some such no-
tion will be functioning in any language in which questions can arise con-
cerning what is true and what is false, what is knowledge and what is er-
ror. This notion is so essential to the basic descriptive or informative use
of language that it is bound to be in some sense a linguistic universal.
What is peculiar to Greek (and to Indo-European) is that a locution for
"reality" in this sense should be provided by a verb whose primary func-
tion is to express predication and sentencehood for statements of the
form X is Y. So doctrines of Being first arose in Greece in connection
with the question: what must reality be like for knowledge and infor-
mative discourse to be possible, and for statements and beliefs of the
form X is Yto be true? In principle, the question concerning knowledge
and informative discourse is one that might have been posed in any
language; the question about the sentential form X is Y reflects a point
of view more specifically Greek. If anyone believes that it was a disaster
for Greek theories of knowledge and reality to be concerned, from the
beginning, with problems of predication and with the propositional
structure of language and thought, let him blame the verb to be.

NOTES
I wish to dedicate this review of my own work on einai to the memory of G. E. L. Owen.
Rereading since his death his major articles on Greek ontology I see more clearly than
before how he was a powerful ally in my campaign against the uncritically "existential"
interpretation of is in Plato and Aristotle. In many cases we came by different routes to
similar conclusions; in some cases I have been echoing his formulation without realizing
it. Like all workers in this vineyard, lowe him a great debt of inspiration and
encouragement.
I Foundations of Language 2 (\966), 245 - 65.
2 The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (Reidel, 1973), The Verb 'Be ' and Its Synonyms, Part
6, ed. by J . W . M. Vtrhaar (= Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series Vol. \6).
This will be cited below simple as Be' .
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 23

3 The earliest clear statement of the dichotomy known to me is that of J. S. Mill in his
System of Logic (IB43), I. iv. I, who attributes it to his father, James Mill, in the Analysis
of the Human Mind{IB29). But the philologists were already using this dichotomy as early
as G. Hermann in IBOI. (See the quotation in 'Be', p. 420, Note I.) Hermann in turn ap-
peals to "what logicians call the copula", and is apparently dependent on the logic of
Christian Wolff, ('Be', p. 423 with Note 5).
4 References to Brugmann, Delbriick, Meillet, Kiihner-Gerth, and Schwyzer-Debrunner in
'Be', p. 199, Note 21. Compare John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics
(196B), p. 322: "Even in the Indo-European languages the copulative function of 'the verb
to be' appears to be of secondary development".
5 For the argument see 'Be', pp. 199 - 207.
6 Thus to explain the stative value of copula*es- we would have to posit an original sense
"to stay, remain" which is unattested, and turns out to be only a projection of the 'be'-
'become' contrast for the copula. The priority of the copula uses is partially clarified
below; for fuller discussions see Chapter VIII of 'Be', especially pp. 395 - 402,407 -409.
For methodological remarks on the claim of priority here, see 'On the Theory of the Verb
To Be', in Logic and Ontology ed. by M. K. Munitz (New York, 1973), pp. 17 - 20.
7 See in particular E. Benveniste, 'Categories de pensee et categories de langues' and
, "~tre" et "avoir" dans leurs fonctions linguistique', in Problemes de linguistique
generale, pp. 63 -74 and IB7 -193.
8 , "Being" in Classical Chinese', The Verb 'be' and Its Synonyms, ed. by J. W. M.
Verhaar, Part I (Reidel, 1967), p. 15. Compare Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical
Linguistics, pp. 322f.
9 See the reference to Mill's Logic in Note 3, above.
10 There has recently been a noticeable trend away from the Mill- Russell view that "is"
has different senses, which the Greek philosophers should have distinguished. See, e.g.,
Benson Mates' suggestion that Plato's different uses of "is" can all be understood on the
basis of a single, univocal use of the copula: 'Identity and Predication in Plato',
Phronesis 24 (1979), 211- 229. And compare Jaakko Hintikka's paper in this volume. In
my opinion, the question whether "is" has different meanings or only different uses cannot
be answered without confronting certain very deep problems in the theory of meaning,
which is ultimately a part of the theory of knowledge. For example, are senses of a word
distinguishable as a matter of logical form and conceptual truth, independently of any fac-
tual question as to the kinds and natures of the things to which the word is applied? Up
to a point, linguistics can settle questions of syntax and sentence structure. But epistemolo-
gy and metaphysics must be called in to decide how linguistic "meanings" are related to
the nature of things or to our "conceptual scheme".
II See, e.g., Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, pp. 322f.
12 C. J. F Williams, What is Existence? (Oxford, 19BI), echoing Quine, Word and Ob-
ject, pp. 96f. This view of the copula ignores the distinction between an 'is' of identity and
of predication, a logical distinction which is not reflected in the syntax of the verb and is
not plausibly regarded as a difference in meaning for 'is'. My argument for this view (in
'Be' p. 372, Note I and p. 400, Note 33) is defended by C. J. F. Williams, op. cit., pp.
10-12. For criticism of this view on philosophical rather than linguistic grounds, see Ernst
Tugendhat, 'Die Seinsfrage und ihre sprachliche Grundlage', in Philosophische Rund-
schau 24 (I977), 164.
13 Logica 'Ingredientibus', ed. by Geyer, p. 351, cited with other passages from Abelard

in 'On the Terminology for Copula and Existence', in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical
Tradition. Essays presented . .. to Richard Walzer (Cassirer, 1972), pp. 146 - 149.
24 CHARLES H. KAHN

14 For the notion of truth claim, see 'Be', pp. 186f; 'Theory of the Verb', pp. Ilf. Compare
Quine's statement: "Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a
sentence that is true or false according as the general term is true or false of the object, if
any, to which the singular term refers" (Word and Object, p. %). This makes clt:ar the
sense in which predication is more than a syntactic notion.
15 For the stative-mutative contrast see' Be' , pp. 194 - 198, following Lyons, Introduction
to Theoretical Linguistics, pp. 397ff. Compare Benveniste, Problemes de linguistique
generale, p. 198: "etre' ... est ... un verbe d'etat, ... est meme par excellence Ie verbe
d'etat" .
The durative aspect emerges as a distinct "sense" of the verb in the Type I ("vital") use
with persons, where einai means "continue (in life), survive": eti eisi "they are still alive",
theoi aiei eontes "the gods who live forever". See 'Be', 241 ff.
16 For the verbs of posture as static be-replacer, see' Be', pp. 217 - 219.
17 See my own exposition of this view in 'Be', pp. 225f, 375 - 379, with the work of J.
Klowski cited there (p. 375n.) from Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967), 138ff.
18 'Be', pp. 201ff.
19 Cf. Thucydides VII. 8.2: tpo{3ov,uvos 010 1'17 oi 1rtl'1rO,uVOL ... ou Ta DVTCl Cx1ra-y-yi>V.w(lIv
"(Nicias) fearing that this messengers might not report the facts (sent a written letter)".
For additional examples, see 'Be', pp. 335 - 355. The veridical "is" appears in
Shakespeare, e.g., King Lear IV.vi.l41: "I would not take this from report: it is,/ And my
heart breaks at it". The idiom is still alive and well in contemporary speech: "Tell it like
it is" .
20 'Be', p. 332, Note 2.
21 For the distinction between the intentional it-is-so of judgment and statement and the
objective being-so of things in the world, see my article in Phronesis 26 (1981) 126f. This
corresponds to the distinction between the roles of infinitives and participles, respectively,
in Aristotle's definition of truth: "to say of what is (to on, objectively) that it is (einai, in-
tentionally), to say of what is not (to me on) that it is not ... " (Met. r, 7, 101lb26).
22 See the passages from Phaedo 65B - 66C cited in Phronesis (1981), 109. Cf. the example
from Thucydides in Note 19 above, and passages where 0 fWV M-yos means "the true
report" (in' Be', p. 354).
23 Met. t. 7, discussed in Phronesis (1981), 106f. Other examples of veridical copula in
'Be', pp. 356 - 360.
24 Thus I ignore here two types (the "vital" use in Type I and the verb of occurrence in
Type V) counted as existential in 'Be', pp. 239ff, 282ff. For Type III, see the next note.
25 In my existential Type III, which represents the plural of (I) above, instead of the verb
in initial position we often have a kind of quantifier-word like "many" or "others":
1ro>v'al -yae Cxva UTeaTov tiUL xi>-.tVIJOL "For there are many paths up and down the en-
campment" (Iliad X.66). Further examples in 'Be', 261ff.
26 For examples, see 'Be~, 277ff.
27 Examples ln 'Be', 300ff.

28 See 'Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy', Ar-
chiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), 323 - 34.
29 The one case where einai provides .m independent predicate is my Type I "vital" use
for persons, where ouketi esti means "he is no longer alive". See Note 15 above.
30 Further discussion in 'Be', 301, 303 - 6, 320 - 323, 326 - 330.
31 With this "pure existential" use contrast a typical non-technical existential in
Herodotus, with a locative restriction as in type I above: "There is no stag or wild boar
in all of Libya" (IV, 192.2, cited in 'Be', p. 327).
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 25

32 See Note 21 above.

33 For this interpretation of Protagoras' homo mensura formula, see Phronesis (1981),
117 -119.
34 See the star example of this instability in Post. An. I!. I - 2, where the question ei esti
is initially existential ("is there or is there not a centaur or a god"), but then gets divided
into "particular" (epi merous) and "unqualified" (haplos) cases, where the unqualified
cases are still more or less existential (fi fonv ~ /l~ OfA~VT/ ij vu~) "whether or not there is
a moon or whether it is (?) night "), but the particular cases are not: "is the moon being
eclipsed? or is it waxing?" (90" 1 - 5). This problem has been much discussed. (See Ross'
commentary, pp. 610 - 612; A. Gomez-Lobo in Review oj Metaphysics 34 (1980), 71 - 89.)
Barnes (Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics, p. 194) takes the particular or "partial" (epi
merous) question ei esti in Chapter 2 to be a reformulation of the hoti question in Chapter
1: " 'X is Y' says that X is 'partially' because 'X is' is a part of 'X is Y' ". Even if this
is right, it would show that Aristotle did not consistently read ei esti (or hoti est!) as existen-
tial. The copula construction X is Y (fi rae ion rt ij /l~ fan n at 90" 4) is treated as a
special case of the unqualified ("existential") esti. For what seems to me the most plausible
explanation of this rather baffling fact, see the notion of predicative complex borrowed
from Mohan Matthen in Note 46 below. According to this suggestion, Aristotle thinks of
X is Yas equivalent to the YX exists.
3S Aside from the problematic example from Parmenides to be discussed in the text, the
only type 3 existentials older than Melissus and Protagoras seem to be in the fragments of
Zeno, where the syntax i~ uncertain. In frs. I and 3, fi 1rOMa fonv can be read either as
"if (the) many exist" or as "if (beings) are many". In fro 3 aft rae fUeCX /lfrcx~V
rwv ovrwv iort "there are always other things between the beings" the locative qualifica-
tion recalls my Homeric Type III, the plural of type I above. (Compare the locative-
existential from Herodotus in Note 31 above.) But fiT/ and d Of fonv at the beginning of
fro I seem to be straight-forward cases of type 3 existentials.
16 See passages cited in Phronesis 1981, p. 130, Note 17.
37 Here I am agreeing with, and in part echoing, a series of studies by G. E. L. Owen.
Compare: "There is [for Aristotle) no general sense to the claim that something exists over
and above one of the particular senses" ('Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works
of Aristotle', in Articles on Aristotle Vol. 3, ed. by Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji = p. 165
in Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century, ed. by DUring and Owen); "To be, then,
is always to be something or other" (,Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', in New Essays
on Plato and Aristotle ed. by R. Bambrough, pp. 76ff); "The concept of being that he [viz.
Plato) takes himself to he elucidating here [in the Sophist) is not that of existence" ('Plato
on Not-Being' in Plato. A Collection oj Critical Essays I. Metaphysics and Epistemology,
ed. by G. Vlastos, pp. 240f).
38 The view that I am opposing is defended by D. Gallop in ' "Is" or "Is not"?', The
Monist 62 (1979),61 ff and J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, Vol. I, pp. 161 ff. BOlh
Gallop and Barnes are following G. E. L. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions', Classical Quarterly
10 (1960), 84 - 102. It is ironicallhat these scholars should not have recognized the extent
to which Owen's own work on einai in Plato and Aristotle (cited in the preceding note) has
succeeded in undermining their assumption that the modern notion of existence is an ap-
propriate instrument for capturing the sense of 'to be' in Greek philosophy. Owen himself
later expressed some qualms about his use of the "conventional choice" between copula
and existence to decide in favor of the traditional, uncriticized notion of existence for in-
tepreting esti in Parmenides' thesis. (See 'Plato on Not-Being', p. 225.)
39 My interpretation here follows the main lines of the view developed in greater detail in
26 CHARLES H. KAHN

'The Thesis of Parmenides' and 'More on Parmenides', Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969),

700- 24 and 23 (1969),333 -40. But my earlier interpretation of esti and ouk esti in the
thesis now seems to me too schematic.
40 Despite its recent reprinting by Tanin and other editors, I think that' A>4IEL'15 fU}(V}(Af05
in fro 1.29 is indefensible, both in terms of MSS. evidence and the rules for noun-
formation. (On this see Gnomon 40 (1968), 124.) The reading firndlfos is better attested
and is guaranteed by the context: "persuasive truth" answers, with chiastic reversal, to
pistis alethes in the next verse . The thought ("trust only in the truth") is fundamental, and
recurs in 2.4 (the Way of Persuasion, who follows Truth) and 8.50 (the end of the pistos
logos concerning truth).
41 G. E. L. Owen identified the subject as "what can be talked or thought about" ('Eleatic
Questions', p. 95) without reference to the proem or the context. Gallop first suggests the
vaguer subject "a thing", but ends by following Owen (Monist (1979),68 and 71). Barnes
(The Presocratics I, 163) approximates to my identification by taking the subject of esti to
be "the implicit object of dizesios", i.e., the object of inquiry .
42 "Nor can you point it out" (oute phrasais, 2.8), i.e., you can give no reliable informa-
tion about what is not the case. Of course you can say what is not so, and hence some
stronger notion than mere statement seems to be implied by Parmenides' claim "it is not
sayable (ouphaton) . .. that it is not'" in 8.9. (The same problem arises for the rival inter-
pretation of esti as "exists", for of course we can talk about what does not exist.) It was
perhaps to strengthen this side of Parmenides' thesis that the paradox of false statement
was first formulated.
43 Thus J . Hintikka rightly suggested that a rule like" 'm knows that p' entails 'p' " might
be called "Parmenides' law", on the basis of fro 2.7. See his Knowledge and Belief, p. 22,
Note 7.
44 Except for the locative-spatial implication, which does not hold for the Forms, Plato's
adaptation of Parmenides' argument in Rep. V, 476 Eff follows the same steps, from the
veridical on as object of knowledge (to on gnonai hos echei at 478 A 6) to the existential
whose negation is nothing (meden at 478 B 12) and the copula at 479 B 9: "is there any
one of these many things which is any more than it is not what one says it to be?"
In view of this close affinity between copula and veridical uses (since the simpler ex-
amples of facts or states of affairs can always be framed in an X is Y construction), there
is no real incompatibility between my reading of the Parmenidean esti and Mourelatos'
proposal to regard the thesis as a predicative sentence frame: .. - - - is - - -" (with
.. - - - is not - - -" for the negation). The basic copula function of esti in Greek will
assure that, on any reading of the thesis, this sentence form is immediately felt to be im-
plied. And I would not exclude Mourelatos' notion of "speculative predication" (as he
says, this is a narrower concept which "falls within the range" of the veridical). But I do
not think there is enough. early evidence for "quiddity" uses of einai to justify such a
restriction on the primary reading of esti. See A. P. D . Mourelatos, The Route of
Parmenides, pp. 55 - 59.
45 For Plato, see the preceding note; for Aristotle see Note 34 above. These remarks repre-
sent my answer to the second of Gallop's three objections to my interpretation, namely that
a state of affairs is "of the wrong logical type to serve as the bearer of such attributes as
'ungenerable' ... and 'immovable' ", which belong rather to a thing-like entity (Monist
(1979),66). I agree, and this might stand as an objection to Parmenides' argument. But
it counts as an objection to my interpretation only if one assumes that Parmenides is in-.
capable of overlooking such a distinction of logical type (as Plato and Aristotle certainly
were not!). Much the same holds for Gallop's first objection, that a premise which presup-
 THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 27

poses that knowledge of the truth is possible is too weak to support Parmenides' argument,
since "a sceptic might well respond, that no one knows anything, precisely because there
is no truth to be known" (ibid). This objection seems to me to mistake Parmenides for
Descartes. Why should Parmenides be thought of as arguing against a sceptic? His argu-
ment is about how to get to the truth and what one will find there, not about whether there
is any such thing.
Gallop's third objection is more substantial: if we start by rejecting "what is not the
case" as an object for knowledge, how do we get to the rejection of non-existence that is
required to disprove generation and perishing? (ibid., pp. 67 and 72). I agree that we must
find in to me eon a sense of not-being which is equivalent to "nothing at ail", and if this
is what is meant by an existential eon, then Parmenides' Being must be existential. But, as
suggested above, if to eon as a determinate state of affairs is understood to contain or imply
a real ("existing") subject and definite attributes, and if the negation (to me eon) is
understood as denying everything contained in or implied by to eon, then "what is not"
must be construed not as a well-defined, unrealized state of affairs but rather as a blank
non-entity: no subject ("what does not exist") with no attributes ("is not P' for every Fl.
It is obvious that Not-being so understood must turn out to be not only unknowable but
indescribable. Plato will defuse Parmenides' argument precisely by distinguishing this
hopelessly unqualified Not-being from the more precisely defined not-being-F for various
values of F.
46 The most enlightening explanation known to me for the easy shift from propositional
to existential and copulative construals of einai in Greek 'philosophy is the notion of a
"predicative complex" proposed by Mohan Matthen in an unpublished paper. Matthen
defines a predicative complex as "an entity formed from a universal and a particular when
that particular instantiates the universar'. Thus artistic Coriscus is such an entity, which
"exists when and only when Coriscus is artistic". In grammatical terms, a predicative com-
plex (or rather, its linguistic expression) is the attributive transform of an ordinary copula
sentence: corresponding to X is Y we may assume the existence of a logically equivalent
predicative complex, the YX exists. Thus for (I) Socrates is healthy we have the correspon-
ding (2) The healthy Socrates exists, where the truth conditions for (I) and (2) are assumed
to be identical. Furthermore, truth conditions will also be the same for the veridical
transform of (I), namely (lA): It is the case that Socrates is healthy. Aristotle in Met. 1!t..7
slides effortlessly between (1) and (lA). (See 1017" 33 - 35, as interpreted in Phronesis
(l9SI), 106f) Now if (I) is transformed as (2), we see how the copula-veridical-existential
slide can seem so natural in Greek, since all three formulations are logically equivalent. I
believe this construal (following Matlhen) captures something quite deep, and quite strange
to us, in the use of einai by the Greek philosophers. And it shows why our conventional
dichotomy between existence and copula imposes a choice upon the interprett:r which cor-
responds to nothing in the Greek data. Also, our difference in "logical form" between pro-
positional (fact-like) and substantial (thing-like) entities as subject of einai will reappear
in this conception simply as a difference in formulation between (I A) and (2).
47 For the double construal of on at Symposium 21 IA I, see Phronesis (l9SI), lOR.
48 First in an idiomatic variant at 65D 13 - E I, then progressively from 74B 2 to 75D and
7SD. See Phronesis (1981), 109- Ill.
49 For a convergence of veridical (Being versus Seeming) and "existential" values (Being
versus Becoming), see Rep. VI, 50SD 5 - 9, where to on is first paIred with atetheia, as
radiating the light of rational cognition, and then contrasted with to gignomenon te kai
apollumenon, the source of darkness and inconstant opinion. This is of course compatible
with a slightly different contrast in the following section (50SE - 509B), where the role of
28 CHARLES H. KAHN

the Good as cause of truth and knowledge is distinguished from its role as source of Being
(to einai te kai ten ousian) for the objects known. There Being for intelligible things is
presented as parallel to generation (genesis) and growth for visible things and must refer
to the stable existence of the Forms as appropriate objects for knowledge. (Shorey renders
einai ... ousia as "existence and essence", thus recognizing that both ideas are in play;
but it would be a mistake to look for any fundamental difference in sense between the verb
and the noun. At 479C 7 he renders ousia alone as "existence or essence", again rightly.)
so See, for example, the double syntax of aei on cited in Note 47. The stative, and hence
potentially predicative rather than strictly existential force of expressions like (TO) ov ad
is clearly indicated by the alternative formula with hELv: e.g. TO aft Xo/Ta
TO/UTa WUo/VTWS fXOV for Forms as object of knowledge at Rep. VI, 484B 4 (cf. Phaedo 79A
9, 80B 2, etc.), which is immediately picked up by TO OV with veridical overtones (T~ ovn)
at 484C 6: "those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of
things" (Shorey). Thus at 485B;2 ExfLVT/ ;, ouuLO/I;, ad oJu<x is first of all the object of the
philosophical eros for knowledge, and at the same time contrasted with "ousia" that is made
to wander by coming-to-be and passing-away". Of course this convergence of veridical and
stative-existential values for einai is systematically motivated by Plato's theory: the Forms
are reliable objects for knowledge and truth just because they are eternally invariant. (And
in technical contexts this invariant being-what-they-are will be expressed by strong copula
uses such as to ho esti.) It is just this union of" true reality" plus "eternally stable reality"
that is conveyed by to on and ousia throughout Rep. VI - VII, e.g. (following on the
passages just cited) "the spectacle of all time and all ousia" at 486A 8, thought which is
naturally led t1f't rilv TOU OVTOS iOi<xv lxaurov at 486D 10, the soul which is to have an ade-
Quate and complete grasp of to on at 486E 2.

Dept. of Philosophy,
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A.