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4 The best single textual evidence for all three claims can be found in HusserI, Edmund,
Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophic II, HusserIiana
Vol. IV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1952, p. 99. There is, of course, countless other textual
evidence in HusserI's work.
70 SARTRE AND THE CARTESIAN EGO
Now, it is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such
unifying and individualising I. Indeed, consciousness is defined by intentionality.
By intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It unites itself by escaping
from itself. The unity of a thousand active consciousnesses by which I have added,
do add, and shall add two and two to make four, is the transcendent object "two
and two make four." Without the permanence of this eternal truth a real unity
would be impossible to conceive ... The object is transcendent to the conscious-
nesses which grasp it, and it is in the object that the unity of the consciousnesses
is found. 3s (38)!
II
Sartre might have proceeded like the early Husserl and claimed that
there is no Cartesian Ego anywhere. Instead he asserts that "there is
not one of my consciousnesses which I do not apprehend as provided
with an I." (44) Thus the ego of the cogito does in fact emerge for Sartre.
How does he reconcile this claim with the previous ones? The problem
(I) to keep the Cartesian Ego in some form; and
(2) to expel the transcendental ego from consciousness;
is solved by Sartre's introduction of
(3) the transcendent ego which (a) does not exist on the level of un-
reflected consciousness and (b) emerges as the object of reflecting
consciousness.
Thus Sartre strips the Cartesian Ego of its Husserlian "purity" and
makes it an object of a special consciousness. It is crucial that the
distinction be made between a reflecting consciousness which has some
consciousness as its object, the reflected consciousness, and unreflected
consciousness which is not the object of consciousnesses belonging to
the same stream of consciousness. Sartre's arguments are entangled but
I hope to capture them in the following system of premises and con-
clusions which I will then discuss in some detail.
Premise I: Consciousness is intentional and never without an object
toward which it is directed (its "intentional Object").
Definition I: A reflecting consciousness is a consciousness which has a
consciousness as its object.
Definition 2: A reflected consciousness is a consciousness which is the
object of some consciousness.
Definition 3: An unreflected consciousness is a consciousness which is
not the object of some consciousness belonging to the same stream
of consciousness.
Premise 2: No unreflected consciousness is its own object.
Premise 3: A consciousness which has some particular consciousness as
its object is not itself an object of some consciousness belonging to
the same stream of consciousness.
74 SARTRE AND THE CARTESIAN EGO
8 Ibid., p. II2.
SARTRE AND THE CARTESIAN EGO
e Ibid., p. 204.
SARTRE AND THE CARTESIAN EGO