Page 1
REPUBLIC v. UMALI
G.R. No. 80687
Apr. 10, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversion of a
parcel of land on the ground that the
original sale thereof from the
government was tainted with fraud
because based on a forgery and
therefore void ab initio. The present
holders of the property claiming to
be innocent purchasers for value
and not privy to the alleged forgery,
contend that the action cannot lie
against them.
The land in question is situated in
Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865
square meters. 1 It was originally
purchased on installment from the
government on July 1, 1910 by
Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly
transferred her rights thereto in
favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio
and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in
1922. 2 Tomasa and Julio assigned
their shares to Martina, Maria and
Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three
assignees purportedly signed a joint
affidavit which was filed with the
Bureau of Lands to support their
claim that they were entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title over
the said land on which they said
they had already made full payment.
4 On the basis of this affidavit, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources executed Deed No. V-
10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on
September 10, 1971, in favor of the
said affiants. 5 Subsequently, on
October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044
(replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180)
was issued by the register of deeds
of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal,
Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of
Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz
Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion
was filed on October 10, 1985, the
registered owners of the land,
following several transfers, were
Remedios Miclat under TCT No.
80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No.
80393, and Rosalina, Luz and
Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394.
7 They were named as defendants
and asked to return the property to
the State on the aforestated grounds
of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff
claimed that Gregorio Cenizal
having died on February 25, 1943,
and Maria Cenizal on January 8,
1959, they could not have signed the
joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971,
on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale
Certificate No. 1280) was based. 8
In their answer, Pulido and the
Navals denied any participation in
the joint affidavit and said they had
all acquired the property in good
faith and for value. By way of
affirmative defenses, they invoked
estoppel, laches, prescription and
res judicata. 9 For her part, Miclat
moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that the government had
no cause of action against her
because there was no allegation that
she had violated the plaintiff's right,
that the government was not the
real party-in-interest because the
subject land was already covered by
the Torrens system, and that in any
event the action was barred by
prescription or laches. 10
The respondent court, in its order
dated October 2, 1987, granted the
motion. 11 The petitioner,
contesting this order, now insists
that it has a valid cause of action and
that it is not barred by either
prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset
that the joint affidavit is indeed a
forgery. Apart from the fact that two
of the supposed affiants were
already dead at the time they were
supposed to have signed the sworn
statement, even the most cursory
examination of the document will
show that the three signatures
affixed thereto were written by one
and the same hand. 12 There is no
doubt about it. It is indeed difficult
to understand how such an obvious
forgery could have deceived the
people in the Bureau of Lands who
processed the papers of this case
and made possible the fraudulent
transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the
sale itself be considered null and
void from the start, as the petitioner
insists, so as to make all titles
derived therefrom also ineffectual
ab initio?
We agree with the contention that
there is no allegation in the
complaint 13 filed by the petitioner
that any one of the defendants was
privy to the forged joint affidavit or
that they had acquired the subject
land in bad faith. Their status as
innocent transferees for value was
never questioned in that pleading.
Not having been disproved, that
status now accords to them the
protection of the Torrens System
and renders the titles obtained by
them thereunder indefeasible and
conclusive. The rule will not change
despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration
Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title
for value in good faith shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except
those noted on said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are
indeed as numerous as they are
consistent:
Page 2
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529
(then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act),
every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered
land taking a certificate of title for
value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted
on the certificate and any of the
encumbrances which may be
subsisting, and enumerated in the
law. Under said provision, claims
and liens of whatever character,
except those mentioned by law as
existing against the land prior to the
issuance of certificate of title, are cut
off by such certificate if not noted
thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world,
including the government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled
to the protection of Sec. 39 of the
Land Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens
System of land registration is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of
registration in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once the
title was registered, the owner
might rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador
de su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land. 16
The decision in Pin ero v. Director of
Lands 17 is not applicable to the
present proceeding because the
lands involved in that case had not
yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. They
were still held by the Pineros. The
action for reversion was filed by the
government against them as the
original transferees of the
properties in question. They were
the direct grantees of the free
patents issued by the government
pursuant to which the
corresponding certificates of title
were issued under the Torrens
system. The fraud alleged by the
government as a ground for the
reversion sought was imputable
directly to the Pineros, who could
not plead the status of innocent
purchasers for value.
The difference between them and
the private respondents is that the
latter acquired the land in question
not by direct grant but in fact after
several transfers following the
original sale thereof to Bobadilla in
1910. The presumption is that they
are innocent transferees for value in
the absence of evidence to the
contrary. The petitioner contends
that it was Pedro Miclat who caused
the falsification of the joint affidavit,
but that is a bare and hardly
persuasive allegation, and indeed,
even if true, would still not prove
any collusion between him and the
private respondents. The mere fact
that Remedios Miclat was the
daughter and heiress of Miclat,
without more, would not necessarily
visit upon her the alleged sins of her
father.
The Solicitor General also argues
that Remedios is an extension of the
juridical personality of her father
and so cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser for value
because she is charged with
knowledge of her father's deceit.
Such conclusion has no basis in fact
or law. Moreover, there is evidence
that Remedios did not merely
inherit the land but actually
purchased it for valuable
consideration and without
knowledge of its original defect. The
agreement to subdivide, 18 which
she presented to show that she had
acquired the land for valuable
confederation, is more acceptable
than the conjectures of the
petitioner. It is also consonant with
the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered
under the Torrens system in the
names of the private respondents,
the government has no more control
or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer
part of the public domain or, as the
Solicitor General contends as if it
made any difference of the Friar
Lands. The subject property ceased
to be public land when OCT No. 180
was issued to Florentina Bobadilla
in 1910 or at the latest from the
date it was sold to the Cenizals in
1971 upon full payment of the
purchase price. As private registered
land, it is governed by the
provisions of the Land Registration
Act, now denominated the Property
Registration Decree, which applies
even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land
Registration Act was Section 122,
which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in
the Philippine Islands belonging to
the Government of the United States
or to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands. 19
This should be related to Section 12
of the Friar Lands Act, providing
thus:
Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the
final installment together with all
accrued interest, the Government
Page 3
will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by
him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued
and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred
and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the
Land Registration Act.
The petitioner claims that it is not
barred by the statute of limitations
because the original transfer of the
land was null and void ab initio and
did not give rise to any legal right.
The land therefore continued to be
part of the public domain and the
action for this reversion could be
filed at any time. The answer to that
is the statement made by the Court
in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran
Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even
if respondent Tagwalan eventually is
proven to have procured the patent
and the original certificate of title by
means of fraud, the land would not
revert back to the State," precisely
because it has become private land.
Moreover, the petitioner errs in
arguing that the original transfer
was null and void ab initio, for the
fact is that it is not so. It was only
voidable. The land remained private
as long as the title thereto had not
been voided, but it is too late to do
that now. As the Court has held in
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21
A certificate of title fraudulently
secured is not null and void ab
initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part
of the public domain, although it is
not. In such case the nullity arises,
not from the fraud or deceit, but
from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. Inasmuch as the land
involved in the present case does
not belong to such category, OCT No.
282-A would be merely voidable or
reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs.
Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113):
(1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2)
although valid and effective, until
annulled or reviewed in a direct
proceeding therefor (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590), not
collaterally (Sorongon vs.
Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259, 262;
Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89
Phil. 184; Henderson vs. Garrido, 90
Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs. Sambilon,
107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the
statutory period therefor (Sec. 38,
Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33
Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs. Paterno,
34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial
Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs.
Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs.
Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs.
Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of
Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70
Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title
would be conclusive against the
whole world, including the
Government (Legarda vs. Saleeby,
31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs.
Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason
vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).
And as we declared in Municipality
of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources:
22
. . . Once a patent is registered and
the corresponding certificate of title
is issued, the land ceases to be part
of public domain and becomes
private property over which the
director of Lands has neither control
nor jurisdiction. A public land
patent, when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds, is
a veritable Torrens Title, and
becomes as indefeasible as Torrens
Title upon the expiration of one (1)
year from the date of issuance
thereof. Said title is, like one issued
pursuant to a judicial decree, subject
to review within one (1) year from
the date of the issuance of the
patent. Beyond said period, the
action for the annulment of the
certificate of title issued upon the
land grant can no longer be
entertained. (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth observing here that in
two earlier cases, the private
respondents were challenged by the
heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson but
both were dismissed and the titles
of the registered owners were
confirmed by the trial court. 23 This
decision was later sustained by this
Court. 24 While this is not to say
that the present petition is barred
by res judicata, as the government
was not a party in these cases, it
does suggest that the issue it wants
to rake up now has long been
settled. It should not be the subject
of further judicial inquiry, especially
at this late hour. Litigation must stop
at some point instead of dragging on
interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in
this country because it was believed
to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on
the assurance that the seller's title
thereto is valid, he should not run
the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to
him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence
in the system would be eroded and
land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of
ownership. The further
consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more
numerous and complex than they
are now and possibly also more
abrasive if not even violent. The
government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder
Page 4
once the conditions laid down by
the law are satisfied. As in this case.
We find that the private respondents
are transferees in good faith and for
value of the subject property and
that the original acquisition thereof,
although fraudulent, did not affect
their own titles. These are valid
against the whole world, including
the government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
PINO v. CA
G.R. No. 94114
June 19, 1991
PARAS, J.:
The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21457
which affirmed in toto, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of
Echague, Isabela, Branch 24 in Civil
Case No. 24-0190, the dispositive
portion of which latter decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale made by Rafaela
Donato Vda. de Gaffud in favor of the
defendant on June 10, 1970 over Lot
6-B of the subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-68395 being a portion of Lot 6
of the Echague Cadastre LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 1063, containing an area of
11,095 square meters, more or less,
null and void insofar as the shares of
Cicero Gaffud and Raymundo Gaffud
are concerned, which is one-half-
thereof, or approximately 5,547.5
square meters, more or less;
2. Ordering the cancellation of
TCT No. 49380 in the name of the
defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to
reconvey one-half of the property
subject of this proceeding to the
plaintiffs within ten (10) days from
finality of this Decision, failing
which the same shall be done at the
cost of the defendant by the Clerk of
Court and such act, when so done,
shall have like effect as if done by
her;
4. Ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiffs P5,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
is now being assailed in the instant
petition for certiorari upon the
ground
THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION PETITION
I (Raymundo and Cicero are the sons
WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT AN
INNOCENT PURCHASER OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY;
II
WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT PRESCRIPTION WOULD NOT
LIE TO BAR PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' ACTION; and
III
WHEN IT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING AS VALID THE
TRANSFER OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FROM THE ORIGINAL
REGISTERED OWNERS TO RAFAELA
DONATO;
The pertinent background facts as
found by the trial court and adopted
by the respondent Court of Appeals
in its now assailed decision are the
following:
The property subject of the
controversy is a parcel of land
situated in Echague, Isabela,
identified as Lot 6-B of the
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-68395,
being a portion of Lot 6 containing
an area of 11,095 square meters,
more or less.
Lot 6 has an area of 12,799 square
meters, more or less. It was
acquired in 1924 by the spouses
Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato.
Juan Gaffud died in 1936. On
January 11, 1938, Lot 6 was
originally registered in the
Registration Book of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Isabela,
under Original Certificate of Title
No. 4340 pursuant to Decree No.
650247 issued under L.R.C.
Cadastral Record No. 1063 in the
names of Rafaela Donato, Raymundo
Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud
of the spouses) as co-owners
thereof in fee simple subject to such
of the incumbrances mentioned in
Section 39 of said act and to Section
4, Rule 74, Rules of Court. The said
lot was sold to Rafaela Donato
through a Deed of Transfer which
cancelled O.C.T. No. 4340 and in lieu
thereof T.C.T. No. T-30407 was
issued in the name of Rafaela
Donato.
On February 25, 1967, Rafaela
Donato sold a portion of said Lot 6,
consisting of 1,704 sq. m., more or
less in favor of Fortunato Pascua.
The aforesaid sale caused the
subdivision of the said Lot 6 into Lot
6-A containing an area of 1,704 sq.
m., more or less, and Lot 6-B
containing an area of 11,095 sq. m.,
Page 5
more or less, under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-68395.
Upon registration of said sale in
favor of Fortunato Pascua, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-30407 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
32683 was issued in the name of
Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967
covering the land designated as Lot
6-B of the subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd-68395, being a portion of Lot 6
of the Echague Cadastre, LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 1063, containing an area of
11,095 sq.m., more or less, which is
the subject land. (RTC Decision
dated November 15, 1988, p. 310
Record).
On June 10, 1970 Rafaela Donato
sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino
said Lot 6-B in consideration of
P10,000.00 as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale she executed
in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino
which was notarized by her lawyer,
Atty. Concepcion Tagudin (Exh. 1).
Rafaela Donato undertook to
register the Deed of Absolute Sale
with the Register of Deeds of Isabela
and on July 13, 1970 the sale was
inscribed therein under Entry No.
9286 and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-49380 was issued in the
name of Felicisima Pino.
On September 30, 1980, Cicero
Gaffud died survived by his wife
Demetria Gaffud and sons Romualdo
Gaffud and Adolfo Gaffud who are
the private respondents herein.
On March 9, 1982, private
respondents filed a complaint for
nullity of sale and reconveyance
against petitioner Felicisima
Pino. Incidentally, the sale of the
other portion (Lot A) of the same lot
to Fortunato Pascua is not assailed
by private respondents.
During the pendency of the case
before the trial court, Rafaela
Donato (who was not a party to the
case) died on November her 26,
1982.
On November 5, 1988, the trial court
rendered its decision (the
dispositive portion of which was
earlier quoted in this decision)
which was affirmed on appeal by the
Court of Appellant in its now
assailed decision, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
The defense of an innocent
purchaser for value would be of no
help to appellant in the absence of
the document on extrajudicial
partition indicating that the
conjugal property has been
adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda.
de Gaffud and which would be the
source of her authority in
transferring the subject property to
defendant. The sensible thing to do
by any prudent person is to examine
not only the certificate of title of
said property but also all the factual
circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaw in
vendor's capacity to transfer the
land.
Nor would prescription of action lie.
An ordinary action for reconveyance
based on fraud prescribes in four
(4) years (Lanera v. Lopos, 106 Phil.
70). Appellant was a party to the
alleged fraudulent transfer of the
subject property, consequently,
appellees have four (4) years to file
an action to annul the deed of sale
from the discovery of the fraudulent
act. In the case at bar, appellees
learned about the fraud on July 6,
1981 when they received a letter
from the appellant (Exhibit D). The
filing, therefore, of the complaint on
March 9, 1982 (p. 1. Rec.) was
within the prescriptive period. (pp.
62-63, Rollo)
In elevating the judgment of the
respondent Court of Appeals to Us
for review petitioner prays that the
appealed decision be reversed and
another one entered declaring as
valid (1) the sale of the subject
property executed on June 10, 1970
in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino
by Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud
and (2) the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-49380 issued in the
name of petitioner by the Register of
Deeds of Isabela on July 13, 1970
upon the grounds
(a) that private respondents
has (sic) no cause of action against
petitioner because she is an
innocent purchaser for value of the
subject property;
(b) that the action of private
respondents was already barred by
prescription when it was filed; and
(c) that the transfer of the
subject property from the original
registered owners to Rafaela Donato
was valid. (pp. 61-62, Rollo)
The rule applicable to this
controversy is well-settled. Where
the certificate of title is in the name
of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the
certificate of title. In the absence of
anything to excite or arouse
suspicion, said vendee is under no
obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of
the vendor appearing on the face of
said certificate. The rationale for the
rule is stated thus:
The main purpose of the Torrens'
System is to avoid possible conflicts
of title to real estate and to facilitate
transactions relative thereto by
giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of a Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense
with the need of inquiring further,
Page 6
except when the party concerned
had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make
such further inquiry. (Pascua v.
Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78) Thus, where
innocent third persons relying on
the correctness of the certificate
thus issued, acquire tights over the
property, the court cannot disregard
such rights. (Director of Land v.
Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606)
In the case at bar, the evidence on
record discloses that when
petitioner purchased the subject
property on June 10, 1970, the title
thereto (TCT No. T-32683) was in
the name of her vendor Rafaela
Donato alone. The said TCT No. T-
32683 was shown to petitioner
which shows on its face the
following:
is registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration
Act in the name of
RAFAELA DONATO, Filipino, of legal
age, widow and with residence and
postal address at Centro, Echague,
Isabela, Philippines as owner
thereof in fee simple, subject to such
of the encumbrances mentioned in
Section 39 of said Act as may be
subsisting, and to Section 4, Rule 74,
of the Rules of Court. (Ex. A, p. 169,
Record)
The lien imposed by Section 4, Rule
74, Rules of Court appears as
cancelled on April 8, 1969 under the
following entry:
Entry No. 2090 Petition
for cancellation of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of
the
D-340; P-75-1 Rules of Court
executed by Rafaela D.Vda. de
B-4; S-1969 Gaffud. Hence, by
virtue of which the lien appea-
R.M. Angubong, ring on the face of
this title is now cancelled.
Notary Public
Date of Instrument March 11,
1969
Date of Inscription April 2, 1969
Time: 12:30 p.m.
(Sgd.) ANASTACIO J. PASCUA
ANASTACIO J. PASCUA
Deputy Register of Deeds V
(Emphasis supplied) (p. 15, Rollo)
Petitioner was advised by her
lawyers that she could proceed to
buy the property because the same
was registered in the name of the
vendor. Thus, on pp. 13 & 14 of the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of
the hearing of December 12, 1986,
petitioner testified as follows:
Atty. Mallabo:
Q Before you brought this
property madam witness, were you
shown a copy of the title of Rafaela
Donato vda. de Gaffud on the
property?
A Yes, sir, she showed me the
title. And I saw that the title was in
her name.
Q When the offer was made to
you and the title was shown to you,
do you remember if you have done
anything?
A Yes, sir, before I bought the
property, I showed the documents
she bought to me to our lawyer,
Custodia Villalva and Concepcion
Tagudin.
Q Why did you show them the
title Madam witness?
A To be sure that the title
does not have any encumbrance and
because I do not know anything
about legal matters.
Q What did they advise you?
A Yes, Okey, I can proceed in
buying the property, the title was
registered in her name, it was her
personal property. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
In the case of Maguiling v. Umadhay,
(33 SCRA 99, 103) this Court held:
However, while the Umadhay
spouses cannot rely on the title, the
same not being in the name of their
grantor, respondent Crisanta S.
Gumban stands on a different
footing altogether. At the time she
purchased the land the title thereto
was already in the name of her
vendors (T.C.T, 15522). She had the
right to rely on what appeared on
the face of said title. There is
nothing in the record to indicate
that she knew of any unregistered
claims to or equities in the land
pertaining to other persons, such as
that of herein petitioner, or of any
other circumstances which should
put her on guard and cause her to
inquire behind the certificate.
According to the Court of Appeals
she took all the necessary
precautions to ascertain the true
ownership of the property, having
engaged the services of a lawyer for
the specific purpose and, it was only
after said counsel had assured her
that everything was in order did she
make the final arrangements to
purchase the property. The
appellate court's conclusion that
respondent Crisanta S. Gumban was
a purchaser in good faith and for
value is correct, and the title she has
thereof acquired is good and
indefeasible.
Petitioner paid the sum of
P10,000,00 in consideration of the
sale which is fair and reasonable
considering that in 1967 Fortunato
Page 7
Pascua paid the sum of P390.00 for
the portion of the land consisting of
1,704 square meters. (Exhs. 1 and 5)
The court a quo, however, ruled and
this was sustained by respondent
Court of Appeals that petitioner was
not an innocent purchaser.
The defense of an innocent
purchaser for value could be of no
help to appellant in the absence of
the document on extra-judicial
partition indicating that the
conjugal property has been
adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda.
de Gaffud and which would be the
source of her authority in
transferring the subject property to
defendant. The sensible thing to do
by any prudent person is to examine
not only the certificate of title of
said property but also all the factual
circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in
vendor's capacity to transfer the
land. (p. 10, Rollo)
We do not find any evidence in the
record that would sustain such a
finding. The extra-judicial partition
adverted to in said ruling was
executed by the heirs of Juan Gaffud
prior to, and as the basis for, the
issuance of the Original Certificate
of Title No. 4340 in the names of the
heirs of Juan Gaffud, as testified to
by witness Demetria Gaffud in this
wise:
Q Were you able to read the
title that was kept by your brother
in law?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was the registered
owner?
A Rafaela Donato, Raymundo
Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud, co-owner.
Q In other words, the title you
read appears that the owners were
Raymundo, Cicero and Rafaela?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know what a title
is ?
A Yes, it is thick.
Q You said that the property
was bought by Juan Gaffud and
Rafaela Gaffud, how come that there
is no name Juan Gaffud in the title?
A Because he was already
dead when I got married.
Q Do you have a knowledge
how the title come to have the name
of Raymundo, Rafaela and Cicero?
A Yes, sir. (p. 66, Rollo)
The extra-judicial settlement, upon
which was based the lien imposed
by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court,
was executed after the death of Juan
Gaffud in 1936 but before the
issuance of the original title on
January 11, 1938 so that the title
would be issued in the names of the
heirs of Juan Gaffud, namely: Rafaela
Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and
Cicero Gaffud.
This conclusion is supported (a) by
the fact that the subject property
was registered only on January 11,
1938, which is around two (2) years
after the death of Juan Gaffud in
1936, and therefore the title could
not have been issued in the name of
Juan Gaffud; (b) by the fact that the
lien imposed by Section 4, Rule 74,
Rules of Court was inscribed on the
face of the title itself and was not
entered on the Memorandum of
Encumbrances as were done with
the mortgages and their releases
which were inscribed under their
Entry Numbers on the page for
Memorandum of Encumbrances and
(c) by the fact that the Original
Certificate of Title was issued in the
names of the heirs of Juan Gaffud.
The extra-judicial settlement,
therefore, has no bearing on
whether or not there was fraud in
the transfer of the subject property
to Rafaela Donato.
On the other hand, it was a Deed of
Transfer which transferred the
subject property from the original
owners to Rafaela Donato as stated
in Exhibit 3 which is the petition to
cancel the conditions imposed by
Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court, to
wit:
That since the time of the execution
of the Deed of transfer from the
original owners to herein petitioner
in 1967, and also since the time of
the registration of the said transfer
at Register of Deeds of Isabela
last March 2, 1967, more than
two (2) years have already elapsed;
That from the time of the Deed of
Transfer and within the period of
two years thereafter, NO CLAIM
WHATSOEVER has been filed
against the herein petitioner with
respect to the property thus sold to
her . (p. 67, Rollo)
Even granting that the extra-judicial
settlement was the document which
transferred the subject property
from the original owners to Rafaela
Donato the non-production thereof
(private respondents should have
presented it, not petitioner) does
not prove that there was fraud
committed in its execution and
neither does it prove that petitioner
was a party thereto. There was no
allegation, and much less any
evidence, that the transfer of the
subject property from the original
owners to Rafaela Donato was
fraudulent.
Page 8
What private respondents allege as
fraudulent was the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Juan
Gaffud. But it has been shown that
this settlement was not the basis of
the transfer of the subject property
to Rafaela Donato, petitioner's
vendor.
That petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value is within the
scope of established jurisprudence.
The decision of the lower court
would set at naught the settled
doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the
property covered by the title in good
faith and for value can rest assured
that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible. (Benin v. Tuason,
57 SCRA 531, 581)
xxx xxx xxx
Guided by previous decisions of this
Court, good faith consists in the
possessor's belief that the person
from whom he received the thing
was the owner of the same and
could convey his title (Ariola v.
Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627).
Good faith, while it is always
presumed in the absence of proof to
the contrary, requires a well-
founded belief that the person from
whom title was received by himself
the owner of the land, with the right
to convey it (Santiago v. Cruz, 19
Phil. 148). There is good faith where
there is an honest intention to
abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage from
another (Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA
351). Otherwise stated, good faith is
the opposite of fraud and it refers to
the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. In the case at
bar, private respondents (petitioner
in this case), in good faith relied on
the certificate of title in the name of
Fe S. Duran (Rafaela Donato in this
case) and . . . "even on the
supposition that the sale was void,
the general rules that the direct
result of a previous illegal contract
cannot be valid (on the theory that
the spring cannot rise higher than
its source) cannot apply here for We
are confronted with the functionings
of the Torrens System of
Registration. The doctrine to follow
is simple enough: a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may
become the ROOT of a valid title if
the certificate of title has already
been transferred from the name of
the true owner to the name of the
forger or the name indicated by the
forger. (Duran v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489,
494).
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, where innocent third persons
relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued, acquire
rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and
order the total cancellation of the
certificate for that would impair
public confidence in the certificate
of title; otherwise everyone dealing
with property registered under the
torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance as to
whether the title had been regularly
or irregularly issued by the court.
Indeed, this is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every
person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor
and the law will in no way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the
property. Stated differently, an
innocent purchaser for value relying
on a torrens title issued is
protected . . . (Duran v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489,
494-495). (pp. 68-70, Rollo)
In the case of Centeno v. Court of
Appeals (139 SCRA 545, 555) the
same rule was observed by this
Court when it ruled
. . . Well settled is the rule that all
persons dealing with property
covered by torrens certificate of title
are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title.
When there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore further than
what the torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest or any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right
thereto. (William Anderson v.
Garcia, 64 Phil. 506; Fule v. Legare, 7
SCRA 351). (p. 71, Rollo)
Petitioner being an innocent
purchaser for value, private
respondents will have no cause of
action against her. "The issue alone
that petitioner is a purchase in good
faith and for value sufficiently
constitutes a bar to the complaint of
private respondents . . ."(Medina v.
Chanco, 117 SCRA 201, 205).
If an action for reconveyance based
on constructive trust cannot reach
an innocent purchaser for value, the
remedy of the defrauded party is to
bring an action for damages against
those who caused the fraud or were
instrumental in depriving him of the
property. And it is now well-settled
that such action prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of the
Torrens Title over the property.
(Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA
396, 407; Caro v. Court of Appeals,
180 SCRA 401, 407; Walstron v.
Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431, 442).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
32683 was issued in the name of
Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967.
Page 9
The present action for reconveyance
was filed only on March 9, 1982.
Clearly then, the action has already
prescribed because it was filed
fifteen (15) years after the issuance
of TCT No. T-32683. Even if the
period were to be reckoned from the
registration of the deed of absolute
sale in favor of petitioner on July 13,
1970, which is also the date of the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-49380 in the name of
petitioner, the action of private
respondents had already prescribed
because a period of eleven (11)
years, seven (7) months and twenty-
six (26) days has elapsed from July
13, 1910 to March 9, 1982.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED; the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another one
rendered dismissing Civil Case No.
Br. V-756, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela.
SO ORDERED.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. CA
G.R. No. 114299
Sept. 1999
KAPUNAN, J.:
The present controversy has its
roots in a mortgage executed by the
spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in
favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB)
pursuant to a loan extended by the
latter to the former. The mortgage
covered several properties,
including a parcel of land, the
subject of the present dispute.[1]
The loan became due on January 8,
1964 and the same having remained
unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings upon the
mortgaged property.
To prevent the propertys sale by
public auction, the Capays, on
September 22, 1966, filed a petition
for prohibition with preliminary
injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453)
before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the
mortgage was void since they did
not receive the proceeds of the loan.
The trial court initially granted the
Capays' prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On March 17, 1967, the Capays
caused to be filed in the Register of
Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis
pendens over the disputed property.
Said notice was entered in the Day
Book, as well as in the Capays
certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued
by the trial court was lifted thus
allowing the foreclosure sale to
proceed. Foreclosure proceedings
were initiated and on October 17,
1968, the property was sold to TRB
which was the highest bidder at the
auction sale. A sheriff certificate of
sale was issued in its name on the
same day. On February 25, 1970, the
property was consolidated in the
name of TRB, the sole bidder in the
sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of
the Capay spouses was then
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-
16272,[2] was entered in the banks
name. The notice of lis pendens,
however, was not carried over in the
certificate of title issued in the name
of TRB.
Thereafter, the Capays filed with the
CFI a supplemental complaint
praying for the recovery of the
property with damages and
attorneys fees. Trial in Civil Case No.
Q-10453 proceeded and, on October
3, 1977, the CFI rendered its
decision declaring the mortgage
void for want of consideration. The
CFI ordered, among other things, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in
the name of TRB and the issuance of
new certificates of title in the name
of the Capay spouses.
TRB appealed to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals,
TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the
land to Emelita Santiago in whose
name a new certificate of title, TCT
No. 33774,[3] was issued, also,
without any notice of lis pendens
annotated thereon. Santiago in turn
divided the land into six (6) lots and
sold these to Marcial Alcantara,
Armando Cruz and Artemio
Sanchez, who became co-owners
thereof.[4] Alcantara and his co-
owners developed the property and
thereafter sold the six (6) lots to
separate buyers who were issued
separate titles, again, bearing no
notice of lis pendens.[5]
On July 30, 1982, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision
modifying the decision of the trial
court as to the award of damages
but affirming the same in all other
respects.
For having been filed out of time
and for lack of merit, the petition for
certiorari filed by TRB before this
Court[6] was denied in a Resolution
dated September 12,1983. TRBs
motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied in a Resolution
dated October 12, 1983. The Courts
September 12, 1983 Resolution
having become final and executory
on November 9, 1983, the trial court
issued a writ of execution directing
the Register of Deeds of Baguio City
to cancel TCT No. T-16272 in the
name of TRB, and to issue a new one
in the name of the Capay spouses.
Said writ, however, could not be
implemented because of the
successive subsequent transfers of
the subdivided property to buyers
who obtained separate titles
thereto. Thus, a complaint for
recovery of possession/ownership
dated 8 June 1985 was filed before
Page 10
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
against TRB and the subsequent
transferees of the property, the
respondents in G.R. No. 118862
(hereinafter, the non-bank
respondents). Plaintiffs in said case
were Patria Capay, her children by
Maximo[7] who succeeded him
upon his death on August 25, 1976,
and Ramon Gonzales, counsel of the
spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453
who became co-owner of the
property to the extent of 35%
thereof as his attorneys fees
(collectively, the Capays). On March
27, 1991, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
against the defendants and ordering
the Register of Deeds for Baguio to
cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198,
Page 177 in the names of defendants
Spouses Honorato D. Santos and
Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT
No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in
the names of defendant Spouses
Cecilio Pe and Josefina L. Pe; to
cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198,
Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron
Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind
Wescombe (now deceased); to
cancel TCT No. T-36147, Book 198,
page 147 in the names of Spouses
Telesforo P. Alfelor II and Liza R.
Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730,
Book 201, Page 130 in the names of
Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando
and Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to
cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205,
Page 37 in the name of Remedios
Oca, and issue new ones free from
all liens and encumbrances, together
with all the improvements therein in
the names of plaintiffs sharing pro
indiviso as follows: 35% to Ramon
A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y.
Gonzales, of legal age, with postal
address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New
Manila, Quezon City; 37.92% to
Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow,
Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann
Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen;
Chona Margarita Capay, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Waldo Flores;
Rosario Capay, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.;
Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy
Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Pedro Duran, all with postal
address at 37 Sampaguita St.,
Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City,
ordering said defendants to vacate
the premises in question and
restoring plaintiffs thereto and for
defendant Traders Royal Bank to
pay each of the plaintiffs moral
damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in
exemplary damages and P40,000.00
as attorneys fees, all with legal
interest from the filing of the
complaint, with costs against
defendants.
SO ORDERED.[8]
TRB and the non-bank respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
a Decision promulgated on February
24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920,
the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto.[9]
It ruled that the non-bank
respondents cannot be considered
as purchasers for value and in good
faith, having purchased the property
subsequent to the action in Civil
Case No. Q-10453 and that while the
notice of lis pendens was not carried
over to TRBs certificate of title, as
well as to the subsequent
transferees titles, it was entered in
the Day Book which is sufficient to
constitute registration and notice to
all persons of such adverse claim,
citing the cases of Villasor vs.
Camon,[10] Levin vs. Bass[11] and
Director of Lands vs. Reyes.[12]
As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals
said that the bank was in bad faith
when it sold the property knowing
that it was under litigation and
without informing the buyer of that
fact.
On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with
this Court a petition for review to
set aside the CA decision, docketed
herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking
the following grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN PROMULGATING THE
DISPUTED DECISION AND
THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY
TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND
TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS
COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM
THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF REVIEW BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
a) The public respondent has plainly
and manifestly acted whimsically,
arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave
abuse of discretion, in excess of
jurisdiction tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.
xxx
b) The public respondent erred in
not finding that it was not the fault
of petitioner when the notice of lis
pendens was not carried over to its
new title.
Page 11
xxx
c) The public respondent erred in
not finding that PD No. 1271 had
legally caused the invalidation of the
Capays property and the subsequent
validation of TRBs title over the
same property was effective even as
against the Capays.[13]
Meanwhile, the non-bank
respondents moved for a MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA
reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision. Convinced of the
movants arguments, the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on August 10, 1994
granted the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed the
complaint as against them. The
dispositive portion of the resolution
states:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the
foregoing disquisitions and finding
merit in the motion for
reconsideration, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Consequently, the
decision of this Court, promulgated
on February 24, 1994, is hereby
RECONSIDERED. The complaint
filed against defendants-appellants
with the court a quo is hereby
ordered DISMISSED, and the
certificate of titles originally issued
to them in their individual names
are hereby ordered restored and
duly respected. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Capays thus filed with this
Court a petition for review, docketed
as G.R. No. 118862, to set aside the
resolution of the Court of Appeals
raising the following errors:
I RESPONDENTS
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS.
REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA
VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT
APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA
436, IS APPLICABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT ATUN VS.
VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE NOT
APPLICABLE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS.
BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS.
CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68
SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE
HEREOF.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.
V to the disputed property, and (2)
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO
DISTINCTION IN THE
REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY
INSTRUMENTS VIS--VIS
INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT
WHO ARE
LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS
AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS
IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE
EXEMPTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF
THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF
WITH REGARDS TO TRADERS
ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER
HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO
THE SUPREME COURT.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY
ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
COUNTER-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THAT:
B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS
ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453.
Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was
consolidated with G. R. No. 114299,
pursuant to this Courts Resolution
dated July 3, 1996.[15]
The consolidated cases primarily
involve two issues: (1) who, as
between the Capays and the non-
bank respondents, has a better right
whether or not TRB is liable to the
Capays for damages.
On the first issue, we rule for the
non-bank respondents.
I
First, when TRB purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale, the
notice of lis pendens that the Capays
caused to be annotated on their
certificate of title was not carried
over to the new one issued to TRB.
Neither did the certificate of title of
Emelita Santiago, who purchased
the property from TRB, contain any
such notice. When Santiago caused
the property to be divided, six (6)
Page 12
new certificates of title were issued,
none of which contained any notice
of lis pendens. Santiago then sold
the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his
co-owners who next sold each of
these to the non-bank respondents.
The non-bank respondents,
therefore, could not have been
aware that the property in question
was the subject of litigation when
they acquired their respective
portions of said property. There was
nothing in the certificates of title of
their respective predecessors-in-
interest that could have aroused
their suspicion. The non-bank
respondents had a right to rely on
what appeared on the face of the
title of their respective
predecessors-in-interest, and were
not bound to go beyond the same.
To hold otherwise would defeat one
of the principal objects of the
Torrens system of land registration,
that is, to facilitate transactions
involving lands.
The main purpose of the torrens
system is to avoid possible conflicts
of title to real estate and to facilitate
transactions relative thereto by
giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of a Torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make
such further inquiry. Where
innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of
title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights and order the
total cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such an outright
cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate
of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the
Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly
or irregularly issued by the court.
Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will
in no way oblige him to go beyond
the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in
this country because it was believed
to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on
the assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run
the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to
him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence
in the system would be eroded and
land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of
ownership. The further
consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more
numerous and complex than they
are now and possibly also more
abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by
the law are satisfied.[16]
Second, the foregoing rule
notwithstanding, the non-bank
respondents nevertheless physically
inspected the properties and
inquired from the Register of Deeds
to ascertain the absence of any
defect in the title of the property
they were purchasing-an exercise of
diligence above that required by law.
Thus, respondent Aida Fernando
Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son
Dean, testified:
Q How did you come to live in
Baguio City, particularly in Km. 2.5
San Luis, Baguio City?
A In one of my visits to my sister
who has been residing here for
twelve (12) years now, I got
interested in buying a property here.
Q How did you come to know of this
property at Asin Road where you
now reside?
A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.
Q When this particular property was
bought by you, when was that?
A I do not remember the exact date,
but it was in early 1984, sir.
Q At the time when you went to see
the place where you now reside,
how did it look?
A This particular property that I
bought was then a small one (1)-
room structure, it is a two (2)-storey
one (1) bedroom structure.
Q What kind of structure with
regards to material?
A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.
Q And aside from this two (2)-storey
one (1)-room structure, how did the
surrounding area look like at the
time you visited?
A There were stone walls from the
road and there were stone walls in
front of the property and beside the
property.
Q At the time you went to see the
property with your agent, rather,
your sister Ruth Ann Valdez, did you
come to know the owner?
Page 13
A We did because at the time we
went there, Mr. Alcantara was there
supervising the workers.
Q And who?
A Amado Cruz, sir.
Q After you saw this property, what
else did you do?
A My first concern then was am I
buying a property with a clean title.
Q In regards to this concern of
yours, did you find an answer to this
concern of yours?
A At first, I asked Mr. Alcantara and I
was answered by him.
Q What was his answer?
A That it was a property with a clean
title, that he has shown me the
mother title and it is a clean title.
Q Aside from being informed that it
is a property with a clean title, did
you do anything to answer your
question?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do?
A Well, the first step I did was to go
to the Land Registration Office.
Q Are you referring to the City Hall
of Baguio?
A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.
Q And what did you do in the
Registry of Deeds?
A We looked for the title, the
original title, sir.
Q When you say we, who was your
companion?
A Mr. Alcantara and my present
husband, sir.
Q The three (3) of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What title did you see there?
A We saw the title that was made up
in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.
Q And what was the result of your
looking up for this title in the name
of Amado Cruz?
A We had to be reassured that it was
a genuine one, so we asked Atty.
Diomampo who heads the office. We
showed him a copy of that title and
we were also reassured by him that
anything that was signed by him
was as good as it is.
Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure
you that the title was good?
A He did.
Q After your conversation with the
Register of Deeds, what did you do?
A The second step we did was to
confer with our lawyer, a friend
from RCBC Binondo, Manila, this is
Atty. Nelson Waje.
Q What is your purpose in going to
this lawyer?
A We wanted an assurance that we
were getting a valid title just in case
we think of buying the property.
Q What was the result of your
conference with this lawyer?
A He was absolutely certain that
that was a valid title.
Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the
place, going to the Register of Deeds,
looking at the title and seeing your
lawyer friend, what decision did you
finally make regarding the property?
A We wanted more reassurances, so
we proceeded to Banaue, as advised
by that same lawyer, there is
another office of the Bureau of
Lands. I cannot recall the office but
it has something to do with
registration of the old.
Q What is your purpose in going to
this Office in Banaue?
A I wanted more reassurances that I
was getting a valid title.
Q What was the result of your visit
to the Banaue Office?
A We found the title of this property
and there was reassurance that it
was a clean title and we saw the
mother title under the Hilario
family.
Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue,
what particular place is this
Banaue?
A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon
City, sir.
Q And when you saw the title to this
property and the mother title, what
was the result of your investigation,
the investigation that you made?
A We were reassured that we were
purchasing a valid title, we had a
genuine title.
Q When you were able to determine
that you had a valid, authentic or
genuine title, what did you do?
A That is when I finally thought of
purchasing the property.[17]
Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of
Lot 4, narrated going through a
similar routine:
Page 14
Q How did you come to know of this
place as Asin Road where you are
presently residing?
A It was actually through Mrs. Flory
Recto who is presently the Branch
Manager of CocoBank. She informed
my wife that there is a property for
sale at Asin road, and she was the
one who introduced to us Mr.
Alcantara, sir.
Q When you were informed by Mrs.
Recto and when you met with Mr.
Alcantara, did you see the property
that was being offered for sale?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you specifically see the
property, if you can recall?
A I would say it is around the third
quarter of 1983, sir.
Q When you went to see the place,
could you please describe what you
saw at that time?
A When we went there the area is
still being developed by Mr.
Alcantara. As a matter of fact the
road leading to the property is still
not passable considering that during
that time it was rainy season and it
was muddy, we fell on our way going
to the property and walked to have
an ocular inspection and physical
check on the area, sir.
xxx
Q What was the improvement, if any,
that was in that parcel which you
are going to purchase?
A During that time, the riprap of the
property is already there, the one-
half of the riprap sir.
Q Do you know who was making
this improvement at the time that
you went there?
A I would understand that it was
Marcial Alcantara, sir.
Q After you saw the place and you
saw the riprap and you were in the
course of deciding to purchase this
property, what else did you do?
A First, I have to consider that the
property is clean.
Q How did you go about
determining whether the title of the
property is clean?
A Considering that Marcial
Alcantara is a real estate broker, I
went to his office and checked the
documents he has regarding the
property.
Q And what was the result of your
checking as to whether the title of
the property is clean?
A He showed me the copy of the title
and it was clean, sir.
Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara
to check up the title of the property,
what else did you do?
A Well, the next thing is I requested
his wife to accompany me to the
Bureau of Lands or rather the
Registry of Deeds, sir.
Q What registry of Deeds are you
referring to?
A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio
City, sir.
Q And were you able to see the
Register of Deeds regarding what
you would like to know?
A Yes, and we were given a
certification regarding this
particular area that it was clean, sir.
Q What Certification are you
referring to?
A It is a Certification duly signed by
the employee of the Registry of
Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir.
Q Do you have a copy of that
Certification?
A Yes, I have, sir.[18]
The testimonies of Honorato
Santos[19] and Josefina Pe[20] were
to the same effect.
The non-bank respondents
predecessor-in-interest, Marcial
Alcantara, was no less thorough:
Q And will you give a brief
description of what you do?
A I normally acquire land, quite big
tract of land and subdivide it into
smaller lots and sold it to some
interested parties.
Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara, will you
please inform the Court in what
place in Baguio have you acquired
and subdivided and sold lots?
A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill,
Crystal Cave and Asin Road, sir.
Q You mentioned Asin Road, what
particular place in Asin Road are
you referring?
A That property I bought from
Emelita Santiago, sir.
Q When you say you bought it from
Emelita Santiago, how did you come
to know that Emelita Santiago is
disposing of the property?
Page 15
A Because of the father, he is the one
who offered me the property, sir,
Armando Gabriel.
Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?
A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad,
sir.
Q How did you come to know of this
Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a
property in Asin?
A He approached me in the house,
sir. He has acquired a title from the
Traders Royal Bank.
Q Can you inform the Honorable
Court when you had this
conversation with Armando Gabriel
on the sale of the property at Asin
Road?
A Later part of March, 1983, sir.
Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel
informed you that he wants his
property to be sold, what did you
do?
A I went to the place with the agent,
sir.
Q When you say you went to the
place with the agent, what place?
A Kilometer 2, Asin Road, sir.
Q And when you went there to see
the place, did you actually go there
to see the place?
A By walking, I parked my car a
kilometer away, sir.
Q Is it my understanding that when
you went to see the property there
were no roads?
A None, sir.
xxx
Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to
see this place at Asin Road last week
of March, 1983, will you please
briefly describe how this place
looked like at that time?
A The place was mountainous,
grassy, there were cogon trees, some
of the roads were eroding already,
so we cannot possibly enter the
property, sir.
Q At the time you entered the place,
was there any visible sign of claim
by anyone?
A None, sir.
Q In terms of fence in the area?
A There is no such, sir.
xxx
Q Aside from looking or going to the
property, what else did you do to
this property prior to your
purchase?
A I investigated it with the Register
of Deeds, sir.
Q What is your purpose in
investigating it with the Register of
Deeds?
A To see if the paper is clean and
there are no encumbrances, sir.
Q To whom did you talk?
A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.
Q And when you went to the
Registry of Deeds to investigate and
check, did you have occasion to talk
with Atty. Diomampo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was the result of your
talk with Atty. Diomampo?
A The papers are clean except to the
annotation at the back with the road
right of way, sir.
Q After making this investigation
with the Register of Deeds and
talking with Atty. Diomampo, what
else transpired?
A We bought the property, sir.
Q After purchasing the property
from Emelita Santiago, could you
please tell the Honorable Court what
you did with that deed of sale?
A We registered it with the Register
of Deeds for the Certificate of Title
because at that time when we
bought the property, Emelita
Santiago had it subdivided into six
(6) lots, sir.
Q Is it our understanding that prior
to your purchase the property was
subdivided into six (6) parcels?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please inform the
Honorable Court if you have any
buyers in the subdivision of this
property prior to your purchase?
A Yes, I have.
Q This subdivision of this property,
to what office was it brought for
action?
A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La
Union, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time
that you had this property
subdivided by the owner, could you
please inform the Court if there was
any claim by any other party
opposing the subdivision or
claiming the property?
A None, sir.
Page 16
Q When the Deed of Sale was
executed and you said that you
presented it to the Register of Deeds
and after the subdivision already,
what action did the Register of
Deeds have regarding the matter?
A They approved it and registered it
already in six (6) titles, sir.
Q In whose names?
A One (1) title under my name,
Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.
Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said
that you are the sole purchaser of
this entire area of One Thousand
Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591)
Square Meters. Now, you are
informing this Honorable Court that
one Amado Cruz and one Dr.
Sanchez were also issued two (2)
titles. Could you explain how these
titles came into their possession?
A Actually, two (2) are our co-
owners, sir.
Q So, is it our understanding that
the Deed of Sale from Emelita
Santiago is in favor of these two (2)
Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez?
A Yes, sir.[21]
Third, between two innocent
persons, the one who made it
possible for the wrong to be done
should be the one to bear the
resulting loss.[22] The Capays filed
the notice of lis pendens way back
on March 17, 1967 but the same was
not annotated in TRBs title. The
Capays and their counsel Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of
the property to TRB and the
consolidation of title in the banks
name following the lapse of the one-
year period of redemption. But in
the next fifteen (15) years or so,
they did not bother to find out the
status of their title or whether the
liens noted on the original
certificate of title were still existing
considering that the property had
already been foreclosed. In the
meantime, the subject property had
undergone a series of transfers to
buyers in good faith and for value. It
was not until after the land was
subdivided and developed with the
buyers building their houses on the
other lots when the Capays
suddenly appeared and questioned
the occupants titles. At the very
least, the Capays are guilty of laches.
Laches has been defined as the
failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could nor
should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the
party entitled to it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
[23]
Verily, the principle on prescription
of actions is designed to cover
situations such as the case at bar,
where there have been a series of
transfers to innocent purchasers for
value. To set aside these
transactions only to accommodate a
party who has slept on his rights is
anathema to good order.
Independently of the principle of
prescription of actions working
against petitioners, the doctrine of
laches may further be counted
against them, which latter tenet
finds application even to
imprescriptible actions. x x x.[24]
In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of
Appeals,[25] we held:
While it is true that under the law it
is the act of registration of the deed
of conveyance that serves as the
operative act to convey the land
registered under the Torrens System
(Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the
petitioners cannot invoke said
dictum because their action to
recover Lot 4362 is barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches.
The act of registering the
conveyance to Rosendo was
constructive notice to the whole
world of the fact of such conveyance
(Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152
SCRA 253).
But the petitioners complaint to
recover the title and possession of
Lot 4362 was filed only on July 21,
1981, twelve (12) years after the
registration of the sale to Rosendo.
The petitioners failed and neglected
for an unreasonably long time to
assert their right, if any, to the
property in Rosendos possession.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays
cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor
vs. Camon, Levin vs. Bass and
Director of Lands vs. Reyes[26] to
the effect that entry of the notice of
lis pendens in the day book
(primary entry book) is sufficient to
constitute registration and such
entry is notice to all persons of such
adverse claim. Certainly, it is most
iniquitous for the Capays who, after
sleeping on their rights for fifteen
years, to assert ownership over the
property that has undergone several
transfers made in good faith and for
value and already subdivided into
several lots with improvements
introduced thereon by their owners.
In the same vein, the cases cited by
the Capays in their first two (2)
assignment of errors do not help
them any, as the transferees In said
cases were not innocent purchasers
for value and in good faith. In
Tuazon vs. Reyes and Siochi,[27]
where the land involved therein was
Page 17
sold by Petronilo David to Vicente
Tuazon, it was with a deed
containing the recital that the land
was in dispute between the vendor
and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who
was merely subrogated to the rights
of the vendor was aware of the
dispute and, furthermore, David did
not warrant the title to the same. In
Rivera vs. Moran,[28] Rivera
acquired interest in the land before
the final decree was entered in the
cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the
transferee, was aware of the
pending litigation and,
consequently, could not have been
considered a purchaser in good
faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs.
Nunez, et al.[29] and Laroza vs.
Guia,[30] the buyers of the property
at the time of their acquisition knew
of the existence of the notice of lis
pendens. In contrast to the cited
cases, the non-bank respondents in
the case at bar acquired their
respective portions of the land with
clean title from their predecessors-
in-interest.
II
We come now to TRBs liability
towards the Capays.
The Bank unconvincingly tries to
wash its hands off the present
controversy, and attempts to shift
the blame on the Capays, thus:
xxx
23. The petitioner Bank, during all
the time that it was holding the title
for over fourteen (14) years that
there was no legal impediment for it
to sell said property, Central Bank
regulations require that real
properties of banks should not be
held for more than five (5) years;
24. The fault of the Register of
Deeds in not carrying over the
Notice of Lis Pendens to the new
title of the petitioner Bank should
not be absorbed by the latter
considering that in all good faith, it
was not aware of the existence of
said annotation during all the time
that said title was in its possession
for almost fourteen (14) years
before the property was sold to
Emelita G. Santiago xxx.[31]
TRB concludes that (t)he inaction
and negligence of private
respondents, allowing ownership to
pass for almost 15 years constitute
prescription of action and/or laches.
[32]
Section 25 of the General Banking
Act,[33] provides that no bank shall
hold the possession of any real
estate under mortgage or trust,
deed, or the title and possession of
any real estate purchased to secure
any debt due to it, for a longer
period than five years. TRB,
however, admits holding on to the
foreclosed property for twelve (12)
years after consolidating title in its
name. The bank is, therefore,
estopped from invoking banking
laws and regulations to justify its
belated disposition of the property.
It cannot be allowed to hide behind
the law which it itself violated.
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the
existence of the lis pendens because
when the property was foreclosed
by it, the notice of lis pendens was
annotated on the title. But when
TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the
Capay spouses was cancelled after
the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272
which was issued in place thereof in
the name of TRB did not carry over
the notice of lis pendens.
We do not find the Capays guilty of
inaction and negligence as against
TRB. It may be recalled that upon
the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings by TRB, the Capays
filed an action for prohibition on
September 22, 1966 against the TRB
before the CFI to stop the
foreclosure sale. Failing in that
attempt, the Capays filed a
supplemental complaint for the
recovery of the property. The case
reached this Court. Prescription or
laches could not have worked
against the Capays because they had
persistently pursued their suit
against TRB to recover their
property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to
believe TRBs assertion that after
holding on to the property for more
than ten (10) years, it suddenly
realized that it was acting in
violation of the General Bank Act.
What is apparent is that TRB took
advantage of the absence of the
notice of lis pendens at the back of
their certificate of title and sold the
property to an unwary purchaser.
This notwithstanding the adverse
decision of the trial court and the
pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose
timing indeed smacks of bad faith,
thus transferred caused the
property without the lis pendens
annotated on its title to put it
beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly,
the bank acted in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs and public
policy, and should be held liable for
damages.[34]
Considering, however, that the
mortgage in favor of TRB had been
declared null and void for want of
consideration and, consequently, the
foreclosure proceedings did not
have a valid effect, the Capays would
ordinarily be entitled to the
recovery of their property.
Nevertheless, this remedy is not
now available to the Capays
inasmuch as title to said property
has passed into the hands of third
parties who acquired the same in
good faith and for value. Such being
the case, TRB is duty bound to pay
the Capays the fair market value of
Page 18
the property at the time it was sold
to Emelita Santiago, the transferee
of TRB.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 24,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as
modified by its Resolution dated
August 10, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders
Royal Bank is ordered to pay the
Capays the fair market value of the
property at the time it was sold to
Emelita Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to
whatever criminal, civil or
administrative action against the
Register of Deeds and/or his
assistants that may be taken by the
party or parties prejudiced by the
failure of the former to carry over
the notice of lis pendens to the
certificate of title in the name of
TRB.
SO ORDERED.
CASIMIRO DEVT CORP v. MATEO
G.R. No. 175485
July 27, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
The focus of this appeal is the faith
that should be accorded to the
Torrens title that the seller holds at
the time of the sale.
In its decision promulgated on
August 31, 2006,[1] the Court of
Appeals (CA) declared that the
respondent and his three brothers
were the rightful owners of the land
in litis, and directed the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Las Pias City to
cancel the transfer certificate of title
(TCT) registered under the name of
petitioner Casimiro Development
Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its
place another TCT in favor of the
respondent and his three brothers.
Thereby, the CA reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) rendered on May 9, 2000
(dismissing the respondents
complaint for quieting of title and
reconveyance upon a finding that
CDC had been a buyer in good faith
of the land in litis and that the
respondents suit had already been
time-barred).
Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition
for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
The subject of this case is a
registered parcel of land (property)
with an area of 6,693 square meters,
more or less, located in Barrio
Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, that was
originally owned by Isaias Lara,[2]
the respondents maternal
grandfather. Upon the death of
Isaias Lara in 1930, the property
passed on to his children, namely:
Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and
a grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta
who had predeceased Isaias in
1920). In 1962, the co-heirs effected
the transfer of the full and exclusive
ownership to Felicidad (whose
married surname was Lara-Mateo)
under an agreement denominated
as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng
Hukuman.
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five
children, namely: Laura, respondent
Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and
Leonardo. With the agreement of
the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed
of sale covering the property was
executed in favor of Laura, who, in
1967, applied for land registration.
After the application was granted,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole
name.
In due course, the property now
covered by OCT No. 6386 was used
as collateral to secure a succession
of loans. The first loan was obtained
from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor
Bank). To repay the loan to Bacoor
Bank and secure the release of the
mortgage, Laura borrowed funds
from Parmenas Perez (Perez), who,
however, required that the title be
meanwhile transferred to his name.
Thus, OCT No. 6386 was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 438959 was issued in the
name of Perez. Subsequently, Laura
recovered the property by repaying
the obligation with the proceeds of
another loan obtained from Rodolfo
Pe (Pe), resulting in the cancellation
of TCT No. 438595, and in the
issuance of TCT No. S-91595 in
Lauras name. She later executed a
deed of sale in favor of Pe, leading to
the issuance of TCT No. S-91738 in
the name of Pe, who in turn
constituted a mortgage on the
property in favor of China Banking
Corporation (China Bank) as
security for a loan. In the end, China
Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and
consolidated its ownership of the
property in 1985 after Pe failed to
redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-
11749-A was issued in the name of
China Bank.
In 1988, CDC and China Bank
negotiated and eventually came to
terms on the purchase of the
property, with China Bank executing
a deed of conditional sale for the
purpose. On March 4, 1993, CDC and
China Bank executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property.
Resultantly, on March 29, 1993, CDC
was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its
own name.
In the meanwhile, on February 28,
1991, Felicidad died intestate.
On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an
action for unlawful detainer in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Las Pias City against the
respondents siblings, namely: Cesar,
Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the
Page 19
other occupants of the property.
Therein, the defendants maintained
that the MeTC did not have
jurisdiction over the action because
the land was classified as
agricultural; that the jurisdiction
belonged to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); that they had been in
continuous and open possession of
the land even before World War II
and had presumed themselves
entitled to a government grant of
the land; and that CDCs title was
invalid, considering that the land
had been registered before its being
declared alienable.[3]
On October 19, 1992, the MeTC
ruled in favor of CDC, viz:
The Court, after careful
consideration of the facts and the
laws applicable to this case[,] hereby
resolves:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction.
The defendants alleged that the land
in question is an agricultural land by
presenting a Tax Declaration
Certificate classifying the land as
FISHPOND. The classification of the
land in a tax declaration certificate
as a fishpond merely refers to the
use of the land in question for the
purpose of real property taxation.
This alone would not be sufficient to
bring the land in question under the
operation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.
2. On the issue of open and adverse
possession by the defendants.
It should be noted that the subject
land is covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of
plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest
China Banking Corporation.
Certificates of Title under the
Torrens System is indefeasible and
imprescriptible. As between two
persons claiming possession, one
having a [T]orrens title and the
other has none, the former has a
better right.
3. On the issue of the nullity of the
Certificate of Title.
The defense of the defendants that
the subject property was a forest
land when the same was originally
registered in 1967 and hence, the
registration is void[,] is not for this
Court to decide[,] for lack of
jurisdiction. The certificate of title
over the property must be respected
by this Court until it has been
nullified by a competent Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering the
defendants
1. [sic] and all persons claiming
right[s] under it to vacate the
subject premises located at Pulang
Lupa I, Las Pias, Metro Manila and
surrender the possession of the
same to herein plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable
compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject premises
hereby fixed at (P100.00) one
hundred pesos a month starting
November 22, 1990 (the time when
the demand letter to vacate was
given) until defendants actually
vacate the property;
No pronouncement as to costs and
attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The decision of the MeTC was
assailed in the RTC via petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The RTC
resolved against CDC, and held that
the MeTC had acted without
jurisdiction because the land, being
a fishpond, was agricultural; hence,
the dispute was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988).[5]
CDC appealed to the CA, which, on
January 25, 1996, found in favor of
CDC, declaring that the MeTC had
jurisdiction. As a result, the CA
reinstated the decision of the MeTC.
[6]
On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the
Court affirmed the CAs decision in
favor of CDC, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R.
SP No. 34039, dated January 25,
1996 and February 21, 1997
respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The decision in G.R. No. 128392
became final.
Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the
respondent brought an action for
quieting of title, reconveyance of
four-fifths of the land, and damages
against CDC and Laura in the RTC in
Las Pias City entitled Renato L.
Mateo v. Casimiro Development
Corporation and Laura Mateo de
Castro. In paragraph 4 of his
complaint, he stated that he was
bringing this action to quiet title on
behalf of himself and of his three (3)
brothers Cesar, Leonardo, and
Candido, Jr., all surnamed MATEO in
his capacity as one of the co-owners
of a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las
Pias, Metro Manila.
On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in
favor of CDC, disposing:
Page 20
WHEREFORE, and by strong
preponderance of evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendant Casimiro
Development Corporation and
against the plaintiff Renato L. Mateo
by (1) Dismissing the complaint,
and upholding the validity and
indefeasibility of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-34640 in the name of
Casimiro Development Corporation;
(2) Ordering the plaintiff Renato
Mateo to pay defendant Casimiro
Development Corporation the sum
of [a] P200,000.00 as compensatory
damages; [b] P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and [c] to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696),
the CA promulgated its decision on
August 31, 2006, reversing the RTC
and declaring CDC to be not a buyer
in good faith due to its being
charged with notice of the defects
and flaws of the title at the time it
acquired the property from China
Bank, and decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
May 9, 2001 of Branch 225, Regional
Trial Court, Las Pias City in Civil
Case No. 94-2045 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one rendered:
(1) Declaring appellant Renato
Mateo and his brothers and co-
owners Cesar, Candido, Jr., and
Leonardo, all surnamed Mateo as
well as his sister, Laura Mateo de
Castro as the rightful owners of the
parcel of land, subject of this case;
and
(2) Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Las Pias City, Metro-Manila
to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-34640 under the name of
appellee Casimiro Development
Corporation, and that a new one be
issued in favor of the appellant and
his co-heirs and siblings, mentioned
above as co-owners pro indiviso of
the said parcel.
(3) No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The CA denied CDCs motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal, in which CDC
urges that the CA committed serious
errors of law,[10] as follows:
(A) xxx in failing to rule that the
decree of registration over the
Subject Property is incontrovertible
and no longer open to review or
attack after the lapse of one (1) year
from entry of such decree of
registration in favor of Laura Mateo
de Castro.
(B) xxx in failing to rule that the
present action is likewise barred by
res judicata.
(C) xxx in failing to rule that the
instant action for quieting of title
and reconveyance under PD No.
1529 cannot prosper because the
Subject Property had already been
conveyed and transferred to third
parties who claimed adverse title for
themselves.
(D) xxx in failing to rule that the
action of respondent for quieting of
title, reconveyance and damages is
barred by laches.
(E) xxx in ruling that the Subject
Property must be reconveyed to
respondent because petitioner
Casimiro Development Corporation
is not a purchaser in good faith.
CDC argues that it was a buyer in
good faith; and that the CA did not
rule on matters that fortified its title
in the property, namely: (a) the
incontrovertibility of the title of
Laura; (b) the action being barred
by laches and res judicata; and (c)
the property having been conveyed
to third parties who had then
claimed adverse title.
The respondent counters that CDC
acquired the property from China
Bank in bad faith, because it had
actual knowledge of the possession
of the property by the respondent
and his siblings; that CDC did not
actually accept delivery of the
possession of the property from
China Bank; and that CDC ignored
the failure of China Bank to warrant
its title.
Ruling
We grant the petition.
1.
Indefeasibility of title in
the name of Laura
As basis for recovering the
possession of the property, the
respondent has assailed the title of
Laura.
We cannot sustain the respondent.
There is no doubt that the land in
question, although once a part of the
public domain, has already been
placed under the Torrens system of
land registration. The Government is
required under the Torrens system
of registration to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact
that the person named in the
certificate is the owner of the
property therein described, subject
to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law
warrants or reserves.[11] The
objective is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of the
Page 21
Torrens certificate and to dispense,
as a rule, with the necessity of
inquiring further. The Torrens
system gives the registered owner
complete peace of mind, in order
that he will be secured in his
ownership as long as he has not
voluntarily disposed of any right
over the covered land.[12]
The Government has adopted the
Torrens system due to its being the
most effective measure to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established
and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run
the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all,
which will not only be unfair to him
as the purchaser, but will also erode
public confidence in the system and
will force land transactions to be
attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of
ownership. The further
consequence will be that land
conflicts can be even more abrasive,
if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the
first to accept the validity of titles
issued thereunder once the
conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied.[13]
Yet, registration under the Torrens
system, not being a mode of
acquiring ownership, does not
create or vest title.[14] The Torrens
certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described
therein.[15] In that sense, the
issuance of the certificate of title to a
particular person does not preclude
the possibility that persons not
named in the certificate may be co-
owners of the real property therein
described with the person named
therein, or that the registered owner
may be holding the property in trust
for another person.[16]
Nonetheless, it is essential that title
registered under the Torrens system
becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible.[17]
The land in question has been
covered by a Torrens certificate of
title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
Laura, and its derivative certificates)
before CDC became the registered
owner by purchase from China
Bank. In all that time, neither the
respondent nor his siblings opposed
the transactions causing the various
transfers. In fact, the respondent
admitted in his complaint that the
registration of the land in the name
of Laura alone had been with the
knowledge and upon the agreement
of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is
unthinkable, therefore, that the
respondent, fully aware of the
exclusive registration in her sister
Lauras name, allowed more than 20
years to pass before asserting his
claim of ownership for the first time
through this case in mid-1994.
Making it worse for him is that he
did so only after CDC had
commenced the ejectment case
against his own siblings.
Worthy of mention is that Candido,
Jr., Leonardo, and Cesars defense in
the ejectment case brought by CDC
against them was not predicated on
a claim of their ownership of the
property, but on their being
agricultural lessees or tenants of
CDC. Even that defense was
ultimately rejected by this Court by
observing in G.R. No. 128392 as
follows:
With regard to the first element, the
petitioners have tried to prove that
they are tenants or agricultural
lessees of the respondent
corporation, CDC, by showing that
the land was originally owned by
their grandfather, Isaias Lara, who
gave them permission to work the
land, and that CDC is merely a
successor-in-interest of their
grandfather. It must be noted that
the petitioners failed to adequately
prove their grandfathers ownership
of the land. They merely showed six
tax declarations. It has been held by
this Court that, as against a transfer
certificate of title, tax declarations
or receipts are not adequate proofs
of ownership. Granting arguendo
that the land was really owned by
the petitioners grandfather,
petitioners did not even attempt to
show how the land went from the
patrimony of their grandfather to
that of CDC. Furthermore,
petitioners did not prove, but relied
on mere allegation, that they indeed
had an agreement with their
grandfather to use the land.
As for the third element, there is
apparently no consent between the
parties. Petitioners were unable to
show any proof of consent from CDC
to work the land. For the sake of
argument, if petitioners were able to
prove that their grandfather owned
the land, they nonetheless failed to
show any proof of consent from
their grandfather to work the land.
Since the third element was not
proven, the fourth element cannot
be present since there can be no
purpose to a relationship to which
the parties have not consented.[18]
The respondents attack against the
title of CDC is likewise anchored on
his assertion that the only purpose
for having OCT No. 6386 issued in
the sole name of Laura was for
Laura to hold the title in trust for
their mother. This assertion cannot
stand, however, inasmuch as Lauras
title had long ago become
indefeasible.
Page 22
Moreover, the respondents suit is
exposed as being, in reality, a
collateral attack on the title in the
name of Laura, and for that reason
should not prosper. Registration of
land under the Torrens System,
aside from perfecting the title and
rendering it indefeasible after the
lapse of the period allowed by law,
also renders the title immune from
collateral attack.[19] A collateral
attack occurs when, in another
action to obtain a different relief and
as an incident of the present action,
an attack is made against the
judgment granting the title. This
manner of attack is to be
distinguished from a direct attack
against a judgment granting the
title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or
enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or
to seek recovery if the property
titled under the judgment had been
disposed of.[20]
2.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for
value
The CA found that CDC acquired the
property in bad faith because CDC
had knowledge of defects in the title
of China Bank, including the adverse
possession of the respondents
siblings and the supposed failure of
China Bank to warrant its title by
inserting an as-is, where-is clause in
its contract of sale with CDC.
The CA plainly erred in so finding
against CDC.
To start with, one who deals with
property registered under the
Torrens system need not go beyond
the certificate of title, but only has to
rely on the certificate of title.[21] He
is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated
on the title.[22] The pertinent law
on the matter of burdens and claims
is Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree,[23] which
provides:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting
title. Every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking
a certificate of title for value and in
good faith, shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate and any of
the following encumbrances which
may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising
or existing under the laws and
Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to
appear of record in the Registry of
Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or
encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes
levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the
land by an innocent purchaser for
value, without prejudice to the right
of the government to collect taxes
payable before that period from the
delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or
private way established or
recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, if the certificate of
title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof
have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the
property or limitation on the use
thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any
other law or regulations on agrarian
reform.
In short, considering that China
Banks TCT No. 99527 was a clean
title, that is, it was free from any lien
or encumbrance, CDC had the right
to rely, when it purchased the
property, solely upon the face of the
certificate of title in the name of
China Bank.[24]
The CAs ascribing of bad faith to
CDC based on its knowledge of the
adverse possession of the
respondents siblings at the time it
acquired the property from China
Bank was absolutely unfounded and
unwarranted. That possession did
not translate to an adverse claim of
ownership that should have put CDC
on actual notice of a defect or flaw in
the China Banks title, for the
respondents siblings themselves, far
from asserting ownership in their
own right, even characterized their
possession only as that of mere
agricultural tenants. Under no law
was possession grounded on
tenancy a status that might create a
defect or inflict a flaw in the title of
the owner. Consequently, due to his
own admission in his complaint that
the respondents own possession
was not any different from that of
his siblings, there was really nothing
factually or legally speaking that
ought to have alerted CDC or, for
that matter, China Bank and its
predecessors-in-interest, about any
defect or flaw in the title.
The vendees notice of a defect or
flaw in the title of the vendor, in
order for it to amount to bad faith,
should encompass facts and
circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious person to make
further inquiry into the vendors
title,[25] or facts and circumstances
that would induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in
litigation.[26] In other words, the
presence of anything that excites or
arouses suspicion should then
Page 23
prompt the vendee to look beyond
the certificate and to investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the
face of said certificate.[27]
And, secondly, the CA grossly erred
in construing the as-is, where-is
clause contained in the deed of sale
between CDC (as vendee) and China
Bank (as vendor) as proof or
manifestation of any bad faith on the
part of CDC. On the contrary, the as-
is, where-is clause did not affect the
title of China Bank because it related
only to the physical condition of the
property upon its purchase by CDC.
The clause only placed on CDC the
burden of having the occupants
removed from the property. In a sale
made on an as-is, where-is basis, the
buyer agrees to take possession of
the things sold in the condition
where they are found and from the
place where they are located,
because the phrase as-is, where-is
pertains solely to the physical
condition of the thing sold, not to its
legal situation and is merely
descriptive of the state of the thing
sold without altering the sellers
responsibility to deliver the
property sold to the buyer.[28]
What the foregoing circumstances
ineluctably indicate is that CDC,
having paid the full and fair price of
the land, was an innocent purchaser
for value, for, according to Sandoval
v. Court of Appeals:[29]
A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys property of another, without
notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claim
or interest of some other persons in
the property. He buys the property
with the belief that the person from
whom he receives the thing was the
owner and could convey title to the
property. A purchaser cannot close
his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and
still claim he acted in good faith.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition
for review on certiorari; set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 94-2045;
and declare Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-34640 in the name of
Casimiro Development Corporation
valid and subsisting.
The respondent shall pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LABURADA v. LRA
G.R. No. 101387
Mar. 11, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration
proceeding in which applicants have
been adjudged to have a registrable
title, may the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a
decree of registration if it has
evidence that the subject land may
already be included in an existing
Torrens certificate of title? Under
this circumstance, may the LRA be
compelled by mandamus to issue
such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting
this Court in this special civil action
for mandamus[1] under Rule 65
which asks this Court to direct the
Land Registration Authority (LRA)
to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in Land Registration
Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in
LRC Case No. N-11022 for the
registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372,
located in Mandaluyong City. On
January 8, 1991, the trial court,
acting as a land registration court,
rendered its decision disposing
thus:[3]
WHEREFORE, finding the
application meritorious and it
appearing that the applicants,
Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
Laburada, have a registrable title
over the parcel of land described as
Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court
declares, confirms and orders the
registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall
become final, let the corresponding
decree be issued in the name of
spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
Laburada, both of legal age, married,
with residence and postal address at
No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the
trial court, upon motion of
petitioners, issued an order[4]
dated March 15, 1991 requiring the
LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the
LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed
this action for mandamus.[5]
Attached to the LRAs comment on
the petition is a report dated April
29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez,
director of the LRA Department of
Registration, which explained public
respondents refusal to issue the said
decree:[6]
In connection with the Petition for
Mandamus filed by Petitioners
through counsel, dated August 27,
1991 relative to the above-noted
case/record, the following
comments are respectfully
submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for
registration of title of a parcel of
land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan
Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block
Page 24
No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the
Municipality of San Felipe Neri,
Province of Rizal was filed by
Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada
and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan
sought to be registered in our
Municipal Index Sheet, it was found
that it might be a portion of the
parcels of land decreed in Court of
Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos.
699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of
the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
319932, a copy of said subdivision
plan is Annex A hereof;
The records on file in this Authority
show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240,
696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26,
1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this
Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is
Annex B hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in
the name of Compania Agricola de
Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true
copy of the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by
this Authority, a copy is Annex C
hereof, per unsigned letter of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro
Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT
NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of
land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this
Authority to send another letter
dated April 15, 1992 to the Register
of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a
copy is Annex E hereof, requesting
for a certified typewritten copy of
OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a
certified copy of the subsisting
certificate of title with complete
technical description of the parcel of
land involved therein. To date,
however, no reply to our letter has
as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on
file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that
Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3,
Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 29337 issued in the name
of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a
copy is attached as Annex F hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer
from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6595. However, the title issued for
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 cannot be located because TCT
No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration
sought by the petitioners pursuant
to the Decision dated January 8,
1991 and Order dated March 15,
1991, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, and thus contravene
the policy and purpose of the
Torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same
(G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose
vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x
x.
In view of the foregoing explanation,
the solicitor general prays that the
petition be dismissed for being
premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the
parties, petitioners filed an urgent
motion, dated September 4, 1995,
[7] for an early resolution of the
case. To this motion, the Court
responded with a Resolution, dated
October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]
x x x Acting on the urgent motion for
early resolution of the case dated 04
September 1995 filed by petitioner
Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court
resolved to require the Solicitor
General to report to the Court in
detail, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution, what
concrete and specific steps, if any,
have been taken by respondent
since 19 May 1993 (the date of
respondents Memorandum) to
actually verify whether the lot
subject of LRC Case No. N-11022
(Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 68), described as Lot 3A,
Psd-1372 and situated in
Mandaluyong City, might be a
portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land
Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699,
875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor
general submitted his compliance
with the above resolution, to which
was attached a letter dated
November 27, 1997 of Felino M.
Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary
and Cadastral Decree Division,
which states:[9]
With reference to your letter dated
November 13, 1995, enclosed
herewith is a copy of our letter
dated 29 April 1992 addressed to
Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating
among others that Lot 3-B, of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, a
portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237
is really covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued
in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de
Bunaflor [sic] which was
transfer[ed] from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6395, per
verification of the records on file in
the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
However, the title issued for the
subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot
be located because TCT #6595 is
incomplete.
Page 25
It was also informed [sic] that for
this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration
sought by the petitioners pursuant
to the decision dated January 9,
1991 and order dated March 15,
1991, would result in the
duplication of [the] title over the
same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purposes
of the torrens registration system,
and destroy the integrity of the
same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San
Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to
the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same
parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue:
[10]
Whether or not Respondent Land
Registration Authority can be
compelled to issue the
corresponding decree in LRC Case
No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right
Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus
is available in this case, for the LRA
unlawfully neglect[ed] the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office x x x. They
cite four reasons why the writ
should be issued. First, petitioners
claim that they have a clear legal
right to the act being prayed for and
the LRA has the imperative duty to
perform because, as land
registration is an in rem proceeding,
the jurisdictional requirement of
notices and publication should be
complied with.[11] Since there was
no showing that the LRA filed an
opposition in this proceeding, it
cannot refuse to issue the
corresponding decree. Second, it is
not the duty of the LRA to take the
cudgels for the private persons in
possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No.
29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595.
Rather, it is the sole concern of said
private person-holders of said titles
to institute in a separate but proper
action whatever claim they may
have against the property subject of
petitioners application for
registration. Third, petitioners
contend that they suffered from the
delay in the issuance of their title,
because of the failure of the Register
of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to
furnish LRA of [sic] the certified
copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT
No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack
of opposition from the holders of
said titles.[12] Fourth, the State
consented to its being sued in this
case[;] thus, the legislature must
recognize any judgment that may be
rendered in this case as final and
make provision for its satisfaction.
[13]
On the other hand, the LRA,
represented by the solicitor general,
contends that the decision of the
trial court is not valid, considering
that [the] Court of First Instance has
no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed
in an earlier land registration case
and [so] a second decree for the
same land is null and void.[14] On
the question of whether the LRA can
be compelled to issue a decree of
registration, the solicitor general
cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15]
which held:[16]
Nevertheless, even granting that
procedural lapses have been
committed in the proceedings
below, these may be ignored by the
Court in the interest of substantive
justice. This is especially true when,
as in this case, a strict adherence to
the rules would result in a situation
where the LRA would be compelled
to issue a decree of registration over
land which has already been
decreed to and titled in the name of
another.
It must be noted that petitioners
failed to rebut the LRA report and
only alleged that the title of the
Payatas Estate was spurious,
without offering any proof to
substantiate this claim. TCT No.
8816, however, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoys
the conclusive presumption of
validity. As we declared in an early
case, (t)he very purpose of the
Torrens system would be destroyed
if the same land may be
subsequently brought under a
second action for registration. The
application for registration of the
petitioners in this case would, under
the circumstances, appear to be a
collateral attack of TCT No. 8816
which is not allowed under Section
48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring
supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general.
We hold that mandamus is not the
proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners
allegations, the judgment they seek
to enforce in this petition is not yet
executory and incontrovertible
under the Land Registration Law.
That is, they do not have any clear
legal right to implement it. We have
unambiguously ruled that a
judgment of registration does not
become executory until after the
expiration of one year after the
entry of the final decree of
Page 26
registration. We explained this in
Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17]
It is not disputed that the decision
dated 5 August 1981 had become
final and executory. Petitioners
vigorously maintain that said
decision having become final, it may
no longer be reopened, reviewed,
much less, set aside. They anchor
this claim on section 30 of P.D. No.
1529 (Property Registration
Decree) which provides that, after
judgment has become final and
executory, the court shall forthwith
issue an order to the Commissioner
of Land Registration for the issuance
of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. Petitioners
contend that section 30 should be
read in relation to section 32 of P.D.
1529 in that, once the judgment
becomes final and executory under
section 30, the decree of registration
must issue as a matter of course.
This being the law, petitioners
assert, when respondent Judge set
aside in his decision, dated 25
March 1985, the decision of 5
August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981, he clearly acted
without jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention is not correct.
Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or
land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several
decisions, has held that as long as a
final decree has not been entered by
the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from
date of entry of such decree, the title
is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a
decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign
of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRAs
reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, such
issuance may contravene the policy
and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens
system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this
Court ruled that the LRA is
mandated to refer to the trial court
any doubt it may have in regard to
the preparation and the issuance of
a decree of registration. In this
respect, LRA officials act not as
administrative officials but as
officers of said court, and their act is
the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration
proceedings.
True, land registration is an in rem
proceeding and, therefore, the
decree of registration is binding
upon and conclusive against all
persons including the government
and its branches, irrespective of
whether they were personally
notified of the application for
registration, and whether they filed
an answer to said application. This
stance of petitioners finds support
in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing
finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall
be entered. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and
quiet title thereto, subject only to
the exceptions stated in the
following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general
description To all whom it may
concern. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to
file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. Upon
the expiration of said term of one
year, every decree or certificate of
title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible. If
there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force
and effect forever, subject only to
the right of appeal herein before
provided: Provided, however, That
no decree or certificate of title
issued to persons not parties to the
appeal shall be cancelled or
annulled. But any person aggrieved
by such decree in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or
any other person for fraud in
procuring the decree. Whenever the
phrase innocent purchaser for value
or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Act, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer
for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act
No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630,
and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
Page 27
However, we must point out that the
letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino
M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and
November 27, 1995, respectively,
clearly stated that, after verification
from the records submitted by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the
property which petitioners are
seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of
Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a
portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan
S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No.
6595 has already been issued. Upon
the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B
of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was
issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus,
the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of
registration is based on documents
which, if verified, may render the
judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration
court has no jurisdiction to order
the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in
an earlier land registration case. A
second decree for the same land
would be null and void,[19] since
the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of
land only once.[20] Thus, if it is
proven that the land which
petitioners are seeking to register
has already been registered in 1904
and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will
run counter to said principle. As
ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21]
As the title of the respondents, who
hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes
indefeasible, it follows that the
Court of First Instance has no power
or jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings for the registration of
the same parcels of land covered by
the certificates of title of the
respondents. Such has been our
express ruling in the case of Rojas,
et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al.,
G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court,
through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is
one of jurisdiction on the part of the
lower court. All the other
contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or
claims of better right, while perhaps
valid in an appropriate ordinary
action, as to which we here express
no opinion, can not avail in the case
at bar if the court a quo, sitting as
land registration court, had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter
in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the
registration, in favor of respondent
city, of a lot already previously
decreed and registered in favor of
the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of
decisions, it has been well-settled
that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed
in an earlier land registration case
and a second decree for the same
land is null and void. This is so,
because when once decreed by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the
title to the land thus determined is
already a res judicata binding on the
whole world, the proceedings being
in rem. The court has no power in a
subsequent proceeding (not based
on fraud and within the statutory
period) to adjudicate the same title
in favor of another person.
Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first
registered owner in the Registration
Book is a standing notice to the
world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the
latter applicant is chargeable with
notice that the land he applied for is
already covered by a title so that he
has no right whatsoever to apply for
it. To declare the later title valid
would defeat the very purpose of
the Torrens system which is to quiet
title to the property and guarantee
its indefeasibility. It would
undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in the efficacy of the
registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a
Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus.
Thus, this Court held in Valmonte
and Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]
Moreover, after the rendition of a
decision by a registration or
cadastral court, there remain many
things to be done before the final
decree can be issued, such as the
preparation of amended plans and
amended descriptions, especially
where the decision orders a
subdivision of a lot, the segregation
therefrom of a portion being
adjudicated to another party, to fit
the said decision. As said by this
Court in the case of De los Reyes vs.
De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that
the decrees of registration must be
stated in convenient form for
transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate
technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men.
Moreover, it frequently occurs that
only portions of a parcel of land
included in an application are
ordered registered and that the
limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of
the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and
sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final
decree can be entered. That can
hardly be done by the court itself;
the law very wisely charges the chief
surveyor of the General Land
Page 28
Registration Office with such duties
(Administrative Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final
decree is actually prepared by the
Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance
of the final decree can hardly be
considered a ministerial act for the
reason that said Chief of the General
Land Registration Office acts not as
an administrative officer but as an
officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a
judicial function and not an
administrative one (De los Reyes vs.
De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring
supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the
issuance of such decree is not
compellable by mandamus because
it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise,
the writ of mandamus can be
awarded only when the petitioners
legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete.
[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law
or is inferable as a matter of law. If
the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising
merely technical questions will be
disregarded.[25] But where the
right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in
this case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by
mandamus to pass and act upon a
question submitted to it for
decision, but it cannot be enjoined
to decide for or against one of the
parties.[26] As stated earlier, a
judicial act is not compellable by
mandamus.[27] The court has to
decide a question according to its
own judgment and understanding of
the law.[28]
In view of the foregoing, it is not
legally proper to require the LRA to
issue a decree of registration.
However, to avoid multiplicity of
suits and needless delay, this Court
deems it more appropriate to direct
the LRA to expedite its study, to
determine with finality whether Lot
3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, and to
submit a report thereon to the court
of origin within sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, after which
the said court shall act with
deliberate speed according to the
facts and the law, as herein
discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED but the case is
REMANDED to the court of origin in
Pasig City. The Land Registration
Authority, on the other hand, is
ORDERED to submit to the court a
quo a report determining with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included
in the property described in TCT No.
6595, within sixty (60) days from
notice. After receipt of such report,
the land registration court, in turn,
is ordered to ACT, with deliberate
and judicious speed, to settle the
issue of whether the LRA may issue
the decree of registration, according
to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF LOPEZ v. DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 112905
Feb. 3, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this case, the two applications for
registration of the same parcel of
land were filed twelve years apart in
different branches of the same Court
of First Instance, but a certificate of
title was issued in one case while
the other is still pending appeal.
The applicants in the earlier case
are now before this Court on a
petition for review on certiorari.
They assert that the decision
ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in their favor, while
promulgated subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title in
the names of the second applicants,
should be "executed" and that the
certificate of title issued to the latter
should be nullified.1a wphi1.ne t
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al.
filed an application for the
registration of a 69-hectare parcel of
land in Tagaytay City with the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, Branch III
under Land Registration Case No.
299 and LRC Record No. 11617. On
January 29, 1957, the court issued
an order of general default,
excepting only the Director of Lands.
On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal
Jose M. Legaspi, representing the
Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a
motion to lift the order of general
default and submitted an opposition
on behalf of the municipality. The
opposition was later amended on
September 16, 1966 alleging that a
portion of the land applied for
which the municipality had leased
to private persons had been its
patrimonial property since 1930 or
earlier. The municipality further
alleged that in a registration case
entitled "Mariano Lopez de Leon v.
Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No.
8161-R), the Court of Appeals found
that the applicants had never been
in possession of the land sought to
be registered.
In its answer to the amended
opposition, the applicants claimed
that a part of the whole tract of land
they sought to register was their
inheritance, which includes Lot No.
Page 29
2 of plan PSU-51901 with an area of
119 hectares. However, it had to be
excluded in the application for
registration of the 69-hectare land
in Cavite upon the recommendation
of the Chief Surveyor of the General
Land Registration Office because it
is located in the province of Laguna.
Similarly, Lot No. 1 of PSU-51901
that lies within Tagaytay City had
been excluded from the registration
proceedings under G.L.RO. Rec. No.
53498 or Land Registration Case No.
2201 in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna.1
Nevertheless, the municipality filed
a motion to dismiss the application
for original registration of Lot No. 1
on the ground of res judicata. The
applicants, on the other hand,
contended that the principle of res
jucidata is not applicable because
the subject matter of CA-G.R. No.
8161-R (Mariano Lopez de Leon v.
Municipality of Silang) was Lot No. 2
or the portion of the land in Laguna.
On February 7, 1969, the lower
court issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit
on the ground that the oppositor
municipality had no personality to
intervene considering that Lot No. 1
was outside of its territorial limits.
The lower court held:
. . . . Even if said land was communal
property of the Municipality of
Silang, by virtue of its incorporation
into (the) city of Tagaytay it became
the property of the latter. Hence, the
Municipality of Silang has no
personality to appear in this (sic)
proceedings. If any right of action
exists, it accrues in favor of the City
of Tagaytay and the same should be
pursued by the said city.2
The oppositor municipality filed a
motion for reconsideration of the
said order. On July 23, 1970, the
court issued an order stating that
"in order not to impede whatever
action the movant" might take
against the order of February 7,
1969, said motion should be denied.
On January 12, 1971, the applicants
filed a motion praying that the clerk
of court be commissioned to receive
evidence for them it appearing that
the order of July 23, 1970 had
become final and executory "by
virtue of which the Municipality of
Silang no longer ha(d) any
personality to appear in these
proceedings."3 The court granted
said motion and directed the clerk
of court to submit a report on the
matter.
In his report dated April 15, 1971,
Clerk of Court Rolando D. Diaz
stated that since time immemorial,
Micaela, Fernando, Ciriaco and
Catalino, all surnamed De los Reyes,
owned and possessed the parcel of
land in question. On November 3,
1870, they sold the land to
Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad and
Francisco Dimaranan. On September
15, 1892, the property passed in
ownership to Pedro Lopez de Leon,
Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the
daughter and sole heir of Ambrocio
Carrillo Trinidad. Pedro and Maxima
remained in possession of the
property until their death when
their children, applicants Pedro
Lopez, Mariano Lopez de Leon,
Pastor Lopez de Leon, Eulogio
Lopez, Clara Lopez, Ricarda Lopez
and Rosario Lopez took over
ownership and possession thereof.
Upon their death, their respective
heirs succeeded over the property
and, on February 25, 1971, they
partitioned it. The agricultural
property was under the supervision
of Domingo Open a who planted
portions thereof to rice and other
agricultural products.
The clerk of court thus
recommended that the court
confirm its order of general default,
approve his report, and register the
property in the names of the
applicants in accordance with the
extrajudicial partition of the
property.4
On April 19, 1971, the court5
accordingly rendered a decision
approving the report of the clerk of
court and ordering that once the
decision becomes final, the
corresponding decree of registration
of title be issued in favor of the
applicants.6
The oppositor Municipality of Silang
interposed an appeal from the said
decision of the land registration
court to the Court of Appeals. On
May 2, 1979, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision7 dismissing the
appeal "for lack of personality of the
oppositor-appellant Municipality of
Silang to interfere in the registration
proceedings below."8 Undaunted,
the oppositor municipality filed
with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
51054 (Municipality of Silang v.
Court of Appeals) which was denied
on September 19, 1979. The
municipality's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied
with finality for lack of merit on
October 24, 1979.9 On November 9,
1979, judgment was entered in the
said case.10
Meanwhile, in the course of
examining the records for the
purpose of issuing the decree of
registration in favor of Pedro Lopez,
et al., the Land Registration
Commission discovered that Lot No.
1, plan Psu-51901 had been decreed
in favor of private respondents
Honesto de Castro, et al.11
Further investigation revealed that
sometime in 1967,12 Honesto de
Castro, et al. filed before the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in
Tagaytay City, an application for the
Page 30
registration of the same parcel of
land under Land Registration Case
No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No. N-
33292. The case was called for
hearing on March 18, 1968. Eight
(8) days later or on March 26, 1968,
the court13 promulgated a decision
adjudicating the land located at
Barrio Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more
particularly described as Plan Psu-
51901-Amd., in favor of said
applicants and directing that upon
the finality of the decision, the
corresponding decree of registration
be issued.14 The ruling of the court
was based on its finding that one
Hermogenes Orte, who originally
owned the land sought to be
registered, sold it in 1932 to
Marciano de Castro. The deed
evidencing said sale was destroyed
during the Japanese occupation. De
Castro continued possession of the
land until his death on April 26,
1940. His wife Epifania and their
children named Maria Socorro,
Francisco, Honesto, Romualdo,
Felicitacion, Faustino and Felixberto
continued possession of the
property who declared the land for
assessment and taxation purposes
in Cabuyao, Laguna. However, upon
learning that the property lies in
Tagaytay City, the applicants
declared it in their names in said
city.
The cause of the conflicting claims
over the same land was never
explained because the head of the
geodetic engineers of the Land
Registration Commission did not
appear in court in Land Registration
Case No. 299. Hence, on August 19,
1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III15
issued an order declaring that the
court had lost jurisdiction to hear
the case, without, however,
dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, or on June 28,
1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez, et al.
filed a complaint "for execution of
judgment and cancellation of land
titles of the defendants and their
successors-in-interest" before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 18, at Tagaytay City.
Docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1028,
the complaint named as defendants
Honesto C. de Castro, Maria Socorro
de Castro married to Antonio
Perigrina, Francisco de Castro
"widow", Faustino de Castro,
Felixberto de Castro, Epifania C. Vda.
de Castro and their successors-in-
interest.
The complaint alleged the facts
pertinent to enforce the judgment of
April 19, 1971. The plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, alleged further
that, upon the filing of their
application for registration with the
CFI of Cavite, Branch III at Cavite
City, said court acquired jurisdiction
over the res because land
registration proceedings are in rem
and therefore, the CFI of Cavite,
Branch IV at Tagaytay City could not
have acquired jurisdiction over the
same res by virtue of De Castros'
application for registration. They
claimed that no less than this Court
had recognized the jurisdiction of
Branch III in Cavite City when it
passed upon the correctness of the
lower court's ruling in favor of
Pedro Lopez, et al. Contending that
the decision of Branch III on April
19, 1971 declaring that title to the
land belonged to Pedro Lopez, et al.
had become final and executory on
June 18, 1980, they asserted that
they were the lawful owners of the
land. However, they had been
unduly deprived ownership and
possession thereof on account of its
"wrongful registration" in the name
of the defendants "by means of
fraud and misrepresentation." As a
result of their undue deprivation of
ownership, possession and
enjoyment of the property
notwithstanding that the question of
ownership had been settled in their
favor, plaintiffs claimed that they
suffered actual and moral damages.
Claiming that the judgment sought
to be executed had not been barred
by the statute of limitations, they
prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the
judgment to effect:
1. Execution of judgment of the
decision of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) Branch III, Cavite,
dated April 19, 1971 by the Hon.
Judge Alfredo Catolico which
became final on June 18, 1980;
2. Ordering the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration
Administration and the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the
titles of the land in question under
the names of the defendants and
their successors in interest and that
new title to the same parcel of land
be issued to plaintiffs;
3. Ordering all the occupants of the
questioned land to vacate the
premises and deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the defendants and/or
their successors in interest to pay
plaintiffs or its (sic) heirs and/or
successors in interest actual
damages (in) the amount of
P200,000.00 or the amount that
may be proven during the hearing
and trial of this case;
5. Ordering the defendants and/or
their successors in interest to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees;
6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary
damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 or the sum that may be
proven during the trial;
7. Ordering the defendants to pay
the costs of suit.
Page 31
Plaintiffs further pray for such other
reliefs just and proper under the
premises.16
In their answer with compulsory
counterclaim, the defendants
interposed the defenses of
prescription, laches and/or estoppel
and failure to state a cause of action.
They averred that they were no
longer the owners of the property as
it had been sold "absolutely and
unconditionally to innocent third
parties for valuable consideration
and in good faith." They contended
that in view of the indefeasibility of
their title to the property, even the
title of their successors-in-interest
can not be subject to collateral
attack. They claimed that Branch III
of the CFI in Cavite should have
"remanded" the records of LRC Case
No. 299 or LRC Record No. 11617 to
the same CFI branch in Tagaytay
City to which the "legal and proper
jurisdiction to hear and decide that
particular case belonged." They
asserted that the complaint should
have been directed by the plaintiffs
against the Assurance Fund under
the provisions of P.D. No. 1529.
Alleging that the "very precipitate
and wrongful suit" caused them
mental anguish, serious anxiety,
social humiliation and similar injury,
they claimed moral damages of
P500,000.00, nominal damages of
P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P300,000.00.
On May 21, 1990, the RTC of Cavite,
Branch 18 in Tagaytay City17
rendered the decision in Civil Case
No. TG-1028 dismissing the
complaint for being "improper and
premature". The court likewise
dismissed the defendants'
counterclaims for "their dearth of
sufficient legal, factual and
evidentiary support."18
The lower court held that the
decision of Branch III that became
final on June 18, 1980, could not be
enforced against defendants
considering that they were not
parties in LRC Record No. 11617.
Neither could it order the
cancellation of the titles issued to
defendants because the LRC and/or
the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay
City had not been impleaded as
parties to the case and therefore the
court did not acquire jurisdiction
over them.
The lower court held further that
because the case was covered by Act
No. 496 and/or P.D. No. 1529 which
are special laws, Section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court on execution of
judgment by independent action
cannot be invoked. The court also
ruled that:
Treating the second issue raised by
plaintiffs, the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, or this
Court, validly acquired jurisdiction
over the case filed by defendants
Honesto de Castro, et al., in LRC Case
No. TG 95. The records show that
herein defendants as petitioner(s)
in that case, complied with all the
jurisdictional requirements of law,
conferring jurisdiction upon this
Court to try that case and lent
validly (sic) upon its proceedings. As
admitted by the plaintiffs
themselves, this Court was not
aware of the existence of LRC
Record No. 11617, pending before
the other Branch of this Court, in the
same manner that they, or the
plaintiffs themselves, did not also
know the existence of LRC Case No.
TG 95 before this Court. This
Court is assured that good faith
pervaded among the parties
concerned, in the conduct of its
proceedings, all procedural
requirements having been
punctiliously complied with and no
irregularity or breach of law having
been committed. So that the
decision rendered by this Court in
that case is valid and subsisting, for
all intents and purposes and can be
nullified only under circumstances
and through procedures mandated
by law. Hence, the corresponding
decree of registration issued in TG-
95 and the original certificates of
titles issued to defendants in
consequence thereof, are all valid
and binding until declared
otherwise, in a case directly
assailing their validity, and of
course, by a competent court. And
by express provision of law, the
same are insulated from any
collateral attack.19
The court concluded that the
complaint was in the nature of a
collateral attack on the validity of
the certificate of title issued in favor
of the defendants and their
successors-in-interest because,
"(b)y its caption and averments, the
validity of the title in question, is not
directly assailed."
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision,
which was denied on May 29, 1991.
It reiterated that the plaintiffs'
failure to implead the Administrator
of the NLRDRA, the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City and the
possessors of the property in
question was a fatal procedural
error because they were
indispensable parties over which
the court should acquire
jurisdiction. Their inclusion as
defendants in the case was
necessary in order that their title to
the property could be directly
attacked. Petitioners should have
availed of the remedy provided by
Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 and their
failure to observe that law was a
"colossal error" because once
issued, a certificate of title becomes
indefeasible, "completely insulated
Page 32
from any form of collateral attack
assailing its validity."20
Petitioners sought recourse before
the Court of Appeals, dismissed the
appeal on November 29, 1993.21
Stressing the indefeasibility of title
under the Torrens System of land
registration, the Court of Appeals
echoed the lower court's ruling that
the decree of registration in favor of
respondents cannot be reopened or
set aside in a "collateral proceeding
such as the one in the case at bar
which has for its objective the
execution of a judgment which
apparently has become dormant,
thus appellants' insistence that it be
revived." Citing Article 1544 of the
Civil Code on sale of property to
different vendees which it opined
had a "persuasive influence" in the
resolution of the appeal, it held that
"in case land has been registered in
the name of two different persons,
the earlier in date (of registration)
shall prevail." Nonetheless,
emphasizing that the land in
question has been transferred to a
third person, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the title issued in favor of
respondents should be "maintained
in their status quo, until the proper
court shall have determined their
priorities, and the equities resulting
therefrom."22
Consequently, petitioners filed the
instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, raising the following
assignment of errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO RULE ON THE VITAL
AND PIVOTAL ISSUE THAT THE
TRIAL COURT (CFI TAGAYTAY CITY,
BRANCH IV), HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBSEQUENT LAND
REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE
APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, AND IN
DECREEING THE REGISTRATION OF
TITLE OVER THE SAID LOTS WHICH
WERE ALREADY PREVIOUSLY THE
SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS BY ANOTHER COURT
(CFI CAVITE, BRANCH III) IN A
PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION
CASE IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH WAS
SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND EVEN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE
INSTANT ACTION FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS FOR EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT OF CFI BRANCH III,
WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A
REVIVAL OF THE JUDGMENT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN MERELY
RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE,
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
RESPONDENTS' TITLES, AND
PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION
AND ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS,
WHICH RELIANCE ARE MISPLACED
AND UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF THE
LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE
LOWER COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND TO
ISSUE THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
CANNOT DIVEST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED
LOTS BY FILING THE INSTANT
ACTION FOR EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS'
TITLES.
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY
AND LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE
LOTS IN QUESTION.
In all cases where the authority to
proceed is conferred by a statute
and the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory, the same
must be strictly compiled with, or
the proceedings will be utterly
void.23
When petitioners applied for the
registration of Lot No. 1 before the
CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the
governing law then as regards the
matter of jurisdiction was the
Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic
Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law
providing for the permanent
stations of district judges or judges
of Courts of First Instance stated
that for the Seventh Judicial District
that included the province of Cavite,
there would be two judges in Cavite
City.24 The law did not create other
branches of the CFI in the province
of Cavite outside of the City of
Cavite.
It was on June 22, 1963 when
Republic Act No. 3749 took effect
that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City
was set up.25 That amendment to
Republic Act No. 296 provided that
four judges would preside "over the
Courts of First Instance of the
Province of Cavite and the Cities of
Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Martires"
who would be "judges of the first,
second, third and fourth branches"
of that court. Because the rule has
always been that court having
territorial jurisdiction over the
property should take cognizance of
its registration,26 upon the creation
of the Tagaytay City branch,
Page 33
petitioners' application for
registration should have been
transferred to that court inasmuch
as the property involved is located
in that city.
It appears, however, that the Cavite
City branch remained the venue of
petitioners' application for
registration, apparently on account
of the following provision of Rep.
Act No. 3749:
Sec. 6. Wherever an additional
branch or branches of the Court of
First Instance is or are established
in this Act in the same place where
there is an existing court or courts
of first instance, all cases already
filed in the latter court or courts
shall be heard, tried and decided by
such latter court or courts.
Notably, the law is not clear on
whether or not the phrase "in the
same place" refers to the judicial
district/province or the place where
a branch of the court is stationed.
Hence, considering the general rule
that once a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case it remains
with that court until its full
termination,27 the phrase "in the
same place" should be interpreted
as referring to the province of
Cavite. The Cavite City branch of the
CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained
jurisdiction over the application for
registration because there was no
jurisdictional question involved in
the proceedings in Land
Registration Case No. 299. What was
in question was whether the Cavite
City branch of the Cavite CFI was the
proper venue for said case upon the
creation of the Tagaytay City branch.
As this Court said:
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely
distinct matters. Jurisdiction may
not be conferred by consent or
waiver upon a court which
otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of an action; but the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the
parties and an objection that the
plaintiff brought his suit in the
wrong county may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to make a
timely objection. In either case, the
court may render a valid judgment.
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be
left to the consent or agreement of
the parties, whether or not a
prohibition exists against their
alteration.28
Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be
waived. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather
than restrict their access to the
courts as it relates to the place of
trial.29 Thus, the last paragraph of
Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296
provided that in land registration
cases, the Secretary of Justice, who
was then tasked with the
administration and supervision of
all courts, may transfer land
registration courts "to any other
place more convenient to the
parties." This implied that Land
Registration Case No. 299 could be
retained in the Cavite City branch of
the CFI if it would be convenient to
the applicants who had been used to
transacting business with that
branch; the case did not have to be
transferred to be transferred to
Tagaytay City. Parenthetically,
Circular No. 46 dated July 3, 1963
that then Secretary of Justice Juan R.
Liwag addressed to all CFI judges
and clerks of court in line with the
enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947,
merely quotes Section 6 thereof.
Said circular does not elucidate on
whether cases should be transferred
to the branches that had territorial
jurisdiction over them.
Petitioners' claim that this Court
had "sustained" the jurisdiction of
the Cavite City branch of the CFI
over Land Registration Case No. 299
in G.R. No. 51054 is incorrect. To be
sure, the principal issue raised in
the petition for review on certiorari
in G.R. No. 51054 was the
personality of the Municipality of
Silang to file an opposition to the
application for land registration.
While this Court upheld the lower
court's ruling on that issue, such
affirmance in no way implied that
the issue of jurisdiction was likewise
resolved. It is only now that the
same issue is brought to light for
resolution.
As regards the jurisdiction of the
Tagaytay City branch over the land
registration proceedings instituted
by private respondents, the order of
general default issued in Land
Registration Case No. 299 is of
relevance. When the Cavite City
branch of the CFI issued an order of
default, it is presumed to have
regularly performed its task in
accordance with law especially with
regard to notice requirements. Act
No. 496 provided that after the
court shall have set the application
for initial hearing the following
procedure should be observed:
Sec. 31. Upon receipt of the order of
the court setting the time for initial
hearing of the application from the
clerk of the Court of First Instance,
the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office shall cause a
notice thereof to be published twice,
in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, in the English language. The
notice shall be issued by order of the
court, attested by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office,
and shall be in form substantially as
follows: . . . .30
The general order of default of
January 29, 1957 stated as follows:
Page 34
It appearing from the certificate of
the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office and the return of
the Sheriff, attached to the record of
this case, that the time notice
relative to the application in said
case was duly published, posted,
and served in accordance with law;
and that the time allowed for
entering appearance and filing
answers expired at 9:30 A.M. on the
29th day of January, 1957, for which
date said case was duly set for
hearing by the Court;
And it further appearing from said
record that no person has appeared
as respondent in the case filed an
answer within the time for that
purpose allowed, with the exception
of the Director of Lands represented
by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M.
Legaspi;
All persons, except those herein
above named, are hereby declared
to be in default in the above-entitled
case, and it is ordered that a general
default be recorded in said case, and
that the application therein be taken
as confessed by all the world, except
the persons hereinabove named.
It is so ordered.31
On January 24, 1957, the
Municipality of Silang filed a motion
to lift said general order of default
and to admit its opposition to the
registration.32 This fact supports
the presumption that the officials
concerned performed their duties
regularly because it implies notice,
whether actual or constructive, on
the part of said municipality that a
land registration proceedings had
been filed with respect to Lot No. 1.
Compliance with the requirement of
notice and publication had the effect
of notifying all persons interested in
the proceedings including the herein
private respondents. As this Court
said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan:
. . . it is true that appellants were not
personally notified of the pendency
of the present registration case even
if they were actually occupying, as
they claim, portions of the land, but
such procedural defect cannot affect
the jurisdiction of the court because
registration proceedings have the
nature of actions in rem. . . . .33
A proceeding in rem, such as land
registration proceedings, requires
constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests
in the property.34 Constructive
seizure of the land for registration is
effected through publication of the
application for registration and
service of notice to affected
parties.35 Consequently, when
private respondents filed their own
application for registration of the
same parcel of land, strictly
speaking, the Tagaytay City branch
could no longer entertain the
application for registration as the
res involved had been constructively
seized by the Cavite City branch of
the same court. In hindsight, this
complication of two applications for
registration having been filed for
one and the same tract of land could
have been avoided had Land
Registration Case No. 299 been
transferred to the Tagaytay City
branch of the same court where it
rightfully belonged, upon the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 3947.
Be that as it may, the Court is not
persuaded that the registration
proceedings instituted by private
respondents should be nullified by
reason of the fact that the Cavite
City branch of the same court was
already proceeding with another
registration case for the same piece
of land.
In land registration proceedings, all
interested parties are obliged to
take care of their interests and to
zealously pursue their objective of
registration on account of the rule
that whoever first acquires title to a
piece of land shall prevail. To
illustrate, where more than one
certificate of title is issued over the
land, the person holding a prior
certificate is entitled to the land as
against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate.36 It should
be stressed that said rule refers to
the date of the certificate of title and
not to the date of filing of the
application for registration of title.
Hence, even though an applicant
precedes another, he may not be
deemed to have priority of right to
register title. As such, while his
application is being processed, an
applicant is duty-bound to observe
vigilance and to take care that his
right or interest is duly protected.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due
diligence required of them as
applicants for land registration. In
the same way that publication of
their application for registration
was supposed to have rendered
private respondents on constructive
notice of such application, the
publication of notice in the land
registration proceedings initiated by
private respondents had the same
effect of notice upon petitioners.
Petitioners were thus presumed to
have been notified of the land
registration proceedings filed by
private respondents in the Tagaytay
City branch of the Cavite CFI thereby
providing them with the
opportunity to file an opposition
thereto.
The fact that an interlocutory matter
in Land Registration Case No. 299
had to be resolved by both the Court
of Appeals and this Court did not in
any way mean that petitioners
should no longer exercise due
Page 35
diligence to protect their right or
interest in the said proceedings. On
the contrary, they were bound to
exercise such diligence with vigor
especially because as early as April
19, 1971, they already had a
judgment in their favor. The record
does not show why petitioners did
not have actual knowledge of the
registration proceedings instituted
by private respondents. However,
the lack of such knowledge in fact
raises a doubt as to the veracity of
their claim that they were in
possession of the land. If indeed
they possessed the property, even if
through an administrator, as diligent
owners, the threat to their
ownership could not have escaped
them considering that the property
is in a rural community where news
travels fast.
Even granting that petitioners did
not really have actual knowledge of
private respondents' application for
registration, yet after discovering
that the land was already registered
in the name of private respondents,
petitioners should have immediately
sought recourse in law to protect
their rights. As it turned out, they let
almost seven (7) years to pass from
such discovery before they acted to
revive what already was a dormant
judgment. Hence, they filed the
separate action "for execution of
judgment and cancellation of titles"
of private respondents because
more than five (5) years had elapsed
since the promulgation of the
decision directing the issuance of a
decree of registration.37 Under
these circumstances, the inevitable
conclusion is that petitioners
neglected for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due
diligence, they could or should have
done earlier. They neglected or
omitted to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that they either had
abandoned or declined to assert
it.38 In short, they were guilty of
laches.
The doctrine of stale demands or
laches is based on grounds of policy
which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale
claims and is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.39 Land
registration proceedings entails a
race against time and non-
observance of time constraints
imposed by law exposes an
applicant to the loss of registration
rights if not to the deleterious
effects of the application of the
doctrine of laches. An applicant for
registration has but a one-year
period from the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of
another applicant, within which to
question the validity of the
certificate of title issued pursuant to
such decree. Once the one-year
period has lapsed, the title to the
land becomes indefeasible. While
the law grants the aggrieved
applicant certain remedial
measures, these are designed to
make up for his failure to register
his title to the property and not
necessarily to restore ownership
and/or title that he had allowed by
inaction to be vested in another
person. In Javier v. Court of
Appeals,40 the Court set out these
remedies as follows:
. . . . The basic rule is that after the
lapse of one (1) year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to
review or attack although its
issuance is attended with actual
fraud. This does not mean however
that the aggrieved party is without a
remedy at law. If the property has
not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available. The
decree becomes incontrovertible
and can no longer be reviewed after
one (1) year from the date of the
decree so that the only remedy of
the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to
bring an ordinary action in court for
reconveyance, which is an action in
personam and is always available as
long as the property has not passed
to an innocent third party for value.
If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, the remedy is an action for
damages. . . . .
In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of
Appeals,41 the Court also said:
. . . it has been held that the proper
recourse of the true owner of the
property who was prejudiced and
fraudulently dispossessed of the
same is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused
or employed the fraud, and if the
latter are insolvent, an action
against the Treasurer of the
Philippines may be filed for
recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.
In filing the action for execution of
judgment and cancellation of titles,
petitioners must have realized that
only the remedy of filing an action
for damages was available to them.
Otherwise, they could have filed an
action for reconveyance of the
property. Of course, petitioners
cleverly clothed their complaint as
one for execution of judgment under
the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, such procedural strategy
was a bid to revive the decision of
the lower court ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration
in their names. In other words,
petitioners availed of procedural
remedies provided for by the Rules
of Court as it appeared that because
of the lapse of time, they would not
Page 36
benefit from remedies prescribed by
land registration laws.
The wrong appellation of
petitioners' complaint shall not
mislead this Court as, in the
determination of the nature of a
complaint, its averments rather than
its title, are the proper gauges.42 A
reading of the allegations of the
complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028
betrays petitioners' true intention in
filing the case. In paragraph 15 of
the complaint, petitioners alleged
that they were '"unduly deprived of
their ownership and lawful
possession of the land . . . due to the
wrongful registration of the subject
land in the name of the defendants
by means of fraud and
misrepresentations." Except for this
general statement, the issue of fraud
or misrepresentation is not alleged
with particularity in the
complaint.43 This is unfortunate
because, if filed within the time set
by law, a complaint with the proper
allegation of fraud coupled with
proof thereof could cause the loss of
the indefeasibility of private
respondents' title to the property. It
is established that if fraud attended
the acquisition of title under the
Torrens System, such title cannot be
used as a means to perpetuate fraud
against the rightful owner of real
property.44
We take note of petitioners'
allegation in their reply
memorandum that in the
registration proceedings filed by
private respondents, "what was
published in the Official Gazette was
the description of a bigger tract of
land that includes the smaller lot
actually applied for by
respondents."45 That factual
allegation could have had its impact
before the trial court in an action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud
in the acquisition of title but not
before this Court where factual
issues may no longer be raised.
The inevitable conclusion therefore
is that petitioners were cognizant all
the while of the futility of their
attempt to cancel the title of private
respondents under the law. Hence,
they indirectly and collaterally
attacked the land title duly issued to
private respondents on the theory
that the revival of the dormant
judgment in their favor could result
in the realization of their objective
of nullifying such title, However,
aggrieved applicants for land
registration cannot seek protection
under the provisions of the Rules of
Court which are merely suppletory
to special laws governing land
registration proceedings.
The resolution of the instant
petition cannot be complete without
a word on the manner by which
officials of the then Land
Registration Commission ignored
the lower court's order to explain
the conflicting claims of ownership
over the same property. Particularly,
there is a need for an explanation
why they caused the publication of
the notice of hearing in private
respondents' application for
registration notwithstanding that
the same office had already
published the notice of hearing as
regards petitioners' application for
registration of the same parcel of
land. It is within the power of these
officials to determine whether or
not the same parcel of land is the
subject of two applications for
registration. The indefeasibility of
private respondents' title over the
property should not get in the way
of an administrative investigation of
possible omission or neglect of
official duty. This Court cannot let
such malfeasance or misfeasance in
office pass unnoticed lest the
integrity of the Torrens System of
land registration be undermined.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for review is DENIED, and the
dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028
is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the
Department of Justice so that an
investigation against officials who
were responsible for the publication
of two notices of hearing of an
application for registration of the
same parcel of land may be
conducted and the guilty officials
duly sanctioned.1a wphi1.ne t
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. HERBIETO
G.R. No. 156117
May 26, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002,[1] which affirmed the
Judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu,
dated 21 December 1999,[2]
granting the application for land
registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition
are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias
and David, who filed with the MTC,
on 23 September 1998, a single
application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and
8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots).
They claimed to be owners in fee
simple of the Subject Lots, which
they purchased from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3]
Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted
the following set of documents:
Page 37
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No.
8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan
of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the
Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department
of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dispensing with
the need for Surveyors Certificates
for the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
certificates of title covering the
Subject Lots;[7]
(e) Certifications by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its
finding that the Subject Lots are
alienable and disposable, by virtue
of Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of
Assessment of Real Property (ARP)
No. 941800301831, in the name of
Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422,
issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of
David, covering Lot No. 8423, also
issued in 1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed
on 25 June 1976 by spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan selling the Subject Lots and
the improvements thereon to their
sons and respondents herein,
Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot
No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while
Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the
petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an
Opposition to the respondents
application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1)
Respondents failed to comply with
the period of adverse possession of
the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents muniments of title
were not genuine and did not
constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of
the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic
and were not subject to private
appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on
03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12]
All owners of the land adjoining the
Subject Lots were sent copies of the
Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy
of the Notice was also posted on 27
July 1999 in a conspicuous place on
the Subject Lots, as well as on the
bulletin board of the municipal
building of Consolacion, Cebu,
where the Subject Lots were located.
[14] Finally, the Notice was also
published in the Official Gazette on
02 August 1999[15] and The
Freeman Banat News on 19
December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03
September 1999, the MTC issued an
Order of Special Default,[17] with
only petitioner Republic opposing
the application for registration of
the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to
offer and mark documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional
facts. The MTC commissioned the
Clerk of Court to receive further
evidence from the respondents and
to submit a Report to the MTC after
30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC
promulgated its Judgment ordering
the registration and confirmation of
the title of respondent Jeremias over
Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
David over Lot No. 8423. It
subsequently issued an Order on 02
February 2000 declaring its
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
final and executory, and directing
the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue a decree of registration for the
Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the
MTC Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19]
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment
reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no
question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as
within the alienable and disposable
zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, respectively provides
that All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be
the object of prescription and that
Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in
the case at bench, their parents
already acquired the subject parcels
of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that
they cultivated the same and
planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment
dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In
short, it is undisputed that herein
appellees or their predecessors-in-
interest had occupied and possessed
the subject land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently,
even assuming arguendo that
appellees possession can be
reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or
Page 38
from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone, still
the argument of the appellant does
not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject
property, being alienable since 1963
as shown by CENRO Report dated
June 23, 1963, may now be the
object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By
express provision of Article 1137,
appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its
registration, as provided by Section
14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows
individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again,
even considering that possession of
appelless should only be reckoned
from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of
land in open, continuous, and in the
concept of an owner, for 35 years
already when they filed the instant
application for registration of title to
the land in 1998. As such, this court
finds no reason to disturb the
finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present
Petition for the review and reversal
of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 22 November 2002,
on the basis of the following
arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish
that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession
of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. According to the petitioner
Republic, possession of the Subject
Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot
be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of
possession required by law. The
Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963, per CENROs certification.
It also alleges that the Court of
Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v.
Doldol,[21] where this Court
declared that Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended and as
it is presently phrased, requires that
possession of land of the public
domain must be from 12 June 1945
or earlier, for the same to be
acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for
registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels
of land individually and separately
owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit
in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree,
as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be
filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single
application only in case they are co-
owners. While an application may
cover two parcels of land, it is
allowed only when the subject
parcels of land belong to the same
applicant or applicants (in case the
subject parcels of land are co-
owned) and are situated within the
same province. Where the authority
of the courts to proceed is conferred
by a statute and when the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory,
it must be strictly complied with or
the proceedings will be utterly void.
Since the respondents failed to
comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property
Registration Decree, the
proceedings held before the MTC is
void, as the latter did not acquire
jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of
jurisdiction, this Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed
with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents
but for reasons different from those
presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action
and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and
proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single
application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were
not co-owners. Respondents
Jeremias and David were actually
seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the
procedural irregularity committed
by the respondents was fatal to their
case, depriving the MTC of
jurisdiction to proceed with and
hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Courts
pronouncement in Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple
omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court
with the authority or jurisdiction to
proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining
jurisdiction as prescribed by the
statute which is mandatory has not
been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void.
Page 39
This Court, however, disagrees with
petitioner Republic in this regard.
This procedural lapse committed by
the respondents should not affect
the jurisdiction of the MTC to
proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the
Subject Lots.
The Property Registration
Decree[23] recognizes and
expressly allows the following
situations: (1) the filing of a single
application by several applicants for
as long as they are co-owners of the
parcel of land sought to be
registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a
single application for registration of
several parcels of land provided that
the same are located within the
same province.[25] The Property
Registration Decree is silent,
however, as to the present situation
wherein two applicants filed a single
application for two parcels of land,
but are seeking the separate and
individual registration of the parcels
of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration
Decree failed to provide for such a
situation, then this Court refers to
the Rules of Court to determine the
proper course of action. Section 34
of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, [t]he Rules of
Court shall, insofar as not
inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases by
analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and
convenient.
Considering every application for
land registration filed in strict
accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause
of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by
the respondents with the MTC
constitutes a misjoinder of causes of
action and parties. Instead of a
single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias
and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate
applications for registration of Lots
No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and
parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and
proceed with the case.[26] They are
not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof.[27] Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the
misjoinder of causes of action and
parties involve an implied
admission of the courts jurisdiction.
It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a
party to the case or on its own
initiative, to order the severance of
the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case
of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and
the severance of any claim against
said misjoined party, also to be
proceeded with separately (in case
of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action
and parties in the present Petition
may have been corrected by the
MTC motu propio or on motion of
the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC
failed to detect the misjoinder when
the application for registration was
still pending before it; and more
regrettable that the petitioner
Republic did not call the attention of
the MTC to the fact by filing a
motion for severance of the causes
of action and parties, raising the
issue of misjoinder only before this
Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to
comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the
Property Registration Decree, thus,
the MTC was not invested with
jurisdiction as a land registration
court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties in the present
Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land
registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect
in the publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC
from assuming jurisdiction to hear
and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
A land registration case is a
proceeding in rem,[28] and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of
notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree requires that
the public be given Notice of the
Initial Hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting. Publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the
court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once
in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so
far as known, and to all whom it
may concern. Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to
Page 40
appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer
of said application shall not be
granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the
aforequoted Section 23(1) of the
Property Registration Decree
expressly provides that publication
in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court, it still
affirms its declaration in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that
publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is mandatory for
the land registration court to validly
confirm and register the title of the
applicant or applicants. That Section
23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described
in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of
the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all
such requirements, including
publication of the Notice in a
newspaper of general circulation, is
essential and imperative, and must
be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on
the reason behind the compulsory
publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when
the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as
well as by mailing and posting, all of
which have already been complied
with in the case at hand. The reason
is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspaper
and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not
be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own
any other real estate. In sum, the all
encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences
of default orders issued against the
whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide
a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial
hearing was set by the MTC, and was
in fact held, on 03 September 1999
at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof
was printed in the issue of the
Official Gazette, dated 02 August
1999, and officially released on 10
August 1999, it was published in
The Freeman Banat News, a daily
newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities
of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas
and Mindanao, only on 19 December
1999, more than three months after
the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the
Notice, way after the date of the
initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever
read the Notice as it was published
in The Freeman Banat News and
had a claim to the Subject Lots was
deprived of due process for it was
already too late for him to appear
before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose
respondents application for
registration, and to present his
claim and evidence in support of
such claim. Worse, as the Notice
itself states, should the claimant-
oppositor fail to appear before the
MTC on the date of initial hearing,
he would be in default and would
forever be barred from contesting
respondents application for
registration and even the
registration decree that may be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the
MTC did issue an Order of Special
Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to
no publication at all, having the
same ultimate result. Owing to such
defect in the publication of the
Notice, the MTC failed to
constructively seize the Subject Lots
and to acquire jurisdiction over
respondents application for
registration thereof. Therefore, the
MTC Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of
respondents Jeremias and David
over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as the MTC
Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21
December 1999 final and executory,
and directing the LRA Administrator
to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots, are both null and
void for having been issued by the
MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with
the required period of possession of
the Subject Lots for the judicial
confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found
that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and proceed
with respondents application for
registration, this Court nevertheless
deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of
possession for acquiring title to
public land.
Respondents application filed with
the MTC did not state the statutory
basis for their title to the Subject
Lots. They only alleged therein that
they obtained title to the Subject
Lots by purchase from their parents,
Page 41
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.
Respondent Jeremias, in his
testimony, claimed that his parents
had been in possession of the
Subject Lots in the concept of an
owner since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO
Certification, submitted by
respondents themselves, the Subject
Lots are within Alienable and
Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28
per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion,
Cebu certified under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063,
dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is
outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga
Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932
dated June 29, 1992.[33] The
Subject Lots are thus clearly part of
the public domain, classified as
alienable and disposable as of 25
June 1963.
As already well-settled in
jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from
the government;[34] and it is
indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should
show that his title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended,
governs lands of the public domain,
except timber and mineral lands,
friar lands, and privately-owned
lands which reverted to the State.
[36] It explicitly enumerates the
means by which public lands may be
disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization
(free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is
appropriately covered by separate
chapters of the Public Land Act
because there are specific
requirements and application
procedure for every mode.[38] Since
respondents herein filed their
application before the MTC,[39]
then it can be reasonably inferred
that they are seeking the judicial
confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization
of imperfect or incomplete title to
land, not exceeding 144 hectares,
[40] may be availed of by persons
identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which
reads
Section 48. The following-described
citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree
No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural
minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to
agriculture whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 shall
be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national
cultural minorities, respondents
may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June
1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963. Any period of possession
prior to the date when the Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the
computation of the period of
possession; such possession can
never ripen into ownership and
unless the land had been classified
as alienable and disposable, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect
title shall not apply thereto.[41] It is
very apparent then that
respondents could not have
complied with the period of
possession required by Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, to acquire imperfect or
Page 42
incomplete title to the Subject Lots
that may be judicially confirmed or
legalized.
The confirmation of respondents
title by the Court of Appeals was
based on the erroneous supposition
that respondents were claiming title
to the Subject Lots under the
Property Registration Decree.
According to the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of
the Property Registration Decree
allows individuals to own land in
any other manner provided by law.
It then ruled that the respondents,
having possessed the Subject Lots,
by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25
June 1963 to 23 September 1998,
when they filed their application,
have acquired title to the Subject
Lots by extraordinary prescription
under Article 1113, in relation to
Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.
[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the
difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public
Land Act. Under the Property
Registration Decree, there already
exists a title which is confirmed by
the court; while under the Public
Land Act, the presumption always is
that the land applied for pertains to
the State, and that the occupants
and possessors only claim an
interest in the same by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous,
open, and notorious possession.[43]
As established by this Court in the
preceding paragraphs, the Subject
Lots respondents wish to register
are undoubtedly alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain and respondents may have
acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein
that even though respondents may
acquire imperfect or incomplete
title to the Subject Lots under the
Public Land Act, their application for
judicial confirmation or legalization
thereof must be in accordance with
the Property Registration Decree,
for Section 50 of the Public Land Act
reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or
their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any
lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in
every case present an application to
the proper Court of First Instance,
praying that the validity of the
alleged title or claim be inquired
into and that a certificate of title be
issued to them under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for
registration of the Subject Lots must
have complied with the substantial
requirements under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the
Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil
Code on prescription of ownership
and other real rights apply in
general to all types of land, while the
Public Land Act specifically governs
lands of the public domain. Relative
to one another, the Public Land Act
may be considered a special law[45]
that must take precedence over the
Civil Code, a general law. It is an
established rule of statutory
construction that between a general
law and a special law, the special
law prevails Generalia specialibus
non derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the
foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625,
dated 22 November 2002, is
REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC
Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02
February 2000 are declared NULL
AND VOID. Respondents application
for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. OF DENR v. YAP
G.R. No. 167707
Oct. 8, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases
is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles
over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated
petitions. The first is G.R. No.
167707, a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for
titling purposes. The second is G.R.
No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No.
1064[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of
Malay, Aklan, with its powdery
white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a
premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home
to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in
the bone-shaped islands three
barangays.[5]
Page 43
On April 14, 1976, the Department
of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of
Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several
lots as being occupied or claimed by
named persons.[7]
On November 10, 1978, then
President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated
September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad
Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-
claimants alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them.[10]
Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified
as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, they had the right
to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief.
The OSG countered that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a)
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705
or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as
amended.
The OSG maintained that
respondents-claimants reliance on
PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to
judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.
705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-
claimants and the OSG stipulated on
the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in
possession of parcels of land in
Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of
land were planted with coconut
trees and other natural growing
trees; (3) the coconut trees had
heights of more or less twenty (20)
meters and were planted more or
less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the
land they were occupying for tax
purposes.[12]
The parties also agreed that the
principal issue for resolution was
purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance
or impediment to the titling of the
lands in Boracay. They decided to
forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective
memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14]
that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly
Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were
covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol.
These lots were involved in Civil
Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered
a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those
similarly situated to acquire title to
their lands in Boracay, in accordance
with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-
claimants right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name.
Page 44
It ruled that neither Proclamation
No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.[18] The
Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.[19] The trial
court cited Sections 87[20] and
53[21] of the Public Land Act as
basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and
that only those forested areas in
public lands were declared as part
of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration
but its motion was denied.[23] The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate
court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the
lower court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-
claimants could not be prejudiced
by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial
were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought
reconsideration but it was similarly
denied.[25] Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the
pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064[26]
classifying Boracay Island into four
hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved
for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-
claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27]
Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other
landowners[29] in Boracay filed
with this Court an original petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.[30] They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their
prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.[31]
Petitioners-claimants contended
that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay
into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed
agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926, known as the first Public Land
Act.[32] Thus, their possession in
the concept of owner for the
required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG
argued that petitioners-claimants do
not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a)
of PD No. 705. Being public forest,
the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain
into alienable and disposable lands.
There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court
ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve
the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of
whether Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all
those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.[34]
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5)
issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON
NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS
DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?
Page 45
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS
ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER
THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF
BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT
APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION
OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA
141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF
PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22,
2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS
OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR
IS PROCLAMATION 1064
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR
SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35]
(Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is
whether private claimants
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in
G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin
petitions pertain to their right, if
any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as
amended. They do not involve their
right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the
executive
to reclassify lands of the public
domain
Private claimants rely on three (3)
laws and executive acts in their bid
for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in
relation to Act No. 926, later
amended and/or superseded by Act
No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b)
Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued
by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued
by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. We shall proceed to
determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive
acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian
principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.[40]
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest and grazing lands, and such
other classes as may be provided by
law,[41] giving the government
great leeway for classification.[42]
Then the 1987 Constitution reverted
to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition:
national parks.[43] Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated.
[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064
of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had
never been expressly and
administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that
all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.
[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.
[47] Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.[48]
Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public
domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government,
as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as
the persona in law to determine
who shall be the favored recipients
of public lands, as well as under
what terms they may be granted
such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of
their exercise of what otherwise
would be ordinary acts of
ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots
to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories
and possessions in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.[50]
The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were
not acquired from the Government,
Page 46
either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed
by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.
[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the
Maura Law[53] partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws
of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the
method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in
said decree.[54] Under Section 393
of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information
title,[55] when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted
into a title of ownership only after
the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which
must be actual, public, and adverse,
[56] from the date of its inscription.
[57] However, possessory
information title had to be perfected
one year after the promulgation of
the Maura Law, or until April 17,
1895. Otherwise, the lands would
revert to the State.[58]
In sum, private ownership of land
under the Spanish regime could only
be founded on royal concessions
which took various forms, namely:
(1) titulo real or royal grant; (2)
concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5)
informacion posesoria or
possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the
disposition of public lands in the
Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill
of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3)
grand divisions, to wit: agricultural,
mineral, and timber or forest lands.
[61] The act provided for, among
others, the disposal of mineral lands
by means of absolute grant
(freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).[62] It also
provided the definition by exclusion
of agricultural public lands.[63]
Interpreting the meaning of
agricultural lands under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular
Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase
agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x[65]
(Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine
Legislature passed Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established
a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible.
This is known as the Torrens
system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903,
the Philippine Commission passed
Act No. 926, which was the first
Public Land Act. The Act introduced
the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or
lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the
nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public
domain.[67] Under the Act, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of
agricultural lands for the next ten
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926
was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second
Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which
gave Filipinos the same privileges.
For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en
concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894,
was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, CA No. 141 amended
Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936.
To this day, CA No. 141, as amended,
remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and
mineral lands,[70] and privately
owned lands which reverted to the
State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained
the requirement under Act No. 2874
of possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since
time immemorial or since July 26,
1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942,[72] which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was
last amended by PD No. 1073,[73]
which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on
February 16, 1976 discontinued the
use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.[76]
Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply
Page 47
for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered
lands[77] shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was
amended and updated by PD No.
1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted
to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It
governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as
unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as
alienable and disposable is required.
In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official
proclamation,[80] declassifying
inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.[81] In fact, Section
8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands
which have been officially delimited
and classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for
registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.[83] To
overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.[84] There
must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an
application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.[85] The
applicant may also secure a
certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.
[86]
In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not
make the whole of Boracay Island,
or portions of it, agricultural lands.
Private claimants posit that Boracay
was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine
Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa
v. The Insular Government (1909).
[89] These cases were decided
under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926. There is a statement in these
old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown.
[90]
Private claimants reliance on
Ankron and De Aldecoa is
misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of
Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926 merely
provided the manner through which
land registration courts would
classify lands of the public domain.
Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were
decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber, and
agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or
were vested with implicit power to
do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.[91]
This was the Courts ruling in Heirs
of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca
and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist
that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing
the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the
Page 48
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on
October 7, 1926, under which there
was no legal provision vesting in the
Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance
of the evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land
registration cases under Act No.
926, it was then necessary to devise
a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the
dictum in Ankron that the courts
have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary
is shown.[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the
presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of
imagination did the presumption
convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private
claimants, the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched
Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the
provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant
for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed
to avail themselves of the benefits of
Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in
Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there
was proof that the land was better
suited for non-agricultural uses, the
courts could adjudge it as a mineral
or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or
another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within
it is not of itself sufficient to declare
that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be
some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the
forestry and of the minerals. While,
as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for
agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the
forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is
not sufficient to show that there
exists some trees upon the land or
that it bears some mineral. Land
may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral,
be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason
of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today
may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe,
however, considering the fact that it
is a matter of public knowledge that
a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case. The
fact that the land is a manglar
[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act
No. 1148, may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the
latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
Page 49
question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms
of said Act (No. 1148), may decide
for itself what portions of the public
domain shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis
ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer
free to determine the classification
of lands from the facts of each case,
except those that have already
became private lands.[96] Act No.
2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No.
141, gave the Executive Department,
through the President, the exclusive
prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a
Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or
implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the
Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
issued their title in 1933,[98] did
not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land
registration court of the propertys
land classification. Simply put, there
was no opportunity for the courts
then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming
were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No.
2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation
having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, the courts were no longer
authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence,
private claimants cannot bank on
Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in
G.R. No. 167707 mentioned
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,[100] which was decided in
1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited
the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,[102] and
Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling
here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential
lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands;
and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court
ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring
agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is
whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically
deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of
agricultural public lands mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of
Act No. 2874, including Ankron and
De Aldecoa.[105] As We have
already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided
when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as
agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued
possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the
land is alienable. Private claimants
also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926[106]
ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely
rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals.[107] Collado,
citing the separate opinion of now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading,
selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in
the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands. In short, the Public Land
Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the
government; and that the
governments title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The
term public land referred to all
lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners
to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private
Page 50
individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.[108]
(Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by
existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD
No. 705. The DENR[109] and the
National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority[110] certify
that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President
Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705
defines a public forest as a mass of
lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for
the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and
which are not. Applying PD No. 705,
all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The Court notes that the
classification of Boracay as a forest
land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no
doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial
island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of
Boracay have built multi-million
peso beach resorts on the island;
[111] that the island has already
been stripped of its forest cover; or
that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy
the islands tourism industry, do not
negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the
Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands
of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks,
do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.[113] The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry[114] is
particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels
of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. Forest
lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between
forest as defined in a dictionary and
forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes.
One is descriptive of what appears
on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal
purposes.[116] At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the
legal status of Boracay Island, and
not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public
forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on
Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that,
as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA
Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in
the law or the Circular which made
Boracay Island an agricultural land.
The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
private lands[117] and areas
declared as alienable and
disposable[118] does not by itself
classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-
82 makes reference not only to
private lands and areas but also to
public forested lands. Rule VIII,
Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands
may be cut without prior authority
from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Page 51
Clearly, the reference in the Circular
to both private and public lands
merely recognizes that the island
can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers
under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then
Bureau of Forest Developments
authority to declare areas in the
island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas
declared as alienable and disposable
by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801
cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
The Whereas clauses of
Proclamation No. 1801 also explain
the rationale behind the declaration
of Boracay Island, together with
other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as a tourist zone
and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure
the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the
development of the areas tourism
potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for
tourism and ecological purposes. It
does not address the areas
alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No.
1801 covers not only Boracay
Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and
Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol,
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro,
and Misamis Oriental, to name a few.
If the designation of Boracay Island
as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other
areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of
2006 which positively declared part
of Boracay as alienable and opened
the same to private ownership.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120]
provide that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral
lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of
the public domain, presumably
subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have
no authority to do so.[122] Absent
such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.[123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies
Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The
Proclamation likewise provides for a
15-meter buffer zone on each side of
the center line of roads and trails,
which are reserved for right of way
and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants
argument, there was nothing invalid
or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island
made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not
violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No.
1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo
can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running
afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following
lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain devoted
to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral
Page 52
lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of
this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental
and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified
as a public forest under PD No. 705
did not bar the Executive from later
converting it into agricultural land.
Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public
domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,[124] the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land
classification map does not
categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they
were unclassified lands leads to the
same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered
open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the
CARL applies only to a continuous, exclusive, and notorious
reclassification of land. If the land
had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian
law. We agree with the opinion of
the Department of Justice[126] on
this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct
application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word
reclassification. Where there has
been no previous classification of
public forest [referring, we repeat,
to the mass of the public domain
which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification
for purposes of determining which
are needed for forest purposes and
which are not] into permanent
forest or forest reserves or some
other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no
reclassification of forest lands to
speak of within the meaning of
Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in
Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior
law delimiting the limits of the
public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public
domain, denominated as public
forest under the Revised Forestry
Code, which have not been
previously determined, or classified,
as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to
apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141.
Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the
said law. There are two requisites
for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a
bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and (2) the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.[128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of
Boracay Island into an agricultural
land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public
domain and, applying the Regalian
doctrine, is considered State
property.
Private claimants bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title,
relying on the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801, must fail because of the
absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable
and disposable. This is clear from
the wording of the law itself.[129]
Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land,
no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.
[130]
Neither may private claimants apply
for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation
No. 1064, with respect to those
lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands
in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC
conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of
private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest
of the tax declarations in the name
of private claimants were issued in
1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they
have a vested right in Boracay,
Page 53
having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have
invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued
possession and investments give
them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and
considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give
them a vested right in Boracay. Nor
do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable.
As the law and jurisprudence stand,
private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of
pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number
of years, thousands of people have
called the island their home. While
the Court commiserates with private
claimants plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito
ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private
claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141,
as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other
areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean
the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does
not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.
For one thing, those with lawful
possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can
take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead[131] or
sales patent,[132] subject to the
conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may
enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under
the present land laws. There is one
such bill[133] now pending in the
House of Representatives. Whether
that bill or a similar bill will become
a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064,
the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to
private ownership. This gesture may
not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification
of the island partially into a forest
reserve as absurd. That the island is
no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance
between progress and ecology.
Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are
fundamental to our nations survival.
Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians
and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction
of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado
Sanchez in 1968 in Director of
Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the
cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite
often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and
reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a
vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of
the necessary green cover on our
lands produces a number of adverse
or ill effects of serious proportions.
Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls.
As waterfalls cease to function, so
will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
away; geological erosion results.
With erosion come the dreaded
floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not
to mention precious human lives.
Indeed, the foregoing observations
should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R.
No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R.
No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Page 54

SO ORDERED.