VOLUNTARINESS Concurrence of

freedom, intelligence and intent makes up the

criminal mind behind the criminal act. Thus,
to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and
in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime
is committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent (People vs.
Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004).
Voluntariness is an element of crime, whether
committed by dolo or culpa or punishable under
special law. The act to be considered a crime must
be committed with freedom and intelligence. In
addition to voluntariness, intentional felony must
be committed with dolo (malice), culpable felony
with culpa, and mala prohibita under special law
with intent to perpetrate the act or with specific
intent (such as animus possidendi in illegal
possession of firearm). Presumption of
voluntariness: In the determination of the
culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness
is an essential element. Without it, the
imputation of criminal responsibility and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be
legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity,
and understanding it is not purely an intellectual
process but is dependent to a large degree upon
emotional and psychological appreciation. A
mans act is presumed voluntary. It is improper to
assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously, for the moral and legal
presumption is that every person is presumed to be
of sound mind, or that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person
(People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75,
March 17, 2004).

CRIMINAL INTENT To be held

liable for intentional felony, the offender must
commit the act prohibited by RPC with specific
criminal intent and general criminal intent.
General criminal intent (dolo in Article 3 of
RPC) is an element of all crimes but malice is
properly applied only to deliberate acts done on
purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite
with an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A
deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a
presumption of malice by intent. On the other
hand, specific intent is a definite and actual
purpose to accomplish some particular thing. In
estafa, the specific intent is to defraud, in
homicide intent to kill, in theft intent to gain
(Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June
27, 2006, ). In the US vs. Ah Chong, the
accused was acquitted because of mistake of fact
principle even though the evidence showed that he
attacked the deceased with intent to kill (United
States vs. Apego, G.R. No. 7929, November 8,
1912; Dissenting opinion of J. Trent), which
was established by the statement of the accused
"If you enter the room I will kill you." Article
249 (homicide) should be read in relation to
Article 3. The accused was acquitted not because
of the absence of intent to kill (specific intent)
but by reason of lack of general intent (dolo or
malice).

PRESUMED MALICE - The general

criminal intent (malice) is presumed from the
criminal act and in the absence of any general
intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence
must be proved by the accused (Ah Chong case,
the accused was able to rebut the presumption of
general criminal intent or malice). Generally, a
specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a
matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as
any other essential element. This may be shown,
however, by the nature of the act, the
circumstances under which it was committed, the
means employed and the motive of the accused
(Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June
27, 2006). There are other specific intents that
are presumed. If a person died due to violence,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. Intent to
gain is presumed from taking property without
consent of owner.

MOTIVE

Doubt as to the identity of the culprit -

Motive gains importance only when the identity of
the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of
cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the
motive of the accused when the latter has been
identified as the author of the crime. The accused
was positively identified by witnesses. Thus, the
prosecution did not have to identify and prove the
motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed for no
apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even
relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a
crime. The lack or absence of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction
where there are reliable witnesses who fully and
satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the
perpetrator of the felony (Kummer vs. People, GR
No. 174461, September 11, 2013).

Circumstantial or inconclusive evidence -

Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence
is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some
doubt on whether a crime has been committed or
whether the accused has committed it. The
following circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
convict accused: 1. Accused had motive to kill the
deceased because during the altercation the latter
slapped and hit him with a bamboo, prompting
Romulo to get mad at the deceased; 2. Accused
was chased by the deceased eastward after the
slapping and hitting incident; 3. Said accused
was the last person seen with the deceased just
before he died; (4) Accused and Antonio Trinidad
surrendered to police authorities with the samurai;
(5) Some of the wounds inflicted on the deceased
were caused by a bolo or a knife. (Trinidad vs.
People, GR No. 192241, June 13, 2012).
 INDETERMINATE OFFENSE
DOCTRINE In People vs. Lamahang,
G.R. No. 43530, August 3, 1935, En Banc -
Accused who was caught in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store
was held guilty of attempted trespassing and not
attempted robbery. The act of making an opening
on the wall of the store is an overt act of
trespassing since it reveals an evident intention to
enter by means of force said store against the will
of its owner. However, it is not an overt act of
robbery since the intention of the accused once he
succeeded in entering the store is not determinate;
it is subject to different interpretations. His final
objective could be to rob, to cause physical injury
to its occupants, or to commit any other offense.
In sum, the crime the he intended to commit inside
the store is indeterminate, and thus, an attempt to
commit it is not punishable as attempted felony.
 In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441,
October 08, 2014 - The petitioner climbed on top
of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts
when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring
from such circumstances that rape, and no other,
was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and
lewd designs towards her being fully manifest.
Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
"susceptible of double interpretation" (People v.
Lamahang). Verily, his felony would not
exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for
some other felony like simple seduction (if he
should employ deceit to have her yield to him)
could also be ultimate felony.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
 Proximate cause is the primary or moving
cause of the death of the victim; it is the cause,
which in the natural and continuous sequence
unbroken with any efficient intervening cause
produces death and without which the fatal result
could not have happened. It is the cause, which is
the nearest in the order of responsible causation
(Blacks Law Dictionary). Intervening cause -
The direct relation between the intentional felony
and death may be broken by efficient intervening
cause or an active force which is either a distinct
act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious
act of the offender. Lightning that kills the
injured victim or tetanus infecting the victim
several days after the infliction of injuries, or
voluntary immersing the wounds to aggravate the
crime committed by accused is an intervening
cause. Thus, the accused is liable for physical
injuries because of the intervening cause rule. On
the other hand, carelessness of the victim, or
involuntary removal of the drainage, lack of
proper treatment is not an intervening cause.
Hence, the accused is liable for the death because
of the proximate cause rule.

If the victim died due to tetanus of which he

was infected when the accused inflicted injuries
upon him, the crime committed is homicide (People
vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947).
If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was
infected after the accused inflicted injuries upon
him, the crime committed is physical injuries. The
accused is not liable for homicide because tetanus
is an efficient intervening cause. Thus, the
proximate cause of the death of the victim is not
the infliction of injuries. In Villacorta vs.
People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011
(Justice De Castro), there had been an interval of
22 days between the date of the stabbing and the
date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. Since the
victim was infected of severe tetanus, he died the
next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus
is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have
been infected at the time of the stabbing since that
incident occurred 22 days before the victim was
rushed to the hospital. The infection of victims
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause. The accused was held liable for
physical injuries.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that

cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred." Although there was no
direct injury on his vital organs of the victim, his
wounds affected his kidneys, causing multiple
organ failure and eventually his death. Accused is
liable for homicide. Without the stab wounds, the
victim could not have been afflicted with an
infection which later on caused multiple organ
failure that caused his death. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim (Belbis, Jr. vs. People,
GR No. 181052, November 14, 2012).