Isip v.

People of the Philippines

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Isip was charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City, after he allegedly received from complainant, Atty. Jose, a seven-carat
diamond mens ring valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
return the same if not sold. Petitioner denied receiving the jewelry and failed to return the ring or proceeds of the sale even after repeated demand. On
the other hand, petitioners wife, Marietta Isip, was indicted before the same court for 7 counts of Violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) after she
issued checks in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry she received from Atty. Jose which were subsequently dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. The
complainant alleged that the foregoing transactions happened at his ancestral house in Cavite while he was on leave of absence from the Bureau of
Customs. In defense, petitioner averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because he and his wife had transactions with the complainant at
the latters residence located at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila as both of them were also Manila residents. Despite this, the trial court found them
guilty of the said allegations. Upon appeal to the CA, Marietta Isip died before any decision could have been promulgated thereby extinguishing her
criminal and civil liability. However, the CA still affirmed Manuel Isips conviction for estafa, hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense imputed to petitioner and for which he was convicted.

Held:
Yes. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his home in Cavite. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it
is now petitioners task to prove otherwise. In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction
happened in Manila due to the following reasons:
Even if petitioner lives in Manila and the issued checks were drawn against banks in Manila or Makati, it still does not prove that the transactions did not
happen in Cavite. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods he can sell to earn a living.
It is settled that when the RTCs findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases:
The offense should have been committed; or
Any one of its essential ingredients shouldve taken place within the courts territorial jurisdiction.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside that territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court
over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.

Landbank of the Philippines v. Belista

Facts:
Spouses Ralla donated 8 parcels of lot located in Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, herein private respondent. Consequently, the 8 parcels of lot
were placed by DAR under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Belista then claimed payment of just compensation over said
agricultural lands. DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only at P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank assessed the same at P317,259.31. Believing
that her lots were grossly underestimated, Belista filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against Landbank before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). The RARAD issued a Decision wherein the just compensation for the subject areas was fixed at P2,540,211.58.
Aggrieved, petitioner Landbank filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. Landbank lodged a MFR arguing
that the DARAB Rules of Procedure does not apply to Special Agrarian Courts but the court a quo still denied its MFR. Petitioner Landbank elevated the
case before the CA through a Petition for Review. The CA ruled that under the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution
should be filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not before the RTC and that petitioner's filing of the case
before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioner
filed a MFR, but the same was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657, the RARADs Decision must first be appealed to DARAB before
a party can resort to the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.

Held:
No. Petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Section 56 of RA 6657 provides that DAR is
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for:
Determination of just compensation to landowners;
Prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.
Clearly, further exception to DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners and
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657, which are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.

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Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of
procedure cannot.

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant, vs.JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.
Juridiction to Issue Hold Departure

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349 July 12, 2001

FACTS:
Complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity
and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97
which provides that "hold departure orders" shall be issued ONLY in CRIMINAL CASES within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order. When required to comment
on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that
he was not furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated
October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the
scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.

ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed hold departure order

HELD:
YES, the respondent judge erred. It was not within his jurisdiction to issue a hold departure order as an MtCC judge because the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction of issuing hold departure orders for criminal cases.

NOTES:
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the
said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." The Court, in
exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping
abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which
has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always
be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.

Foz Vs People
(G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009)
Facts:
In an Information filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr., and Danny G. Fajardo, columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
Panay News were charged with the crime of libel. They wrote and publish in the reular issue of the Panay news a certain article maliciously injuring and
exposing one Dr. Edgar Portigo, a company physician of San Miguel Corporation office, SMC, as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched
himself at the expense of the poor.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA which rendered its assailed
Decision affirming in toto the RTC decision. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
Held:
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People:
xxx the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. Xxx
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation:
xxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: xxx
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the
libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.

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Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case.
Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of
competent jurisdiction.
Decision:
Petition Granted.

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People Vs Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009)
Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get
hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made.
As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance
within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate
charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict
respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and
was opposed by The OSP.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines
falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19,
1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the
alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Decision:
Petition Granted.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan, GR 162059, January 22, 2008

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011

(Public Officer, Student Regent)

Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon
City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will
be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the
following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.

The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of administration and exercise the
corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.

Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through
its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.

Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held: Yes.

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First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.

Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

ESQUIVEL v. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:

Police officers Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony
"Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave
threats. According to Eduardo, he was about to eat lunch at his parents house at Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived who disarmed him of his Cal. 45
service pistol. They then forced him to board petitioners vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. On the way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita,
aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo
at report." He was struck with a handgun and released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in
good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor
believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested
members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777 for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy"
Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners submit that
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses filed against petitioners, and thus committed GAD when it assumed jurisdiction.

Issue: WON Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction? YES

Held:

Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the
positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal
mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not
a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of
the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a
salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade
27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778,
involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.

DOJ v. Liwag

Facts: Mary Ong alleges that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Narcotics Group Jan. 8, 2001 - She filed before the OMB a complaint against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B.
Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino including: 1. Kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong
and Wong Kam Chong; 2. Murder of Wong Kam Chong; and 3. Kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming May 7, 2001 - a panel of prosecutors
from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et al May 18, 2001 - Lacson and Aquino sent a letter saying the DOJ should dismiss the complaint because the
OMB has a similar complaint with the same facts May 28, 2001 - DOJ denied dismissal Lacson and Aquino filed in the RTC a motion for prohibition, insisting
the DOJ does not have jurisdiction Judge Liwag issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation DOJ et
al appealed to the SC Issues: W.O.N. the DOJ can concurrently investigate a case wherein the OMB has an existing complaint before it No - the pendency of
the case before the OMB is one of primary jurisdiction to investigate 1987 Admin Code governing the DOJ states: Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the

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declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system; Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers
and functions: Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system; PD 1275 states: Section 1.
Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of
Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws. OMB act (RA 6640) states: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and
Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
anystage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; Art. 11, Sec. 13 of the Constitution vests the OMB with plenary
investigative powers and fiscal autonomy They are granted great leeway in investigating and prosecuting offenses Prosecution under the OMB has
preference over other bodies RA 6770 gives them primary jurisdiction in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes them to take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases The DOJ has general jurisdiction, it cannot diminish the primary jurisdiction of the
OMB This is the first case wherein the first complaint was filed with the OMB before the DOJ The subsequent assumption of the DOJ would not promote
an orderly administration of Justice Defendants would not know where their recourse would be (DOJ or OMB) There is a risk of conflicting resolutions
regarding guilt Two investigations would lead to unnecessary expenditure of government funds Petition dismissed, OMB to have jurisdiction for the
preliminary investigation.

1. PEOPLE v DUCA

FACTS

It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca and several of her relatives. The case was decided
in favor of Calanayan. Decision became final and executory.

Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction block to satisfy judgment and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the
highest bidder in the auction sale.

Cecilia Duca went on fighting. She filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary
Restraining order. When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment
case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. This is the core of the controversy: Cecilia (Mother) and Arturo (Son) Duca feloniously prepared a Declaration of
Real Property over a bungalow type residential house by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of her
other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was false of course, as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only long after the dastardly deed.

Accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon and by doing so caused damage to private complainant Pedro Calanayan. Because of the
isrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen
ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.

Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at
that time. Arturo insisted there was no falsification. The MTC found him guilty. RTC affirmed. Duca filed petition for review at the CA.

The CA ruled that Arturo was empowered by Aldrin to issue that tax declaration, hence no crime had been committed. Aggrieved, the SolGen declared that
the CA should have given the Republic a chance to be heard before ruling such.

ISSUE: w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without discretion by resolving the appeal without giving the SOLGEN a chance to be heard.

HELD: CA abused its discretion.

Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the People of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.

Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity
to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
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 SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)

The CA also failed to follow Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the
clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and
the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
(emphasis supplied)

Respondent Duca appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was
mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the
Philippines through the OSG.

Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The
service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is
the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court.

Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the case to the CA

Ballesteros.Beltran.Callangan.Carbonell.Falgui.Francisco.Ilagan.Ladringan.Maglaya.Martin.Ortinez.StaMaria.Villalva.Zabala
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