GABRIEL vs.

BILON
(G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007)

FACTS:

Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay were jeepney drivers of jeepneys owned by
Melencio Gabriel. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required
to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees.

The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers
reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The
three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their
backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M.

On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to
Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on
April 4, 1997. The copy was re-sent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to
the LA on June 5, 1997.

The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation
was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten
day period required for appeal.

The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-
employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
but it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be
reinstated.

ISSUES:

Whether the appeal was filed on time.

HELD:

YES. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to have been
validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly
effected on April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997. Section 4, Rule III of
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions.
Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties
to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt
thereof or by registered mail; Provided, That where a party is represented by counsel or
authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative;
Provided further, That in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on
both parties and their counsel. For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same
shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.

The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit
his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name,
and the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately
attached and shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving
officer shall state the reason therefore in the return. Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which
is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that: "service of the papers may be made by
delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk
or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight
in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a
person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein." The foregoing provisions
contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the delivery
of a copy of the tribunals decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before a copy
of the labor arbiters decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply.
As aptly stated by the NLRC: In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not
represented by counsel during the pendency of the case.

A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while Mr. Gabriel passed
away on April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision
was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same. His
surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents.
Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to
receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is not applicable in
the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and is not just available to
receive the decision. The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not
become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent. Thus,
the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision
via registered mail on May 28, 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed.
 PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS
(G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994)

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June19, 1991. While the
appeal was pending, Bayotas died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal; however, it required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor-General
expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. This comment was opposed by the counsel of
accused-appellant, arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties, he cited in support and invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held that the civil obligation in
a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil
liability.

HELD:

Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability
because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted as
one source of obligation other than delict. Moreover, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the
felony upon which the civil action might arise exists, and for the simple reason thatthere is no
party defendant. The Rules of Court state that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.
In addition, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. As in this case, the right to institute a separate civil
action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover both the criminal
and the civil aspects of the case. The accused died before final judgment was rendered, thus,
he is absolved of both his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on delict or the crime
committed. Appeal dismissed.
 SHEKER vs. SHEKER
(G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007)

FACTS:

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left
a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The
trial court issued order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed contingent money claim in the amount of 206,250.00
representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties of Alice an
another 275,000.00 as reimbursements for the expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money
claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum
shopping thereto.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD:

No. the Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only
for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was
initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim but rather upon the filling of the petition for
allowance of the Alice Shekers will. Under the Section 1 and 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims, otherwise, they would be barred subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate
and as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right of remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It
relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.
 STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORP.
(G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006)

FACTS:

On May 24, 1989, Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos,
Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage
system in Republic-Asahis compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Republic- Asahi was to
pay JDS. JDS posted a performance bond which executed, jointly and severally with Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc (SICI). Due to allege slow pace of construction, Republic-Asahi extra judicially
rescinded the contract without prejudice for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties.
Through the filing of the complaint, Republic-Asahi sought to recover the amount expended to
complete the project using another contractor. SICI filed its answer and interposed the defense
that the money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D.
Santos, Jr. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi, but it was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor.

HELD:

No, as a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that
are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Death is
not a defence that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
performance bond.
 UNION BANK vs. SANTIBAEZ
(G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005)

FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13, 1980. Sometime in
February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.

Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the
estate of the decedent.

During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two
(2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence.

Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.

Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.

Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held thatthe petitioner
should have filed its claim with the probate court. It further held that the partition made in the
agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the joint agreement was valid.

HELD:

No, the joint agreement is invalid. The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or
not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can
hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory.

The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will.

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic
will which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the
heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect.