Constitutional Law II
Art. XI. Accountability of Public Officers
I. Impeachment
A. Impeachable Officers (Sec. 2)
B. Grounds for Impeachment (Sec. 2)
C. Procedure (Sec. 3)
Romulo v. Iiguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986
In Romulo vs. Yiguez, it was held that the Court cannot
compel the Batasang Pambansa to conduct an impeachment
trial. In Romulo, petitioners representing more than one-fifth of
the members of the Batasang Pambansa, filed a resolution calling for
the impeachment of President Ferdinand Marcos as well as a
verified complaint. The resolution and complaint was referred to
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government,
but the Committee dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaint was not sufficient in form and substance, and, thereafter,
the case was archived. Petitioners filed a petition to compel the
Batasang Pambansa to recall the case from the archives. The Court
in Romulo stated that if it were to compel the legislature to
recall the archived case, the Court would in effect compel the
legislature to proceed with the impeachment, an act which is
constitutionally forbidden.
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November
10, 2003
FACTS:
Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed
against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable
controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent
filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment
provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof
is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes
for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this was met by
a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by
at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
FACTS:
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment
complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment
complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed
another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution
of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier
Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to
Speaker Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application
for injunctive reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the
issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to
comment on the petition in 10 days.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising
any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking
cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a
political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.
Petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using
the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural
vehicles.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication.
Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar
rule.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Impeachment
 Constitutional Law II
Art. XI. Accountability of Public Officers
First issue:
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation
that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Second issue:
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year. However, the
term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on
it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to
the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.
Petition is DISMISSED.
D. Judgment (Sec. 3(7))
II. The Sandiganbayan (Sec. 4)
III. The Ombudsman
A. Composition (Sec. 5)
B. Qualifications and Appointment (Sec. 8 & 9)
C. Term (Sec. 11)
Gonzales v. Office of the President,
G.R. Nos. 196231, September 4, 2012
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of
the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with
payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
effective immediately) even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the
above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.
11-1 B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for
alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR?
YES. THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER
OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT
EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF
1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM
OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides that
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office
by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT?
NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED
IN THE REMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND
OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.
PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE
WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL
OF PUBLIC TRUST.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise
of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and
(2) that there must be observance of due process.
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of
the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the
Courts review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious
constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying
bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the
President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a
Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place,
then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs decision on the
merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the
OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored
on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole
case including the constitutional issue remains alive for the
Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit
v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of
public officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional
principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that all other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment in the second sentence of
Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more
stringent rule of removal only by impeachment to favoured public
officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can
this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to
provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner
and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this
must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and
principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due
process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the
principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and
balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to
provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public
officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the
basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.
D. Powers and Functions (Sec. 12-14)
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E. Salary (Sec. 10)
F. The Special Prosecutor
 Constitutional Law II
Art. XI. Accountability of Public Officers
De Jesus v. Pp., 120 SCRA 760
In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a
government official (COMELEC Registrar) who violated the election
law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more
registered voters) must be prosecuted by the COMELEC, before the
RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. The 1978 Election Code is clear that the
COMELEC shall have the power to conduct preliminary
investigations of all election offenses, and that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the
character or personality of the offender (public official) but the
crime committed (violation of election law) that determines
jurisdiction. This provision of the 1978 Election Code has been
integrated in the 1987 Constitution.
Jardiel v. Comelec, 124 SCRA 650, 1983
Facts:
In the local elections of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, held on January 30,
1980, petitioner Cesar Jardiel, a Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)
candidate for Mayor seeking re-election, prevailed over private
respondent Benjamin Aves, a Nacionalista Party (NP) candidate, by a
plurality of 1,678 votes and was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers on the same date.
The day after the elections, or on January 31, 1980, the COMELEC
received a telegraphic report from its Special Action Team, and a
letter-request from private respondent recommending the
suspension of the canvass for Mayor and Vice Mayor and the
annulment of those already completed. The letter alleged that armed
goons supporting the petitioner disrupted the counting of votes and
caused the transfer of the ballot boxes and the canvassing of votes to
the Municipal Hall where accredited NP watchers were denied
access, and that ballots were tampered with and blank unused
ballots were filled up in favor of KBL candidates.
After hearing the position of the adverse parties the COMELEC
declared the elections or the results thereof, annulled for they do not
reflect the true or popular will of the electorate.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC is estopped to investigate and
prosecute violations of the election laws during the January 30, 1980
elections.
Held: Petitioners contention that the findings of the Ministry of
Justice Election Task Force dismissing the complaint against
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence is res judicata is untenable.
The Task Force was deputized by the COMELEC to the end that
violators throughout the Philippines of laws relative to elections
would be charged in Court and correspondingly penalized. The
charges filed before it were for election offenses which are criminal
in nature. It was not a body exercising judicial functions. To the
COMELEC belongs the prerogative to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and to see to it that elections are free, honest
and orderly. It cannot be estopped by any finding or
recommendation by any Task Force organized to assist it in the
performance of its functions.
Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252
G.R. Nos. L-50508-11, October 11, 1985
FACTS:
Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino filed four
informations before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Vicente
S. Orap, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on
different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took
various sums of money from several persons in connection with a
criminal case pending before his sala.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had
no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not
acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The respondent court
denied the motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.
Hence, petitoner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the SC. It is the petitioners position that the Tanodbayan has no
power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and
prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant
judicial staff. He contended that under the Section 9(a) of the
Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant
judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan,
and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government,
whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said
official.
ISSUE:
Has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk
of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon
a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding
information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners argument overlooks the fact that under the decree,
the Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as
prosecutor as well.
As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to
complaints initiated against officers and personnel of
administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. To
that extent, we agree with the petitioners interpretation of the law
that insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the courts,
judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are outside the
Tanodbayans investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is
quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court that exercises administrative supervision over all
courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to
which administrative complaints involving judges and the courts
personnel should be lodged.
As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary
and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and
19 of P.D. 1607, as follows:
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.There is hereby
created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant
Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall
have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and who
shall be appointed by the President;
The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor
and the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable, by the
Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and
control the prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that
the Tanodbayan may upon recommendation of the Chief Special
Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation
except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the
Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules
and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.If the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official employee,
or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be
investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper
administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan
shall make the appropriate recommendations to the administrative
agency concerned.
Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the
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Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special
Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file
 Constitutional Law II
Art. XI. Accountability of Public Officers
informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of
said cases therein. If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court
personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan,
then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for
crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of
proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary
investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd
situation the law could never have intended, considering that the
Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to give effect to the
constitutional right of the people to petition the government for
redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity
and efficiency in the government service.
Petition dismissed.
Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA 494
Facts:
1. Inting filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davaos
office, against Angelina S. Salcedo (in latters personal data sheets,
she indicated that she completed the 1- year Secretarial Science
course at USC in Cebu although she never enrolled in, and neither
did she complete the course) Salcedo is an appurtenant of the
judicial staff of the City Court of Davao.
2. City Fiscal of Davao thru Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte
conducted preliminary investigation
3. found prima facie case for perjury and filed 3 separate counts of
perjury under article 183 of RPC
4. Salcedo interposed appeal to the ministry of Justice.
5. Ministry of Justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant to
Section 10 (f) of the PD No. 1630, which vests on the latter the
power to file and prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office.
6.Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal.
7. directed city fiscal to move for dismissal of the 3 criminal cases for
perjury against Salcedo.
Issue: WON Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review
and nullify the resolutions of the City of Davao.
Held: Yes
Ratio :
1. Tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedos case
even if it does not involve graft and corrupt offices because it falls
under such other offenses covered by section 10 (f) of PD 1630
2. Act of perjury was in relation to Salcedos office. Section 18 of PD
1630 gives Tanodbayan authority to conduct investigations and file
case for such occurrence.
3.Tanodbayan therefore had authority to nullify and review
resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao as the case involved the
actions of a government official related to his office.
IV.
V.
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 843
Facts:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case.
Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan
to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme
Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper
interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme
Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation
theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The
Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez
stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was
only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the
rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than
six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to
go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of
the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his
criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements,
particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme
Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the
practice of law.
Ill-Gotten Wealth (Sec. 15)
Loans (Sec. 16)
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