EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR

IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette
will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs.
Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the
view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and
limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available,
have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended
so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all
other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
seven.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS

FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES
P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S.
PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek

1
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in
the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to
the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a
general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because,
if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself
is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those
in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings

2
 no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to
institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people,
has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed
is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme

3
Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

4
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under
the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor
the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced
by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-
G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in
said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule
65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this
Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto

5
by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified
the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and
periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in
the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case
at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the
subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and
as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

6
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse,
if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma
G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding
was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within
his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and
name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is
overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier
filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,
1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy,"
which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that
article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

7
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will
suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have
been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has
not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is
already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do
not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage,
a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing
spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from
the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

8
 xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3)
upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the
system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.

9
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the
other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation.
Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding
of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. 99-1211 January 28, 2000

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of
Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a
copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar alleging

a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; . . .

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal
sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason
at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City
Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my
marriage was not registered; . . .

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the
Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of
the Local Civil Registrar.

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

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In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances:

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his
station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment,
complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in
said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for
abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage
would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer
and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as
sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be
out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and
necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for
the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad;
and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered
impracticable by the parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid
marriage, which respondent found all in order.1wphi1.nt

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent

realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so
doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent:

3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent
left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage
ceremonies were held, intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
keep the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating
to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files,
all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by
subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw
complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding
party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr.
Yman's claim.

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country,
a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this
dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her
husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but that said husband
admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems

11
 reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with
the missing copies of the marriage certificate.

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the
public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents
in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in
the City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil
Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt
with more severely pointing out that:

As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein
a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala,
to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:

It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to
send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after
the marriage, to the local civil register of the place where the marriage was solemnized. .
. . (emphasis ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-
feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting
that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of
such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is
based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.

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After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the OCA
well-taken.

Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this
country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are
largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent
the bringing about a condition that would shake its foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that

Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (Emphasis ours)

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the point of death
or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge
further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he
was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for
citizens to get married."

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and
render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge is not only bound by
oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. 5

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in
this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the hierarchy of social
institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on its significance in our
culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns
upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct
an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior
authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to

13
know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. 6 Thus respondent Judge should be
reminded that

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 7

Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. 8

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in
the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance
with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article
8. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that
the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court
because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. 11

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This
Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

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