2.) Roxas Vs.

Enriquez 29 Phil 31

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.

Southworth and Faison for appellants.

D. R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A,
Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of
said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.

From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.

I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in
the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the
northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters,
on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P.
Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for
62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.

II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to
survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by
buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo
Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94,
and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan
with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle
Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S.
49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the
topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net

| Points
or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |

| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |
| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
| D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
 | F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
| J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | |

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked
on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle
Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the
west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.

The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the
petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."

{bmc 029035a.bmp}

By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted
that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30' W., and that the distance between A
and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters.
Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but
its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below.

Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of
title of the petitioner.

We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in
question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows:

The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land
conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:

The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple,
Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San
Miguel.

Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the
petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who
made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th
day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title
of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of
said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.

Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d
day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the
following notice:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
 To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F.
M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No.
92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28;
Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36;
and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio
Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng
Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these
of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs
of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of
Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel;
Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and
Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of
Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the
city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:

Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa
Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59,
district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following
described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon,
situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as
follows:

Parcel A. Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan,
being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the
Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the
Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50'
E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36
20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J";
N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt.
"M"; N. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.

Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by
property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.

Date of survey, December 26, 1905.

You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall,
Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April, A. D. nineteen
hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer
of said application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and
place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as
confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree
entered thereon.

Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year
nineteen hundred and six.

Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.

In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th
day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by
registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice,
including the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The
record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said
notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been
published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.

On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the
following certificate relating to the notice and to the publication of the notices required by section 31
of Act No. 496.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.

I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in
compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for
registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The
Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and
year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke
& Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao
Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez;
Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in
Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the
purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April,
1906.

A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.

On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila
(p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there
existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error.
The said attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in
the original petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating
to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.

In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was
brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said
notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of
Antonio Enriquez."

On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on
for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the
city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to
the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan
presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said
errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said
Parcel A.

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable
Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgment in default against all persons:
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

No. 1895.

Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real
estate described herein,

vs.

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas
Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo &
Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim
Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala
de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui;
Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern,
defendants.

The present case having been duly tried, and

Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from
referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed
in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of
this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication
of said notice was effected;

Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the
publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the
persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;

Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land
included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a
conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the
fourteen days preceding that set for the termination of the period fixed;

Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the
application, within the period fixed by the law;

This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who
may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted.

Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.

Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.

Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of
land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said
decree was as follows:

Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real
 property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is
hereinafter set forth:

A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the
NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW.
by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.

Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the
extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Passage de
Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E.,
16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to
point E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G;
thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence
N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30'
E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to
point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.

All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey,
December 26, 1905.

Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39
of said Act that may be in force and effect.

Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten
minutes ante meridian.

Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.

A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and
delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the
Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.

After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906,
nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th
day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we
find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Case No. 1895.

Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

MOTION.

The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and
respectfully represents;
 I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of
closure greater than 1/1500;

II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a
portion of said land for use as a public street;

Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in
the plan filed in this case.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.

It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the
incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the
petition of the petitioner.

On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th
day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure
in said plans."

On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief
surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that
notice be given to the adjoining owners.

On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of
July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was
as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.

Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents:

1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the
applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, among them the following:

(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo.

(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo.

(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle
Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.

2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the
buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo,
which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the
year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter
(a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings
at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter
(b) was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings
at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter
(c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars
United States currency.

4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical
descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to the above-
entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under
consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one
behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in
that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated
by the letter (c).

5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said
estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land and the buildings stated.

6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners
conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the buildings erected on them are likewise
mentioned.

7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered
in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree
or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the
parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each
was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743,
which accompany this application.

8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of
the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and
one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency,
the receipts and vouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the
applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring
that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court
of Land Registration and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a
person delegated therefor by the applicant.

9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the
omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as
in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed
that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects
the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the
correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land,
without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title
thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-
entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.

10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist
not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected on each, the applicant
attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates,
wherein are stated the two points mentioned.

11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable
court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to
by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein
 record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third
paragraph of this application.

Manila, February 28, 1912.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.

On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to
Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract,
showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold
all her rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic
Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of
the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.

On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of
the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of
December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the
original plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as
follows (see page 48):

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;

(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title
the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and

(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in
accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo

{bmc 029048.bmp}

Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down
for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said motion were transferred from one date
to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings,
in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon
the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906.
During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some
objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific
objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of their objections
appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears
that their objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new
certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that
they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.

After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a
unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new
trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lower court were manifestly contrary to
the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective
parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A.
Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In
this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:

1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land
Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming
the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.

3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments
of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together.

In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument
against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole
argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued
July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency
of the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the
pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez.
Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members
represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed
out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were
the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We
have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the
representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some
of them, in the present proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion
found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said
attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original
proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they
received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that
"personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in
favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by
that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but
that the original certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal
notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested
in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute
prerequisite to the validity of said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that
personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had been given and that a publication of the
same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After
the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for
hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that
notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that
said "certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or
mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such
service."

On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of
the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answer
within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken
for confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made
parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by
the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."

The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It
seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the
granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.

The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section
38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it
may concern.'"

There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that:
"The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining
owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the
application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to
give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections
31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the
application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is
seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to
give motive to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the
Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or
delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal
notice? Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have
suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State
Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled,
unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against
the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the
granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by
fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the
present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an
innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud,
in the slightes degree.

While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its
provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirements relating to notices has been
a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because
of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been
presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs.
De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that
fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was
predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):

In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein
was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held,
That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the
world.

The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in
personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to
those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
 between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the
persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is
not charged even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.

In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the
registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens
or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the
registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not
intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title,
which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of
whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the
certificate issued.

If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by
his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title. The registration either
relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to
come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly
concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.

The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would
absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could
never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of
possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment,
in fact, to the transfer of titles.

Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give
the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil.
Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This
rule was first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of
the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant
ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very
nature of its business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage
depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause
damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all
possible obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts
came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real
owner. Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into
effect the broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the
action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the
State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case
of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said:

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice,
a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside
of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or
the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have
said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make
a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who
were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95
U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights,
without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment
cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S.,
714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of
deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also
unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the
condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal
service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.

The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by
notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw
Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal.,
580.)

Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a
procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control over real property within
its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a
citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or
public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these
question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters,
195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues,
130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and
proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the method of procedure.
(American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc.,
Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)

The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in
a proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all
persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118;
Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29
Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill.,
165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662;
Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24;
Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)

If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against
an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted services against
residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it
be made to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown.

Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question,
said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles
against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of
unknown as well as known claims indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its
chief end and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."

Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American
Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are
repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where
rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the
proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not
the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements,
having reference to the subject with which the statute deals."

The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199,
215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said:
"Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the
acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the
process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this
legislation, that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a
legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular
instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of
constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal
steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title,
Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)"

The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land
Company vs. Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts
which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention
of the appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:

Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San
Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the
public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco
was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the
complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in
controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that
of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of
any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged to
be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of
owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any
kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be
the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that
no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either
legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.

Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency
of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was required by law. Notice was also posted
upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of
the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the
complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a
decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and
entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any
right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present
or future, vested or contingent.

Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th
day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the entry of the decree of the superior court, in
the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed
title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to
Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San
Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of
law, and that said superior court, in said action and proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the
persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss
had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation."
The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California,
not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose;
that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive
notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the
real property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until
more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the
question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion
(219 U. S., 47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the
contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.

The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of
registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An
act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction
of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide
a method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such
an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which
would furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact
that practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of California had
recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that
whenever the public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost
or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims
an estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons
holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring
and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in which said
real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.

The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in
which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or
notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the country in which the
action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved,
which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property
herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants.

The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of
two months.

The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in
the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.

The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service
upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the
court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person
and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any
part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for
the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein,
which is provided for in the law.

In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the
validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the
reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual
notice of the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the
United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and
that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the
decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the
appellants.

Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure
provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands; and

Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law;
and

Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties
connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now
entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside.

There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we
deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in
a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the
petition for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to
the registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is
registered. It is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of
the lines in the plan, said plan will not close that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one
of the four corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of the character may be
corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the
original petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or
different lands than were included in the original petition, we find the following statements made by
one of the judges who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:

At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon
the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in this case.

Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should
be the holding on this particular point.

We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to
the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by
some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved
practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or
not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering
for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:

Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of
the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order of the court issued at
the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be
that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so
indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on
the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description
and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have
not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the
adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged
easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roots of the
petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is
settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran
S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A,
page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of
the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46
30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application why the original plan (see
Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That
error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan.
Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the
plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.

There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and
that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of
registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located
upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12,
1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with
the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of
the land as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have
been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of
the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors.
Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected
any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on
any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such
original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe
that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record
contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon,
even though they are not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in
view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as
to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as
well.

With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no
sufficient reasons for not granting the same.

Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court
below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

3.) Traders Royal Bank vs. CA 315 SCRA 190

Facts:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and
subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in
public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void
because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was
filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a
foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was
cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs name without the notice of lis pendens carried over
the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision
declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRBs title and issued
a new cert. of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided
and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot
be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a
subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the
titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while
knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute
while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue:
1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title
to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens
annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title.
Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good
faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis
pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to
find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the
declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding
has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property
it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot
be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value
of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

5.) Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources 347 SCRA 128

Version 1

347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis
Regalian Doctrine

Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic
Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates
the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources.

In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private
landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was
no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law
was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against
the regalian doctrine.
 Version 2

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a
concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

6.) Collado vs. CA 390 SCRA 343

7.) Hrs. of Clemente Ermac vs. Hrs. of Vicente Ermac 403 SCRA 291

Facts: At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by
his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name
alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-interests.The respondents were able to prove
consistently and corroboratively that they as well as their predecessors-in-interests had been
in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.

According to the appellate court, [t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of
title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property
described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were
acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by
succession were effectively disregarded.

The Issues

1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over
the property in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and
Anunciacion Suyco[;]

2. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue:

Ownership of the Disputed Lot

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of
respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that
the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.

We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a
factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a
hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.19

Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they
may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period
sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property
for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts
as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.

Second Issue:

Prescription and Laches

Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches,
because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.

When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive
trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established
in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente
Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents
were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property,
and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.

Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.23

It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its application should not
prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the
name of another.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

8.) Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan 21 SCRA 743

ANGELES, J.:

On appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the complaint,
without costs.

On December 7, 1960, the plaintiffs, numbering 24 in all, surnamed Manarpaac, filed this action
against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos
Norte, on a complaint which as amended on December 22, 1960, alleges that the plaintiffs have
been, since time immemorial, in actual pos-session as owners of two parcels of land, the first, with
an area of 8,742 sq. m. and assessed at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206, in the name of
Rogaciano Manarpaac, the second, with an area of 12211 sq. m. and assessed at P390.00 under
tax de-claration No. 030876, both parcels are situated at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, specifically
described in paragraph "2" of the complaint; that such posses-sion has been public, uninterrupted
and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the land; that in the year 1956, the
defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public
land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 sq. m., and said defendant
"taking advantage of the ig-norance and lack of education of the plaintiffs, wil-fully, fraudulently,
maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever, included the
above described parcels of land" (par. "2" of the complaint) in his application for free pa-tent; that on
November 7, 1959, a free patent was is-sued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the Director of
Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in the name of
Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of deeds; that said certifi-cate of title which included the land of
the plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru "fraudulent misrepresentation";
and that the proceed-ings leading to the investigation and survey of the land were without notice
and without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the free
patent and the certificate of title be declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled; "4.
That in case the title issued may not be annulled, that the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan be
ordered to reconvey unto the plaintiffs their lands unlawfully and fraudulently included in said title";
that the defendant be ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and "6. That the
plaintiffs pray for such further relief and remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises."
The defendants filed separate answer.

In his answer dated February 8, 1961, Rosalino Cabanatan denied the material allegations in the
com-plaint, and, as special defense alleged: (a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of
title in his name were regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; (b) that the
plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands against the defendant's application for free
patent; they did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands awarding the land to said
defendants; and the plain-tiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative reme-dies required by law,
and, therefore, the decision of the Director of Lands has become final; (c) that the original complaint
was for nullity of title, however, the amended complaint is for RECONVEYANCE which is le-gally
impermissible, for it changed the cause of action, and hence, the amended complaint should have
been dis-missed, and the plaintiffs required to file a new com-plaint.

In its answer dated January 6, 1961, the Direct-or of Lands alleged that the issuance of the free
patent was regular and after compliance with the require-ments of the law; that "2. x x x he admits
the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that one year from the issuance of patent
has not yet elapsed"; and that the plaintiffs never filed any pro-test with the Bureau of Lands against
the application for free patent filed by Rosendo Cabanatan.

The Register of Deeds in his answer dated January 11, 1961, alleged that the issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan was in pur-suance of a decree of patent
presented to its office, and that he merely acted in compliance of the law.

On September 22, 1962, Rosalino Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss on the following ground:
"That even assuming that plaintiffs have a right over the land in suit, their action has already
prescribed and that the court, therefore, has no jurisdiction", predicating the contention on the
rulings that "When any public lands are alienated, the same shall be brought forthwith un-der the
operation of Section 22 of the Land Registra-tion Act and shall become registered land x x x and a
certificate of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land (Diwaling Sumail, et al. v. CFI
of Cotabato, L-8287, April 20, 1955), and "the one year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should,
in the case of public land grants (patent), be counted from the issuance of the patent by the
Government under the Public Land Act (Nelayan v. Nelayan, 109 Phil. 183).

The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss.

On September 23, 1963, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint holding that the free
patent having been issued on November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7,
1960, the action for review of the decree was, therefore, filed more than one year after the issuance
of the patent.

From this order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court.

From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have been, since
time immemorial, in possession as owners of the dis-puted land, have declared the land for tax
purposes the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud
and irregularity, de-fendant Rosalino Cabanatan succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of
title in question. The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment of ownership.
Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain, or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish con-quest. And so,
we said in one case

"x x x All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, be-long to
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial. FOR SUCH
POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRE-SUMPTION THAT THE LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN
PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN
BEFORE THE SPANISH CON-QUEST." (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, citing Cario v.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 394.)

Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only
after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective
evidence.

The ruling in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 [re-affirmed in Mesin v. Pineda, 108
Phil. 251] sustained on all fours the validity of plaintiffs' theory, thus -

"In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure establish-ed in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the pub-lic
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate
of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Va-lentin Susi had already acquired by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. If by legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the state, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Ra-zon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no lon-ger any title or control and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

"The Director of Lands con-tends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot main-tain an action to recover poss-ession thereof.

"If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private pro-perty, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi
has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it."

In the case at bar, predicated upon the allega-tions in the complaint, together with the admission of
defendant Cabanatan in his answer - that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance,
which are deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any debate that the
complaint states a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land, for, settled is the
rule that the remedy of the land-owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the
decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799.)

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the case is ordered
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Costs in this appeal against the defendant
Rosalino Cabanatan.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
9.) Averia Jr. vs. Caguioa 146 SCRA 459

(This is the best I can do for this Case!!!)

10.) Hrs. of Amunatigue vs. Director of Forestry 126 SCRA 69

11.) UP vs. Rosario 355 SCRA 591

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.

The Case

This is an appeal[1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals[2] setting aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied respondent Segundina Rosarios
(hereafter, Segundina) motion to dismiss[3] and cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042.

The Facts

There being no controversy as to the facts and the petition raising pure questions of law, we adopt
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows:[4]

On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, an
application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, with an area of
100,000 square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended.[5]

On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the Philippines (hereafter, U. P.) filed with the trial court
a motion for intervention in the case, claiming that the land covered by the application (by Datu
Ditingke Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462.

On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu Ditingke
Ramos application for registration.

On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as follows:

Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the University of the Philippines and considering the
certification, sketch plan (Exhibits O and P). the testimony of the Acting Chief, Geodetic Engineer as
well as the written manifestation of the Land Registration Commission to the effect that the land
subject matter of this application and covered by plan SWO-15055 does not encroach on the
property of the University of the Philippines and that it is not inside any decreed property, the motion
to dismiss the application is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided the application as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application is hereby granted, declaring the applicant Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving spouse of the original applicant who was substituted as
party applicant in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and
covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon in the order of
April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO
15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon this decision becoming final, let the required
decree of registration be issued and after payment of corresponding fees, let the certificate of title
be issued in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino and a resident of Quezon
City.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On March 19, 1974, the trial court[8] issued an order stating:

The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case under the date of June 8, 1973
having become final, the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission is hereby directed to
comply with Section 21 of Act 2347.[9]

On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor of
Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
issued OCT No. 17 in her name.

On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos due
to errors in the technical description.[10]

On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the parcel of land embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619.

On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall Building which housed the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the titles destroyed by
the fire.

Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195
(223619).

On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Quezon City[11] a petition
for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-126671) 367316 naming Segundina,
Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
among others, as respondents.

On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the registration with the Register of Deeds of the deed
of absolute sale. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
121042 in Segundinas name, resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
78195(223619).

On November 19, 1996, after the parties had presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed an
amended petition alleging that it is the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and that
the unlawful acts of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay Construction and
Development Corporation) as well as the existence of their spurious certificates of title, create a
cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.).

In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the
reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab initio for being spurious and
fraudulently issued.

On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an omnibus motion for the dismissal of U. P.s
third cause of action in the amended petition as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. 121042.

On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied Segundinas omnibus motion.

On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration questioning
the denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.[12]
On April 16, 1998, the trial court[13] denied Segundinas motion for reconsideration and motion to
cancel the notice of lis pendens.[14]

On November 10, 1997, the trial court[15] again denied Segundinas omnibus motion to dismiss and
cancel notice of lis pendens.[16]

On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of Appeals[17] a petition for certiorari[18] assailing
the orders of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss.

On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in favor of Segundina. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of action is barred by res judicata and that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Segundinas motion to dismiss.[19] We quote
its dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders
dated November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE
insofar as they deny petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. The
Third Cause of Action in respondent University of the Philippines Amended Petition is ordered
DISMISSED and the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042, CANCELLED. The writ
of preliminary injunction, insofar as it relates to the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 121042, is
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration of the
afore-quoted decision.[21]

On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22]

Hence, this appeal.[23]

Petitioners Submissions

First, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously allowed Segundinas motion to dismiss as
Segundina has yet to prove in a full-blown hearing whether her reconstituted title traces its roots to
OCT No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundinas title was highly anomalous.[24]

Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC Case No. Q-239 as void ab initio.
According to U.P., the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case Q-239 as
the requisite signature approval of the Director of Lands...over the survey plan...was nowhere to be
found.[25]

Third, U.P. asserts that the Court of Appeals ruled on unestablished factual issues...by admitting all
the photocopies annexed to respondent (Segundina) Rosarios petition as evidence despite the fact
that they all still remained subject to authentication and examination by the parties before the trial
court.[26]

Fourth, U. P. attacks the verification of Segundinas petition in the Court of Appeals as defective.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

We outline the history of the title that Segundina holds (Title No. 121042): First, the land was
originally covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, which the Court of First Instance
declared as not encroaching on the property of U.P. and as absolutely owned by Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos. Thus, OCT No. 17 was issued in her name. Second, OCT No. 17 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was issued. Third, Rosario Alcovendas Vda.
de Ramos executed an absolute deed of sale over the land in favor of Segundina. Fourth, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619 was burned in the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall. Fifth, Title No.
223619 was reconstituted and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was issued in its place.
Sixth, Segundina registered the deed of absolute sale. Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
78195 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 was issued in Segundinas name.

In LRC Q-329 the trial court declared U.P. as having no interest in the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 121042. However, UPs contention that OCT No. 17 is void for lack of the
requisite signature approval of the Director of Landsover the survey plan[27] is worth looking into.

P. D. No. 1529[28] requires the Director of Lands to sign and approve the survey plan for the land
applied for, otherwise, the title is void.

Sec. 17. What and where to file - The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with
the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands.

The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished
the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all the annexes (emphasis ours).

No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of
Lands.[29] The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a
plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no
value.[30]

Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan was nowhere to be found is an
important jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial court. In Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[31] this Court stated that void ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership. Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to OCT No. 17, her claim
would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source.[32]

Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the qualification that If the parcel of land is found
to be inside decreed properties, this plan is automatically cancelled.[33]

Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside decreed property is an issue of fact that can be
best determined by the trial court after an examination of the evidence. We find meritorious the trial
courts rationale for denying Segundinas motion to dismiss. We quote:

To establish their respective rights over the disputed property, both plaintiff and respondents
submitted documentary exhibits, the genuineness and authenticity of which can only be proved in a
full blown trial.

There is no pretense that the foregoing conflicting claims entail determination of facts. It, thus,
become imperative that both parties be given their day in Court to avoid the danger of committing a
grave injustice if they were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their behalf.

It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate under the present stage of the action
to DENY the instant motion.[34]
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundinas motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens
must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 18, 1998, in CA-G. R. SP No. 47783.

In lieu thereof, the Court orders the case REMANDED to the trial court for trial on the merits.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

12.) Divina vs. CA 352 SCRA 527

Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated October 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 03068 reversing and setting aside the judgment dated July 7, 1979 of the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-147.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22,
1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion is particularly described as:

A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North by Lot #1464 - Fausto
Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria Fajardo: on the East, by Lot # 1446 - Silverio Garcia: on the South, by
Lot #1891 - Antonio Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 - Federico Faronas and Lot #1890 -
Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts are the visible signs of boundary. It has no permanent
improvement thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa. Declared under Tax No. 13038,
valued at P760.00 for the current year in the name of ANTONIO BEROSA[2]

On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos. In the deed of
sale to Gamos, the lot was more particularly described as:

A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 - Fausto
Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria F. Estonante: on the East, by Lot #1464 Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot
#1466 - Felix Arimado; on the South, by Lot #1898 - Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot #1890
- Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 - Antonio Escobedo. Concrete cements posts are the visible
signs of boundary. No permanent improvements thereon. Covered by Lot #1893 of Teotimo E.
Berosa, and declared under Tax No. 13039, valued at P760.00 for the present year in the name of
TEOTIMO E. BEROSA.[3]

On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893,
a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March
28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it
had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor
Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032
in Gamos name.
The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos,
showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was
approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.

On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was
secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034
hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 were
thickets.

On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of
Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. It is described as follows:

A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, having an
area of 54,818 square meters and bounded on the N., by Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot 1887
(Jaime Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of Zacarias Espadilla); on the (Illegible), by Lot 1466; on the SE,
by Lot 1893-A; on the S., by Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892 (Antonio
Escobedo) and Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro Fajardo); all of
Gubat Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot 1893-B, a portion of Lot 1893, Cad 308-D.[4]

On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23,
1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as
containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot
1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot
1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.

On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for
P20,000.00. The land was particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under Tax Declaration No. 12927 in the
name of Jose P. Gamos, covered by Lots No. 1466 and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area
of 100,034 sq. m., more or less.[5]

On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 12509.

On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property at the then Court
of First Instance of Sorsogon, docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO Record No. 42920. The
application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of the said court to include
therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-
9021.

The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of private
respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.

On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before the
same court a Petition for Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the owner of a
portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19,
1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents
failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent
fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that
another person had acquired the same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final
and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the
petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.

The trial court, in its Decision[6] dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review was timely
filed. It also ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her application
for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the lot subject of her application is not
contested when in fact it was. Private respondent, according to the trial court, should have included
in her application at least the person of petitioners cousin, Elena Domalaon who had, before
respondent filed her application for registration, made known to the latters sister her apprehension
of their land being included in respondents application for registration. This misrepresentation,
according to the court, amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496.[7] The
trial court in its decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case and revoking the order for the
issuance of a Decree;

(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of the land applied for containing
an area of 54,818 square meters which is described in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of
Judgment; and

(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion applied for which is outside the
limits of the portion herein awarded to the petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and

(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting therein the area not contested
and which is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to
petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to whom the land registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed
to proceed after he shall have adduced such other evidence as are appropriate in land registration
cases.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. It averred
that the trial court erred (1) in declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a portion of Lot 1893, in
ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to proceed with registration after
adducing evidence as are appropriate; (2) in declaring respondent-appellant guilty of actual fraud in
the land registration case; (3) in taking cognizance of the petition for review of judgment, setting
aside the decision dated June 29, 1975, and revoking the order of the issuance of the final decree in
the land registration case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for review of judgment with cost.[9]

The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:

In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining
owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned
portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted with
bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension
or claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in the application for
registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding.

There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-
appellee.
There being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the registration of the property in the name
of respondent-appellee, We find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the assigned errors. Suffice it
to state that Lot 1893 bought by Teotimo Berosa which he sold to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it
to respondent-appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such a manner as to put its
identity beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot was determined after a resurvey/relocation
was conducted for Gamos in 1961 the result of which is reflected in the Plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what really defines a piece of land is not the area but the
boundaries therein laid down (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Edition, p. 213);
that the Lot 1893-B sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of any tax declaration covering it,
unlike the different deeds of sale covering Lot 1893, thereby raising the presumption that Lot 1893-
B was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos to respondent-appellant; and that the subdivision of
Lot 1893 into Lots A and B, caused to be made by petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B to
have been the Lot 1893-B subject of the January 19, 1967 Deed of Sale in his favor which was
registered on November 28, 1968, appears to have been made in 1977, ten years from the date of
said deed of sale, a confirmation that there was no such Lot 1893-B subject of his purchase in 1967;
and in any event, as the subdivision survey prepared for petitioner-appellee was not approved by
the Bureau of Lands, it is not of much value (vide Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).

In fine, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of the judgment
rendered in the land registration case in respondent-appellants favor are present. The present
appeal is thus meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another rendered
DISMISSING petitioner-appellees petition at the court a quo.[10]

Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the reversal of the Court of Appeals of the trial
court decision. In substance, he raises the primary issue of whether or not, there was deliberate
misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondents part when she failed to give or
post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land, such that it was error
for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of the disputed land.

Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of judgment, we have repeatedly said that the
adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of then final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued,
and the one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set
aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party.[11] In the present case, a
certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that no final decree of registration had
yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it restrained the
Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling of the one year period has not even
began. Thus, the trial court did not err when it entertained the petition.

Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners
name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor.
However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on whether or not there was
deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give
notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the application for registration.
The trial court said there was, but the appellate court disagreed.

Section 15 of P.D. 1529[12] is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land titles,
the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those
of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to
find them. As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a
mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not
sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary. The trial court was correct
when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had a
conversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their land
may have been included in respondents application for registration of the disputed land.[13]
Respondents omission of this material information prevented petitioner from having his day in court.
The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion with jurisprudence to the
effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person.[14] Such omission can not but be deliberate misrepresentation
constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No.
496, The Land Registration Act.

Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the
initial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn
sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioners name would not be found on
the said survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the
portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-147 of the
then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

14.) Republic vs. CA (Duha ini na case kasi di ko aram kun hain didi an tunay, Peace yow)

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the
government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by
his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years
old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first
be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could
not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14
of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Issue:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

Held: Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,
provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by
Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax
declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide
claim of ownership.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence
with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p.
41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were
no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347
and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega,
all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization
and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.

Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of
.265 meters road right-of-way.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination:
 In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens
when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice
and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that
they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant
action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon,
they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely
to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference
to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands
within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back
to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not
Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from
acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)

Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.

Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not
been for the constitutional issue presented therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over
the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant
is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of
title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare
it public land, depending on the evidence.

As found by the trial court:

The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied
for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12,
1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions
essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are
sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
(Rollo, p. 26)

Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:

The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and
disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2)
reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house
of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means
of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the
vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
 applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of
great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such
that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land
in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)

The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:

17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in
the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or
reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing
cases)

18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years
prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as
saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No.
1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there
is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30)
years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when,
according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in
their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)

The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.

As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)

As amended by PD 1073:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
 himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945.

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked
to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945,
but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its
perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short
of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-
in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could
otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves
scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in
the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated
in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:

(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. . . .

Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act

No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-
in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in

the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the
 statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land
and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
(National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.

In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not
confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able
to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to
prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of
land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her
only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned
lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest
was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).

In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground
of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports
petitioner's thesis.

We disagree.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land
registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on
appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:

As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely
on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title
under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not
present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial"
or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the
"titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their
claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.

If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since
time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated
in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):

. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through

his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act,
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra)

It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be
either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos
v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court
of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant
for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification
from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for
more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.

In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the
property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the
contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under
the then 1973 Constitution).

. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title

to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . .
., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial
possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning,
 and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra).
Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .

. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than
eighty (80) years, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-
interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No.
15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of
partition of his estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the same from
the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever,
with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such
filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an
imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner
that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application,
as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of
the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapias mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8
of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of
the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
 Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private
land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine
laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the
total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he
shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a
natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration
of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view
of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of
the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to
a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him
as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of
the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied
with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:

Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration
of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the
transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the
property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the
names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the
location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his
intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case
since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance
therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of
an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration
court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is
only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has
become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of
Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree
of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.