QUIZZES 80% (5% of grade), 60% (5% of grade) = 70%,

Progress as of April 18, 2013

LECTURE 11: Immanuel Kant: What is freedom?

Kants Case for Rights
Immanuel Kant (17241804) offers an alternative account of duties and rights, one of the most
powerful and influential accounts any philosopher has produced. It does not depend on the idea that
we own ourselves, or on the claim that our lives and liberties are a gift from God. Instead, it depends
on the idea that we are rational beings, worthy of dignity and respect.

Five years after Jeremy Benthams Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780), Kants Groundwork
launched a devastating critique of utilitarianism. It argues that morality is not about maximizing
happiness or any other end. Instead, it is about respecting persons as ends in themselves.

Kants Groundwork appeared shortly after the American Revolution (1776) and just before the French
Revolution (1789). In line with the spirit and moral thrust of those revolutions, it offers a powerful
basis for what the eighteenth-century revolutionaries called the rights of man, and what we in the
early twenty-first century call universal human rights.

What is the supreme principle of morality? And in the course of answering that question, it
addresses another hugely important one: What is freedom?

I distinguished three approaches to justice

1. One approach, that of the Utilitarians, says that the way to define justice and to determine the
right thing to do is to ask what will maximize welfare, or the collective happiness of society as
a whole.
2. A second approach connects justice to freedom. Libertarians offer an example of this
approach. They say the just distribution of income and wealth is whatever distribution arises
from the free exchange of goods and services in an unfettered market. To regulate the market
is unjust, they maintain, because it violates the individuals freedom of choice.
3. A third approach says that justice means giving people what they morally deserveallocating
goods to reward and promote virtue. As we will see when we turn to Aristotle (in Chapter 8),
the virtue-based approach connects justice to reflection about the good life.

Kant rejects approach one (maximizing welfare) and approach three (promoting virtue). Neither, he
thinks, respects human freedom.

So Kant is a powerful advocate for approach twothe one that connects justice and morality to
freedom. But the idea of freedom he puts forth is demandingmore demanding than the freedom
of choice we exercise when buying and selling goods on the market. What we commonly think of as
market freedom or consumer choice is not true freedom, Kant argues, because it simply involves
satisfying desires we havent chosen in the first place.

Kant rejects utilitarianism. By resting rights on a calculation about what will produce the greatest
happiness, he argues, utilitarianism leaves rights vulnerable. There is also a deeper problem: trying
to derive moral principles from the desires we happen to have is the wrong way to think about
morality. Just because something gives many people plea sure doesnt make it right. The mere fact
that the majority, however big, favors a certain law, however intensely, does not make the law just.
Kant argues that morality cant be based on merely empirical considerations, such as the interests,
wants, desires, and preferences people have at any given time. These factors are variable and
contingent, he points out, so they could hardly serve as the basis for universal moral principles
such as universal human rights. But Kants more fundamental point is that basing moral principles
on preferences and desireseven the desire for happinessmisunderstands what morality is about.
The utilitarians happiness principle contributes nothing whatever toward establishing morality, since
making a man happy is quite different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in
seeking his advantage quite different from making him virtuous.2

Basing morality on interests and preferences destroys its dignity. It doesnt teach us how to
distinguish right from wrong, but only to become better at calculation.3

Kant argues instead that we can arrive at the supreme principle of morality through the exercise
of what he calls pure practical reason. Kant argues that every person is worthy of respect,
not because we own ourselves but because we are rational beings, capable of reason; we are also
autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing freely. He means only that we have the capacity
for reason, and for freedom, and that this capacity is common to human beings as such.
Kant readily concedes that our capacity for reason is not the only capacity we possess. We also have
the capacity to feel plea sure and pain.

Kant recognizes that we are sentient creatures as well as rational ones. By sentient, Kant means
that we respond to our senses, our feelings. So Bentham was rightbut only half right. He was
right to observe that we like plea sure and dislike pain. But he was wrong to insist that they are
our sovereign masters. Kant argues that reason can be sovereign, at least some of the time.
When reason governs our will, we are not driven by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain.
Our capacity for reason is bound up with our capacity for freedom. Taken together, these
capacities make us distinctive, and set us apart from mere animal existence. They make us more than
mere creatures of appetite.

What is freedom? Freedom is the opposite of necessity.

Kant reasons as follows: When we, like animals, seek pleasure or the avoidance of pain, we arent
really acting freely. We are acting as the slaves of our appetites and desires.

Kant doesnt say its wrong to satisfy our preferences. His point is that, when we do so, we are not
acting freely, but acting according to a determination given outside us. After all, I didnt choose my
desire for espresso toffee crunch rather than vanilla. I just have it.

Whenever my behavior is biologically determined or socially conditioned, it is not truly free. To act
freely, according to Kant, is to act autonomously. And to act autonomously is to act according
to a law I give myselfnot according to the dictates of nature or social convention.
Contrasting autonomy with its opposite
One way of understanding what Kant means by acting autonomously is to contrast autonomy with its
opposite. Kant invents a word to capture this contrastheteronomy. When I act heteronomously,
I act according to determinations given outside of me (something I havent chosen for
myself). Here is an illustration: When you drop a billiard ball, it falls to the ground. As it falls, the
billiard ball is not acting freely; its movement is governed by the laws of naturein this case, the law
of gravity.

Here, then, is the link between freedom as autonomy and Kants idea of morality. To act freely
is not to choose the best means to a given end; it is to choose the end itself, for its own
sakea choice that human beings can make and billiard balls (and most animals) cannot.

Heteronomous determinationdoing something for the sake of something else, for the sake of
something else, and so on. When we act heteronomously, we act for the sake of ends given outside
us. We are instruments, not authors, of the purposes we pursue.

Kants notion of autonomy stands in stark contrast to this. When we act autonomously,
according to a law we give ourselves, we do something for its own sake, as an end in itself. We cease
to be instruments of purposes given outside us. This capacity to act autonomously is what gives
human life its special dignity. It marks out the difference between persons and things. For Kant,
respecting human dignity means treating persons as ends in themselves.

Whats Moral? Look for the Motive

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action consists not in the consequences that flow from it,
but in the intention from which the act is done. What matters is the motive, and the motive must
be of a certain kind. What matters is doing the right thing because its right, not for some
ulterior motive.

A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, Kant writes. It is good
in itself, whether or not it prevails. Even if . . . this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out
its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . even then it would still shine like
a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.4

For any action to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral lawit
must also be done for the sake of the moral law.5 And the motive that confers moral worth on
an action is the motive of duty, by which Kant means doing the right thing for the right
reason.

. . . once we glimpse the motive of duty, we can identify the feature of our good deeds that gives
them their moral worthnamely, their principle, not their consequences.

Question: Once youre conscious of morality, you can alter your motive. You
might say, I want to be moral.

Kant speaks of a different kind of incentive to moral action than inclination or self-interest. He
speaks of reverence for the moral law. Here, the person has formed his will to the moral law, and
once he has formed his will, conformed it to the moral law once he has seen the importance of
it, that is his incentive to moral action out of duty.

Question: What stops morality from becoming completely subjective?

Autonomously means that I am acting morally according to a law I give myself. Thats how I
escape the chain of cause and effect and the laws of nature. But whats to guarantee that the
law I give myself is the same as the law you give yourself? How many moral laws can there be?

Kant says: There is only one moral law. The reason that leads us to the law we give
ourselves (autonomously) is a kind of practical reason that we share as human beings. Its not
idiosyncratic. The reason we need to respect the dignity of all human beings is that we are
all rational beings. We all have the same capacity for reason, and its that exercise of reason
that exists, undifferentiated, in all of us that makes us worthy of dignity. Its that same
universal capacity in all of us that delivers a moral law it turns out that to
act autonomously is to act according to a moral law we give ourselves by
exercising our reason (but its the reason we share with all human beings)
as rational beings. It is not the particular reasons we give ourselves (my values, my
interests). Its pure practical reason that legislates a priori, which operates regardless of any
particular contingent or empirical ends.

What kind of law would that kind of reason deliver? What is the content?

SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1 According to Kant, what sets us (human beings) apart from other creatures is
a.
 our capacity to experience pleasure. b) our capacity to experience pain. c)
our capacity for reason. d) a and b. e) none of the above.

QUESTION 2 According to Kant, what it means to act freely is to
a.

b. act heteronomously. b) act according to a law I give myself. c) be able to

do what one wants. d) act according to desires or inclinations that I have not chosen for
myself. e) (a) and (d).
c.
QUESTION 3 According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth?
1. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of its
consequences. b) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the
quality of the motive from which the act is done. c) According to Kant, what gives
an action its moral worth is simply its conformity with the laws of one's country.
d) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is simply its conformity to
the moral law. e) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the
strength of the desire from which it springs.

EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of the motive from
which the act is done and not the quality of its consequences.
b) Correct.
c) Incorrect. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of the motive from
which the act is done.
d) Incorrect. According to Kant, it is not sufficient for an action to conform to the moral law. For an
action to be morally worthy it has to be done for the sake of the moral law.
e) Incorrect. According to Kant, an actions moral worth has nothing to do with the strength of the
desire from which it springs; an action only has moral worth if it is done from the motive of duty.
LECTURE 12: Immanuel Kant: The Supreme Principle of Morality
https://www.edx.org/c4x/HarvardX/ER22x/asset/Chapter_5_-_Immanuel_Kant__124-129_.pdf
Groundwork is about two questions:
1. What is the supreme principle of Morality?
2. How is Freedom possible?

What is the supreme principle of morality?

Kants Three Parallel Contrasts

Morality Motive: duty (rise above inclination) vs. inclination (self-interested motives)
Freedom - Determination of will: autonomously (according to a law I give myself by
reason) vs. heteronomously
Reason Imperatives (an ought): hypothetical (if (means) . . . then (ends) . . .) vs.
categorical (good in itself, w/o reference to any other purpose - independent of nature, and
circumstance)
 Kants 1st Test of the Categorical imperative

Maxim (a principle) = a rule that explains the reason for what you are doing.

Example of the Test to Determine if an Imperative is Categorical

You promise to pay me back next week, knowing you cant do that. Is that false promise
consistent with the categorical imperative? Kant says No.

The test would be to try to universalize it. Universalize the maxim upon which youre about to
act (i.e., giving a false promise). That is, If everybody made false promises when they needed
money, then nobody would believe those promises. There would be no such thing as a promise.
Therefore, the maxim, universalized, would undermine itself. You do this test (universalize the
maxim) to see if you are privileging your particular needs and desires over everyone elses.

Kants 2nd version of the Categorical imperative Test

Kant: We cant base the categorical imperative on any particular interests, purposes, or ends,
because then it would be only relative to the person whose ends they were.
Kant: Rational beings are persons. They dont just have a relative value with us. But if
anything has, they have an absolute value, and intrinsic value: that is, rational beings have
dignity. They are worthy of reverence and respect.

Kants 2nd Formulation of the categorical Imperative Humanity as an End

When I make a false promise to you, Im using you as a means to my ends. And so, Im
failing to respect your dignity. Im manipulating you.

Murder and suicide are at odds with the categorical imperative. If I murder someone, I
have a particular purpose (money, hate, etc.) for the sake of which Im using him. Suicide is
on a par with murder. When we take a life (even our own) we use that person, we use a rational
being, we use humanity as an end. And so, we fail to respect humanity as an end. That reason
lies, undifferentiated, in all of us.

The reason we have to respect the dignity of other people has not to do with anything particular
about them. Respect is unlike love, sympathy, solidarity, or fellow feeling because those have to
do with who those people are in particular. But, respect is for humanity, which is universal, for a
rational capacity, which is universal. And thats why violating iit in my own case (suicide) is just as
objectionable as violating it in any other.

SELF-TEST

QUESTION 1
Which of the following best captures Kants distinction between the motive of duty and the motive
of inclination?

a) What Kant has in mind is the difference between doing the right thing for the right
reason and doing the right thing because one feels like it. b) What Kant has in mind is
the difference between doing the right thing for the right reason and doing the right thing
because one is forced to do so. c) What Kant has in mind is the difference between
doing the right thing for the wrong reason and doing the wrong thing for the right reason.
d) All of the above. e) None of the above.
QUESTION 2
Which of the following capture the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative?

(a) A hypothetical imperative commands with reference to or dependence on another

purpose, while a categorical imperative commands without reference or dependence on
any other purpose. b) A hypothetical imperative has the form: If you want X, then
do y; a categorical imperative has the form: Do y. c) A hypothetical imperative is
an expression of means-end reasoning; a categorical imperative is not an expression of
means-end reasoning. d) None of the above. e) (a), (b), and (c).
QUESTION 3
 Which of the following best captures the Formula of Universal Law formulation of the Categorical
Imperative?

(a) I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will. b) Act only on that
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
c) Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should guide
those who feel like being moral. d) All of the above. e) None of the above.
QUIZ 3 100%

QUESTION 1
Which of the following best captures Kants Formula of Humanity as End?

a) I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should

become a universal law. b) Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your

own person or in any other person, only as an end, never as a means. c) Never make

an exception for yourself. d) Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time

will that it should become a universal law. e) Act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means.

QUESTION 2
I am to make a deceitful promise in circumstances in which my situation is such that I am in real
need of money and I know that I will never be able to pay it back in order to further my own personal
advantage. Kant claims that the universalization of this maxim results in a contradiction. What does
Kant mean?

a) Kant means that a world where everyone makes deceitful promises would be a bad one.
b) Kant means that we cannot imagine a world where everyone makes deceitful promises, because
the practice of promising presupposes trust and no one would trust anyone in a world where everyone

makes deceitful promises. c) Kant means that it is pointless to make a deceitful promise.
d) Kant means that it is impossible to conceive of a world in which all promises are offered with the
intention of being broken, because a promise will only be accepted if all promises are kept. So, if one

promise is broken, none will be accepted. e) Kant means that on pains of irrationality we must
never keep our promises.

QUESTION 3
In Kants time, peasants would sometimes sell their teeth to wealthier individuals who needed them.
Kant objected to this, and he would presumably, for similar reasons, object to selling organs (like
kidneys) in the present day. Which of following most accurately characterizes Kants reasons for
objecting to selling parts of ones body?

a) The pain caused by having a tooth or an organ extracted is severe severe enough to

outweigh the pleasure that the recipient will enjoy. b) Extracting teeth and organs is digusting,

and, therefore, morally wrong. c) Extracting teeth and organs inherently involves a certain
amount of risk. Something could go wrong, and the procedure could result in infection, further illness,

or death. Kant says that we are not allowed to take risks with our lives. d) By selling part of her

body, a person would be treating herself as a mere means, and not as an end in herself. e) An
individuals body is owned by God, and so she is not free to do with it whatever she wishes. God has
ultimate ownership over her body, and so selling a tooth or an organ would require selling something
that one does not actually own.

QUESTION 4
Which of the following most accurately expresses Kants view about the relationship between freedom
and duty?

a. To be truly free, a person must not be constrained in any way. To have a duty is
to be required to act in a particular way, and thus to be subject to a constraint. Thus, freedom

and duty are incompatible. b) To be truly free, a person must not follow any laws at all. To
be free is to be lawless. But acting from duty involves acting from laws. So the moral person is

necessarily unfree. c) To be truly free, a person must not follow any laws. However, it is
impossible to avoid acting from laws altogether. So a person should act from moral laws because
moral laws are good. And because they are good, a person who acts from them is mostly free.

d) To be truly free, a person must not act on laws that are imposed on her by another, but
only on laws that she gives to herself. The moral law is the law that a rational being gives to

herself. Therefore, the person who acts from the moral law is truly free. e) To be truly free,
a person must do only what she wants. A rational person will always have a strong desire to do
moral things. So when she acts on that desire, she will be

QUESTION 5
Kant offers an example of an honest shopkeeper who refuses to cheat his customers. Kant imagines
one motive that the shopkeeper might have: a worry that if he is dishonest, word will get out and he
will lose business. Why does Kant discuss this example?

a) He wants to argue that honesty is the best policy, because if the shopkeeper does what is

right, he is also likely to thrive as a businessperson. b) He wants to demonstrate that an honest

action can sometimes lack moral worth if it is done from the wrong motive. c) He wants to show
us that there are many motives that have moral worth, and that the honest shopkeeper deserves

our praise. d) He wants to show that if everyone acted the way that the shopkeeper does, no
one would be able to conduct business anymore. Therefore, the shopkeepers actions violate the

categorical imperative. e) He wants us to see the inherent moral dilemma faced by those who run
a business.
LECTURE 13: Immanuel Kant: A lesson in Lying

Sex: An ethic of unfettered consent vs. an ethic of respect for the autonomy and dignity of
persons.
Kant concludes that only sex within marriage can avoid degrading humanity. Only when
two persons give each other the whole of themselves, and not merely the use of their sexual
capacities, can sex be other than objectifying. Only when both partners share with each other
their person, body and soul, for good and ill and in every respect, can their sexuality lead to a
union of human beings.

Lies: Suppose a friend was hiding in your house, and a murderer came to the door looking
for him. Wouldnt it be right to lie to the murderer? Kant says no. The duty to tell the truth holds
regardless of the consequences.

Truthfulness in statements that cannot be avoided is the formal duty of man to everyone,
however great the disadvantage that may arise there from for him or for any other. Admittedly,
helping a murderer carry out his evil deed is a pretty heavy disadvantage. But remember,
for Kant, morality is not about consequences; its about principle. You cant control the
consequences of your actionin this case, telling the truthsince consequences are bound up
with contingency.

Kant states, is not that the murderer is entitled to the truth, or that a lie would harm him. Its that
a lieany lievitiates the very source of right . . . To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is,
therefore, a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of reason that admits of no expediency
whatsoever.

Kant says: You cant tell an outright lie My friend is not here. But you can say, An hour ago, I
saw her down the road, at the grocery store.

What, morally speaking, is the difference between a technically true but misleading statement
and an outright lie? Unlike a white lie (on receiving an ugly gift tie, you say, Its so nice.) the
latter statement might give the murderer the false impression that your friend is not in your house.
But it would nonetheless be true.

On Kants moral theory, its the intention, or motive, that matters. A

misleading truth includes two motives, not one. If I simply lie to the murderer, I act out
of one motiveto protect my friend from harm. If I tell the murderer that I recently saw my friend
at the grocery store, I act out of two motivesto protect my friend and at the same time to uphold
the duty to tell the truth. In both cases, I am pursuing an admirable goal, that of protecting my
friend. But only in the second case do I pursue this goal in a way that accords with the motive of
duty.

Kants point is rather that a misleading statement that is nonetheless true does not coerce or
manipulate the listener in the same way as an outright lie.
JUSTICE: The political theory he favors rejects utilitarianism in favor of a theory of justice based
on a social contract.

Political Theory:
1. A just constitution aims at harmonizing each individuals freedom with that of everyone
else.
a. Resting rights on utility would require the society to affirm or endorse one
conception of happiness over others. To base the constitution on one particular
conception of happiness (such as that of the majority) would impose on some the
values of others; it would fail to respect the right of each person to pursue his or her
own ends.
2. It derives justice and rights from a social contractbut a social contract with a puzzling
twist.
a. Although legitimate government must be based on an original contract, we need
by no means assume that this contract . . . actually exists as a fact, for it cannot
possibly be so. Kant maintains that the original contract is not actual but imaginary.
b. Why insist its imaginary?
i. Practical reason - Its often hard to prove historically, in the distant history of
nations, that any social contract ever took place.
ii. Philosophical reason - Moral principles cant be derived from empirical facts
alone.
1. Just as the moral law cant rest on the interests or desires of
individuals, principles of justice cant rest on the interests or desires of
a community. The mere fact that a group of people in the past agreed
to a constitution is not enough to make that constitution just.

What kind of imaginary contract could possibly avoid this problem?

Kant simply calls it an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it
can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced
by the united will of a whole nation, and obligate each citizen as if he had consented. Kant
concludes that this imaginary act of collective consent is the test of the rightfulness of every
public law.

Making Sense of Kants Moral Theory

Answer 3 Questions:
1. How can duty and autonomy (freedom) go together?
a. Kant: Duty is compatible with freedom because acting out of duty is following a
moral law that you author and will on yourself.
2. How many moral laws are there? Whats to guarantee that my law (conscience) will be the
same as yours?
a. Kant: Moral law is not dependent on particular conditions, and it would be a
universal law. The reason that wills the law in me is the same reason that
operates when others choose the moral law.
3. How is a categorical imperative possible?
 a. Kant: We need to make a distinction between two standpoints from which we can
make sense of our experience.
i. Object of experience I inhabit the sensible world, where my actions are
determined by the laws of nature, and by the regularities of cause and effect.
ii. Subject of experience (Due to the notion of freedom), I inhabit an
intelligible world, where I am independent of laws of nature and capable
of autonomy. Here I am free. I am not wholly an empirical being (Utilitarian)
subject to the delivery of my senses, we would be conditioned by our senses
and all choice would be heteronomous choice.
b. Because we inhabit both realms (standpoints), there is always potentially a gap
between what we do and what we ought to do.
i. Morality is not empirical. Moral law stands at certain distance from the world
(science, etc.).

Murderer at the door or Clintons I never had sexual relations with that woman:
Using a misleading truth is not a lie.
Unlike a falsehood unlike a lie a misleading truth pays a certain homage to the dignity of
moral law (duty). The homage it pays to duty is what justifies even the work of evasion.

SELF-TEST Lecture 13
QUESTION 1
What is the relation between duty and autonomy in Kants moral philosophy?

a) The concepts of duty and autonomy have no relation in Kants moral philosophy. b)

Duty limits ones autonomy by disallowing one to act in immoral ways. c) Acting from duty and

acting autonomously are one and the same. d) Acting from duty does not always require acting
autonomously because sometimes we may simply feel inclined to do the right thing in certain cases.

e) (c) and (d).

UESTION 2
What is the difference between the sensible and the intelligible realm?

a) Human beings only inhabit the intelligible realm. b) Human beings only inhabit the

sensible realm. c) Only as a member of the sensible realm can I make sense of myself as

autonomous. d) Only as a member of the intelligible realm can I make sense of myself as

autonomous. e) None of the above answers are correct.

QUESTION 3
On Kantian grounds, is there a moral difference between a lie and a misleading truth?

a) Yes, there is a difference because a misleading truth will often have better consequences than

an outright lie. b) Yes, there is a difference because a misleading truth at least pays homage to
the moral law, whereas a lie does not. c) No, there is no difference because the motive behind

a lie is the same as the motive behind a misleading truth. d) No, there is no difference because

a misleading truth will often have the same consequences as a lie. e) None of the above are
correct.
LECTURE 14: The Morality of Consent
Just laws arise from a certain kind of just contract. But this contract is of an exceptional
nature. A contract that generates justice is an idea of reason.
[This is not a contract created by a meeting of people, who have differing ideas and special
interests and abilities to debate their reasons.]

What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, that never happened. First, what is the
moral force of actual contracts?

Answer to Question 2 How do they justify the terms they produce?

They dont justify the terms that they produce, at least not on their own. Actual contracts
are not self-sufficient moral contracts. It can always be asked, Is it fair? The fact of the
agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement.
Example: Our own constitution agreed to allow slavery to exist.

Answer to Question 1 - How do they bind or obligate? What is the moral

force of actual contracts?
Example Consent-Based Autonomy Contract - I promise to give to you $100, if
you harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters. But I call you back before youve done any work
and say I dont want the lobsters.
Example Benefit-Based Reciprocity Contract I promise to give to you $100, if
you harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters. I eat the lobsters and serve them to my friends and
then dont pay.

To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways:
The Moral Limits of Actual Contracts
Because two people agree to the terms of an agreement does not mean that the
agreement is fair. Therefore, an actual agreement (contract) is not a sufficient condition of
there being an obligation.
An actual agreement (contract) is not even a necessary condition of there being an
obligation. If there is an act of reciprocity (an exchange), even w/o a contract, there can be
an obligation.
David Hume (18th C. Scottish philosopher) As a young man, he argued
against Kants idea of an original social contract calling it a philosophical
fiction (that consent as the basis of obligation). At 62 years of age Hume
experienced renting his home to a friend who sublet it to another, who
decided the house needed repairs and paint. The bill was sent to Hume,
and he refused to pay on the grounds that he had not consented. But he
had to pay.

Examples of the distinction between the consent-based aspect of obligations and the benefit-
based aspect, and how they can run together.

Example 1: On a road trip across country, car breaks down. Up comes a mobile car repair Van.
He offers $50 for an hour or a part of hours work, repaired or not. He lifts hood and starts to
examine, and does nothing more. Car owner says stop, and man says, You owe me $50.
How can we be sure there has been a fair exchange, if consent has not been received?
Example 2: Every year on trip across country, wife is having an affair with another. Wouldnt
husband have two different reasons for moral outrage?
1. Husband and wife had an agreement, and she broke her promise. Her consent at
marriage?
2. Husband had been so faithful for his part, is this what he deserves in return?
Reciprocity?
Each reason has an independent moral force.

But every actual contract may fall short (may fail to realize) the ideals that give
contracts their moral force, in the first place.
The ideal of autonomy may fail because there is a difference in the bargaining power of
the parties.
The ideal of reciprocity may not be realized because there is a difference of knowledge,
and so they may misidentify what counts as having equivalent value.

What kind of contract would it have to be to have guaranteed ideals of

autonomy and reciprocity?
Contract among parties who were equal in power and knowledge, and
identically situated rather than differently situated.
Rawls Idea of Justice The way to think about justice is from the
standpoint of a hypothetical contract behind a veil of ignorance that
creates a condition of equality that rules out, or enables us to forget
for a moment, the differences in power and knowledge that could
(even in principle) lead to unfair results.
 SELF TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Professor Sandel, how do actual contracts bind or obligate us?

a) Actual contracts obligate us in part because they are instruments of mutual benefit. b)
Actual contracts obligate us because the fact that we have agreed to the contract means the terms

of the contract are fair. c) Actual contracts obligate us in part because we voluntarily consent to

them. d) Actual contracts do not obligate us. e) Answers (a) and (c) are both correct.

QUESTION 2
In the example of the Sam the repairman, Sam begins working on Professor Sandel's car without his
consent. After 15 minutes of work (and no luck in fixing the car), Sam informs Professor Sandel that
there is nothing wrong with the ignition system, but he has 45 minutes left in his hour of hired labor.
Professor Sandel objects that he has not yet hired the repairman, and that, therefore, he owes him
nothing. Which of the following responses offers a consent-based line of argument?

a) Had I fixed the car, you surely would have owed me payment. b) Even though I was
unable to fix the car, you owe me payment because now you know that the ignition system is not the

problem c) If you didnt want me to look at your car, you could have told me to stop at any

point during the last 15 minutes! d) Each of the above responses offers a consent-based line of

argument. e) None of the above responses offers a consent-based line of argument.

QUESTION 3
In contrast to Locke, Rawls and Kant argue that the social contract that generates the principles of
justice is not an actual contract. Rather, it is a purely hypothetical contract that would be agreed upon
by parties with no information about their particular place in society. According to Professor Sandel,
why might a hypothetical contract be preferable to an actual contract in determining the principles of
justice?

a. A hypothetical contract better represents the ideals of autonomy and reciprocity that give

contracts their moral force. b) A hypothetical contract relies on tacit consent, which is much

easier to obtain than actual consent. c) A hypothetical contract is more efficient because it does

not require everyone to attend a meeting or sign a document. d) Each of the above responses is

correct. e) None of the above answers are correct.

LECTURE 15: John Rawls The Case for Equality
READING
Behind the veil of ignorance, we dont know where we will wind up in society, but we do know that we
will want to pursue our ends and be treated with respect In order to protect against these dangers, we
would reject utilitarianism and agree to a principle of equal basic liberties for all citizens, including the
right to liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. And we would insist that this principle take priority
over attempts to maximize the general welfare. We would not sacrifice our fundamental rights and
liberties for social and economic benefits.

Behind a veil of ignorance we would recognize that Utilitarianism does not sufficiently
take into consideration the differences between individuals.
Principle 1 We wouldnt trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.

Principle 2 - Social and economic policies would be based on the difference principle. Rawls calls the
difference principle: only those social and economic inequalities are permitted that work to the benefit
of the least advantaged members of society.

Principle 3 - But Rawlss case for the difference principle doesnt rest entirely on the assumption that
people in the original position (behind the veil of ignorance) would be risk averse (i.e., that people
choosing principles to govern their fundamental life prospects wouldnt take chances.) Underlying the
device of the veil of ignorance is a moral argument that can be presented independent of the thought
experiment. Its main idea is that the distribution of income and opportunity should not be based on
factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

Rival Theories of Justice:

Feudal Aristocracies or Caste Systems
These systems are unfair, Rawls observes, because they distribute income, wealth,
opportunity, and power according to the accident of birth.
But the circumstances of your birth are no doing of yours. So its unjust to make your life
prospects depend on this arbitrary fact.
Market Societies
Citizens are assured equal basic liberties, and the distribution of income and wealth is
determined by the free market.
Legally, it allows everyone to strive and to compete. In practice, however, opportunities
may be far from equal (e.g., a supportive family and good education gives you advantages).
The most obvious injustice of this libertarian system is that it permits distributive shares
to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.
A Fair Meritocracy Meritocratic Conception
Goes beyond merely formal equality of opportunity. It removes obstacles to achievement
by providing equal educational opportunities, so that those from poor families can
compete on an equal basis with those from more privileged backgrounds.
Even if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies, Rawls
writes, the meritocratic system still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be
determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents.
If Rawls is right, even a free market operating in a society with equal educational
opportunities does not produce a just distribution of income and wealth. The reason:
Distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural (athletic prowess, for
instance) lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more
reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of
 natural assets than by historical and social fortune.
CONCLUSION: Free Market (Libertarian) and Meritocratic Theories of Justice
Rawls concludes that the meritocratic conception of justice is flawed for the
same reason (though to a lesser degree) as the libertarian conception; both base
distributive shares on factors that are morally arbitrary. Once we are troubled by
the influence of either social contingencies or natural chance on the determination of
the distributive shares, we are bound, on reflection, to be bothered by the influence
of the other. From a moral standpoint the two seem equally arbitrary.

Although the difference principle does not require an equal distribution of income and

wealth, its underlying idea expresses a powerful, even inspiring vision of equality:

The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the

distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of
this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by
nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that
improve the situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are
not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of
training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less
fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more
favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate
these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure of
society can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least
fortunate.

Consider, then, four rival theories of distribution justice:

1. Feudal or caste system: fixed hierarchy based on birth.
2. Libertarian: free market with formal equality of opportunity.
3. Meritocratic: free market with fair equality of opportunity.
4. Egalitarian: Rawlss difference principle.

Rawls argues that each of the first three theories bases distributive shares on
factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of viewwhether accident of birth, or
social and economic advantage, or natural talents and abilities. Only the difference
principle avoids basing the distribution of income and wealth on these contingencies.
Although the argument from moral arbitrariness does not rely on the argument
from the original position, it is similar in this respect: Both maintain that, in thinking
about justice, we should abstract from, or set aside, contingent facts about persons
and their social position.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
Why does Rawls think that the people behind the veil of ignorance would not choose utilitarian
principles to govern their society?

a) The people behind the veil of ignorance are denied knowledge of the doctrine of utilitarianism.

b) The people behind the veil of ignorance know that, whatever their aims, they will each want

to possess certain fundamental rights. c) The people behind the veil of ignorance would reach
the conclusion that certain pleasures are qualitatively better than others, and therefore, reject

utilitarianism. d) (a) and (b). e) None of the above answers are correct

QUESTION 2
What kind of social and economic inequalities does Rawls believe the people in the original position
would agree to permit?

a. The people in the original position would not permit any social and economic inequalities:

they would require strict equality of income and wealth. b) The people in the original position
would permit only those social and economic inequalities that work to the benefit of the least

well-off members of society. c) The people in the original position would permit only those

social and economic inequalities that work to increase the overall well-being of the society. d)
The people in the original position would permit any social and economic inequalities that do not

violate individuals' rights to self-ownership. e) None of the above answers are correct.

QUESTION 3
Which of the following distributive systems does Rawls favor (holding constant equal basic liberties for
all)?

a. A feudal aristocracy in which the division of distributive shares is determined by the family

into which one is born. b) A libertarian system with careers open to talents in which one

is permitted to apply to any job regardless of the family into which one was born. c) A
meritocratic system with fair equality of opportunity in which everyone is given the same

opportunity to develop their talents and rewards are distributed based on natural talent. d)
A system with fair equality of opportunity in which rewards are distributed in a way that works to

the advantage of the least well-off. e) None of the above answers are correct
Lecture 16 Distributive Justice: Who Deserves What?

Objections to difference principle:

1. Incentives - If the talented can benefit from their talents only on terms that help the least
well off, what if they decide to work less, or not to develop their skills in the first place?
a. Rawls: The Difference Principle permits income inequalities for the sake of incentives,
provided the incentives are needed to improve the lot of the least advantaged.
i. Paying CEOs more or cutting taxes to increase GDP is not enough. Incentives
only to generate economic growth for the least.
ii. Income inequalities are just only insofar as they call forth efforts that
ultimately help the disadvantaged.
2. Effort - Rawls rejects the meritocratic theory of justice on the grounds that peoples natural
talents are not their own doing. But what about the hard work people devote to cultivating
their talents? Notwithstanding their talents and gifts, dont they deserve the rewards their
efforts bring?
a. Rawls: Even effort may be the product of a favorable upbringing. Even the
willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is
itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.18 Like other factors
in our success, effort is influenced by contingencies for which we can claim no credit.
It seems clear that the e! ort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural
abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more
likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously . . . [Birth order argument]
b. The claim that people deserve the rewards that come from effort and hard work is
questionable for a further reason: although proponents of meritocracy often invoke
the virtues of effort, they dont really believe that effort alone should be the basis of
income and wealth. Consider two construction workers. One is strong and brawny, and
can build four walls in a day without breaking a sweat. The other is weak and scrawny,
and cant carry more than two bricks at a time. Therefore, it is contribution not effort
that should be and is rewarded. And that takes us back to natural talents.
3. Libertarian - Nosick - Self-ownership. If you tax someone against his/her will, you are
stealing. Its coercion. Then you are using people, if they own their talents.
a. Rawls: Maybe we dont own ourselves in that thorough going way. The only respect in
which the ownership of self must give way is when we ask whether I own myself in the

sense that I have a privilege claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my
talents in a market economy.
 Rejecting Moral Desert
If Rawls argument about the moral arbitrariness of talents is right, it leads to a
surprising conclusion: Distributive justice is not a matter of rewarding moral desert.
Its about moral deserts, on the one hand, and entitlements to legitimate
expectations on the other.

What is the difference between moral deserts and entitlements?

One is a game of chance (like a lottery) - If I win, Im entitled to my winnings,
but there is no sense in which I morally deserve to win in the first place.
Thats an entitlement.
One is a game of skill (Red Sox win World Series) They are entitled to
the trophy according to the rules. But did they deserve to win? Thats an
antecedent standard moral desert.

Rawls: A just scheme answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their
legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are
entitled to is not proportional to or dependent upon their intrinsic worth.

The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure . . . do not mention moral
desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.

What morally is at stake? What are the contingencies, sources of moral

arbitrariness?
1. Effort - (c.f. above)
2. I live in a society that happens to prize my talents. Is it to my credit that
I have the talents that enable me to get ahead? No. It is dependent on the law
of supply and demand, which is not my doing.
a. What counts as contributing depends on what a society wants.
b. Those with less of these prized talents are no less worthy than we.
c. The moral import of the distinction between moral deserts and
entitlements to legitimate expectations - We are entitled to the benefits
that the rules of the game promise for the exercise of our talents; but it
is a mistake and a conceit to suppose, in the first place, that we deserve
a society that values the talents that we happen to have in abundance.
3. What about opportunities and honors? What about the distribution of
access and distribution of seats in an elite colleges and universities?
a. What is the moral status of your claim (to your seat at Harvard)?
 i. Are seats an honor or reward for those who worked so hard to get
them?
ii. Or are those seats entitlements to legitimate expectations that
depend for their justification on those of us who enjoy them doing
so, in a way, that works to the benefit of the least advantaged in
society.
That is the question that Rawls difference principle poses.

SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1

How would Rawls respond to the following incentives objection: if we raise taxes
too high, Michael Jordan will refuse to play basketball, and CEOs will go into less
productive lines of work?

a) Rawls would respond that, as a psychological fact, individual workers do not

respond to incentives, and therefore changing the tax rate will have no effect on
productivity.b) Rawls would respond that, even if it is a psychological fact that
individual workers will be more productive given certain incentives, such incentives
are unjust because no one deserves to have a greater share of goods than anyone
else.c) Rawlss difference principle takes into account the effect of incentives: if
raising the marginal tax rate on the wealthy would discourage talented individuals
from pursuing productive lines of work that are necessary to increase the overall
economic production of a society, then Rawls would object to raising taxes.d)
Rawlss difference principle takes into account the effect of incentives:
if raising the marginal tax rate on the wealthy would discourage talented
individuals from pursuing productive lines of work that are necessary for
the benefit of the least well-off, then Rawls would object to raising taxes. e)
None of the above answers are correct.

QUESTION 2
How would Rawls respond to the following meritocratic objection: people who work
hard and exert effort deserve to receive greater benefit?

a) Rawls would argue that his two principles of justice are aimed at rewarding
effort, and therefore, the objection does not undermine his theory.b) Rawls would
argue that even the willingness to strive conscientiously depends on family
circumstances and contingencies for which one can claim no credit. c) Rawls would
argue that effort is not an appropriate moral basis of distributive shares.d) Both
(b) and (c) are correct. e) None of the above answers accurately describe how
Rawls would respond to the meritocratic objection.

QUESTION 3

How would Rawls respond to the following libertarian objection: the difference
principle, by treating our natural talents as common assets, violates the right to self-
ownership?

a) Rawls would argue that we do not own ourselves in the way that the
libertarians think we do. b) Rawls would argue that the difference principle
would not require redistribution through taxation, and therefore does not oppose the
idea of that we own ourselves.c) Rawls would argue that the idea of individual
rights is nonsense.d) Rawls would argue that individual rights are only justified
insofar as they increase the overall well-being of society, and that the right to self-
ownership may, in certain instances, lower the overall well-being of society.e)
None of the above answers are correct.

QUIZ 4
QUESTION 1
What is the original position?
a) A time in the past when people lived behind a veil of ignorance that covered up their
knowledge about who in particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents).b) A utopian
society in which people live behind a veil of ignorance that covers up their knowledge about who in
particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents).c) A hypothetical scenario in
which people who are temporarily placed behind a veil of ignorance that covers up their knowledge
about who in particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents) choose the principles of
justice for their society. d) A utopian society in which everyone acts in accordance with Rawls
principles of justice.e) A time past when people acted in accordance with Rawls principles of
justice.
You have used 1 of 1 submissions

QUESTION 2
What is the main function of the veil of ignorance?
a) To ensure that people are not biased by knowledge about particular facts about themselves
(e.g. how strong or intelligent they are) when thinking about matters of justice. b) To ensure
peoples anonymity when choosing principles of justice.c) To ensure that people are just as
biased when they choose principles of justice as they are in real life.d) To ensure that people are
keenly aware of differences in bargaining power when choosing principles of justice.e) To
ensure that, when choosing principles of justice, individuals are keenly aware of their distinguishing
features.
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QUESTION 3
Why, according to Rawls, is a hypothetical contract between people of equal standing who are placed
behind a veil of ignorance morally more significant than an actual contract?
a) Because it is not tainted by asymmetries in bargaining power (e.g. differences in people's
wealth or intelligence or strength). b) Because it is more thoughtful.c) Because people often
do not know what they want.d) Because an actual contract is not tainted by asymmetries in
bargaining power (e.g. differences in people's wealth or intelligence or strength).e) Because tacit
consent is more informative than a hypothetical contract.
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QUESTION 4
Individuals who use their talents to earn an income on the free market sometimes claim that they
ought to be allowed to keep all of that income because they morally deserve it. How would Rawls
respond to this?
a) While you might think that your talents are your own, this is merely an illusion. A persons
talents are the property of the entire society, and so the wealth created through the use of a persons
talents is also collective property that we need to distribute fairly.b) The fact that you were born
with the talents you have is a morally arbitrary fact. You do not morally deserve your talents, and so
the claim that you deserve the wealth that your talents attract is dubious.c) The fact that you were
born into a society in which your particular talents are in high demand or in low supply is a morally
arbitrary fact. The fact that your particular talents are in high demand or in low supply is what allows
you to use those talents to become wealthy. So the claim that you deserve the wealth that your
talents attract is dubious.d) (a) and (b).e) (b) and (c).
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QUESTION 5
Rawls thinks that people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do when:
a) They acquired those objects by mixing their labor with them, and they acquired other wealth
by engaging in free exchange with others.b) They acquired those objects and wealth through a
system that rewards them for the moral excellence they exhibit when they work hard and show
initiative.c) The objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice
that protect individual liberties and fair equality of opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of
the least well-off members of society. d) a and c. e) b and c.

EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to Rawls, people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do
when the objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice that
protect individual liberties and fair equality of opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of the
least well-off members of society.
b) Incorrect. According to Rawls, people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do
when the objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice that
protect individual liberties and fair equality opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of the
least well-off members of society.
c) Correct.
d) Incorrect. Only (c) is correct.
e) Incorrect. Only (c) is correct.

Lecture 17 - Arguing Affirmative Action

Arguments for Affirmative Action
1. Corrective - For differences in educational background
a. That argument is consistent in principle that only academic promise
scholarly practice should count in admissions, and we just need to go
beyond test scores and grades alone to get a true estimate of academic
promise and scholarly practice.
2. Compensatory - As a way of compensating for past wrongs, and historic
injustices
a. Objections
 i. Is it fair for s potential student today to pay the price for an
injustice of the past in which she had no part.
ii. Is there such a thing as collective responsibility that reaches over
time.
3. Diversity -
a. Educational experience of everyone - Different from compensatory,
because it makes an appeal to the social mission of the university
b. A common good is served for society as a whole, if there is an ethnically
and racially diverse student body.
i. Harvards argument in 1970s Supreme Court Case: Diversity has
always been a part of the Harvard entrance criteria. 15 years ago
it meant: from all states and and with all talents, etc. The only
difference now, is that we are adding Racial and Ethnic criteria to
our long list of diversity considerations.
c. Objections
i. Is there an individual right that is being violated? Shouldnt we
be considered for our accomplishments, our effort? Isnt that the
right that is being violated?
ii. Rawls: (No Moral Desert) No one has the right to say that a school
should design its admission goals to include your capacities (scores
or effort or minority status).

Is moral desert is/is not the basis for distributive justice?