2011 ELECTION CASES

CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA v. MAYOR ENRILO

G.R. No. 187256 [February 23, 2011]

Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

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FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192856 [March 8, 2011]

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof, and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof,
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election."

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under
Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the
election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to
office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

In the more recent case of Fermin v. Commission on Elections, we stressed that a

petition filed under Section 78 must not be interchanged or confused with one filed under
Section 68. A petition which is properly a "Section 78 petition" must therefore be filed within the
period prescribed therein, and a procedural rule subsequently issued by COMELEC cannot
supplant this statutory period under Section 78. We further distinguished the two petitions as to
their nature, grounds and effects, to wit:
 Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office
he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible
for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification
of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.
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MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193846 [April 12, 2011]

The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be

elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to
the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all
the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.

Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor
can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the
disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the
Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division
denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory
order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without
a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with
counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is the Kho case.
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CERIACO BULILIS v. VICTORINO NUEZ

G. R. No. 195953 [August 9, 2011]

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC only has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
courts in election cases and not interlocutory orders. The court said that in a subsequent
issuance, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC (which amended, among others, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court),
clearly provided that:
 In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial
court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied.)

The court recognizes that COMELECs appellate jurisdiction over petitions

for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the recent case
of Galang v. Geronimo, the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition
for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within
the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari involving an interlocutory order of a
regional trial court in a municipal election contest, the rationale for the above ruling applies to an
interlocutory order issued by a municipal trial court in a barangay election case. Under Rule 14,
Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, decisions of municipal trial courts in election contests
involving barangay officials are appealed to the COMELEC. Following the Galang doctrine, it is
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari involving acts of the municipal
trial courts in such election contests.
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SALVADOR VIOLAGO SR. vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 194143 [October 4, 2011]

Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference Brief.
While it may be argued that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of the scheduled conference a
day prior to the date set through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the
fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly prepare for
the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of
the protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules
on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration was not verified, the
COMELEC en banc should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioners
meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary
conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence in support of ones claim or defense. It is the denial of this
opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. More particularly, procedural due
process demands prior notice and hearing. As discussed above, the fact that petitioner
somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the preliminary conference by
means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his
protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to
adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only
able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself.