IV JUDICIAL REVIEW CASES

A. Theory and Justification

Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of
the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3,
1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest
against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of
which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation
made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC
proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and
that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with
the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
B. Who may exercise the power
Sec. 5(2), Article VII
Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before
the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition
is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue
of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter
to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the
state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if
not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the
equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial

power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by
Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Mirasol vs. CA, G.R. No. 128448, Feb. 1, 2001

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National
Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-
1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed
CreditAgreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to
negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine

Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed
to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that
said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the
export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific

performance, and damages against PNB.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties
have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree,
or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in
this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action
assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor
General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in
court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory
notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any
action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is
noambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction.
15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential
decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are
void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the
taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask
this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for
theexercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must
be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act
must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality
must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

C. Functions of Judicial Review

Salonga vs. Pano, G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life
and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no
prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of
1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner
a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et
al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the
preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at
2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given
ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting
evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies
of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA
1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981,
the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case
against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon
City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including
Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and
4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It
is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information
against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite
the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law
exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a
decision from the Supreme Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a

consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions,
if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the
subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the
Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided
to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the
accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Courts
crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of

subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this
Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the
obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center
of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order
was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter
pursuant to the Presidents legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the
preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact
that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in
the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the
most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

Mitra vs Comelec, 104 SCRA 58 (1981)

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among
other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus
ceased to be a component city of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this
new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for
elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for
the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents)
filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled
that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as
mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was
upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient
to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity
of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any
legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence
was a misrepresentation."
On judicial review:
The Limited Review in Certiorari Petitions under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court

A preliminary matter before us is the respondents jurisdictional objection based on the

issues raised in the present petition. The respondents assert that the questions Mitra brought to us
are beyond our certiorari jurisdiction. Specifically, the respondents contend that Mitras petition
merely seeks to correct errors of the COMELEC in appreciating the parties evidence a question
we cannot entertain under our limited certiorari jurisdiction.
Mitra brought his case before us pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.[53] Our review, therefore, is based on a very limited ground the jurisdictional issue of
whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether the COMELEC, by law, has jurisdiction over a case or matter brought to it is
resolved by considering the black-letter provisions of the Constitution and pertinent election
laws, and we see no disputed issue on this point. Other than the respondents procedural
objections which we will fully discuss below, the present case rests on the allegation of grave
abuse of discretion an issue that generally is not as simple to resolve.

As a concept, grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition; generally, it refers to

capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[54] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.[55] We have held, too, that
the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-
makers action with grave abuse of discretion.[56]

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by
substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.[57]

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in
a certiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.[58] When
grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from
error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.[59]

Our reading of the petition shows that it is sufficient in form with respect to the requisite
allegation of jurisdictional error. Mitra clearly alleged the COMELEC acts that were supposedly
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, we do not agree with the respondents contention
that the petition on its face raises mere errors of judgment that are outside
our certiorari jurisdiction.Whether the allegations of grave abuse are duly supported and
substantiated is another matter and is the subject of the discussions below.

Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194 (1988)

Javier v Comelec 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with
all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroadthe private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner
went to theCommission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing
that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commissionon Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized
to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election.

Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust
the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the
other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would
have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23,
1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

D. Requisites of Judicial Review

Article VIII, Section 5(2)
1. Actual Case or Controversy

Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139. Jan. 13, 2004

ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

7/8/2010

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Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized
Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and
allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization

program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases
of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation
System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III
Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order

No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004
elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional
P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility
and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due
to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition),
they sought a re-bidding.
Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;
Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to
Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract
executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further
ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into
with regard to this project.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without
adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal
requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at
the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements
designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the
mandatory eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the
issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution,
only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process,
there were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set
forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated election system
IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the
failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of
Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding
for the automated counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral
Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas
of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical
tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the
award, and their effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by
what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines
were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the
manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3) types of
software, which are intended for use in the following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award
the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs
running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo"
software, which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the
subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo
innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form?

In view of awarding of contract

The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for
Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope,
two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish
its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid
was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.

The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of

incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT
certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary evidence to
establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to
perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial statements for
the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity.

However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium

agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the
members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding
process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really
existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members
were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the
government's interest.

In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered
voters and concerned citizens respond that the issues central to this case are "of
transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding
and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on
the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the
ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the
democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any
contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts;
therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be
followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a
claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected
to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
"wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28
serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the
decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia,
two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-
protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

Guingona vs. CA, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998

Prematurity:
Mariano vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119694 March 7, 1995
Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of
the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Cutaran v. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001

This case involves separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over
the land which the petitioners, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In
1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the
recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances the Heirs
of Apeng Carantes filed an application [5] for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of
land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the
petitioners. Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued
by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents
issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the
portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed
some of the improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not for the
petitioners timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have been totally evicted
therefrom.
 CUTARAN v. DENR There is no justiciable controversy because the applications
are still pending. Hence, there is not government act to speak of and rule upon.

Montesclaros v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang
Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths
at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age. On 18 February 2002,
Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections be
held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo
wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002
inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and
expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11
March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and
House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the
membership age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was
approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13
March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The
petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order
seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of
age requirement on 11 March 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no
actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law
that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioners perayer to prevent
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present actual
controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not
a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional
right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not
yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any
provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.

Mootness:
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No.
38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is
resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless
arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain
regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May
1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to
the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the
validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to
leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void
ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners
prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature
being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the
writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint
which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking

earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacaang.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the
Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003
which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF
and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to

declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as
they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of
P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions
for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA
they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and
must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall
ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent with
the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Limdistinguishes
supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo
the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the
rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the
discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent
required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall
be released to them without need of further action. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules &
regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional
mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the
LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding
fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the

LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can
it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress
cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should
be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended
to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are
matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to
undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe
the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.

David vs. Macapagal Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon
the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred
that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision
is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying
out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

Exceptions to Mootness:
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002
The Court may still take cognizance of an otherwise moot and
academic case, if it finds that
(a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved;
(c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. 159085, February 3, 2004

Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular
session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the

appointments, assert that while Congress is in session, there can be
no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an
office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue

appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of

appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the

power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and
laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him
by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable
to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause;
or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for
a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature
of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos

issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the

undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures
interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to
respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of
Congress.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. [4] However, as an
exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.[5]
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the
constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity
while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

2. Proper Party
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to
the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a
new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act
of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the
said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide
pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative

power

2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act
does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a
roving commission which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality
leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The
classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General
and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Decision: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-
General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case. If Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by
the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

Joya vs PCGG, G.R. 96541, August 24, 1993

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a

Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling 82
Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be
part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives
and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the
Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the
auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.
Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or

interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be
 prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the
action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only
if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the
interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers

Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings
a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty
for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution,
and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper
party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only
when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that
the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable
by a court of justice.

Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003

Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the
possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they
formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to
the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III
project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air
Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that
preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project wasawarded to
Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport
Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a
concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said
terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of
pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to
the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and
charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with
the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a
contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition
for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service
providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several
employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality
of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres.
Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts
which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void,

together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to

public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and
entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The
amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial
benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and
financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms
were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and
supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the

 concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from
them.

Citizen Standing:
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government officials
to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The
petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern
(Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also invoking
that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the Official
Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal standing to carry out such petition since
they are not personally and directly prejudiced by the non-publication of the
issuances in question. Respondents also contended that the publication in the
Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which provide their own affectivity
date. Since the issuances in question contain the date of effectivity, publication
is not necessary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry
out the instant petition and whether publication is necessary for laws which
have its own effectivity date.

HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizens legal personality since the right sought
to be enforced by the petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution.
The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would be no
adequate notice to the general public of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conducts as citizens. It would render injustice to punish or
burden a citizen for the transgression of law which he had no notice.
It is the respondent officials duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all
presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is mandated
by law. Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.

Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002

4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of
acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public
interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional
rights to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.