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VITUG v. CA G.R. No. 82028
March 29, 1990 J. Sarmiento
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Mortis Causa
SUMMARY: Romarico Vitug filed a motion asking the court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the
estate to cover his advances from his own saving account.
Corona, as executrix of Mrs. Vitug, opposed the motion on the
ground that the savings account was conjugal property. The SC
ruled that the account was indeed Romaricos through a
survivorship agreement which gave him full ownership of the
account upon the death of his wife. It rejected the theory that it
was a conveyance mortis causa since the conveyance was not
embodied in a will.
FACTS:
Jan 13, 1985: Romarico Vitug filed a motion asking for
authority for the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and
real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate (P667,731.66) which he claimed were
from personal funds.
Rowena Corona, as executrix of Mrs. Vitug, opposed
the motion to sell.
o (Ground: the same funds withdrawn from the savings
account 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and
part of the estate).
Vitug claims that the said funds are his exclusive
property having acquired the same through a survivorship
agreement executed with his late wife and the Bank of America
on June 1970:
o all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or
either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account
shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to
and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our
lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to
and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall
be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
or survivors.
TC: granted the motion (Ground: valid agreement).
CA: agreement was a conveyance mortis causa and
did not comply with the formalities.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: In Rivera v. People's Bank and
Trust Co. and Macam v. Gatmaitan, SC sustained the validity
of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory
contracts.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in its ruling YES
HELD:
- The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs.
Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired
upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings
account No. 35342-038.
- [DOCTRINE]: The conveyance is not one of mortis
causa, which should be embodied in a will.
o A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes
of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties
to take effect after his death." (The bequest or device must
pertain to the testator.)
o In this case, the monies subject of savings account No.
35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds.
o Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co.: SC rejected
claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one
party's separate properties in favor of the other. It only proved
their joint holdings/account.
o Macam v. Gatmaitan: It was held that the parties
reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another
conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death
determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right
by the one or the other depended.
o There is no showing that the funds exclusively
belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be
conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the
marital relations.
NICE TO KNOW:
- The survivorship agreement is neither a donation inter
vivos as it would take effect after the death of one.
- It is also not a donation between spouses because it
involved no conveyance of a spouses own property to another.
- The agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership by "mere stipulation" and that it is no
"cloak" to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations.
o The spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank
account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as
an "and/or" account.
o Case At Bar: when the spouses Vitug opened savings
account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably
been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
- The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason
of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract
imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death
which is permitted by the Civil Code.
o ART. 2010 (OCC). By an aleatory contract, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do
something in consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is
to occur at an indeterminate time.
o Under the Art. 2010, the fulfillment of an aleatory
contract depends on either the happening of an event which is
(1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time."
o A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake
ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a
contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et
sequentia, has been categorized under the second.
o In either case, the element of risk is present.
o In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party
and survivorship of the other.
- Although the survivorship agreement is per se not
contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law.
o For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to
transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of
a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such
grounds.
o No such unlawful purpose was proved.
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DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD,
PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, Petitioners,
versus
ZENAIDA ALUAD, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and
respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).Crispin was
the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677,
680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his
wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document
entitled Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos (Deed
of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria covering all the
six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title
over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matildes name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by
a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed
a last will and testament,devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and
680 to Maria, and her remaining properties including Lot
No. 674 to respondent. Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while
Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent.
The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996,
held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
By Decision of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of
Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos,
and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of
a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed
by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not
in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation
mortis causa and have complied with the formalities of a will.
RULING:
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observedbut they were not, as it was
witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following
Article 805 of the Civil Code.Further, the witnesses did not even
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sign the attestation clausethe execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the
affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of
the will.
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PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL. v. MANUELA REBACA
POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-20234, 23 December 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and
Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the
local dialect whereby they willed that two parcels of land owned
and acquired by them during their marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to a niece, Manuela
Rebaca. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the
aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, by
Order of October 31, 1939, admitted it for probate.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952,
another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952. For
failure of the Manuela R. Potot and her attorney to appear, the
case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.
The Court of First Instance declared the testament null and void,
for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the
Civil Code, but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of
Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and
conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of
probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the
fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity
of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally,
or in favor of a third party. The error thus committed by the
probate court was an error of law, that should have been
corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of
the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision,
however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for
the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world, and public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also,
to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in
1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband,
Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the
share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court
acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not
then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil
Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate
of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined
and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the
court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited
by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question.
-----------------------xxx-----------------------
Dacanay v. Florendo
September 19, 1950| Ozeta, J. | Governing Law; Joint Wills
Digester: Anna Mickaella Lingat
SUMMARY: Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate a joint and
reciprocal will with his deceased wife Isabel Florendo. The will
provides that he will inherit all the properties of Florendo. The
relative of Florendo opposed the probate. The trial court
dismissed the petition for probate on the ground that the said will
is null and void ab initio for violating Art 669 of the Civil Code.
Dacanay argues that the prohibition of Art 669 is against joint
wills and not reciprocal wills and that Art 669 is already repealed,
contending that whether two wills should be executed conjointly
or separately is but a matter of extrinsic formality. The Court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court and held that the reason for
the provisions is that when a will is made jointly or in the same
instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will
or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will
for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or
she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but
reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen to be
unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, may be tempted
to kill or dispose of the other. The Court ruled that considering
the wisdom of the provision and that fact that it is not yet
expressly repealed, Art 669 is still in force.
DOCTRINE: The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code
prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons
conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is
not against public policy.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband
and wife, is that when a will is made jointly or in the same
instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will
or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will
for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or
she desires to favor.
And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of
the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked,
faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of
the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal
and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or
dispose of the other.
FACTS:
Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate a joint and
reciprocal will with his deceased wife Isabel V. Florendo. The
will provides in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint
testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties
of the latter, with an agreement as to how the surviving spouse
shall dispose of the properties in case of his or her demise.
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The relative of deceased Isabel Florendo opposed the
probate of said will on various statutory grounds.
Trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
probate on the ground that the said will is null and void ab initio
having been executed in violation of Art 669, CC.
RULING: Order appealed from is affirmed
Whether the joint and reciprocal will of the spouses is void? -
YES
Dacanays arguments:
o The prohibition of Article 669 of the Civil Code is
directed against the execution of a joint will, or the expression
by two or more testators of their wills in a single document and
by one act, rather than against mutual or reciprocal wills, which
may be separately executed.
o Upon this premise, however, he argues that Article 669
has been repealed by Act. No. 190, which he claims provides
for and regulates the extrinsic formalities of wills, contending
that whether two wills should be executed conjointly or
separately is but a matter of extrinsic formality.
COURT:
The Court cites the case In re Will of Victor Bilbao,
which involves a joint will executed also by the spouses. The
petitioning spouse also forwarded the same argument -- that Art
669 of the Civil Code has been repealed by Secs. 614 and 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.
In that case, the Court said, through Mr. Justice
Montemayor:
o The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting
the execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in
the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public
policy.
o The reason for this provision, especially as regards
husband and wife, is that when a will is made jointly or in the
same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger
in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of
the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons
whom he or she desires to favor.
o And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the
terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both
conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted
to kill or dispose of the other.
o Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article
669 and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least not
expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not
incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the
subject of wills, we believe and rule that said article 669 of the
Civil Code is still in force.
o The Court is not alone in this opinion. The following
cites that the articles is still in force:
Mr. Justice Willard as shown by his Notes on the Civil
Code, believes that this article 669 is still in force.
Sinco and Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code,
Vol. II, favorably cite Justice Willard's opinion that this article is
still in force.

Judge Camus in his book on the Civil Code does not
include this article among those he considers repealed.
o Lastly, we find that this article 669 has been
reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386). The implication is that the Philippine
Legislature that passed this Act and approved the New Civil
Code, including the members of the Code Commission who
prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669
of the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
NOTES:
Art 669, CC: Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly
or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for
the benefit of a third person.
Art 818, NCC: Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly,
or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for
the benefit of a third person.
Art 819, NCC: Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country
where they may have been executed.
----------------------xxx---------------------
Johnny Rabadilla vs Court of Appeals
FACTS :
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition
was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister
of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the
near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria
Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or
sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny
Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel
Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza
because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms
of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and
that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank,
which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants
in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and
not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja
had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can
substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of
the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to
comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.
Page |4
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit.
The near descendants being referred to in the will are the heirs
of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was
already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence,
when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same
property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of
succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by
his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by
virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time
of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death
also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have
continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do
so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the
property to the estate of Aleja.
------------------------xxx---------------------
Seangio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
FACTS
There was a petition for the probate of an alleged
holographic will which was denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-
aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents,
the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir,
devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will
it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court
is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on
preterition did not apply because Segundos will did not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed
where petitioners argued as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3
and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively
mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of
said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator
Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,
Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition
in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in
the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the
holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid,
respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of
the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the
intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render
nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the
Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as
a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of
a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms
of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of
Page |5
the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by
one who is not learned in the law should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument
and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was
intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was
executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.
-----------------------xxx----------------------
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of
partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which
will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition
should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the
specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the
testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted
to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather
than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises
to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific
properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be
in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in
the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note
the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called
compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration,
the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by
designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the
testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate
called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of
Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with
Article 886.
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was
survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1
legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the
others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and
written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory
heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her
properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and
personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar
Central Devt Co

3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was
name the executor of the deceaseds estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be
divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition where
she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition,
Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition
adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was
P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or properties
specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties
that they received in the will less the cash/properties to complete
their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a
counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were
to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of
partition citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide that
when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the
oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution
of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered
controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to
be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva
v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed
law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an
early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed
clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and
complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the
oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent
was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted
that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for the probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid,
Page |6
she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that
my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each
real property in her estate and designated the particular heir
among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project
of partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the properties
respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent
in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were
taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas,
who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal
provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would
reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate
as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the
estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory
heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a
distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will,
contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and
obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's
will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered
all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the
will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save
for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition
her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of
adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account
of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly
borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately
following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph
in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall
die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because
here, distribution and partition of the entire estate was made by
the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations

during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by
will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of
the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR
LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has
been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they
can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion
of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix
principally to the executrix-appellee.
---------------------------xxx-------------------------
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa. Marcelino
Casas, applicant and appellant
Malcolm, J. Nov. 7, 1918 No. 14074
Doctrine Law governing form: All statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the
purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the
doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect.
Summary Riosa executed a will in 1908 in accordance
with the law then in force, but said law was amended by Act No.
2645 in 1916. The latter added formalities for the signing and
attestation of the will. Riosa died in 1917, however, without
having left a will that conformed to the new requirements. Thus,
the trial court disallowed the will. The Supreme Court reversed
the order and held that whats controlling is the law existing on
the date of the execution of the will, not that which was existing
at the death of the testator. The will was declared as valid.
Facts
- Jose Riosa executed a will on January 1908 in which
he disposed his estate worth P35,000. It was in conformity with
Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Act No. 2645 took effect after July 1,1916, amending
Sec. 618, and it added additional formalities for the signing and
attestation of wills.
- Thus, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and
attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed
by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and
every page, nor did the attestation state these facts.
- Riosa died on April 17, 1917, without having left a will
which conformed to the new law. The trial court disallowed the
will.
Ratio/
Issues 1. Whether the law existing on the date of the
execution of a will or that existing at the death of the testator
controls (The date of the wills execution)
COURT: a. The instant case presents a situation wherein the
will was made prior to the new law and the testator died after
said law took effect. However, there is a cleavage of authority
among the cases and text-writers as to the effect of the change
in the statutes. Three rules were considered, but in deciding
Page |7
which was to be applied, the Court depended more on reason
than technicality.
b. First rule was that the statutes in force at the testator's death
are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with
such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at
the time it was made.
The reason for its application in other jurisdictions was
that as until the testators death, the paper executed by him,
expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act
which may or may not be a will.
c. Second rule states that the validity of the execution of a will
must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution
and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective
effect.
This was the old English view, as held in English cases,
but also a modern view. On ruling out the retrospective effect of
the law, it was held that retrospective laws generally work
injustice and ought to be construed only when the mandate of
the legislature is imperative.
When a testator makes a will, formally executed
according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of
its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though
before his death.
It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of
the testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take
effect until then. General words apply to the property of which
the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of
revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing or
devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though
to go into effect at a future time.
This was applied by the Court. In doing so, it held that,
citing the general rule of statutory construction, all statutes are
to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless
the purpose and intention of the Legislature is to give them
retrospective effect.
The language of Act No. 2645 did not indicate a
retrospective effect. Also, section 634 of the Code of Civil
Procedure states that a will shall be disallowed if not executed
and attested as provided by this Code.
d. Third rule states that statutes relating to the execution of wills,
when they increase the necessary formalities, should be
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made
and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be
construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to
the law in force at the time of their making.
HELD Order reversed
-----------------------xxx----------------------
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND
SANCHO ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.
v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament.

Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943. He
left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946,
one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins
and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he
left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote
out the will in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood, and that he signed on the left hand margin of the
front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic
numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing
at the last page. All this was done in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will. The said
three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each
other.
The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic
will. Although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law,
still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was
to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a
liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated
January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will as the Last Will
and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
appealed from that decision, and because only questions of law
are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme
Court by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will
executed before the New Civil Code may be considered for
probate as such during the effectivity of the same.
RULING:
No.
At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were
not permitted. The law at the time imposed certain requirements
for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator
and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were
not complied with. The failure of the testator and his witnesses
to sign on the left hand margin of every page vitiates the
testament.
What is the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father
Abadia? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code
which not allows holographic wills? But article 795 of this same
new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to
its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity
of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in
court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but
at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support
of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is
Page |8
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a
completed act.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator
should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate
remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to
carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen
the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of
the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the
legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a
will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs
will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law
with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights
in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.
-------------------------xxx---------------------
Miciano vs. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo
is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to
this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition
in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things,
provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs,
36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish
laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be
given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain
testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove
such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with
the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor
was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court
in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not
being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he
is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken
into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part
of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the
other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of
my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in
the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect
this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
Page |9
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who,
by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of
the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10
of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator
is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above
cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective
even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding
the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing
that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one
of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without
any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
----------------------xxx------------------------
Cayetano v. Leonidas
(May 30, 1984)
Doctrine: Intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during
probate of will. The attested will is still valid even if the
compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime because the
decedent, at the time of his death, was a citizen of US, and was
governed by Pennsylvania law which does not have a system of
legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion can therefore dispose of
her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share in her
estate. (My formulation)
Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen
naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US
which did not leave anything to her father, who was her sole
compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already
a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply

as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father
would not have anything)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul
orders of respondent judge of CFI of Manila which admitted to
probate and allowed last will of Adoracion Campos, after the ex-
parte presentation of evidence by private respondent.
PONENTE: Gutierrez, 1st Division
FACTS:
Decedent: Adoracion Campos
Surviving heirs:
o Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir
o Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta
Medina
-Hermogenes executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of
Adoracion
-11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate
of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US
and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased testatrix.
- An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
Hermogenes:
o will in question is a forgery
o intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void
o even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions
are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him
- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver
of Rights or Interests): confirms validity of will
-TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate in RP
- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief:
o alleged that withdrawal of his opposition was secured
through fraud (he was made to sign papers, inserted among
them, the withdrawal.)
- motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order
of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
-TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of it
WILL:
o Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania at the time she made the will
o She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her
sister
o Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated
and registered in Penn. after her death
Issues/Held/Ratio:
WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during
probate of the will? YES.
GR: probate court's authority is limited only to:
the extrinsic validity of the will
due execution
testatrix's testamentary capacity
Compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law
P a g e | 10
Exception: where practical considerations demand intrinsic
validity to be passed upon
WON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived
of his legitime? YES.
It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at
the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent: law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code]
Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give
away entire estate to strangers!
WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of
share) is against public policy? NO
-cited Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals.
Was Hermogenes Campos denied due process?
There was no denial of due process in this case. As regards the
alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the
records will bear that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates was Hermogenes petition for relief and not
his motion to vacate order. There is no reason why he was led
to believe otherwise. The Court even admonished Hermogenes
for his failure to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process.
DISPOSITION: Dismissed
--------------------------xxx------------------------
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United
States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss,
Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June
1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by
Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who
notarized the testators will, after the testator instructed him on
the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary
public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him
time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The
formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned
he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will
Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind.
 P a g e | 11

2. Josefina conspired with the notary public; and

3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the will. 2. W/N the signature of Placido in
the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife
as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will
did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud
in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or

pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature
or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate
to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception
regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging
the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence
of fraud. Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
Because the law does not even require that a notarial will be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The
variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and
attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the
notary public and instrumental witnesses.