March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Posted on April 24, 2011 by Ramon G. Songco Posted in Legal Ethics
Here are selected March 2011 rulings of the Philippine Supreme Court on legal and judicial ethics:

Administrative Cases Initiated by Supreme Court; procedure. Respondent law professors asked for alternative
reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for
hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the
plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and
evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. It should be
clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such
an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed. As
respondent professors are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Proceedings; burden of proof. A complaint charging Judge Kapili with Conduct Unbecoming
of a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
was dismissed because of the failure of the complainant to meet the burden of proof required in administrative
proceedings. Administrative charges against judges have been viewed by this Court with utmost care, as the
respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this character are in
their nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases.
The charges in such case must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Jocelyn Datoon v. Judge
Bethany G. Kapili, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2247, March 2, 2011.
Attorney; breach of fiduciary duties. Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining money from his clients under the
respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the
memorandum for them erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the
particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount in his personal account without the consent of the
clients and to fail to file the memorandum and not return the money upon demand, constituted a serious breach
of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing
that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have
misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust
reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he
should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients. Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence
reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and
Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation
of general morality and of professional ethics that impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Erlinda R. Tarog v. Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253, March 15, 2011.
Clerk of Court; gross inefficiency. Atty. Lometillo utterly failed to perform her duties with the degree of
diligence and competence expected of a clerk of court. The performance of ones duties in a perfunctory
manner is never justified especially when reliance on employees of lower rank projects nothing else but gross
inefficiency and incompetence. Next to the judge, the clerk of court is the chief administrative officer charged
with preserving the integrity of court proceedings. A number of non-judicial concerns connected with trial and
adjudication of cases is handled by the clerk of court, demanding a dynamic performance of duties, with the
prompt and proper administration of justice as the constant objective. The nature of the work and of the office
mandates that the clerk of court be an individual of competence, honesty and integrity. The Clerks of Court
perform a very delicate function as custodian of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and
premises. They wear many hats those of treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager of the
court, hence, they are entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing
regulations regarding fiduciary funds and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of
such funds and property. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of
Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P.
Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-09-
2637. March 29, 2011.
Clerk of Court; gross neglect of duty. Atty. Lometillos 42-year stint in office provides the Court a reasonable
expectation that she was aware of the consequences that delay in the remittances of collections constitutes
neglect of duty. Surely, her long service to the judiciary must have made her realize the effect of delayed
deposit of collections: that the court is deprived of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited
in a bank. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII,
Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk
III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,A.M. No. P-09-2637. March
29, 2011.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Bengson should be liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for facilitation of the
land transfer papers at the BIR and representing that her half-sister and niece had the power, influence and
capacity to facilitate the titling of subject property. Bengsons act begrimed both the image and integrity of her
office. At this point, the Court would like to once again underscore that the conduct of every court personnel
must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the judiciary. They must
totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their
official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office.
Every court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise.
They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in
dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond any
suspicion. Priscilla L. Hernando v. Juliana Y. Bengson, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 104, Quezon
City, A.M. No. P-09-2686. March 28, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Sheriffs unilateral and repeated demands for sums of money
from a party-litigant, purportedly to defray the expenses of execution, without obtaining the approval of the
trial court for such purported expense and without rendering to that court an accounting thereof, in effect,
constituted dishonesty and extortion. That conduct, therefore, fell far too short of the required standards of
public service. Such conduct is threatening to the very existence of the system of the administration of
justice. For grave misconduct, dishonesty and neglect of duty, Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Butuan City, was suspended from office without pay for six months. In Sanga v. Alcantara,
the Court had another occasion to remind sheriffs on the performance of their duty: Under Section 9, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses and
fees needed to implement the court process. A sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the
following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the
courts approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received
from the judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute writs or processes to estimate the expenses
to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount
with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff,
subject to his liquidation, within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he
forms an integral part of the administration of justice, since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and
execute all processes of the court. As such, he is required to live up to the strict standards of honesty and
integrity in public service. His conduct must at all times be characterized by honesty and openness and must
constantly be above suspicion. Dy Teban Trading Co., Inc. v. Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 33
Butuan City, A.M. No. P-11-2914, March 16, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Tagubas act of collecting or receiving money from a litigant
constitutes grave misconduct in office. Grave misconduct is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved
in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel,
irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these
court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are
expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to
maintain the peoples confidence in the Judiciary. This expectation is enforced, among others, by Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which mandates that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or
accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions. Section 2(e), Canon III, on the other hand, mandates that [c]ourt personnel
shall not x x x [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under
circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the
court personnel in performing official duties. The acts addressed are strictly prohibited to avoid the
perception that court personnel can be influenced to act for or against a party or person in exchange for
favors. Milagros Villaceran and Omar T. Miranda v. Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Eugenio
Taguba, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Santiago City, Isabela, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727, March 22,
2011.
Court Personnel; immoral conduct. The sole issue in this case is whether respondents Halasan and Largo, who
admitted to having an illicit relationship with each other, are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. The
Court once again reminds its employees that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice. In this case, we
found respondents Halasan and Largo guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for which they may be held
administratively liable. Presiding Judge Jeoffre W. Acebido, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de
Oro City v. Ludycissa A. Halasan, Court Stenographer III, and Joel A. Largo, Utility Worker I, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-10-2803. March 30, 2011.
Court Personnel; immorality. This is an administrative complaint for immorality filed against respondent Gibas
and respondent Lintao who were accused of having an illicit relationship. Court employees should maintain
moral righteousness and uprightness in their professional and private conduct to preserve the integrity and
dignity of the courts of justice. Court personnel should avoid any act of impropriety which tarnishes the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary, thus: Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity
not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the courts good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest
of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of
justice. Emmanuel M. Gibas, Jr. v. Ma. Jesusa E. Gibas, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court,
Guiguinto, Bulacan, and Franconello S. Lintao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos City,
Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2651, March 23, 2011.
Court Personnel; misconduct. Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid certificate of sheriffs
sale in behalf of her friend without regard to the impropriety of her acts considering that she is a court
employee. As a public servant, she should have known that she is enjoined to uphold public interest over and
above personal interest at all times. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not
only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other people so as
to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. The image of the court, as
being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women
who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowliest of its personnel. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M.
Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677,
March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; professionalism. An administrative complaint was filed against a court employee for using
her position to assist a friend in stopping the implementation of a courts judgment. In addition, the court
employee was absent from work to attend to this and did not even file a leave. Time and again, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment of official time to public service. The
conduct and behavior of court personnel should be characterized by a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility, as they mirror the image of the court. Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official
time to inspire public respect for the justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G.
Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; punctuality. Administrative employees of the Court are being sanctioned herein for their
habitual tardiness. It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This canon includes
the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment of such hours
for the public service, because only thereby may the public servants recompense the Government and the
people for shouldering the costs of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees must
at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire the publics respect for the justice system. Absenteeism
and tardiness are, therefore, impermissible. Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second
Semester of 2009, A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011.
Court Personnel; reassignment by executive judge. Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of
their job description. While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work outside the
scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present
functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within
the same area of administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service
requires, after consultation with the presiding judges of the branches concerned. The reassignment of court
personnel in multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the executive judges
administrative supervision must involve (1) work within the scope of the court personnels job description or
(2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court personnels present functions. Executive
Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC,
Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. This is an administrative complaint of first impression involving the
designation of court personnel, specifically a legal researcher as court interpreter, by an executive
judge. While the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that court personnel may perform other duties the
presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly related to, and must not
significantly vary from, the court personnels job description. However, in case of a sudden vacancy in a court
position, the judge may temporarily designate a court personnel with the competence and skills for the position
even if the duties for such position are different from the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The
temporary designation shall last only for such period as is necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel
with the appropriate prescribed duties. Such temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite period, or
until the vacancy is filled up. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M.
Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. Requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court
Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent jeopardize her
present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another, her qualification as Court
Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but compromise court personnels
professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the performance of their respective roles in the
dispensation of justice. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M.
Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. An administrative complaint for gross
ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position paper due to her
mistaken belief that the same was filed out of time. Upon a showing of the judges good faith and efforts to
rectify her mistake, the complaint was dismissed. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy
for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge
are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or
extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there
would be no occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make her position doubly unbearable. Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v.
Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-08-
1718, March 9, 2011.
Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. As to the allegation of grave misconduct
against Judge Pao in holding a hearing notwithstanding the fact that defendants counsel already rested his
case, the same has no leg to stand on. Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that the acts of a judge,
pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. If the complainant felt aggrieved, his recourse is through judicial
remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. Indeed,
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative
liability may be made only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with
finality. Ferdinand C. Bacolot v. Hon. Francisco D. Pao, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro,
Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2241, March 9, 2011.
Judges; conduct unbecoming of a judge. In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed against him,
respondent judge used derogatory and irreverent language in relation to the complainant. Verily, we hold that
Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a
lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness. Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9,
2011.
Judges; gross ignorance of law. An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed against
Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position paper due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed out
of time. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation
of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but,
most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. The complaint is dismissed. Atty. Rafael T. Matinez and Spouses Dan
and Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718, March 9, 2011.
Judges; gross misconduct. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge,
he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative
without giving up his judicial post, he violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer
or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign. The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signatures on the certificate of
candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy, thus negating his claim
that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the
candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. For his continued performance of his
judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post, Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office.
While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his
political goals while still on the bench. We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. In light of the
gravity of Judge Limbonas infractions, we find OCAs recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate.
Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal. Ashary M. Alauya,
Clerk of Court, Sharia District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M. Limbona, Sharia Circuit Court,
Lanao del Sur, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011.
Judges; impropriety. Respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors to
a meeting inside his chamber and using derogatory and irreverent language in relation to a
complainant. Accordingly, he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be
models of propriety at all times. Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly
enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of
impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by
the larger community as such. Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical
conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge
Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. It took respondent judge six (6) years to resolve, on
technicality, a case governed by the rule on summary procedure. When confronted with administrative charges
of delay, the Court shall be guided by the period allowed by law. Reglementary periods fixed by law and the
various issuances of the Court are designed not only to protect the rights of all the parties to due process but
also to achieve efficiency and order in the conduct of official business. The Court has time and again
admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as dispenser of justice, since undue
delays erode the peoples faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the
wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, but invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of
the judge. The raison dtre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so
seasonably. Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B. Capellan, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 1, Malolos City,
Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782, March 23, 2011.
Law Professors; academic freedom; limitation. A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has
not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also
law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts. Applying by
analogy the Courts past treatment of the free speech defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom
cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the
constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and
the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. It is not contested that
respondent professors are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are
free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is
nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the
manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this
Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity:
A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism
and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; engaged in practice of law. It would do well for the Court to remind respondent law
professors that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who
do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity:
A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism
and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; freedom of expression and speech; limitation. Respondent law professors claim that the
Court, upon its issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with their constitutionally mandated
right to free speech and expression. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the right to criticize the
courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of
the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers
whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the
limits of fair comment and common decency. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of
the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Re: Letter
of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; respect for courts. For the disposition of the Court are the submissions of 37 respondent law
professors in response to the Resolution directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for issuing a statement which alleged acts of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by
certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded
from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from
this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.