GUIDELINES FOR STRUCTURAL VERIFICATION AND
FRACTURE CONTROL OF SHUTTLE PAYLOADS
C.E. L i f e r
M.C. Lou
I J e t Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, Cal if o r n i a
Abstract
The development of t h e Space S h u t t l e i n t r o -
duced a "new breed" o f payload developers as w e l l
as a broader range o f payload types. Factors
such as crew and passenger safety, r e u s a b i l i t y ,
and mixes o f payloads i n a s i n g l e launch brought
greater complexity t o t h e process o f v e r i f y i ng
payload launch safety. The need f o r w r i t t e n
guidelines i n t h e areas o f s t r u c t u r e s , m a t e r i a l s ,
and f r a c t u r e control became apparent, and t h e
Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082
NASA O f f i c e o f t h e Chief Engineer undertook t h e
development o f a document t o f i l l t h i s need.
A f t e r a two-year development and review process
NASA Handbook 8070.x~ "Space S h u t t l e Payloads
S t r u c t u r a l V e r i f i c a t i o n and Fracturyl F o n t r o l
Guide1 ine ,I' w i 11 soon be r e 1eased.
This paper describes the procedure f o r developing
these guidelines and t h e contents o f t h e document
I.I n t r o d u c t i o n
The i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e Space S h u t t l e as a
launch v e h i c l e f o r t r a n s p o r t i t i g a wide v a r i e t y o f
payloads i n t o low earth o r b i t and r e t u r n has t r e -
mendously broadened t h e scope o f space a c t i v i t y
f o r both government and p r i v a t e organizations.
Further, i t has tremendously increased t h e number
o f users and has r e s u l t e d i n many payload deve-
lopers who are not experienced i n space techno-
logy. This combination o f circumstances has made
t h e j o b o f ensuring f l i g h t s a f e t y much more com-
plex than was the case w i t h un-manned single-pay-
load launch vehicles. As a r e s u l t o f f a c t o r s such
as crew and passenger safety, v e h i c l e s a f e t y and
r e u s a b i l i t y , payload r e t r i o v a l and reuse, mixes
of payloads on s i n g l e f l i g h t s , there were many new
questions concerning acceptable procedures d u r i n g
e a r l y S h u t t l e f l i g h t s . It has always been o f
paramount importance t h a t each payload must be
judged t o be "safe" before i t can be accepted f o r
launch. This paper w i l l describe how acceptable
procedures have been established f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n
of payload structures and m a t e r i a l s and how these
procedures ha been documented i n NASA Handbook
NHB 8 0 7 0 . x ~ . Yf)
Personnel s a f e t y i s a t o p p r i o r i t y considera-
t i o n i n any NASA program, t h e r e f o r e t h e Space
Shuttle, w i t h i t s crews o f astronauts, s c i e n t i s t s ,
Congressmen, and teachers, and i t s payloads have
received e x t r a care and a t t e n t i o n t o reduce
hazards t o a minimum. Requirements were s e t f o r t h
i n " Safety P o l i c y and Requirements f o r Payloads
Using t h e Space Transportation Systeni (STS)", NHB
1700.7, which was pub1;shed i n 1979, and based on
e a r l y experience was revised (NHB 1700.,'4) i n Dec-
ember, 1980. This document i d e n t i f i e d basic
requirements and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which were l a t e r
supplemented i n various documents published by JSC
and o t h e r NASA Centers, however, many d e t a i l s were
not addressed, and i n many cases the acceptable
VI
---
- J..---. .-Cn*. *rrriCtrinn
. * . .
+ h > t r a n p l i r a m a n + c had
Copyright 0 American Institute01Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Inc.. 1985. All rights reserved.
42
been met were n o t apparent. E a r l y S h u t t l e payload
saf9ty acceptance was accomplished on a case-by-
case basis .
Of p a r t i c u l a r concern and a t t e n t i o n during
e a r l y S h u t t l e payload safety reviews was the area
o f f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l because o f +he r e l a t i v e imma-
t u r i t y o f t h i s technology. A1 ti.4ugh t h e p r i n c i -
ples and t h e o r i e s o f f r a c t u r e mechanics had been
uncrer development f o r several decades, the develop-
ment of a l l r e l a t e d elements (design, material
s e l e c t i o n and c o n t r o l , analysis, f a b r i c a t i o n ,
inspection) i n t o an integrated process had only
r e c e n t l y progressed t o the p o i n t o f being w e l l
understood and accepted. I n t h e e a r l y 1980's
there was s t i l l considerable d i v e r s i t y o f opinion
among experts i n t h i s f i e l d on such topics as mate-
r i a l p r o p e r t i e s t o be used i n analysis, c a p a b i l i -
t i e s o f f l a w d e t e c t i o n techniques, and approxi-r l t e
a n a l y t i c a l screening methods. This d i v e r s i t y k d s
exhibited by d i f f e r e n t acceptable procedures a t
t h e various NASA Centers and t h e A i r Force, lead-
i n g t o confusion on the p a r t o f t h e new community
o f pay1oad developers .
From t h e e a r l y Shuttle payload s a f e t y reviews i n
1981 a t t h e Johnson Space Center i t became c l e a r
t h a t some guidance t o the payload community was
needed i n t h e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d areas o f f r a c t u r e
control and s t r u c t u r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . I t was also
c l e a r t h a t considerable f l e x i b i l i t y was required
because o f wide v a r i a t i o n s i n payloads, as i l l u s -
t r a t e d i n Figures 1 and 2, and because there are
several t e c h n i c a l l y acceptable a1 t e r n a t i v e
approaches i n hardware developmeot t o achieving
equally h i g h l e v e l s o f safety. I n order t o $e cost
e f f e c t i v e , payload developers must be given the
freedom t o s e l e c t t h e combination o f design, ana-
l y s i s , and t e s t approaches which are optimum f o r
t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . Thus, NASA s e t o u t t o develop
guide1 ines f o r Space S h u t t l e payloads s t r u c t u r a l
v e r i f i c a t i o n and f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l . This e f f o r t
was d i r e c t e d by t h e O f f i c e o f t h e Chief Engineer,
w i t h t e c h n i c a l support f r o m t h e Structures and
Thermal D i v i s i o n of the Johnson Space Center, was
coordinated w i t h a l l NASA Centers and the A i r
Force Space D i v i s i o n , and was c a r r i e d out by the
A m l i e d Mechanics Technology Section o f the J e t
Propulsion Laboratory. Figure 3 shows schematical-
l y t h i s relationship.
Figure 4 Jhows the approach t o developing the
technical contents of the document, which followed
these general steps: I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l
and f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l requirements ; survey govprn-
ment and i n d u s t r y t o i d e n t i f y v e r i f i c a t i o n methods
being used and p o b l e m areas; survey government
and i n d u s t r y f o r innovative new approaches ; pre-
pare d d r a f t document f o r broad review; prepare
and d i s t r i b u t e t h e guidelines. A major milestone
i n t h e process was a government and industry work-
s h o p h p l d a+ .lDl i n netnhnr 1987 ;It which a W i d p
 spectrum o f payload development engineers present-
ed p r a c t i c e s , problems, and recommendations, and
government personnel discussed pay1oad pol ic i es
and requirements. This workshop was attended by
approximately e i g h t y people, and was very produc-
t i v e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g those areas where g u i d e l i n e s
were needed. Some o f these areas f o r emphasis
were :
( a ) s i m p l e f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l screening
methods

(b) d e f i n i t i o n o f NDE i n s p e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s
and l i m i t s

( c ) c r i t e r i a and a n a l y s i s methods f o r con-

tainment o f p a r t s

(d) relationship o f t e s t i n g t o analytical

F i g u r e 1 Gal i1eo Spacecraft Launch verification
Configuration
Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082

Subsequent t o t h e workshop each o f these areas

was addressed and g u i d e l i r e s were develop 1.

MTIVITY PARTlClPANTS
I
1
I
I NASA HEAWUARTETL~
1 REOUIREMENTS NASA CENTERS
!
1
AFISPACE DIVISION
-
1' I UNI VERS I T I ES
I
I
WORKSHOP TO
IDENTIFY METHODS 4 '
NASA HEAWUARTERS
NASA CENTERS
i AND PROBLEMS AFISPACE DIVISION
i
1 IDENTIFY & DEVELOP - -
NASA CENTERS
NEW APPROACHES AFISPACE DIVISION
INDUSTRY
i
+
REVIEW DRAFT .
NASA HEAWUARTERS
NASA CENTERS
F i q- u r e 2 S h u t t l e Payload Bay Contamination GUIDELINES AFiSPACE DIVISION
M o n i t o r Package " INDUSTRY

PUBLISH GUIDELINES NASA HEAWUARTERS

- -
NASA HQ OCE Figure 4 Guide1 ines Develooment Process
J. McDEVlTT

11. Guidelines Document D e s c r i p t i o n

TECHNl CAL COORDlNAT ION INPUT The purpose o f t h i s document i s t o a s s i s t pay-
mREVIEW. load developers i n s e l e c t i n g t h e most c o s t - e f f i -
NASA - JSC NASA CENTERS c i e n t means t o ensure t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r a l design
8. HOLDER AND AF/SD o f t h e i r payloads meets t h e Space S h u t t l e s a f e t y
requirements. Although intended t o b e n e f i t m a i n l y
those payload developers n o t having p r e v i o u s l y
been exposed t o t h e S h u t t l e s a f e t y requirements,
such as u n i v e r s i t i e s and small companies, i t i s
hoped t h a t i t w i l l be a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e e n t i r e
spectrum o f payload developers.

F i g u r e 3 P a r t i c i p a n t s i n Development Process The development o f these g u i d e l i n e s was based

For Guidelines on a l i t e r a t u r e review o f c u r r e n t technology
a p p l i c a b l e t o s t r u c t u r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and f r a c t u r e
c o n t r o l , and on p a s t NASA and A i r Force experience

43
 r e l a t e d t o these two t o p i c s . This +ocument p u t s
emphasis on S h u t t l e - p e c u l i a r aspects o f implemen-
t i n g s t r u c t u r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and f r a c t u r e contro '
i n t h e process o f payload development and i n t e g r a -
t i o n . A l l classes o f payloads, ranging from " get-
away s p e c i a l s " t o l a r g e spacecraft, are consi-
dered. The s t r u c t u r a l components' o f these pay-
loads may have a wide v a r i e t y o f material selec-
t i o n s , configurations, and designs.
The main body o f t h e document i s d i v i d e d i n t o
three chapters. Chapter one contains general
i n f o r m a t i o n on the document's objective, a p p l i -
cable documents , background o f S h u t t l e s a f e t y
requirements, and t h e t i m e l i n e considerations o f a
t y p i c a l payload development program. A t y p i c a l
payload devtlopment milestone c h a r t i s shown i n
Figure 5, w i t i , t h e Safety Reviews i d e n t i f i e d .
The normal coverage o f s t r u c t u r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and
f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l f o r each o f these reviews w i l l be
discussed l a t e r .
Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082
nonth5 From Porlect Start
Figure 5 Typical Payload Safety V e r i f i c a t i o n
Time1ine
Chapter two discusses s a f e t y c r i t i c a l i t y and
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of payload components, and presents
recommended procedures and a1 t e r n a t i v e approaches
f o r s t r u c t u r a l v e r i f i c a t i o n o f payloads. S p e c i f i c
t o p i c s covered i n Chapter two i n c l u d e m a t e r i a l s
considerations , v e r i f i c a t i o n o f loads analysis
model, mechanism v e r i f i c a t i o n , data confidence,
s t r u c t u r a l t e s t i n g , and documentation r e q u i r e -
ments. S i m i l a r t o Chapter two but f o r t h e imple-
mentation of f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l , Chapter t h r e e a l s o
presents recommended procedures and a1t e r n a t e
approaches. It discusses t h e preparation o f f r a c -
t u r e c o n t r o l plans and management o f f r a c t u r e con-
t r o l programs and covers r e l a t e d technical t o p i c s .
The fundamentals o f f a t i g u e crack growth a n a l y s i ,
i n i t i a l flaw s i z e determination, f r a c t u r e proper-
t i e s o f materials, v e r i f i c a t i o n o f safe l i f e by
t e s t , i n i t i a l f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l screening, p r o o f
t e s t l o g i c and analysis procedures, stress corro-
sion cracking, and t h e treatment o f pressure ves-
sels, fasteners, and composite p a r t s are discussed
i n t h i s chapter.
Tne appendices 3 f t h e guidelines document con-
t a i n mainly technical m a t e r i a l which i s considered
too lengthy t o be included i n t h e main body of t h e
document. The issues discussed are combination of
loads, containment, f a i l - s a f e analysis, f a t i g u e
load cycles, v e r i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g o f loads analy-
s i s model, and t h e d u c t i l e and allowable s t r e s s
44
screeni ng c r i t e r i a . Additional l y , two o f t h e
appendices a r e included t o d e f i n e t h e meaning o f
terms, acronyms and symbols.
Wherever i n t h e document a s a f e t y requirement
o r a t e c h n i c a l t o p i c requires i n f o r m a t i o n beyond
t h e scope o f t h e document references are given.
111. Significant Highlights
A. NASA/AF STS Payload Safety Review Process
STS payload s a f e t y reviews are conducted t o
v a l i d a t e compliance w i t h s a f e t y requirements i n a l l
aspects o f payload design, f l i g h t operations,
ground support equipment (GSE) design, and ground
operations. The implementation o f the s a f e t y
review process i s a j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e
payload s a f e t y review panel established by JSC and
KSC .
The depth dtld number o f formal s a f e t y reviews
may vary from payload t o payload. JSC document
13830 recommends a process c o n s i s t i n g o f an i n
t i a l contact meeting and f o u r phased reviews.
I n the i n i t i a l contact meeting t h e payload develo-
1;)
per i s b r i e f e d on technical and system safety
requirements, and given i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the con-
duct o f t h e phased safety reviews. He i s also
requested t o provide a schedule o f payload develop-
ment milestones. The Phase 0 review i s an informal
discussion between t h e developer and the JSC and
KSC s a f s t y representatives t o i d e n t i f y s a f e t y - c r i -
t i c a l subsystems. Phase I,11, and 111 reviews are
formal reviews i n v o l v i n g t h e e n t i r e JSC/KSC payload
s a f e t y review panel. I n t h e Phase I review the
proposed implementation approach i s assessed,
hazards and planned resolutions a r e reviewed, and
an understanding o f v e r i f i c a t i o n approach i s deve-
loped. The Phase I1 review i s p r i m a r i l y used t o
v e r i f y t h e design compl iance w i t h s a f e t y require-
ments and t o review t h e v e r i f ic a t i o n methods.
F i n a l l y , i n t h e Phase I11 review t h e incorporation
o f previous review agreements and t h e s a t i s f a c t o r y
completion o f s a f e t y v e r i f i c a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s are
validated.
The i n t e r f a c e w i t h NASA/AF safety reviews should
be one o f t h e major considerations i n formulating
p r o j e c t schedule f o r the development o f any STS
payload. JSC document 13830 gives a l i s t o f sup-
p o r t i n g documents and data r e q u i r e d f o r each o f the
f o u r phased reviews. The submittal t o JSC o f t h e
supporting m a t e r i a l f o r a s p e c i f i c safety review
should be made 30 days i n advance.
6. FIASA/AF Payload Safety Requirements Documents
-
-
Figure 6 shows t h e general o r d e r o f precedence
f o r documents t h a t define STS payload safety
requirements. For commercial payloads , the top
l e v e l document i s usually a launch service agree-
ment made between the payload developer and NASA.
For DOD payloads, t h i s can be replaced by a memor-
andum o f agreement. The second l e v e l document i s
NASA NHB 1700.7 which provides t h e o v e r a l l s a f e t y
p o l i c i e s and requirements a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l STS
payloads and t h e i r GSE. This document i s followed
by a payload i n t e g r a t i o n plan ( P I P ) prepared by
t h e developer and approved by JSC. The P I P i s a
document d e s c r i b i n g the procedures t o be used i n
i n t e n r a t i n q t h e Dayload w i t h t h e STS, i n c l u d i n q
 v e r i f i c a t i o n methods f o r s a f e t y compliance. The
more d e t a i l e d safety requirements r e l a t e d t o spe-
c i f i c t e c h n i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s a r e given by t h e
i n t e r f a c e c o n t r o l documents (ICD's) f o r o r b i t e r /
cargo standard i n t e r f a c e s . These requirements can
also*be found i n other NASA ant A i r Force p u b l i c a -
t i o n s such as JSC 14046 f o r payload v e r i f i c a t i o n ,
JSC 18327 GSFC GHB 8060.1 and AFSD SO-YV-0068 f o r
f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l , and MSFC-HDBK-527 SC 09604 f o r
m a t e r i a l s selection, etc. (3,495,6965
Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082
. PAYLOAD INTEGRATION PLAN
I
1
INTERFACCE CONTROL DOCUMENTS
AND OTHERS
Figure 6 Document Precedence
C. Desiqn Approaches
To minimize t h e impact o f STS safety r e q u i r e -
ments on t h e cost and schedule o f payload develop-
ment p r o j e c t s , t h e s a f e t y o f Space Shuttle, as
w e l l as t h a t o f the o t h e r payloads t o be f l o w n
w i t h t h e payload under development, shoLld be one
o f t h e major engineering concerns i n the design
phase o f a payload component. The guidelines
document recommends several design p r a c t i c e s which
help i n producing nonsafety c r i t i c a l s t r u c t u r a l
components:
. Avoid t h e use o f s t r e s s corrosion s u s c e p t i b l e
materials.
. Minimize stress concentrations.
. E l i m i n a t e residual and assembly stresses.
. U t i l i z e containment and f a i l - s a f e design
approaches.
. Follow t h e established guidelines f o r t h e use
o f nonredundant fasteners.
0. Test Approaches
Various safety r e l a t e d t e s t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s a r e
discussed i n the guidelines document. The docu-
ment a l s o deals w i t h t h e t e c h n i c a l advahtages and
45
d i f f i c u l t i e s o f commonly used t e s t methods.
Developmental t e s t i n g , aimed a t obtaining i n f o r -
mation t o v e r i f y s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s (loads,
stress) models, may be performed on a component o r
a system l e v e l . A development t e s t may be a s t a -
t i c t e s t , a random v i b r a t i o n t e s t , a sine sweep
t e s t , o r one o f t h e many forms o f a modal t e s t ,
such as m u l t i p o i n t slne dwell, s i n g l e p o i n t random,
time domain, and impact. The s e l e c t i o n o f a p a r t i -
c u l a r developmental t e s t u s u a l l y i s based on t h e
data requirements and other considerations i n c l u -
ding cost, schedule, f a c i l i t y and hardware a v a i l a -
b i l i t y and, i n some cases, t r a d i t i o n s and e s t a b l i -
shed p r a c t i c e s o f the payload development organi-
zation. For payloads which are d i r e c t l y mounted
t o the S h u t t l e cargo bay and which have fundamen-
t a l f i x e d i n t e r f a c e v i b r a t i o n mode frequency equal
t o o r higher than 35 hz., modal t e s t intended o n l y
f o r t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o f dynamic mathematical model
i s not required.
To q u a l i f y t h e structures o f a payload f o r shut-
t l e f l i g h t , JSC has s p e c i f i e d t h e s t a t i c t e s t
l e v e l s f o r various combinations o f the design
safety f a c t o r s , t e s t hardware c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and
experience l e v e l o f the design. These required
s t a t i c t e s t l e v e l s range from 1.1 t o 1.4 times
design l i m i t load. JSC w i l l a l s o consider other
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t approaches i n c l u d i n g the no-
s t a t i c - t e s t o p t i o n o f increasing t h e design s a f e t y
f a c t o r t o 2.25 f o r structures o f f a i 1- s a c - designs.
E. M a t e r i a l s Considerations
S h u t t l e m a t e r i a l s requi rements include not o n l y
s t r u c t u r a l s t r e n g t h (mechanical properties) v e r i -
f i c a t i o n b u t a l s o environmental c o m p a t i b i l i t y con-
s i d e r a t i o n s such as flammability, stress- corrosion
t o x i c i t y , outgassing, and contamination. Where
these p r o p e r t i e s are determined t o be c r i t i c a l t o
safety a c c e p t a b i l i t y i t i s necessary t o v e r i f y
them by methods such as t r a c e a b i l i t y documentation,
inspection, non- destructive evaluation, and char-
acterization testing.
A l l m a t e r i a l s used i n s h u t t l e payloads must be
i d e n t i f i e d and screened f o r a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n t h e
areas l i s t e d above. Where m u t e r i a l s are not con-
sidered standard acceptable m a t e r i a l s as defined
i n " Materials Selection L i s t f o r Space Hardware
Systems," MSFC-HDBK-527 C (JSC 09604 C ) , o r "Non-
M e t a l l i c M a t e r i a l s Design Guidelines," JSC-02681,
submitted t o JSC. f8,9r
a r a t i o n a l e f o r t h 'r se must be developed and
F. The Safety C r i t i c a l i t y Review Process
The review process recommended by the guide-
l i n e s document i s t o consider and c l a s s i f y each o f
the payload components, i f possible, as nonsafety
c r i t i c a l . Any component t h a t f a i l s t o be c l a s s i -
f i e d as nonsafety c r i t i c a l i s assumed t o be s a f e t y
c r i t i c a l by d e f a u l t . The reasons f o r c l a s s i f y i n g
a component as nonsafety c r i t i c a l are: Low-mass,
contained, and f a i l - s a f e . Any o t h e r argument sup-
p o r t i n g t h e nonsafety c r i t i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a
component can also be submitted, on an exception
basis, t o JSC f o r approval.
A s a f e t y c r i t i c a l component w i 11 be acceptable
f w S h u t t l e f l i g h t only when a s e t o f s p e c i f i c
conditions i s met. These in c l ude safety factors,
 t e s t i n g requirements, and f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l .
D e t a i l s of these c o n d i t i o n s a r e given i n t h e
gui d e l ines document.
F i g u r e 7 i s a f l o w c h a r t o f t h e recommended
payload component s a f e t y c r i t i c a l i t y review pro-
cedure. It a l s o shows how t h e s a f e t y c r i t i c a l
a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f a component can be established.
CRITICAL
REOUIRED? TESTING
Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082
APPLICABLE7
FRACTWIECONrROL
REOLIIREMNTS?
cs
1 i f c e r t a i n simple conditions a r e s a t i s f i e d . These
Figure 7 C r i t i c a l i t y Review Procedure
G. Nondestructive E v a l u a t i o n (NDE) I n s p e c t i o n
For S h u t t l e payload f r a c t u r e c o n t r o l , NDE
i n s p e c t i o n f o r flaws i s used t o determine t h e i n i -
t i a l crack s i z e f o r s a f e - l i f e determination by
crack- growth analysis. Important p o i n t s covered
by t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f NDE a p p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e
gu5del ines document in c l ude:
. Some l e v e l of NDE i n s p e c t i o n should be per-
formed on a l l payload components, except pro-
b a b l y those designed t o be contained.
. The i n i t i a l crack s i z e determined by t h e s e l e c -
t e d NDE technique must correspond t o t h e 90
percent probabi 1ity/95 percent confidence
l e v e l o f i n s p e c t i o n r e 1 ia b i l ity.
. Unaided v i s u a l i n s p e c t i o n and v i s u a l inspec-
t i o n aided o n l y m a g n i f i c a t i o n are n o t consider-
ed r e l i a b l e i n d e t e c t i n g i n i t i a l cracks f o r
metal p a r t s . These techniques can be employed
f o r a l i m i t e d number o f s p e c i a l cases o n l y .
. Proof t e s t i s u s u a l l y a more expensive crack-
d e t e c t i o n technique than NDE, and should be
used o n l y when NDE i s n o t a v i a b l e approach.
H. F r a c t u r e Mechanics Screening Procedures
The f r a c t u r e mechanics screening procedures a r e
used t o i d e n t i f y , i n a simple y e t e f f e c t i v e way,
payload components having l a r g e f'racture-mechanics-
based s a f e t y margins. The use o f these screening
procedures w i 11 e l iminate t h e need o f performing
complex and time-consuming a - t a i l e d crack growth
analyses on many components and thus reduce t h e
cost o f f r i i c t u r e c o n t r o l .
Any screening procedure, as l o n g as i t can be
shown t o Ire conservative, may be used by t h e pay-
1oad developers . The guide1 ines document discusses
t h r e e procedures t h a t are considered acceptable by
JSC. The are: (1) t h e low s t r e s s screening c r i -
t e r i a ; ( 2 1 t h e d u c t i l e screening c r i t e r i a ; and ( 3 )
t h e a1 1owabl e s t r e s s screeni ng c r i t e r i a .
The components t o be accepted by t h e low s t r e s s
screening c r i t e r i a must have a minimum u l t i m a t e
s t r e s s s a f e t y f a c t o r o f 4.0, be made o f w e l l char-
acterized, d u c t i l e materials not sensitive t o
s t r e s s c o r r o s i o n cracking, and be subject t o , as
a minimum, v i s u a l NDE i n s p e c t i o n f o r i n i t i a l crack
d e t e c t i o n . I n addition, t h e r e a r e l i m i t a t i o n s on
t h e thickness, width, and maximum number o f l o a d
cycles imposed on these p a r t s .
The d u c t i l e screening c r i t e r i a was i n i t i a l l y
proposed and used f o r A i r Force payloads (see
Reference 6 ) . I t states t h a t a p a r t i s acceptable
c o n d i t i o n s r e l a t e t h e plane s t r a i n f r a c t u r e tough-
ness, t h e p a r t thickness, and a " proof t e s t f a c t o r "
t o t h e a l l o w a b l e operating s t r e s s . The value o f
t h e p r o o f t e s t f a c t o r depends on m a t e r i a l s t r e n g t h
and f a c t o r o f s a f e t y o f t h e design. To ensure t h e
v a l i d i t y o f t h e d u c t i l e screening c r i t e r i a , several
c o n s t r a i n t s a r e recommended t o be imposed on i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n s . These c o n s t r a i n t s l i m i t the number
o f l o a d cycles, s p e c i f y t h e minimum p a r t s i z e as
f u n c t i o n s o f detectable i n i t i a l f l a w size, and
exclude t h e use 01 t h i s c r i t e r i a on p a r t s made o f
i n h e r e n t l y b r i t t l e m a t e r i a l s such as glass o r bery-
l l i u m a l l o y s . The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s c r i t e r i a on
NASA payloads must have p r i o r approval o f t h e r e s -
p o n s i b l e center.
The a l l o w a b l e Stress screening c r i t e r i a i s a
v a r i a t i o n o f t h e high margin screening c r i t e r i a
developed a t JPL f o r t h e G a l i l e o p r o j e c t . Based
on a s e t o f conservative assumptions on t h e i n i t i a l
crack shape and size, and on t h e amount o f crack
growth r e q u i r e d t o p r e c i p i t a t e f a i l u r e , an a l l o w -
a b l e s t r e s s i s formulated i n terms o f equivalent
load cycles, crack growth r a t e o f t h e m a t e r i a l ,
p a r t geometry, and l e v e l o f NDE inspection. I f
- t h i s a l l o w a b l e s t r e s s exceeds t h e maximum opera-
t i n g s t r e s s i n t h e part, t h e p a r t i s acceptable.
This screening c r i t e r i a i s somewhat more invol ved
than t h e low s t r e s s o r t h e d u c t i l e screening pro-
cedure, b u t i s s t i l l considerably l e s s complex
than performing a d e t a i l e d crack growth a n a l y s i s .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , u n l i k e t h e o t h e r two c r i t e r i a which
a r e a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o payload p a r t s subjected t o
a few number o f load cycles, t h e allowable screen-
i n g c r i t e r i a can be used on p a r t s t h a t w i l l e x p e r i -
ence s i g n i f i c a n t post- inspection c y c l i c loading .
 I. Components o f Special Concern
C e r t a i n types of payload components requi re
special treatment f o r s a f e t y v e r i f i c a t i o n . Some
o f these a r e pressure vessels, fasteners, and
p a r t s made o f composite m a t e r i a l s , and these a r e
addressed s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e Suidelines.
Pressure vessels a r e r e w i r e d by NHB 1700.7A
t o be designed t o an u l t i m . . safety f a c t o r of
1.5 o r greater, t o t h e ASME B o i l e r and Pressure
Vessel Code, Sectinn V I I I , o r t L MIL-STD-1522.
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g i s a l s o required, and i n
some cases l i f e cycle t e s t i n g i s required. Pres-
sure vessels are g e n e r a l l y required t o be placed
under f r a c t u r e control, w i t h t h e exception o f
those which have u l t i m a t e f a c t o r s o f s a f e t y g r e a t -
e r than 4.0 and do n o t c o n t a i n f l u i d s which acce-
l e r a t e f l a w growth.

Fasteners which are i n a p a t t e r n t h a t can be

Downloaded by Freie Universitaet Berlin on January 1, 2017 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/6.1985-6082

shown t o be adequate t o withstand l i m i t load when

one o f t h e fasteners has f a i l e d can be c l a s s i f i e d
as n o n s a f e t y - c r i t i c a l . A l l s a f e t y c r i t i c a l f a s t e -
ners must be v e r i f i e d by a s a f e - l i f e approach
i n c l u d i n g analysis and inspection, o r by p r o o f
test.

Composite structures a r e o f t e n d i f f i c u l t t o
r e l i a b l y inspect, therefore, where they are used
i n such applications, s t r i c t q u a l i t y c o n t r o l i s
required t o minimize defects during manufacture
and handling. Precautions against impact must be
implemented. Proof l o a d t e s t i n g may be used t o
screen o u t f a u l t y items .
References
1. Space S h u t t l e Payloads S t r u c t u r a l V e r i f i c a -
t i o n and Fracture Control Guidelines, NASA
Handbook NHB 80/0 ,xx, 1985
2, Implementation Procedures f o r Payloads System
Safety Requirements, JSC Document 13830, May
1979.
3. Payload V e r i f i c a t i o n Requirements, JSC Docu-
ment 14046, Revision A, J u l y 1982.

4. F r a c t u r e Control Guide1 ines f o r STS Payloads,

JSC Document 18327, June 1982.
5. General Fracture Plan f o r Payloads Using t h e
2 a c e Transportation System (STS), GSFC Docu-
ment GHB 8060.1, t o be published.
6. F r a c t u r e Control Requirements f o r DoD S h u t t l e
Payloads, A i r Force Space D i v i s i o n Document
SD-Y V-0068, November 1981

7. Design C r i t e r i a f o r Control 1i n g Stress Cor-

r o s i o n Cracking, MSFC Document MSFC-SPEC-
522A, November 1977.
8. M a t e r i a l s Selection L i s t f o r Space Hardware
Systems, MSFC/JSC Document MSFC-HDBK-527/JSC
09604, Revision C, September 1984.
9. Non-Metallic M a t e r i a l s Design Guidelines, JSC
Document 02681, Revision J, February 1983.

47