Pinker on Reason and Morality

By GARY GUTTING

The Stone is a forum for contemporary philosophers on issues both timely and timeless.

Tags:

morality, Philosophy, reason, Steven Pinker, violence

The Stone is featuring occasional posts by Gary Gutting, a professor of philosophy at the
University of Notre Dame, that apply critical thinking to information and events that have
appeared in the news.

Steven Pinkers impressive new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has
Declined, has been much reviewed and discussed since its publication last montha rare

occurrence for a book of ideas. The two key empirical claims that Pinker puts forward are
suggested in the title: that the level of human violence (war, murder, etc.) has been decreasing

over the centuries and that the human ability to reason has been correspondingly increasing. He

goes on to explain the first claim by the second. Our ability to reason causes us to be less

violent: A smarter [more rational] world, he says, is a less violent world.

In a book awash with empirical data and analysis, it is remarkable that Pinkers capstone
explanation (developed on pp. 647-650) is not based solely on empirical facts. It also depends
on a philosophical argument that rationality logically implies a moral rejection of
violence. Historians and psychologists will scrutinize Pinkers empirical claims. Here I discuss his

crucial philosophical argument, which I think faces some serious problems.

Pinker is talking about reason in a strong sense: the ability to think in abstract logical terms. The
question he poses is, Do we have any reason to expect that rationality should orient a reasoner
to wanting less violence? Yes, he says, provided I (the reasoner) meet two further conditions: (1)
I am concerned about my own individual welfare and (2) I live in a community with others who

can affect my welfare, and with whom I can engage in rational discussion.

Given these conditions which obviously apply to us humans the case against harming

others goes like this. In virtue of (1), I will want to avoid having others harm me. In virtue of (2),
I will, therefore, try to convince others that they shouldnt harm me. But, Pinker asks, what reason
can a human give other humans for not harming him that is not also a reason for his not harming
them? As soon as he says, Its bad for you to hurt me, hes committed to Its bad for me to
hurt you, since logic cannot tell the difference between me and you. . . . So as soon as you try

to persuade someone to avoid harming you by appealing to reasons why he shouldnt, youre
sucked into a commitment to the avoidance of harm as a general goal.

Pinkers argument recalls many similar efforts by modern philosophers since Immanuel Kant to
develop a rigorous case for morality. (Pinker mentions Peter Singer and Thomas Nagel as

influences on his formulation.) Its not clear, however, that the argument is sufficient to establish
morality. Suppose, for example, King Henry claims that, because of his superior social status, he
has a right to harm Peasant Peter, but that Peter, because of his inferior status, does not have a
right to harm Henry. Henrys claim is logically consistent as long as he agrees that, were their

positions reversed, Peter would have a right to harm Henry and Henry would not have a right to

harm Peter. Morality requires that superior social status alone does not give anyone a right to
harm another. Logic requires only that we recognize the right to harm because of superior social

status no matter who has the superior status.

Pinkers argument needs, therefore, a further premise, one that asserts the moral equality of all

human beings (or even perhaps of all rational beings). Logical reasoning alone does not yield

this premise.

All right, you may say, but why cant Pinker just add this premise to his argument? After all, isnt
it obvious that morality requires treating all human beings equally? Not really. If morality
requires treating everyone equally, then its wrong to privilege, say, my spouse, children, friends, or

neighbors over others. But suppose (to use a sort of example dear to philosophers) a house is

on fire and two people are in danger of death. Im fairly near to one, whom I could almost
certainly save; the other is farther off, so that a rescue is possible but not highly likely. Morality
no doubt would say, make the certain rescue. But suppose the person further off is my
wife. The principle of treating everyone equally would imply that this should make no

difference. But this is a difficult conclusion to accept. Shouldnt I try to save my wife even if the

likely result is that both she and the stranger will die?

A similar problem arises from a famous line of thought developed and endorsed by Peter Singer
(who, as we noted, influenced Pinkers ethical ideas). We all agree that it would be morally wrong
not to pull a drowning child from a nearby lake, even if that meant ruining a suit of clothes worth,
say, $500. But suppose we know that a donation of $500 to Oxfam is virtually certain to save a
child in Africa from starving to death. If theres no moral difference between the child starving in
Africa and the child drowning nearby, then donating to Oxfam (or similar groups) is not an
optional act of charity but a moral obligation. In particular, if a couple spend $500 on an

anniversary dinner instead of giving it to save starving children, they have acted immorally.

Both of these conclusionsthat its wrong to try to save my wife and wrong for a well-off couple

to spend $500 on an anniversary dinnerare counter-intuitive. But they seem to follow from
Pinkers assumption that you cant favor members of your own group [family, neighborhood,

country, etc.] over members of another group. At a minimum, then, this key assumption of
Pinkers argument from reason to morality requires a lot more support than he gives it. If, as I
suspect, this support cant be provided, then we may have to accept that morality has its roots

more in feeling than in reason.