Varieties of transcendental

metaphysics
A Comparison of Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth





























Rikard Dahl



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 3

2. Preliminaries on limitations, material and emphasis 4

3. The legacy of Transcendental Thomism 5

3.1. An outline of Joseph Marchals philosophy 6

3.2. Marchal and the transcendental method 7

4. Lonergans metaphysics 7

5. Coreths metaphysics 9

6. Comparison: Prima facie similarities; underlying differences 9

6.1. The architecture of metaphysics: cognitional or ontological primacy? 11

6.2. Metaphysics and the critique of knowledge: mediated-immediate realism vs. critical

realism 14

7. Further discussion 16

8. Concluding summary 18

Bibliography 19
1. Introduction
At the core of this thesis is the famous review by Bernard Lonergan of Emerich Coreths
Metaphysik, published in 19631 as Metaphysics as horizon. This represents the meeting of
the mature thought of two extraordinarily innovative minds, working in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition, but in deep dialogue with modern philosophy. Both of these thinkers
have been called transcendental Thomists, owing to the fact of the influence of Joseph
Marchal on their thought. Both are known for their systematic proposals on the topic of
metaphysics, and have thus contributed to the renewal of metaphysical thought during the
twentieth century.

The major purpose of this thesis then, is to compare Lonergan and Coreths metaphysics
through the examination of Lonergans Insight2, his Metaphysics as horizon and Coreths
Metaphysik3, to show how Lonergan and Coreths metaphysics, despite being seen as
similarnot least in terms of their appropriation of Marchals legacynonetheless contain a
number of fundamental differences. This comparisonundertaken in section 6will be
framed as proceeding from prima facie similarities, to the uncovering of significant
underlying differences. Another overall objective will be to show the interdependence of the
two philosophies, highlighting the importance of comprehensive analysis when it comes to
assessing the adequacy of their respective philosophical legacies. In line with this last point,
the present thesis can merely hope to scratch the surface of the large and complex body of
material involved; nonetheless it is hoped that some pertinent points involved in such a
comparison can be highlighted.

Regarding methodology and structure, the thesis approaches the purpose mentioned above
through three procedures, the execution of which can be seen as the thesis subordinate or
methodological aims: firstly, exposition; seeking to present clearly, and render as plausible.
the two philosophical positions; secondly, critical investigation; seeking to uncover whether
the conflicting positions truly conflict; thirdly, and in significant continuity with the last point,
therapeutic analysis4: seeking a rapprochement between the positions where possible. Besides

1. First published in Gregorianum 44 (1963) 307-18; later published in Bernard Lonergan, Collection (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967), and, perhaps surprisingly, even as an appendix to the English translation of
Coreths Metaphysik, viz. Metaphysics, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 197-220.
2. Bernard Lonergan, Insight: a study of human understanding (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1975).
3. Emerich Coreth, Metaphysik: eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1961).
4. Therapeutic is here meant in the sense of solving, or untangling, philosophical problems or pseudoproblems;
the word is used analogously with the way a Wittgenstein or a John Mcdowell would use the word.

3
informing the general argumentation of the thesis, these procedures also reflect, to some
extent, its structure: first, an expos of Joseph Marchal and his legacy, and of both Lonergan
and Coreths metaphysics is provided; then we proceed to a critical comparative assessment;
finally, in the discussion, we pursue a more therapeutic reconciliation.

It is hoped that the comparison of these two monumental thinkers and their no less
monumental systemsthough, admittedly, limited by what can only be seen as an inverse
proportion between the actual scope of the thesis and the massive scope of the philosophical
systemsmay be a help to anyone that is somewhat familiar with their thought, but has, as
the present author, wondered about the similarities and differences between them.

2. Preliminaries on limitations, material and emphasis

Preliminarily there is needed a comment on a question of omission, namely that of Coreths
reply to Lonergans review titled Immediacy and the mediation of being: an attempt to
answer Bernard Lonergan, originally given as a position paper at the First International
Lonergan Congress in 19705. We have not included Coreths replies here because of the
limited amount of space; still, the paper has been surveyed by the present author and it has
been utilized for the concretization of the positions in question; it has thus, in its own way,
contributed to the final form of the thesis.

Further, and in regards to the comparison of the two thinkers in question, the author admits a
certain bias of emphasis and of detail, towards Lonergans thought. This minor assymetry is
deliberate on the part of the author; whose personal objective it is to achieve clearer account
of Lonergans metaphysics through contrasting it with a reference point that is similar, yet
different; nonetheless, we trust that the reader will find that Coreths thought is accounted for
with appropriate clarity and detail.

Besides the concern of this thesis with Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth, there is the
concern with the subject of metaphysics; a topic whose magnitude and breadth naturally
invites some the drawing up of some clear boundaries. If metaphysics is thought of like a vast
metropolitan city, containing both the common infrastructure generally found in cities, a share
of unique monumentswitnessing to various historical eventsbut also different

5. Available in written form in the second volume of papers from the conference, i.e. Philip McShane,
Language, Truth and Meaning (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972).

4
neigbourhoods, where particular, localor parochialcustoms are practiced, what we
propose to examine in the following have partly to do with the infrastructureor,
architectureof metaphysics; partly with that part of the city where inhabitants are engaged
with maintaining the scholastic traditionstill impressing us with the monuments of figures
such as Thomas Aquinasand partly with that somewhat peripheral suburb that hold
transcendental Thomism in high regard.

Now this qualification at once brings up the difficulty of separating metaphysicscommonly

thought of as the universal, and most general philosophical discipline6from the other parts
of a philosophical whole. In this respect, it must be noted that both Lonergan and Coreth
conceive of their respective systems as integrated wholesthough, as we will see, it may be
easier to define the distinct place of metaphysics within Lonergans thought. The difference
between the two may be formulated as follows: while Coreths Metaphysik proceeds at once
to an explication of the subject matter and structure of metaphysicsintegrating within it
questions of knowledge and objectivity, and of the subject as material, temporal and
historicalLonergan begins his Insight with a more extensive, and clearly separated account
of the subject, before developing his metaphysics.
Now, both the extensive nature, and the interdependence of both philosophical systems makes
for a significant challenge when attempting an abbreviated presentation of them, as well as
complicating the issue of performing a satisfactory comparison. As mentioned above then, the
thesis is knowingly somewhat simplistic with respect to philosophical detailsthough not,
hopefullyillegitimately reductionistic. The topics selected, both for presentation and
comparison, are the ones that have been regarded to be the most promising, but there are
certainly several more that could have been chosen. All of this notwithstanding, it is hoped
that the analysis will bring some clarity to the issues involved, as well as providing pointers
for some fruitful lines of thought regarding the many similarities and differences between
Lonergan and Coreth.

3. The legacy of Transcendental Thomism

One common way of characterizing both Lonergan and Coreth, is to frame their thought
within that stream of Catholic philosophizing that flows from Joseph Marchal, viz.

6. This being true at least when it comes to metaphysicians working in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.

5
transcendental Thomism. There are both advantages and disadvantages to using this epithet7;
if the term is used in general way, there is the risk of obscuring the significant philosophical
differences between the particular thinkers associated with it; this seems especially true when
comparing transcendental Thomists with philosophers following other schools of thought.
Nevertheless, in the context of this particular paper, when contrasting the relative positions of
two philosophers that associated with this school, it can be a good starting point.

3.1. An outline of Joseph Marchals philosophy

Historically, then, the common source of the varieties of transcendental Thomism is the
philosophy of Joseph Marchal (1878-1944) as outlined in his Le point de dpart de la
mtaphysique8 (1922-1947). The legacy of Marchal is his synthetic attempt to integrate late-
modern Kantian philosophy with the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics. Marchals objective
was to reclaim the affirmation of being as the starting point of metaphysics9 vis--vis what he
saw as the basic error of Kantian philosophy: the denial of true objectivity and the restriction
of human knowledge to the phenomenal realm. It is this ontological impoverishment that
Marchal seeks to remedy. Thus he defines metaphysics, pace Kant, as the science of the
absolute10. According to one commentator of his work, this does not mean that he restricts
the nature of metaphysics to the super-sensible[]but rather that everything must be viewed
in relation to the ultimate, non-relative order of being11 This arguably classical-Aristotelian
affirmation of being contrasts with the Kantian analysis which denies this affirmation by
denying human access to the thing in itself: Kant deceives himself by accepting only the
pure synthesis of what is empirically given in the activity of the mind12 Instead, Marchal
argues that the human intellect is, at one and the same time, an empirical faculty and a
possibility for the absolute.13 In opposition to what he perceives as the central Kantian
problem, the question of objectivity, Marchal interprets the act of judgement as referring to
being: Only in this way is the essential characteristic of judgment (to be either true or false)

7. Regarding Lonergan's views on transcendental Thomism, we can note that while he acknowledged that he is a
part of the movement that came out of Marchal, he seems to have some reservations against being labeled as
a transcendental Thomist per se. Cf. Lonergan, Collection, 189.
8. Joseph Marchal, Le point de dpart de la mtaphysique: leons sur le dveloppement historique et thorique
du problme de la connaissance (Brussels: Edition universelle, 1944).
9. Otto Muck, Transcendental method (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 27.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, 28.
12. From Jugement scolastique concernant la racine de lagnosticisme kantien (Romiley, 1914) in Mlanges
Joseph Marchal (Brussels, 1950), 274, quoted in Muck, Transcendental method, 40.
13. Muck, Transcendental Method, 40.

6
possible.14 This interpretation, in turn, gives Marchal his starting point for metaphysics;
thus from the judgement of the affirmation of being, an entire metaphysic can unfold.

3.2. Marchal and the transcendental method

Now, lest it be assumed that Marchal is simply doing Scholastic apologetics for Neo-
Kantians, it has to be stressed that Marchal does not simply defend the classical
metaphysical position in Kantian language; because he expressly employs the Kantian method
of transcendental analysis to arrive at his position, Marchal actually introduces something
novel into the tradition that he defends; what he introduces is the transcendental method. As is
well known, what is central to this way of philosophizing is the shift of focus to the universal
and necessary conditions of all possible of knowledge15. More precisely, these conditions are
to be found in the subject and its consciousness. These conditions are reached by various
moves that are essential to the transcendental method; two of which are transcendental
deduction and retorsion16. Simply stated, a transcendental deduction is a logical deduction in
which the premises include the conditions of the possibility of some thing or state of affairs17.
Retorsion is a strategy of validating a philosophical position by showing that anyone that tries
to deny it is involded in a performative self-contradiction or incoherence.

4. Lonergans metaphysics
Because of the relative brevity of the present thesis we will not present a general overview
over Lonergans philosophy, but only touch on some of the particularities of his metaphysical
thought.
What is perhaps most distinctive about Lonergan's metaphysicmost systematically
presented in Insightis its derivation from prior cognitional and epistemic theory, thereby
making explicit the inevitable connection between epistemology and ontology. On the
conviction that metaphysics is not something to be found in a book but in a mind18i.e., in
the mind of a particular, concrete subjectLonergan starts with the terms and structures
revealed in his own analysis of consciousnessroughly corresponding to the first part of
Insights two partsand uses them to form a heuristic anticipation of the terms and structures

14. Ibid, 30.
15. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines transcendental arguments in the following way: As standardly
conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely
that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Ywhere then, given that Y is the case, it logically
follows that X must be the case too. Cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/
16. Sometimes spelled retortion. This strategy was not new to Marchal, indeed, Aristotle can be seen as using a
version of it in his Metaphysics, Gamma, 3,4.
17. This definition is my own but I believe it to be consistent with the general understanding of the term.
18. Lonergan, Insight, 421.

7
of the science of being. The definition of metaphysics that issues from this is formulated as
the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of
proportionate being.19 Now, this phrasing may give the reader the impression of a total
departure from the Aristotelian-Thomistic formulation of metaphysics as the study of being
qua being, but arguably much of the difference is terminological. What is meant by heuristic
structure is that the metaphysic in question is a structural systematization of the anticipated
ontology that corresponds to the epistemology in question. By proportionate being is meant
the being that is known through human experience.

During this process, through several key moments, Lonergan progressively develops his own
definitions of the key terms of metaphysics. The most important of them are: firstly, what
Lonergan calls the notion of being; an anticipation of being inherent in the very nature of the
inquiring subject; what he calls the pure desire to know20. This idea is important because it
allows Lonergan on the one hand, to speak of the human intellect as directed towards being,
and on the other to deny that there is knowledge of being without judgement21. Secondly,
there is Lonergan's definition of being as that which is to be known through the totality of true
judgements22; this makes explicit the link between judgement and being that is crucial for
Lonerganian critical realism. Thirdly, there is the definition of objectivity as a patterned
context of judgements23; further translating epistemological terms into prior cognitional
correlates. Fourthly, and in line with the idea that was touched upon in the end of the last
paragraph: Lonergan builds on the thought of Aquinasregarding the idea of a
proportionality or connaturality between the knower and the known24and defines what he
calls the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and being25; the purpose of which is
againto make explicit the connection between cognitional theory and metaphysics; allowing
for the translationor transpositionof the terms and structures of the former into the latter.

19. Ibid, 416.
20. A nice way of putting this is found in G. Sala, when he writes that being is the correlate of intentionality.
In this formulation the later Lonergans emphasis on intentionality is included, giving us a succinct and
correct expression of the idea. Cf. Giovanni B. Sala, Lonergan and Kant (Toronto: University of Toronto
press, 1994).
21. I.e. if there was immediate knowledge of being, it would be possible to attain knowledge without the
cognitional process that synthesizes experience, understanding and judgement, and that this is impossible is
one of Lonergans main points.
22. Lonergan, Insight, 376.
23. Lonergan, Insight, 399.
24. Dunstan Robidoux has written an interesting paper of the relationship between Aquinas and Lonergan on this
issue. Cf. http://lonergan.org/?p=152
25. Lonergan, Insight, 424.

8
All of this customized philosophical vocabulary can seem, perhaps, somewhat peculiar, but it
is the present authors conviction that the explicit linking of how we know with what can
be known that is achieved through it, gives Lonergans metaphysics a methodical clarity and
rigour that is much needed within the discipline; it also has the potential to give more
plausibility to the pursuit of a more traditional metaphysics, in a time whenthe emergence
of analytic metaphysics notwithstanding26this project is met with considerable suspicion.

5. Coreths metaphysics
Lonergans project as a whole then, was characterized by a metaphilosophical search for the
foundations of philosophy; but a similar exigency is fully exhibited in Coreths metaphysical
work as well. The main written contribution in this area was originally published as
Metaphysik: Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung in 1961. This work is, above all,
characterized by the deliberate emphasis on the transcendental method in the outworking of
metaphysics; and by the positing of the act of the question as the starting point of its
unfolding27. This question is said to contain the pure pre-knowledge (Vorgriff) of being as its
condition; thereby Coreth sublates the insight of Marchali.e. the affirmation of being as
the point of departure for metaphysicsbut refining it by making it less open to question
through retorsion28. From the transcendentally secured starting point, Coreth proceeds to
explicitate what is implicit in it, advancing dialectically through the performance (Vollzug)
and the concept (Begriff), with the latter being what is containedor co-knownin the first.

6. Comparison: Prima facie similarities; underlying differences

In this introduction to this section we will examine the significant points of contact that exist
between Lonergan and Coreths thought. These are framed as prima facie similarities that,
when examined, reveal significant differences. Before proceeding, we will give a preliminary
summary of these pointsunder the aspect of the similaritiesso as to set the stage for the
explication of the differences that will ensue in the following two subsections.

Firstly then, there is the emphasis on methodology; both Lonergan and Coreth share the

26. On the relationship between Lonergans metaphysics and the more recent developments within anglophone
philosophy, I refer the reader to the excellent Method in metaphysics. Especially interesting is the affinity
between Lonergans docrine of the isomorpism of knowing and being and the presuppositions of these
analytic metaphysicians.
27. This point is masterfully contrasted with alternative proposed starting points in metaphysics; even Marchals
point of departure is criticized and found lacking. Cf. Coreth, Metaphysics, 31-44, 45-64.
28. I.e. questioning the act of questioning as the proper starting point of metaphysics only reinforces Coreths
proposal.

9
conviction that metaphysics must be scientific, and so both emphasize this aspect29. Indeed, it
could be said that some of the greatest strengths in their respective proposals, lies in their
mutual concern for methodology. Secondly, there is the significant mutual understanding of
what metaphysics is in terms of its general character: both authors attempt, in their own way,
to vindicate the scholastic tradition30; this meansat leastthat metaphysics is considered to
be of prime importance by both of them, and that they see it as a science that is both unifying
and normative for other sciences. Thirdly, there is the question of the outworking and
structure of metaphysics as proceeding from similar starting points: for Coreth this starting
point is the human act of questioning which reveals the absolute horizon of being, and
therefore grounds the development of metaphysics; for Lonergan it is the pure desire to know
which is the source of the anticipatory notion of being as such, and which drives the
inquiringnote the similarity with Coreths emphasis on questioningsubject, through the
structured dynamism of intentonal consciousness, to anticipate the structure of being in
explicit metaphysics. Fourthly, we have the similar use of the term horizon that is such that it
gives a further commonality of architectural structure to their philosophies31. Fifthly, both
authors emphasize as crucial the philosophical account of the human subject. Sixthly, both
Lonergan and Coreth make use of the tools of transcendental method in the outworking of
their thought; specifically this regards the use of transcendental deduction and retorsion.
Sevently and finally, there is some similarity between the dialectical structure of the
outworking of their respective systems, in as much as Lonergan uses a dialectic of position
and counterposition to develop his philosophy; and Coreth uses a dialetic of
performance(Vollzug) and concept(Begriff) in his.

In the following two subsections we will examine some of the different themes that arise in a

29. For Lonergan, see chapter 16. Metaphysics as science in Lonergan, Insight,; Coreth agrees A science is
really a science only when it possesses its own method[]If this rule is binding on all science, it is especially
binding on metaphysics" Cf. Coreth, Metaphysics, 31.
30. Lonergan does this under a dictum taken from Pope Leo XIIIs encyclical Aeterni Patris: vetera novis augere
et perficere; to enlarge and perfect the old by means of the new. Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 768. Regarding
Coreths program, see his introduction in Coreth, Metaphysics, 17-31.
31. The reason that Lonergan titles his review of Coreths book Metaphysics as horizon, is, I takie it, to
highlight a recognition of commonality with respect to the latter. Further, when engaging Coreth critically,
Lonergan uses the concepts of the subjective and objective poles of the horizon of the latters metaphysic.
For his part, Coreth, answers with the same terminology. Cf. Lonergan, Collection, 188-203, and McShane,
Language, truth and meaning, 33-48.
For a helpful explication technical and descriptive meanings of horizon in Lonergan see David Tracy, The
achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 9-21. Interestingly, Coreth is also
mentioned in the chapter as taking over this term from Husserl, together with both Lonergan and Rahner. In
the following I will use the term horizon as defined by Lonergan and taken from Tracys book: A horizon
is[]a maximum field of vision from a determinate viewpoint. It possesses both an objective and a
subjective pole, each one of which is conditioned by and conditions the other. Ibid, 14.

10
consideration of similarities and differences between Lonergan and Coreth. Because of the
compact and interwoven nature of their philosopies, there will be some overlapping between
the different themes, and so the whole section should be read as one unit, attempting to tease
out the particularities of their respective positions.

6.1. The architecture of metaphysics: cognitional or ontological

primacy?
One helpful entry-point into this section may be the following question: Is it not true that
both Lonergan and Coreth participate in that turn to the subjective at the beginning of our
modern times32 thereby according primacy to the subject within their philosophical
architecture? This question could be posed critically: for example by those subscribing to a
more traditional andostensiblyobject-oriented metaphysic; indeed, Aristotelian-Thomist
thought has been regarded by some as exactly that, and so has been seen to be at odds with the
accounts of both Lonergan and Coreth33. Now, before attempting to answer this question,
there is the preliminary that the turn to the subject will be interpreted as a question of the
philosophical emphasis34 on subject in opposition to object. A second preliminary is that this
emphasis occurs along the scope of a range of positions: as a helpful exemplary marker of the
most subjective pole on this continuum, we can place Kants position with its exclusion of the
thing-in-itself and thereforearguablytrue objectivity; Kant thus makes knowledge
completely conditioned by the subject; his emphasis on the subject was arguably unparalleled
up to that point it. But not even the most extreme empiricist would deny that there is some
contribution from the subject in the knowledge-making process; therefore, we claim that the
present question is one that should be parsed out in terms of the emphasis that particular
philosophers place on the role and function of the human subject.

Having thus noted that we are dealing with a question of degrees of emphasis, we can turn to
what we have called the prima facie similarities between Lonergan and Coreth. As mentioned
in the third point in the last section, both of these thinkers affirm that the starting point of
metaphysics is to be located in an operation of the subject: for Coreth, it is the performance of

32. A quote by Karl Rahner, referring to the developments in western philosophy after Descartes and Kant. Cf.
Ibid, 20.
33. This is, in effect, John Knasas criticism of both Lonergan and Coreth in John Knasas, Being and some 20th
Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003).
34. The easiest way to explain in this context what is meant by emphasizing the subject is to exemplify it with
reference to those who stand in this tradition. The more technical explanation would be to refer to the degree
to which objectivity is conditioned by the subject as opposed to the object. This is not meant to be a complete
description of what is entailed by the turn to the subject but merely one epistemological aspect that is quite
important when making metaphilosophical assessments and comparisons after Kants copernican revolution.

11
questioning; for Lonergan, it is the structures of intentionality; both of these starting points
are then unfolded into an explicit metaphysic; these accounts represent the subjective poles of
the corresponding metaphysical horizons. Given this commonality, one would perhaps expect
agreement when it comes to the basic structure of their respective horizons, but in actual fact,
this is one of the main points of contention in their exchange, which we must now turn to. We
will quote a particularly salient passage from Lonergans reviewone, where he critically
reflects on Coreths workand see if we can draw out the roots of the disagreement.
Lonergan asserts:
I should not equate metaphysics with the total and basic horizon, the Gesamt- und
Grundwissenschaft. Metaphysics, as about being, equates with the objective pole of that
horizon; but metaphysics, as science, does not equate with the subjective pole. In my
opinion, Fr Coreth's subjective pole is under a measure of abstraction that is quite
legitimate when one is mediating the immediacy of latent metaphysics, but is to be
removed when one is concerned with the total and basic horizon. In the concrete, the
subjective pole is indeed the inquirer, but incarnate, liable to mythic consciousness, in
need of a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from. The incarnate
inquirer develops in a development that is social and historical, that stamps the stages
of scientific and philosophic progress with dates[] The critique, accordingly, has to
issue in a transcendental doctrine of methods with the method of metaphysics just one
among many and so considered from a total viewpoint. For latent in the performance of
the incarnate inquirer not only is there a metaphysics that reveals the objective pole of
the total horizon but also there is the method of performing which, thematized and
made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature.35
(italics mine)

The distinctions made by Lonergan in this passage are very subtle, very intricate, and even
somewhat abstruse. We will therefore try to untangle them to some extent before attempting
to utilize them for the comparison with Coreth. There is then, the question of the distinction
between horizon and science; and between metaphysics as about being and as a science.
Coreth writes that metaphysics is the total and basic science (Gesamt- und
Grundwissenschaft), which should probably be taken to mean that in the outworking of
metaphysics, a full description of what can be known is made explicit. In contrast to this,
Lonergan makes a distinction between metaphysics, as about being and metaphysics, as
science; in horizon-language, he also agrees to correlate the former with the objective pole,

35. Lonergan, Collection, 203-204.

12
but the denies that the latter is to be correlated with the subjective pole. What Lonergan seems
to be protesting against here, is that Corethaccording to himaccounts for the horizon of
the subject, so to speak, within the discipline of metaphysics; but the distinctions he uses to
make this point raises some questions. Firstly, does Lonergan mean that metaphysics as
about being does not include the existence of the subject? This seems highly unlikely; even
though he writes that metaphysics, under this aspect, equates with the objective polethereby
giving the impression that metaphysics does not account for the existence of the subjectit
certainly does not follow that he wishes to exclude from the metaphysics the ground of the
subjective pole, i.e. the subject-existent itself. It seems more likely that he is making a
different point; that he is driving the discussion towards an epistemological-cognitional
analysis of the subjective pole. This is driven home more clearly in the next sentence:
metaphysics, as science, does not equate with the subjective pole. What is meant by this is
probably that the epistemological account of the horizon of the subject is not developed by
giving an ontologicaltherefore metaphysicalaccount of it; for this, another method is
needed; this seems to be the main point Lonergan is making.

To the present author, the conflict seems rooted in the following: both Lonergan and Coreth
unfolds metaphysics from the starting point of the human subject. But Coreth subsumes this
process in itself in metaphysics, while Lonergan begins with cognitional theoryand thus
accounts for the human subject separatelyby a different methodbefore proceeding from
this ground to the unfolding metaphysics. While Coreth says that metaphysicsas a
sciencecan account for the total and basic horizon, Lonergan sees the more basicor
priorhorizon as that which is generated by the epistemological account of the subject and its
corresponding subjective pole.

When considering Lonergans first remarks in the quoted passage then, we would like to
suggest that Lonergan seems to perceive Coreth as equivocating metaphysics with being; i.e.
as failing to distinguish between the extensionor subject matterof metaphysics, viz.
being, and the practice of metaphysics qua science or philosophy. That this interpretation is
reasonable can be illustrated by quoting Joseph Donceel36, whoin the preface to Coreths

36. Coreths editor for the English translation of Metaphysik. This quote was chosen purely for economical
reasons because it illustrates the point I am making nicely; it should be observed though, that the argument
could be supported by a number of passages from Coreths reply as well; such as when the latter writes in
objection to Lonergans emphasis on cognition over ontology: I wish to say: every cognitionwhether it
wants to be or notis cognition of being. McShane, Language, Truth and Meaning, 36.

13
bookcomments on Lonergans criticism:
The reader himself will have to decide whether Fr. Lonergan is right when, at the end of
his review, he prefers not to "equate metaphysics with the total and basic horizon." On
this point the editor of the present English translation sides with Fr. Coreth against Fr.
Lonergan, for it seems to him that "metaphysics, as about being", equates with
absolutely every being, including the "subjective pole."37
(italics mine)

Now, apart from the fact that this objection seems to miss the distinction in questionthat
between metaphysics, as about being and metaphysics, as sciencewe can begin to see
the difference in emphasis between Lonergan and Coreth emerging somewhat clearer. Coreth
(and Donceel) wants to vindicate the universality and the primacy of metaphysics; this
amounts to an emphasis on ontology. Lonergan, for his part, clearly accepts the uniqueness of
metaphysics within philosophyone thinks of his formulation that metaphysics is not the
whole of knowledge, but the whole in knowledge38 but nevertheless, he prefers to make
room for a separate epistemological account of the subject and its operations; thus having
more of an emphasis on the cognitional.

Now, what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, is meant to speak to the title of this
subsection, which asked about Cognitional or ontological primacy?; the reason for this title
should by now have emerged more clearly. The argument we are making is that the difference
between Lonergan and Coreth, when it comes to their relative emphasis on the human subject,
reveals a fundamental disagreement in their understanding of the scope and function of
metaphysics; and one that can be most adequately understood by reflecting on by differing
accounts of the relationship between the cognitional and the ontological. The implications of
this difference will continue to unfold in the following subsections.

6.2. Metaphysics and the critique of knowledge: mediated-immediate

realism vs. critical realism
Lonergan and Coreths difference of emphasis regarding the subject is closely related to
issues that we will examine in this subsection. Going back to Lonergans criticisms, we find
him highlighting the need for a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from.

37. Editors preface in Coreth, Metaphysics, 12.
38. Paraphrased from Lonergan, Insight, 416.

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We also have another part of Lonergans review, not part of the earlier quote, where he states
that
my operation is not altogether in accord with Fr Coreth's exclusion of an
Erkenntniskritik, his aim of presuppositonless metaphysics, his projected
inclusion within metaphysics of an Erkenntnismetaphysik.39
(italics mine.)

Andto clarify the terms used herealso:

Kant wrote an Erkenntniskritik: the conditioned is the objective pole, the condition is
the subjective pole. Fr Coreth is writing a metaphysics: his subjective pole, questioning,
is the conditioned; and his objective pole, being, is the condition. Hence, Fr Coreth's
transcendental inquiry is just the inverse of Kant's.40
(italics mine.)

It is to the meaning of these remarks we must turn to at present. Building on the issues that
were unearthed in the previous section, we may ask whence this fundamental difference in the
conception of metaphysics comes? Returning for a moment to the question posed in the
beginning of the previous section, about the emphasis on the subject, we can recall the
continuum on which Kant was placed at the most subject-oriented pole. This highlights the
connection between the critique of knowledge and the architecture of the relation between
metaphysics and epistemology. The similarity between Kant and Lonergan it that the latter
approaches the philosophical structure of the former by positing experience and
understanding as the conditioned, and the subject as the condition. The relevant difference
or one of them at leastbetween the two is that the Lonergans subject achives unconditioned
objectivity through the act of judgement, while this is denied by Kant. This point further
illuminates the comparison that we are presently concerned with, inasmuch as the inverse
relationship between condition and conditioned that is claimed by Lonergan to obtain
regarding Coreth and Kant, also obtains regarding Coreth and Lonergan. The former is in one
sense an immediate realisteven though insisting that objectivity has to be mediated41
while the latter is a mediateor criticalrealist; for Coreth there is the immediate pre-
knowledge of being that grounds the realist outlook of the subject; for Lonergan there are the

39. Lonergan, Collection, 203.
40. Lonergan, Collection, 203-204.
41. It is important to note that this does not mean that Lonergan would see Coreth as a naive realist; the former
clearly recognizes the importance of the mediation of objectivity to the latters thought.

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immediate givens of the notion of being and the structures of consciousness, but these are
neither knowledge nor objectivity, and thus the distinction becomes clear: Coreth posits being
as the condition, Lonergan posits the intentional subject. This explains the problems Lonergan
has with the exclusion [from metaphysics of] an Erkenntniskritik. The critique of
knowledge that Lonergan has in mind is built into his own cognitional-epistemological
theory, whichas we saw previouslyhas a certain methodical priority with respect to
metaphysics. This would explain his disagreement with Coreths presuppositionless
metaphysics seen in the quote above.
In closing then, the disagreement can be formulated as follows: How are disputes in
metaphysics to resolved? For Lonergan they are to be resolved by going back to the
cognitional and epistemic root of the unfolding of metaphysics. Cognitional theory thus
adjudicates on metaphysical questions. Lonergans worry may be that this procedure is not
methodically available to Coreth.

The argument made in this section serves to further develop the fundamental differences
between Lonergan and Coreth that we outlined in the previous one; together both sections
reveal the interdependence within the two philosophies in question between epistemology and
metaphysics.
We can also see some of the different of outcomes that result from the differences in
metaphysical method; to the question of method we will return in the discussion below, which
will follow after our conclusion.

7. Further discussion
This thesis has sought to explore some of the similarities and differences that obtain between
the metaphysics of Bernard Lonergan and Emerich Coreth. To save space we chose simply to
introduce presumptive similarities between them, before proceeding to discuss some of the
quite fundamental differences at more length. But this scheme should not be taken to try to
explain away the prior similarities. This final discussion will continue to discuss some
similarities and differences, but here we will have more of an emphasis on the former.

Firstlyand maybe surprisinglythere is the fact of the overlapping nature of their basic
conception of metaphysics, notwithstandingor denyingtheir fundamental disagreements.
Indeed, when reviewing both the definitions of metaphysics in the works of both Lonergan
and Coreth, one is struck by the resemblance of some of their formulations. Coreth writes

16
that, metaphysics is the science which investigates the ultimate ground of absolutely
everything[]Metaphysics proposes a final answer to a total problem.42 While Lonergan for
his part holds that [Metaphysics] is the original total question that moves to the total answer
by transforming and putting together all other answers.43 That these statements coexist with
the previously discussed disagreements only serve to emphasize the subtlety of the issues we
have examined.

Secondly, there is thepotentially therapeuticadmittance from both Lonergan and Coreth

of a certain flexibility in the expressions of metaphysics that they are willing to accept. On the
meta-metaphysical (sic!) question of the grounding of metaphysics in transcendental method,
Coreth writes, It is not a crucial issue for me whether the transcendental grounding should
already be called metaphysics or not. Correspondingly, Lonergan actually seems to accept
at least to a certain degreethe priority of metaphysics over cognitional theory as long as this
is sufficiently accounted for within the account. Thus Lonergan editors paraphrase him as
saying start where you please, but complete the circle from cognitional to metaphysical and
back to cognitional, or metaphysical to cognitional and back to metaphysical; further, one
must go round the circle over and over, expanding and deepening one's understanding.44

Thirdly, there is the similarity-in-difference on the topic of philosophical methods. On the

basic level, there is the transcendental method. This isroughlyunderstood by Coreth to
amount to the use of transcendental deduction and retorsion.45 Lonergan would not disagree
completely with this, but it is clear that Lonergan different view on what the most basic
constituents of this method is. For him, the method is the cognitional operations of the subject
itself; it is the very dynamism of the intelligent mind as a transcendental condition; thus,
method is what underpins any and every philosophical or intellectual endeavor. But the
method must be adverted to; it must be made explicit if it is to function as a method. Every
thinking person uses this transcendental method implicitly, but what is needed is an account
of this method that thematizes its acts, structure and dynamism so that it may be appropriated
and put to good use.

42. Coreth, Metaphysics, 17.
43. Lonergan, Insight, 416.
44. From Editors note b to Metaphysics as horizon in Lonergan, Collection, 286. The paraphrase is from
Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and being: an introduction and companion to INSIGHT : the Halifax
lectures (Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 220-221.
45. As witnessed by his deduction of the pre-knowledge of being from the act of questioning, and by his
validation of the same by retorsion.

17
In addition to the core transcendental method there is also the axuiliary method of dialectic,
central to both Lonergan and Coreth, and ostensibly there is some affinity between Coreths
dialectic of Vollzug and Begriff and Lonergans position and counterposition. The former uses
the dialectic methodically in unfolding his metaphysic transcendentally; as a way of making
explicit in concept what is implicit in performance; the latter uses the dialectic positively to
establish which positions are live options for the philosopher, and negatively to establish
which are ruled out by the positive positions.

Fourthly and finally then, it is pertinent to revisit the degree to which many of the
commonalities between Lonergan and Coreth seems to converge genetically in their common
inheritance from Marchal. The integration of the Marchals act of judgement as referring to
being in Lonergan, and the refinement of judgement as a starting point in Coreth; the way
both of them make use of transcendental methodeven though reintepreted in Lonerganin
general, and its corresponding deduction and retorsion in particular; the use of dialectical
method; all of this can be reasonably presumed to trace back to Marchal, thus somewhat
rehabilitating their identification as transcendental Thomists.

8. Concluding summary
The central point of this thesis has been the comparative contrasting of Lonergan and Coreth;
introduced through a rundown of a number of prima facie similarities; through the analysis of
the complex issues that followed in the succeding two subsections. By outlining the structure
of their respective metaphysics in term of the emphasis on subject and object, we found that
the disagreement over the scope of the metaphysical horizon could be explained in terms of a
difference in the positing of either cognition(Lonergan) or ontology(Coreth) as having
primacy. This disagreement were substantiated and developed in the next subsection where
the reasons behind it were suggested to be related to Lonergans stress on the critique of
knowledge(Erkenntniskritik) and Coreths inclusion of the same within metaphysics. The
interconnection of epistemological presuppositions, metaphysical architecture, and the
function and limitation of metaphysics is demonstrated by the account. What is gained from
this analysis, hopefully, is some initial comparative data from which an appraisal can proceed.

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Lonergan, Bernard. Insight: a study of human understanding. London: Darton, Longman and

Todd, 1975

Lonergan, Bernard. Collection. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967

McShane, Philip. Language, Truth and Meaning. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

press,

1972

Muck, Otto. Transcendental method. New York: Herder and Herder, 1968.

Sala, B. Giovanni. Lonergan and Kant. Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1994.

Tracy, David. The achievement of Bernard Lonergan. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

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