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Legal Separation

Laperal v. Republic
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance
of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her
and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

Family code obligations of husband and wife

Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of
his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

70 Pelayo v. Lauron
Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be
fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical
assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses
were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving,
doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each other,
there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary
services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable
for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of
the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the
plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the
defendants herein.

87.Matabuena v. Cervantes
s stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result
in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

94 Obligations of the ACP

Ayala Investment v. CA
if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business.
Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was
clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure,
appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161
of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product
or a spin off of the loan itself.

96 Ownership administration enjoyment and disposition of CP

Siochi v. Gozon
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art
124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The
agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court
however said that the CA erred in saying that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in
favour of Winifred. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property
was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property
as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation)
in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred.

(2) Was the donation to Winifred valid? No, the donation was not valid. Elviras consent was

(3) Was the sale to Inter-Dimensional valid? Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith.
SC says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

Jader Manlo v. Camaisa

Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written

Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell
to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma
Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to
demonstrate consent.

Ravina v. Villa Abrille

Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same
being contrary to law and evidence.[10]
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her
children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners[21]
surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then
were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with
such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damages caused. [23] It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall
short of these established civil law standards.

147 and 148 property regime of unious without marriage

Valdez v. Rtc
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.


The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the

Agapay v palang
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.

Tumlos v Fernandez
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.


SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The
claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented
to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario
and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be
accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated
to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under
Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast
to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary,
income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven
then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Carino v. carion
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same
has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each
party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits
earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were
capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due
to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to
have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Sanguid v. ca
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances
of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.
Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion
of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

Acre v yuttikki
Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested properties.

Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested properties.

The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code,
considering that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148, properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. If there is
no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.

The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual contribution
in acquiring the contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here.

The certificate of title on its face show that the one property were exclusively owned by
Evangeline, and the other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is well-settled that the
words "married to" preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of

150 and 151 Family Relations

Gayon v. gayon

whether or not the case at bar would fall under the provision of Art. 217 of family code.

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits filed or
maintained between members of the same family. This phrase members of the same family
should, however be constracted in the light of Art. 217 of the same code.

Esquivias v. ca
e agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but the same have failed. The reason for the law is
that a lawsuit between family members generates deeper bitterness than one between
strangers. Hence, it is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise
before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family.[11]

But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code applies only to suits between or among
members of the same family. The phrase "between members of the same family" should be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the Civil Code[12] under which "family relations" include only
those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants
and their descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias is not included in the
enumeration of who are members of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-law of
respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with
respondents is based on affinity and not on consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is
concerned, he is a stranger with respect to the family of his wife and, as such, the mandatory
requirement of "earnest effort toward a compromise" does not apply to him. In Magbaleta v.
Gonong[13] we ruled that "efforts to compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as
necessary or indispensable one. An alien to the family may not be willing to suffer the
inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between
and among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
rights of a family be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to have innocently
acquired some interest in a property by virtue of his affinity to the parties. Contrary to the ruling
of the Court of Appeals, we find no reason to give Art. 222 a broader scope than its literal

Sandejas v. Ignacio
Whether or not Alice and Rosita are justified in encashing the subject check given the factual
circumstances established in the present case. 2.Whether or not the petitioners can hold
respondent liable for moral damages as effect of his complaint. DECISION OF THE COURT:
Petitioners' posture is not sanctioned by law. If they truly believe that Arturo took advantage of
and violated the rights of Rosita, petitioners should have sought redress from the courts and
should not have simply taken the law into their own hands. Our laws are replete with specific
remedies designed to provide relief for the violation of one's rights. It is true that Article 151 of
the Family Code requires that earnest efforts towards a compromise be made before family
members can institute suits against each other. However, nothing in the law sanctions or allows
the commission of or resort to any extra-legal or illegal measure or remedy in order for family
members to avoid the filing of suits against another family member for the enforcement or
protection of their respective rights. As to Patricia's entitlement to damages, this Court has held
that while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that
the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its
causal connection to defendants acts.In the present case, both the RTC and the CA were not
convinced that Patricia is entitled to damages. In addition, and with respect to Benjamin, the
Court agrees with the CA that in the absence of a wrongful act or omission, or of fraud or bad
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded

Lee v. ca
We likewise held therein that:

x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of
the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at all.

in this case, petitioners true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered
the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is
especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their fathers legitimate children, did
not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive
them of their sole right to inherit from their mothers (Keh Shiok Chengs) estate. It was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that
time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the
registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private
respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners birth records in 1989. Petitioners
base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of
prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the
time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.[56]
Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the
whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to
a parcel of land, a persons parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of
a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
153 and 154 Family code; family home
Manacop v. CA
WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.


The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC.

Cabang v. Basay

The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount
of P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas.24 Under the afore-quoted
provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.25

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution,26 provided it
was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters
Products, Inc.27 "[T]he family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent,
or on the property of the unmarried head of the family."28 In other words:

The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the
conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other.
It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive
property of either spouse with the consent of the latter.1avvphi1

If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal

property existing, it can be constituted only on his or her own property.29 (Emphasis and italics

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary,
the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality
of the appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on
the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.

All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case
where the family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy
meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution
of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation
is mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment

Spouses de mesa v. acero

Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution


Petition DENIED.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is
generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived
or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family
home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert
their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject
property as a family home.

164 166 170 171 Legitimate children grounds to impugn legitimacy

Andal v. macaraig
WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.


Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by
husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is
patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than
the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner
of the parcel land.
Benitez badua v. ca

WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.


The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants.
In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the
petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.

De jesus v. estate of dizon

Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina. However, they
were acknowledged as an illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan died.


Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.

No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
children of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.

People v. umanito
he fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to
Umanito s absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the
father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA testing under
the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct
2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).
DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is
available. The groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out
in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the
development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in case proof
of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could be resorted to.
The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the
fair and correct adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since
SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for
reception of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to
the standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC
shall determine the institution to undertake the testing, and the parties are free to manifest their
comments on the choice. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the
parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of
evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of probative
value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined to
observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.
To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the parties are primarily bound to
bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.
172 and 175 Proof Filiation

Fernandez v. ca
there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private
respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent
during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede
that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can
remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta
Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to
prove the paternity of the petitioners.

We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court applying
the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition
and support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to
substantiate their cause of action.

Jison v. ca
WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.


Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the
various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot
be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25
years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the
high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action
well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied

Tijing v ca
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy
Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. (Egardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and

Gotardo v buling
Alma testified and narrated all the foregoing events. She also presented her uncle who owned
the boarding house to corroborate her testimony. While the case was pending the RTC granted
a monthly child support of P2,000.

For his defense Romy testified and denied the imputed paternity. While he admitted that he had
sexual encounters with Alma, he said it occurred on a much later date such that it was
physically impossible for Alma to have been three months pregnant already when he was
informed of the pregnancy. However, he failed to substantiate his allegations of Almas infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity. Is Almas paternity suit meritorious?

Opinion ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1

Yes. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. A prima facie case exists if a woman
declaressupported by corroborative proofthat she had sexual relations with the putative
father; at this point the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father who may show:(1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency; or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

In this case Alma established a prima facie case that Romy is the putative father of Sonny
through her testimony that she had been sexually involved only with Romy at the time of her
conception. Her uncle corroborated her testimony that Romy and Alma had intimate

On the other hand, Romy did not deny that he had sexual relations with Alma only that it
occurred at a much later date that make it physical impossible for Alma to be already pregnant
by him Howver, he failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity of Alma. Romys denial cannot overcome Almas clear and categorical assertions.
So Romy should recognize his minor son and give him P2,000 monthly suppor

176 illegitimate children; parental authority

Tonog v. ca
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?


In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child.

Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family
Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213
where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained
by the Code Commission:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived
of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons
for the good of the child.

For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven
years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.
The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent
chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or
even to a third person.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a
petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position
to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain
with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.

Dela cruz v. Garcia

Whether or not the minor child can bear the surname of the deceased.

Yes. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the
now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a
former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the
petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.


Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt


Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses
Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt
her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.


The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required
to adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However,
the American husband must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency
requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed

From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We
discern that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the
embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and
friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his
desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice
to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a
former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and
reasonable cause for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong
Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a person
should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra).
Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the
interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name. 23

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. 24 Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When
the change will avoid confusion; 25 (d) Having continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; 27 and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. 28

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. 29 Summarizing, in special
proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that
the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's
family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights
and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently
accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare
of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On
this point, there is unanimous agreement. 32

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive
parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other
legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had
been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and
restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More specifically under the present state of our
law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code on the matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
issue involved in this case:

WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual
custody was lodged with the biological parents.


Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,

their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the
case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with
the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil code.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had
been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the
natural parents of Adelberto.


WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of
the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

209 and 211

Santos, Sr. v. CA
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father
is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the
boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of
the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

213 Parental authority in case of legal separation

Chua v. cabangbang
In the case of cabangbang, before that, in the 1950s, cabangbang became a very popular
congressman in bohol, he was considered a war hero because he was a pilot of the Philippine
airforce during the second world war. Congressman cabangbang and his wife was not blessed
with a child, so when he was in manila, omeone approached him and his wife, saying, do you
want a baby?

The mother of the child was a prostitute, so the cabangbangs said, ok. So they raised the child
like their own, in fact they let the child study in Cebu in a school exclusive for girls, Saint
Theresas College. They really treated the child like their own daughter. Later on, when the child
grew up, the mother came back because that mother was working in a club in Japan. After
working for several years in Japan, she came back in the Philippines kay dghan naman xag
kwarta. The mother together with the father of the child planned to get the child. So they asked
the cabangbang to return to them their daughter but the cabangbang refused to give the child.
So they filed a case against the cabangbangs to get back the child. So the issue now here is
that, between the parents and the cabangbang couple who were not related by blood to the
child and thus were strangers. So between the parents and a stranger, who should have
custody over the child and who should exercise parental authority?

The supreme court said that, as between the real parents and the stranger, the court can
disregard the general rule that the parents should have custody and parental authority over the
child if the court finds that if the real parents are not fit to be called parents, imagine the child
was only few months old when the real parents abandoned the child and besides, the child said
that there was no way that he would go with her real parents and she chose to be with the
cabangbang couple. The paramount interest of the child should be the primary consideration,
the best interests of the child.

Why the maternal preference rule? Which gives preference to the mother over the father in
having custody and parental authority, it is based on the universal rule that the mother is the
natural guardian of her young. But that is only the general rule as I have said, if there are
compelling reasons, a mother can be deprived. Now, the issue of custody of children can be
resolved in the very same court where the pending case of declaration of nullity is being heard.
If there is a case for declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment case, the issue of the
custody of the children shall also be tried in that same court because the issue of custody is a
necessary consequence of the annulment case. That is the case of Yu vs Yu, you need not a
file a separate action for custody.

Now in the case of custody over minors, a case of habeas corpus can be filed simultaneously
with the case of custody. Such that the court will not only decide over the habeas corpus case
but will also decide on the custody of minor children. In a habeas corpus case, youre asking the
court to order a person who is in the custody of another person to produce that body in court
and when the body is already produced in court and the reasons are already explained for the
detention are given then the case of habeas corpus is terminated, its over.

In the case of madrinian vs madrinian, the court said that if you file a case of habeas corpus and
the child was already produced in court, the court should not dismissed the case right away
because if it is intertwined with the issue of custody of minors, the court should try the issue of
custody who between the plaintiff and the defendant should have a better custody over the
child. So, it is wrong for the court to dismiss the habeas corpus case which includes the issue of
custody simply because the child is already produced in court. The issue of custody should be
resolved together with the habeas corpus case. In the case of madrinian, the court said that the
family court did not divest the CA and the SC of their jurisdiction of their habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minor. Now, in another case going back to the issue of custody of a
child, when a father and the mother of the child are already separated the court will have to
resolve or to decide who among them shall have the custody of the child. When the court
decides that it should be with the mother then so be it, the father will however be given visitorial
rights. The court should not give joint custody because that is not to the best interest of the
child. Joint custody of a child by parents who are already separated is discouraged. Okay? So
the court should award custody only to one. Parental authority however may be exercised by
both the father and the mother but the custody should only be given to one. Okay?

Now, lets go to the substitute parental authority, now, when we talk of parental authority
actually, there are 3 kinds of parental authority mentioned in the family code, we have the
parental authority of the real parents, two the substitute parental authority, and three the special
parental authority. Or it could be the other way. There are 2 kinds of parental authority exercised
by grandparents. K? The lineal parental authority is the one exercised by the father and the
mother but there are two kinds of parental authority exercised by a non-parent, one is the
substitute parental authority the other one is a special parental authority.

Substitute parental authority is given to the grandparents In case of death, absence or

unsuitability of the childs parents to exercised parental authority if both parents of the child are
already dead then parental authority over the child shall be given to the grandparents. If there
are no grandparents it will go to brothers or sisters of the child who are over 21 year old unless
disqualified to exercised parental authority. And the 3rd in the line kung walay bros and sis
walay grandparents who are qualified then to the actual custodian of the child. Actual custodial
would be anybody it could be a relative or even a stranger like in the case of cabangbang a
stranger. Okay? So, theyre the ones who can exercised substitute parental authority. Who
between the two sets of grandparents is prefereed? The paternal or maternal? In the old law,
there was preference for the paternal grandparents between the paternal and the maternal
grandparents the court used to grant it to the paternal, they are preferred over the maternal but
that is not anymore found in the new family code. There is no more preference for paternal
grandparents in the family code. So, in an issue like this the court will decide what is best for the
child. If the maternal grandparent are better off, more educated, than the paternal, then mas
maayo ang bata adto didto.

Now, the filial privilege rule refers to the right of the descendant not to be compelled to testify in
a criminal cae against parents and grandparents except when such testimony is indispensable
in a crime against the descendant of a one parent against the other parent. Okay.

So, these are the order,

Oldest bros and sis over 21 unless disqualified.

In case of foundling, abandoned or any several dissimulated children, parental authority shall be
vested upon the heads of the childrens homes or orphanages or any childrens institution.

So we have the same order of preference under 216.

So, the childs actual custodian maybe awarded custody of the child as against the real parents
( chua v. cabangbang case)

Now lets go to special parental authority, what is this special parental authority. This refers to
the parental authority exercised by the school, or the principal or the teachers of a minor child
once the child is inside the school. Remember, that if you have a minor child enrolled in a
school once this child enters the gate of the school, parental authority is momentarily transferred
to the teachers of the school. K? what kind parental authority is exercised by the teacher and
the school? Special parental authority as distinguished from the substitute. When a child makes
an offense inside the school, that causes or injury to another, the school is civilly liable. There
was one case, I remember of a child who stabbed his classmate with a sharpened pencil, who
was a grade 2 or 3 pupil, maldito kayo. Now, question? Who is liable here? There is a provision
in our law, in the law of torts and damages that the teacher and the school is liable and what is
the extent of the liability of the teacher and the school? The school and the teacher is primarily
liable. Now, what about the parent of the child? They are only subsidiarily liable. Makabayd lang
ang parent a bata kung ang skwelahan dili kabayad. The primary liability is sa skwelahan ug sa
teacher. The teacher, school are solidarily liable.

This applies only to students who are no longer minor, if you look at the family code, this
actually applies only to minors. Minor students below 18. So this is only elementary up to high

In case the students are no longer minors, normally, dili na liable ang school. But theres a
provision in torts that the teacher is libale and not the school. However, if the teacher cannot
pay, the school will still be liable. Why? There is that principle of respundat superior that if an
employee is held civilly liable and he cannot pay his superior or employer will answer. The
employer is liable for the negligence of their employee.

In the case of minors, there is a rule that children who injures another even outside the school if
it is still related to school activity liable ra gihapon ang school. Waiver does not hold water. Btw,
the school and the teacher can only be liable if there is negligence on the part of the teacher, dili
na automatic cos there is an available defense on the part of the teacher and the school and
that is if the teacher can prove that he exercise due diligence of a good father of a family, that
happens in the case of amadora which happened here in cebu.
Perez v. ca
ho should have rightful custody of a child?
Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and
wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the
care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of
First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason
of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor. (Italics supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long
as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love
and care that a mother gives to his child.
Sy v. ca
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite
yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place.
Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional
character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological
capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage
license at the time of celebration.

Gamboa-hirsch v. ca
hether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor
child to both parents.

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration (emphasis supplied)." The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the
same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The so-called "tender-
age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction
with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother's custody.
225 Parental authority upon property of children
Pineda v. ca
WON Insular Life should still be liable to the complainants when they relied on the special
powers of attorney, which Capt. Nuval presented as documents, when they released the checks
to the latter.
2. WON Insular Life should be liable to the complainants when they released the check in favor
of Ayo and Lontok, even if no bond was posted as required.

Held: Yes to both. Petition granted.

1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to
Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance proceeds arising
from the death of the seaman-insured.
Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and receipt of
such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies.
They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries themselves. Even the
Isnular rep admitted that he gave the checks to the policyholder.
Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. However, it acted
imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying without question on the special power of
Strong vs. Repide- third persons deal with agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to
the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract.
Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez- The person dealing with an agent must also act with
ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if he knows or has good reason to
believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he cannot claim protection the party dealing
with him may not shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal with
the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs.
Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the beneficiaries.
2. Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property
of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a
bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the
obligations of a general guardian.
On group insurance :
Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that provides coverage for many
individuals, particularly for the employees of one employer.
There is a master agreement issued to an employer. The employer acts as the collector of the
dues and premiums. Disbursement of insurance payments by the employer is also one of his
They require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the employer deducts from
wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This is known as a contributory plan as
compared to a non-contributory plan where the premiums are solely paid by the employer.
Although the employer may be the policyholder, the insurance is actually for the benefit of the
employee. In a non-contributory plan, the payment by the employer of the entire premium is a
part of the total compensation paid for the services of the employee.
The primary aim of group insurance is to provide the employer with a means of procuring
insurance protection for his employees at a low cost and thereby retain their loyalty and
376 ra 9048
Lee v. ca
hirdly, Republic Act No. 9048[47] which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001
substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are
now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had
said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress response to the confusion
wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for
changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate
adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that
though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that
summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may,
the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective
application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.

II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the
cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to
impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death.[48]
Article 171 provides:

The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Petitioners contention is without merit.

Remo v. sec. of foreign affairs
Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport.


Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she should not resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her
maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.


In Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court, petitioner therein filed with the Sharia
District Court a Petition to resume the use of maiden name in view of the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. Petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting
and who opted to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her
maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not
squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former
husband is already married to another woman, petitioners marriage remains subsisting.
Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement
passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones