Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as
Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for
short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991
and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing
and deploying such workers.

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA,
to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.

In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going
to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily
suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject
to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.

In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are
likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers
to Hong Kong on a regional basis.

For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)

Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing
GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong
Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong
Kong.

Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government
processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of
recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and
mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.

I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)

An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take
charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
 The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:

1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies

2. Manpower Pooling

3. Worker Training and Briefing

4. Processing and Deployment

5. Welfare Programs

II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or
Principals

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the
HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.

xxx xxx xxx

X. Interim Arrangement

All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991
under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their
accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which
shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective
pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.

For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)

On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong

Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment
of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been attested by the
Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts
Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.

Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under
the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine
Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have
themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in
Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall
submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of
the HWPU manpower pool.

For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)

On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars
and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:

1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in
issuing said circulars;
 2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and

3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with.

There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment
and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)

On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982
to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:

1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power
and duty:

"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art.
15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)

2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:

3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . .
(Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)

3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:

2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies

in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor
Code.)

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable
and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's
ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same
fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs.
Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power
(City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power
to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost,
of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:

. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or
area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of
domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance
the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment
and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of
Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for
other countries.

Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment
 agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under
the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted
today, is affected with public interest.

xxx xxx xxx

The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely
a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of
Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private
employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991."

The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong
only.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting
from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private
employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole
recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book
VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of
their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis
supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this
Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the laws. (p. 448.)

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with
the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51353 June 27, 1988

SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.

Picazo, Agcaoile, Santayana, Reyes and Tayao for plaintiff-appellee.

F.E. Evangelista, A.L. Bautista & Juan P. Adcaura and Albamento Bisquera for defendant- appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This case comes to us on a Court of Appeals resolution certifying the controversy as one which involves a pure question of law. The
resolution states the factual background of the case.

On May 1, 1970, Congress approved the Act imposing a stabilization tax on consignments abroad (RA 6125).
Section 1 of the statute, in part, provided as follows:

Section 1. There shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the gross
F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt of such
proceeds, whether partial or total, of any exportation of the following schedule:

a. In the case of logs, copra, centrifugal sugar, and copper ore and concentrates;

Ten per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received on or after the date of effectivity of this Act to
June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-one;

Eight per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one
to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-two.

xxx xxx xxx

"Any export products the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million
United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise
be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said
aggregate value."

In August, 1970, the Central Bank, through its Circular No. 309 provided that:

The stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January 1st following the calendar year during
which such export products shall have reached the aggregate F.O.B. value of more than US
$5 million, and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in Schedule (b) of
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said
aggregate value.

During 1971, appellee Shell, Philippines, Inc. exported seria residues, a by-product of petroleum refining, to an
extent reaching $5 million. On January 7, 1972, the Monetary Board issued its Resolution No. 47 "subjecting
petroleum pitch and other petroleum residues" to the stabilization tax effective January 1, 1972. Under the
Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by Resolution No. 47, appellee had to pay the stabilization tax
beginning January 1, 1972, which it did under protest.

On September 14, 1972, appellee filed suit against the Central Bank before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
praying that Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 be declared null and void, and that Central Bank be ordered to
 refund the stabilization tax it paid during the first semester of 1972. Its position was that, pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6125, it had to pay the stabilization tax only from July 1, 1972.

The lower court sustained appellee, and it declared Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 as void and it ordered
refund of the stabilization tax paid by appellee during the period January 1 to June 30, 1972. Central Bank has
appealed from the judgment. (Rollo, pp. 47-49)

The trial court opined:

Note that the law mentions both calendar year and fiscal year. Calendar year refers to one year starting from
January to December. Fiscal year, as it is usually and commonly used, refers to the period covered between July
1 of a year to June 30 of the following year. In using these two terms, it is the considered opinion of this Court
that they should be taken in the meaning where they are commonly and usually understood. So that when an
export product reaches an aggregate F.O.B. value of more than $5,000,000.00 in a calendar year it becomes
subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value.

The statute is clear and free from ambiguity so that an interpretation even becomes unnecessary ... . (Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, pp. 34-35)

The Central Bank appeals from the above cited decision alleging that the trial court erred in regarding the deliberations of the Senate
on the stabilization tax in favor of Shell Philippines, Inc. and in failing to consider the authority granted to the appellant to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of the stabilization tax law.

It should be mentioned, however, that on July 1, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 230 took effect. This law entitled

Amending the Tariff and Customs Code, creating Title III in Book I Export Tariff," expressly repealed Section 1 of Republic Act No.
6125 and transferred the assessment and collection of the export duty from the Central Bank to the Bureau of Customs by ordering
the Commissioner of Customs to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of the decree, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Finance (Section 2 of the Decree).

Notwithstanding this fact, the issue raised must be resolved on the merits as an affirmative relief was granted to the appellee.

First, the petitioner's allegation that the trial court gave undue weight to the deliberations of the Senate on the stabiliza tion tax law
is not supported by either the records or the decision itself. It is clear in the decision that the trial court found no ambiguity in the
provision of law governing the dispute and accordingly applied it in its ordinary sense. The cited Senate deliberations merely
corroborated the fact that the tax commences on the following fiscal year after the aggregate value is reached. However, even if the
lower court was influenced by the Senate deliberations, we see nothing wrong in courts' examining and following the intent of the
legislature when an act of Congress has to be interpreted.

Second, while it is true that under the same law the Central Bank was given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the statutory provision in question, we reiterate the principle that this authority is limited only to carrying into effect what
the law being implemented provides.

In People v. Maceren (79 SCRA 450, 458 and 460), this Court ruled that:

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing
Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971,42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
(University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid
regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villamor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 665, 676;
Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

xxx xxx xxx

... The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
 In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v.
Lim, 108 Phil. 1091)

Considering the foregoing, we rule that the trial court was correct in declaring that "Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 is void insofar
as it imposes the tax mentioned in Republic Act No. 6125 on the export seria residue of (plaintiff) the aggregate annual F.O.B., value
of which reached five million United States dollars in 1971 effective on January 1, 1972." The said resolution runs counter to the
provisions of R.A. 6125 which provides that "(A)ny export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million
United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force
during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value."

We note that under the same provision of law the tax accrues when the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of the export product has
exceeded five million United States dollars during any calendar year. The imposition of the tax is only deferred until the "f iscal year
following its reaching the said aggregate value." It is only then that the rates in force are ascertained.

In this case, there is no question that in 1971, the appellee exported seria residue with an F.O.B. value of more than five m illion US
dollars. The appellee's objection lies in the collection of the tax thereon as of January 1972 rather than in July 1972.

It is, therefore, undeniable that the respondent was liable to pay the tax and that the Central Bank merely collected the said tax
prematurely. There is likewise no controversy over the rate of tax in force when payment became due. Thus, the tax refund granted
by the trial court was not proper because the tax paid was in fact, and in law due to the government at the correct time.

We decline to grant to the respondent an amount equivalent to the interest on the prematurely collected tax because of the well
entrenched rule that in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing payment of interest on the
amount to be refunded to the taxpayer, the Government cannot be required to pay interest. Likewise, it is the rule that interest may
be awarded only when the collection of tax sought to be refunded was attended with arbitrariness (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. v. Commission
on Internal Revenue, 100 SCRA 556). There is no indication of arbitrariness in the questioned act of the appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to the effect that the tax refund
granted by the trial court is ordered retained by or reverted to, as the case may be, the Central Bank.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Fernan, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, respondents.

Sisenando R. Villaluz, Jr. for petitioner.

Abdulmaid Kiram Muin colloborating counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General Caparas, Tabios, Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan Law Office and Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office
for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G.
Inciong, in NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-76 entitled "Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (complainant-appellee), vs.
Insular Bank of Asia and America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: t.hqw
 xxx xxx xxx

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment. promulgated dismissing the
instant case for lack of merit (p. 109 rec.).

The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:

On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department
of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of
both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18, NLRC rec.

On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint
for payment of holiday pay. Pertinent portions of the decision read: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays
as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208, to wit: t.hqw

Art. 208. Right to holiday pay.

(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail
and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers.

(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of
July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.

xxx xxx xxx

This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees was computed in the
past with the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes of determining the deductible amount for
absences incurred Thus, if the employer uses the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of
monthly paid employee, this gives rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not include payments for
unworked regular holidays. The use of the factor 303 indicates the number of ordinary working days in a year
(which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52 Sundays and the 10 regular holidays. The use of 251
as a factor (365 calendar days less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays, and 10 regular holidays) gives rise likewise to the
same presumption that the unworked Saturdays, Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid. This being the case,
it is not amiss to state with certainty that the instant claim for wages on regular unworked holidays is found to
be tenable and meritorious.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) xxx xxxx xxx

(b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular h(olidays since November 1, 1974 (pp.
97-99, rec., underscoring supplied).

Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying
their holiday pay up to and including January, 1976.

On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on
the right to holiday pay to read as follows: t.hqw

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate and
 (c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April,
the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth
of December, and the day designated by law for holding a general election.

Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor)
promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof
reads: t.hqw

Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective
of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by
365 days divided by twelve" (italics supplied).

On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted
rule, pertinent portions of which read: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case
of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are
entitled to the benefit.

Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the
entitlement of monthly paid employees, The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is
receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January
to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are
made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the
ten (10) paid legal holidays. ..." (emphasis supplied).

Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter's decision of August 25, 1975, whereby
the respondent bank was ordered to pay its employees their daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.

On September 10, 1975, respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of execution alleging, among others, that : (a)
its refusal to pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated
August 25, 1975, is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules implementing P. D. 850; an d (b)
that the said award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy Instruction No. 9 of
the Department of Labor, considering that its monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and their monthly pa y is
uniform from January to December, and that no deductions are made from the monthly salaries of its employees on account of
holidays in months where they occur (pp. 64-65, NLRC rec.).

On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the respondent
bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the judgment is already final and
the findings which is found in the body of the decision as well as the dispositive portion thereof is res judicata or is the law of the
case between the parties; and (b) that since the decision had been partially implemented by the respondent bank, appeal from the
said decision is no longer available (pp. 100-103, rec.).

On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited order of Labor Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations
Commission, reiterating therein its contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution. Respondent bank further
alleged for the first time that the questioned order is not supported by evidence insofar as it finds that respondent bank discontinued
payment of holiday pay beginning January, 1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).

On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: t.hqw

In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss, respondent's appeal; to set aside
Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October 1976 and, as prayed for by complainant, to order the
issuance of the proper writ of execution (p. 244, NLRC rec.).

Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979 or almost eight. (8) months after it was
promulgated, while copies were served on the respondent bank on February 13, 1979.
On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent
prayer to stay execution, alleging therein the following: (a) that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in dismissing the respondent's appeal on pure
technicalities without passing upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution appealed from is contrary to the law and
jurisprudence (pp. 260-274, NLRC rec.).

On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and alleged the following grounds: (a) that the
office of the Minister of Labor has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the provisions of P. D. 1391; (b) that the
labor arbiter's decision being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the petitioner; an d (c) that the
decision of the labor arbiter dated August 25, 1975 is supported by the law and the evidence in the case (p. 364, NLRC rec.).

On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying that a writ of execution be issued by the
National Labor Relations Commission pending appeal of the case with the Office of the Minister of Labor. Respondent bank filed its
opposition thereto on August 8, 1979.

On August 13, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order which states: t.hqw

The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to designate a Socio-
Economic Analyst to compute the holiday pay of the employees of the Insular Bank of Asia and America from
April 1976 to the present, in accordance with the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 25, 1975" (p. 80,
rec.).

On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which states: t.hqw

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment promulgated dismissing the
instant case for lack of merit (p. 436, NLRC rec.).

Hence, this petition for certiorari charging public respondent Amado G. Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is: whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding payment of regular holiday pay can still be set aside
on appeal by the Deputy Minister of Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially executed, the finality of
which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission sitting en banc, on the basis of an Implementing Rule and Policy
Instruction promulgated by the Ministry of Labor long after the said decision had become final and executory.

WE find for the petitioner.

WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9
issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay,
they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 1 1, rec.).

Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides: t.hqw

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. ...

The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof which
reads: t.hqw

Art. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings,
whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of
the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support domestic helpers, persons in the personal
service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations.

... (emphasis supplied).

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However,
the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said
benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: "employees who are uniformly
paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. "

Public respondent maintains that "(T)he rules implementing P. D. 850 and Policy Instruction No. 9 were issued to clarify the policy in
the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. As interpreted, 'unworked' legal holidays are deemed paid insofar as monthly
paid employees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the statutory minimum wage, (b) their monthly pay is uniform
from January to December, and (c) no deduction is made from their monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they
occur. As explained in Policy Instruction No, 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally
daily paid employees. In case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal
holidays are entitled to the benefit' " (pp. 340-341, rec.). This contention is untenable.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday
pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then
Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article
4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs.
Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing
him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

Public respondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, as expressed by the Secretary of Labor in the
case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v. The Chartered Bank (NLRC Case No. RB-1789-75, March 24, 1976), is to correct
the disadvantages inherent in the daily compensation system of employment holiday pay is primarily intended to benefit the daily
paid workers whose employment and income are circumscribed by the principle of "no work, no pay." This argument may sound
meritorious; but, until the provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is amended by another law, monthly paid employees are
definitely included in the benefits of regular holiday pay. As earlier stated, the presumption is always in favor of law, negatively put,
the Labor Code is always strictly construed against management.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should
be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as
null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in
the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State
has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role,
C. B. Swisher 1958, p. 36).

Thus. in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981) where
the Secretary of Labor enlarged the scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree granting increase in emerge ncy
allowance, this Court ruled that: t.hqw

... the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority when he included paragraph (k) in Section 1 of the Rules
implementing P. D. 1 1 23.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and
the same is therefore void, as ruled by this Court in a long line of cases . . . .. t.hqw

The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the

administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment, may be found in the early case of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908.
Then came in a 1914 decision, United States vs. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119) delineation of
the scope of such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely
to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People vs.
Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount
to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official We reaffirmed such
a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act
must prevail and must be followed. Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling
inc. vs. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the
matter thus: "A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate
 wisdom. ... On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine chat the law means."

"It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all
executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the
Constitution assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe
the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment.
Its terms must be followed the statute requires adherence to, not departure from its
provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained,
therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were
in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of Rights provides" (Phil. Apparel Workers Union
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, 463, 464, citing Teozon vs. Members of the
Board of Administrators, PVA 33 SCRA 585; see also Santos vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al, 109 Phil.
419; Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil. 295; Sy Man vs. Jacinto & Fabros,
93 Phil. 1093; Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259).

This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable Workers Union (TUPAS) vs. The National Labor
Relations Commission and American Wire & Cable Co., Inc., G.R. No. 53337, promulgated on June 29, 1984.

In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy instruction No. 9 issued by
the then Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong
had no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular holiday pay as directed by the Labor Code.

II

It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, had already become final, and was, in
fact, partially executed by the respondent bank.

However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49, November 13, 1974, he can annul
the final decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing rules of the Labor Code
pursuant to P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April 23, 1976 by the then Secretary of
Labor are facts and circumstances that transpired subsequent to the promulgation of the decision of the labor arbiter, which renders
the execution of the said decision impossible and unjust on the part of herein respondent bank (pp. 342-343, rec.).

This contention is untenable.

To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public respondent is not a labor case wherein the express
mandate of the Constitution on the protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that, "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor and Article 1702 of the Civil Code provides that, " In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall
be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the members of petitioner union of their
vested right acquired by virtue of a final judgment on the basis of a labor statute promulgated following the acquisition of the "right".

On the question of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued prior to its promulgation, this Court,
through Associate Justice Claro M. Recto, said: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Said order, being unappealable, became final on the date of
its issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be deprived thereof by a constitutional
provision enacted or promulgated subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal
laws favorable to the accused, have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or modifying vested rights, or
altering contractual obligations" (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324,
emphasis supplied).

In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "... when a court renders a decision or promulgates
a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revok ing or
rendering it void and of no effect." Thus, the amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code) cannot
be given retroactive effect as to modify final judgments. Not even a law can validly annul final decisions (In re: Cunanan, et al., Ibid).

Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the public respondent are not analogous to that of the case at bar. The case of De
Luna speaks of final and executory judgment, while iii the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed. just as th e court is
ousted of its jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment it becomes final, the court also loses its jurisdiction to annul or
modify a writ of execution upon its service or execution; for, otherwise, we will have a situation wherein a final and executed judgment
can still be annulled or modified by the court upon mere motion of a panty This would certainly result in endless litigations thereby
rendering inutile the rule of law.

Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary because it did so under pain of levy and
execution of its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find no merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its voluntarine ss in
complying with the decision of the labor arbiter by not appealing to the National Labor Relations Commission as provided for under
the Labor Code under Article 223. A party who waives his right to appeal is deemed to have accepted the judgment, adverse or not,
as correct, especially if such party readily acquiesced in the judgment by starting to execute said judgment even before a writ of
execution was issued, as in this case. Under these circumstances, to permit a party to appeal from the said partially execute d final
judgment would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality of judgments long enshrined in this jurisdiction.

Section I of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "... execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the exp iration of
the period to appeal ... or if no appeal has been duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of labor arbiters who are
exercising quasi-judicial functions since "... the rule of execution of judgments under the rules should govern all kinds of execution
of judgment, unless it is otherwise provided in other laws" Sagucio vs. Bulos 5 SCRA 803) and Article 223 of the Labor Code provides
that "... decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. ..."

Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgme nt and the
judgment becomes final ipso jure (Vega vs. WCC, 89 SCRA 143, citing Cruz vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 436, 440, January 31, 1978; see
also Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 621; Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, decided jointly, 77 SCRA 297; Vitug vs. Republic, 75
SCRA 436; Ramos vs. Republic, 69 SCRA 576).

In Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31, 1961, where the lower court modified a final
order, this Court ruled thus: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court was thus aware of the fact that it was thereby altering or modifying its order of January 8, 1959.
Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did, we are constrained to hold however, that the lower
court had no authorities to make said alteration or modification. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of cannot offset the dem ands
of public policy and public interest which are also responsive to the tenets of equity requiring that an issues
passed upon in decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and
definitely closed for, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts
of justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.

xxx xxx xxx

In the recent case of Gabaya vs. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 405, 406, March 30, 1982, this Court said: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil. 237), it was categorically stated that the rule is absolute that after a judgment
becomes final by the expiration of the period provided by the rules within which it so becomes, no further
amendment or correction can be made by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. And such final judgment
is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand
but as to any other admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose (L-7044, 96 Phil. 526). In
the earlier case of Contreras and Ginco vs. Felix and China Banking Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated
that the rule must be adhered to regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case for (W)e have to
subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the over-mastering need of certainty and immutability of judicial
pronouncements

xxx xxx xxx

III

The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the members of the petitioner union of their rights
acquired by virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law Public respondent
completely ignored the rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint since he knew for a fact that the
judgment of the labor arbiter had long become final and was even partially executed by the respondent bank.

A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution
(China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324). A final judgment is "a vested interest which it is right
and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could no. be deprived arbitrarily without
injustice" (Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W. 2d 785, 791).

lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy language of then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and jud icial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary
notwithstanding (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis supplied), And "(I)t has been likewise established
that a violation of a constitutional right divested the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and
confers no rights" (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).

Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due process, the action of public respondent Amado
G. Inciong is a clear example of deprivation of property without due process of law and constituted grave abuse of discretion ,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated November 10, 1979.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF
LABOR ARBITER RICARTE T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.

COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

Guerrero, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.