55

CHAPTER 4

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

CASE STUDY

FMEA is a proactive analysis tool, allowing engineers to anticipate

failure modes even before they happen, or even before a new product or
process is released. It also helps the engineer to prevent the negative effects of
these failure modes from reaching the customer, primarily by eliminating
their causes and increasing the chances of detecting them before they can do
any damage. The actions generated by a good FMEA cycle will also translate
to better yield, quality, reliability and of course greater customer satisfaction.

FMEA was being used around for a very long time. Before any
documented format was developed, most of the inventors and process experts
would try to anticipate what could go wrong with a design or process before it
was developed. The trial and error alternative was both costly and time
consuming. FMEA was formally introduced in the late 1940s with the
introduction of the military standard 1629. Being used for aerospace/rocket
development, the FMEA was helpful in avoiding errors on small sample sizes
of costly rocket technology.

FMEA was encouraged in the 1960s for space product

development and served well on getting a man on the moon. Ford Motor
Company reintroduced FMEA in the late 1970s for safety and regulatory
consideration. Ford Motor Company has used FMEA effectively for
production improvement as well as design improvement.
 56

The output of an FMEA cycle is the FMEA table, which documents

how vulnerable a product or process is to its potential failure modes. The
FMEA table also shows the level of risk attached to each potential failure
mode, and the corrective actions needed (or already completed) to make the
product or process more robust. The FMEA table generally consists of 16 to
17 columns, with each column corresponding to a piece of information
required by FMEA.

4.1 PURPOSE OF FMEA

The purpose of FMEA is to identify the different failures and

modes of failure that can occur at the component, subsystem and system
levels and to evaluate the consequences of these failures. FMEA is not a
problem solver. It is used with problem solving tools. FMEA can be described
as a systematic group of activities intended

(i) to recognise and evaluate the potential failure of a product/

process and the effects of the failure.

(ii) to identify action that could eliminate or reduce the chance

of such potential failure occurring

(iii) to document the entire process.

4.2 FMEA PREREQUISITES

The prerequisites of FMEA are given below.

(i) Select proper team and organise members effectively.

(ii) Select team for each product/services, process/system
(iii) Create a ranking system
(iv) Agree on format for FMEA
(v) Define the customer need
 57

(vi) Design/process requirement

(vii) Develop the process flow chart

4.3 UPDATING FMEA TABLE

FMEA table is to be updated when

(i) a new product or process is being designed or introduced.

(ii) a critical change in the operating conditions of the product or

process occurs.

(iii) the product or process itself undergoes a change

(iv) a new regulation that affects the product or process

(v) customer complaints about the product or process are

received

(vi) an error in the FMEA table is discovered or new information

that affects its contents comes to light.

4.4 BENEFITS OF FMEA

FMEA is designed to assist the engineer to improve the quality and

reliability of design. Properly used FMEA provides the engineer several
benefits and they are given below.

(i) Improves product/process reliability and quality

(ii) Increases customer satisfaction

(iii) Helps for early identification and elimination of potential

product/process failure

(iv) Prioritises product/process deficiencies

(v) Captures engineering/organisation knowledge

(vi) Emphasises problem prevention

 58

(vii) Documents risk and actions taken to reduce risk

(viii) Provides focus for improved testing and development

(ix) Minimises late changes and associated cost

(x) Serves as a catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange

between functions.

4.5 KEY TERMS USED IN FMEA

(i) Criticality

Criticality rating is the mathematical product of severity and

occurrence ratings. This number is used to place priority on items that require
additional quality planning.

(ii) Critical characteristics

Critical characteristics are the special characteristics defined by

Ford Motor Company that affect customers safety and/or could result in non-
compliance with government regulations and thus require special controls to
ensure 100% compliance.

(iii) Causes

A particular element of the design or process results in a failure

mode, due to a cause.

(iv) Failure mode

Failure modes are sometimes described as categories of failure. A

potential failure mode describes the way in which a product or process could
fail to perform its function (design intent or performances requirement) as
described by the needs, wants and expectations of internal and external
customers.
 59

(v) Severity

Severity (S) is an assessment of how serious the effect of the

potential failure mode is. A rating of 1 to 10 is chosen based on the severity.
The severity ratings are given in the Table A2.1 in Appendix 2.

(vi) Occurrence

Occurrence (O) is an assessment of the likelihood that a particular

cause will happen and result in failure mode during the life and use of a
product. Occurrence rating is given from 1 to 10 which is to be chosen as
given in the Table A2.2.

(vii) Detection

Detection (D) is an assessment of the likelihood that the current

control (design and process) will detect the causes of failure mode or the
failure mode itself, thus preventing it from reaching the customer. Detection
rating of 1 to 10 is to be chosen as given in Table A2.3 in Appendix 2.

(viii) Current control

Current control (design and process) are the mechanisms that

prevent the causes of failure mode from occurring, or which detect the failure
before it reaches the customer.

(ix) Risk Priority Number (RPN)

The RPN is the mathematical product of the Severity (S),

Occurrence (O) and Detection (D).

RPN = S x O x D
 60

4.6 CASE STUDY ON FMEA

FMEA was carried out at an industry which is a leading

manufacturer of Engine Valves. situated at Chennai, Tamilnadu, South India.

4.6.1 Process Flow Chart

The process flow chart of an engine exhaust valve is shown in

Figure A2.1. FMEA was carried out for the friction welding process of the
engine exhaust valves.

4.6.2 Friction Welding

Friction welding employs the heat produced due to friction welding

and pressure to accomplish the fusion of materials. The basic operation is
carried out by rotating one component and made to be in contact with the
secondary component which is held stationary. Axial pressure is applied
during the rotation which aids in generating heat. This process of pressurising
and heating creates a bond at the interface of the two mating parts. It is
significant that the metal at the interface does not melt, but rather becomes
plastic. Welding heat is obtained at the joint by rotating one part against the
other at a constant or varied RPM, with an axial force applied to the mating
components. Energy is provided to this joint from a continuously running
prime mover, directly connected to the machine spindle. This energy source is
infinite with respect to time, and is supplied to the interface until the proper
total heat is obtained. When this point is reached, the rotating member is
stopped and a forging load is applied to the parts to be joined. Figure 4.1
shows the various components of a friction welding machine. The photograph
of the friction welding machine that was used in this study is shown in
Figure 4.2.
 61

Figure 4.1 Components of a Friction Welding Machine

Figure 4.2 Friction Welding Machine

 62

4.6.2.1 Study of Key variables and process parameters

The variables in friction welding process can essentially be divided

into machine related variables and non-machine related variables. Non-
machine variables will include the material type to be welded and the part
configuration and size. These variables like in any other welding process will
determine the selection of welding parameters. The machine variables include
friction and forge pressures, speed of rotation. The rotational speed and the
pressure will control the ultimate quality of the weld.

The rotational speed and pressure affect both the width and the
shape of the heat-affected zone (HAZ). High pressures tend to compress the
HAZ, especially at the center, heavily work the interfacial material and cause
a notch effect at the junction. Higher speeds tend to increase the width of the
HAZ and also the grain size. Subsequent use of high pressure forging after
spindle stop is used to work the structure and refine the grain size. The
parameters that can be selected and controlled will optimise the metallurgical
condition.

The process parameters of the friction welding process are soft

force, soft force time, upset force, friction force, upset time, burn off,
permissible shrinkage limit, slide home position, clamp open position and
lube cycle.

4.6.3 Failure Report

Failure reports of the various types of exhaust valves in passenger

car line for two months have been collected and given in TableA2.4 and
shown in Figure 4.3.
 63

Figure 4.3 Various failure modes

From the failure report it was observed that the majority of the
failures are due to runout. Part Number 40767 has got the highest failure
percentage. The prominent failure modes are weld crack and low tensile
strength and part number 40767 has a production volume of more than 98%
and hence part number 40767 was chosen for carrying out FMEA. Table 4.1
gives the specifications of the parts to be welded.

Table 4.1 Specifications of the parts to be welded

Composition Dimensions in
Final
in % mm
Structure Dimensio
Before Friction ns in mm
C Si Mn Cr Ni P Welding
Head Austenite 0.4 1 <0.6 7.5 <0.6 <0.03 Dia- 6.175 Dia- 6.175
To To To Length-125 0.025
0.55 2 9.5
Stem Martensite 0.15 0.75 1.5 20 10.5 <0.04 Dia- 6.175 Length-
To To To To Length-63 181
0.25 1.25 22 12.5

4.6.4 Failure modes and detection

(i) Low tensile strength: The valve has to withstand a

minimum tensile strength of 700N/mm2. Tensile testing is
 64

used to detect the tensile strength of the valves. For every lot
of 1000 numbers, 7 valves are subjected to tensile testing.

(ii) Runout: Runout is the out of roundness of valves. A

tolerance limit of +0.04 mm is set as threshold and the valve
which exceeds the threshold is scraped. Runout is detected
in the process by the operator by random checking. The
defective valves that pass through friction welding are
detected in centre less grinding process by 100% inspection.
Both the inspections are carried out by v-block and dial
gauge assembly.

(iii) Weld crack: Ultrasonic testing is used to detect the weld

crack in the weld zone. The rejected valves are kept
separately and examined again. The valves which show
discontinuation are scraped.

(iv) Overall bar length: The bar length for the valve should be
181 mm after friction welding. The length is randomly
checked by the operator. The defective valves which pass
through friction welding are detected during loading of valve
in upsetting machine.

4.6.5 Estimation of Severity Ranking

The severity of each failure can be estimated by interpreting the

failure mode and effect diagram with the suggested severity evaluation. The
failure mode and effect diagram is given in Figure 4.4. The estimation of
severity ranking was done using Table A2.1 and is given in Table 4.2.
 65

SCRAP

POOR REJECTION REJECTION

UNFIT FOR
WELDING IN C`LESS IN
OTHER
UPSETTING
OPERATION

WELD OVERALL
LOW RUNOUT
CRACK LENGTH
TENSILE LOW/HIGH
STRENGTH
H

Figure 4.4 Failure Mode and Effect Diagram

Table 4.2 Estimation of Severity Ranking

Severity
S.No. Failure mode Effect Severity
ranking
1. Runout Scrap (<100%) Moderate 6
2. Low tensile strength Scrap Very high 8
3. Weld crack Scrap Very high 8
4. Overall bar length Scrap (<100%) Moderate 6
low/high

4.6.6 Estimation of Occurrence Ranking

The occurrence of each failure can be estimated by interpreting the

Cause and effect diagram with the suggested PFMEA occurrence evaluation
from Table A2.2. The causes for the failures were arrived by Brain storming
 66

the people concerned with the process and the probable causes are shown in
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6.

MISALIGNMENT WORN OUT JAWS COLLET

OF JAWS WEAROUT

RUNOUT

Figure 4.5 Causes for runout

IMPROPER IMPROPER IMPROPER IMPROPER

BURN OFF UPSET TIME UPSET FORCE FRICTION
FORCE

OVERALL BAR LOW TENSILE WELD CRACK

LENGTH STRENGTH

Figure 4.6 Causes for other failures

4.6.7 Occurrence of Failures

Occurrence is ranked by calculating the failure occurring per 1000

components and using the TableA2.2. The estimation of occurrence ranking is
given in Table 4.3.
 67

Table 4.3 Estimation of Occurrence Ranking

Occurrence/ Occurrence Occurrence

S.No. Failure mode
1000 valves criteria ranking
1. Runout 314/138842 Occasional 6
= 2.26 Failure
2. Low tensile 186/138842 Occasional 5
strength = 1.34 Failure
3. Weld crack 40/138842 Relatively Low 3
= 0.29 Failure
4. Overall bar 132/138842 Relatively Low 3
length = 0.95 Failure
low/high

4.6.8 Estimation of Detection Ranking

Estimation of detection ranking was made using the detection

ranking table given in Table A2.3. Table 4.4 gives the detection ranking of the
failure mode based on the detection methods.

Table 4.4 Estimation of Detection Ranking

Detection Detection Detection

S.No. Failure mode
method criteria ranking
1. Runout Error is detected High 3
in multi stages
2. Low tensile Error is detected Low 4
strength in subsequent
operations
3. Weld crack 100% inspection Moderate 5
at UT
4. Overall bar In station error Very high 2
length low/high detection
 68

4.6.9 Estimation of Risk Priority Number (RPN)

The priority of the problems is articulated via Risk Priority Number

(RPN). It is the product of occurrence, severity, detection.

Risk Priority Number = Occurrence(O) x Severity(S) x Detection(D)

The initial RPN for the failure modes have been calculated and are
shown in Table 4.5, the details of which are given in Table A2.5.

Table 4.5 Initial RPN

Sl.No. Failure Mode RPN

1 Low Tensile strength 160
2 Weld crack 120
3 Run out 108
4 Bar length low/high 36

From the above failure modes, since the RPN for the failure modes
of low tensile strength, weld crack and run out were high, they were given
priority and the cause and effect diagrams were prepared which are shown in
Figures 4.7 to 4.9.
 69

MAN MACHINE

NOT TIME SPINDLE SPEED

FOLLOWING VARIATION VARIATION
SOP

LOW
OPERATOR LOAD CELL
CLAMPING
SKILL MALFUNCTIONING

WELD
CRACK

HARDNESS
IMPROPER
VARIATION
UPSET
BAR MIX UP FORCE
MICRO
STRUCTURE IMPROPER
VARIATION FRICTION FORCE

OIL IMPROPER
BURN OFF
VARIATION

IMPROPER
SPINDLE SPEED
MATERIAL METHOD

Figure 4.7 Cause and Effect Diagram for weld crack

 70

MAN MACHINE

OPERATOR NOT SPINDLE SPEED

SKILL FOLLOWING VARIATION
SOP

LOAD CELL
MALFUNCTIONING
LOW
TENSILE
STRENGTH

HARDNESS
IMPROPER
VARIATION
UPSET
BAR MIX UP FORCE
MICRO
STRUCTURE IMPROPER
VARIATION FRICTION FORCE

IMPROPER
BURN OFF

MATERIAL METHOD

Figure 4.8 Cause and Effect Diagram for low tensile strength
 71

MAN MACHINE POOR AXES

ALIGNMENT
VARIATION IN
UPSET FORCE END STOPPER
ROD WEAR AND
TEAR
FC VALVE IN
DEFLASH IMPROPER GRIP OF
MULTIBORE
BAD FACEPLATE COLLET BY THE
CONDITION
RUNOUT

MULTI BORE
COLLET WEAR
DEFLECTION
UNIT SET
LENGTH HIGH
PRECISION STEM AND HEAD
COLLET WEAR HARDNESS
VARIATION
V BLOCK WEAR

MATERIAL METHOD

Figure 4.9 Cause and Effect Diagram for runout

4.7 REDUCTION OF RPN

4.7.1 Tensile Strength and Weld Crack

The reduction of RPN with respect to low tensile strength and weld
crack can be achieved by optimising the process parameters. In order to
optimise the process parameters, Design of Experiments (DOE) was used as
explained below.
 72

Upset force, friction force, burn off and spindle speed are the major
causes of weld crack and low tensile strength. These parameters were
optimised using 2 level DOE involving multiple factors.

The experimental factors of the DOE are upset force, friction force,
burn off length and spindle speed. The factors and the levels are shown in
Table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Factors and levels of DOE

Upset force Friction force Burn off Spindle speed

Factors/Levels (Tons) (Tons) (mm) (rpm)
A B C D
1 0.712 0.3516 4 2100
2 1.03 0.415 4.5 2300

4.7.1.1 Experimental results

Crack free micro structure, Tensile strength of minimum

700N/sq.mm and HAZ on head and stem are the response variables of the
DOE. A full factorial DOE was carried out and the experimental results are
shown in Table A2.6.

4.7.1.2 Column effects method

This approach was suggested by Taguchi as a simplified ANOVA

to subjectively point out factors which have large influence on the response.
The sum of the data associated with the first level is subtracted from the sum
of the data associated with the second level for each column of the array. The
magnitudes of the differences are compared to each other to find out the
relatively large effects. The relative magnitudes indicate the relative power of
 73

the factors in affecting the results. The strongest factors or interaction will
have the largest differences. Table 4.7 shows the column effects analysis
method summary. Looking at the difference row, factor B has the largest
effect and considered as the most critical factor while the other factors have a
moderate effect on the response. Considering tensile strength, weld crack and
HAZ the selection of process parameters by Columns effects method is shown
in Table 4.8.

Table 4.7 Number of defects

Trial No. A B C D No. of defects

1 1 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 1 2 1
3 1 1 2 1 0
4 1 1 2 2 0
5 1 2 1 1 0
6 1 2 1 2 0
7 1 2 2 1 0
8 1 2 2 2 0
9 2 1 1 1 0
10 2 1 1 2 2
11 2 1 2 1 1
12 2 1 2 2 0
13 2 2 1 1 0
14 2 2 1 2 0
15 2 2 2 1 0
16 2 2 2 2 0
SUM 1 1 4 3 1
SUM 2 3 0 1 3
Difference -2 4 2 -2
 74

Table 4.8 Selection of process parameters by Column effects method

Factors Level Parameter

Upset force 2 1.03 T
Friction force 2 0.4156 T
Burn off 2 4.5 mm
Spindle speed 1 2100 rpm

4.7.1.3 Anaysis of Variance (ANOVA)

ANOVA is a statistically based, objective decision making tool for

detecting any differences in average performance of group of items tested. A
sample of 30 valves was taken and the four way ANOVA was carried out for
four factors A, B, C and D at two levels. The number of defects with respect
to the factors and their levels are given in Table 4.9 and the summary of the
four way ANOVA is given in Table 4.10.

Table 4.9 ANOVA Table indicating the defects

A1 A2
Factors with their levels
B1 B2 B1 B2
D1 0 0 0 0
C1
D2 1 0 2 0
D1 0 0 1 0
C2
D2 0 0 0 0
 75

Table 4.10 Four way ANOVA Table

Sum of Degrees of Mean Sum of Percent

Factors F
Squares Freedom Squares Contribution
A 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
B 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 4 15
C 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
D 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
A*B 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
A*C 0 1 0 -- --
A*D 0 1 0 -- --
B*C 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
B*D 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
C*D 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 4 15
A*B*C 0 1 0 -- --
A*B*D 0 1 0 -- --
A*C*D 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 1 --
B*C*D 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 4 15
Error 0.0083336 1 0.0083336 -- 55
Total 0.1666666 15 100

4.7.1.4 Pooling up estimates of error values

The pooling up strategy entails F-testing the smallest column effect

against the next larger one to see if significance exists. If no significance
exists, then these two effects are pooled together to test the next larger column
effect until some significant F ratio exists.
 76

Table 4.11 Pooling error variance ANOVA summary table

Sum of Degrees of Mean Sum of Percent

Factors F
Squares Freedom Squares contribution
B 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 6 16.67
C*D 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 6 16.67
B*C*D 0.0333333 1 0.0333333 6 16.67
Error 0.0666666 12 0.005555 -- 50
Total 0.1666666 15 --- -- 100

From Table 4.11, it is found that the factor A does not affect the
final table and hence HAZ effect at level 2 is selected. B is the most critical
factor of all and the interactions of C, D and B, C and D are also considered to
be critical. The mean values of the occurrence of the defect for 30 valves
under the combination of influential factors (B, C and D) are given in
Table 4.12.

Table 4.12 Mean value of defects

D1 D2
C1 0.5 0.75
B1
C2 0.25 0.5
C1 0 0.25
B2 C2 -0.25 0

The levels B2, C2 and D1 give less mean value and hence these are
selected. The optimised parameters are given in Table 4.13.
 77

Table 4.13 Selection of process parameters by ANOVA

Factors Level Parameter

Upset force 2 1.03 T
Friction force 2 0.4156 T
Burn off 2 4.5 mm
Spindle speed 1 2100 rpm

4.7.2 Runout

4.7.2.1 Causes for runout

The various causes for runout were analysed by brain storming and
the causes and the remarks are given in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14 Causes for runout

Is it a significant
Sl.
Factor cause for the Remarks
No.
defect?
1 Poor axes No Machine was tested by the
alignment in m/c manufacturer to ensure
2 V block wear No SOP says clearly about the
frequency of change of V
Block unit
3 Multi bore collet No SOP says clearly the
wear frequency of change of
Crawford Collet
4 Precision collet No SOP says clearly the
wear frequency of change of
precision collet
5 End stopper rod No Stopper rod is reground
wear and tear properly in case of wear and
tear
 78

Table 4.14 (Continued)

Is it a significant
Sl.
Factor cause for the Remarks
No.
defect?
6 Bad face plate Yes To be studied further
condition
7 Improper grip of Yes To be studied further
multibore collet
by the adaptor
8 Variation in upset No Machine is built with closed
force loop system
9 Flow control No There is a provision to
valve at deflash avoid misuse. Periodical
unit maintenance is carried out
10 Deflection unit No There is matching mark
traverse high with which the limit switch
is set to control the traverse
length
11 Stem and head No Receiving inspection is
hardness variation clear at the raw material
stage by metallurgical lab
12 Operator Yes To be studied further

From Table 4.14, it was identified that face plate wear, multi bore
collet and operator may be the causes to be analysed and studied further.

4.7.2.2 Operator

Five operators were studied to find out whether there is any

significant difference in their ability to cause the runout and it was found that
operator was not a major cause.
 79

4.7.2.3 Face plate wear

In order to find whether the wear of face plate is a significant cause

for the failure, trials have been made with the worn out and new face plate.
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 give the details of the occurrence of the runout
with a worn out face plate and with a new face plate respectively and it was
found that face plate wear is not a major cause for runout.

Table 4.15 Runout defects with a worn out face plate

Trial No. Day Shift No. of defects No. of components produced

1 A 11 2300
2 1 B 12 2300
3 C 15 2417
4 A 14 2411
5 2 B 13 2312
6 C 12 2300
7 A 14 2413
8 3 B 11 2300
9 C 13 2345

Table 4.16 Runout defects with a new face plate

Trial No. Day Shift No. of defects No. of components produced

1 A 11 2317
2 1 B 10 2311
3 C 14 2417
4 A 13 2411
5 2 B 11 2312
6 C 12 2444
7 A 12 2442
8 3 B 10 2300
9 C 13 2445
 80

4.7.2.4 Multi bore collet adaptor

The multi bore collet and face plate assembly is shown in

Figure 4.10. To find whether the wear of the collet adaptor is a major cause
for the runout, trials were made with a new adaptor and the runout defects are
given in Table 4.17. It was found that there is a considerable decrease in the
number of defects by using a new adaptor.

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 4.10 Multi bore collet and face plate assembly

(a) Multi Bore collet Adaptor (b) Multi Bore collet with face plate
(c) Assembly of (a) and (b)

Table 4.17 Runout defects with a new adaptor

Sl. No. Day Shift Defects No. of components produced

1 A 3 2317
2 1 B 2 2322
3 C 1 2300
4 A 2 2412
5 2 B 2 2300
6 C 2 2326
 81

Table 4.17 (Continued)

Sl. No. Day Shift Defects No. of components produced

7 A 2 2415
8 3 B 3 2352
9 C 2 2300
10 A 3 2314
11 4 B 4 2316
12 C 3 2418
13 A 3 2320
14 5 B 4 2412
15 C 2 2300
16 A 2 2314
17 6 B 3 2410
18 C 2 2306
Total 45 42154

4.8 IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF THE

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

4.8.1 Tensile Strength and Weld Crack

The recommended actions were incorporated and trials have been

taken. A trial batch of 57000 valves of passenger car exhaust valve line was
examined and the results of the implemented parameters are given in
Table 4.18. It was found that none of the valves was rejected due to micro
crack in ultrasonic testing. The tensile strength was well over the limit of
700N/mm2.
 82

Table 4.18 Results of the implemented parameters

Day Head HAZ Stem HAZ Tensile strength Weld crack

1 1.00 1.20 914 Nil
2 1.12 1.30 876 Nil
3 1.00 1.12 962 Nil
4 1.03 1.01 916 Nil
5 1.06 1.15 920 Nil
6 0.99 1.20 893 Nil
7 1.30 1.10 897 Nil
8 1.10 1.10 904 Nil
9 1.05 1.20 912 Nil
10 1.10 1.15 916 Nil
11 1.00 1.15 892 Nil

4.8.2 Runout

The wornout collet adaptor was replaced with a new one and the
spindle runout is below 100 micron.

4.9 IMPROVED RPN

The improved occurrence ranking is shown in Table 4.19. The

details of improved RPN are given in Table A2.7. The comparison of the
initial RPN and the improved RPN for the three failure modes is shown in
Table 4.20.
 83

Table 4.19 Improved Occurrence Ranking

Occurrence per 1000 Occurrence

Sl.
Failure Mode valves Ranking
No.
Before After Before After
1 Runout 2.26 1.068 6 4
2 Low Tensile 1.34 Nil 5 1
Strength
3 Weld crack 0.29 Nil 3 1

Table 4.20 Initial RPN and Improved RPN

Improved
Sl.No. Failure Mode Initial RPN
RPN
1 Low Tensile strength 160 40
2 Weld crack 120 40
3 Run out 108 72