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LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:


The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar

FACTS:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order
dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according
to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in
equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of
Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion
was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No.
4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging
that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491
par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par.
H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971
that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

ISSUE:
Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case
No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?
RULING:
No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act
unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6,
1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence,
the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did
not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from
the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce,
consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because
the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation
or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their
interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that
if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency,
the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these
funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in
favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed
that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of
the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely
a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations
for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within
the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for
by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared
as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive
is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good.
The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked
to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition
for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in
Article 2 unless otherwise provided.

HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April
24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no
basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
In relation to writ of mandamus obtained by the petitioner, Lorenzo Tanada where the
Court affirmed the necessity of publication, said petitioner is now asking for
reconsideration / clarification of that decision.

ISSUES:
(1) What is meant by law of public nature or general applicability?
(2) Must distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
(3) What is meant by publication?
4) Where is the publication to be made?
(5) When is the publication to be made?

RULING:
(1) All laws as defined shall immediately upon their approval or as soon as thereafter
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days
from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
(2) The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general although there are some that
do not apply directly; covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
(3) Publication of statues must be in full otherwise it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law;
(4) Publication of statutes must be made in Official Gazette and not elsewhere;
(5) Laws must be published as soon as possible to give effect to the law pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League
of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10
and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,
declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved
the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of
December 21, 2009.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
3. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them.
The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A.
No. 9009.
Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws.
When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units
income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities
from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and
thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC but the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself.

2. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent


municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability
of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the
11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.

3. Yes, the operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an


unconstitutional law.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play.
In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may
be recognized as valid and effective.
This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.
Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may
have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.
Joya, et al. vs. PCGG
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993

FACTS:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres.
Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction off
Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35
petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding
with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that,
as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art alleging that they have been deprived of their right to public property
without due process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents
who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated
by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power
of judicial review over this case.

HELD:
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not the
legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine
arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver wedding
anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after
the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only
ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well
since the items in question were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case.
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding
the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had long past, the issues raised
have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no such
justification in this petition.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON.


RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through
the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.

RULING:
1. The respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor
Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

2. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies


is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern
society.
3. The orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other


government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided


by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen
(15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,


ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH
Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check
mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team
Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any
if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no


constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is


not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that


the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough
to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as


COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their


position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,


being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the


subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court


has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be


substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private


property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private
property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards
the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and
not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or
to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;


2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:


The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar

FACTS:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order
dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according
to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in
equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of
Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion
was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No.
4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging
that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491
par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par.
H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971
that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

ISSUE:
Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case
No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?
RULING:
No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act
unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6,
1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence,
the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did
not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from
the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce,
consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because
the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation
or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their
interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that
if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency,
the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these
funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in
favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed
that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of
the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely
a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations
for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within
the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for
by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared
as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive
is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good.
The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked
to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition
for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in
Article 2 unless otherwise provided.

HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April
24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no
basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

FACTS:
In relation to writ of mandamus obtained by the petitioner, Lorenzo Tanada where the
Court affirmed the necessity of publication, said petitioner is now asking for
reconsideration / clarification of that decision.

ISSUES:
(1) What is meant by law of public nature or general applicability?
(2) Must distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
(3) What is meant by publication?
4) Where is the publication to be made?
(5) When is the publication to be made?

RULING:
(1) All laws as defined shall immediately upon their approval or as soon as thereafter
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days
from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
(2) The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general although there are some that
do not apply directly; covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
(3) Publication of statues must be in full otherwise it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law;
(4) Publication of statutes must be made in Official Gazette and not elsewhere;
(5) Laws must be published as soon as possible to give effect to the law pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League
of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10
and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,
declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved
the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of
December 21, 2009.

ISSUES:
4. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
6. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional.

RULING:
4. The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them.
The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A.
No. 9009.
Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws.
When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units
income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities
from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and
thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC but the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself.

5. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent


municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability
of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the
11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.

6. Yes, the operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an


unconstitutional law.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play.
In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may
be recognized as valid and effective.
This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.
Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may
have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.
Joya, et al. vs. PCGG
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993

FACTS:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres.
Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction off
Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35
petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding
with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that,
as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art alleging that they have been deprived of their right to public property
without due process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents
who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated
by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power
of judicial review over this case.

HELD:
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not the
legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine
arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver wedding
anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after
the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only
ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well
since the items in question were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case.
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding
the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had long past, the issues raised
have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no such
justification in this petition.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON.
RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through
the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

4. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
5. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
6. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.

RULING:
4. The respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor
Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

5. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies


is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern
society.
6. The orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other


government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided


by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen
(15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,


ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH
Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check
mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team
Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

8. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of
review.
9. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any
if its divisions.
10. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
11. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
12. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
13. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
14. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no


constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is


not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that


the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough
to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as


COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their


position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,


being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the


subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court


has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be


substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private


property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private
property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards
the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and
not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or
to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

4. It has a secular legislative purpose;


5. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
6. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal
guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos, petitioner,
vs.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

FACTS:

This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention,
reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before
the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business,
or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been
made, or before the court at the place of destination.

The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent


Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in
Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the
Philippines.

On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified
for his return to San Francisco

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is constitutional; and
(2) Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
(1)Requisites for judicial inquiry into constitutionality of a law or treaty-It is well-settled
that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that
the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunity raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.

(2) Doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically; Formal government
act of rejection necessary- But the more important consideration is that the treaty has
not been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity
for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of
the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
The judicial system of that country in known for its sense of fairness and, generally,
its strict adherence to the rule of law.
ADELPHA FERNANDEZ, MARISSA DOMINGO, EUNICE OFRECIA, ROSELYN
MENDOZA, ARLENE CABALLERO, ALMIRA MIRANDA, and MARY CHRISTINE
VALENTON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT and JOSE
SARMIENTO, ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza,


Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek certiorari and
prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE
Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional
Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."
Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza,
Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek certiorari and
prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE
Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional
Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Item No 1 of DOLE Circular No.01-91 is constitutional.

RULING:

The Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of justiciable controversy.
Constitutional Law, Labor Law requirements of Judicial Inquiry on a constitutional
question= In action involving constitutional issues the firmly settled rule is that a
constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the Courts unless the judicial
requirements of inquiry are met:

1. The existence of actual case or controversy;


2. The party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and
substantial interest in the resolution thereof;
3. The controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity;
That the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final
determination of the controversy.

Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and
comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three
(23) years of age.-[T]hat Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not
establish an absolute and comprehensive probihition of deployment abroad of
entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from
performing artists from coverage hereof.

The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary


G.R. No. L-56503 April 4, 1981

RAMON MITRA, JR., NAPOLEON RAMA, EMMANUEL T. SANTOS, ERNIE


RONDON, ANTONIO MARTINEZ, JEJOMAR BINAY, RODRIGO H. MELCHOR,
JOAQUIN (Titong) ROCES, RAFAEL YAP, and MEL LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled,
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.

This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and
Puerto Princesa City.

He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and


represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative),
Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased
to be a component city of the Province of Palawan.

The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto
Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan.

He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a


resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.


RULING:

Yes, Mitra is qualified to run for the position as Governor of Palawan.

The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met
the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.

The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome
Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of
his representation on this point in his COC.

Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to
conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a
misrepresentation."
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,


vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL
SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.

Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic
opposition in the Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila
area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely,
Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice
of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the
supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence.

The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by
Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other
accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD
1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the
motion.

On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an


information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against
40 people, including Salonga.

The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are
the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that
no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of
an information against him.

He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the
Supreme Court

RULING:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent
Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to
drop the subversion case against the petitioner.

Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its


evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one
of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by
the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative powers under martial law.

Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation


and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of
its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.
BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW Represented
by EDUARDO A. AFUAN, respondents.

FACTS:

- The Order of public respondent Minister of Labor dated December 9, 1985 in a


case for non-compliance with Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6

- TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY- FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE


(P284,625.00)

- This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against


petitioner on September 21, 1984 with the Regional Office of the MOLE, Region
XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5.

- After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated November 16,
1984 in favor of private respondents.

- The Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable


properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating
expenses kept with the bank were garnished.

- The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of
the private respondents (281 hospital employees) directly, in the total amount of
P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984.

- After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with
Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6
which took effect on November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file
against petitioner another complaint docketed as ROXI-LSED-14-85

- the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the
complainants declaring that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing is in itself
submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a
previous case where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the
workers on orders of the Regional Office.

- On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the
Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order
unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional
Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor has jurisdiction over
the matter

2. Whether or not the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are unconstitutional and void

RULING:

1. No, the case falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

- RA 6715 amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code

- Republic Act 6715, provided that the following requisites concur, to wit:

1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic


or household service, or househelper under the code;

2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement;


and

3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not


exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

- -In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee
relations, other than claims for employee's compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits.

- -Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa in his Separate Opinion in the case of Briad Agro
Dev. Corp.:

The first inquiry should be into whether the employment relation does
indeed still exist between the claimant and the respondent.
If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek
reinstatement, the case is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, not by the
Regional Director.

If the employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is sought, the next


inquiry should be into the amount involved.

If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director
undeniably has jurisdiction. But even if the amount of the claim exceeds
P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessary removed from the
Regional Director's competence.

In respect thereof, he may still exercise the visitorial and enforcement


powers vested in him by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended,
supra; that is to say, he may still direct his labor regulations officers or
industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's premises and
examine his records

If the officers should find that there have been violations of labor standards
provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and hearing, order
compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement thereof.

However, this power may not, to repeat, be exercised by him where the
employer contests the labor regulation officers' findings and raises issues
which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters not
verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case
will have to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication,
since it falls within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.

2. No, the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are not unconstitutional and therefore not void.

- The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately
declare a law unconstitutional.

- Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be
the source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner
complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of
P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to October
16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before paying the
amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality.
- The Regional Director is plainly, without the authority to declare an order or law
unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid,
unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional.

- there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which
Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor.
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN,
defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

- Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank
dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275
of the province of Pangasinan.

- As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount
of P1,294.00.

- As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted extra-judicial


foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.

- Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959,
her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had
long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July
19, 1944.

- She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against
defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision
now on appeal.

- Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on
plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if
the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued,
to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period
of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan.

- As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and
decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

- ISSUES:
- Whether or not the action to claim the REM by PNB has prescribed?

- FACTS:

- No the action to claim the REM by PNB has not yet prescribed.

- Using the unorthodox view, the action could still prosper

- The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was
declared unconstitutional, should be counted for the purpose of prescription
since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect,
only 7 years had elapsed.

- Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior
to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told
later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to
collect.

- Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courts declare a law
to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila),
of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political question.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

1. No, the plaintiffs have a cause of action. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution.

The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.

Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful
ecology.

Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be


adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

2. No, the case is not a political question. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII
of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme
Court.

It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

3. No, the original prayer of the plaintiffs does not result in the impairment of
contracts.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted.

It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked.

It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare


as in this case.

The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of


contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
FACTS:

Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira.
Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a
resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her death.
At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines.
The CIR then issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes of P369,383.96.
Rueda filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties worth
P396,308.90 should be exempted from taxes.
The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to
Section 122 (now Section 104) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda.
The CTA stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a government
of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of
our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes.
It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the provision of
Section 122 of our Tax. Code."

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Tangier is a state.
2. Whether the exemption is valid.

RULING:
1. Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the
exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is
not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption
to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity.

2. Yes, The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property

(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at
the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned
by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it
is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law.

A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed
as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence
to exact obedience to its commands.

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the
CIR has not successfully made out a case.

The Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, like
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this
exempt category.
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

FACTS:

The petitioner (Ynot) had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive
Order No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The questioned the constitutionality of the executive
order.

The said executive order reads in part as follows:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.

Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not
by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., HON. HERMOGENES CALAUAG, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) and HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch V), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), THE CHAIRMAN-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND
TENURE ADMINISTRATION, BRUNA ROSETE and BUENAVENTURA DIZON, respondents.

3 SCRA 696 (1961) G.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961

FACTS:

In the ejectment cases, the Court of Appeals rendered final judgment in favour of the landowners (JM
Tuason & Company); the Court of First Instance issued orders of demolition of the houses of the
evictees (Rosete & Dizon).

A few days before that, land-owner J. M. Tuason & Company (petitioner) also applied for a writ of
prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City against the Land Tenure administration, the
Auditor General, and the Solicitor General (respondent), to restrain them from instituting expropriation
proceedings of the petitioner Company's land, the "Tatalon Estate", as expressly and specifically
authorized by Republic Act No. 2616.

At petitioner's request, Judge Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance issued an ex parte
writ of preliminary injunction. After injunction was issued, the evictees (Rosete & Dizon) of said land
petitioned the Court of First Instance to suspend the order of demolition of their houses. Republic Act
No. 2616, section 4, prescribes as follows:

Section 4. After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in section two of this Act shall have
been initiated and during the pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no
ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than the present
occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public document.

However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the suspension.
Thereupon, the evictees recourse to the Court of Appeals, and there instituted certiorari proceedings.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the certiorari petition ordered the issuance ex parte of the
preliminary injunction prayed for.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to lift, quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ
of injunction issued by Judge Caluag.
HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.

The authority of said Court to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas
corpus is expressly limited by statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and it has
been repeatedly ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue such writs must be
based on the existence of a right to appeal to it from the judgment on the merits in the main case.

Without such right of appeal, the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to interfere, for that Court is
purely a creature of statute.

Since the issuance of orders for execution after the judgment of ejectment had become final are not
appealable, as the Court of Appeals itself has ruled, otherwise litigations would never end, and since
the prohibition case involved the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616, an issue of which the Court
of Appeals could not take cognizance, said Court clearly had no authority to interfere by prerogative
writ in either litigation, for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA
CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

Facts:
May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the
Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00,
without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, which
was then secretly remitted to Hong Kong
Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King
attempted to bribe officers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza,
Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the
OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase.
A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed
a surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally
setting them at liberty
Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for
the reason that the same does not constitute legal ground for deportation of
aliens, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion
was denied by the Board on Feb. 9, 1953
Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court,
but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and
filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against
petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition
proceedings.
The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized
agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority
to order their arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the
president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It
also sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for
the aliens temporary release pending investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Adminsistrative Code.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,
2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it
the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of

HELD:
1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code

-x-
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign
power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded
from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated.
In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself
or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses."
-x-

While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these
aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President is a
clear indication of such power. SC stated petitioners committed the act of
profiteering which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order
their deportation if after investigation they are shown to have committed the
act charged.

2. No. President Quirinos EO 398 authorizes the DB to issue the warrant for the
arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release. The exercise of the
power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the
one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon
whom the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of power that would serve as
curtailment on the fundamental right of security to life and liberty, which equally
applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human
rights, then, must not rest on such a shaky foundation.

EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is therefore declared as
illegal.
Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.
G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA, Petitioner,


vs.
HILARIO M. MARCO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong


5 days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along with 25 other
appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds were available for
the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were
revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds for
the position. Marcos sought reconsideration from the CSC Regional Office but was
denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the
appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the
certification did not affect its validity because evidence was not presented.
Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC
because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement
the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of the Apr 14
Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via Rule 43 against
the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution, invoking the constitutional
prohibition against midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition and upheld the
CSC decision.

ISSUE:
1. Political Law: W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to
appointments made by local executives
2. Remedial Law:W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case

RULING:
1. No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential
appointments, and not to those made by local executives.

In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.
2. No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal
may be taken over an order of execution.
Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an
appeal where the order appealed from is not appealable.
This rule is based on the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states
that a final and executory removes from the court which renders it the power
and jurisdiction to further alter or amend it, much less revoked it.
Thus, even if a judgment is later on discovered to be erroneous, it remains
immutable.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. FACIFICADOR, respondents,
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo Katipunan for petitioner,

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner and private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support
but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites
of power.

On May 13, 1984, the eve of the election several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed. Seven suspects including respondent Facipicador, are facing trial
for these murders.

The incidents heightened the tension in the province and sharpened the climate of
fear among the electorate. It intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

The election canvass resulted Facificador garnered majority votes over Javier.

The petitioner went to COMELEC to question the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body.

The petitioner came to the court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
it was made only by a division and not by the Commission on Election en banc as required
by the Constitution. Meanwhile, the respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.

On February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad
daylight. The nation already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos. In the same month Marcos regime ended and installed the
President Corazon C. Aquino government.

The abolition of Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in


dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both whom have gone their
separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case.
ISSUES:

- Was the Second Division of the Commission on Election authorized to


promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner of election?

- On the other hand, the respondents, argue that only contests need to be heard
and decided en banc all other cases can be in fact, should be filed with and
decided only by any of the three divisions.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3 , of the 1973
Constitution .

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and of
all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All


election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety
days from the date of their submission for decision.

Ruling:

The Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction
between the terms contests and cases to prove this point . Simply put his contention
is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private
respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a
mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was
at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power
to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, not its authority as sole judge of
the election contest.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election
cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The
exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
which had to be heard and decided en banc. The en banc requirement would apply only
from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was a proclaimed winner, for it
was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before
such time were, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would
come under the general heading of election cases.

As the court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the
proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its
administrative power. and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be
heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the
Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was
hearing a proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa
because there was as yet no contest; or put it still another way, the Commission en banc
could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre
proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections
could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and
city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the
election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers.
But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the
proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter
before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.

The 1978 Election Code, Section 175 provides:

Section 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation. The Commission shall


be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or
rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after
due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or
annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in
Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

DECISION:

Let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening
events that have legally rendered t moot and academic, this petition would have been
granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside
as violative of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras , JJ concur.

Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ concur in the result