Signals intelligence

Sigint redirects here. For other uses, see Sigint (disam- 1 History
biguation).
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-
1.1 Origins

Main article: Signals intelligence in modern history

Electronic interception appeared as early as 1900, dur-

ing the Boer Wars. The Royal Navy had installed wire-
less sets produced by Marconi on board their ships in the
late 1890s and some limited wireless signalling was used
by the British Army. Some wireless sets were captured
by the Boers, and were used to make vital transmissions.
Since the British were the only people transmitting at the
time, no special interpretation of the signals that were in-
tercepted by the British was necessary.[1]
The birth of signals intelligence in a modern sense dates
to the Russo-Japanese War. As the Russian eet prepared
RAF Menwith Hill, a large site in the United Kingdom, part of
for conict with Japan in 1904, the British ship HMS Di-
ECHELON and the UKUSA Agreement, 2005
ana stationed in the Suez canal was able to intercept Rus-
sian naval wireless signals being sent out for the mobiliza-
tion of the eet, for the rst time in history.[2]

1.2 Development in World War I

The last German message intercepted by the British during World
War II, signaling Germanys unconditional surrender
gathering by interception of signals, whether communica-
tions between people (communications intelligence
abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals
not directly used in communication (electronic intelli-
genceabbreviated to ELINT). Signals intelligence is a
subset of intelligence collection management.
As sensitive information is often encrypted, signals intel-
ligence often involves the use of cryptanalysis to decipher
the messages. Trac analysisthe study of who is sig-
naling whom and in what quantityis also used to derive
information.
Over the course of the First World War, the new method
of signals intelligence reached maturity.[3] Failure to
properly protect its communications fatally compromised
the Russian Army in its advance early in World War I
and led to their disastrous defeat by the Germans under
Ludendor and Hindenburg at the Battle of Tannenberg.
In 1918, French intercept personnel captured a message
written in the new ADFGVX cipher, which was cryptan-
alyzed by Georges Painvin. This gave the Allies advance
warning of the German 1918 Spring oensive.
The British in particular built up great expertise in the
newly emerging eld of signals intelligence and code-
breaking. On the declaration of war, Britain cut all Ger-
man undersea cables.[4] This forced the Germans to use
either a telegraph line that connected through the British
network and could be tapped, or through radio which
the British could then intercept.[5] Rear-Admiral Henry
Oliver appointed Sir Alfred Ewing to establish an inter-
ception and decryption service at the Admiralty; Room
40.[5] An interception service known as 'Y' service, to-
gether with the post oce and Marconi stations grew
rapidly to the point where the British could intercept al-
most all ocial German messages.[5]

1
2 1 HISTORY

ing the North Sea. Some of these stations also acted as

'Y' stations to collect German messages, but a new sec-
tion was created within Room 40 to plot the positions of
ships from the directional reports.[5]
Room 40 played an important role in several naval en-
gagements during the war, notably in detecting major
German sorties into the North Sea. The battle of Dogger
Bank was won in no small part due to the intercepts that
allowed the Navy to position its ships in the right place.[6]
It played a vital role in subsequent naval clashes, includ-
ing at the Battle of Jutland as the British eet was sent
out to intercept them. The direction-nding capability
allowed for the tracking and location of German ships,
submarines and Zeppelins. The system was so successful,
that by the end of the war over 80 million words, compris-
ing the totality of German wireless transmission over the
course of the war had been intercepted by the operators of
the Y-stations and decrypted.[7] However its most aston-
ishing success was in decrypting the Zimmermann Tele-
gram, a telegram from the German Foreign Oce sent
via Washington to its ambassador Heinrich von Eckardt
in Mexico.

1.3 Postwar consolidation

With the importance of interception and decryption
rmly established by the wartime experience, countries
established permanent agencies dedicated to this task in
the interwar period. In 1919, the British Cabinets Se-
cret Service Committee, chaired by Lord Curzon, rec-
ommended that a peace-time codebreaking agency should
be created.[8] The Government Code and Cypher School
(GC&CS) was the rst peace-time codebreaking agency,
with a public function to advise as to the security of
codes and cyphers used by all Government departments
and to assist in their provision, but also with a secret di-
rective to study the methods of cypher communications
Zimmermann telegram, as decoded by Room 40 in 1917.
used by foreign powers.[9] GC&CS ocially formed on
1 November 1919, and produced its rst decrypt on 19
October.[8][10] By 1940, GC&CS was working on the
The German eet was in the habit each day of wireless- diplomatic codes and ciphers of 26 countries, tackling
ing the exact position of each ship and giving regular po- over 150 diplomatic cryptosystems.[11]
sition reports when at sea. It was possible to build up a
The US Cipher Bureau was established in 1919 and
precise picture of the normal operation of the High Seas
achieved some success at the Washington Naval Confer-
Fleet, indeed to infer from the routes they chose where
ence in 1921, through cryptanalysis by Herbert Yardley.
defensive mineelds had been placed and where it was
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson closed the US Cipher
safe for ships to operate. Whenever a change to the nor-
Bureau in 1929 with the words Gentlemen do not read
mal pattern was seen, it immediately signalled that some
each others mail.
operation was about to take place and a warning could be
given. Detailed information about submarine movements
was also available.[5]
1.4 World War II
The use of radio receiving equipment to pinpoint the loca-
tion of the transmitter was also developed during the war. The use of SIGINT had even greater implications dur-
Captain H.J. Round working for Marconi, began carry- ing World War II. The combined eort of intercepts and
ing out experiments with direction nding radio equip- cryptanalysis for the whole of the British forces in World
ment for the army in France in 1915. By May 1915, the War II came under the code name "Ultra" managed
Admiralty was able to track German submarines cross- from Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley
 3

Unit 8200 (the SIGINT unit of the Israeli Intelligence Corps) base
on Mount Avital, Golan Heights

A Mark 2 Colossus computer. The ten Colossi were the worlds

rst programmable electronic computers, and were built to break
the German codes.

Park. Properly used, the German Enigma and Lorenz ci-

phers should have been virtually unbreakable, but aws
in German cryptographic procedures, and poor discipline
among the personnel carrying them out, created vulnera-
bilities which made Bletchleys attacks feasible.
Bletchleys work was essential to defeating the U-boats
in the Battle of the Atlantic, and to the British naval vic- A52 Oste, an Oste class ELINT (Electronic signals intelligence)
tories in the Battle of Cape Matapan and the Battle of and reconnaissance ship, of the German Navy
North Cape. In 1941, Ultra exerted a powerful eect
on the North African desert campaign against German
forces under General Erwin Rommel. General Sir Claude
Auchinleck wrote that were it not for Ultra, Rommel
would have certainly got through to Cairo. "Ultra" de-
crypts featured prominently in the story of Operation
SALAM, Lszl Almsy's daring mission across the
Libyan Desert behind enemy lines in 1942.[12] Prior to
the Normandy landings on D-Day in June 1944, the Allies
knew the locations of all but two of Germanys fty-eight
Western-front divisions.
Satellite ground station of the Dutch Nationale SIGINT Organ-
Winston Churchill was reported to have told King George isatie (NSO) (2012)
VI: It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Men-
zies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!"
Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at intelligence, however transmitted.
the end of the war, described Ultra as having been de-
cisive to Allied victory.[13] Ocial historian of British 2. Intelligence derived from communications, elec-
Intelligence in World War II Sir Harry Hinsley, argued tronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.[15]
that Ultra shortened the war by not less than two years
and probably by four years"; and that, in the absence of Being a broad eld, SIGINT has many sub-disciplines.
Ultra, it is uncertain how the war would have ended.[14] The two main ones are communications intelligence
(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

2 Technical denitions
3 Disciplines shared across the
The United States Department of Defense has dened the
term signals intelligence as: branches

1. A category of intelligence comprising either in- 3.1 Targeting

dividually or in combination all communica-
tions intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelli- A collection system has to know to look for a particu-
gence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals lar signal. System, in this context, has several nuances.
4 3 DISCIPLINES SHARED ACROSS THE BRANCHES

Targeting is an output of the process of developing col- tical SIGINT requirement, where the larger aircraft tend
lection requirements: to be assigned strategic/national missions.
Before the detailed process of targeting begins, someone
1. An intelligence need considered in the al- has to decide there is a value in collecting information
location of intelligence resources. Within the about something. While it would be possible to direct
Department of Defense, these collection re- signals intelligence collection at a major sports event, the
quirements fulll the essential elements of in- systems would capture a great deal of noise, news signals,
formation and other intelligence needs of a and perhaps announcements in the stadium. If, however,
commander, or an agency. an anti-terrorist organization believed that a small group
would be trying to coordinate their eorts, using short-
2. An established intelligence need, val-
range unlicensed radios, at the event, SIGINT targeting of
idated against the appropriate allocation of
radios of that type would be reasonable. Targeting would
intelligence resources (as a requirement) to
not know where in the stadium the radios might be, or
fulll the essential elements of information
the exact frequency they are using; those are the functions
and other intelligence needs of an intelligence
of subsequent steps such as signal detection and direction
consumer.[15]
nding.
Once the decision to target is made, the various intercep-
3.2 Need for multiple, coordinated re- tion points need to cooperate, since resources are limited.
ceivers Knowing what interception equipment to use becomes
easier when a target country buys its radars and radios
First, atmospheric conditions, sunspots, the targets trans- from known manufacturers, or is given them as military
mission schedule and antenna characteristics, and other aid. National intelligence services keep libraries of de-
factors create uncertainty that a given signal intercept sen- vices manufactured by their own country and others, and
sor will be able to hear the signal of interest, even with then use a variety of techniques to learn what equipment
a geographically xed target and an opponent making no is acquired by a given country.
attempt to evade interception. Basic countermeasures Knowledge of physics and electronic engineering further
against interception include frequent changing of radio narrows the problem of what types of equipment might be
frequency, polarization, and other transmission charac- in use. An intelligence aircraft ying well outside the bor-
teristics. An intercept aircraft could not get o the ground ders of another country will listen for long-range search
if it had to carry antennas and receivers for every possible radars, not short-range re control radars that would be
frequency and signal type to deal with such countermea- used by a mobile air defense. Soldiers scouting the front
sures. lines of another army know that the other side will be
Second, locating the transmitters position is usually part using radios that must be portable and not have huge an-
of SIGINT. Triangulation and more sophisticated radio tennas.
location techniques, such as time of arrival methods,
require multiple receiving points at dierent locations.
These receivers send location-relevant information to a 3.4 Signal detection
central point, or perhaps to a distributed system in which
all participate, such that the information can be correlated Even if a signal is human communications (e.g., a radio),
and a location computed. the intelligence collection specialists have to know it ex-
ists. If the targeting function described above learns that
a country has a radar that operates in a certain frequency
3.3 Intercept management range, the rst step is to use a sensitive receiver, with one
or more antennas that listen in every direction, to nd an
Modern SIGINT systems, therefore, have substantial area where such a radar is operating. Once the radar is
communications among intercept platforms. Even if known to be in the area, the next step is to nd its location.
some platforms are clandestine, there is a broadcast of If operators know the probable frequencies of transmis-
information telling them where and how to look for sions of interest, they may use a set of receivers, preset to
signals.[16] A United States targeting system under devel- the frequencies of interest. These are the frequency (hor-
opment in the late 1990s, PSTS, constantly sends out in- izontal axis) versus power (vertical axis) produced at the
formation that helps the interceptors properly aim their transmitter, before any ltering of signals that do not add
antennas and tune their receivers. Larger intercept air- to the information being transmitted. Received energy
craft, such as the EP-3 or RC-135, have the on-board on a particular frequency may start a recorder, and alert a
capability to do some target analysis and planning, but human to listen to the signals if they are intelligible (i.e.,
others, such as the RC-12 GUARDRAIL, are completely COMINT). If the frequency is not known, the operators
under ground direction. GUARDRAIL aircraft are fairly may look for power on primary or sideband frequencies
small, and usually work in units of three to cover a tac- using a spectrum analyzer. Information from the spec-
3.6 Trac analysis 5

is the simplest case; a target may try to confuse listeners

Simplied spectrum analyzer display of superheterodyned,
amplitude modulated signals.
trum analyzer is then used to tune receivers to signals of An alternative to tunable directional antennas, or large
interest. For example, in this simplied spectrum, the omnidirectional arrays such as the Wullenweber, is to
actual information is at 800 kHz and 1.2 MHz.
by having multiple transmitters, giving the same signal
from dierent locations, switching on and o in a pattern
known to their user but apparently random to the listener.
Individual directional antennas have to be manually or au-
tomatically turned to nd the signal direction, which may
be too slow when the signal is of short duration. One
alternative is the Wullenweber array technique. In this
method, several concentric rings of antenna elements si-
multaneously receive the signal, so that the best bearing
will ideally be clearly on a single antenna or a small set.
Wullenweber arrays for high-frequency signals are enor-
mous, referred to as elephant cages by their users.
measure the time of arrival of the signal at multiple
points, using GPS or a similar method to have precise
time synchronization. Receivers can be on ground sta-
tions, ships, aircraft, or satellites, giving great exibility.
Modern anti-radiation missiles can home in on and attack
transmitters; military antennas are rarely a safe distance
from the user of the transmitter.

3.6 Trac analysis

Main article: Trac analysis

Hypothetical displays from four spectrum analyzers connected to
directional antennas. The transmitter is at bearing 090 degrees.
When locations are known, usage patterns may emerge,
from which inferences may be drawn. Trac analy-
Real-world transmitters and receivers usually are direc-
sis is the discipline of drawing patterns from informa-
tional. In the gure to the left, assume that each display
tion ow among a set of senders and receivers, whether
is connected to a spectrum analyzer connected to a direc-
those senders and receivers are designated by location
tional antenna aimed in the indicated direction.
determined through direction nding, by addressee and
sender identications in the message, or even MASINT
3.4.1 Countermeasures to interception techniques for ngerprinting transmitters or operators.
Message content, other than the sender and receiver, is
Spread-spectrum communications is an electronic not necessary to do trac analysis, although more infor-
counter-countermeasures (ECCM) technique to defeat mation can be helpful.
looking for particular frequencies. Spectrum analysis can For example, if a certain type of radio is known to be used
be used in a dierent ECCM way to identify frequencies only by tank units, even if the position is not precisely de-
not being jammed or not in use. termined by direction nding, it may be assumed that a
tank unit is in the general area of the signal. Of course,
the owner of the transmitter can assume someone is lis-
3.5 Direction-nding tening, so might set up tank radios in an area where he
wants the other side to believe he has actual tanks. As
Main article: Direction nding part of Operation Quicksilver, part of the deception plan
for the invasion of Europe at the Battle of Normandy,
The earliest, and still common, means of direction nding radio transmissions simulated the headquarters and sub-
is to use directional antennas as goniometers, so that a line ordinate units of the ctitious First United States Army
can be drawn from the receiver through the position of the Group (FUSAG), commanded by George S. Patton, to
signal of interest. (See HF/DF.) Knowing the compass make the German defense think that the main invasion
bearing, from a single point, to the transmitter does not was to come at another location. In like manner, fake ra-
locate it. Where the bearings from multiple points, using dio transmissions from Japanese aircraft carriers, before
goniometry, are plotted on a map, the transmitter will be the Battle of Pearl Harbor, were made from Japanese lo-
located at the point where the bearings intersect. This cal waters, while the attacking ships moved under strict
6 3 DISCIPLINES SHARED ACROSS THE BRANCHES

radio silence.
Trac analysis need not focus on human communica-
tions. For example, if the sequence of a radar signal,
followed by an exchange of targeting data and a conr-
mation, followed by observation of artillery re, this may
identify an automated counterbattery system. A radio sig-
nal that triggers navigational beacons could be a landing
aid system for an airstrip or helicopter pad that is intended
to be low-prole.
Patterns do emerge. Knowing a radio signal, with certain
characteristics, originating from a xed headquarters may
be strongly suggestive that a particular unit will soon move
out of its regular base. The contents of the message need
not be known to infer the movement.
There is an art as well as science of trac analysis. Ex-
pert analysts develop a sense for what is real and what is
deceptive. Harry Kidder, for example, was one of the star
cryptanalysts of World War II, a star hidden behind the
secret curtain of SIGINT.[17] EOB and related data ow

3.7 Electronic order of battle Signals intelligence units will identify changes in the
EOB, which might indicate enemy unit movement,
Generating an electronic order of battle (EOB) requires changes in command relationships, and increases or de-
identifying SIGINT emitters in an area of interest, de- creases in capability.
termining their geographic location or range of mobility, Using the COMINT gathering method enables the intel-
characterizing their signals, and, where possible, deter- ligence ocer to produce an electronic order of battle by
mining their role in the broader organizational order of trac analysis and content analysis among several enemy
battle. EOB covers both COMINT and ELINT.[18] The units. For example, if the following messages were inter-
Defense Intelligence Agency maintains an EOB by loca- cepted:
tion. The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) of the Defense
Information Systems Agency supplements this location
database with ve more technical databases: 1. U1 from U2, requesting permission to
proceed to checkpoint X.

1. FRRS: Frequency Resource Record Sys-
tem
2. BEI: Background Environment Informa-
tion
3. SCS: Spectrum Certication System
4. EC/S: Equipment Characteristics/Space
5. TACDB: platform lists, sorted by nomen-
clature, which contain links to the C-E
equipment complement of each platform,
with links to the parametric data for each
piece of equipment, military unit lists and
their subordinate units with equipment
used by each unit.
For example, several voice transmitters might be identi-
ed as the command net (i.e., top commander and direct
reports) in a tank battalion or tank-heavy task force. An-
other set of transmitters might identify the logistic net for
that same unit. An inventory of ELINT sources might
identify the medium- and long-range counter-artillery
radars in a given area.
2. U2 from U1, approved. please report at
arrival.
3. (20 minutes later) U1 from U2, all vehi-
cles have arrived to checkpoint X.
This sequence shows that there are two units in the bat-
tleeld, unit 1 is mobile, while unit 2 is in a higher hi-
erarchical level, perhaps a command post. One can also
understand that unit 1 moved from one point to another
which are distant from each 20 minutes with a vehi-
cle. If these are regular reports over a period of time,
they might reveal a patrol pattern. Direction-nding and
radiofrequency MASINT could help conrm that the traf-
c is not deception.
The EOB buildup process is divided as following:
Signal separation
Measurements optimization
Data Fusion
Networks build-up
4.1 Voice interception 7

Separation of the intercepted spectrum and the signals 4. The time and duration of transmission, and the
intercepted from each sensors must take place in an ex- schedule if it is a periodic transmission
tremely small period of time, in order to separate the def-
erent signals to dierent transmitters in the battleeld.
5. The frequencies and other technical characteristics
The complexity of the separation process depends on the
of their transmission
complexity of the transmission methods (e.g., hopping or
time division multiple access (TDMA)).
6. If the transmission is encrypted or not, and if it can
By gathering and clustering data from each sensor, the
be decrypted. If it is possible to intercept either an
measurements of the direction of signals can be opti-
originally transmitted cleartext or obtain it through
mized and get much more accurate than the basic mea-
cryptanalysis, the language of the communication
surements of a standard direction nding sensor.[19] By
and a translation (when needed).
calculating larger samples of the sensors output data in
near real-time, together with historical information of sig-
nals, better results are achieved. 7. The addresses, if the signal is not a general broad-
Data fusion correlates data samples from dierent fre- cast and if addresses are retrievable from the mes-
quencies from the same sensor, same being conrmed sage. These stations may also be COMINT (e.g., a
by direction nding or radiofrequency MASINT. If an conrmation of the message or a response message),
emitter is mobile, direction nding, other than discover- ELINT (e.g., a navigation beacon being activated)
ing a repetitive pattern of movement, is of limited value or both. Rather than, or in addition to, an address
in determining if a sensor is unique. MASINT then be- or other identier, there may be information on the
comes more informative, as individual transmitters and location and signal characteristics of the responder.
antennas may have unique side lobes, unintentional radi-
ation, pulse timing, etc.
Network build-up, or analysis of emitters (communi- 4.1 Voice interception
cation transmitters) in a target region over a sucient
period of time, enables creation of the communications A basic COMINT technique is to listen for voice commu-
ows of a battleeld.[20] nications, usually over radio but possibly leaking from
telephones or from wiretaps. If the voice communica-
tions are encrypted, trac analysis may still give infor-
mation.
4 COMINT
In the Second World War, for security the United States
COMINT redirects here. For other uses, see COMINT used Native American volunteer communicators known
(disambiguation). as code talkers, who used languages such as Navajo,
Comanche and Choctaw, which would be understood by
few people, even in the U.S. Even within these uncom-
COMINT (Communications Intelligence) is a sub- mon languages, the code talkers used specialized codes,
category of signals intelligence that engages in dealing so a buttery might be a specic Japanese aircraft.
with messages or voice information derived from the in- British forces made limited use of Welsh speakers for the
terception of foreign communications. It should be noted same reason.
that COMINT is commonly referred to as SIGINT, which
can cause confusion when talking about the broader in- While modern electronic encryption does away with the
telligence disciplines. The US Joint Chiefs of Sta de- need for armies to use obscure languages, it is possible
nes it as Technical information and intelligence derived that some irregular groups might use rare dialects that few
from foreign communications by other than the intended outside their ethnic group would understand.
recipients.[15]
COMINT, which is dened to be communications among
people, will reveal some or all of the following: 4.2 Text interception

1. Who is transmitting Morse code interception was once very important, but
Morse code telegraphy is now obsolete in the west-
2. Where they are located, and, if the transmitter is ern world, although possibly used by special operations
moving, the report may give a plot of the signal forces. Such forces, however, now have portable crypto-
against location graphic equipment. Morse code is still used by military
forces of former Soviet Union countries.
3. If known, the organizational function of the trans- Specialists scan radio frequencies for character sequences
mitter (e.g., electronic mail) and fax.
8 5 ELECTRONIC SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

4.3 Signaling channel interception intended EMCON policy; equipment aected by

A given digital communications link can carry thousands
or millions of voice communications, especially in devel-
oped countries. Without addressing the legality of such
actions, the problem of identifying which channel con-
tains which conversation becomes much simpler when the
rst thing intercepted is the signaling channel that carries
information to set up telephone calls. In civilian and many
military use, this channel will carry messages in Signaling
System 7 protocols.
Retrospective analysis of telephone calls can be made
from Call detail record (CDR) used for billing the calls.
4.4 Monitoring friendly communications
More a part of communications security than true in-
telligence collection, SIGINT units still may have the
responsibility of monitoring ones own communications
or other electronic emissions, to avoid providing intel-
ligence to the enemy. For example, a security monitor
may hear an individual transmitting inappropriate infor-
mation over an unencrypted radio network, or simply one
that is not authorized for the type of information being
given. If immediately calling attention to the violation
would not create an even greater security risk, the monitor
will call out one of the BEADWINDOW codes[21] used
by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United King-
dom, the United States, and other nations working under
their procedures. Standard BEADWINDOW codes (e.g.,
BEADWINDOW 2) include:
EMCON policy.
5. Friendly or enemy key personnel: Movement or
identity of friendly or enemy ocers, visitors, com-
manders; movement of key maintenance personnel
indicating equipment limitations.
6. Communications security (COMSEC): Friendly
or enemy COMSEC breaches. Linkage of codes
or codewords with plain language; compromise of
changing frequencies or linkage with line num-
ber/circuit designators; linkage of changing call
signs with previous call signs or units; compromise
of encrypted/classied call signs; incorrect authen-
tication procedure.
7. Wrong circuit: Inappropriate transmission. Infor-
mation requested, transmitted or about to be trans-
mitted which should not be passed on the subject
circuit because it either requires greater security pro-
tection or it is not appropriate to the purpose for
which the circuit is provided.
8. Other codes as appropriate for the situation may be
dened by the commander.
In WWII, for example, the Japanese Navy, by poor prac-
tice, identied a key persons movement over a low-
security cryptosystem. This made possible Operation
Vengeance, the interception and death of the Combined
Fleet commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

1. Position: (e.g., disclosing, in an insecure or 5 Electronic signals intelligence

inappropriate way, Friendly or enemy position,
movement or intended movement, position, course, Electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) refers to
speed, altitude or destination or any air, sea or intelligence-gathering by use of electronic sensors.
ground element, unit or force. Its primary focus lies on non-communications signals
intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Sta dene it as
2. Capabilities: Friendly or enemy capabilities or
Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from
limitations. Force compositions or signicant casu-
foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations
alties to special equipment, weapons systems, sen-
emanating from other than nuclear detonations or
sors, units or personnel. Percentages of fuel or am-
radioactive sources.[15]
munition remaining.
Signal identication is performed by analyzing the col-
3. Operations: Friendly or enemy operation inten- lected parameters of a specic signal, and either match-
tions progress, or results. Operational or logistic ing it to known criteria, or recording it as a possible new
intentions; mission participants ying programmes; emitter. ELINT data are usually highly classied, and are
mission situation reports; results of friendly or en- protected as such.
emy operations; assault objectives.
The data gathered are typically pertinent to the electron-
4. Electronic warfare (EW): Friendly or enemy ics of an opponents defense network, especially the elec-
electronic warfare (EW) or emanations control tronic parts such as radars, surface-to-air missile systems,
(EMCON) intentions, progress, or results. Intention aircraft, etc. ELINT can be used to detect ships and
to employ electronic countermeasures (ECM); re- aircraft by their radar and other electromagnetic radia-
sults of friendly or enemy ECM; ECM objectives; tion; commanders have to make choices between not us-
results of friendly or enemy electronic counter- ing radar (EMCON), intermittently using it, or using it
countermeasures (ECCM); results of electronic sup- and expecting to avoid defenses. ELINT can be collected
port measures/tactical SIGINT (ESM); present or from ground stations near the opponents territory, ships
5.3 ELINT and ESM 9

o their coast, aircraft near or in their airspace, or by 5.3 ELINT and ESM
satellite.
Electronic support measures (ESM) or Electronic
Surveillance Measures are really ELINT techniques us-
ing various Electronic Surveillance Systems, but the term is
5.1 Complementary relationship to used in the specic context of tactical warfare. ESM give
COMINT the information needed for electronic attack (EA) such
as jamming, or directional bearings (compass angle) to a
Combining other sources of information and ELINT al- target in signals intercept such as in the HUFF-DUFF Ra-
lows trac analysis to be performed on electronic emis- dio Direction Finding (RDF) systems so critically impor-
sions which contain human encoded messages. The tant during the WW-II Battle of the Atlantic. After WW-
method of analysis diers from SIGINT in that any hu- II, the RDF originally applied in only communications
man encoded message which is in the electronic trans- was broadened into systems to also take in ELINT from
mission is not analyzed during ELINT. What is of inter- radar bandwidths and lower frequency communications
est is the type of electronic transmission and its location. systems, giving birth to a family of NATO ESM systems,
For example, during the Battle of the Atlantic in World such as the shipboard US AN/WLR-1[22] AN/WLR-6
War II, Ultra COMINT was not always available because systems and comparable airborne units. EA is also called
Bletchley Park was not always able to read the U-boat electronic counter-measures (ECM). ESM provides in-
Enigma trac. But "Hu-Du" (High Frequency Di- formation needed for electronic counter-counter mea-
rection Finder) was still able to nd where the U-boats sures (ECCM), such as understanding a spoong or jam-
were by analysis of radio transmissions and the positions ming mode so one can change ones radar characteristics
through triangulation from the direction located by two to avoid them.
or more Hu-Du systems. The Admiralty was able to
use this information to plot courses which took convoys
away from high concentrations of U-boats. 5.4 ELINT for meaconing
Yet other ELINT disciplines include intercepting and
Meaconing[23] is the combined intelligence and electronic
analyzing enemy weapons control signals, or the
warfare of learning the characteristics of enemy naviga-
Identication, friend or foe responses from transponders
tion aids, such as radio beacons, and retransmitting them
in aircraft used to distinguish enemy craft from friendly
with incorrect information.
ones.

5.5 Foreign instrumentation signals intel-

5.2 Role in air warfare ligence

A very common area of ELINT is intercepting radars and Main article: FISINT
learning their locations and operating procedures. At-
tacking forces may be able to avoid the coverage of cer- FISINT (Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence) is
tain radars, or, knowing their characteristics, electronic a sub-category of SIGINT, monitoring primarily non-
warfare units may jam radars or send them deceptive sig- human communication. Foreign instrumentation signals
nals. Confusing a radar electronically is called a soft include (but not limited to) telemetry (TELINT), tracking
kill, but military units will also send specialized missiles systems, and video data links. TELINT is an important
at radars, or bomb them, to get a hard kill. Some mod- part of national means of technical verication for arms
ern air-to-air missiles also have radar homing guidance control.
systems, particularly for use against large airborne radars.
Knowing where each surface-to-air missile and anti-
5.6 Counter-ELINT
aircraft artillery system is and its type means that air raids
can be plotted to avoid the most heavily defended areas
Still at the research level are techniques that can only be
and to y on a ight prole which will give the aircraft the
described as counter-ELINT, which would be part of a
best chance of evading ground re and ghter patrols. It
SEAD campaign. It may be informative to compare and
also allows for the jamming or spoong of the enemys de-
contrast counter-ELINT with ECCM.
fense network (see electronic warfare). Good electronic
intelligence can be very important to stealth operations;
stealth aircraft are not totally undetectable and need to
know which areas to avoid. Similarly, conventional air- 6 SIGINT versus MASINT
craft need to know where xed or semi-mobile air defense
systems are so that they can shut them down or y around Main article: Measurement and signature intelligence
them. Signals intelligence and measurement and signature in-
10 8 SEE ALSO

frequency than the voice modulation usually uses, even

though the voice conversation is meaningful, MASINT
might suggest it is a deception, not coming from a real
tank.
See HF/DF for a discussion of SIGINT-captured infor-
mation with a MASINT avor, such as determining the
frequency to which a receiver is tuned, from detecting
the frequency of the beat frequency oscillator of the
superheterodyne receiver.

7 Legality
Since the invention of the radio, the international consen-
sus has been that the radio-waves are no ones property,
and thus the interception itself is not illegal. There can
however be national laws on who is allowed to collect,
store and process radio trac, and for what purposes.
Monitoring trac in cables (i.e. telephone and Internet)
is far more controversial, since it most of the time re-
quires physical access to the cable and thereby violating
ownership and expected privacy.

A model of a German SAR-Lupe reconnaissance satellite inside

a Russian Cosmos-3M rocket. 8 See also
Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science
telligence (MASINT) are closely, and sometimes con- & Technology
fusingly, related.[24] The signals intelligence disciplines
COINTELPRO
of communications and electronic intelligence focus on
the information in those signals themselves, as with ECHELON
COMINT detecting the speech in a voice communica-
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
tion or ELINT measuring the frequency, pulse repetition
Amendments Act of 2008
rate, and other characteristics of a radar.
MASINT also works with collected signals, but is more Geospatial intelligence
of an analysis discipline. There are, however, unique Human intelligence (espionage)
MASINT sensors, typically working in dierent regions
or domains of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as in- Imagery intelligence
frared or magnetic elds. While NSA and other agencies Intelligence Branch (Canadian Forces)
have MASINT groups, the Central MASINT Oce is in
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). List of intelligence gathering disciplines
Where COMINT and ELINT focus on the intentionally Open-source intelligence
transmitted part of the signal, MASINT focuses on un-
Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
intentionally transmitted information. For example, a
given radar antenna will have sidelobes emanating from RAF Intelligence
other than the direction in which the main antenna is
aimed. The RADINT (radar intelligence) discipline in- Signals intelligence by alliances, nations and indus-
volves learning to recognize a radar both by its primary tries
signal, captured by ELINT, and its sidelobes, perhaps Signals intelligence operational platforms by nation
captured by the main ELINT sensor, or, more likely, a for current collection systems
sensor aimed at the sides of the radio antenna.
TEMPEST
MASINT associated with COMINT might involve the
detection of common background sounds expected with US signals intelligence in the Cold War
human voice communications. For example, if a given
Venona
radio signal comes from a radio used in a tank, if the
interceptor does not hear engine noise or higher voice Zircon satellite

9 References
[1] Lee, Bartholomew. Radio Spies Episodes in the Ether
Wars (PDF). Retrieved 8 October 2007.
[2] Report from HMS Diana on Russian Signals intercepted at
Suez, 28th January 1904, Naval library, Ministry of De-
fence, London.
[3] Douglas L. Wheeler. A Guide to the History of Intel-
ligence 18001918 (PDF). Journal of U.S. Intelligence
Studies.
[4] Winkler, Jonathan Reed (July 2009). Information War-
fare in World War I. The Journal of Military History. 73:
845867. doi:10.1353/jmh.0.0324.
[5] Beesly, Patrick (1982). Room 40: British Naval Intelli-
gence, 19141918. Long Acre, London: Hamish Hamil-
ton Ltd. ISBN 0-241-10864-0.
[6] Livesey, Anthony, Historical Atlas of World War One,
Holt; New York, 1994 p. 64
[7] Code Breaking and Wireless Intercepts.
[8] Johnson, John (1997). The Evolution of British Sigint:
16531939. HMSO. p. 44. ASIN B002ALSXTC.
[9] Smith, Michael (2001). GC&CS and the First Cold
War. In Smith, Michael; Erskine, Ralph. Action This
Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code
to the Birth of the Modern Computer. Bantam Press. pp.
1617. ISBN 978-0-593-04910-5.
[10] Gannon, Paul (2011). Inside Room 40: The Codebreakers
of World War I. Ian Allen Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7110-
3408-2.
[11] David Alvarez, GC&CS and American Diplomatic Crypt-
analysis
[12] Gross, Kuno, Michael Rolke and Andrs Zboray,
Operation SALAM Lszl Almsys most daring Mis-
sion in the Desert War, Belleville, Mnchen, 2013
[13] Winterbotham, F. W. (1974), The Ultra Secret, New York:
Harper & Row, pp. 154, 191, ISBN 0-06-014678-8
[14] Hinsley, Sir Harry (1996) [1993], The Inuence of UL-
TRA in the Second World War (PDF), retrieved 23 July
2012
[15] US Department of Defense (12 July 2007). Joint Pub-
lication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili-
tary and Associated Terms (PDF). Retrieved 1 October
2007.
[16] Precision SIGINT Targeting System (PSTS)". Intelli-
gence Research Program. Federation of American Scien-
tists.
[17] Whitlock, Duane (Autumn 1995). The Silent War
against the Japanese Navy. Naval War College Review.
XLVIII (4). Retrieved 30 September 2007.
11
[18] 743d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (August 1999).
Warghter Guide to Intelligence 2000. Joint Spec-
trum Center, (US) Defense Information Services Agency.
Archived from the original on 14 August 2007. Retrieved
26 October 2007.
[19] Kessler, Otto. SIGINT Change Detection Approach
(PDF). Dynamic Database: Eciently convert mas-
sive quantities of sensor data into actionable information
for tactical commanders. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency.
[20] Terry, I. (2003). US Naval Research Laboratory Net-
worked Specic Emitter Identication in Fleet Battle Ex-
periment Juliet. NRL Review. Retrieved 26 October
2007.
[21] Combined Communications-Electronics Board (CCEB)
(January 1987). ACP 124(D) Communications Instruc-
tions: Radio Telegraph Procedure (PDF). ACP 224(D).
Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 September 2007.
Retrieved 2 October 2007.
[22] AN/WLR-1. 1999-01-01. Retrieved 2015-09-27.
[23] US Army (17 July 1990). Chapter 4: Meaconing, In-
trusion, Jamming, and Interference Reporting. Field
Manual 2333, Communications Techniques: Electronic
Counter-Countermeasures. FM 2333. Retrieved 1 Oc-
tober 2007.
[24] Interagency OPSEC Support Sta (IOSS) (May 1996).
Operations Security Intelligence Threat Handbook: Sec-
tion 2, Intelligence Collection Activities and Disciplines.
IOSS Section 2. Retrieved 3 October 2007.
10 Further reading
Bamford, James, Body of Secrets: How Americas
NSA and Britains GCHQ eavesdrop on the world
(Century, London, 2001)
West, Nigel, The SIGINT Secrets: The Signals Intel-
ligence War, 1900 to Today (William Morrow, New
York, 1988)
J. A. Biyd, D. B. Harris, D. D. King & H. W. Welch,
Jr. (Editors) (1979). Electronic Countermeasures.
Los Altos, CA: Peninsula Publishing (1961). ISBN
0-932146-00-7.
Gannon, Paul (2007) [2006], Colossus: Bletchley
Parks Greatest Secret, London: Atlantic Books,
ISBN 978 1 84354 331 2
Jgiaas, Aadu, Disturbing soviet transmissions in Au-
gust 1991, Museum of Occupations, retrieved 25
June 2013
Bolton, Matt (December 2011), The Tallinn Ca-
bles: A Glimpse into Tallins Secret History of Es-
pionage (PDF), Lonely Planet Magazine, retrieved
25 June 2013
12 11 EXTERNAL LINKS

11 External links
Part I of IV Articles On Evolution of Army Signal
Corps COMINT and SIGINT into NSA
NSAs overview of SIGINT

USAF Pamphlet on sources of intelligence

German WWII SIGINT/COMINT

Intelligence Programs and Systems

The U.S. Intelligence Community by Jerey T.

Richelson

Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War

and Beyond by Matthew Aid et. al.

Maritime SIGINT Architecture Technical Stan-

dards Handbook
 13

12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

12.1 Text
Signals intelligence Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signals_intelligence?oldid=715122433 Contributors: Damian Yerrick, Carey
Evans, The Anome, JeLuF, Arvindn, SimonP, Peterlin~enwiki, Heron, AdamWill, Isomorphic, Liftarn, Stewacide, Wapcaplet, Fwappler,
Karada, Rodzilla, Ronabop, Theresa knott, Julesd, Camryl, Ww, The Anomebot, Zoicon5, Tpbradbury, Jnc, Flockmeal, Robbot, PBS, Psy-
chonaut, Sverdrup, Mushroom, GreatWhiteNortherner, Filemon, DocWatson42, Orangemike, Taviso, Rj, Ofus, BKoehler, Matt Crypto,
SWAdair, Vadmium, Telso, Fuck you Very Much, Secureoce, Ratiocinate, Holliday~enwiki, N328KF, ArnoldReinhold, Bender235,
CanisRufus, Fuxx, John Warburton, Maurreen, Fg, Egil530, ExpatEgghead, Linmhall, Sligocki, ZeiP, Suruena, BDD, RHaworth, Robert
K S, Pol098, Wikiklrsc, Stefanomione, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, Biederman, NeonMerlin, Brighterorange, Ground Zero, Mathbot, Leslie
Mateus, Malhonen, Cornellrockey, The Rambling Man, YurikBot, RussBot, Fabartus, DanMS, Gaius Cornelius, Los688, ColonelKasatka,
Ytcracker, Ormondroyd, FF2010, Canley, GrinBot~enwiki, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, John Lunney, Ccreitz, Gjs238, Mauls, Chris the
speller, Jprg1966, Maxsonbd, Kirbyple, Harumphy, Hippo43, Adamantios, Bowlhover, Gamgee, A.R., ALR, Ohconfucius, Dave314159,
LWF, Jacopo, Peter Horn, Hu12, Big davej, Teemuk, DouglasCalvert, Iridescent, JoeBot, Linkspamremover, Recondaddy, CmdrObot,
Barreto, Cydebot, Mike1979 Russia, Shirulashem, Nabokov, Thijs!bot, Hcberkowitz, Oosh, Dougher, Bjenks, Erxnmedia, JAnDbot,
YaZug, WLU, Jim.henderson, Anaxial, R'n'B, Kateshortforbob, CommonsDelinker, Shoghi, Maurice Carbonaro, L337 kybldmstr, Cpi-
ral, Cromdog, M-le-mot-dit, Stambouliote, Olegwiki, AzureCitizen, RJASE1, Hugo999, TreasuryTag, Philip Trueman, TedColes, Aaron
Rotenberg, UnitedStatesian, Tmaull, @pple, CarlosFlys, SieBot, Ahrii, The1marauder, Mark Klamberg, Lightmouse, Bert Schlossberg,
Cyfal, Comint, ImageRemovalBot, Martarius, Binksternet, TableManners, Wutsje, Mild Bill Hiccup, Superdude2077, Niceguyedc, Rox-
port, Aaroncorey, Piledhigheranddeeper, Sv1xv, Specialmissions, Morana, Tylerdmace, Gtstricky, Monsignore~enwiki, Caalip, Dopren-
dek, Addbot, Poco a poco, Mabdul, Fyrael, MrOllie, AnnaFrance, U-bootwisky, Aditya.m4, MuZemike, Jarble, Quantumobserver, Ettrig,
, Signalworks, VP-bot, Yobot, TheThomas, Mohlam12, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, Senor Freebie, Citation
bot, DynamoDegsy, LilHelpa, Gabriel1907, Omnipaedista, Anotherclown, Miyagawa, Philippe Nicolai-Dashwood, Dead Mary, FrescoBot,
Nageh, Bambuway, Citation bot 1, Jonesey95, Rochdalehornet, Gay bashers, Enemenemu, Trappist the monk, Lotje, Aoidh, DexDor,
Tommy2010, Ida Shaw, , Bamyers99, Aeonx, H3llBot, BP OMowe, Noodleki, ChuispastonBot, Zabanio, Miguel.baillon, Clue-
Bot NG, Nikita.perestoronin, MerlIwBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Gob Lofa, Joeykai, Ninney, Dainomite, NotWith, SD5bot, DA - DP,
Mogism, GabeIglesia, Rybec, Radio1963, Dodi 8238, Gavleson, *thing goes, Monkbot, Filedelinkerbot, Gsantella and Anonymous: 131

12.2 Images
File:120715_Grondstation_Nationale_SIGINT_Organisatie_(NSO)_Burum_Fr_NL.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/7/70/120715_Grondstation_Nationale_SIGINT_Organisatie_%28NSO%29_Burum_Fr_NL.jpg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Wutsje
File:A52_Oste.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f0/A52_Oste.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors:
Self-photographed Original artist: KleeBuchemer 19:37, 18. Aug. 2007 (CEST)
File:Bletchley_Park_last_German_intercept.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/dd/Bletchley_Park_
last_German_intercept.JPG License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Created by Magnus Manske. Original artist: Magnus Manske
File:Colossus.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4b/Colossus.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
This le is from the collections of The National Archives (United Kingdom), catalogued under document record FO850/234. For high
quality reproductions of any item from The National Archives collection please contact the image library.
Original artist: Unknown<a href='//www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q4233718' title='wikidata:Q4233718'><img alt='wikidata:Q4233718'
src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Wikidata-logo.svg/20px-Wikidata-logo.svg.png' width='20'
height='11' srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Wikidata-logo.svg/30px-Wikidata-logo.svg.png 1.5x,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Wikidata-logo.svg/40px-Wikidata-logo.svg.png 2x' data-le-width='1050'
data-le-height='590' /></a>
File:DirectionalSpectra.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f0/DirectionalSpectra.png License: CC BY 3.0
Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz
File:Fbi_duquesne.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Fbi_duquesne.jpg License: Public domain Con-
tributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Har_Avital.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Har_Avital.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.0 Contribu-
tors: GCC Trip To Israel in 2007 Original artist: Marion Doss
File:JSC-Databases-and-Flow.GIF Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/JSC-Databases-and-Flow.GIF Li-
cense: Public domain Contributors: http://www.gordon.army.mil/AC/Fall/Fall%2001/JSCmtrc.htm Original artist: ?
File:Menwith-hill-radomes.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Menwith-hill-radomes.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Matt Crypto
File:SAR-Lupe.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4b/SAR-Lupe.jpg License: GFDL Contributors: http:
//ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:SarLupe.JPG Original artist: Marshall80
File:SpectrumAnalyzer-Superhet.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/SpectrumAnalyzer-Superhet.
png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz
File:Ztel2.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/14/Ztel2.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original
artist: ?

12.3 Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0