PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATIONS V COMELEC

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create
the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could beTHE
BASIS OF the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the
regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner
is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional
provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have
not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and
honest.

ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are
less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the
scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE VS AQUINO

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May
22, 1986)

FACTS:

1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602

Facts:

Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay
dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986
signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating

Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar
memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:

Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:

No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,
1987 and not December 1, 1986.
2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer
in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article
XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.
Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has
been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

ALIH VS CASTRO

Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987

Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A
shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of
men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger printing,
paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned
to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they
were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation
of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners
did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was
no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as
criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.

The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as
evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in
court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of

the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-
incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
CASTRO ALIH

lih vs. Castro CASE DIGEST

151 SCRA 279

June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compoundoccupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A
shoot-out ensuedafter petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of
men. The followingmorning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger

printing, paraffin testing andphotographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle,
grenades and ammunitions were alsoconfiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned
to themand invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they
wereacting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation
of thepeace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of
thepetitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and
areinadmissible as evidence against them.
Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners
didnot excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution
againstunreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and
should beprotected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore,
there was noshowing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners
as criminals orfugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the

fruits

of the poisonous

tree

were held inadmissible as evidencein any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by
the respondents was done without awarrant and so the items seized during said operation should
not be acknowledged in court asevidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the
law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of

theprovision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-
incrimination

applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18
The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition ofthe use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his

body as evidence when it may be material.

HOR V FRAANCISCO

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June
2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.