“Politics” Aristotle

BOOK ONE

Part I

Every tate is a community of some kind, and every community is established

with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain
that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good,
the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and
which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than
any other, and at the highest good.

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder,

and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only
in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few
is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a
still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference
between a great household and a small state. The distinction which
is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the
government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the
rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in
turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will

be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method
which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science,
so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple
elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the
elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see
in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether
any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.

Part II

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether
a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In
the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without
each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue
(and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but
because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have
a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and
of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that
which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to
be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to
such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and
slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between
the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith
who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing
for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended
for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction
is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler
among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore
the poets say,

"It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; "

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature
one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave,
the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he
says,

"First house and wife and an ox for the plough, "

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association
established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and
the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,'
and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when
several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed
is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to
be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and
grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And
this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came
together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the
eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form
of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer
says:

"Each one gives law to his children and to his wives. "

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore
men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either
are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine,
not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like
their own.

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large

enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in
existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier
forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of
them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is
when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking
of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of
a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that

man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not
by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above
humanity; he is like the

"Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, "

whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of

war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing
in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the
gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure
or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature
attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation
of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended
to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise
the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes
a family and a state.

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to

the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part;
for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot
or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone
hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But
things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to
say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality,
but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is
a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,
when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part
in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society,
or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either
a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted
in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the
greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals,
but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all;
since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at
birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which
he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he
is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full
of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for
the administration of justice, which is the determination of what
is just, is the principle of order in political society.

Part III

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking

of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The
parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose
the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen.
Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible
elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are
master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore
to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be:
I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the
conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly,
the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there
is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth,
which, according to some, is identical with household management,
according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art
will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical
life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation
than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a
master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the
mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying
at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a
master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction
between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and
being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.
Part IV

Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property

is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live
well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries.
And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have
their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work,
so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of
various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the
pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument;
for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a
possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement
of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number
of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which
takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument
could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of
others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus,
which, says the poet,

"of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; "

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch
the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want
servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must
be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production,
whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example,
is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a
garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production
and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the
instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life
is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister
of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of;
for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs
to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the
master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave
is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence
we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature
not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be
said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession.
And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable
from the possessor.

Part V

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for
whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all
slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both

of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled
is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule
is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example,
to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the
work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one
man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work);
for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made
up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between
the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality
exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in
the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life
there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering
from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living
creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and
of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject.
But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which
retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body
and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although
in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over
the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At
all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical
and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical
rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional
and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the
body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate,
is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule
of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals
in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild,
and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for
then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and
the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this
principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business
is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be,
and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle
enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave
by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle;
they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of
tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister
to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the
bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor,
the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful
for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite
often happens- that some have the souls and others have the bodies
of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the
mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from
men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves
of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just
that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty
of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It
is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves,
and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.

Part VI

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right
on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave
are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well
as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention- the
law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the
victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator
who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion
that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior
in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among
philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute,
and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows:
in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the
greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power is only
found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems
to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for
it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the
other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these
views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or
plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to
rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle
of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that
slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law,
but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the
war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who
is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest
rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents
chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do
not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians.
Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of
whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility.
Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their
own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home,
thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom,
the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:

"Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung

from the stem of the Gods? "

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,
noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They
think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good
men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend
it, cannot always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion,
and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature,
and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between
the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be
slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience,
the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended
them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for
the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and
the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of
his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between
them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where
it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.

Part VII

The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master
is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of
rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there
is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another
over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is
a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional
rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not called
a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character,
and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there
may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science
of the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made
money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge
may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial
arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the more
honorable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave, master before
master.' But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is
likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves;
for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but
with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great
or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which
the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position
which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households
while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But
the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs
both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a
species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinction between master
and slave.

Part VIII
Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting
wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been
shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the
art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household
or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in
the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art
of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental
to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same
way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material
I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is
the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy
to see that the art of household management is not identical with
the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the
other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no
other than the art of household management. There is, however, a doubt
whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management
or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence
wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property
and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food
in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again,
there are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of
lives both of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences
in their food have made differences in their ways of life. For of
beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the
way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are
carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined
for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater
facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have
different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all
of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals
further differ among themselves. In the lives of men too there is
a great difference. The laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life,
and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their
flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture,
they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm.
Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds.
Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes
or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others
live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain
a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes
of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up
of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade-
there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman,
the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments,
eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life
of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of
a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly
combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property,
in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself
to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up.
For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much
food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this
the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous
animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young
in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that,
after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that
the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and
food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for
food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now
if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference
must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. And so,
in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition,
for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought
to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended
by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind
is naturally just.

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is

a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household
management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such
things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family
or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches;
for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not
unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

"No bound to riches has been fixed for man. "

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts;

for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number
or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be
used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural
art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and
by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

Part IX

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly

and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested
the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected
with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they
are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already
described is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and
art.

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:

Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to

the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper,
and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a
shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of
the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him
who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not
its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object
of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of
exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what
is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others
too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part
of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased
to exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed,
which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins
to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family
originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided
into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in
different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they
wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among barbarous
nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life and
nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange
for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting
art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction
of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange
grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants
of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they
imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of,
money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life
are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their
dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful
and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron,
silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply
by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it,
to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of
necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely,
retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became
more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by
what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the
use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be
chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches
and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed,
riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the
arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others
maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but
conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity
for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to
any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin
may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth
of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger,
like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything
that was set before him into gold?

Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting
wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For
natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different
thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a household;
whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every
way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin;
for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And
there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth
getting. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit
of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit
of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to
the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always
the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit
of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition
of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household
management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition
of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view,
all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we
find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase
their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is
the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either,
the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so
they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property,
but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but
there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to
believe that getting wealth is the object of household management,
and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase
their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin
of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only,
and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they
also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit.
Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily
pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on
property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises
the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in
excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and,
if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting
wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner
contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended
to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim
of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims at victory
and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality
or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the
end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is

unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting,
which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural
part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision
of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having
a limit.

Part X
And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the
art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household
and of the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed
by them. For as political science does not make men, but takes them
from nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth
or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty
of the manager of a household, who has to order the things which nature
supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but
to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable
or bad and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult
to see why the art of getting wealth is a part of the management of
a household and the art of medicine not; for surely the members of
a household must have health just as they must have life or any other
necessary. The answer is that as from one point of view the master
of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider about health,
from another point of view not they but the physician; so in one way
the art of household management, in another way the subordinate art,
has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already
said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for
the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and
the food of the offspring is always what remains over of that from
which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits
and animals is always natural.

There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part

of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary
and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured;
for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another.
The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which
makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object
of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase
at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money
from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring
resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this
is the most unnatural.

Part XI

Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now
proceed to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not
unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal
and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge
of livestock- which are most profitable, and where, and how- as, for
example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals
are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these
pay better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for
some do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry,
which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and
of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These
are the divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and
come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and
most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds-
the provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale-
these again differing as they are safer or more profitable), the second
is usury, the third, service for hire- of this, one kind is employed
in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There
is still a third sort of wealth getting intermediate between this
and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also
concerned with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit
from the earth, and from things growing from the earth which, although
they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the
cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals
are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds
of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of wealth-getting
I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful
in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater
length now.

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least
element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most
deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use
of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need
of excellence.

Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons; for
example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have
treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other
branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to their writings.
It would be well also to collect the scattered stories of the ways
in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all
this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There
is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which
involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to
him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for
his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no
use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while
it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in
the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the
use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired
at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time
came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them
out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus
he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like,
but that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have
given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device
for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but
the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities
when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.

There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought
up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants
from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and
without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when
Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but
that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had
discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests.
He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create
a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these
things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such
devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some
public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

Part XII

Of household management we have seen that there are three parts- one
is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already,
another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father,
we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs,
the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional
rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature,
the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as
the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature.
But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled
by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the
natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless,
when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference
of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated
by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male
to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent.
The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue
both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal
power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of
Gods and men,' because he is the king of them all. For a king is the
natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin
or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger,
of father and son.

Part XIII

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than

to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more
than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the
virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may
indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave
beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities-
whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and
the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities.
And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for,
if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the
other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it
seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may
be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues:
ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to
be called temperate, and intemperate, or note So in general we may
ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they
have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally
required in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other
always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree,
for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind,
which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is
the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not,
to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can
he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious
and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore,
that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural
subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of
the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and
the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to
be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of
the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious
that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all
things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule
differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from
that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the
child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they
are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative
faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the
child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed
to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but
only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment
of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection,
for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and
rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other
hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each
of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the
temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of
a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the
courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And
this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we
look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists
in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like,
only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their
mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes
must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says
of women,

"Silence is a woman's glory, "

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect,
and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone,
but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the
virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that
a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously
require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his
duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will ask
whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required
also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the
lack of self control? But is there not a great difference in the two
cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less
closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion
as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and
separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the
shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master
ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a
mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in
his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse
with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves
stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one
another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good
and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak
of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family
is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family,
and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole,
women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the
constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make
any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference:
for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons
in a state are women.
Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak
at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete,
we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various
theories of a perfect state.